G.R. No.
152577 September 21, 2005 a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
CRASUS L. IYOY, Respondent.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General, prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001,1 affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October
1998,2 declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada
Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines.
The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a Complaint3 for
declaration of nullity of marriage by respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997.
According to the said Complaint, respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December
1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their
union, they had five children – Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos –
who are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of their marriage, respondent
Crasus discovered that Fely was "hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant." In 1984,
Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their
five children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the care of respondent
Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a
letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded
the said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters
sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she
eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her American
family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did not bother to
talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to bear the sorrow and the
pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines several times more: in
1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain
operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely
continued to live with her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been
openly using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the
U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which she
was named as "Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus." At the time the Complaint was filed, it had
been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no
more possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged
in his Complaint that Fely’s acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and
clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential
obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes
68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim4 with the RTC on 05 June 1997. She
asserted therein that she was already an American citizen since 1988 and was now
married to Stephen Micklus. While she admitted being previously married to
respondent Crasus and having five children with him, Fely refuted the other
allegations made by respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She explained that she was
no more hot-tempered than any normal person, and she may had been indignant at
respondent Crasus on certain occasions but it was because of the latter’s
drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find employment and to
contribute to the maintenance of their household. She could not have been
extravagant since the family hardly had enough money for basic needs. Indeed, Fely
left for abroad for financial reasons as respondent Crasus had no job and what she
was then earning as the sole breadwinner in the Philippines was insufficient to
support their family. Although she left all of her children with respondent Crasus,
she continued to provide financial support to them, as well as, to respondent
Crasus. Subsequently, Fely was able to bring her children to the U.S.A., except for
one, Calvert, who had to stay behind for medical reasons. While she did file for
divorce from respondent Crasus, she denied having herself sent a letter to
respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce papers. After
securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her American husband and
acquired American citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her American
husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her status shall be
governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely also pointed out that
respondent Crasus himself was presently living with another woman who bore him
a child. She also accused respondent Crasus of misusing the amount of ₱90,000.00
which she advanced to him to finance the brain operation of their son, Calvert. On
the basis of the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her marriage to
respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to
Fely the ₱90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary
damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.
After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-Trial Briefs,5 the RTC
afforded both parties the opportunity to present their evidence. Petitioner Republic
participated in the trial through the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.6
Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in support of his
Complaint: (1) his own testimony on 08 September 1997, in which he essentially
reiterated the allegations in his Complaint;7 (2) the Certification, dated 13 April
1989, by the Health Department of Cebu City, on the recording of the Marriage
Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register of Deeds, such
marriage celebration taking place on 16 December 1961;8 and (3) the invitation to
the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, wherein Fely openly used her American
husband’s surname, Micklus.9
Fely’s counsel filed a Notice,10 and, later on, a Motion,11 to take the deposition of
witnesses, namely, Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr. and Daphne, upon written
interrogatories, before the consular officers of the Philippines in New York and
California, U.S.A, where the said witnesses reside. Despite the Orders12 and
Commissions13 issued by the RTC to the Philippine Consuls of New York and
California, U.S.A., to take the depositions of the witnesses upon written
interrogatories, not a single deposition was ever submitted to the RTC. Taking into
account that it had been over a year since respondent Crasus had presented his
evidence and that Fely failed to exert effort to have the case progress, the RTC
issued an Order, dated 05 October 1998,14 considering Fely to have waived her
right to present her evidence. The case was thus deemed submitted for decision.
Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the
marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio, on the basis of the
following findings –
The ground bearing defendant’s psychological incapacity deserves a reasonable
consideration. As observed, plaintiff’s testimony is decidedly credible. The Court
finds that defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of psychological
incapacity to comply with her marital duties such as striving for family unity,
observing fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and support. From the evidence
presented, plaintiff adequately established that the defendant practically
abandoned him. She obtained a divorce decree in the United States of America and
married another man and has establish [sic] another family of her own. Plaintiff is in
an anomalous situation, wherein he is married to a wife who is already married to
another man in another country.
Defendant’s intolerable traits may not have been apparent or manifest before the
marriage, the FAMILY CODE nonetheless allows the annulment of the marriage
provided that these were eventually manifested after the wedding. It appears to be
the case in this instance.
Certainly defendant’s posture being an irresponsible wife erringly reveals her very
low regard for that sacred and inviolable institution of marriage which is the
foundation of human society throughout the civilized world. It is quite evident that
the defendant is bereft of the mind, will and heart to comply with her marital
obligations, such incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage in
question is shown by defendant’s own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff.
In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendant’s psychological incapacity
to comply with the essential marital obligations which already existed at the time of
the marriage in question has been satisfactorily proven. The evidence in herein case
establishes the irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy, firmly.
Going over plaintiff’s testimony which is decidedly credible, the Court finds that the
defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of such psychological incapacity
to comply with her marital obligations. These are her excessive disposition to
material things over and above the marital stability. That such incapacity was
already there at the time of the marriage in question is shown by defendant’s own
attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff. And for these reasons there is a legal
ground to declare the marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant Fely Ada
Rosal Iyoy null and void ab initio.15
Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC was
contrary to law and evidence, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court, though, in its Decision, dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed
Judgment of the RTC, finding no reversible error therein. It even offered additional
ratiocination for declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely null
and void, to wit –
Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has remarried, and is
now permanently residing in the United States. Plaintiff-appellee categorically
stated this as one of his reasons for seeking the declaration of nullity of their
marriage…
…
Article 26 of the Family Code provides:
"Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4),
(5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
"WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY
CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE
ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE
SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW."
The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted provision is to
avoid the absurd and unjust situation of a Filipino citizen still being married to his or
her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse
because he or she has obtained a divorce abroad. In the case at bench, the
defendant has undoubtedly acquired her American husband’s citizenship and thus
has become an alien as well. This Court cannot see why the benefits of Art. 26
aforequoted can not be extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse eventually
embraces another citizenship and thus becomes herself an alien.
It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances, plaintiff would
still be considered as married to defendant, given her total incapacity to honor her
marital covenants to the former. To condemn plaintiff to remain shackled in a
marriage that in truth and in fact does not exist and to remain married to a spouse
who is incapacitated to discharge essential marital covenants, is verily to condemn
him to a perpetual disadvantage which this Court finds abhorrent and will not
countenance. Justice dictates that plaintiff be given relief by affirming the trial
court’s declaration of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.16
After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March 2002,17 denied its
Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner Republic filed the instant Petition before this
Court, based on the following arguments/grounds –
I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondent’s wife do not per
se constitute psychological incapacity.
II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not in accord with law
and jurisprudence considering that the Court of Appeals committed serious errors
of law in ruling that Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code is inapplicable to the
case at bar.18
In his Comment19 to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained that Fely’s
psychological incapacity was clearly established after a full-blown trial, and that
paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines was indeed
applicable to the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely, because the latter had
already become an American citizen. He further questioned the personality of
petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, to institute
the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines
authorizes the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the trial court, not the
Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf of the State, in proceedings for annulment
and declaration of nullity of marriages.
After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable laws and
jurisprudence, this Court finds the instant Petition to be meritorious.
I marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the finding of
psychological incapacity of Fely.
Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of the Family Code
of the Philippines, reads –
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization.
Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological incapacity. In a
series of cases, this Court laid down guidelines for determining its existence.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,20 the term psychological incapacity was defined, thus
– or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person
". . . [P]sychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must
exist at the time the marriage is celebrated…21
The psychological incapacity must be characterized by –
(a) Gravity – It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating
the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and
(c) Incurability – It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would
be beyond the means of the party involved.22
More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the
Family Code of the Philippines were handed down by this Court in Republic v. Court
of Appeals and Molina,23 which, although quite lengthy, by its significance,
deserves to be reproduced below –
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it
"as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family
and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties,
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need
be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of
the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job…
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71
of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and
225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts…
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless
the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall
submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case
is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.24
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,25 further clarified that there is no requirement that
the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity. Such psychological incapacity, however, must be
established by the totality of the evidence presented during the trial.
Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence, this Court
finds that the totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably
to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is
no basis for declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family
Code of the Philippines.
The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC was
his testimony, which can be easily put into question for being self-serving, in the
absence of any other corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of
evidence: (1) the Certification on the recording with the Register of Deeds of the
Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely, such marriage being
celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus,
Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American husband’s surname. Even
considering the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent
Crasus’s Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is not enough to convince this
Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness that prevented her from assuming
the essential obligations of marriage.
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines
contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume
the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill
will, on the part of the errant spouse.26 Irreconcilable differences, conflicting
personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also
do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article.27
As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article 36 "is not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a
party even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume."28
The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and embarrassed
respondent Crasus and the rest of the family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and
extravagance; her abandonment of respondent Crasus; her marriage to an
American; and even her flaunting of her American family and her American
surname, may indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to comply with
her marital obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was not identified. If
the root cause of the incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily
established as a psychological or mental defect that is serious or grave; neither
could it be proven to be in existence at the time of celebration of the marriage; nor
that it is incurable. While the personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or
psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of their marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, by virtue of this Court’s ruling
in Marcos v. Marcos,29 respondent Crasus must still have complied with the
requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina30 that the root
cause of the incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and that its
incapacitating nature be fully explained.
In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage.31 No less than the Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic social institution and marriage as the foundation
of the family.32
II
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not applicable to the
case at bar.
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines –
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and
a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of
the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time
the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said
provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely
because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen.
Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer
filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime
after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her American
husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American
citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen,
and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties,
status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad.
Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce
between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from
respondent Crasus.
III
The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in
proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.
Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines, respondent Crasus argued
that only the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the RTC may intervene on
behalf of the State in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriages; hence, the Office of the Solicitor General had no personality to file the
instant Petition on behalf of the State. Article 48 provides –
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the
Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on
behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to
take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him or
his Office from intervening in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriages. Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987, appoints the Solicitor General as the principal law officer and legal defender
of the Government.33 His Office is tasked to represent the Government of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. The
Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and,
as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers.34
The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that the
interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or
the fabrication or suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind that the Solicitor
General is the principal law officer and legal defender of the land, then his
intervention in such proceedings could only serve and contribute to the realization
of such intent, rather than thwart it.
Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is authorized to bring
or defend actions on behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines once
the case is brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals.35While it is the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively participates, on behalf of the State, in a
proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, the
Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the case is elevated to the Court of
Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be eventually responsible for taking the case to
the appellate courts when circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable and
practical that even while the proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the Office
of the Solicitor General can already exercise supervision and control over the
conduct of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to better guarantee the
protection of the interests of the State.
In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the Solicitor
General in several cases for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages that
were appealed before it, summarized as follows in the case of Ancheta v.
Ancheta36 –
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198 (1997)], this Court laid
down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the Family
Code, one of which concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless
the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall
submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case
is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095. [Id., at 213]
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285 (2001)] reiterated its
pronouncement in Republic v. Court of Appeals [Supra.] regarding the role of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
State…37
Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,38 which became effective on
15 March 2003, should dispel any other doubts of respondent Crasus as to the
authority of the Solicitor General to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State.
The Rule recognizes the authority of the Solicitor General to intervene and take part
in the proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages before the
RTC and on appeal to higher courts. The pertinent provisions of the said Rule are
reproduced below –
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition. –
… loveless marriage, this is one of those situations where neither law nor society can
(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on
the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor,
within five days from the date of its filing and submit to the court proof of such
service within the same period.
… REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Sec. 18. Memoranda. – The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor,
in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective
memoranda in support of their claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is
terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own
memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State. No other pleadings or
papers may be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the period
herein provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without
the memoranda.
Sec. 19. Decision. –
…
(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be
served with copies of the decision personally or by registered mail. If the
respondent summoned by publication failed to appear in the action, the dispositive
part of the decision shall be published once in a newspaper of general circulation.
(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to the
parties. Entry of judgment shall be made if no motion for reconsideration or new
trial, or appeal is filed by any of the parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor
General.
…
Sec. 20. Appeal. –
…
(2) Notice of Appeal. – An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from
the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial of
the motion for reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the
notice of appeal on the adverse parties.
Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to those of the RTC
and the Court of Appeals, and sustains the validity and existence of the marriage
between respondent Crasus and Fely. At most, Fely’s abandonment, sexual infidelity,
and bigamy, give respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal separation under Article
55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the same Code. While this Court commiserates with
respondent Crasus for being continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless and
provide the specific answer to every individual problem.39
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the
RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, is
The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and
subsisting.
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him
or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite
ruling on this apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision1 dated May 15,
2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and
its Resolution2 dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The
court a quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated
to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the
Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his
American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine
Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.3
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage
was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady
Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer.
A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an
American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a
divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her
child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry
invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed.
Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein
petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration
but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY
CODE4
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable
to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a
marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy,
according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal
separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs
respondent’s situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of
judicial determination.6
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case
but insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which
capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant
to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.7
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the
trial court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection,
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will, contract
or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive
order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before
breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to
determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of
his rights or duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are
adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy;
and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.8
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage
between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a
divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are
also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the
institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of
his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the
controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as
when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of
his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this
provision had come about in the first place, and what was the intent of the
legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No.
209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988.
Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive
Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the
Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now
provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4),
(5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation
presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The
instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were
two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen
and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed
she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the Family Code, the Catholic
Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to
Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are
Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able
to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino
citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be
considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be
deleted and made into law only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent
of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of
the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce,
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn
v. Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the
alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a
foreign citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of
Appeals.11 In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got
married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a
divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a
Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under
Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason,
we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry
as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the
interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be
construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the
letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal
meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.12
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining
a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26. Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to
allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of
foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his wife, who was
foreigner; and naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such
remarry. declaration could only be made properly upon respondent’s submission of the
aforecited evidence in his favor.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was ASIDE.
still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate
would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce
capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced"
Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy of the
Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal
separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular
case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have
all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a
sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally
separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted
by respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent’s
wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and
mere allegation is not evidence.13
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation
that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign
divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must
prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it.14 Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and
proved.15 Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows
his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there
would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into
another marriage.
G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on
certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005,
Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.4 Due to
work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the
wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise
Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another
man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for
divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s
petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month
later, on January 8, 2006.5
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina
to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert
went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce
decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the
divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert
that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be
enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a
competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned,
Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized
letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerbert’s
petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was
prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be
considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC
concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial
recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It
ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,8 in order for him or her to be able to
remarry under Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4),
(5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and
a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the
enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined
by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;10 the provision was enacted to "avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse."11
THE PETITION
From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief,
similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his
rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into
account the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
he contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He
claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the
standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse – an interpretation he claims
to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to
institute the case, as there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if
he marries his Filipina fiancée in the Philippines since two marriage certificates,
involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the
Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments,14 both support
Gerbert’s position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this
jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURT’S RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent
behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void15 and
voidable16 marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of
absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the
marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful
union for cause arising after the marriage.17 Our family laws do not recognize
absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.18
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino
and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers
under the Freedom Constitution,19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227,
amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4),
(5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and
a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively
incorporated into the law this Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil
v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien
spouse’s assertion of marital rights after a foreign court’s divorce decree between
the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had
already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van
Dorn v. Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still
married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be
just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should
not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served.22
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse."23 The
legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her
marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a
substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as
dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of
divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related
issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since
our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond;25 Article
17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be
subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the
second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to
this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between
the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court
finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare
that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No
court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien
spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal
capacity are generally governed by his national law.26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting
the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other
words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party
with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary
statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition
before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to
petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign
divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national
law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section
states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or
final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the
judgment or final order is as follows:
 (a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment
or final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or
final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is
sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before
our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we
have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her
national law.27
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments
and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give
effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another
country."28 This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be
proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
herself.29 The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the
purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral
aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the
alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts
of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play.
This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested
by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records
are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by
the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree,
as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity,30 but failed to include a
copy of the Canadian law on divorce.31 Under this situation, we can, at this point,
simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem
it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the
divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article
26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious
conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other
interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner’s
presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every
precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is
made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res
judicata32 between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court.33
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal
recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the
foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial
recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same
effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the
substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry
Office has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage
certificate based on the mere presentation of the decree.34 We consider the
recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench
and the bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law
requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal
consequences touching upon a person’s legal capacity and status, i.e., those
affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature,
not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate,
or his being married or not."35
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a
person’s legal capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the
Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce
decrees in the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for recording the civil status of
persons, in which shall be entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
 (d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their
offices the following books, in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries
concerning the civil status of persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages
solemnized but also divorces and dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and
naturalization register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the
law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the
decree’s registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a
judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata
effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing
the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out
of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree
on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign
decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court
recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,36 and Department of
Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 198237 – both of which required a final order
from a competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage,
can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of
the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree
without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any
legal effect.1avvphi1
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may
extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation
of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is
not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the
cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements
Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial
proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or
corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and
procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It
also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of
the province where the corresponding civil registry is located;38that the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the
proceedings;39and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a
newspaper of general circulation.40 As these basic jurisdictional requirements have
not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed
with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as
requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree
in the civil registry – one for recognition of the foreign decree and another
specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding
itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.
Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial
proceeding41 by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured
and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the
October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as
well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial
court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this
Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
107, Quezon City, through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court on a pure question of law. The petition assails the Order1 dated 31
January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2
March 2011 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the
petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity
of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner,
Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent
Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The
marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his
wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the
first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008
in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay
allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to
contact Fujiki.3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship.
In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which
declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of
bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki
prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initiounder
Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to
direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court
judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to
endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar
General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order
dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket.7 The
RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –
(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city
where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months
prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he
may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation"
of the above provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding
requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the
petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband or the wife," in
this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage
void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of
marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of
foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right
or a particular fact,"9 and not a civil action which is "for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."10 In other words,
the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of
Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the
Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the
Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the
Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine
courts.12
In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void
marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because only
the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of
course, difficult to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage
declared a nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki
had material interest and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural
implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to Article 413
of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the "successful
petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of
the court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled
marriage was solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil
registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage" and
"judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning" are subject to cancellation
or correction.18 The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate the
judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage between
Marinay and Maekara.
Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court
"gravely erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper
venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue with the
concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to
dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate
Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant’s
prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio
dismissing the case."20Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court should not
have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
because he substantially complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
In its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the
petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage.21 The trial
court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and
improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC
considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the proceeding because he "is not the
husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he
now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not
explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court
cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken
together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v.
The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.25 The Court in Braza
ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no
jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x."26 Braza emphasized that the "validity of
marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a]
petition [for correction of entry] x x x."27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional
ground" to dismiss the petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification
against forum shopping of the petition was not authenticated as required under
Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the "immediate
dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the
Letters of Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the
petition for review.30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon
City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated
through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor
General filed a Manifestation and Motion.31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s
"pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further
proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first
marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage
between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v.
Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in
cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only
discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and
especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent
marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they
would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the
"injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting
previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous
marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the
prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse.
The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse
and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the
Constitution.34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family
Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo
Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may
be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such
as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right
of a party or a particular fact."37 While Corpuzconcerned a foreign divorce decree,
in the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status
of the parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure
to record "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons"
in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he
law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal
consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and status x x x."38 The Japanese
Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and
should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in
assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Niñal
v. Bayadog40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be
collaterally attacked."41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the
directive for them to comment on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay
concealed from him the fact that she was previously married to Fujiki.43Maekara
also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on Marinay.44 On the other hand,
Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition.45 She would like to
maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause misunderstanding
between her and Fujiki.46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between
his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize
a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held
that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind
the petition is bigamy."48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner
only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be
more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and
proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section
48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court
judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by
the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a
foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and
authenticated by the seal of office.50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign
judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its
provisions, including the form and contents of the petition,51 the service of
summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-
trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because it
will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign
judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues."57 The
interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits.
In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign
court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her
original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded
litigation."59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status,
condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment
is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines,
Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with
domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code
provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law.
Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition
by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it
exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of
such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not
require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the
foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot
substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign
citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can
only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final
order against a person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48
of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on
foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign
judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it
can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." The rule
on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of party
expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized
foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are
successfully proven under the rules of evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution
of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the
extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While
the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however,
recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign
spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese
Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on
the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family
Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous
marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family
Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki
can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with
Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the
judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of
the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a
party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a
remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the State pursuant to
the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such
as birth, death or marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted
by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding
itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry
relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For
the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel
the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the
basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in
maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations
arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an
entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public
record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse
not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68) his most intimate human
relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the
moment he contracts marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the
right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family"70 and
preserving the property regime of the marriage.71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution,72 but a
spouse’s right in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under
Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family
Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the
substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage.74 In any
case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by
limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by
law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting
marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy.
On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"75
—it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4)
of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the
parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law.
The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the
personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the
beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,76 which
penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for
bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of
crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of
nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue
on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only
share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also
personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is
clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the
suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as
the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership
aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the
prior spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in
order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court
to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially
declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established,
there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage
in the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court
held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct
action" to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition
for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the
foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry
cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary
to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage
under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these
safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children,84 the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation
of the public prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct action for declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the
jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act
No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry
may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is
located."87 In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the
mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil
registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under
Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A
recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an
action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which
presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The
procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of
the foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the
effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v.
Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of
Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country. The second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the
effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow
divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount
to trying a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the
anomaly that results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow
divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the
Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign
under the laws of his or her country. The correction is made by extending in the judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor
country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default,
Code is based on this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule
the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in her own country if the 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive
ends of justice are to be served."91 evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment,
this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a
correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign
Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a
on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare
new status, right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil registry.
the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of
Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity
Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign
of the foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines.1âwphi1
judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or
her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is
spouse will be discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
spouse cannot remarry. Code.93 The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not
a ground for extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are
Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of
empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the
prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from
marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding
the Philippine archipelago."
Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend
the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to
judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference between address the questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under
the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the
with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and
Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City,
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo
in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court
full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-
is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance with
11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts
this Decision.
have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage,
without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to
substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They
cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal
capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus,
Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a
foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide
whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex
nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign
judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2)
G.R. No. 215723
DOREEN GRACE PARILLA MEDINA, a.k.a. "DOREEN GRACE MEDINA
KOIKE," Petitioner
vs.
MICHIYUKI KOIKE, THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA,
and THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL
STATISTICS OFFICE, Respondents
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1are the Decision2 dated July 31,
2014 and the Resolution3 dated November 28, 2014, of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 106 (RTC), in Sp. Proc. No. Q-13-72692, denying petitioner's
petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to
remarry pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Facts
Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla (Doreen), a Filipino citizen, and respondent
Michiyuki Koike (Michiyuki), a Japanese national, were married on June 14, 2005 in
Quezon City, Philippines.4 Their union bore two children, Masato Koike, who was
born on January 23, 2006, and Fuka Koike who was born on April 4, 2007.5
On June 14, 2012, Doreen and Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of Japan, filed for
divorce6 before the Mayor of Ichinomiya City, Aichi Prefecture, Japan. They were
divorced on even date as appearing in the Divorce Certificate7and the same was
duly recorded in the Official Family Register ofMichiyuki Koike.8
Seeking to have the said Divorce Certificate annotated on her Certificate of
Marriage9 on file with the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, Doreen filed on
February 7, 2013 a petition10 for judicial recognition of ioreign divorce and
declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code11 before the RTC, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-13-72692.
At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the petition.12 On the other hand,
Doreen presented several foreign documents, namely, "Certificate of Receiving/
Certificate of Acceptance of Divorce"13 and "Family Register of Michiyuki
Koike"14 both issued by the Mayor of Ichinomiya City and duly authenticated by the
Consul of the Republic of the Philippines for Osaka, Japan. She also presented a
certified machine copy of a document entitled "Divorce Certificate" issued by the
Consul for the Ambassador of Japan in Manila that was authenticated by the
Department of the Foreign Affairs, as well as a Certification15 issued by the City Civil
Registry Office in Manila that the original of said divorce certificate was filed and
recorded in the said Office. In addition, photocopies of the Civil Code of Japan and
their corresponding English translation, as well as two (2) books entitled "The Civil
Code of Japan 2000" 16 and "The Civil Code of Japan 2009"17 were likewise
submitted as proof of the existence of Japan's law on divorce.18
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision19 dated July 31, 2014, the RTC denied Doreen's petition, ruling that in
an action for recognition of foreign divorce decree pursuant to Article 26 of the
Family Code, the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven in accordance
with Sections 2420 and 2521 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. The RTC
ruled that while the divorce documents presented by Doreen were successfully
proven to be public or official records of Japan, she nonetheless fell short of proving
the national law of her husband, particularly the existence of the law on divorce.
The RTC observed that the "The Civil Code of Japan 2000" and "The Civil Code of
Japan 2009," presented were not duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in
Japan as required by Sections 24 and 25 of the said Rules, adding too that the
testimony of Doreen relative to the applicable provisions found therein and its
effect on the matrimonial relations was insufficient since she was not presented as a
qualified expert witness nor was shown to have, at the very least, a working
knowledge of the laws of Japan, particularly those on family relations and divorce. It
likewise did not consider the said books as learned treatises pursuant to Section
46,22 Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, since no expert witness on the
subject matter was presented and considering further that Philippine courts cannot
take judicial notice of foreignjudgments and law.23
Doreen's motion for reconsideration24 was denied in a Resolution25 dated
November 28, 2014; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the RTC erred in denying
the petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce.1âwphi1
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, it bears stressing that Philippine law does not provide for absolute
divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. However, Article 26 of the Family Code -
which addresses foreign marriages or mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner - allows a Filipino spouse to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
divorce is validly obtained abroad by an alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry. The provision reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4),
(5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
 Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly questions of fact and law should be brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) in
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the accordance with Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.33
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
Nonetheless, despite the procedural restrictions on Rule 45 appeals as above-
shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
adverted, the Court may refer the case to the CA under paragraph 2, Section 6 of
law. (Emphasis supplied)
Rule 56 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Under the above-highlighted paragraph, the law confers jurisdiction on Philippine SEC. 6. Disposition of improper appeal. -x x x
courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.26 An appeal by certiorari taken to the Supreme Court from the Regional
Trial Court submitting issues of fact may be referred to the Court of
In Corpuz v. Sta. Tomas,27the Court had the occasion to rule that:
Appeals for decision or appropriate action. The determination of the
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the Supreme Court on whether or not issues of fact are involved shall be
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments final.
and laws.1âwphi1 Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound
to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another This, notwithstanding the express provision under Section 5 (f) thereof that an
country." This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be appeal likewise "may" be dismissed when there is error irr the choice or mode of
proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable appeal.34
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
Since the said Rules denote discretion on the part of the Court to either dismiss the
herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the
appeal or refer the case to the CA, the question of fact involved in the instant appeal
purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral
and substantial ends of justice warrant that the case be referred to the CA for
aspect of his claim or defense.28 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citation
further appropriate proceedings. It bears to stress that procedural rules were
omitted)
intended to ensure proper administration of law and justice. The rules of procedure
ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help
Thus, in Garcia v. Recio,29 it was pointed out that in order for a divorce obtained
secure, not override, substantial justice. A deviation from its rigid enforcement may
abroad by the alien spouse to be recognized in our jurisdiction, it must be shown
thus be allowed to attain its prime objective, for after all, the dispensation of justice
that the divorce decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Both
is the core reason for the existence of the courts.35
the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who
obtained the divorce must be proven.30 Since our courts do not take judicial notice WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, the case is
of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce hereby REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action including the
decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven like any other reception of evidence to DETERMINE and RESOLVE the pertinent factual issues in
fact.31 accordance with this Decision.
Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and Michiyuki, SO ORDERED.
as well as the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the matter are essentially
factual that calls for a re-evaluation of the evidence presented before the RTC, the
issue raised in the instant appeal is obviously a question of fact that is beyond the
ambit of a Rule 45 petition for review.
Well entrenched is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. The resolution of
factual issues is the function of the lower courts, whose findings on these matters
are received with respect and are in fact binding subject to certain exceptions.32 In
this regard, it is settled that appeals taken from judgments or final orders rendered
by RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction raising questions of fact or mixed
April 24, 2018
G.R. No. 221029
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner
vs
MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent
RESOLUTION
peralta, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules)
seeks to reverse and set aside the September 18, 2014 Decision1 and October 12,
2015 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076. The
dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15 October 2012
of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, First Judicial Region, Branch 43, in SPEC.
PROC. NO. 2012-0005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan, Metro Manila.
SO ORDERED.3
The facts are undisputed.
On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition
for cancellation of
Entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan , Metro Manila, by virtueof a
judgment of divorce Japanese court.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City set the case for initial hearing on April 25,
2012. The petition and the notice of initial hearing were published once a week for
three consecutive weeks in newspaper of general circulation. During the initial
hearing, counsel for Manalo marked the documentary evidence (consisting of the
trial courts Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of publication, and issues of the
Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and
March 6-12, 2012) for purposes of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for petitioner
Republic of the Philippines authorizing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan
to appear on its behalf. Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion was filed questioning
the title and/or caption of the petition considering that based on the allegations
therein, the proper action should be a petition for recognition and enforcement of a
foreign judgment.
As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court granted.
The Amended Petition, which captioned that if it is also a petition for recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgment alleged:
2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national
named YOSHINO MINORO as shown by their Marriage Contract xxx;
3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in
Japan and after die proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6,
2011 was rendered by the Japanese Court x x x;
4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and
her divorce Japanese husband are no longer living together and in fact,
petitioner and her daughter are living separately from said Japanese
former husband;
5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in
Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila cancelled, where the petitioner
and the former Japanese husband's marriage was previously registered,
in order that it would not appear anymore that petitioner is still
married to the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband or
is no longer married to her, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by
aid entry of marriage;
6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the
cancellation of entry of the marriage between the petitioner and the
said Japanese national, pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which marriage was already dissolved by virtue of the aforesaid
divorce decree; [and]
7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the
cancellation of the said entry of her marriage, that she be allowed to
return and use her maiden surname, MANALO.4
Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave for Japan
for her employment. Among the documents that were offered and admitted were:
1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its attachments to
be sufficient in form and in substance;
2. Affidavit of Publication;
 3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February
28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012;
4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese
husband;
5. Divorce Decree of Japanese court;
6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate
General in Osaka, Japan of the Notification of Divorce; and
7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.5
The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of
Manalo.
On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling
that the divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined
that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not afford
Filipinos the right to file for a divorce whether they are in the country or living
abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their
marriage in the Philippines or in another country" and that unless Filipinos "are
naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over
issues related to Filipinos' family rights and duties, together with the determination
of their condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations,
inclusing marriages."6
On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family
Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed
for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree may obtained makes
the latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry.
Conformably with Navarro, et al. V. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al.7 ruling that the
meaning of the law should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in view of
the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be height of injustice to consider
Manalo as still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married
to her. For the appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce
case is inconsequential. Cited as similar to this case was Van Dorn v. Judge Romilo,
Jr.8 where the mariage between a foreigner an a Filipino was dissolved filed abroad
by the latter.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.
We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after the marriage,
are of two types: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the
marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves
the bond in full force.9 In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:
1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts
cannot grant it.10
2. Consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the New Civil
Code, the marital bond between two Filipinos cannot be
dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad.13
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who both
aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is
consistent with their respective national laws.14
4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the
former is allowed to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.15
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code of
the Philippines, which took effect on August 3, 1988.16 Shortly
thereafter , E.O. No. 227 was issued on July 17, 1987.17 Aside from
amending Articles 36 and 39 of the Family Code, a second paragraph
was added to Article 26.18 This provision was originally deleted by
the Civil Code Revision Committee (Committee),but it was presented
and approved at a Cabinet meeting after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No.
209.19 As modified, Article 26 now states:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance
with the laws in force in the where country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and
38.
Where a marriage between Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him her to remarry under Philippine law.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the
effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.20 It authorizes our courts
to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines
does not allow divorce.21 Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits
because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case.22Under the principles of comity,
our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by the spouse of foreign
nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the
children or property relations of the spouses, must still be determined by our
courts.23
According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea of the
amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his
or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the former because
he or she had obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his or national
law.24 The aim was that it would solved the problem of many Filipino women who,
under the New Civil Code, are still considered married to their alien husbands even
after the latter have already validly divorced them under their (the husbands')
national laws and perhaps have already married again.25
In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case where,
at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a
divorce proceeding, and obtained a favorable decree. We held in Republic of the
Phils. v. Orbecido III:26
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of
Appeals. In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got
married. The wife became naturalized American citizen n 1954 and obtained a
divorce in the same year. The court therein hinted, by the way of obiter dictum, that
a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under
Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the
rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be
interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of
them becomes naturalized as foreign citizen and obtains divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if
the other party were foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and
injustice. x x x
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming
within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application
of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of
the celebration of marriage, but their citizenship at the time valid
divorced obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry.
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino
citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce
proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien
spouse who is capacitated to remarry. Specifically, Manalo pleads for the
recognition of enforcement of the divorced decree rendered by the Japanese court
and for the cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local civil registry " in order
that it would not appear anymore that she is still married to the said Japanese
national who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her; [and], in the
event that [she] decides to be remarried, she shall not be bothered and disturbed
by said entry of marriage," and to use her maiden surname.
We rule in the affirmative.
Both Dacasin v. Dacasin28 and Van Dorn29 already recognized a foreign divorce
decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal
effects on the issues of child custody and property relation,respectively.
In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the joint
custody of their minor daughter. Later on, the husband who is a US citizen, sued his
Filipino wife enforce the Agreement, alleging that it was only the latter who
exercised sole custody of their child. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of
jurisdiction, on the ground, among others, that the divorce decree is binding
following the "nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction. The husband moved to
reconsider, arguing that the divorce decree obtained by his former wife is void, but
it was denied. In ruling that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit bu
not to enforce the Agreement, which is void, this Court said:
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not because the
Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that the divorced decree violated Illinois law,
but because the divorce was obtained by his Filipino spouse - to support the
Agreement's enforceability . The argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not
bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dron v. Romillo settled the
matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree
obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien divorcee's Philippine suit for
accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission
that the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this
jurisdiction x x x.30
Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a complaint
was filed by the ex-husband , who is a US citizen, against his Filipino wife to render
an accounting of a business that was alleged to be a conjugal property and to be
declared with right to manage the same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on the
ground that the cause of action was barred by previous judgment in the divorce
proceedings that she initiated, but the trial court denied the motion. On his part,
her ex-husband averred that the divorce decree issued by the Nevada court could
not prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national
policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign court cannot, especially if the same
is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction to entertain
matters within its jurisdiction . In dismissing the case filed by the alien spouse, the
Court discussed the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their conjugal
property in the Philippines. Thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the
States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an
American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the
divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local
law and public policy.
Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15
of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorce abroad, which may
be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from standards of American law, under
which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal
Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed.
794,799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the
bond of matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction
are to change the existing status or domestic relation of
husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond.
The marriage tie, when thus severed as stone party, ceases
to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without
a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides
in the nature of penalty, that the guilty party shall not
marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still
absolutely feed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case
below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal
assets. As he is estopped by his own representation before said court
from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that under our laws,
petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and
still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil
Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together
with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.31
In addition, the fact that a validity obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino
spouse can be recognized and given legal effects in the Philippines is implied from
Our rulings in Fujiki v. Marinay, et al.32 and Medina v. Koike.33
In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her husband, who is a Japanese national,
was able to obtain a judgment from Japan's family court. Which declared the
marriage between her and her second husband, who is a Japanese national, void on
the ground of bigamy. In resolving the issue of whether a husband or wife of a prior
marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
subsequent marriage between his her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of
bigamy, We ruled:
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For
the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel
the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the
basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
 There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material
interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and
the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is
interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the
civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The
interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to
preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most intimate human
relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by
operation of law the moment he contracts marriage. These property
interests in marriage included the right to be supported "in keeping
with the financial capacity of the family" and preserving the property
regime of the marriage.
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the
Constitution, but a spouse's right in a marriage extends further to
relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations
between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. x x x34
On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband jointly
filed for divorce, which was granted.1âwphi1 Subsequently, she filed a petition
before the RTC for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity
to remarry pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 26. The RTC denied the petition on the
ground that the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse
recognizing his capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven in accordance with
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. This Court agreed
and ruled that, consistent with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.35 and Garcia v.
Recio,36 the divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse must be
proven. Instead of dismissing the case, We referred it to the CA for appropriate
action including the reception of evidence to determine and resolve the pertinent
factual issues.
There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When
this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by
the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and
property relation, it should not stop short in a likewise acknowledging that one of
the usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry.
Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and observe fidelity.
When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the
domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from the
marital bond.
The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's personal
status is subject to Philippine law, which prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the
divorce decree which she obtained under Japanese law cannot be given effect, as
she is, without dispute, a national not of Japan, bit of the Philippines. It is said that
that a contrary ruling will subvert not only the intention of the framers of the law,
but also that of the Filipino peopl, as expressed in the Constitution. The Court is,
therefore, bound to respect the prohibition until the legislature deems it fit to lift
the same.
We beg to differ.
Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 speaksof "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading
of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The
letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who
initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not
distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the
foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither
can We put words in the mouth of lawmakers.37 The legislature is presumed to
know the meaning of the words to have used words advisely and to have expressed
its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est
recedendum, or from the words if a statute there should be departure."38
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted
to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse,
still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart
from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions
inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.39 Law have ends to achieve, and
statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and
purposes.40 As held in League of Cities of the Phils. et al. v. COMELEC et. al.:41
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which
the resulting law is couched. Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal
interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and lead to inconvience, an
absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the
principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to
the rule that the spirit of the law control its letter.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign
divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure is free to marry
under the laws of his or her countr.42 Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the
foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond
and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the
Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated
a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstances as a
Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the
subject provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino
means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on a Filipinos who is married to a foreign citizen. There are real, material and substantial
whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operations of their alien differences between them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike, both as to rights
spouses are severed by operation on the latter's national law. conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are political, economic
cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and procedures,
Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found
all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to an alien spouse has to
under Article 15 of the City Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the
contend with. More importantly, while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a
mer e existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that the State may
Filipino against another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an
provide for an exception thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality
alien against his her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in accordance with the
principle must be disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and oppression
national law of the foreigner.55
to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by law. The
courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who
only if they are constitutional.43 initiated a foreign divorce proceedings a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree
upon the instance of his or her alien spouse . In the eyes of the Philippine and
While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification
foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and
and that its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the court of justice,
obligations in a alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it
such classification may be subjected to judicial review.44 The deference stops where
not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses
the classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded
who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between
special protection by the Constitution.45 When these violations arise, this Court
them based merely on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the
must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and
divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor
require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations.46 If a
to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.
legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental
right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class strict judicial Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 Article 26 is arbitrary. There is inequality
scrutiny is required since it is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon in treatment because a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by a
the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling Filipino citizen against his or her alien spouse would not be recognized even if based
state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.47 on grounds similar to Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code. 56 In filing for
divorce based on these grounds, the Filipino spouse cannot be accused of invoking
"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal
foreign law at whim, tantamount to insisting that he or she should be governed with
protection clause are those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the
whatever law he or she chooses. The dissent's comment that Manalo should be
Constitution.48 It includes the right to free speech, political expression, press,
"reminded that all is not lost, for she may still pray for the severance of her martial
assembly, and forth, the right to travel, and the right to vote.49 On the other hand,
ties before the RTC in accordance with the mechanism now existing under the
what constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale rights and
Family Code" is anything but comforting. For the guidance of the bench and the bar,
powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history.50 It is akin to the
it would have been better if the dissent discussed in detail what these "mechanism"
paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way,
are and how they specifically apply in Manalo's case as well as those who are
such as the promotion of public interest, public safety or the general welfare.51 It
similarly situated. If the dissent refers to a petition for declaration of nullity or
essentially involves a public right or interest that, because of its primacy, overrides
annulment of marriage, the reality is that there is no assurance that our courts will
individual rights, and allows the former to take precedence over the latter.52
automatically grant the same. Besides, such proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and
Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same principle protracted. All to the prejudice of our kababayan.
applies with respect to the acts of the President which have the force and effect of
It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26
law unless declared otherwise by the court. In this case, We find that Paragraph 2 of
encourages Filipinos to marry foreigners, opening the floodgate to the
Article 26 violates one of the essential requisites53 of the equal protection
indiscriminate practice of Filipinos marrying foreign nationals or initiating divorce
clause.54 Particularly, the limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce decree
proceedings against their alien spouses.
initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on superficial, arbitrary,
and whimsical classification. The supposition is speculative and unfounded.
First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever was sworn
to support what he intends to prove. Second, We adhere to the presumption of
good faith in this jurisdiction. Under the rules on evidence, it is disputable
presumed (i.e., satisfactory if uncontradicted and overcome by other evidence) that
a person is innocent of crime or wrong,57 that a person takes ordinary care of his
concerns,59 that acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in
was conformable to the law and fact, 60 that a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage,61 and that the law has been obeyed.62 It is whimsical to easily attribute
any illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on the part of a Filipino just because he or
she opted to marry a foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is presumed that
interracial unions are entered into out of genuine love and affection, rather than
prompted by pure lust or profit. Third, We take judicial notice of the fact that
Filipinos are relatively more forbearing and conservative in nature and that they are
more often the victims or losing end of mixed marriages. And Fourth, it is not for Us
to prejudge the motive behind Filipino's decision to marry an alien national. In one
case, it was said:
Motive for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and
cannot dictated on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to
regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would
raise serious constitutional questions. The right marital privacy allows married
couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see it fit, to live
together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not,
and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise,
such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they
comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal
consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other
considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.63
The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is
the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.64 Nevertheless, it
was not meant to be a general prohibition on divorce because Commissioner Jose
Luis Martin C. Gascon, in response to a question by Father Joaquin G. Bernas during
the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was categorical about this
point.65 Their exchange reveal as follows:
MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas be
recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is
recognized.
FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been
categorically answered. I refer specifically to the proposal of
Commissioner Gascon. Is this be understood as a prohibition of a
general law on divorce? His intention is to make this a prohibition so
that the legislature cannot pass a divorce law.
MR. GASCON. Mr. Presding Officer, that was not primarily my intention.
My intention was primarily to encourage the social institution of
marriage, but not necessarily discourage divorce. But now that the
mentioned the issue of divorce, my personal opinion is to discourage it.
Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. No my question is more categorical. Does this carry the
meaning of prohibiting a divorce law?
MR. GASCON. No Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. Thank you.66
Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effectivity March 11,
1917, Philippine courts could grant an absolute divorce in the grounds of adultery
on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband by virtue of Act
No. 2710 of the Philippine Legislature.67 On March 25, 1943, pursuant to the
authority conferred upon him by the Commander-in-Chief fo the Imperial Japanese
Forces in the Philippines and with the approval of the latter, the Chairman of the
Philippine Executive Commission promulgated an E.O. No. 141 ("New Divorce Law"),
which repealed Act No. 2710 and provided eleven ground for absolute divorce, such
as intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at least one year prior to the
filing of the action, slander by deed or gross insult by one spouse against the other
to such an extent as to make further living together impracticable, and a spouse's
incurable insanity.68 When the Philippines was liberated and the Commonwealth
Government was restored, it ceased to have force and effect and Act No. 2710 again
prevailed.69 From August 30, 1950, upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 836 or
the New Civil Code, an absolute divorce obatined by Filipino citizens, whether here
or abroad, is no longer recognized.70
Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of the
Philippine society to re-institute absolute divorce. As a matte of fcat, in the currnet
17th Congress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos. 11671 106272 238073 and 602774 were filed
in the House of representatives. In substitution of these bills, H.B. No. 7303
entitled "An Act Instituting Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage in the
Philippines" or the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted by the House
Committee on Population
And Family Relations of February 8, 2018. It was approved on March 19, 2018 on 1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code restated
Third Reading - with 134 in favor, 57 against, and 2 absentations. Under the bill, the as follows:
grounds for a judicial decree of absolute divorce are as follows:
1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code, modified or a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage
amended, as follows: annulled was eighteen (18) years of age or over but below
twety-one (21), and the marriage was solemnized without the
consent of the parents guradian or personl having substitute
a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against
parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after
the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;
attaining the age of twenty-one (21) such party freely
cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband
b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner
and wife;
to change religious or political affiliation;
b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after
c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a
coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband
common child, or a child of a petitioner, to engage in
and wife;
prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless
d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment
such party afterwards with full knowledge of the facts
of more than six (6) years, even if pardoned;
constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other husband
and wife;
e. Drug addiction or habitual alchoholism ro chronic gambling
of respondent;
d. consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation
or undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or
f. Homosexuality of the respondent;
ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other
as husband and wife;
g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous
marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad;
e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the
marriage with the other and such incapacity continues or
h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another appears to be incurable; and
person other than one's spouse during the marriage, except
when upon the mutual agreement of the spouses, a child is
f. Either part was afflicted with the sexually transmissible
born to them by in vitro or a similar procedure or when the
infection found to be serious or appears to be incurable.
wife bears a child after being a victim of rape;
Provided, That the ground mentioned in b, e and f existed either at the time of the
i. attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a
marriage or supervening after the marriage.
common child or a child of a petitioner; and
1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5) years at the
j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable time the petition for absolute divorce is filed, and the reconciliation is highly
cause for more than one (1) year. improbable;

When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more thath two (2) 2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article 36
years, either or both spouses can petition the proper court for an absolute divorce of the Family Code, whether or not the incapacity was present at the
based on said judicial decree of legal separation. time of the celebration of the marriage or later;
 3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment surgery
or transition from one sex to another, the other spouse is entitled to
petition for absolute divorce with the transgender or transsexual as
respondent, or vice-versa;
4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted in
the total breakdown of the marriage beyond repair, despite earnest
and repeated efforts at reconciliation.
To be sure, a good number of Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react
adversely to any attempt to enact a law on absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary
to our customs, morals, and traditions that has looked upon marriage and family as
an institution and their nature of permanence,
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can
do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They can
neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for
everyone, nor can they cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in
simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus
establish a state religion.76
The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the
State and the rest of the citizenry nor can it demand that the nation follow its
beliefs, even if it is sincerely believes that they are good for country.77While
marriage is considered a sacrament, it has civil and legal consequences which are
governed by the Family Code.78 It is in this aspect, bereft of any ecclesiastical
overtone, that the State has a legitimate right and interest to regulate.
The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is a
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State, should not be read in
total isolation but must be harmonized with other constitutional provision. Aside
from strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally
mandated to actively promote its total development.79 It is also obligated to
defend, among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development.80 To Our mind, the State cannot effectively enforce these obligation s
if We limit the application of Paragraph 2 or Article 26 only those foreign divorce
initiated by the alien spouse. It is not amiss to point that the women and children
are almost always the helpless victims of all forms of domestic abuse and violence.
In fact, among the notable legislation passed in order to minimize, if not eradicate,
the menace are R.A. No. 9262 ("Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children
Act of 2004") R.A. No. 9710 ("The Magna Carta of Women"), R.A. No 10354 ("The
Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012") and R.A. No
9208 ("Anti-Trafficking in Person Act of 2003"), as amended by R.A. No.
10364 ("ExpandedAnti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012").Moreover, in protecting
and strengthening the Filipino family as a basic autonomous social institution, the
Court must not lose sight of the constitutional mandate to value the dignity of every
human person, guarantee full respect for human rights, and ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.81
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If
We disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the
coverage of Paragraph 2 Article 26 and still require him or her to first avail of the
existing "mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he
or she would enter in the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the
Philippine law. Worse, any child born out such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer the
stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the
adverse consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold
a restrictive interpretation of the subject provision. The irony is that the principle of
inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is meant to
be tilted in favor of marriage and against unions not formalized by marriage, but
without denying State protection and assistance to live-in arrangements or to
families formed according to indigenous customs.82
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the
advancement of communication and information technology, as well as the
improvement of the transportation system that almost instantly connect people
from all over the world, mixed marriages have become not too uncommon.
Likewise, it is recognized that not all marriages are made in heaven and that
imperfect humans more often than not create imperfect unions.83 Living in a
flawed world, the unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment of the
individual's full human potential and self fulfillment is not found and achieved in the
context of a marriage. Thus it is hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of existing
marriages and, at the same time, brush aside the truth that some of them are rotten
quality.
Going back, we hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment
between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society
where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains
bound to it.84 In reiterating that the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated
against in his or her own country if the ends of justice are to be served, San Luis v.
San Luis85 quoted:
x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Applellate Court, the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results: and
likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in
seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be
to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably,
 the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice
as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of
that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature,
is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in
consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must
keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally
valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because
only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in
slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a
balance between the sord and the will, that justice may be done even
as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly
apply the law as it worded, yielding like robots to the literal command
without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by
sticking too closely to the words of law," so we are warned, by Justice
Holmes agaian, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond
them."
xxxx
More that twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the
constant and perpetual wish to render every one of his due." That wish
continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law
in ever case brought to it for decisions. Justice is always an essential
ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrant, we interpret
the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the
intention if the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with
justice.86
Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal
import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as
far as necessary the letter of the law.87 A statute may therefore, be extended to
cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its
spirit or intent.88
The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this controversy by
granting Manalo's petition to recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered by
the Japanese court and to cancel the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San
Juan, Metro Manila.
Jurisprudence has set guidelines before the Philippine courts recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of
foreign country. Presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice.89 The fact
of divorce must still first be proven.90 Before a a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.91
x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the
document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained
abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. The decree purports to be written act
or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or
document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign
country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the
record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b)authenticated by the seal of
his office.92
In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:
In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the 1) Decision of
the Japanese Court allowing the divorce; 2) the Authentication/Certificate issued by
the Philippines Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce; and
3) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce byu the Petitioner and the Japanese national.
Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the
Rules of Court, these documents sufficiently prove the subject Divorce Decree as a
fact. Thus, We are constrained to recognize the Japanese Court's judgment
decreeing the divorce.93
If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is
rendered admissible a a written act of the foreign court.94 As it appears, the
existence of the divorce decree was not denied by the OSG; neither was the
jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached nor the validity of its proceedings
challenged on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit
an opportunity to do so.95
Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.
x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or
thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs
have the burden of proving the material defendants have the burden of proving the
material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. x x x

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial

notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must alleged and
proved. x x x The power of judicial notice must be exercise d with
caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be
resolved in the negative.96

Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent
Japanese law validating it, as well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall
squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among
those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18,
2014 Decision and October 12, 2015 Resolution if the Court of Appeals in CA G.R.
CV. No. 100076, are AFFIRMED IN PART. The case is REMANDED to the court of
origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese
law on divorce.
[ GR No. 212860, Mar 14, 2018 ] citizen when he obtained the divorce decree,[6] viz.:
[Florie] has sufficiently established that she is a Filipino citizen and
REPUBLIC v. FLORIE GRACE M. COTE married to an American citizen. Her husband obtained a Divorce
Decree on 22 August 2002 and was authenticated and registered by the
Consulate General to the Philippines in Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.A. [Florie]
being a Filipino citizen and is governed by Philippine laws, she is placed
REYES, JR., J: in an absurd, if not awkward situation where she is married to
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks to somebody who is no longer married to her. This is precisely the
reverse and set aside the Decision[1] dated January 21, 2014 and circumstances contemplated under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the
Resolution[2] dated June 11, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. Family Code which provides a remedy for Filipino spouses like [Florie].
122313.
Under the above-cited provision, [Florie] is allowed to contract a
The Facts
subsequent marriage since the divorce had been validly obtained
abroad by her American husband, capacitating her to remarry. In this
As culled from the records, the antecedent facts are as follows:
line, the court holds that this petition be, as it is, hereby GRANTED.
On July 31, 1995, Rhomel Gagarin Cote (Rhomel) and respondent Florie Grace
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
Manongdo-Cote (Florie) were married in Quezon City. At the time of their marriage,
declaring [Florie] capacitated to remarry pursuant to Article 26
the spouses were both Filipinos and were already blessed with a son, Christian
paragraph 2 of the Family Code, in view of the Divorce Decree which
Gabriel Manongdo who was born in Honolulu, Hawaii, United States of America
had been validly obtained abroad by her American spouse, dissolving
(USA).[3]
their marriage solemnized on 31 July 1995 in Quezon City, Philippines.
[7]
On August 23, 2002, Rhomel filed a Petition for Divorce before the Family Court of
the First Circuit of Hawaii on the ground that their marriage was irretrievably
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on May 17, 2011. However, the RTC, believing
broken. This was granted on August 23, 2002 by the issuance of a decree that states
that the petition was covered by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of
among others:
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, applied
A decree of absolute divorce is hereby granted to [Rhomel], the bonds Section 20 of said Rule and denied the appeal because the notice was not preceded
of matrimony between [Rhomel] and [Florie] are hereby dissolved and by a motion for reconsideration.[8]
the parties hereto are restored to the status of single persons, and
either party is permitted to marry from and after the effective date of Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA claiming that the RTC
this decree.[4] committed grave abuse of discretion.

Seven years later, Florie commenced a petition for recognition of foreign judgment In a Decision[9] dated January 21, 2014, the CA denied the petition. The pertinent
granting the divorce before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Florie also prayed for the portions read as follows:
cancellation of her marriage contract, hence, she also impleaded the Civil Registry
The fact that even the Solicitor General and private respondent were
of Quezon City and the National Statistics Office (NSO). The Office of the Solicitor
confused as to the true nature of the petition and the procedure that
General, representing Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), deputized the Office
must be followed only shows that We cannot attribute a whimsical and
of the City Prosecutor to appear on behalf of the State during the trial.[5]
capricious exercise of judgment to the RTC.
On April 7, 2011, the RTC granted the petition and declared Florie to be capacitated
x x x x
to remarry after the RTC's decision attained finality and a decree of absolute nullity
has been issued. The RTC ruled, inter alia, that Rhomel was already an American
Besides, petitioner's omission, by itself, is a ground for dismissing the
 petition. The last paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court
allows the dismissal of a petition for certiorari if the material parts of
the records were not attached to the petition. "Certiorari, being an
extraordinary remedy, the party seeking it must strictly observe the
requirements for its issuance." Although it has been ruled that the
better policy is for petitioner to be accorded, in the interest of
substantial justice, "a chance to submit the same instead of dismissing
the petition" We cannot allow petitioner to benefit from this rule
because the need to submit the transcript of stenographic notes and all
other pieces of evidence is quite obvious for petitioner which is
questioning the sufficiency of the evidence presented. Hence, it would
be bending the rules too far if We still allow petitioner to be excused
from this lapse.[10]
Hence, this present petition.
The Issues
I. THE CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE DID
NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN APPLYING THE
PROCEDURAL RULES FOR NULLITY OF MARRIAGE
PROCEEDINGS UNDER A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC IN A PROCEEDING
FOR RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN DECREE OF DIVORCE;
II. THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE STATE HAS NO
PERSONALITY TO INTERVENE IN PROCEEDINGS FOR
RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN DECREE OF DIVORCE;
III. THE CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE FAILURE OF THE
PETITIONER TO APPEND COPIES OF THE TRANSCRIPT OF
STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF FLORIE'S DIRECT EXAMINATION AND
HER JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT IS FATAL, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT
THE VERY SAME DOCUMENTS WERE INCORPORATED AND
QUOTED BY FLORIE IN HER COMMENT; and
IV. THE CA ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION
DATED APRIL 7, 2011 GRANTING FLORIE'S PETITION FOR
RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN DECREE OF DIVORCE DESPITE LACK
OF SHOWING THAT HER FORMER FILIPINO HUSBAND WAS
ALREADY AN AMERICAN CITIZEN AT THE TIME HE PROCURED
THE DECREE OF DIVORCE.[11]
Ruling of the Court
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the provisions of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC[12] applies in a case involving recognition of a foreign decree of
divorce.
It bears stressing that as of present, our family laws do not recognize absolute
divorce between Filipino husbands and wives. Such fact, however, do not prevent
our family courts from recognizing divorce decrees procured abroad by an alien
spouse who is married to a Filipino citizen.
Article 26 of the Family Code states:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
The wordings of the second paragraph of Article 26 initially spawned confusion as to
whether or not it covers even those marriages wherein both of the spouses were
Filipinos at the time of marriage and then one of them eventually becomes a
naturalized citizen of another country.
In the landmark case of Republic v. Orbecido III,[13] the Court ruled that the
reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.[14]
Although the Court has already laid down the rule regarding foreign divorce
involving Filipino citizens, the Filipino spouse who likewise benefits from the effects
of the divorce cannot automatically remarry. Before the divorced Filipino spouse can
remarry, he or she must file a petition for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce.
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments
and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give
effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country."
This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts
under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to
show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may The RTC, in its Decision[18] dated January 21, 2014 ruled that Florie had sufficiently
be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action established that she is married to an American citizen and having proven
where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or compliance with the legal requirements, is declared capacitated to remarry.
defense.[15]
The confusion arose when the RTC denied petitioner's appeal on the ground that no
To clarify, respondent filed with the RTC a petition to recognize the foreign divorce prior motion for reconsideration was filed as required under Section 20 of A.M. No.
decree procured by her naturalized (originally Filipino) husband in Hawaii, USA. By 02-11-10-SC. Petitioner posits that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC do not cover cases
impleading the Civil Registry of Quezon City and the NSO, the end sought to be involving recognition of foreign divorce because the wording of Section 1 thereof
achieved was the cancellation and or correction of entries involving her marriage clearly states that it shall only apply to petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of
status. void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages, viz.:
Section 1. Scope - This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of
In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.,[16] the Court briefly explained the nature of
absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable
recognition proceedings vis-a-vis cancellation of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules
marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines. [Underscoring
of Court, viz.:
Ours]
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil register
shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order. The Rules of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court applies; Motion for Reconsideration not a condition
Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically precedent to the filing of an appeal
providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil
registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules The CA is correct when it ruled that the trial court misapplied Section 20 of A.M. No.
of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements 02-11-10-SC.
that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the
cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also A decree of absolute divorce procured abroad is different from annulment as
requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the defined by our family laws. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only covers void[19] and
RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located; voidable[20] marriages that are specifically cited and enumerated in the Family
that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest Code of the Philippines. Void and voidable mmTiages contemplate a situation
must be made parties to the proceedings; and that the time and place wherein the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the
for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation. x x marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. It treats the marriage as if it
x. never existed. Divorce, on the other hand, ends a legally valid marriage and is
usually due to circumstances arising after the marriage.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be
construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of It was error for the RTC to use as basis for denial of petitioner's appeal Section 20 of
a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry one for recognition of the A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Since Florie followed the procedure for cancellation of entry
foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry in the civil registry, a special proceeding governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court,
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign an appeal from the RTC decision should be governed by Section 3[21] of Rule 41 of
divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the the Rules of Court and not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a As culled from the records, petitioner received a copy of the RTC Decision on May 5,
particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as 2011. It filed a Notice of Appeal[22] on May 17, 2011, thus complying with the 15-
the appropriate adversarial proceeding by which the applicability of the day reglementary period for filing an appeal.
foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional
infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake An appeal is a statutory right that must be exercised only in the manner and in
of law or fact.[17] accordance with the provisions of law. Having satisfactorily shown that they have
complied with the rules on appeal, petitioners are entitled to the proper and just
disposition of their cause.[23]

This now brings the Court to the issue whether or not the RTC's denial of
petitioner's appeal is tantamount to grave abuse of discretion. The Court rules in the
negative.

No grave abuse of discretion

Although the Court agrees with petitioner that the RTC erroneously misapplied A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC, such error does not automatically equate to grave abuse of
discretion. The Court has ruled time and again that not all errors attributed to a
lower court or tribunal fall under the scope of a Rule 65 petition for certiorari.

Jurisprudence has defined grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction in this wise:
Grave abuse of discretion is defined as capricious or whimsical exercise
of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or
to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.
[24]

After a careful consideration of the evidence presented and Florie having sufficiently
complied with the jurisdictional requirements, judgment was rendered by the lower
court recognizing the decree of foreign divorce. It likewise declared Florie legally
capacitated to remarry citing the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
Thus, the CA is correct in denying the Rule 65 petition for certiorari, notwithstanding
the RTC's dismissal of petitioner's appeaL The dismissal, albeit erroneous, is not
tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

The Court finds no indication from the records that the RTC acted arbitrarily,
capriciously and whimsically in arriving at its decision. A petition for certiorari will
prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proved to exist. The burden
is on the part of the petitioner to prove not merely reversible error on the part of
private respondent, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision

dated January 21, 2014 and Resolution dated June 11, 2014 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 122313 are hereby AFFIRMED.
DELA CRUZ-MORISONO V. RYOJI MORISONO
GR 226013 JULY 2 2018
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 105 (RTC), through a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the
Decision[2] dated July 18, 2016 of the RTC in SP. PROC. NO. Q-12-71830 which
denied petitioner Luzviminda Dela Cruz Morisono's (Luzviminda) petition before it.
The Facts
Luzviminda was married to private respondent Ryoji Morisono (Ryoji) in Quezon City
on December 8, 2009.[3] Thereafter, they lived together in Japan for one (1) year
and three (3) months but were not blessed with a child. During their married life,
they would constantly quarrel mainly due to Ryoji's philandering ways, in addition to
the fact that he was much older than Luzviminda.[4] As such, she and Ryoji
submitted a "Divorce by Agreement" before the City Hall of Mizuho-Ku, Nagoya City,
Japan, which was eventually approved on January 17, 2012 and duly recorded with
the Head of Mizuho-Ku, Nagoya City, Japan on July 1, 2012.[5] In view of the
foregoing, she filed a petition for recognition of the foreign divorce decree obtained
by her and Ryoji[6] before the RTC so that she could cancel the surname of her
former husband in her passport and for her to be able to marry again.[7]
After complying with the jurisdictional requirements, the RTC set the case for
hearing. Since nobody appeared to oppose her petition except the government,
Luzviminda was allowed to present her evidence ex-parte. After the presentation
and absent any objection from the Public Prosecutor, Luzviminda's formal offer of
evidence was admitted as proof of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements,
and as part of the testimony of the witnesses.[8]
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision[9] dated July 18, 2016, the RTC denied Luzviminda's petition. It held
that while a divorce obtained abroad by an alien spouse may be recognized in the
Philippines – provided that such decree is valid according to the national law of the
alien – the same does not find application when it was the Filipino
spouse, i.e., petitioner, who procured the same. Invoking the nationality principle
provided under Article 15 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 26 (2) of the Family
Code, the RTC opined that since petitioner is a Filipino citizen whose national laws
do not allow divorce, the foreign divorce decree she herself obtained in Japan is not
binding in the Philippines;[10]hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the RTC correctly denied
Luzviminda's petition for recognition of the foreign divorce decree she procured
with Ryoji.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
The rules on divorce prevailing in this jurisdiction can be summed up as
follows: first, Philippine laws do not provide for absolute divorce, and hence, the
courts cannot grant the same; second, consistent with Articles 15[11] and 17[12] of
the Civil Code, the marital bond between two (2) Filipino citizens cannot be
dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad; third, an absolute divorce
obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws;
and fourth,in mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is
allowed to contract a subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.[13]
The fourth rule, which has been invoked by Luzviminda in this case, is encapsulated
in Article 26 (2) of the Family Code which reads:
Article 26. x x x
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall likewise. have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
This provision confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a
foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine
the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. It authorizes our courts to adopt the
effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow
divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount
to trying a divorce case. Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a
valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal effects
thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children or property relations of
the spouses, must still be determined by our courts. The rationale for this rule is to
avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or her alien
spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the former because he or she
had obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his or her national law.
[14] In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,[15] the Court held:
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse."The legislative intent is for the benefit
of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the
doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino
spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien
spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry. Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether
in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related
issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino
spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing
the marital bond; Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy
against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments
promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second
paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception
to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the
marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce
decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse
to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise
capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction,
however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other
than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal
capacity are generally governed by his national law.[16] (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
According to Republic v. Orbecido III,[17] the following elements must concur in
order for Article 26 (2) to apply, namely: (a) that there is a valid marriage celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and (b) that a valid divorce is obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.[18] In the same case,
the Court also initially clarified that Article 26 (2) applies not only to cases where a
foreigner was the one who procured a divorce of his/her marriage to a Filipino
spouse, but also to instances where, at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them acquired foreign
citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a
favorable decree.[19]
However, in the recent case of Republic v. Manalo (Manalo),[20] the Court En
Banc extended the application of Article 26 (2) of the Family Code to further cover
mixed marriages where it was the Filipino citizen who divorced his/her foreign
spouse. Pertinent portions of the ruling read:
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same
provision, a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under
Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and
obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is
capacitated to remarry. x x x.
We rule in the affirmative.
x x x x
When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was
initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal
effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should
not stop short in likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and
necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to
remarry.Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together
and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to
exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the former spouses
change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.
x x x x
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." Based
on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that
there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does
not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated
the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not
distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by
the words of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouths of
the lawmakers. "The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of
the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its
intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis
non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no
departure."
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should
be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually
initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of
the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the
legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the
general purpose of the act. Laws have ends to achieve, and statutes
should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and
purposes. x x x.
x x x x
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the
country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly
where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign
spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. Whether
the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a
favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or
her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino
spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who
initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like
circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien
initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not
make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to
recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos
whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of
the latter's national law.
x x x x
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated
with a Filipino who is married to a foreign citizen. There are real,
material and substantial differences between them. Ergo, they should
not be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities
imposed. Without a doubt, there are political, economic, cultural, and
religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and procedures,
all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to an alien
spouse has to contend with. More importantly, while a divorce decree
obtained abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino is null and void, a
divorce decree obtained by an alien against his or her Filipino spouse is
recognized if made in accordance with the national law of the
foreigner.
On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a
Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceedings and a Filipino
who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien
spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are
considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in
an alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it
not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their
foreigner spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to
make a distinction between them based merely on the superficial
difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is
utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and
unjustly discriminate against the other.
x x x x
The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State, should not be read in total isolation but must be harmonized
with other constitutional provisions. Aside from strengthening the
solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to
actively promote its total development. It is also obligated to defend,
among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms
of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial
to their development. To our mind, the State cannot effectively enforce
these obligations if We limit the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26
only to those foreign divorce initiated by the alien spouse. x x x.
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm
than good. If We disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a
foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 and still
require him or her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the
Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would enter in
the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine
law. Worse, any child born out of such "extra-marital" affair has to
suffer the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just
but a few of the adverse consequences, not only to the parent but also
 to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive interpretation of the subject prevailing Japanese laws on divorce. Notably, the RTC did not rule on such issues.
provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of marriage Since these are questions which require an examination of various factual matters, a
under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is meant to be tilted in remand to the court a quo is warranted.
favor of marriage and. against unions not formalized by marriage, but
without denying State protection and assistance to live-in WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated July 18, 2016 of
arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous customs. the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 105 in SP. PROC. NO. Q-12-71830 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the instant case is REMANDED to the
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present court a quo for further proceedings, as directed in this Decision.
time. With the advancement of communication and information
technology, as well as the improvement of the transportation system
that almost instantly connect people from all over the world, mixed
marriages have become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized
that not all marriages are made in heaven and that imperfect humans
more often than not create imperfect unions. Living in a flawed world,
the unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment of the
individual's full human potential and self-fulfillment is not found and
achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus, it is hypocritical to
safeguard the quantity of existing marriages and, at the same time,
brush aside the truth that some of them are of rotten quality.

Going back, We hold that marriage, being mutual and shared

commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of
any good to the society where one is considered released from the
marital bond while the other remains bound to it. x x x.
[21] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Thus, pursuant to Manalo, foreign divorce decrees obtained to nullify marriages

between a Filipino and an alien citizen may already be recognized in this jurisdiction,
regardless of who between the spouses initiated the divorce; provided, of course,
that the party petitioning for the recognition of such foreign divorce decree –
presumably the Filipino citizen – must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate
its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.[22]

In this case, a plain reading of the RTC ruling shows that the denial of Luzviminda's
petition to have her foreign divorce decree recognized in this jurisdiction was
anchored on the sole ground that she admittedly initiated the divorce proceedings
which she, as a Filipino citizen, was not allowed to do. In light of the doctrine laid
down in Manalo, such ground relied upon by the RTC had been rendered nugatory.
However, the Court cannot just order the grant of Luzviminda's petition for
[ GR No. 224015, Jul 23, 2018 ]
recognition of the foreign divorce decree, as Luzviminda has yet to prove the fact of
her. "Divorce by Agreement" obtained, in Nagoya City, Japan and its conformity with
STEPHEN I. JUEGO-SAKAI v. REPUBLIC
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Amended Decision[1] dated March 3,
2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 104253 that set aside its former
Decision dated November 25, 2015, which in turn, affirmed the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte, granting petitioner's
Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Stephen I. Juego-Sakai and Toshiharu Sakai got married on August 11,
2000 in Japan pursuant to the wedding rites therein. After two (2) years, the parties,
by agreement, obtained a divorce decree in said country dissolving their marriage.
[2] Thereafter, on April 5, 2013, petitioner filed a Petition for Judicial Recognition of
Foreign Judgment before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Camarines
Norte. In its Decision dated October 9, 2014, the RTC granted the petition and
recognized the divorce between the parties as valid and effective under Philippine
Laws.[3] On November 25, 2015, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
In an Amended Decision[4] dated March 3, 2016, however, the CA revisited its
findings and recalled and set aside its previous decision. According to the appellate
court, the second of the following requisites under Article 26 of the Family Code is
missing: (a) there is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner; and (b) a divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.[5] This is because the divorce herein was
consensual in nature, obtained by agreement of the parties, and not by Sakai alone.
Thus, since petitioner, a Filipino citizen, also obtained the divorce herein, said
divorce cannot be recognized in the Philippines. In addition, the CA ruled that
petitioner's failure to present authenticated copies of the Civil Code of Japan was
fatal to her cause.[6]
On May 2, 2016, petitioner filed the instant petition invoking the following
arguments:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE [COURT OF APPEALS] GRAVELY
ERRED UNDER LAW WHEN IT HELD THAT THE SECOND REQUISITE FOR
THE APPLICATION OF THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 26 OF THE
FAMILY CODE IS NOT PRESENT BECAUSE THE PETITIONER GAVE
CONSENT TO THE DIVORCE OBTAINED BY HER JAPANESE HUSBAND.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE [COURT OF APPEALS] GRAVELY
ERRED UNDER LAW WHEN IT HELD THAT THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL
COMPLIANCE WITH REQUIREMENT ON THE SUBMISSION OF
AUTHENTICATED COPIES OF [THE] CIVIL CODE OF JAPAN RELATIVE TO
DIVORCE AS REQUIRED BY THE RULES.[7]
Petitioner posits that the divorce she obtained with her husband, designated as
Divorce by Agreement in Japan, as opposed to Judicial Divorce, is the more practical
and common type of divorce in Japan. She insists that it is to her great disadvantage
if said divorce is not recognized and instead, Judicial Divorce is required in order for
her to avail of the benefit under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, since their divorce had already been granted abroad.[8] Moreover, petitioner
asserts that the mere fact that she consented to the divorce does not prevent the
application of Article 26 for said provision does not state that where the consent of
the Filipino spouse was obtained in the divorce, the same no longer finds
application. In support of her contentions, petitioner cites the ruling in Republic of
the Philippines v. Orbecido III wherein the Court held that a Filipino spouse is
allowed to remarry in the event that he or she is divorced by a Filipino spouse who
had acquired foreign citizenship.[9] As to the issue of evidence presented, petitioner
explains that the reason why she was unable to present authenticated copies of the
provisions of the Civil Code of Japan relative to divorce is because she was unable to
go to Japan due to the fact that she was pregnant. Also, none of her friends could
obtain a copy of the same for her. Instead, she went to the library of the Japanese
Embassy to photocopy the Civil Code. There, she was issued a document which
states that diplomatic missions of Japan overseas do not issue certified true copies
of Japanese Law nor process translation certificates of Japanese Law due to the
potential problem in the legal interpretation thereof. Thus, petitioner maintains that
this constitutes substantial compliance with the Rules on Evidence.[10]
We grant the petition.
The issue before Us has already been resolved in the landmark ruling of Republic v.
Manalo,[11] the facts of which fall squarely on point with the facts herein.
In Manalo, respondent Marelyn Manalo, a Filipino, was married to a Japanese
national named Yoshino Minoro. She, however, filed a case for divorce before a
Japanese Court, which granted the same and consequently issued a divorce decree
dissolving their marriage. Thereafter, she sought to have said decree recognized in
the Philippines and to have the entry of her marriage to Minoro in the Civil Registry
in San Juan, Metro Manila, cancelled, so that said entry shall not become a
hindrance if and when she decides to remarry. The trial court, however, denied
Manalo's petition and ruled that Philippine law does not afford Filipinos the right to
file for a divorce, whether they are in the country or abroad, if they are married to
Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in
another country.
On appeal, however, the Court therein rejected the trial court's view and affirmed,
instead, the ruling of the CA. There, the Court held that the fact that it was the
Filipino spouse who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was
granted should not affect the application nor remove him from the coverage of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code which states that "where a marriage
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law." We observed that to interpret the word "obtained" to mean that the divorce
proceeding must actually be initiated by the alien spouse would depart from the
true intent of the legislature and would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent
with the general purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, which is, specifically, to avoid
the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was
rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The subject provision,
therefore, should not make a distinction for a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce
proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the
receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding.[12]
purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24[15] of Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court applies.[16] Thus, what is required is proof, either by (1) official
publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the
documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these
must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.[17]
In the instant case, the Office of the Solicitor General does not dispute the existence
of the divorce decree, rendering the same admissible. What remains to be proven,
therefore, is the pertinent Japanese Law on divorce considering that Japanese laws
on persons and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges are
supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.[18]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Amended Decision dated March 3, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
104253 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin
for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law
on divorce.

Applying the foregoing pronouncement to the case at hand, the Court similarly rules
that despite the fact that petitioner participated in the divorce proceedings in
Japan, and even if it is assumed that she initiated the same, she must still be
allowed to benefit from the exception provided under Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
Consequently, since her marriage to Toshiharu Sakai had already been dissolved by
virtue of the divorce decree they obtained in Japan, thereby capacitating Toshiharu
to remarry, petitioner shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Nevertheless, as similarly held in Manalo, We cannot yet grant petitioner's Petition

for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment for she has yet to comply with certain
guidelines before our courts may recognize the subject divorce decree and the
effects thereof. Time and again, the Court has held that the starting point in any
recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do
not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws.[13] This means that the
foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on
evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to show the effect of the
judgment on the alien himself or herself.[14] Since both the foreign divorce decree
and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce,