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G.R. No. 178266 July 21, 2008 ₱80,000.

08 ₱80,000.00 to their own use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of said Veneranda Paler
and other heirs of the late Dionesio Paler, Sr. in the aforementioned sum of ₱80,000.00.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs. Contrary to law.
SAMUEL and LORETA VANZUELA, Respondents.
Upon arraignment, respondents pleaded not guilty. During pre-trial, the parties agreed that the
DECISION respondents had been the agricultural tenants of Veneranda for more than ten (10) years; and
that the palay was harvested twice a year on the subject property. Thereafter, trial on the merits
NACHURA, J.: ensued. After the prosecution rested its case, the respondents filed a Demurrer to
Evidence,6 praying that the criminal case be dismissed for failure of the petitioner to establish the
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil culpability of the respondents beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner filed a
Procedure. The petitioner People of the Philippines (petitioner) seeks the reversal of the Comment/Opposition7arguing that the respondents, as agricultural tenants, were required by law
Order2 dated May 18, 2007, issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30 of Surigao City, to hold the lease rentals in trust for the landowner and thereafter turn over the same to the latter.
which dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter the criminal case for estafa filed
by private complainant Veneranda S. Paler (Veneranda) against respondents Samuel Vanzuela In an Order8 dated May 18, 2007, the RTC dismissed the criminal case ratiocinating, thus:
(Samuel) and his wife, Loreta Vanzuela (Loreta) (respondents). The case ostensibly involves an
agrarian dispute, hence, according to the RTC, within the exclusive original From the averments of the information, the admissions of the parties and the evidence adduced
by the prosecution, it is easily discernable (sic) that the instant case pertains to the non-payment
jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). of rentals by the accused to the private complainant, involving a lease of an agricultural land by
the former from the latter. This being so, the controversy in the case at bench involves an
The antecedents are as follows: agrarian dispute which falls under the primary and exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), pursuant to Section 1, Rule II of
the DARAB New Rules of Procedure, x x x.
Veneranda is the wife of the late Dionisio Paler, Sr.3 who is the registered owner of a parcel of
irrigated riceland, containing an area of more than four (4) hectares, situated in Barangay Mabini
(Roxas), Mainit, Surigao del Norte, and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. Citing our ruling in David v. Rivera9 and Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals,10 the RTC
5747.4 One (1) hectare of this riceland (subject property) was cultivated by the respondents as opined that it had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case because the controversy had
agricultural tenants for more than ten (10) years, with an agreed lease rental of twelve and one the character of an "agrarian dispute." The trial court did not find it necessary to rule on the
half (12½) cavans of palay, at 45 kilos per cavan, per harvest. The respondents allegedly failed respondents’ Demurrer to Evidence and, in fact, no mention of it was made
to pay the rentals since 1997. Initially, Veneranda brought the matter before the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) Office in Mainit, Surigao del Norte, but no amicable settlement was in the assailed Order of May 18, 2007. Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
reached by the parties. Thus, Veneranda filed a criminal complaint for estafa against the
respondents. 1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 30,
SURIGAO CITY HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CHARGE FOR ESTAFA EVEN IF IT
Consequently, respondents were charged in an Information5 dated February 28, 2002 which INVOLVES AGRICULTURAL TENANTS OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT; [AND]
reads:
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE SEEMING "EXEMPTION" FROM CRIMINAL
That in about and during the period from 1997 to 2001 in Brgy. Roxas, Mainit, Surigao del Norte, PROSECUTION OF AGRICULTURAL TENANTS FOR ESTAFA WOULD
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said spouses Samuel and Loreta CONTRAVENE THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 1, ARTICLE III OF THE
Vanzuela, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, having leased and CONSTITUTION, SPECIFICALLY THE "EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE."11
occupied the farmland of Veneranda S. Paler and other heirs of the late Dionesio Paler, Sr., and
having harvested and accounted for a total of 400 sacks of palay for the past 10 harvest seasons Petitioner, on one hand, contends that, under Section 57 of Republic Act (RA) 6657, otherwise
of which 25% thereof were hold (sic) in trust by them or a total value of ₱80,000.00, did then and known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law" (CARL), Special Agrarian Courts (SACs)
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert said sum of were vested with limited criminal jurisdiction, i.e., with respect only to the prosecution of all
criminal offenses under the said Act; that the only penal provision in RA 6657 is Section 73 For the guidance of the bench and bar, we find it appropriate to reiterate the doctrines laid down
thereof in relation to Section 74, which does not cover estafa; that no agrarian reform law confers by this Court relative to the respective jurisdictions of the RTC and the DARAB.
criminal jurisdiction upon the DARAB, as only civil and administrative aspects in the
implementation of the agrarian reform law have been vested in the DAR; that necessarily, a The three important requisites in order that a court may acquire criminal jurisdiction are (1) the
criminal case for estafa instituted against an agricultural tenant is within the jurisdiction and court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) the court must have jurisdiction over the
competence of regular courts of justice as the same is provided for by law; that the cases relied territory where the offense was committed; and (3) the court must have jurisdiction over the
upon by the RTC do not find application in this case since the same were concerned only with person of the accused.15
the civil and administrative aspects of agrarian reform implementation; that there is no law which
provides that agricultural tenants cannot be prosecuted for estafa after they have First. It is a well-entrenched doctrine that the jurisdiction of a tribunal over the subject matter of
misappropriated the lease rentals due the landowners; and that to insulate agricultural tenants an action is conferred by law. It is determined by the material allegations of the complaint or
from criminal prosecution for estafa would, in effect, make them a class by themselves, which information and the law at the time the action was commenced. Lack of jurisdiction of the
cannot be validly done because there is no law allowing such classification. Petitioner submits
that there is no substantial distinction between an agricultural tenant who incurs criminal liability
court over an action or the subject matter of an action, cannot be cured by the silence,
for estafa for misappropriating the lease rentals due his landowner, and a non-agricultural tenant
acquiescence, or even by express consent of the parties. Thus, the jurisdiction of the court over
who likewise incurs criminal liability for misappropriation.12
the nature of the action and the subject matter thereof cannot be made to depend upon the
defenses set up in the court or upon a motion to dismiss; otherwise, the question of jurisdiction
Finally, petitioner posits that, at this point, it is premature to discuss the merits of the case would depend almost entirely on the defendant. Once jurisdiction is vested, the same is retained
because the RTC has yet to receive in full the evidence of both parties before it can render a up to the end of the litigation.16
decision on the merits. Petitioner also claims that it is pointless to delve into the merits of the
case at this stage, since the sole basis of the assailed RTC Order is simply lack of jurisdiction.13
In the instant case, the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter because the law confers on
it the power to hear and decide cases involving estafa. In Arnado v. Buban,17we held that:
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that share tenancy is now automatically converted into
leasehold tenancy wherein one of the obligations of an agricultural tenant is merely to pay
Under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, "the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum
rentals, not to deliver the landowner's share; thus, petitioner's allegation that respondents
period to prision mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed if the amount of the fraud is over
misappropriated the landowner's share of the harvest is not tenable because share tenancy has
₱12,000.00 but does not exceed ₱22,000.00; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the
already been abolished by law for being contrary to public policy. Accordingly, respondents
penalty provided x x x shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one (1) year for its
contend that the agricultural tenant's failure to pay his lease rentals does not give rise to criminal
additional ₱10,000.00 x x x." Prision mayor in its minimum period, ranges from six (6) years and
liability for estafa. Respondents stand by the ruling of the RTC that pursuant to Section 1, Rule II
one (1) day to eight (8) years. Under the law, the jurisdiction of municipal trial courts is confined
of the DARAB New Rules of Procedure, the DARAB has jurisdiction over agrarian disputes; and
to offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years, irrespective of the amount
that respondents did not commit estafa for their alleged failure to pay their lease rentals.
of the fine.
Respondents submit that a simple case for ejectment and collection of unpaid lease rentals,
instead of a criminal case, should have been filed with the DARAB. Respondents also submit
that, assuming arguendo that they failed to pay their lease rentals, they cannot be held liable for Hence, jurisdiction over the criminal cases against the [respondents] pertains to the regional trial
Estafa, as defined under Article 315, paragraph 4, No. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, because court. x x x
the liability of an agricultural tenant is a mere monetary civil obligation; and that an agricultural
tenant who fails to pay the landowner becomes merely a debtor, and, thus, cannot be held The allegations in the Information are clear -- Criminal Case No. 6087 involves alleged
criminally liable for estafa.14 misappropriation of the amount of ₱80,000.00.

Ostensibly, the main issue we must resolve is whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the crime of Second. The RTC also has jurisdiction over the offense charged since the crime was committed
estafa, because the assailed order is premised on the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject within its territorial jurisdiction.
matter. However, should our resolution be in the affirmative, the more crucial issue is whether an
agricultural tenant, who fails to pay the rentals on the land tilled, can be successfully prosecuted Third. The RTC likewise acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents because they
for estafa. voluntarily submitted to the RTC's authority. Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject
matter and over the person of the accused, and the crime was committed within its territorial
jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues that the law requires the Section 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is hereby vested with the primary
court to resolve.18
1avvphi 1 jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling
Thus, based on the law and material allegations of the information filed, the RTC erroneously under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of
concluded that it lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter on the premise that the case before it Environment and Natural Resources.
is purely an agrarian dispute. The cases relied upon by the RTC, namely, David v. Rivera19 and
Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals,20 are of different factual settings. They hinged on It shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence but shall proceed to hear and
the subject matter of Ejectment and Annulment of Certificate of Land Ownership Awards decide all cases, disputes or controversies in a most expeditious manner, employing all
(CLOAs), respectively. It is true that in Machete v. Court of Appeals21 this Court held that RTCs reasonable means to ascertain the facts of every case in accordance with justice and equity and
have no jurisdiction over cases for collection of back rentals filed against agricultural tenants by the merits of the case. Toward this end, it shall adopt a uniform rule of procedure to achieve a
their landowners. In that case, however, what the landowner filed before the RTC was a just, expeditious and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding before it.
collection suit against his alleged tenants. These three cases show that trial courts were
declared to have no jurisdiction over civil cases which were initially filed with them but were later xxx xxx xxx
on characterized as agrarian disputes and thus, within DARAB's jurisdiction. No such declaration
has been made by this Court with respect to criminal cases. Subsequently, in the process of reorganizing and strengthening the DAR, Executive Order No.
129-A24 was issued; it created the DARAB to assume the adjudicatory powers and functions of
Instead, we have Monsanto v. Zerna,22 where we upheld the RTC’s jurisdiction to try the private the DAR. Pertinent provisions of Rule II of the DARAB 2003 Rules of Procedure read:
respondents, who claimed to be tenants, for the crime of qualified theft. However, we stressed
therein that the trial court cannot adjudge civil matters that are beyond its competence. SECTION 1. Primary and Exclusive Original Jurisdiction. — The Adjudicator shall have primary
Accordingly, the RTC had to confine itself to the determination of whether private respondents and exclusive original jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate the following cases:
were guilty of the crime. Thus, while a court may have authority to pass upon the criminal liability
of the accused, it cannot make any civil awards that relate to the agrarian relationship of the
1.1. The rights and obligations of persons, whether natural or juridical, engaged in the
parties because this matter is beyond its jurisdiction and, correlatively, within DARAB's exclusive
management, cultivation, and use of all agricultural lands covered by Republic Act (RA) No.
domain.
6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), and other related
agrarian laws;
In the instant case, the RTC failed to consider that what is lodged before it is a criminal case for
estafa involving an alleged misappropriated amount of ₱80,000.00 -- a subject matter over which
xxx xxx xxx
the RTC clearly has jurisdiction. Notably, while the RTC has criminal jurisdiction conferred on it
by law, the DARAB, on the other hand, has no authority to try criminal cases at all. In Bautista v.
Mag-isa Vda. de Villena,23 we outlined the jurisdiction of the DARAB, to wit: 1.4. Those cases involving the ejectment and dispossession of tenants and/or leaseholders;

For agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR); xxx xxx xxx
more specifically, in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
Section 3(d) of RA 6657, or the CARL, defines an "agrarian dispute" over which the DARAB has
Executive Order 229 vested the DAR with (1) quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate exclusive original jurisdiction as:
agrarian reform matters; and (2) jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of (d) . . . refer[ing] to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold,
Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. This law divested the tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes
regional trial courts of their general jurisdiction to try agrarian reform matters. concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements
Under Republic Act 6657, the DAR retains jurisdiction over all agrarian reform matters. The including any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other
pertinent provision reads: terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other
agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm
operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.25
Clearly, the law and the DARAB Rules are deafeningly silent on the conferment of any criminal committed fraud by misappropriating or converting to the prejudice of another money received by
jurisdiction in favor of the DARAB. It is worth stressing that even the jurisdiction over the them in trust or under circumstances which made it their duty to deliver it to its owner. Obviously,
prosecution of criminal offenses in violation of RA 6657 per se is lodged with the SACs and not this is a form of fraud specially covered by the penal provision above cited.1awphi1

with the DARAB.26 While indeed, the parties admit that there is an agricultural tenancy
relationship in this case, and that under the circumstances, Veneranda as landowner could have In Embuscado v. People,31 the accused appealed to this Court his conviction for the crime of
simply filed a case before the DARAB for collection of lease rentals and/or dispossession of theft by the Court of First Instance even as the information charged him with Estafa and of which
respondents as tenants due to their failure to pay said lease rentals, there is no law which he was convicted by the City Court. This Court ruled that the accused was denied due process
prohibits landowners from instituting a criminal case for estafa, as defined and penalized under when the Court of First Instance convicted him of a crime not charged in the information, and
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, against their tenants. Succinctly put, though the matter then reinstated with modification the ruling of the City Court convicting him of estafa.
before us apparently presents an agrarian dispute, the RTC cannot shirk from its duty to
adjudicate on the merits a criminal case initially filed before it, based on the law and evidence Unfortunately for the petitioner, these cited cases are inapplicable. People v. Carulasdulasan
presented, in order to determine whether an accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the and Becare32 involved a relationship of agricultural share tenancy between the landowner and
crime charged. the accused. In such relationship, it was incumbent upon the tenant to hold in trust and,
eventually, account for the share in the harvest appertaining to the landowner, failing which the
However, we must reiterate our ruling in Re: Conviction of Judge Adoracion G. Angeles,27that tenant could be held liable for misappropriation. As correctly pointed out by the respondents,
while we do not begrudge a party's prerogative to initiate a case against those who, in his share tenancy has been outlawed for being contrary to public policy as early as 1963, with the
opinion, may have wronged him, we now remind landowners that such prerogative of instituting a passage of R.A. 3844.33 What prevails today, under R.A. 6657, is agricultural leasehold tenancy
criminal case against their tenants, on matters related to an agrarian dispute, must be exercised relationship, and all instances of share tenancy have been automatically converted into
with prudence, when there are clearly lawful grounds, and only in the pursuit of truth and justice. leasehold tenancy. In such a relationship, the tenant’s obligation is simply to pay rentals, not to
deliver the landowner’s share. Given this dispensation, the petitioner’s allegation that the
Thus, even as we uphold the jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the instant respondents misappropriated the landowner’s share of the
criminal case, we still deny the petition.
harvest – as contained in the information – is untenable. Accordingly, the respondents cannot be
Herein respondents were charged with the crime of estafa as defined under Article 315, held liable under Article 315, paragraph 4, No. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.
paragraph 4, No. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, which refers to fraud committed —
It is also worth mentioning that in Embuscado v. People,34 this Court merely dwelt on the issue of
By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other whether the accused charged with estafa could be convicted of the crime of theft. Issues of
personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or tenancy vis-a-vis issues of criminal liability of tenants were not addressed. Thus, the dissenting
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even opinion of then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla in the said case is worth mentioning when he opined
though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having that:
received such money, goods, or other property.
It is also my opinion that the petitioner cannot be found guilty of estafa because the mangoes
We viewed the cases invoked by the petitioner, namely, People v. Carulasdulasan and allegedly misappropriated by him were not given to him in trust or on commission, or for
Becarel28 and Embuscado v. People29where this Court affirmed the conviction for estafa of the administration, or under any obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the
accused therein who were also agricultural tenants. In People v. Carulasdulasan and same, as provided for in Art. 315, par. 4, No. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code. What was
Becarel,30 this Court held that - entrusted to him for cultivation was a landholding planted with coconut and mango trees and the
mangoes, allegedly misappropriated by him, were the fruits of the trees planted on the land.
From the facts alleged, it is clear that the accused received from the sale of the abaca harvested Consequently, the action, if any, should have been for accounting and delivery of the landlord's
by them a sum of money which did not all belong to them because one-half of it corresponds to share in the mangoes sold by the petitioner.35
the landlord's share of the abaca under the tenancy agreement. This half the accused were
under obligation to deliver to the landlord. They therefore held it in trust for him. But instead of In fine, we hold that the trial court erred when it dismissed the criminal case for lack of
turning it over to him, they appropriated it to their own use and refused to give it to him jurisdiction over the subject matter. However, we find no necessity to remand the case to the trial
notwithstanding repeated demands. In other words, the accused are charged with having court for further proceedings, as it would only further delay the resolution of this case. We have
opted to rule on the merits of the parties’ contentions, and hereby declare that respondents
cannot be held liable for estafa for their failure to pay the rental on the agricultural land subject of
the leasehold.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA


Associate Justice
EN BANC with the jeepney strike called by the Alliance of Concerned Transport Organization
(ACTO). Thereafter, they were charged with Illegal Assembly in Criminal Cases Nos.
[G.R. No. 69863-65 : December 10, 1990.]
37783, 37787 and 37788 with Branch 108, Regional Trial Court, NCJR, Quezon City. 2
192 SCRA 183
Except for Brocka, et al. who were charged as leaders of the offense of Illegal Assembly
LINO BROCKA, BENJAMIN CERVANTES, COSME GARCIA, RODOLFO SANTOS, and for whom no bail was recommended, the other petitioners were released on bail of
VALENTINO SALIPSIP, RICARDO VEGA, ERIC MARIANO, JOSE EMMANUEL P3,000.00 each. Brocka, et al.'s provisional release was ordered only upon an urgent
OYALES, RONNIE MATTA, ALFREDO VIAJE, RUBEN EUGENIO, REYNALDO ORTIZ, petition for bail for which daily hearings from February 1-7, 1985 were held.
ORLANDO ORTIZ, NOEL REYES, EDUARDO IMPERIAL, NESTOR SARMIENTO,
However, despite service of the order of release on February 9, 1985, Brocka, et al.
FRANCO PALISOC, VIRGILIO DE GUZMAN, ALBERTO REYES, JESSIE PINILI,
remained in detention, respondents having invoked a Preventive Detention Action (PDA)
ROMULO AUGUIS, DOMINADOR RESURRECION III, RONNIE LAYGO, ROSAURO
allegedly issued against them on January 28, 1985 (p. 6, Rollo). Neither the original,
ROQUE, CLARENCE SORIANO, OCTAVO DEPAWA, CARLITO LA TORRE, SEVERNO
duplicate original nor certified true copy of the PDA was ever shown to them (p. 367,
ILANO, JR., DOMINGO CAJIPE, ALAN ALEGRE, RAMON MARTINEZ, MA. GILDA
Rollo).
HERNANDEZ, EDNA P. VILLANUEVA, DOLLY S. CANU, MELQUIADES C. ATIENZA,
ELIGIO P. VERA CRUZ, ROGER C. BAGAN, ABUNDIO M. CALISTE, Brocka, et al. were subsequently charged on February 11, 1985 with Inciting to Sedition,
Petitioners,vs. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, MAJ. GENERAL FIDEL V. RAMOS, BRIG. docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-38023, Q-38024 and Q-38025 (p. 349, Rollo),
GENERAL PEDRO BALBANERO, COL. ABAD, COL. DAWIS, SERGIO APOSTOL, without prior notice to their counsel (p. 7, Rollo). The original informations filed
P/LT, RODOLFO M. GARCIA and JUDGE RICARDO TENSUAN, Respondents. recommended no bail (p. 349, Rollo). The circumstances surrounding the hasty filing of
this second offense are cited by Brocka, et al. (quoting from a separate petition filed on
their behalf in G.R. Nos. 69848-50 entitled "Sedfrey A. Ordoñez vs. Col. Julian Arzaga,
DECISION et al."), as follows:
"x x x
MEDIALDEA, J.: "6. The sham' character of the inquest examination concocted by all respondents is
starkly bizarre when we consider that as early as 10:30 A.M. today, February 11, 1985,
Benjamin Cervantes was able to contact undersigned petitioner by phone informing
This petition was originally filed on February 13, 1985 to secure the release of counsel that said Benjamin Cervantes and the 4 other persons who are the subjects of
petitioners on habeas corpus and to permanently enjoin the City Fiscal of Quezon City this petition will be brought before the Quezon City Fiscal at 2:30 for undisclosed
from investigating charges of "Inciting to Sedition" against petitioners Lino Brocka, reasons: subsequently, another phone call was received by petitioning counsel informing
Benjamin Cervantes, Cosme Garcia and Rodolfo Santos, (hereafter Brocka, et al.). On him that the appearance of Benjamin Cervantes et al. was to be at 2:00 P.M. When
learning that the corresponding informations for this offense has been filed by the City petitioning counsel arrived in the office of Assistant City Fiscal Arturo Tugonon, the
Fiscal against them on February 11, 1985, a supplemental petition was filed on February complainants' affidavits had not yet been received by any of the panel of three assistant
19, 1985 (p. 51, Rollo) to implead the Presiding Judge, 1 and to enjoin the prosecution city fiscals, although the five persons under detention were already in the office of said
of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-38023, Q-38024 and Q-38025 (p. 349, Rollo) and the issuance assistant fiscal as early as 2:00 P.M. It was only at 3:00 when a representative of the
of warrants for their arrests, including their arraignment. Since then President Ferdinand military arrived bringing with him alleged statements of complainants against Lino Broka
E. Marcos had ordered the provisional release of Brocka, et al., the issue on habeas (sic) et al. for alleged inciting to sedition, whereupon undersigned counsel asked
corpus has become moot and academic (p. 396, Rollo). We shall thus focus on the respondent Colonel Agapito Abad 'who ordered the detained persons to be brought to
question of whether or not the prosecution of the criminal cases for Inciting to Sedition the office of Assistant Fiscal Arturo Tugonon since there were no charges on file;' and
may lawfully be enjoined.:-cralaw

said Colonel Agapito Abad said aloud: 'I only received a telephone call from Colonel
Petitioners were arrested on January 28, 1985 by elements of the Northern Police Arzaga about 11:00 A.M. to bring the detained persons today — I am only the
District following the forcible and violent dispersal of a demonstration held in sympathy custodian.' At 3:15, petitioning counsel inquired from the Records Custodian when the
charges against Lino Broka (sic) had been officially received and he was informed that which corresponding cases were filed. The respondents complied with Our resolution
the said charges were never coursed through the Records Office. requiring them, inter alia, to make a RETURN of the writ of habeas corpus. In their
RETURN, it appeared that all the accused had already been released, four of them on
"7. Under the facts narrated above, respondents have conspired to use the strong arm
February 15, 1985 and one February 8, 1985. The petitioner, nevertheless, argued that
of the law and hatched the nefarious scheme to deprive Lino Broka (sic) et al. the right
the petition has not become moot and academic because the accused continue to be in
to bail because the utterances allegedly constituting inciting to sedition under Article 142
the custody of the law under an invalid charge of inciting to sedition." (p. 395, Rollo).
of the Revised Penal Code are, except for varying nuances, almost verbatim the same
utterances which are the subject of Criminal Cases No. 37783, 37787 and 37788 and for Hence, this petition.
which said detained persons are entitled to be released on bail as a matter of
Brocka, et al. contend that respondents' manifest bad faith and/or harassment are
constitutional right. Among the utterances allegedly made by the accused and which the
sufficient bases for enjoining their criminal prosecution, aside from the fact that the
respondents claimed to be violative of Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code are:
second offense of inciting to sedition is illegal, since it is premised on one and the same
'Makiisa sa mga drivers, "Makiisa sa aming layunin, "Digmaang bayan ang sagot sa
act of attending and participating in the ACTO jeepney strike. They maintain that while
kahirapan,' Itigil ang pakikialam ng imperyalismo sa Pilipinas,' 'Rollback ng presyo ng
there may be a complex crime from a single act (Art. 48, RTC), the law does not allow
langis sa 95 Centavos.' (See Annex B)
the splitting of a single act into two offenses and filing two informations therefor, further,
"8. That when petitioning counsel and other members of the defense panel requested that they will be placed in double jeopardy.
that they be given 7 days within which said counsel may confer with their clients — the
The primary issue here is the legality of enjoining the criminal prosecution of a case,
detained persons named above, the panel of assistant fiscals demanded that said
since the two other issues raised by Brocka, et al. are matters of defense against the
detained persons should sign a 'waiver' of their rights under Article 125 of the Revised
sedition charge.
Penal Code as a condition for the grant of said request, which is a harassing requirement
considering that Lino Broka (sic) et al. were already under the detention, albeit illegally, We rule in favor of Brocka, et al. and enjoin their criminal prosecution for the second
and they could not have waived the right under Rule 125 which they did not enjoy at the offense of inciting to sedition.
time the ruling was made by the panel of assistant city fiscals." (pp. 4-6, Rollo in G.R. Indeed, the general rule is that criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by
69848-50). injunction, preliminary or final. There are however exceptions, among which are:
They were released provisionally on February 14, 1985, on orders of then President F. E. "a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused (Hernandez
Marcos. The circumstances of their release are narrated in Our resolution dated January vs. Albano, et al., L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95);
26, 1985, as quoted in the Solicitor General's Manifestation as follows:
"b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
"G.R. Nos. 69848-50 (Sedfrey A. Ordoñez, Petitioner, vs. Col. Julian Arzaga, et al., multiplicity of actions (Dimayuga, et al. vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez
Respondents). — Petitioner Sedfrey A. Ordoñez filed this petition for habeas corpus in vs. Albano, supra; Fortun vs. Labang, et al., L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA 607);
behalf of Lino Brocka, Benjamin Cervantes, Cosme Garcia, Alexander Luzano, and
Rodolfo Santos, who were all detained under a Preventive Detention Action (PDA) issued "c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice (De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70
by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on January 28, 1985. They were charged in three Phil. 202);
separate informations of the crime of illegal assembly under Art. 146, paragraph 3 of the "d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas vs. Gil, 67
Revised Penal Code, as amended by PD 1834. On February 7, 1985, the Honorable Phil. 62);
Miriam Defensor Santiago, Regional Trial Judge of Quezon City, issued a resolution in the
above criminal cases, directing the release of the five accused on bail of P6,000.00 for "e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation (Young
each of them, and from which resolution the respondent fiscals took no appeal. vs. Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);
Immediately thereafter, the accused filed their respective bail bonds. This "f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang vs. People and Avendia, 109
notwithstanding, they continued to be held in detention by order of the respondent Phil. 1140);
colonels; and on February 11, 1985, these same accused were 'reinvestigated,' this time
on charges of 'inciting to sedition' ** under Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code, following
"g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez vs. City Judge, L-25795, roughshod over a citizen's basic constitutional lights, such as due process, or manipulate
October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616); the law to suit dictatorial tendencies.
"h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia vs. Ocampo, CA- We are impelled to point out a citizen's helplessness against the awesome powers of a
G.R. No. 4760, March 25, 1960); dictatorship. Thus, while We agree with the Solicitor General's observation and/or
manifestation that Brocka, et al. should have filed a motion to quash the information,
"i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance
We, however, believe that such a course of action would have been a futile move,
(Recto vs. Castelo, 18 L.J. [1953], cited in Rañoa vs. Alvendia, CA-G.R. No. 30720-R,
considering the circumstances then prevailing. Thus, the tenacious invocation of a
October 8, 1962; Cf, Guingona, et al vs. City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA
spurious and inoperational PDA and the sham and hasty preliminary investigation were
577); and
clear signals that the prosecutors intended to keep Brocka, et al. in detention until the
"j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash second offense of "Inciting to Sedition" could be facilitated and justified without need of
on that ground has been denied (Salonga vs. Paño, et al., L-59524, February 18, 1985, issuing a warrant of arrest anew. As a matter of fact the corresponding informations for
134 SCRA 438). this second offense were hastily filed on February 11, 1985, or two days after Brocka, et
"7. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the al.'s release from detention was ordered by the trial judge on February 9, 1985.
threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners (Rodriguez vs. Castelo, L-6374, August 1, Constitutional rights must be upheld at all costs, for this gesture is the true sign of
1958)." (cited in Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, p. 188, 1988 Ed.) democracy. These may not be set aside to satisfy perceived illusory visions of national
In the petition before Us, Brocka, et al. have cited the circumstances to show that the grandeur.: na d

criminal proceedings had become a case of persecution, having been undertaken by In the case of J. Salonga v. Cruz Paño, We point out:
state officials in bad faith.
"Infinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal
: nad

Respondents, on the other hand, had invoked a PDA in refusing Brocka, et al.'s release procedure is respect for the citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest and
from detention (before their release on orders of then Pres. Marcos). This PDA was, punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious prosecution . . ." (G.R. No. L-
however, issued on January 28, 1985, but was invoked only on February 9, 1985 (upon 59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438-at p. 448).
receipt of the trial court's order of release). Under the guidelines issued, PDAs shall be
We, therefore, rule that where there is manifest bad faith that accompanies the filing of
invoked within 24 hours (in Metro Manila) or 48 hours (outside Metro Manila). (Ilagan v.
criminal charges, as in the instant case where Brocka, et al. were barred from enjoying
Enrile, G.R. No. 70748, October 28, 1985, 139 SCRA 349). Noteworthy also is Brocka, et
provisional release until such time that charges were filed, and where a sham
al.'s claim that, despite subpoenas for its production, the prosecution merely presented
preliminary investigation was hastily conducted, charges that are filed as a result should
a purported xerox copy of the invoked PDA (par. 4, Counter-Rejoinder, p. 367, Rollo).
lawfully be enjoined.
The foregoing circumstances were not disputed by the Solicitor General's office. In fact
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The trial court is PERMANENTLY
they found petitioner's plight "deplorable" (par. 51, Manifestation, p. 396, Rollo).
ENJOINED from proceeding in any manner with the cases subject of the petition. No
The hasty filing of the second offense, premised on a spurious and inoperational PDA, costs.
certainly betrays respondent's bad faith and malicious intent to pursue criminal charges
SO ORDERED.
against Brocka, et al.
Fernan C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco,
We have expressed Our view in the Ilagan case that "individuals against whom PDAs
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino and Regalado, JJ., concur.
have been issued should be furnished with the original, and the duplicate original, and a
certified true copy issued by the official having official custody of the PDA, at the time of Feliciano, J., is on leave.
the apprehension" (supra, p. 369).
We do not begrudge the zeal that may characterize a public official's prosecution of
criminal offenders. We, however, believe that this should not be a license to run
G.R. No. 170298 June 26, 2007 in payment for assorted pieces of jewelry, received from Leonardo A. Jose, which check upon
presentation with the drawee bank for payment was dishonored for insufficiency of funds and
MANUEL S. ISIP, petitioner, notwithstanding repeated demands made by Leonardo A. Jose for the redemption of the said
vs. check, accused refused and still refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. Leonardo A. Jose in the above-stated amount of ₱562,000.00, Philippine Currency.4

DECISION The six other Informations are similarly worded except for the date when the offense was
committed, the number and amount of the check. The pertinent data in the other informations
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: are as follows:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which seeks Crim. Case No. Date of Commission No. of Check Amount of Check
to set aside the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 26 October 2004 in CA-G.R. CR No.
21275 entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Manuel S. Isip and Marietta M. Isip" to the extent 147-84 17 March 1984 518644 ₱50,000.00
that it affirmed with modifications petitioner Manuel S. Isip’s conviction for Estafa in Criminal
Case No. 136-84 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch XVII, Cavite City, and its Amended 148-84 30 March 1984 518645 ₱50,000.00
Decision2 dated 26 October 2005 denying his Partial Motion for Reconsideration.
149-84 12 March 1984 0300865 ₱150,000.00
The antecedents are the following:
155-84 25 March 1984 518674 ₱95,000.00
Petitioner was charged with Estafa in Criminal Case No. 136-84 before Branch XVII of the RTC
of Cavite City, under the following information: 156-84 29 March 1984 518646 ₱90,000.00

That on or about March 7, 1984, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the 157-84 1 April 1984 518669 ₱25,000.00
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received from Leonardo A. Jose
one (1) seven carat diamond (men’s ring), valued at ₱200,000.00, for the purpose of selling the
The spouses Isip were likewise charged before the same court with five (5) counts of Estafa. The
same on commission basis and to deliver the proceeds of the sale thereof or return the jewelry if
cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84. The
not sold, on or before March 15, 1984, but the herein accused once in possession of the above-
Estafa charged in Crim. Case No. 256-84 was allegedly committed as follows:
described articles, with intent to defraud and with grave abuse of confidence, did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the same to his own
personal use and benefit and notwithstanding repeated demands made by Leonardo A. Jose for That on or about March 20, 1984, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the
the return of the jewelry or the delivery of the proceeds of the sale thereof, failed to do so, to the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
damage and prejudice of the aforesaid Leonardo A. Jose in the abovestated amount of together and mutually helping one another, received from one Leonardo A. Jose the following
₱200,000.00, Philippine Currency.3 pieces of jewelry, to wit: one (1) set dome shape ring and earrings valued at ₱120,000.00, with
the obligation of selling the same on commission basis and deliver the proceeds of the sale
thereof or return them if not sold, on or before March 21, 1984, but the herein accused, once in
Petitioner’s wife, Marietta M. Isip, was indicted before the same court for seven counts of
possession of the said jewelry by means of false pretenses, with intent to defraud and with grave
Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law. The cases
abuse of confidence, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate,
were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and 157-
misapply and convert them to their own personal use and benefit and paid the same with Check
84. The accusatory portion of the information in Criminal Case No. 146-84 reads:
Nos. 518646 and 518669, dated March 29, 1984 and April 1, 1984, respectively, in the amount
of ₱90,000 and ₱25,000, respectively, which upon presentation with the bank was dishonored
That on or about March 27, 1984, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the for insufficiency of funds and notwithstanding repeated demands made by Leonardo A. Jose for
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully well that her the redemption of the said check, failed to do so, to his damage and prejudice in the abovestated
account with the bank is insufficient, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and amount of ₱120,000.00, Philippine Currency.6
knowingly issue Pacific Banking Corporation Check No. 518672 in the amount of ₱562,000.00,
Except for the description and value of the pieces of jewelry involved, date of receipt and agreed as partial payment for the jewelry. The receipt of the jewelry was acknowledged by Marietta Isip
date of return, and the number, date and amount of the checks issued in payment thereof, the with Manuel acting as a witness (pp. 9-11, tsn, ibid).
four other informations are similarly worded. The specifics thereof are as follows:
This particular men’s ring is the subject of Criminal Case No. 378-84 for Estafa while Check Nos.
Crim. Case No. Value of Date of Agreed Date of Check No./Date Amount 518644 and 518645 (Pacific Banking Corp.) dated March 17 and 30, respectively, are the
Jewelry Receipt Return subject of Criminal Case Nos. 147-84 and 148-84.
257-84 030086/03-12-84 ₱150,000
₱150,000 03-07-84 03-30-84 In the morning of March 7, 1984, the Isip couple went again to complainant’s residence in
260-84 518647/03-25-84 ₱95,000 Caridad, Cavite City where complainant delivered one (1) Choker Pearl with 35 pieces of south
₱95,000 03-20-84 03-27-84 sea pearls with diamond worth ₱150,000.00. The condition was that the proceeds be turned over
261-84 518672/03-27-84 ₱562,000 to complainant on or before March 30, 1984 (pp. 27-29, tsn, ibid). March 30, 1984 came, but
₱562,000 03-20-84 03-27-84 instead of turning over the proceeds or return the Choker Pearl, Mrs. Isip issued a check dated
March 12, 1984 for ₱150,000.00 (RCBC check No. 030086) as payment (p. 34, ibid).
378-84 518644/03-17-84 ₱50,000
₱200,000 02-03-84 -
This is the subject of Criminal Case No. 254-84 for Estafa against the spouses and Criminal
518645/03-30-84 ₱50,000 Case No. 149-84 for violation of BP 22 against Marietta Isip.

When arraigned on the charges, petitioner and Marietta Isip pleaded not guilty. There being only In the afternoon of the same day, Mr. Manuel Isip went to complainant’s residence in Cavite City
one complainant in all the cases, joint trial of the cases followed. and got from the latter a men’s ring (7 carats) worth ₱200,000.00. Mr. Isip signed a receipt with
the condition that he return the ring or deliver the proceeds, if sold, on or before March 15, 1984.
The versions of the prosecution and the defense, as taken by the Court of Appeals in the parties’ March 15, 1984 came, but Mr. Isip sought an extension which fell due on April 7, 1984. April 7,
respective briefs, are the following: 1984 came and went by, but Mr. Isip defaulted (pp. 41-46, tsn, ibid). The above is the subject
matter of Criminal Case No. 136-84 for Estafa against Manuel Isip.
i) Prosecution Version. –
On March 20, 1984, the Isips went again to Cavite City and got from complainant one (1) Dome
Sometime in 1982, appellant spouses Manuel and Marietta Isip were introduced to complainant shaped ring with matching earring with diamonds valued at ₱120,000.00. As with their previous
Atty. Leonardo Jose. The introduction was made by complainant’s father, Nemesio, business agreement, the item was to be returned or the proceeds of the sale be delivered on March 21,
associate of the Isips. Nemesio and the Isips were then engaged in the buy and sell of pledged 1984 (pp. 48-52, tsn, ibid). The following morning, however, Mrs. Isip issued two (2) personal
and unredeemed jewelry pawned by gambling habitués (pp. 8-16, tsn, June 8, 1993). checks (Check Nos. 518646 and 518669 dated March 29, 1984 for ₱90,000.00 and ₱25,000.00,
respectively) in payment for the Dome shaped ring (p. 53, tsn, ibid).
Needing a bigger capital to finance the growing operation, the Isips convinced complainant to be
their capitalist, a proposition to which complainant acceded to (p. 14, ibid). This is the subject of Criminal Case No. 256084 for Estafa against the spouses Isip and Criminal
Case Nos. 156-84 and and (sic) 157-84 for Violation of BP 22 against Marietta Isip.
Thus, the operation went smoothly – that was before February, 1984 (pp. 14-18, tsn, ibid).
At noontime on the same day, the Isip couple went back to the residence of complainant and got
On February 3, 1984, at complainant’s residence in Caridad, Cavite City, appellant spouses from him one (1) collar heart shaped necklace and one (1) baguette necklace worth ₱95,000.00
received from complainant a 6 carat men’s ring valued at ₱200,000.00 with the condition that (p. 60, tsn, ibid). As agreed upon, Marietta Isip signed a receipt with the condition that the jewelry
they are going to sell said jewelry x x x on commission basis for ₱200,000.00 and if they are not or the proceeds thereof be delivered to complainant on March 27, 1984. The Isips defaulted and
able to sell the same, they have to return the ring if sold on or before March 3, 1984 (p. 8, tsn, instead, Mrs. Isip issued a check (Check No. 518647) dated March 27, 1984 in the amount of
October 15, 1993). ₱90,000.00 (pp. 3-5, tsn, October 22, 1993).

On March 3, 1984, the Isips did not return the ring or the proceeds thereof. Instead, Marietta Isip The subject pieces of jewelry are the subject of Criminal Case No. 260-84 for Estafa against the
issued two (2) personal checks dated March 17 and 30, 1984, respectively, for ₱50,000.00 each Isip couple and Criminal Case No. 155-84 for Violation of BP 22 against Marietta Isip.
Again, in the early evening of March 20, 1984, the Isips went to complainant informing him that been paid or redeemed, had returned the unsold jewelry to complainant and had conveyed, by
Balikbayan doctors are having a convention in Vigan, Ilocos Sur saying that, that was the most way of payment for other jewelry, some personal properties, like brass and antics, and real
opportune time to sell jewelries. Assorted pieces of jewelry were delivered to Mrs. Isip as properties in Balanga, Bataan and Mabalacat, Pampanga, to complainant who caused the same
reflected in a receipt duly signed by her (Exhibit ‘O’) acknowledging the value thereof to the tune to be registered in the names of his son, Christian Jose, and his wife, Zenaida Jose (Exhibits 1, 2,
of ₱562,000.00. 2-A, 3, 4, 5, 6, 6-A, 7, 7-A), with the result that all the obligations of appellants to complainant
have already been paid for or offset (Tr., Idem, 23; Tr., Idem, 24, 34-36, 37-39; Tr., 3/4/96, 7-8).
Exhibit ‘O’ contained the promise that the jewelry or proceeds thereof will be delivered on March Also, all the checks that appellant Marietta issued which were initially dishonored have already
27, 1984. Inspite of the promise contained in Exhibit ‘O’, Mrs. Isip issued a postdated check been (sic) (Tr., 10/2/95, 25-30; Tr., 3/4/96, 8-9). In fact, complainant caused the dismissal of
(Check No. 51867) dated March 27, 1984 in the amount of ₱562,000.00 as payment for the some cases he filed against appellants. Complainant however failed to return some of the
assorted pieces of jewelry (pp. 8-12, tsn, October 22, 1993). redeemed and/or paid checks issued to him by appellant Marietta on the pretext that he did not
bring them (Tr., 3/4/96, 20). Inasmuch as appellant Marietta incurred some default in payment
This is the subject matter of Criminal Case No. 261-84 for Estafa against the couple and Criminal and complainant suspected that she would not be able to redeem the checks or pay for the
Case No. 146-84 against Marietta Isip for Violation of BP 22. pledged jewelry, complainant demanded that appellants sign certain documents to avoid any
misunderstanding, with threat of prosecution before the Cavite courts if they do not comply (Tr.,
Idem, 19-20; Tr., 3/4/96, 5-6). So, in order to maintain good relations with complainant, appellant
All of the checks covered by the above transactions were deposited on April 6, 1984 (p. 14, tsn,
Marietta signed the document acknowledging obligations to him in one sitting, which appellant
ibid), but all of them bounced for being drawn against insufficient funds. Demand letters sent to
Manuel witnessed (Tr., Idem, 21-22). Later, appellants learned that, although all the transactions
the couple proved futile (pp. 15-20, ibid).
were entered into in Manila, complainant filed the cases herein before the Cavite Regional Trial
Court (Tr., Idem, 23-24).7
ii) Defense Version.
On November 25, 1996, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion thereof
During all the times material to these cases, complainant Leonardo Jose, who had his residence reading:
at Room 411, 4th Floor, Plaza Towers Condominium on (sic) 3375 Guerrero Street, Ermita,
Manila, but claims he had his ancestral home at 506 P. Burgos Street, Caridad, Cavite, was an
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Dra. Marietta M. Isip guilty
employee of the Bureau of Customs, having been so since 1964 (Tr., 6/8/93, 7). Upon the other
beyond reasonable doubt of a (sic) violation of B.P. 22 in Crim. Cases Nos. 146-84, 147-84, 148-
hand, appellants Manuel S. Isip (Manuel hereafter) and Marietta M. Isip (Marietta hereafter) are
84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and 157-84 and she is hereby sentenced to undergo imprisonment
spouses, residents at 3635 M. Arellano Street, Bacood, Sta. Mesa, Manila (Tr., 8/29/93, 4) and
of One (1) year of prision correctional (sic) in each case; and of Estafa in the following Crim.
engaged in various business undertakings in Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Baguio City, Olongapo
Cases: No. 256-84 where she is sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years
City and Bataan (Tr., Idem, 9; Tr., 10/2/95, 13) – appellant Manuel, in the brokerage and trucking
of prision mayor, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to
business; while appellant Marietta, in that of selling jewelry and financing, as well as in PX goods,
indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount of ₱120,000.00 for the value of the
real estate and cars, which she started when she was still single (Tr., Idem, 9-10; Tr., 10/2/95,
articles misappropriated; Crim. Case No. 257-84 where she is sentenced to undergo
12). In 1982, at the casino in Olongapo City, appellant Marietta started obtaining jewelry from
imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of
losing or financially-strapped players which she repledged as security for financing she obtained
reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the
from one Nemesio Jose, father of complainant Leonardo Jose (Tr., Idem, 11-12; Tr., Idem, 14).
amount of ₱150,000.00; Crim. Case No. 260-84 where she is sentenced to undergo
After about a year, when Nemesio Jose ran short of capital, he referred appellants to his son,
imprisonment of, from Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
complainant Leonardo Jose, with address at the Plaza Towers Condominium aforesaid for
Seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Atty.
needed financing (Tr., Idem, 13-14; Tr., Idem, 17-19). Beginning early 1983, at complainant’s
Leonardo Jose the amount of ₱95,000.00; Crim. Case No. 261-84 where she is sentenced to
residence at Plaza Tower Condominium in Manila, appellant Marietta, accompanied by her
undergo imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years and One (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
husband who participated only as a witness, started having transactions with complainant who,
minimum, to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the
on different dates in February, March and April, 1984, extended various amounts to her for which
complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount of ₱562,000.00; Crim. Case No. 378-84 where she
appellant Marietta pledged jewelry which, in turn, were agreed between her and complainant to
is sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years and One (1) day of reclusion
be sold on commission and to turn over the proceeds thereof or return the jewelry to complainant
temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to
(Tr., Idem, 16-18). In the course of the transactions, appellant Marietta had issued several
indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount of ₱200,000.00 and to pay the costs.
checks to complainant as guarantee for the payment of the subject jewelry which have either
Likewise, accused Manuel Isip is acquitted in Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 THE TRIAL COURT, ASSUMING IT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASES BELOW, ERRD
and 378-84. However, in Crim. Case No. 136-84, he is hereby found guilty of Estafa and he is IN NOT HOLDING THAT NO CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22 WAS
hereby sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years and One (1) day of INCURRED BY APPELLANT MARIETTA M. ISIP FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE SUBJECT
reclusion temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, to CHECKS INASMUCH AS SAID CHECKS WERE ISSUED AS MERE GUARANTY FOR
indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose in the amount of ₱200,000.00 value of the OBLIGATIONS INCURRED.
jewelry misappropriated, and to pay the costs.8
- III -
In ruling the way it did, the RTC found that the transactions involved in these cases were
sufficiently shown to have taken place at complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose’s ancestral house in THE TRIAL COURT, ASSUMING ANY INCIPIENT LIABILITY FOR THE CRIME OF ESTAFA
Cavite City when the latter was on leave of absence from the Bureau of Customs where he was HAD BEEN INCURRED BY APPELLANTS IN THE PREMISES, ERRED IN NOT HOLDING
connected. It said the defense failed to substantially prove its allegations that the transactions THAT SUCH INCIPIENT LIABILITY HAD BEEN EXTINGUISHED BY
occurred in Manila, particularly in the Towers Condominium, and that complainant is a resident PAYMENTS/REDEMPTIONS MADE AND/OR NOVATION ENTERED INTO BETWEEN
of Bigasan, Makati. It added that the testimony of Marietta Isip that the money with which the COMPLAINANT AND SAID APPELLANTS.
complainant initially agreed to finance their transactions was withdrawn from the Sandigan
Finance in Cavite City further refuted the defense’s claim that the transactions happened in - IV -
Manila. The trial court likewise found the defense’s contention, that the obligations were already
paid and set-off with the turnover to complainant of personal and real properties, to be untenable
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANTS MANUEL S. ISIP AND MARIETTA M.
for it is contrary to human nature to demand payment when the same had already been made
ISIP GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES OF ESTAFA AND
and the alleged set-offs were for other cases which were settled amicably and subsequently
VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22 RESPECTFULLY IMPUTED UPON THEM AND
dismissed upon motion of the City Prosecutor’s Office at the instance of the complainant.
IN NOT ACQUITTING THEM UPON THE GROUND THAT THEIR GUILT THEREOF, OR OF
ANY CRIME FOR THAT MATTER, HAD NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE
The trial court was convinced that accused Marietta Isip misappropriated the pieces of jewelry DOUBT AND/OR THAT THE LIABILITY INCURRED BY THEM, IF ANY, IS MERELY CIVIL.9
involved in Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84 and violated Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 when she issued the checks mentioned in Criminal Cases No. 146-84, 147-
Before the Court of Appeals could have decided the case, Marietta Isip died thereby
84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and 157-84. As to petitioner, the trial court acquitted him in
extinguishing her criminal and civil liability, if any.
Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84 finding him to have acted as a
mere witness when he signed the receipts involved in said cases, but found him liable in Criminal
Case No. 136-84 for misappropriating a 7-carat diamond men’s ring which he secured from the In a decision promulgated 26 October 2004, the Court of Appeals disposed of the case as
complainant. follows:

Aggrieved, petitioner and spouse appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning the following as WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City (Branch XVII) –
errors:
1. In Crim. Case No. 136-84 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that the sentence imposed
-I- on accused-appellant Manuel S. Isip shall be two (2) years of prision correccional, as minimum,
to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and that the sum of ₱200,000.00 he
was ordered to pay to Leonardo A. Jose shall bear interest at the legal rate from filing of the
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF AND DECIDING THE CASES
information until fully paid;
AGAINST APPELLANTS AND IN NOT DISMISSING THE SAME UPON THE GROUND THAT
NONE OF THE ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS OF THE OFFENSES CHARGED THEREIN WAS
COMMITTED WITH (SIC) ITS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION. 2. In Crim. Cases Nos. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and 157-84 is
REVERSED and accused-appellant Marietta M. Isip ACQUITTED of the crimes charged; and
- II -
3. In Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84 is REVERSED and accused-
appellants Manuel S. Isip and Marietta M. Isip ACQUITTED of the crimes charged, but ordering
them to pay to Leonardo A. Jose, jointly and severally, the sums of ₱120,000.00, ₱150,000.00,
₱95,000.00, ₱562,000.00 and ₱200,000.00 representing the amounts involved in said cases, "3. In Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84 is REVERSED, accused-
plus interest thereon at the legal rate from filing of the information until fully paid.10 appellants Manuel S. Isip and Marietta M. Isip ACQUITTED of the crimes charged and the civil
aspect of those cases DISMISSED."13
The Court of Appeals upheld the lower court’s finding that the venue was properly laid and that
the checks were delivered by the two accused and/or that the transactions transpired at Petitioner is now before us appealing his conviction in Criminal Case No. 136-84. He raises the
complainant’s ancestral home in Cavite City, and that, consequently, the offenses charged took following issues:
place within its territorial jurisdiction. With respect to the seven counts of violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, the appellate court acquitted Marietta Isip of the charges on the ground that First – WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE
since the checks involved were issued prior to 8 August 1984, the dishonor thereof did not give IMPUTED TO PETITIONER AND FOR WHICH HE WAS CONVICTED;
rise to a criminal liability pursuant to Ministry Circular No. 4 of the Ministry of Justice.
Second – WHETHER THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENTLY SHOWS THAT PETITIONER
As to the Estafa cases (Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84), the RECEIVED THE SUBJECT OF SAID OFFENSE OR THAT HE RECEIVED IT IN CAVITE CITY;
Court of Appeals ruled that since the checks issued by Marietta Isip as payment for the pieces of and
jewelry were dishonored, there was no payment to speak of. It also found the defense’s claim of
redemption/dacion en pago – that real and personal properties were conveyed to complainant Third, WHETHER THE INCIPIENT CRIMINAL LIABILITY ARISING FROM SAID OFFENSE, IS
who executed affidavits of desistance and caused the dismissal of some of the cases – to be (sic) ANY, WAS EXTINGUISHED BY NOVATION.
unmeritorious. However, the appellate court ruled that though novation does not extinguish
criminal liability, it may prevent the rise of such liability as long at it occurs prior to the filing of the
On the first issue, petitioner maintains that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the estafa charge in
criminal information in court. In these five cases, it ruled that there was novation because
Criminal Case No. 136-84 and it is pure speculation and conjectural, if not altogether improbable
complainant accepted the checks issued by Marietta Isip as payment for the pieces of jewelry
or manifestly absurd, to suppose that any of the essential elements of the Estafa charged in
involved in said cases. Consequently, the Court of Appeals acquitted Marietta and
Criminal Case No. 136-84 took place in Cavite City. First, he states that the residence of the
petitioner,11 but held them liable to complainant for the value of the jewelry involved.
parties is immaterial and that it is the situs of the transaction that counts. He argues that it is non
sequitur that simply because complainant had an alleged ancestral house in Caridad, Cavite,
As regards Criminal Case No. 136-84 for estafa against petitioner, the appellate court affirmed complainant actually lived there and had the transactions there with him when he and his late
the trial court’s ruling of conviction. It found petitioner’s claims that he did not receive the jewelry wife were actual residents of Manila. Mere convenience suggests that their transaction was
worth ₱200,000.00 mentioned in the information; that the receipt he issued for said jewelry was entered into in Manila. He adds that the source of the fund used to finance the transactions is
among those documents which were forced upon him to sign under threat of criminal prosecution; likewise inconsequential because it is where the subject item was delivered and received by
and that he signed the same to preserve his friendship with complainant, to be not persuasive. petitioner and/or where it was to be accounted for that determines venue where Estafa, if any,
may be charged and tried. Second, he further argues that it does not follow that because
On 17 November 2004, petitioner, for himself and in representation of his deceased wife, complainant may have been on leave from the Bureau of Customs, the transactions were
Marietta Isip, filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration insofar as it affirmed his conviction in necessarily entered into during that leave and in Cavite City. He asserts that there is no
Criminal Case No. 136-84 and adjudged him civilly liable, jointly and severally, with Marietta Isip competent proof showing that during his leave of absence, he stayed in Cavite City; and that the
in Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84.12 transactions involved, including the subject of Criminal Case 136-84 covering roughly the period
from February to April 1984, coincided with his alleged leave.
On 26 October 2005, the Court of Appeals, taking into account the death of Marietta M. Isip prior
to the promulgation of its decision, rendered an Amended Decision with the following dispositive The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike in civil cases, is jurisdictional.14 The
portion: place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an
essential element of jurisdiction.15 It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by
WHEREFORE, the decision dated October 26, 2004 is AMENDED in respect to par. 3 of the courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential
dispositive portion thereof which shall now read as follows: ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial
jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or
to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction
over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in evidence that the ring subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84 was ever actually received by, or
the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of delivered to, him.
the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was
committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.16 We find his contentions untenable. The finding of the Court of Appeals that petitioner received
the ring subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84 is supported by the evidence on record. The
In the case at bar, we, like the RTC and the Court of Appeals, are convinced that the venue was acknowledgment receipt21 executed by petitioner is very clear evidence that he received the ring
properly laid in the RTC of Cavite City. The complainant had sufficiently shown that the in question. Petitioner’s claim that he did not receive any ring and merely executed said receipt
transaction covered by Criminal Case No. 136-84 took place in his ancestral home in Cavite City in order to preserve his friendship with the complainant deserves scant consideration.
when he was on approved leave of absence17 from the Bureau of Customs. Since it has been
shown that venue was properly laid, it is now petitioner’s task to prove otherwise, for it is his Petitioner, an astute businessman as he is, knows the significance, import and obligation of what
claim that the transaction involved was entered into in Manila. The age-old but familiar rule that he executed and signed. The following disputable presumptions weigh heavily against petitioner,
he who alleges must prove his allegations applies.18 namely: (a) That a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act; (b) That a
person takes ordinary care of his concerns; (c) That private transactions have been fair and
In the instant case, petitioner failed to establish by sufficient and competent evidence that the regular; and (d) That the ordinary course of business has been followed 22 Thus, it is presumed
transaction happened in Manila. Petitioner argues that since he and his late wife actually resided that one does not sign a document without first informing himself of its contents and
in Manila, convenience alone unerringly suggests that the transaction was entered into in Manila. consequences. We know that petitioner understood fully well the ramification of the
We are not persuaded. The fact that Cavite City is a bit far from Manila does not necessarily acknowledgment receipt he executed. It devolves upon him then to overcome these
mean that the transaction cannot or did not happen there. Distance will not prevent any person presumptions. We, however, find that he failed to do so. Aside from his self-serving allegation
from going to a distant place where he can procure goods that he can sell so that he can earn a that he signed the receipt to preserve his friendship with complainant, there is no competent
living. This is true in the case at bar. It is not improbable or impossible for petitioner and his wife evidence that would rebut said presumptions. It is clear from the evidence that petitioner signed
to have gone, not once, but twice in one day, to Cavite City if that is the number of times they the acknowledgment receipt when he received the ring from complainant in Cavite City.
received pieces of jewelry from complainant. Moreover, the fact that the checks issued by
petitioner’s late wife in all the transactions with complainant were drawn against accounts with Petitioner’s argument that he did not receive the subject ring23 is further belied by the testimony
banks in Manila or Makati likewise cannot lead to the conclusion that the transactions were not of his wife when the latter testified that said ring was borrowed by him on 7 March 1984.24 In all,
entered into in Cavite City. the delivery of the ring and the transaction regarding the same occurred in Cavite City.

It is axiomatic that when it comes to credibility, the trial court’s assessment deserves great Anent the third issue, petitioner argues that, assuming gratia argumenti that any criminal liability
weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some was incurred by petitioner respecting the ring subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84, the same
fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity was incipient, at best, and was effectively extinguished by novation. The personal and real
to observe directly the witnesses’ deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a properties delivered/conveyed to complainant were more than sufficient to cover or offset
better position than the appellate court to evaluate properly testimonial evidence.19 It is to be whatever balance remained of the obligations incurred as shown by the fact that complainant
pointed out that the findings of fact of the trial court have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. executed Affidavits of Desistance and caused the dismissal of some of the cases filed. He
It is settled that when the trial court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said maintains that the Court of Appeals did not apply the rule of novation as regards the ring subject
findings are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court.20 In the case at bar, we find no of Criminal Case No. 136-84 because it rejected his denial of receipt of said ring and his claim
compelling reason to reverse the findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that he signed the receipt supposedly covering the same under threat of prosecution and merely
and to apply the exception. We so hold that there is sufficient evidence to show that the to preserve their good relations. He claims the Court should not have denied the application of
particular transaction took place in Cavite City. the rule of novation on said case because the rejected initial claim (that he did not receive the
ring and that he signed the receipt to preserve their good relations) was but an alternative
On the second issue, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals’ holding that the ring subject defense and its rejection is not a reason to deny the application of the novation rule in said case.
of Crim. Case No. 136-84 was delivered to and received by petitioner is seriously flawed. He
argues that assuming he signed the receipt evidencing delivery of the ring, not due to the threat We agree with the Court of Appeals that novation25 cannot be applied in Criminal Case No. 136-
of prosecution but merely to preserve his friendship with complainant, the fact remains that there 84. The claim of petitioner that the personal and real properties conveyed to complainant and/or
is no showing that the ring was actually delivered to him. Petitioner insists there is no competent to his family were more than sufficient to cover or offset whatever balance remained of the
obligations incurred has no basis. If it were true that the properties delivered to complainant were SO ORDERED.
sufficient, the latter would have caused the dismissal of all, not some as in this instance, the
cases against petitioner and his late wife. This, complainant did not do for the simple reason that MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
the properties conveyed to him were not enough to cover all the obligations incurred by Associate Justice
petitioner and his deceased wife. Complainant testified that the properties he received were in
settlement of cases other than the cases being tried herein.26 In particular, he said that petitioner
and his spouse settled eight cases which were subsequently dismissed when they delivered
properties as payment.27 It follows then that the obligations incurred by petitioner and his spouse
were not yet settled when the criminal cases herein tried were filed.

His contention, that the Court of Appeals did not apply the rule of novation in Criminal Case No.
136-84 because it rejected or did not believe his (alternative) defense of denial, is untenable.
The main reason why the Court of Appeals did not apply novation in said case was that not all
the elements of novation are present. For novation to take place, four essential requisites have
to be met, namely, (1) a previous valid obligation; (2) an agreement of all parties concerned to a
new contract; (3) the extinguishment of the old obligation; and (4) the birth of a valid new
obligation. In Criminal Case No. 136-84, only the first element is extant. What distinguishes this
case from Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84, where the Court of
Appeals applied the rule of novation, was that there were checks issued as payment, though
subsequently dishonored, for the pieces of jewelry involved. In Criminal Case No. 136-84, it is
very clear that neither petitioner nor his wife issued any check as payment for the subject ring
that could have extinguished his old obligation and brought to life a new obligation.

From the allegations of the information in Criminal Case No. 136-84, it is clear that petitioner was
charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b), of the Revised Penal Code. The
elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are: (1) the offender receives the money, goods or
other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same; (2) the offender misappropriates or
converts such money or property or denies receiving such money or property; (3) the
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) the offended party
demands that the offender return the money or property.28 All these are present in this case.
Petitioner received from complainant a seven-carat diamond (men’s ring), valued at ₱200,000.00,
for the purpose of selling the same on commission basis and to deliver the proceeds of the sale
thereof or return the jewelry if not sold. Petitioner misappropriated or converted said ring for his
own benefit and even denied receiving the same. Despite repeated demands from complainant,
petitioner failed to return the ring or the proceeds of the sale thereof causing damage and
prejudice to complainant in the amount of ₱200,000.00.

As to the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals on petitioner, we find the same to be in order.

WHEREFORE, the decision and amended decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
21275 dated 26 October 2004 dated 26 October 2005, respectively, are AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 192565 February 28, 2012 in the Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did not commence
any other action or proceeding involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency.
UNION BANK OF THE, PHILIPPINES and DESI TOMAS, Petitioners,
vs. Tomas filed a Motion to Quash,3 citing two grounds. First, she argued that the venue was
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. improperly laid since it is the Pasay City court (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping
was submitted and used) and not the MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against Forum
DECISION Shopping was subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the perjury case. Second, she argued that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense because: (a) the third element of perjury – the
BRION, J.: willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood – was not alleged with particularity without specifying
what the other action or proceeding commenced involving the same issues in another tribunal or
agency; (b) there was no other action or proceeding pending in another court when the second
We review in this Rule 45 petition, the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Makati
complaint was filed; and (c) she was charged with perjury by giving false testimony while the
City (RTC-Makati City) in Civil Case No. 09-1038. The petition seeks to reverse and set aside
allegations in the Information make out perjury by making a false affidavit.
the RTC-Makati City decision dismissing the petition for certiorari of petitioners Union Bank of
the Philippines (Union Bank) and Desi Tomas (collectively, the petitioners). The RTC found that
the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 63, Makati City (MeTC-Makati City) did not commit any The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has jurisdiction over the case
grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash the information for perjury filed by since the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized in Makati City.4 The MeTC-Makati
Tomas. City also ruled that the allegations in the Information sufficiently charged Tomas with
perjury.5 The MeTC-Makati City subsequently denied Tomas’ motion for reconsideration.6
The Antecedents
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC-Makati City to annul and set aside the
MeTC-Makati City orders on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. The petitioners anchored
Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for
their petition on the rulings in United States v. Canet7 and Ilusorio v. Bildner8 which ruled that
making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The Information against her
venue and jurisdiction should be in the place where the false document was presented.
reads:
The Assailed RTC Decision
That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make untruthful statements under oath upon a material matter In dismissing the petition for certiorari, the RTC-Makati City held:
before a competent person authorized to administer oath which the law requires to wit: said
accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a complaint for sum of money [I]nsofar as the petitioner’s stance is concerned[,] the more recent case of [Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy]
with prayer for a writ of replevin docketed as [Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the Metropolitan Trial (GR Nos. 174168 & 179438, March 30, 2009) however, reaffirms what has been the long
Court[,] Pasay City, that the Union Bank of the Philippines has not commenced any other action standing view on the venue with respect to perjury cases. In this particular case[,] the high court
or proceeding involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency, accused knowing well reiterated the rule that the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
that said material statement was false thereby making a willful and deliberate assertion of municipality or territory where the offense was committed, or where any of its essential
falsehood.2 ingredients occurred. It went on to declare that since the subject document[,] the execution of
which was the subject of the charge[,] was subscribed and sworn to in Manila[,] then the court of
The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Bank’s two (2) complaints for sum of money with the said territorial jurisdiction was the proper venue of the criminal action[.]
prayer for a writ of replevin against the spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe.
The first complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-0717, was filed before the RTC, Branch 109, xxxx
Pasay City on April 13, 1998. The second complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 342-000, was
filed on March 15, 2000 and raffled to the MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City. Both complaints x x x Given the present state of jurisprudence on the matter, it is not amiss to state that the city
showed that Tomas executed and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping. Accordingly, court of Makati City has jurisdiction to try and decide the case for perjury inasmuch as the gist of
she was charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC by falsely declaring under oath the complaint itself which constitute[s] the charge against the petitioner dwells solely on the act
of subscribing to a false certification. On the other hand, the charge against the accused in the
case of Ilusorio v. Bildner, et al., based on the complaint-affidavits therein[,] was not simply the hear the case. The reason for this rule is two-fold. First, the jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to
execution of the questioned documents but rather the introduction of the false evidence through well-defined territories such that a trial court can only hear and try cases involving crimes
the subject documents before the court of Makati City.9 (emphasis ours) committed within its territorial jurisdiction.12 Second, laying the venue in the locus criminis is
grounded on the necessity and justice of having an accused on trial in the municipality of
The RTC-Makati City ruled that the MeTC-Makati City did not commit grave abuse of discretion province where witnesses and other facilities for his defense are available.13
since the order denying the Motion to Quash was based on jurisprudence later than Ilusorio. The
RTC-Makati City also observed that the facts in Ilusorio are different from the facts of the present Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal cases carries jurisdictional
case. Lastly, the RTC-Makati City ruled that the Rule 65 petition was improper since the consequences. In determining the venue where the criminal action is to be instituted and the
petitioners can later appeal the decision in the principal case. The RTC-Makati City subsequently court which has jurisdiction over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of
denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.10 Criminal Procedure provides:

The Petition (a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or
municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential
The petitioners pray that we reverse the RTC-Makati City decision and quash the Information for ingredients occurred. [emphasis ours]
perjury against Tomas. The petitioners contend that the Ilusorio ruling is more applicable to the
present facts than our ruling in Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy Chim.11 They argued that the facts in Ilusorio The above provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules
showed that the filing of the petitions in court containing the false statements was the essential of Criminal Procedure which states:
ingredient that consummated the perjury. In Sy Tiong, the perjurious statements were made in a
General Information Sheet (GIS) that was submitted to the Securities and Exchange Place of commission of the offense. – The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be
Commission (SEC). understood from its allegations that the offense was committed or some of its essential
ingredients occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place
Interestingly, Solicitor General Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz shared the petitioners’ view. In his where it was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense charged or is necessary
Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Comment (which we hereby treat as the Comment to the for its identification.
petition), the Solicitor General also relied on Ilusorio and opined that the lis mota in the crime of
perjury is the deliberate or intentional giving of false evidence in the court where the evidence is Both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases not only in the
material. The Solicitor General observed that the criminal intent to assert a falsehood under oath court where the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took
only became manifest before the MeTC-Pasay City. place. In other words, the venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged
where the Information states that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients
The Issue occurred at a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.

The case presents to us the issue of what the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the Information Charging Perjury
RPC should be – Makati City, where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized, or
Pasay City, where the Certification was presented to the trial court. Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, contains the requirement
for a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The Certificate against Forum Shopping can be made
The Court’s Ruling either by a statement under oath in the complaint or initiatory pleading asserting a claim or relief;
it may also be in a sworn certification annexed to the complaint or initiatory pleading. In both
We deny the petition and hold that the MeTC-Makati City is the proper venue and the proper instances, the affiant is required to execute a statement under oath before a duly commissioned
court to take cognizance of the perjury case against the petitioners. notary public or any competent person authorized to administer oath that: (a) he or she has not
theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court,
Venue of Action and Criminal Jurisdiction tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his or her knowledge, no such other action or
claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement
of the present status thereof; and (c) if he or she should thereafter learn that the same or similar
Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines not only the place
action or claim has been filed or is pending, he or she shall report that fact within five days
where the criminal action is to be instituted, but also the court that has the jurisdiction to try and
therefrom to the court wherein his or her aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. [S]aid accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a complaint for sum of
In relation to the crime of perjury, the material matter in a Certificate against Forum Shopping is money with prayer for a writ of replevin docketed as [Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the Metropolitan
the truth of the required declarations which is designed to guard against litigants pursuing Trial Court[,] Pasay City, that the Union Bank of the Philippines has not commenced any other
simultaneous remedies in different fora.14 action or proceeding involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency, accused knowing
well that said material statement was false thereby making a willful and deliberate assertion of
In this case, Tomas is charged with the crime of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC for making falsehood.17 (underscoring ours)
a false Certificate against Forum Shopping. The elements of perjury under Article 183 are:
Tomas’ deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly shown when she made
(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a the false declarations in the Certificate against Forum Shopping before a notary public in Makati
material matter. City, despite her knowledge that the material statements she subscribed and swore to were not
true. Thus, Makati City is the proper venue and MeTC-Makati City is the proper court to try the
(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to perjury case against Tomas, pursuant to Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of
receive and administer oath. Criminal Procedure as all the essential elements constituting the crime of perjury were
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati City, not Pasay City.
(c) That in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion
of a falsehood. Referral to the En Banc

(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made The present case was referred to the En Banc primarily to address the seeming conflict between
for a legal purpose.15 (emphasis ours) the division rulings of the Court in the Ilusorio case that is cited as basis of this petition, and the
Sy Tiong case that was the basis of the assailed RTC-Makati City ruling.
Where the jurisdiction of the court is being assailed in a criminal case on the ground of improper
venue, the allegations in the complaint and information must be examined together with Section The Cited Ilusorio and Sy Tiong Cases
15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. On this basis, we find that the
allegations in the Information sufficiently support a finding that the crime of perjury was The subject matter of the perjury charge in Ilusorio involved false statements contained in
committed by Tomas within the territorial jurisdiction of the MeTC-Makati City. verified petitions filed with the court for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copies of
certificates of title. The verified petitions containing the false statements were subscribed and
The first element of the crime of perjury, the execution of the subject Certificate against Forum sworn to in Pasig City, but were filed in Makati City and Tagaytay City. The question posed was:
Shopping was alleged in the Information to have been committed in Makati City. Likewise, the which court (Pasig City, Makati City and/or Tagaytay City) had jurisdiction to try and hear the
second and fourth elements, requiring the Certificate against Forum Shopping to be under oath perjury cases?
before a notary public, were also sufficiently alleged in the Information to have been made in
Makati City: We ruled that the venues of the action were in Makati City and Tagaytay City, the places where
the verified petitions were filed. The Court reasoned out that it was only upon filing that the intent
That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and to assert an alleged falsehood became manifest and where the alleged untruthful statement
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there found relevance or materiality. We cited as jurisprudential authority the case of United States. v.
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make untruthful statements under oath upon a material matter Cañet18 which ruled:
before a competent person authorized to administer oath which the law requires to wit: said
accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit x x x.16 It is immaterial where the affidavit was subscribed and sworn, so long as it appears from the
information that the defendant, by means of such affidavit, "swore to" and knowingly submitted
We also find that the third element of willful and deliberate falsehood was also sufficiently false evidence, material to a point at issue in a judicial proceeding pending in the Court of First
alleged to have been committed in Makati City, not Pasay City, as indicated in the last portion of Instance of Iloilo Province. The gist of the offense charged is not the making of the affidavit in
the Information: Manila, but the intentional giving of false evidence in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province
by means of such affidavit. [emphasis and underscoring deleted]
In Sy Tiong, the perjured statements were made in a GIS which was subscribed and sworn to in and shall moreover, thereafter be incapable of holding any public office or of giving testimony in
Manila. We ruled that the proper venue for the perjury charges was in Manila where the GIS was any court of the Philippine Islands until such time as the judgment against him is reversed.
subscribed and sworn to. We held that the perjury was consummated in Manila where the false
statement was made. As supporting jurisprudence, we cited the case of Villanueva v. Secretary This law was copied, with the necessary changes, from Sections 539224 and 539325 of the Revised
of Justice19 that, in turn, cited an American case entitled U.S. v. Norris.20 We ruled in Villanueva Statutes of the United States.26 Act No. 1697 was intended to make the mere execution of a false
that – affidavit punishable in our jurisdiction.27

Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration well may affect the dearest concerns of the In turn, Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No. 58 provided that the venue shall be the
parties before a tribunal. Deliberate material falsification under oath constitutes the crime of court of the place where the crime was committed.
perjury, and the crime is complete when a witness' statement has once been made.
As applied and interpreted by the Court in Cañet, perjury was committed by the act of
The Crime of Perjury: A Background representing a false document in a judicial proceeding.28 The venue of action was held by the
Court to be at the place where the false document was presented since the presentation was the
To have a better appreciation of the issue facing the Court, a look at the historical background of act that consummated the crime.
how the crime of perjury (specifically, Article 183 of the RPC) evolved in our jurisdiction.
The annotation of Justices Aquino and Griño-Aquino in their textbook on the RPC29 interestingly
The RPC penalizes three forms of false testimonies. The first is false testimony for and against explains the history of the perjury provisions of the present RPC and traces as well the linkage
the defendant in a criminal case (Articles 180 and 181, RPC); the second is false testimony in a between Act No. 1697 and the present Code. To quote these authors:30
civil case (Article 182, RPC); and the third is false testimony in other cases (Article 183, RPC).
Based on the Information filed, the present case involves the making of an untruthful statement Art. 180 was taken from art. 318 of the Old Penal Code and art. 154 of Del Pan’s Proposed
in an affidavit on a material matter. Correctional Code, while art. 181 was taken from art. 319 of the old Penal Code and Art. 157 of
Del Pan’s Proposed Correctional Code. Said arts. 318 and 319, together with art. 321 of the old
These RPC provisions, however, are not really the bases of the rulings cited by the parties in Penal Code, were impliedly repealed by Act 1697, the Perjury Law, passed on August 23, 1907,
their respective arguments. The cited Ilusorio ruling, although issued by this Court in 2008, which in turn was expressly repealed by the Administrative Code of 1916, Act 2657. In view of
harked back to the case of Cañet which was decided in 1915, i.e., before the present RPC took the express repeal of Act 1697, arts. 318 and 321 of the old Penal Code were deemed revived.
effect.21 Sy Tiong, on the other hand, is a 2009 ruling that cited Villanueva, a 2005 case that in However, Act 2718 expressly revived secs. 3 and 4 of the Perjury Law. Art. 367 of the Revised
turn cited United States v. Norris, a 1937 American case. Significantly, unlike Canet, Sy Tiong is Penal Code repealed Act Nos. 1697 and 2718.
entirely based on rulings rendered after the present RPC took effect.22
It should be noted that perjury under Acts 1697 and 2718 includes false testimony, whereas,
The perjurious act in Cañet consisted of an information charging perjury through the presentation under the Revised Penal Code, false testimony includes perjury. Our law on false testimony is of
in court of a motion accompanied by a false sworn affidavit. At the time the Cañet ruling was Spanish origin, but our law on perjury (art. 183 taken from sec. 3 of Act 1697) is derived from
rendered, the prevailing law on perjury and the rules on prosecution of criminal offenses were American statutes. The provisions of the old Penal Code on false testimony embrace perjury
found in Section 3, Act No. 1697 of the Philippine Commission, and in Subsection 4, Section 6 of committed in court or in some contentious proceeding, while perjury as defined in Act 1697
General Order No. 5823 for the procedural aspect. includes the making of a false affidavit. The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on false
testimony "are more severe and strict than those of Act 1697" on perjury. [italics ours]
Section 3 of Act No. 1697 reads:
With this background, it can be appreciated that Article 183 of the RPC which provides:
Sec. 3. Any person who, having taken oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any
case in which a law of the Philippine Islands authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period
testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, disposition, or shall be imposed upon any person, who knowingly makes untruthful statements and not being
certificate by him subscribed is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any included in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under oath, or make an
material matter which he does not believe to be true, is guilty of perjury, and shall be punished affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath
by a fine of not more than two thousand pesos and by imprisonment for not more than five years; in cases in which the law so requires. [emphasis supplied; emphases ours]
in fact refers to either of two punishable acts – (1) falsely testifying under oath in a proceeding case. The Cañet ruling would then have been completely applicable as the sworn statement is
other than a criminal or civil case; and (2) making a false affidavit before a person authorized to used in a civil case, although no such distinction was made under Cañet because the applicable
administer an oath on any material matter where the law requires an oath. law at the time (Act No. 1697) did not make any distinction.

As above discussed, Sy Tiong – decided under Article 183 of the RPC – essentially involved If Article 183 of the RPC were to be used, as what in fact appears in the Ilusorio ruling, then only
perjured statements made in a GIS that was subscribed and sworn to in Manila and submitted to that portion of the article, referring to the making of an affidavit, would have been applicable as
the SEC in Mandaluyong City. Thus, the case involved the making of an affidavit, not an actual the other portion refers to false testimony in other proceedings which a judicial petition for the
testimony in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil. From this perspective, the situs of the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of a Certificate of Condominium Title is not because it
oath, i.e., the place where the oath was taken, is the place where the offense was committed. By is a civil proceeding in court. As a perjury based on the making of a false affidavit, what assumes
implication, the proper venue would have been the City of Mandaluyong – the site of the SEC – materiality is the site where the oath was taken as this is the place where the oath was made, in
had the charge involved an actual testimony made before the SEC. this case, Pasig City.

In contrast, Cañet involved the presentation in court of a motion supported and accompanied by Procedurally, the rule on venue of criminal cases has been subject to various changes from the
an affidavit that contained a falsity. With Section 3 of Act No. 1697 as basis, the issue related to time General Order No. 58 was replaced by Rules 106 to 122 of the Rules of Court on July 1,
the submission of the affidavit in a judicial proceeding. This came at a time when Act No. 1697 1940. Section 14, Rule 106 of the Rules of Court provided for the rule on venue of criminal
was the perjury law, and made no distinction between judicial and other proceedings, and at the actions and it expressly included, as proper venue, the place where any one of the essential
same time separately penalized the making of false statements under oath (unlike the present ingredients of the crime took place. This change was followed by the passage of the 1964 Rules
1âwphi1

RPC which separately deals with false testimony in criminal, civil and other proceedings, while at of Criminal Procedure,33 the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure,34 and the 2000 Revised Rules of
the same time also penalizing the making of false affidavits). Understandably, the venue should Criminal Procedure which all adopted the 1940 Rules of Criminal Procedure’s expanded venue
be the place where the submission was made to the court or the situs of the court; it could not of criminal actions. Thus, the venue of criminal cases is not only in the place where the offense
have been the place where the affidavit was sworn to simply because this was not the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took place.
charged in the Information.
In the present case, the Certification against Forum Shopping was made integral parts of two
The case of Ilusorio cited the Cañet case as its authority, in a situation where the sworn petitions complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the respondent spouses
filed in court for the issuance of duplicate certificates of title (that were allegedly lost) were the Eddie Tamondong and Eliza B. Tamondong, who, in turn, filed a complaint-affidavit against
cited sworn statements to support the charge of perjury for the falsities stated in the sworn Tomas for violation of Article 183 of the RPC. As alleged in the Information that followed, the
petitions. The Court ruled that the proper venue should be the Cities of Makati and Tagaytay criminal act charged was for the execution by Tomas of an affidavit that contained a falsity.
because it was in the courts of these cities "where the intent to assert an alleged falsehood
became manifest and where the alleged untruthful statement finds relevance or materiality in Under the circumstances, Article 183 of the RPC is indeed the applicable provision; thus,
deciding the issue of whether new owner’s duplicate copies of the [Certificate of Condominium jurisdiction and venue should be determined on the basis of this article which penalizes one who
Title] and [Transfer Certificates of Title] may issue."31 To the Court, "whether the perjurious "make[s] an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to
statements contained in the four petitions were subscribed and sworn in Pasig is immaterial, the administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires." The constitutive act of the offense is
gist of the offense of perjury being the intentional giving of false statement,"32 citing Cañet as the making of an affidavit; thus, the criminal act is consummated when the statement containing
authority for its statement. a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a duly authorized person.

The statement in Ilusorio may have partly led to the present confusion on venue because of its Based on these considerations, we hold that our ruling in Sy Tiong is more in accord with Article
very categorical tenor in pointing to the considerations to be made in the determination of venue; 183 of the RPC and Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
it leaves the impression that the place where the oath was taken is not at all a material To reiterate for the guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury committed through
consideration, forgetting that Article 183 of the RPC clearly speaks of two situations while Article the making of a false affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is committed at the time the affiant
182 of the RPC likewise applies to false testimony in civil cases. subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time that all the elements of the
crime of perjury are executed. When the crime is committed through false testimony under oath
The Ilusorio statement would have made perfect sense had the basis for the charge been Article in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at the place where the testimony under
182 of the RPC, on the assumption that the petition itself constitutes a false testimony in a civil oath is given. If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is
neither criminal nor civil, a written sworn statement is submitted, venue may either be at the
place where the sworn statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of the
oath and the submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases,
determination of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be constitutive of
the crime committed.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. Costs
against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
G. R. No. 195002 January 25, 2012 To settle his accounts, appellant Hector issued in favor of Elizabeth a Bank of Commerce check
No. 0042856 dated November 10, 2000 in the amount of P120,000.00, deducting from
HECTOR TREÑAS, Petitioner, P150,000.00 the P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees. When the check was deposited with the
vs. PCIBank, Makati Branch, the same was dishonored for the reason that the account was closed.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. Notwithstanding repeated formal and verbal demands, appellant failed to pay. Thus, the instant
case of Estafa was filed against him.3
DECISION
On 29 October 2001, an Information was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor before the
SERENO, J.: Regional Trial Court (RTC), both of Makati City. The Information reads as follows:

Where life or liberty is affected by its proceedings, courts must keep strictly within the limits of That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1999, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
the law authorizing them to take jurisdiction and to try the case and render judgment thereon.1 Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
received in trust from ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the amount of P150,000.00 which money was given
to her by her aunt Margarita Alocilja, with the express obligation on the part of the accused to
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
use the said amount for expenses and fees in connection with the purchase of a parcel of land
Procedure, seeking to annul and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision dated 9 July
covered by TCT No. T-109266, but the said accused, once in possession of the said amount,
20102 and Resolution dated 4 January 2011.
with the intent to gain and abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the
Statement of the Facts and of the Case amount of P130,000.00 less attorney’s fees and the said accused failed and refused and still
fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of complainant Elizabeth Luciaja and
The pertinent facts, as found by the CA, are as follows: Margarita Alocilja in the aforementioned amount of P130,000.00.

Sometime in December 1999, Margarita Alocilja (Margarita) wanted to buy a house-and-lot in CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Iloilo City covered by TCT No. 109266. It was then mortgaged with Maybank. The bank manager
Joselito Palma recommended the appellant Hector Treñas (Hector) to private complainant During arraignment on 26 April 2002, petitioner, acting as his own counsel, entered a plea of
Elizabeth, who was an employee and niece of Margarita, for advice regarding the transfer of the "Not Guilty." Allegedly due to old age and poor health, and the fact that he lives in Iloilo City,
title in the latter’s name. Hector informed Elizabeth that for the titling of the property in the name petitioner was unable to attend the pre-trial and trial of the case.
of her aunt Margarita, the following expenses would be incurred:
On 8 January 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision5 finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa
P20,000.00- Attorney’s fees, under section 1, paragraph (b), of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), with the
dispositive portion as follows:
P90,000.00- Capital Gains Tax,
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered finding accused Hector Trenas
P24,000.00- Documentary Stamp, guilty of the crime of Estafa with abuse of confidence as penalized under Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, and which offense was committed in the manner described in the
P10,000.00- Miscellaneous Expenses. aforementioned information. As a consequence of this judgment, accused Hector Trenas is
sentenced to suffer a penalty of Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor to Seventeen
Thereafter, Elizabeth gave P150,000.00 to Hector who issued a corresponding receipt dated (17) Years and Four (4) Months of Reclusion Temporal. Moreover, he is ordered to indemnify
December 22, 1999 and prepared [a] Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage. Subsequently, private complainant Elizabeth Luciaja the amount of P130,000.00 with interest at the legal rate of
Hector gave Elizabeth Revenue Official Receipt Nos. 00084370 for P96,000.00 and 00084369 12% per annum, reckoned from the date this case was filed until the amount is fully paid.
for P24,000.00. However, when she consulted with the BIR, she was informed that the receipts
were fake. When confronted, Hector admitted to her that the receipts were fake and that he used SO ORDERED.6
the P120,000.00 for his other transactions. Elizabeth demanded the return of the money.
We note at this point that petitioner has been variably called Treñas and Trenas in the pleadings Petitioner thus argues that an accused is not required to present evidence to prove lack of
and court issuances, but for consistency, we use the name "Treñas", under which he was jurisdiction, when such lack is already indicated in the prosecution evidence.
accused in the Information.
As to the second issue, petitioner claims that the amount of P150,000 actually belongs to
On 24 August 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,7 which was denied by the RTC Margarita. Assuming there was misappropriation, it was actually she – not Elizabeth – who was
in a Resolution dated 2 July 2008.8 the offended party. Thus, the latter’s demand does not satisfy the requirement of prior demand
by the offended party in the offense of estafa. Even assuming that the demand could have been
On 25 September 2008, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal before the RTC.9 The appeal was properly made by Elizabeth, the demand referred to the amount of P120,000, instead of
docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32177. On 9 July 2010, the CA rendered a Decision10 affirming that P150,000. Finally, there is no showing that the demand was actually received by petitioner. The
of the RTC. On 4 August 2010, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied signature on the Registry Return Receipt was not proven to be that of petitioner’s.
by the CA in a Resolution dated 4 January 2011.11
On 30 May 2011, this Court issued a Resolution directing the Office of the Solicitor General
On 25 January 2011, petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review on (OSG) to file the latter’s Comment on the Petition. On 27 July 2011, the OSG filed a Motion for
Certiorari12before this Court. He asked for a period of 15 days within which to file a petition for Extension, praying for an additional period of 60 days within which to submit its Comment. This
review, and the Court granted his motion in a Resolution dated 9 February 2011. motion was granted in a Resolution dated 12 September 2011. On 23 September 2011, the
OSG filed a Motion for Special Extension, requesting an additional period of five days. On 29
On 3 February 2011, petitioner filed his Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court, with September 2011, it filed its Comment on the Petition.
the following assignment of errors:
In its Comment, the OSG asserts that the RTC did not err in convicting petitioner as charged.
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT AN ACCUSED HAS TO The OSG notes that petitioner does not dispute the factual findings of the trial court with respect
PRESENT EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE DEFENSE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION to the delivery of ₱150,000 to him, and that there was a relationship of trust and confidence
EVEN IF SUCH LACK OF JURISDICTION APPEARS IN THE EVIDENCE OF THE between him and Elizabeth. With respect to his claim that the Complaint should have been filed
PROSECUTION; in Iloilo City, his claim was not supported by any piece of evidence, as he did not present any.
Further, petitioner is, in effect, asking the Court to weigh the credibility of the prosecution witness,
Elizabeth. However, the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT DEMAND MADE BY A
weight, unless tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance, which is not
PERSON OTHER THAN THE AGGRIEVED PARTY SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENT
the case here.
OF DEMAND TO CONSTITUTE THE OFFENSE OF ESTAFA;13
With respect to the second issue, the OSG stresses that the defense of "no valid demand" was
On the first issue, petitioner asserts that nowhere in the evidence presented by the prosecution
not raised in the lower court. Nevertheless, the demand letter sent to Elizabeth suffices, as she is
does it show that ₱ 150,000 was given to and received by petitioner in Makati City. Instead, the
also one of the complainants alleged in the Information, as an agent of Margarita. Moreover, no
evidence shows that the Receipt issued by petitioner for the money was dated 22 December
proof was adduced as to the genuineness of petitioner’s signature in the Registry Return Receipt
1999, without any indication of the place where it was issued. Meanwhile, the Deed of Sale with
of the demand letter.
Assumption of Mortgage prepared by petitioner was signed and notarized in Iloilo City, also on
22 December 1999. Petitioner claims that the only logical conclusion is that the money was
actually delivered to him in Iloilo City, especially since his residence and office were situated The OSG, however, submits that the Court may recommend petitioner for executive clemency, in
there as well. Absent any direct proof as to the place of delivery, one must rely on the disputable view of his advanced age and failing health.
presumption that things happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary
habits of life. The only time Makati City was mentioned was with respect to the time when the The Court’s Ruling
check provided by petitioner was dishonored by Equitable-PCI Bank in its De la Rosa-Rada
Branch in Makati. Petitioner asserts that the prosecution witness failed to allege that any of the The Petition is impressed with merit.
acts material to the crime of estafa had occurred in Makati City. Thus, the trial court failed to
acquire jurisdiction over the case. Review of Factual Findings
While the Petition raises questions of law, the resolution of the Petition requires a review of the taking advantage of her trust so that he could misappropriate for his own personal benefit the
factual findings of the lower courts and the evidence upon which they are based. amount entrusted to him for payment of the capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax.

As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules As clearly narrated by private complainant Luciaja, after accused Trenas had obtained the
of Court. In many instances, however, this Court has laid down exceptions to this general rule, amount of P150,000.00 from her, he gave her two receipts purportedly issued by the Bureau of
as follows: Internal Revenue, for the fraudulent purpose of fooling her and making her believe that he had
complied with his duty to pay the aforementioned taxes. Eventually, private complainant Luciaja
(1) When the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory; discovered that said receipts were fabricated documents.15

(2) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or In his Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, petitioner raised the argument that it had no
conjectures; jurisdiction over the offense charged. The trial court denied the motion, without citing any specific
evidence upon which its findings were based, and by relying on conjecture, thus:
(3) When the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; That the said amount was given to [Treñas] in Makati City was incontrovertibly established by the
prosecution. Accused Treñas, on the other hand, never appeared in Court to present
(4) When there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; countervailing evidence. It is only now that he is suggesting another possible scenario, not
based on the evidence, but on mere "what ifs". x x x
(5) When the appellate court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case,
and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; Besides, if this Court were to seriously assay his assertions, the same would still not warrant a
reversal of the assailed judgment. Even if the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage was
executed on 22 December 999 in Iloilo City, it cannot preclude the fact that the P150,000.00 was
(6) When the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on misapprehension of facts;
delivered to him by private complainant Luciaja in Makati City the following day. His reasoning
the money must have been delivered to him in Iloilo City because it was to be used for paying
(7) When the Court of Appeals failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly the taxes with the BIR office in that city does not inspire concurrence. The records show that he
considered, would justify a different conclusion; did not even pay the taxes because the BIR receipts he gave to private complainant were fake
documents. Thus, his argumentation in this regard is too specious to consider favorably.16
(8) When the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;
For its part, the CA ruled on the issue of the trial court’s jurisdiction in this wise:
(9) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on
which they are based; and It is a settled jurisprudence that the court will not entertain evidence unless it is offered in
evidence. It bears emphasis that Hector did not comment on the formal offer of prosecution’s
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence nor present any evidence on his behalf. He failed to substantiate his allegations that he
evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record.14 had received the amount of P150,000.00 in Iloilo City. Hence, Hector’s allegations cannot be
given evidentiary weight.
In this case, the findings of fact of the trial court and the CA on the issue of the place of
commission of the offense are conclusions without any citation of the specific evidence on which Absent any showing of a fact or circumstance of weight and influence which would appear to
they are based; they are grounded on conclusions and conjectures. have been overlooked and, if considered, could affect the outcome of the case, the factual
findings and assessment on the credibility of a witness made by the trial court remain binding on
The trial court, in its Decision, ruled on the commission of the offense without any finding as to appellate tribunal. They are entitled to great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on
where it was committed: review.17

Based on the evidence presented by the prosecution through private complainant Elizabeth The instant case is thus an exception allowing a review of the factual findings of the lower courts.
Luciaja, the Court is convinced that accused Trenas had committed the offense of Estafa by
Jurisdiction of the Trial Court and P170,000.00 on October 18, 1991 was given in Makati. Neither was there proof to show that
the certifications purporting to prove that NAPOCOR has in its custody the subject aluminum
The overarching consideration in this case is the principle that, in criminal cases, venue is scrap wires and that Fukuzume is authorized by Furukawa to sell the same were given by
jurisdictional. A court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense Fukuzume to Yu in Makati. On the contrary, the testimony of Yu established that all the elements
committed outside its limited territory. In Isip v. People,18 this Court explained: of the offense charged had been committed in Parañaque, to wit: that on July 12, 1991, Yu went
to the house of Fukuzume in Parañaque; that with the intention of selling the subject aluminum
The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an scrap wires, the latter pretended that he is a representative of Furukawa who is authorized to sell
essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by the said scrap wires; that based on the false pretense of Fukuzume, Yu agreed to buy the
courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential subject aluminum scrap wires; that Yu paid Fukuzume the initial amount of P50,000.00; that as a
ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial result, Yu suffered damage. Stated differently, the crime of estafa, as defined and penalized
jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, was consummated when Yu and
to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction Fukuzume met at the latter's house in Parañaque and, by falsely pretending to sell aluminum
over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. scrap wires, Fukuzume was able to induce Yu to part with his money.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in
the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of xxx
the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was
committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove that Fukuzume committed
(Emphasis supplied.) the crime of estafa in Makati or that any of the essential ingredients of the offense took place in
the said city. Hence, the judgment of the trial court convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafa
In a criminal case, the prosecution must not only prove that the offense was committed, it must should be set aside for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice, however, to the filing of appropriate
also prove the identity of the accused and the fact that the offense was committed within the charges with the court of competent jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied)
jurisdiction of the court.
In this case, the prosecution failed to show that the offense of estafa under Section 1, paragraph
In Fukuzume v. People,19 this Court dismissed a Complaint for estafa, wherein the prosecution (b) of Article 315 of the RPC was committed within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati City.
failed to prove that the essential elements of the offense took place within the trial court’s
jurisdiction. The Court ruled: That the offense was committed in Makati City was alleged in the information as follows:

More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-examination of Yu to establish that he That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1999, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
gave any money to Fukuzume or transacted business with him with respect to the subject Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
aluminum scrap wires inside or within the premises of the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati, or received in trust from ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the amount of P150,000.00 x x x. (Emphasis
anywhere in Makati for that matter. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. supplied.)20
xxx
Ordinarily, this statement would have been sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Makati.
In the present case, the criminal information against Fukuzume was filed with and tried by the However, the Affidavit of Complaint executed by Elizabeth does not contain any allegation as to
RTC of Makati. He was charged with estafa as defined under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the where the offense was committed. It provides in part:
Revised Penal Code, the elements of which are as follows: x x x
4. THAT on 23 December 1999, [Elizabeth] personally entrusted to ATTY. HECTOR
The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in Makati. However, aside TREÑAS the sum of P150,000.00 to be expended as agreed and ATTY. HECTOR
from the sworn statement executed by Yu on April 19, 1994, the prosecution presented no other TREÑAS issued to me a receipt, a photo copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "B",
evidence, testimonial or documentary, to corroborate Yu's sworn statement or to prove that any
of the above-enumerated elements of the offense charged was committed in Makati. Indeed, the 5. THAT despite my several follow-ups with ATTY. HECTOR TREÑAS, the latter failed to
prosecution failed to establish that any of the subsequent payments made by Yu in the amounts transfer the title of aforesaid property to MRS. MARGARITA ALOCILJA. He also failed to
of P50,000.00 on July 12, 1991, P20,000.00 on July 22, 1991, P50,000.00 on October 14, 1991 pay the capital gains tax, documentary stamps and BIR-related expenses. What ATTY.
HECTOR TREÑAS accomplished was only the preparation of the Deed of Sale covering Q And what is the breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?
aforesaid property. A copy of said Deed of Sale is hereto attached as Annex "C",
A TWENTY THOUSAND is for his Attorney’s fee, NINETY THOUSAND is for the capital
6. THAT in view of my persistent follow-ups, ATTY. HECTOR TREÑAS issued to me a gain tax TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND is intended for documentary sum (sic) and TEN
check for refund of the sum given to him less the attorney’s fee of P20,000.00 and the THOUSAND PESOS is for other expenses for BIR.
sum of P10,000.00 allegedly paid to BIR or in the net sum of P120,000.00. x x x
Q And did you give him this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?
7. THAT when said check was deposited at EQUITABLE PCI BANK dela Rosa-Rada
Branch at Makati City, the same was dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason: A Yes, sir.
ACCOUNT CLOSED. x x x21
Q Did he issue a receipt?
Aside from the lone allegation in the Information, no other evidence was presented by the
prosecution to prove that the offense or any of its elements was committed in Makati City. A Yes, sir.

Under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC, the elements of estafa are as follows: (1) that money, Q If shown to you a receipt issued by Atty. Treñas for this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for THOUSAND, will you be able to identify it?
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return
the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
A Yes, sir.
offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or
denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) there is demand by the offended party to the
offender.22 Q I am showing to you a document, madam witness, already identified during the pre-
trial as exhibit "B". This appears to be a receipt dated December 22, 1999. Will you
please go over this document and inform this court what relation has this to the receipt
There is nothing in the documentary evidence offered by the prosecution23 that points to where
which you said Atty. Treñas issued to you?
the offense, or any of its elements, was committed. A review of the testimony of Elizabeth also
shows that there was no mention of the place where the offense was allegedly committed:
A This is the receipt issued by Atty. Hector Treñas.
Q After the manager of Maybank referred Atty. Treñas to you, what happened next?
Q Now, after the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND was given to Atty.
Treñas by you, what happened next?
A We have met and he explained to the expenses and what we will have to… and she
will work for the Deed of Sale.
A We made several follow-ups but he failed to do his job.24
Q And did he quote any amount when you got to the expenses?
Although the prosecution alleged that the check issued by petitioner was dishonored in a bank in
Makati, such dishonor is not an element of the offense of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of
A Yes. I gave him ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND.
the RPC.
Q What was the amount quoted to you?
Indeed, other than the lone allegation in the information, there is nothing in the prosecution
evidence which even mentions that any of the elements of the offense were committed in Makati.
A ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND. The rule is settled that an objection may be raised based on the ground that the court lacks
jurisdiction over the offense charged, or it may be considered motu proprio by the court at any
Q Did he give a breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND? stage of the proceedings or on appeal.25 Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a
criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or
A Yes, sir. otherwise. That jurisdiction is conferred
by the sovereign authority that organized the court and is given only by law in the manner and In Cuizon v. Macalino,35 this Court ruled that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored
form prescribed by law.26 for having been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and
confidence reposed on him, shows lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to
It has been consistently held by this Court that it is unfair to require a defendant or accused to render him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action.
undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter
or offense or it is not the court of proper venue.27 Section 15 (a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules This case is thus referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for the initiation of
on Criminal Procedure of 2000 provides that "[s]ubject to existing laws, the criminal action shall disciplinary proceedings against petitioner. In any case, should there be a finding that petitioner
be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was has failed to account for the funds received by him in trust, the recommendation should include
committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred." This fundamental principle is to an order to immediately return the amount of ₱ 130,000 to his client, with the appropriate rate of
ensure that the defendant is not compelled to move to, and appear in, a different court from that interest from the time of demand until full payment.
of the province where the crime was committed as it would cause him great inconvenience in
looking for his witnesses and other evidence in another place.28 This principle echoes more WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 9 July 2010 and the Resolution
strongly in this case, where, due to distance constraints, coupled with his advanced age and dated 4 January 2011 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32177 are SET ASIDE
failing health, petitioner was unable to present his defense in the charges against him. on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 137, Makati
City. Criminal Case No. 01-2409 is DISMISSED without prejudice. This case is REFERRED to
There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, the RTC of that city has the IBP Board of Governors for investigation and recommendation pursuant to Section 1 of Rule
no jurisdiction over the case.29 139-B of the Rules of Court.

As such, there is no more need to discuss the other issue raised by petitioner. SO ORDERED.

At this juncture, this Court sees it fit to note that the Code of Professional Responsibility strongly MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
militates against the petitioner’s conduct in handling the funds of his client. Rules 16.01 and Associate Justice
16.02 of the Code provides:

Rule 16.01 — A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from
the client.
1âwphi 1

Rule 16.02 — A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and
those others kept by him.

When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular purpose (such as for
filing fees, registration fees, transportation and office expenses), he should promptly account to
the client how the money was spent.30 If he does not use the money for its intended purpose, he
must immediately return it to the client. His failure either to render an accounting or to return the
money (if the intended purpose of the money does not materialize) constitutes a blatant
disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.31

Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to deliver his client's funds or properties as they fall due or upon
demand.32 His failure to return the client's money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that
he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed
in him by the client.33 It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it
impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.34
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1349. July 12, 2001 circular specifically provides that hold-departure orders shall be issued only in
criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regional trial courts. Clearly
BERNADETTE MONDEJAR, complainant, vs. JUDGE MARINO S. BUBAN, then, criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of first level courts do not
MTCC, Tacloban City Branch 1, Respondent. fall within the ambit of the circular, and it was an error on the part of
respondent judge to have issued one in the instant case.
RESOLUTION
Canon 3, Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct exhorts judges to be faithful
KAPUNAN, J.: to the law and maintain professional competence. The Court, in exercising
administrative supervision of all lower courts, has not been remised in reminding
In a sworn letter complaint dated May 31, 1999, complainant Bernadette the members of the bench to exert due diligence in keeping abreast with the
Mondejar charged Judge Marino S. Buban, MTCC, Tacloban City, Branch 1, with development in law and jurisprudence. Besides, Circular No. 39-97 is not a new
gross ignorance of the law, partiality, serious irregularity and grave misconduct circular. It was circularized in 1997 and violation of which has been accordingly
relative to Criminal Case No. 98-07-CR-133 entitled People of the Philippines v. dealt with in numerous cases before the Court. Herein judge, therefore, cannot
Bernadette Mondejar and Arlette Mondejar for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. be excused for his infraction. Judges should always be vigilant in their quest for
22. She alleged that respondent judge issued a hold departure order against her new developments in the law so they could discharge their duties and functions
on October 23, 1998 in violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97 which with zeal and fervor.
provides that hold departure orders shall be issued only in criminal cases within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts. She further alleged that In recent cases, 1 involving similar violations, this Court imposed the penalty of
respondent judge did not give her an opportunity to be heard before issuing the reprimand on erring judges. Hence, the same penalty should be imposed on
questioned order. respondent judge.

When required to comment on the matter, respondent judge admitted having WHEREFORE , Judge Marino S. Buban is hereby REPRIMANDED with the
issued said order because he was not aware of the Supreme Court Circular No. warning that a repetition of the same and similar acts in the future will be dealt
39-97. He alleged that he was not furnished a copy of the circular and managed with more severely.
to secure a copy only after he instructed his legal researcher to get one from the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City. Accordingly, on SO ORDERED.
April 14, 1997, he issued an order lifting and setting aside the hold departure
order dated October 23, 1998. As regards the issue of denial of due process,
respondent judge averred that complainant and her counsel were duly notified
of the scheduled hearing but neither appeared on said date.

The Court Administrator after finding that respondent judge erred in issuing the
assailed hold departure order, recommended that he be severely reprimanded
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future
shall be dealt with more severely.

The recommendation of the Court Administrator is well-taken.

Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold-departure orders to criminal
cases within the jurisdiction of second level courts. Paragraph No. 1 of the said
G.R. No. 167764 October 9, 2009 One patient, Lita Payunan, wife of employee Wilfredo Payunan, and residing in Burgos, Lapaz,
Iloilo City, has a sad tale to say about Dr. Portigo. Her story began September 19 last year when
VICENTE FOZ, JR. and DANNY G. FAJARDO, Petitioners, she felt ill and had to go to Dr. Portigo for consultation. The doctor put her under observation,
vs. taking seven months to conclude that she had rectum myoma and must undergo an operation.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Subsequently, the family sought the services of a Dr. Celis and a Dr. de los Reyes at Doctor's
DECISION Hospital. Incidentally, where Dr. Portigo also maintains a clinic. Dr. Portigo got angry, sources
said, after knowing that the family chose a surgeon (Dr. Celis) on their own without his nod as he
PERALTA, J.: had one to recommend.

Before the court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing Lita was operated by Dr. de los Reyes last March and was released from the hospital two weeks
the Decision1of the Court of Appeals (CA), Cebu City, dated November 24, 2004 in CA-G.R. CR after. Later, however, she again complained of difficulty in urinating and defecating[. On] June 24,
No. 22522, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Iloilo City, she was readmitted to the hospital.
dated December 4, 1997 in Criminal Case No. 44527 finding petitioners guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of libel. Also assailed is the CA Resolution2 dated April 8, 2005 The second operation, done by Dr. Portigo's recommendee, was devastating to the family and
denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration. the patient herself who woke to find out her anus and vagina closed and a hole with a catheter
punched on her right side.
In an Information3 dated October 17, 1994 filed before the RTC of Iloilo City, petitioners Vicente
Foz, Jr. and Danny G. Fajardo were charged with the crime of libel committed as follows: This was followed by a bad news that she had cancer.

That on or about the 5th day of July, 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the Dr. Portigo recommended another operation, this time to bore another hole on the left side of
jurisdiction of this court, both the accused as columnist and Editor-Publisher, respectively, of Lita. But a Dr. Rivera to whom he made the referral frankly turned it down because it would only
Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and be a waste of money since the disease was already on the terminal state.
throughout the region, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with malicious intent
of impeaching the virtue, honesty, integrity and reputation of Dr. Edgar Portigo, a physician and The company and the family spent some ₱150,000.00 to pay for the wrong diagnosis of the
medical practitioner in Iloilo City, and with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said Dr. company physician.
Edgar Portigo to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of
said daily publication on July 5, 1994, a certain article entitled "MEET DR. PORTIGO, My sympathy for Lita and her family. May the good Lord, Healer of all healers, be on your side,
COMPANY PHYSICIAN," quoted verbatim hereunder, to wit: May the Healer of all healers likewise touch the conscience of physicians to remind them that
their profession is no license for self-enrichment at the expense of the poor. But, sad to say, Lita
MEET DR. PORTIGO, passed away, July 2, 1994.

COMPANY PHYSICIAN Lita is not alone. Society is replete with similar experience where physicians treat their patients
for profits. Where physicians prefer to act like agents of multinational corporations prescribing
PHYSICIAN (sic) are duly sworn to help to do all their best to promote the health of their patients. expensive drugs seen if there are equivalent drugs sold at the counter for much lower price. Yes,
Especially if they are employed by a company to serve its employees. Lita, we also have hospitals, owned by a so-called charitable religious institutions and so-called
civic groups, too greedy for profits. Instead of promoting baby-and mother-friendly practices
However, the opposite appears to be happening in the Local San Miguel Corporation office, which are cheaper and more effective, they still prefer the expensive yet unhealthy practices.
SMC employees are fuming mad about their company physician, Dr. Portigo, because the latter
is not doing well in his sworn obligation in looking after the health problems of employees, The (sic) shun breast feeding and promote infant milk formula although mother's milk is many
reports reaching Aim.. Fire say. times cheaper and more nutrious (sic) than the brands they peddle. These hospitals separate
newly born from their moms for days, conditioning the former to milk formula while at the same
time stunting the mother's mammalia from manufacturing milk. Kadiri to death!
My deepest sympathy to the bereaved family of Mrs. Lita Payunan who died July 2, 1994, Her II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE EXISTENCE OF MALICE IN
body lies at the Payunan residence located at 236-G Burgos St., Lapaz, Iloilo City. May you rest THIS CASE AND IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SUBJECT ARTICLE IS
in peace, Inday Lita. CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED AS PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS.

wherein said Dr. Portigo was portrayed as wanting in high sense of professional integrity, trust III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF
and responsibility expected of him as a physician, which imputation and insinuation as both PETITIONER FAJARDO WHO HAPPENS TO BE MERELY PUBLISHER OF PANAY
accused knew were entirely false and malicious and without foundation in fact and therefore NEWS AND COULD NOT POSSIBLY SHARE ALL THE OPINIONS OF THE
highly libelous, offensive and derogatory to the good name, character and reputation of the said NEWSPAPER'S OPINION COLUMNISTS.9
Dr. Edgar Portigo.
Petitioners argue that the CA erred in finding that the element of defamatory imputation was
CONTRARY TO LAW.4 satisfied when petitioner Foz, as columnist, portrayed Dr. Portigo as an incompetent doctor and
an opportunist who enriched himself at the expense of the poor. Petitioners pose the question of
Upon being arraigned5 on March 1, 1995, petitioners, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not whether a newspaper opinion columnist, who sympathizes with a patient and her family and
guilty to the crime charged in the Information. Trial thereafter ensued. expresses the family's outrage in print, commits libel when the columnist criticizes the doctor's
competence or lack of it, and such criticism turns out to be lacking in basis if not entirely false.
On December 4, 1997, the RTC rendered its Decision6 finding petitioners guilty as charged. The Petitioners claim that the article was written in good faith in the belief that it would serve the
dispositive portion of the Decision reads: public good. They contend that the CA erred in finding the existence of malice in the publication
of the article; that no malice in law or actual malice was proven by the prosecution; and that the
article was printed pursuant to the bounden duty of the press to report matters of public interest.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the facts obtaining and the jurisprudence aforecited, JUDGMENT is
Petitioners further contend that the subject article was an opinion column, which was the
hereby rendered finding both accused Danny Fajardo and Vicente Foz, Jr. GUILTY BEYOND
columnist’s exclusive views; and that petitioner Fajardo, as the editor and publisher of Panay
REASONABLE DOUBT for the crime of Libel defined in Article 353 and punishable under Article
News, did not have to share those views and should not be held responsible for the crime of libel.
355 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentencing aforenamed accused to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Three (3) Months and Eleven (11) Days of Arresto
Mayor, as Minimum, to One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days of Prision The Solicitor General filed his Comment, alleging that only errors of law are reviewable by this
Correccional, as Maximum, and to pay a fine of ₱1,000.00 each.7 Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45; that petitioners are raising a factual
issue, i.e., whether or not the element of malice required in every indictment for libel was
established by the prosecution, which would require the weighing anew of the evidence already
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order8 dated February 20, 1998.
passed upon by the CA and the RTC; and that factual findings of the CA, affirming those of the
RTC, are accorded finality, unless there appears on records some facts or circumstance of
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed an appeal with the CA. weight which the court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and which, if
properly considered, may alter the result of the case − a situation that is not, however, obtaining
On November 24, 2004, the CA rendered its assailed Decision which affirmed in toto the RTC in this case.
decision.
In their Reply, petitioners claim that the first two issues presented in their petition do not require
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied in a Resolution dated April 8, the evaluation of evidence submitted in court; that malice, as an element of libel, has always
2005. been discussed whenever raised as an issue via a petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners
raise for the first time the issue that the information charging them with libel did not contain
Hence, herein petition filed by petitioners based on the following grounds: allegations sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Iloilo City.

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE SUBJECT ARTICLE The Court finds that the threshold issue for resolution is whether or not the RTC of Iloilo City,
"LIBELOUS" WITHIN THE MEANING AND INTENDMENT OF ARTICLE 353 OF THE Branch 23, had jurisdiction over the offense of libel as charged in the Information dated October
REVISED PENAL CODE. 17, 1994.
The Court notes that petitioners raised for the first time the issue of the RTC's jurisdiction over The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily
the offense charged only in their Reply filed before this Court and finds that petitioners are not newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained
precluded from doing so. therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof.

In Fukuzume v. People,10 the Court ruled: The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for
in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance of the
It is noted that it was only in his petition with the CA that Fukuzume raised the issue of the trial province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the
court’s jurisdiction over the offense charged. Nonetheless, the rule is settled that an objection offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided,
based on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged may be raised or however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of
considered motu proprio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal. Moreover, Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First
jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and
accused, by express waiver or otherwise, since such jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the
authority which organized the court, and is given only by law in the manner and form prescribed action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at
by law. While an exception to this rule was recognized by this Court beginning with the landmark the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first
case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, wherein the defense of lack of jurisdiction by the court which published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed
rendered the questioned ruling was considered to be barred by laches, we find that the factual in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the
circumstances involved in said case, a civil case, which justified the departure from the general commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published x x x.
rule are not present in the instant criminal case.11 (Emphasis supplied.)

The Court finds merit in the petition. In Agbayani v. Sayo,14 the rules on venue in Article 360 were restated as follows:

Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. The Court held in Macasaet v. 1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action
People12 that: may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article
is printed and first published.
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense
should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the 2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the
territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the Court of First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time of the
court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the commission of the offense.
accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly
committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the 3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the
criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence
adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should 4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may
dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.)13 be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the
time of the commission of the offense.15
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363, provides the
specific rules as to the venue in cases of written defamation, to wit: Applying the foregoing law to this case, since Dr. Portigo is a private individual at the time of the
publication of the alleged libelous article, the venue of the libel case may be in the province or
Article 360. Persons responsible.—Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the city where the libelous article was printed and first published, or in the province where Dr. Portigo
publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.
the same.
The relevant portion of the Information for libel filed in this case which for convenience the Court
quotes again, to wit:
That on or about the 5th day of July, 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the the libel action in other locations where Smart File is in general circulation. Using the example of
jurisdiction of this court, both the accused as columnists and Editor-Publisher, respectively, of the Inquirer or the Star, the granting of this petition would allow a resident of Aparri to file a
Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and criminal case for libel against a reporter or editor in Jolo, simply because these newspapers are
throughout the region, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with malicious intent in general circulation in Jolo. Such a consequence is precisely what Rep. Act No. 4363 sought to
of impeaching the virtue, honesty, integrity and reputation of Dr. Edgar Portigo, a physician and avoid.18
medical practitioner in Iloilo City, and with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said Dr.
Edgar Portigo to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of In Agustin v. Pamintuan,19 which also involved a libel case filed by a private individual, the Acting
said daily publication on July 5, 1994, a certain article entitled "MEET DR. PORTIGO, General Manager of the Baguio Country Club, with the RTC of Baguio City where the Information
COMPANY PHYSICIAN...." therein alleged that the libelous article was "published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer, a
newspaper of general circulation in the City of Baguio and the entire Philippines," the Court did
The allegations in the Information that "Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable not consider the Information sufficient to show that Baguio City was the venue of the printing and
circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region" only showed that Iloilo was the place first publication of the alleged libelous article.
where Panay News was in considerable circulation but did not establish that the said publication
was printed and first published in Iloilo City. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as amended provides that a private individual may also
file the libel case in the RTC of the province where he actually resided at the time of the
In Chavez v. Court of Appeals,16 which involved a libel case filed by a private individual with the commission of the offense. The Information filed against petitioners failed to allege the residence
RTC of Manila, a portion of the Information of which reads: of Dr. Portigo. While the Information alleges that "Dr. Edgar Portigo is a physician and medical
practitioner in Iloilo City," such allegation did not clearly and positively indicate that he was
That on or about March 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused [Baskinas and actually residing in Iloilo City at the time of the commission of the offense. It is possible that Dr.
Manapat] conspiring and confederating with others whose true names, real identities and Portigo was actually residing in another place.
present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, with malicious intent of
impeaching the honesty, virtue, character and reputation of one FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, former Again, in Agustin v. Pamintuan,20 where the Information for libel alleged that the "offended party
Solicitor General of the Philippines, and with the evident purpose of injuring and exposing him to was the Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club and of good standing and
public ridicule, hatred and contempt, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and maliciously cause reputation in the community," the Court did not find such allegation sufficient to establish that the
to be published in "Smart File," a magazine of general circulation in Manila, and in their offended party was actually residing in Baguio City. The Court explained its ruling in this wise:
respective capacity as Editor-in-Chief and Author-Reporter, ....17
The residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation or his actual residence or
the Court ruled that the Information did not sufficiently vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Manila to place of abode provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency; no particular length
hear the libel charge in consonance with Article 360. The Court made the following disquisition: of time of residence is required. However, the residence must be more than temporary. The term
residence involves the idea of something beyond a transient stay in the place; and to be a
x x x Still, a perusal of the Information in this case reveals that the word "published" is utilized in resident, one must abide in a place where he had a house therein. To create a residence in a
the precise context of noting that the defendants "cause[d] to be published in 'Smart File', a particular place, two fundamental elements are essential: The actual bodily presence in the
magazine of general circulation in Manila." The Information states that the libelous articles were place, combined with a freely exercised intention of remaining there permanently or for an
published in Smart File, and not that they were published in Manila. The place "Manila" is in turn indefinite time. While it is possible that as the Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country
employed to situate where Smart File was in general circulation, and not where the libel was Club, the petitioner may have been actually residing in Baguio City, the Informations did not
published or first printed. The fact that Smart File was in general circulation in Manila does not state that he was actually residing therein when the alleged crimes were committed. It is entirely
necessarily establish that it was published and first printed in Manila, in the same way that while possible that the private complainant may have been actually residing in another place. One who
leading national dailies such as the Philippine Daily Inquirer or the Philippine Star are in general transacts business in a place and spends considerable time thereat does not render such person
circulation in Cebu, it does not mean that these newspapers are published and first printed in a resident therein. Where one may have or own a business does not of itself constitute
Cebu. 1avv phi 1
residence within the meaning of the statute. Pursuit of business in a place is not conclusive of
residence there for purposes of venue.21
Indeed, if we hold that the Information at hand sufficiently vests jurisdiction in Manila courts since
the publication is in general circulation in Manila, there would be no impediment to the filing of
Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations
of the complaint or information, and the offense must have been committed or any one of its
essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.22 Considering that
the Information failed to allege the venue requirements for a libel case under Article 360, the
Court finds that the RTC of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to hear this case. Thus, its decision
convicting petitioners of the crime of libel should be set aside for want of jurisdiction without
prejudice to its filing with the court of competent jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 24, 2004 and the
Resolution dated April 8, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22522 are SET
ASIDE on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23,
Iloilo City. Criminal Case No. 44527 is DISMISSED without prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 164631 June 26, 2009 SO ORDERED.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, As both parties interposed their respective motions for reconsideration, the RARAD-V eventually
vs. issued an Order dated 8 October 2003, the decretal portion of which reads:
RENE RALLA BELISTA, Respondent.
Wherefore, the Decision dated July 7, 2003 is MODIFIED, fixing the valuation claim of petitioner
DECISION herein with respect to her due share in the above lots to the tune of Two Million Five Hundred
Forty Thousand, Two Hundred Eleven and 58/100 (₱2,540,211.58) Pesos. Land Bank Legaspi
PERALTA, J.: City is hereby ordered to pay herein petitioner said amount pursuant to existing rules and
guidelines, minus the sum already paid per Order dated January 2, 2003.
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
Land Bank of the Philippines (petitioner), seeking to annul and set aside the May 26, 2004 SO ORDERED.
Decision1 and the July 28, 2004 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
81096. Aggrieved, petitioner Bank, on 28 October 2003, filed an original Petition for Determination of
Just Compensation at the same sala of the RTC, docketed as Agrarian Case No. 03-06.
The antecedent facts and proceedings, as narrated by the CA, are as follows:
The court a quo motu propio dismissed the case when it issued the herein first assailed Order
It appears that spouses Pablo Ralla and Carmen Munoz Ralla had donated their eight (8) dated 12 November 2003 "for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and/or comply with
parcels of lot located in Ligao, Albay to their daughter, Rene Ralla Belista, the herein private Sections 5, 6, and 7, Rule XIX, 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure.
respondent.
Petitioner LBP lodged a Motion for Reconsideration arguing, inter alia, "that the DARAB 2003
The eight (8) parcels of lot were placed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR, for brevity) Rules of Procedure does not apply to SAC nor its precursor DARAB Case and that the ground
under the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (Presidential Decree No. for dismissal of the case is not among the instances when a court may dismiss a case on its
27 and Executive Order No. 228). Consequently, private respondent claimed payment of just motion."
compensation over said agricultural lands.
As the court a quo denied its Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated 28 November 2003,
It further appears that the DAR's evaluation of the subject farms was only ₱227,582.58, while petitioner LBP elevated the case before the Tribunal through the present Petition for Review,
petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP, for brevity) assessed the same at ₱317,259.31. theorizing:

Believing that her lots were grossly underestimated, private respondent, on 11 November 2002, I. WHETHER OR NOT THE SAC A QUO ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE
filed a Petition for Valuation and Payment of Just Compensation against petitioning bank before MOTU PROPIO ON THE GROUND OF PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO EXHAUST
the DARAB-Regional Adjudicator for Region V (RARAD-V) docketed as DCN D-05-02-VC-005. ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.

On 07 July 2003, the RARAD-V issued a Decision, in favor of herein private respondent, the fallo II. WHETHER OR NOT SECTIONS 5, 6, AND 7, RULE XIX OF THE DARAB
of which reads: 2003 RULES OF PROCEDURE APPLY TO CASES FILED AND PENDING
BEFORE THE DARAB OR ITS ADJUDICATORS PRIOR TO ITS EFFECTIVITY
Wherefore, just compensation for the subject areas is hereby preliminarily fixed at TWO AND TO CASES FILED AND PENDING WITH THE SPECIAL AGRARIAN
MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED NINETY-SIX THOUSAND and FOUR HUNDRED EIGHT & 91/100 COURTS.3
(₱2,896,408.91) PESOS. Land Bank of the Philippines, Legaspi City, is hereby ordered to pay
herein petitioner said amount pursuant to existing rules and guidelines, minus the sum already On May 26, 2004, the CA rendered its assailed Decision dismissing the petition.
remitted per Order dated January 2, 2003.
The CA ruled that under Section 5, Rule XIX of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, an appeal directly to the RTC; that it was in the observance of the 1994 DARAB Rules that petitioner
from the adjudicator's resolution shall be filed before the DARAB and not before the RTC; that brought the adjudicator's decision to the RTC sitting as SAC.
petitioner's filing of the case before the RTC without first seeking the intervention of the DARAB
is violative of the doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. The CA found that In his Comment, respondent claims that petitioner's petition with the RTC is an original action
petitioner's petition for determination of just compensation was filed in the RTC on October 28, and, since the case was filed at a time when appeal to the DARAB Central Office was already
2003 when the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure was already in effect, i.e., on February 8, 2003, provided in the 2003 DARAB Rules before resorting to judicial action, the RTC correctly
and under its transitory provision, it is provided that the 2003 Rules shall govern all cases filed dismissed the petition, which was correctly affirmed by the CA.
on or after its effectivity; and, since an appeal from the adjudicator's resolution should first be
filed with the DARAB, the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), did not err in Petitioner filed a Reply reiterating its arguments in the petition.
dismissing petitioner's petition.
The issue for resolution is whether it is necessary that in cases involving claims for just
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in a Resolution dated July 28, compensation under Republic Act (RA) No. 6657 that the decision of the Adjudicator must first
2004. be appealed to the DARAB before a party can resort to the RTC sitting as SAC.

Petitioner is now before the Court raising the following arguments: The court rules in the negative.

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN LAW IN DISMISSING THE PETITION Sections 50 and 57 of RA No. 6657 provide:
FOR REVIEW CONSIDERING THAT THE LBP DID NOT VIOLATE THE
"DOCTRINE OF NON-EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES"
Section 50. Quasi-judicial Powers of the DAR. – The DAR is hereby vested with primary
WHEN IT FILED THE ORIGINAL PETITION FOR DETERMINATION OF JUST
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original
COMPENSATION BEFORE THE COURT A QUO WITHOUT FIRST SEEKING
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling
THE INTERVENTION OF THE DARAB.
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) x x x
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE
APPLICABLE RULE IS THE 2003 DARAB RULES OF PROCEDURE, DESPITE
Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. – The Special Agrarian Court shall have original and exclusive
THE FACT THAT THE PETITION (FOR VALUATION AND PAYMENT OF JUST
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the
COMPENSATION) WAS FILED BEFORE THE RARAD ON NOVEMBER 11,
prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. x x x
2002.4
The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction
Petitioner contends that the petition for valuation and payment of just compensation was filed
within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for decision.
with the DARAB- Regional Adjudicator for Region V (RARAD) on November 11, 2002, long
before the effectivity of the 2003 Rules of Procedure; that under the transitory provision of the
2003 DARAB Rules, all cases pending with the Board and the adjudicators prior to the date of Clearly, under Section 50, DAR has primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian
the Rules' effectivity shall be governed by the DARAB Rules prevailing at the time of their filing; reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
that clear from the transitory provision that it is the proceeding of the DARAB which is governed agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the DA and the DENR.
by the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, thus, it is the date of filing of the petition with the Further exception to the DAR's original and exclusive jurisdiction are all petitions for the
DARAB or any of its adjudicators which is the reckoning date of the applicability of the 2003 determination of just compensation to landowners and the prosecution of all criminal offenses
DARAB Rules and not the date of filing with the SAC; that under the 1994 DARAB Rules under RA No. 6657, which are within the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian
prevailing at the time of the filing of the respondent's claim for just compensation, the Rules Court. Thus, jurisdiction on just compensation cases for the taking of lands under RA No. 6657 is
provided that the decision of the adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination of vested in the courts.
just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board, but shall be brought
In Republic v. CA,5 the Court explained:
Thus, Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional Trial Courts, are given original and exclusive mandate of initially determining the value of Wycoco's land pursuant to Executive Order No. 405,
jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit: (1) "all petitions for the determination of just Series of 1990.8 x x x
compensation to landowners" and (2) "the prosecution of all criminal offenses under [R.A. No.
6657]." The provisions of §50 must be construed in harmony with this provision by considering In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad,9 wherein Land Bank questioned the alleged failure
cases involving the determination of just compensation and criminal cases for violations of R.A. of private respondents to seek reconsideration of the DAR's valuation, but instead filed a petition
No. 6657 as excepted from the plenitude of power conferred on the DAR. Indeed, there is a to fix just compensation with the RTC, the Court said:
reason for this distinction. The DAR is an administrative agency which cannot be granted
jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain (for such are takings under R.A. No. 6657) and over At any rate, in Philippine Veterans Bank v. CA, we held that there is nothing contradictory
criminal cases. Thus, in EPZA v. Dulay and Sumulong v. Guerrero - we held that the valuation of between the DAR’s primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and
property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which cannot be vested in exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform,
administrative agencies, while in Scoty’s Department Store v. Micaller, we struck down a law which includes the determination of questions of just compensation, and the original and
granting the then Court of Industrial Relations jurisdiction to try criminal cases for violations of exclusive jurisdiction of regional trial courts over all petitions for the determination of just
the Industrial Peace Act.6 compensation. The first refers to administrative proceedings, while the second refers to judicial
proceedings. 1avvphi1

In a number of cases, the Court has upheld the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC,
sitting as SAC, over all petitions for determination of just compensation to landowners in In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the
accordance with Section 57 of RA No. 6657. DAR to determine in a preliminary manner the just compensation for the lands taken under the
agrarian reform program, but such determination is subject to challenge before the courts. The
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco,7 the Court upheld the RTC's jurisdiction over resolution of just compensation cases for the taking of lands under agrarian reform is, after all,
Wycoco's petition for determination of just compensation even where no summary administrative essentially a judicial function.
proceedings was held before the DARAB which has primary jurisdiction over the determination of
land valuation. The Court held: Thus, the trial court did not err in taking cognizance of the case as the determination of just
compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice.10
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the landowner filed an action for
determination of just compensation without waiting for the completion of DARAB’s re-evaluation In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada,11 where the issue was whether the SAC erred in
of the land. This, notwithstanding, the Court held that the trial court properly acquired jurisdiction assuming jurisdiction over respondent's petition for determination of just compensation despite
because of its exclusive and original jurisdiction over determination of just compensation, thus – the pendency of the administrative proceedings before the DARAB, the Court stated that:

… It is clear from Sec. 57 that the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has "original and It would be well to emphasize that the taking of property under RA No. 6657 is an exercise of the
exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners." power of eminent domain by the State. The valuation of property or determination of just
This "original and exclusive" jurisdiction of the RTC would be undermined if the DAR would vest compensation in eminent domain proceedings is essentially a judicial function which is vested
in administrative officials original jurisdiction in compensation cases and make the RTC an with the courts and not with administrative agencies. Consequently, the SAC properly took
appellate court for the review of administrative decisions. Thus, although the new rules speak of cognizance of respondent's petition for determination of just compensation.12
directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it
is clear from Sec. 57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the
The RTC dismissed petitioner's petition for determination of just compensation relying on
RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the original
Sections 5, 6 and 7 of Article XIX of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, to wit:
jurisdiction of the RTCs into an appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to Sec. 57 and, therefore,
would be void. Thus, direct resort to the SAC [Special Agrarian Court] by private respondent is
valid. Section 5. Appeal. A party who disagrees with the resolution of the Adjudicator may bring the
matter to the Board by filing with the Adjudicator concerned a Notice of Appeal within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the resolution. The filing of a Motion for Reconsideration of said resolution
In the case at bar, therefore, the trial court properly acquired jurisdiction over Wycoco’s
shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the
complaint for determination of just compensation. It must be stressed that although no summary
appeal within the remaining period, but in no case shall it be less than five (5) days.
administrative proceeding was held before the DARAB, LBP was able to perform its legal
Section 6. When Resolution Deemed Final. Failure on the part of the aggrieved party to contest
the resolution of the Adjudicator within the aforecited reglementary period provided shall be
deemed a concurrence by such party with the land valuation, hence said valuation shall become
final and executory.

Section 7. Filing of Original Action with the Special Agrarian Court for Final Determination. The
party who disagrees with the decision of the Board may contest the same by filing an original
action with the Special Agrarian Court (SAC) having jurisdiction over the subject property within
fifteen (15) days from his receipt of the Board's decision.

Notably, the above-mentioned provisions deviated from Section 11, Rule XIII of the 1994
DARAB Rules of Procedure which provides:

Section 11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation –
The decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of
just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board, but shall be brought directly to the
Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt
of the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration.

where DARAB acknowledges that the decision of just compensation cases for the taking of lands
under RA 6657 is a power vested in the courts.13 Although Section 5, Rule XIX of the 2003
DARAB Rules of Procedure provides that the land valuation cases decided by the adjudicator
are now appealable to the Board, such rule could not change the clear import of Section 57 of
RA No. 6657 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine just compensation is in the
RTC. Thus, Section 57 authorizes direct resort to the SAC in cases involving petitions for the
determination of just compensation.14 In accordance with the said Section 57, petitioner properly
filed the petition before the RTC and, hence, the RTC erred in dismissing the case. Jurisdiction
over the subject matter is conferred by law.15 Only a statute can confer jurisdiction on courts and
administrative agencies while rules of procedure cannot.16

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 26,
2004 and the Resolution dated July 28, 2004, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81096,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Legaspi City, sitting as
Special Agrarian Court, is directed to hear without delay petitioner's petition for the determination
of just compensation.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 167304 August 25, 2009 by reason of her office, for which she is duty-bound to liquidate the same within the period
required by law, with deliberate intent and intent to gain, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, and criminally fail to liquidate said cash advances of ₱71,095.00, Philippine Currency, despite
vs. demands to the damage and prejudice of the government in aforesaid amount.
SANDIGANBAYAN (third division) and VICTORIA AMANTE, Respondents.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
DECISION
The case was raffled to the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, Amante filed with
PERALTA, J.: the said court a MOTION TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT AND MOTION FOR
REINVESTIGATION4 dated November 18, 2004 stating that the Decision of the Office of the
Before this Court is a petition1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set Ombudsman (Visayas) dated September 14, 1999 at Cebu City from of an incomplete
aside the Resolution2 of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated February 28, 2005 dismissing proceeding in so far that respondent Amante had already liquidated and/or refunded the
Criminal Case No. 27991, entitled People of the Philippines v. Victoria Amante for lack of unexpected balance of her cash advance, which at the time of the investigation was not included
jurisdiction. as the same liquidation papers were still in the process of evaluation by the Accounting
Department of Toledo City and that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the said criminal
case because respondent Amante was then a local official who was occupying a position of
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
salary grade 26, whereas Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8249 provides that the
Sandiganbayan shall have original jurisdiction only in cases where the accused holds a position
Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Province of otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification
Cebu at the time pertinent to this case. On January 14, 1994, she was able to get hold of a cash Act of 1989, R.A. No. 6758.
advance in the amount of ₱71,095.00 under a disbursement voucher in order to defray seminar
expenses of the Committee on Health and Environmental Protection, which she headed. As of
The OSP filed its Opposition5 dated December 8, 2004 arguing that respondent Amante's claim
December 19, 1995, or after almost two years since she obtained the said cash advance, no
of settlement of the cash advance dwelt on matters of defense and the same should be
liquidation was made. As such, on December 22, 1995, Toledo City Auditor Manolo V. Tulibao
established during the trial of the case and not in a motion for reinvestigation. As to the assailed
issued a demand letter to respondent Amante asking the latter to settle her unliquidated cash
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the OSP contended that the said court has jurisdiction over
advance within seventy-two hours from receipt of the same demand letter. The Commission on
respondent Amante since at the time relevant to the case, she was a member of the
Audit, on May 17, 1996, submitted an investigation report to the Office of the Deputy
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, therefore, falling under those enumerated under
Ombudsman for Visayas (OMB-Visayas), with the recommendation that respondent Amante be
Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249. According to the OSP, the language of the law is too plain and
further investigated to ascertain whether appropriate charges could be filed against her under
unambiguous that it did not make any distinction as to the salary grade of city local
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, otherwise known as The Auditing Code of the Philippines.
officials/heads.
Thereafter, the OMB-Visayas, on September 30, 1999, issued a Resolution recommending the
filing of an Information for Malversation of Public Funds against respondent Amante. The Office
of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), upon review of the OMB-Visayas' Resolution, on April 6, 2001, The Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution6 dated February 28, 2005, dismissed the case against
prepared a memorandum finding probable cause to indict respondent Amante. Amante, the dispositive portion of which reads:

On May 21, 2004, the OSP filed an Information3 with the Sandiganbayan accusing Victoria WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this case is hereby dismissed for lack of
Amante of violating Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445, which reads as follows: jurisdiction. The dismissal, however, is without prejudice to the filing of this case to the proper
court.
That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at Toledo
City, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the The Motion for Reinvestigation filed by the movant is hereby considered moot and academic.
abovenamed accused VICTORIA AMANTE, a high-ranking public officer, being a member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, and committing the offense in relation to office, having SO ORDERED.
obtained cash advances from the City Government of Toledo in the total amount of SEVENTY-
ONE THOUSAND NINETY-FIVE PESOS (₱71,095.00), Philippine Currency, which she received Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner raises this lone issue: office if the offense is "intimately connected" with the office of the offender and perpetrated while
he was in the performance of his official functions.
WHETHER OR NOT THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER A
CASE INVOLVING A SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD MEMBER WHERE THE The petition is meritorious.
CRIME CHARGED IS ONE COMMITTED IN RELATION TO OFFICE, BUT NOT
FOR VIOLATION OF RA 3019, RA 1379 OR ANY OF THE FELONIES The focal issue raised in the petition is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As a background,
MENTIONED IN CHAPTER II, SECTION 2, TITLE VII OF THE REVISED PENAL this Court had thoroughly discussed the history of the conferment of jurisdiction of the
CODE. Sandiganbayan in Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,12 thus:

In claiming that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case in question, petitioner disputes x x x The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President
the former's appreciation of this Court's decision in Inding v. Sandiganbayan.7 According to Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official
petitioner, Inding did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the conduct required of public officers and employees, based on the concept that public officers and
enumeration provided for under Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, exclusively to employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency
cases where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, or and shall remain at all times accountable to the people.13
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner adds that the enumeration
in Section (a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249, which was P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on December 10,
made applicable to cases concerning violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.14
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, equally applies to offenses committed in relation
to public office.
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding
Respondent Amante, in her Comment8 dated January 16, 2006, averred that, with the way the amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No.
law was phrased in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, it is obvious that the jurisdiction of 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. x x x
the Sandiganbayan was defined first, enumerating the several exceptions to the general rule,
while the exceptions to the general rule are provided in the rest of the paragraph and sub-
Specifically, the question that needs to be resolved is whether or not a member of
paragraphs of Section 4. Therefore, according to respondent Amante, the Sandiganbayan was
the Sangguniang Panlungsod under Salary Grade 26 who was charged with violation of The
correct in ruling that the latter has original jurisdiction only over cases where the accused is a
Auditing Code of the Philippines falls within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
public official with salary grade 27 and higher; and in cases where the accused is public official
below grade 27 but his position is one of those mentioned in the enumeration in Section
4(a)(1)(a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended and his offense involves a violation of R.A. No. This Court rules in the affirmative.
3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; and if the
indictment involves offenses or felonies other than the three aforementioned statutes, the The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A.
general rule that a public official must occupy a position with salary grade 27 and higher in order No. 7975 which took effect on May 16, 1995, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by
that the Sandiganbayan could exercise jurisdiction over him must apply. The same respondent R.A. No. 8249. The alleged commission of the offense, as shown in the Information was on or
proceeded to cite a decision9 of this Court where it was held that jurisdiction over the subject about December 19, 1995 and the filing of the Information was on May 21, 2004. The jurisdiction
matter is conferred only by the Constitution or law; it cannot be fixed by the will of the parties; it of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not
cannot be acquired through, or waived, enlarged or diminished by, any act or omission of the at the time of the commission of the offense.15 The exception contained in R.A. 7975, as well as
parties, neither is it conferred by acquiescence of the court.1avv phi1
R.A. 8249, where it expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in
cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section
In its Reply10 dated March 23, 2006, the OSP reiterated that the enumeration of public officials in 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable in the present case as the offense
Section 4(a)(1) to (a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606 as falling within the original jurisdiction of the involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines. The last clause of the
Sandiganbayan should include their commission of other offenses in relation to office under opening sentence of paragraph (a) of the said two provisions states:
Section 4(b) of the same P.D. No. 1606. It cited the case of Esteban v. Sandiganbayan, et
al.11 wherein this Court ruled that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor;
Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in
the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned
commission of the offense: or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations;
The present case falls under Section 4(b) where other offenses and felonies committed by public
officials or employees in relation to their office are involved. Under the said provision, no (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up
exception is contained. Thus, the general rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of
the offense applies in this present case. Since the present case was instituted on May 21, 2004, (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
the provisions of R.A. No. 8249 shall govern. Verily, the pertinent provisions of P.D. No. 1606 as Constitution;
amended by R.A. No. 8249 are the following:
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases the provisions of the Constitution; and
involving:
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of
the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials
B. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or
by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
relation to their office.
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos.
and higher, otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation
1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including:
The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Under Section 4(a), the following offenses are specifically enumerated: violations of R.A. No.
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
Code. In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses, the latter
city department heads;
must be committed by, among others, officials of the executive branch occupying positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, and Position Classification Act of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that
city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads. are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
provided that they hold the positions thus enumerated by the same law. Particularly and
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and exclusively enumerated are provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
higher; panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department
heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers assessors, engineers , and other city department heads; officials of the diplomatic service
of higher rank; occupying the position as consul and higher; Philippine army and air force colonels, naval
captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; rank; City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan regardless of salary grade. According to
institutions or foundations. In connection therewith, Section 4(b) of the same law provides that petitioner, the Inding case did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of
other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection the enumeration provided for under Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, exclusively to
(a) in relation to their office also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. cases where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, or
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. This observation is true in light of the
By simple analogy, applying the provisions of the pertinent law, respondent Amante, being a facts contained in the said case. In the Inding case, the public official involved was a member of
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod at the time of the alleged commission of an offense in the Sangguniang Panlungsod with Salary Grade 25 and was charged with violation of R.A. No.
relation to her office, falls within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. 3019. In ruling that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the said public official, this Court
concentrated its disquisition on the provisions contained in Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as
However, the Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution, dismissed the case with the following amended, where the offenses involved are specifically enumerated and not on Section 4(b)
ratiocination: where offenses or felonies involved are those that are in relation to the public officials' office.
Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, provides that:
x x x the ruling of the Supreme Court in the Inding case, stating that the Congress' act of
specifically including the public officials therein mentioned, "obviously intended cases mentioned b. Other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in
in Section 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, when committed subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.
by the officials enumerated in (1)(a) to (g) thereof, regardless of their salary grades, to be tried
by the Sandiganbayan." Obviously, the Court was referring to cases involving violation of R.A. A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision shows that those public officials
No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code only enumerated in Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only be charged in the
because they are the specific cases mentioned in Section 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended, Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII
so that when they are committed even by public officials below salary grade '27', provided they of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other offenses or felonies in relation to their office. The
belong to the enumeration, jurisdiction would fall under the Sandiganbayan. When the offense said other offenses and felonies are broad in scope but are limited only to those that are
committed however, falls under Section 4(b) or 4(c) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended, it should be committed in relation to the public official or employee's office. This Court had ruled that as long
emphasized that the general qualification that the public official must belong to grade '27' is a as the offense charged in the information is intimately connected with the office and is alleged to
requirement so that the Sandiganbayan could exercise original jurisdiction over him. Otherwise, have been perpetrated while the accused was in the performance, though improper or irregular,
jurisdiction would fall to the proper regional or municipal trial court. of his official functions, there being no personal motive to commit the crime and had the accused
not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the accused is held to have been
In the case at bar, the accused is a Sangguniang Panlungsod member, a position with salary indicted for "an offense committed in relation" to his office.17 Thus, in the case of Lacson v.
grade '26'. Her office is included in the enumerated public officials in Section 4(a) (1) (a) to (g) of Executive Secretary,18where the crime involved was murder, this Court held that:
P.D. No. 1606 as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975. However, she is charged with
violation of Section 89 of The Auditing Code of the Philippines which is not a case falling under The phrase "other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it
Section 4(a) but under Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended. This being the case, the was committed in relation to the accused’s official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what
principle declared in Inding is not applicable in the case at bar because as stated, the charge determines the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender – that
must involve a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section
Revised Penal Code. Therefore, in the instant case, even if the position of the accused is one of 4. x x x.
those enumerated public officials under Section 4(a)(1)(a) to (g), since she is being prosecuted
of an offense not mentioned in the aforesaid section, the general qualification that accused must Also, in the case Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan,19where the public official was charged with grave
be a public official occupying a position with salary grade '27' is a requirement before this Court threats, this Court ruled:
could exercise jurisdiction over her. And since the accused occupied a public office with salary
grade 26, then she is not covered by the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. 1avvphi1

x x x In the case at bar, the amended information contained allegations that the accused,
petitioner herein, took advantage of his official functions as municipal mayor of Meycauayan,
Petitioner is correct in disputing the above ruling of the Sandiganbayan. Central to the discussion Bulacan when he committed the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised
of the Sandiganbayan is the case of Inding v. Sandiganbayan16 where this Court ruled that the Penal Code against complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a municipal councilor. The Office of the
officials enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4(a)(1) of P. D. No. 1606, as amended are included Special Prosecutor charged petitioner with aiming a gun at and threatening to kill Legaspi during
a public hearing, after the latter had rendered a privilege speech critical of petitioner’s Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provision of Section 4(b) does not mention any
administration. Clearly, based on such allegations, the crime charged is intimately connected qualification as to the public officials involved. It simply stated, public officials and employees
with the discharge of petitioner’s official functions. This was elaborated upon by public mentioned in subsection (a) of the same section. Therefore, it refers to those public officials with
respondent in its April 25, 1997 resolution wherein it held that the "accused was performing his Salary Grade 27 and above, except those specifically enumerated. It is a well-settled principle of
official duty as municipal mayor when he attended said public hearing" and that "accused’s legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary
violent act was precipitated by complainant’s criticism of his administration as the mayor or chief acceptation and signification,21 unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or
executive of the municipality, during the latter’s privilege speech. It was his response to private special legal meaning to those words.22
complainant’s attack to his office. If he was not the mayor, he would not have been irritated or
angered by whatever private complainant might have said during said privilege speech." Thus, always presumed.23
based on the allegations in the information, the Sandiganbayan correctly assumed jurisdiction
over the case. WHEREFORE, the Petition dated April 20, 2005 is hereby GRANTED and the Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated February 28, 2005 is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
Proceeding from the above rulings of this Court, a close reading of the Information filed against Consequently, let the case be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.
respondent Amante for violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines reveals that the said
offense was committed in relation to her office, making her fall under Section 4(b) of P.D. No. SO ORDERED.
1606, as amended.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
According to the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, if the intention of the law had been Associate Justice
to extend the application of the exceptions to the other cases over which the Sandiganbayan
could assert jurisdiction, then there would have been no need to distinguish between violations
of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code on
the one hand, and other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees in
relation to their office on the other. The said reasoning is misleading because a distinction
apparently exists. In the offenses involved in Section 4(a), it is not disputed that public office is
essential as an element of the said offenses themselves, while in those offenses and felonies
involved in Section 4(b), it is enough that the said offenses and felonies were committed in
relation to the public officials or employees' office. In expounding the meaning of offenses
deemed to have been committed in relation to office, this Court held:

In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court elaborated on the scope and reach
of the term "offense committed in relation to [an accused’s] office" by referring to the principle
laid down in Montilla v. Hilario[90 Phil 49 (1951)], and to an exception to that principle which was
recognized in People v. Montejo [108 Phil 613 (1960)]. The principle set out in Montilla v.
Hilario is that an offense may be considered as committed in relation to the accused’s office if
"the offense cannot exist without the office" such that "the office [is] a constituent element of the
crime x x x." In People v. Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, said that
"although public office is not an element of the crime of murder in [the] abstract," the facts in a
particular case may show that

x x x the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the accused’s] respective offices
and was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their
official functions. Indeed, [the accused] had no personal motive to commit the crime and they
would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. x x x20
G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008 On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to indict
petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27819
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, petitioner, of the Sandiganbayan.7 The Information reads:
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby
accuses HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA and JADE IAN D. SERANA of the crime of
DECISION Estafa, defined and penalized under Paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended committed as follows:
REYES, R.T., J.:
That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City,
CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government scholaran** accused, along with her brother, of Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-
swindling government funds? named accused, HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, a high-ranking public officer, being
then the Student Regent of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, while
in the performance of her official functions, committing the offense in relation to her
MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang iskolar ng bayan, at ang kanyang
office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her
kapatid, na kapwa pinararatangan ng estafang pera ng bayan?
brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government by falsely and fraudulently
The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition for certiorari assailing the Resolutions1of the representing to former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada that the renovation of the
Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, denying petitioner’s motion to quash the information and her Vinzons Hall of the University of the Philippines will be renovated and renamed as
motion for reconsideration. "President Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student Hall," and for which purpose accused
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA requested the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS
The Antecedents (P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter
relying and believing on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered
Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the Philippines- to said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of
Cebu. A student of a state university is known as a government scholar. She was appointed by FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), which check was subsequently encashed
then President Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999 as a student regent of UP, to serve a by accused Jade Ian D. Serana on October 25, 2000 and misappropriated for their
one-year term starting January 1, 2000 and ending on December 31, 2000. personal use and benefit, and despite repeated demands made upon the accused for
them to return aforesaid amount, the said accused failed and refused to do so to the
In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.
Hall Annex in UP Diliman.2 On September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her siblings and relatives,
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission the Office of the Student Regent CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)
Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).3
Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have
One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex.4President any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student
Estrada gave Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial assistance for regent.
the proposed renovation. The source of the funds, according to the information, was the Office of
the President. Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates
the crimes or offenses over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.8 It has no jurisdiction over
The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize.5 The succeeding student regent, the crime of estafa.9 It only has jurisdiction over crimes covered by Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2
Kristine Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA sa (Crimes Committed by Public Officers), Book II of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Estafa falling
U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within the state university, consequently filed a under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book II of the RPC is not within the
complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman.6 Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction.
She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the government, that was duped. Even Accused-movant’s claim that being merely a member in representation of the student
assuming that she received the P15,000,000.00, that amount came from Estrada, not from the body, she was never a public officer since she never received any compensation nor
coffers of the government.10 does she fall under Salary Grade 27, is of no moment, in view of the express provision of
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8249 which provides:
Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person. As a
student regent, she was not a public officer since she merely represented her peers, in contrast Sec. 4. Jurisdiction – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in
to the other regents who held their positions in an ex officio capacity. She addsed that she was a all cases involving:
simple student and did not receive any salary as a student regent.
(A) x x x
She further contended that she had no power or authority to receive monies or funds. Such
power was vested with the Board of Regents (BOR) as a whole. Since it was not alleged in the (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
information that it was among her functions or duties to receive funds, or that the crime was higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position
committed in connection with her official functions, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of the Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
Sandiganbayan citing the case of Soller v. Sandiganbayan.11
xxxx
The Ombudsman opposed the motion.12 It disputed petitioner’s interpretation of the law. Section
4(b) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 clearly contains the catch -all phrase "in relation to (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
office," thus, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the charges against petitioner. In the same corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. (Italics supplied)
breath, the prosecution countered that the source of the money is a matter of defense. It should
be threshed out during a full-blown trial.13
It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that the Sandiganbayan has original
exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses involving the officials enumerated in subsection
According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her protestations, iwas a public officer. As a (g), irrespective of their salary grades, because the primordial consideration in the
member of the BOR, she hads the general powers of administration and exerciseds the inclusion of these officials is the nature of their responsibilities and functions.
corporate powers of UP. Based on Mechem’s definition of a public office, petitioner’s stance that
she was not compensated, hence, not a public officer, is erroneous. Compensation is not an
Is accused-movant included in the contemplated provision of law?
essential part of public office. Parenthetically, compensation has been interpreted to include
allowances. By this definition, petitioner was compensated.14
A meticulous review of the existing Charter of the University of the Philippines reveals
that the Board of Regents, to which accused-movant belongs, exclusively exercises the
Sandiganbayan Disposition
general powers of administration and corporate powers in the university, such as: 1) To
receive and appropriate to the ends specified by law such sums as may be provided by
In a Resolution dated November 14, 2003, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion for law for the support of the university; 2) To prescribe rules for its own government and to
lack of merit.15 It ratiocinated: enact for the government of the university such general ordinances and regulations, not
contrary to law, as are consistent with the purposes of the university; and 3) To appoint,
The focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over this case. on recommendation of the President of the University, professors, instructors, lecturers
and other employees of the University; to fix their compensation, hours of service, and
It is extremely erroneous to hold that only criminal offenses covered by Chapter II, such other duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant to them in its discretion
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code are within the jurisdiction of this leave of absence under such regulations as it may promulgate, any other provisions of
Court. As correctly pointed out by the prosecution, Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249 provides law to the contrary notwithstanding, and to remove them for cause after an investigation
that the Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other offenses committed by public and hearing shall have been had.
officials and employees in relation to their office. From this provision, there is no single
doubt that this Court has jurisdiction over the offense of estafacommitted by a public It is well-established in corporation law that the corporation can act only through its board
official in relation to his office. of directors, or board of trustees in the case of non-stock corporations. The board of
directors or trustees, therefore, is the governing body of the corporation.
It is unmistakably evident that the Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines is In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,23 the Court clearly explained and illustrated
performing functions similar to those of the Board of Trustees of a non-stock corporation. the rule and the exceptions, thus:
This draws to fore the conclusion that being a member of such board, accused-movant
undoubtedly falls within the category of public officials upon whom this Court is vested As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and
with original exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that she does not occupy a cannot be subject of appeal until final judgment or order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 41).
position classified as Salary Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation and Position The ordinary procedure to be followed in such a case is to file an answer, go to trial and
Classification Act of 1989. if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment. The
same rule applies to an order denying a motion to quash, except that instead of filing an
Finally, this court finds that accused-movant’s contention that the same of P15 Million answer a plea is entered and no appeal lies from a judgment of acquittal.
was received from former President Estrada and not from the coffers of the government,
is a matter a defense that should be properly ventilated during the trial on the merits of This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to
this case.16 dismiss or motion to quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies. The reason is that it would be unfair to
On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.17 The motion was denied require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court
with finality in a Resolution dated February 4, 2004.18 has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense, or is not the court of proper venue,
or if the denial of the motion to dismiss or motion to quash is made with grave abuse of
Issue discretion or a whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment. In such cases, the
ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate. The following are a few
Petitioner is now before this Court, contending that "THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED examples of the exceptions to the general rule.
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN NOT QUASHING THE INFORMATION AND DISMISING THE CASE In De Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IS HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, this Court granted the petition for certiorariand
THE INFORMATION."19 prohibition against the City Court of Manila and directed the respondent court to dismiss
the case.
In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold argument below, namely: (a) the Sandiganbayan
has no jurisdiction over estafa; (b) petitioner is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27 and she In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial of a motion to quash based on
paid her tuition fees; (c) the offense charged was not committed in relation to her office; (d) the lack of jurisdiction over the offense, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and
funds in question personally came from President Estrada, not from the government. enjoined the respondent court from further proceeding in the case.

Our Ruling In Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on
improper venue, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the
The petition cannot be granted. respondent judge from taking cognizance of the case except to dismiss the same.

Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to In Manalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on bar
quash is not correctible by certiorari. by prior judgment, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and directed the
respondent judge to dismiss the case.
We would ordinarily dismiss this petition for certiorari outright on procedural grounds. Well-
established is the rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy is In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss
not a petition for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without prejudice to reiterating the based on the Statute of Frauds, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and
special defenses invoked in their motion to quash.20 Remedial measures as regards interlocutory dismissed the amended complaint.
orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon and often dismissed.21 The evident reason
for this rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action.22
In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted the petition for certiorari after the Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in
motion to quash based on double jeopardy was denied by respondent judge and ordered all cases involving:
him to desist from further action in the criminal case except to dismiss the same.
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and
In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying the motion to quash based on Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II
prescription was set aside on certiorari and the criminal case was dismissed by this of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the
Court.24 following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity,
at the time of the commission of the offense:
We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a grave abuse of discretion.
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position
set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
" (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
We first address petitioner’s contention that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is determined and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
by Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). We note
that petitioner refers to Section 4 of the said law yet quotes Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as " (b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
amended, in her motion to quash before the Sandiganbayan.25 She repeats the reference in the assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
instant petition for certiorari26 and in her memorandum of authorities.27
"(c ) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a mere clerical or typographical error. It bears
stressing that petitioner repeated this claim twice despite corrections made by the " (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
Sandiganbayan.28
" (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial
Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended, rather than R.A. No. 3019, as director and those holding the rank of senior superintended or higher;
amended, that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. A brief legislative history of the
statute creating the Sandiganbayan is in order. The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. " (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in
1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and
employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest
" (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations.
to the people.29
" (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27'" and up under
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on December 10,
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.30
" (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding
amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. " (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the
8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As it provisions of the Constitution; and
now stands, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:
" (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27'" and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
B. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing
by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided,
to their office. however, That where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment
therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the
1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint
determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be
" In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary deemed abandoned."
Grade "27'" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and
PNP officer mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved on August 17, 1960. The said
proper regional court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit law represses certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or
trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.31 Pursuant to Section 10 of R.A. No. 3019, all
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended. prosecutions for violation of the said law should be filed with the Sandiganbayan.32

" The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over which the Sandiganbayan has
resolutions or order of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited by petitioner, deals not with the
jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but with prohibition on private individuals. We quote:

" The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals.– (a) It shall be unlawful for any person
issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, having family or close personal relation with any public official to capitalize or exploit or
and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over take advantage of such family or close personal relation by directly or indirectly
petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed requesting or receiving any present, gift or material or pecuniary advantage from any
or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: other person having some business, transaction, application, request or contract with the
Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme government, in which such public official has to intervene. Family relation shall include
Court. the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity in the third civil degree. The word
"close personal relation" shall include close personal friendship, social and fraternal
" The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing connections, and professional employment all giving rise to intimacy which assures free
rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may thereafter promulgate, relative to access to such public officer.
appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions
for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and (b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any public official to
from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3 hereof.
its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed
pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan while R.A. No. 3019, as amended, defines graft and corrupt practices and
" In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories provides for their penalties.
with the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them. the offense of estafa.

" Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends that estafa is not among those crimes
action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall, at all times, cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. We note that in hoisting this argument, petitioner isolated the
be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, without regard to the succeeding paragraphs of the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed said provision.
The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a sensible construction Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations decrees listed NPDC as a regular
so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion.33 Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda government agency under the Office of the President and allotments for its maintenance
est, ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will and operating expenses were issued direct to NPDC (Exh. 10-A, Perlas, Item Nos. 2, 3).
avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. Kung saan mayroong kalabuan, ang
pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat maging mahirap at katawa-tawa. The Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over estafawas reiterated with greater firmness in Bondoc v.
Sandiganbayan.38 Pertinent parts of the Court’s ruling in Bondoc read:
Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to each other
in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the legislature.34 The intention of the legislator Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer Bondoc’s cases to the Regional Trial
must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of the act is to be taken into Court, for the simple reason that the latter would not have jurisdiction over the offenses.
view.35 In other words, petitioner’s interpretation lies in direct opposition to the rule that a statute As already above intimated, the inability of the Sandiganbayan to hold a joint trial of
must be interpreted as a whole under the principle that the best interpreter of a statute is the Bondoc’s cases and those of the government employees separately charged for the
statute itself.36 Optima statuti interpretatrix est ipsum statutum. Ang isang batas ay marapat na same crimes, has not altered the nature of the offenses charged, as estafathru
bigyan ng kahulugan sa kanyang kabuuan sa ilalim ng prinsipyo na ang pinakamainam na falsification punishable by penalties higher than prision correccional or imprisonment of
interpretasyon ay ang mismong batas. six years, or a fine of P6,000.00, committed by government employees in conspiracy with
private persons, including Bondoc. These crimes are within the exclusive, original
Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads: jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They simply cannot be taken cognizance of by the
regular courts, apart from the fact that even if the cases could be so transferred, a joint
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed trial would nonetheless not be possible.
by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation
to their office. Petitioner UP student regent
is a public officer.
Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in
relation to their office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafaas one of the Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. She does not receive any salary or
offenses included in Section 4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. remuneration as a UP student regent. This is not the first or likely the last time that We will be
The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is committed by called upon to define a public officer. In Khan, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, We ruled that it is
public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and difficult to pin down the definition of a public officer.39 The 1987 Constitution does not define who
that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office. are public officers. Rather, the varied definitions and concepts are found in different statutes and
jurisprudence.
In Perlas, Jr. v. People,37 the Court had occasion to explain that the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over an indictment for estafaversus a director of the National Parks Development In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court held that:
Committee, a government instrumentality. The Court held then:
A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for
The National Parks Development Committee was created originally as an Executive a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an
Committee on January 14, 1963, for the development of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to
and other national parks (Executive Order No. 30). It was later designated as the be exercise by him for the benefit of the public ([Mechem Public Offices and
National Parks Development Committee (NPDC) on February 7, 1974 (E.O. No. 69). On Officers,] Sec. 1). The right to hold a public office under our political system is therefore
January 9, 1966, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos and Teodoro F. Valencia were designated not a natural right. It exists, when it exists at all only because and by virtue of some law
Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively (E.O. No. 3). Despite an attempt to transfer it expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no
to the Bureau of Forest Development, Department of Natural Resources, on December 1, such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold
1975 (Letter of Implementation No. 39, issued pursuant to PD No. 830, dated November office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards
27, 1975), the NPDC has remained under the Office of the President (E.O. No. 709, salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary
dated July 27, 1981). (42 Am. Jur. 881).
In Laurel v. Desierto,41 the Court adopted the definition of Mechem of a public office: Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is a public officer, the Sandiganbayan
would still not have jurisdiction over the offense because it was not committed in relation to her
"A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, office.
for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power,
an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to act without the approval of the BOR.
to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public She adds there was no Board Resolution issued by the BOR authorizing her to contract with
officer."42 then President Estrada; and that her acts were not ratified by the governing body of the state
university. Resultantly, her act was done in a private capacity and not in relation to public office.
Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular
tuition fee-paying student. This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the information.51 More than that,
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by defendant or respondent in an
other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People,43 We held that while the first answer, a motion to dismiss, or a motion to quash.52 Otherwise, jurisdiction would become
part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part dependent almost entirely upon the whims of defendant or respondent.53
specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and
higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms that petitioner, being then a
Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express student regent of U.P., "while in the performance of her official functions, committing the offense
provision of law.44 in relation to her office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with
her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over and feloniously defraud the government x x x." (Underscoring supplied)
Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations,
state universities or educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan when it did not
As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of quash the information based on this ground.
trustees of a non-stock corporation.45 By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public
officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606. Source of funds is a defense that should
be raised during trial on the merits.
Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public
office.46 At most, it is merely incidental to the public office.47 It is contended anew that the amount came from President Estrada’s private funds and not from
the government coffers. Petitioner insists the charge has no leg to stand on.
Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an individual
of some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the We cannot agree. The information alleges that the funds came from the Office of the President
benefit of the public makes one a public officer.48 and not its then occupant, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Under the information, it is averred
that "petitioner requested the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00), Philippine
The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with Article XIV of the Constitution. Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter relying and believing on said false
UP performs a legitimate governmental function by providing advanced instruction in literature, pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No.
philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving professional and technical training.49 Moreover, 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00)."
UP is maintained by the Government and it declares no dividends and is not a corporation
created for profit.50 Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation that the source of the P15,000,000 is
a matter of defense that should be ventilated during the trial on the merits of the instant case.54
The offense charged was committed
in relation to public office, according A lawyer owes candor, fairness
to the Information. and honesty to the Court.
As a parting note, petitioner’s counsel, Renato G. dela Cruz, misrepresented his reference to
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 as a quotation from Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019. A review of his
motion to quash, the instant petition for certiorari and his memorandum, unveils the misquotation.
We urge petitioner’s counsel to observe Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
specifically Rule 10.02 of the Rules stating that "a lawyer shall not misquote or misrepresent."

The Court stressed the importance of this rule in Pangan v. Ramos,55 where Atty Dionisio D.
Ramos used the name Pedro D.D. Ramos in connection with a criminal case. The Court ruled
that Atty. Ramos resorted to deception by using a name different from that with which he was
authorized. We severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a repetition may warrant
suspension or disbarment.56

We admonish petitioner’s counsel to be more careful and accurate in his citation. A lawyer’s
conduct before the court should be characterized by candor and fairness.57 The administration of
justice would gravely suffer if lawyers do not act with complete candor and honesty before the
courts.58

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Austria-Martinez, Corona*, Nachura, JJ., concur.


G.R. No. 137237 September 17, 2002 PO2 Eduardo also stated that while they were on their way to the town hall, Mayor Esquivel
mauled him with the use of a firearm and threatened to kill him. Mayor Esquivel pointed a gun at
ANTONIO PROSPERO ESQUIVEL and MARK ANTHONY ESQUIVEL, petitioners, PO2 Eduardo and said, "Putang-ina mo, papatayin kita, aaksidentihin kita dito, bakit mo ako
vs. kinakalaban!" (You son of a bitch! I will kill you, I will create an accident for you. Why are you
THE HON. OMBUDSMAN, THE SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), THE PEOPLE OF against me?) Upon reaching the municipal hall, Barangay Captain Mark Anthony "Eboy"
THE PHILIPPINES and HERMINIGILDO EDUARDO, respondents. Esquivel shoved PO2 Eduardo inside an adjacent hut. Mayor Esquivel then ordered SPO1
Espiritu to kill him, saying "Patayin mo na iyan at gawan ng senaryo at report." (Kill him, then
RESOLUTION create a scenario and make a report.)

QUISUMBING, J.: At this point, according to SPO1 Catacutan, he arrived to verify what happened to his teammate,
PO2 Eduardo, but Mayor Esquivel likewise threatened him. Mayor Esquivel then ordered P/S
Insp. Bienvenido Padua of the Jaen Police Station to file charges against PO2 Eduardo. Then,
This special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus1 with prayer for preliminary
the mayor once again struck PO2 Eduardo in the nape with a handgun, while Mark Anthony
injunction and/or temporary restraining order seeks to annul and set aside: (1) the Ombudsman
"Eboy" Esquivel was holding the latter. PO2 Eduardo then fell and lost consciousness. When he
resolution2 dated June 15, 1998 finding prima facie case against herein petitioners, and (2) the
regained his consciousness, he was told that he would be released. Prior to his release,
order3 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. Further, in their supplemental
however, he was forced to sign a statement in the police blotter that he was in good physical
petition,4petitioners assail the Sandiganbayan for taking cognizance of cases without or beyond
condition.
its jurisdiction. They impleaded that court and the People of the Philippines as additional parties
in this case.
1âwphi1.nêt

PO2 Eduardo told the PNP-CIDG investigators that he was most likely maltreated and
threatened because of jueteng and tupada. He said the mayor believed he was among the law
The factual antecedents of this case are as follows:
enforcers who raided a jueteng den in Jaen that same day. He surmised that the mayor disliked
the fact that he arrested members of crime syndicates with connections to the mayor.7
PO2 Herminigildo C. Eduardo and SPO1 Modesto P. Catacutan are both residents
of Barangay Dampulan, Jaen, Nueva Ecija, but assigned with the Regional Intelligence and
In support of his sworn statement, PO2 Eduardo presented a medical certificate showing the
Investigation Division (RIID), Police Regional Office 3, Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga.
injuries he suffered and other documentary evidence.8
In their respective complaint-affidavits,5 filed before the Philippine National Police – Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG), Third Regional Office, Camp Olivas, San
Fernando, Pampanga, Eduardo and Catacutan charged herein petitioners Antonio Prospero After the initial investigation, the PNP-CIDG Third Regional Office forwarded the pertinent
Esquivel,6municipal mayor of Jaen and his brother, Mark Anthony "Eboy" records to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon for appropriate action.9
Esquivel, barangay captain of barangay Apo, Jaen, with alleged illegal arrest, arbitrary detention,
maltreatment, attempted murder, and grave threats. Also included in the charges were SPO1 The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon conducted a preliminary investigation and
Reynaldo Espiritu, SPO2 Nestor Villa Almayda, and LTO Officer Aurelio Diaz. PO2 Eduardo and required petitioners and their companions to file their respective counter-affidavits. In their joint
SPO1 Catacutan likewise accused P/S Insp. Bienvenido C. Padua and SPO3 Inocencio P. counter-affidavit,10 petitioners and their companions denied the charges against them. Instead,
Bautista of the Jaen Municipal Police Force of dereliction of duty. they alleged that PO2 Eduardo is a fugitive from justice with an outstanding warrant of arrest for
malversation. They further alleged that the gun confiscated from PO2 Eduardo was the subject
The initial investigation conducted by the PNP-CIDG showed that at about 12:30 p.m. of March of an illegal possession of firearm complaint.
14, 1998, PO2 Eduardo was about to eat lunch at his parents’ house at Sta. Monica Village,
Dampulan, Jaen, Nueva Ecija, when petitioners arrived. SPO1 Espiritu, SPO2 Almayda, LTO On June 15, 1998, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon issued the impugned
Officer Diaz, and several unidentified persons accompanied them. Without further ado, resolution11recommending that both Mayor Esquivel and Barangay Captain Mark Anthony "Eboy"
petitioners disarmed PO2 Eduardo of his Cal. 45 service pistol, which was covered by a Esquivel be indicted for the crime of less serious physical injuries, and Mayor Esquivel alone for
Memorandum Receipt and COMELEC Gun Ban Exemption. They then forced him to board grave threats. The charges against the other respondents below were dismissed, either
petitioners’ vehicle and brought him to the Jaen Municipal Hall. provisionally or with finality.

On August 14, 1998, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the aforesaid resolution.
Thereafter, separate informations docketed as Criminal Case No. 2477712 for less serious (2) Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over
physical injuries against Mayor Esquivel and Mark Anthony "Eboy" Esquivel, and Criminal Case Criminal Cases Nos. 24777 and 24778?
No. 2477813 for grave threats against petitioner mayor, were filed with the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners argue that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to
On August 26, 1998, petitioners moved for reconsideration of the August 14, 1998 resolution of consider the exculpatory evidence in their favor, namely, the admission of PO2 Eduardo that he
the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. As directed by the Sandiganbayan, they likewise filed a was in good physical condition when he left the police station in Jaen, Nueva Ecija.18 With such
motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation14 with the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP). That admission, PO2 Eduardo is now estopped from claiming that he was injured since it is conclusive
motion was, however, denied by the OSP in the assailed order15 dated December 7, 1998. On evidence against him and need not be proven in any other proceeding.19
December 11, 1998, the Ombudsman approved the OSP’s order of denial.
Public respondents, represented by the Office of the Ombudsman through the OSP, counter that
On February 8, 1999, petitioners were arraigned in both cases, and they pleaded not guilty to the petitioners raise a factual issue which is not a proper subject of a certiorari action. They further
charges. postulate that this is the very same defense advanced by petitioners in the charges against them
and being evidentiary in nature, its resolution can only be threshed out in a full-blown trial.20
With their failure to extend the suspension of proceedings previously granted by the
Sandiganbayan by virtue of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners elevated the matter to We find the present petition without merit.
this Court alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents in rendering the
resolution and the order. The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe
that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter,
On June 9, 1999, we denied for lack of merit petitioners’ motion16 reiterating their plea for the to file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts.21Settled is the rule that the
issuance of a TRO directing public respondents to refrain from prosecuting Criminal Cases Nos. Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigatory
24777 and 24778.17 and prosecutory powers without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise.22Said
exercise of powers is based upon his constitutional mandate23 and the courts will not interfere in
Petitioners now submit the following issues for our resolution: its exercise. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory
powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well.
1. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ABUSED HIS Otherwise, innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by
DISCRETION IN DISREGARDING THE ADMISSION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT the Ombudsman will grievously hamper the functions of the office and the courts, in much the
THAT HE WAS IN GOOD PHYSICAL CONDITION WHEN HE WAS RELEASED FROM same way that courts will be swamped if they had to review the exercise of discretion on the part
THE POLICE HEADQUARTERS OF JAEN, NUEVA ECIJA; of public prosecutors each time they decided to file an information or dismiss a complaint by a
private complainant.24 Thus, in Rodrigo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan,25 we held that:
2. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ABUSED HIS
DISCRETION IN FINDING PROBABLE CAUSE FOR GRAVE THREATS WHEN This Court, moreover, has maintained a consistent policy of non-interference in the
PETITIONERS WERE LEGALLY EFFECTING THE ARREST OF THE PRIVATE determination of the Ombudsman regarding the existence of probable cause, provided
RESPONDENT BY VIRTUE OF THE WARRANT OF ARREST ISSUED BY THE there is no grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF GAPAN, NUEVA ECIJA UNDER CRIM. CASE NO. 4925
FOR MALVERSATION OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY; and In this case, petitioners utterly failed to establish that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of
discretion in rendering the disputed resolution and order.
3. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER
THE OFFENSES FILED AGAINST PETITIONERS. There was no abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, much less grave abuse in
disregarding PO2 Eduardo’s admission that he was in good physical condition when he was
Petitioners’ formulation of the issues may be reduced to the following: released from the police headquarters.26Such admission was never brought up during the
preliminary investigation. The records show that no such averment was made in petitioners’
counter-affidavit27 nor was there any document purporting to be the exculpatory statement
(1) Did the Ombudsman commit grave abuse of discretion in directing the filing of the
attached therein as an annex or exhibit. Petitioners only raised this issue in their motion for
informations against petitioners?
reconsideration.28 In his opposition to said motion, PO2 Eduardo did admit signing a document to Second, being an extraordinary remedy, prohibition cannot be resorted to when the ordinary and
the effect that he was in good physical condition when he left the police station. However, the usual remedies provided by law are adequate and available.40 Prohibition is granted only where
admission merely applied to the execution of said document and not to the truthfulness of its no other remedy is available or sufficient to afford redress. That the petitioners have another and
contents. Consequently, the admission that petitioners brand as incontrovertible is but a matter complete remedy at law, through an appeal or otherwise, is generally held sufficient reason for
of evidence best addressed to the public respondents’ appreciation. It is evidentiary in nature denying the issuance of the writ.41 In this case, petitioners were not devoid of a remedy in the
and its probative value can be best passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits. ordinary course of law. They could have filed a motion to quash the informations at the first
instance but they did not. They have only themselves to blame for this procedural lapse as they
Given these circumstances, certiorari is not the proper remedy. As previously held, but now have not shown any adequate excuse for their failure to do so. Petitioners did make a belated
bears stressing: oral motion for time to file a motion to quash the informations, during their much delayed
arraignment,42 but its denial is not a proper subject for certiorari or prohibition as said denial is
. . . [t]his Court is not a trier of facts and it is not its function to examine and evaluate the merely an interlocutory order.43
probative value of all evidence presented to the concerned tribunal which formed the
basis of its impugned decision, resolution or order.29 Third, a writ of prohibition will not be issued against an inferior court unless the attention of the
court whose proceedings are sought to be stayed has been called to the alleged lack or excess
Petitioners would have this Court review the Sandiganbayan’s exercise of jurisdiction over of jurisdiction.44 The foundation of this rule is the respect and consideration due to the lower
Criminal Cases Nos. 24777-78. Petitioners theorize that the latter has no jurisdiction over their court and the expediency of preventing unnecessary litigation;45 it cannot be presumed that the
persons as they hold positions excluded in Republic Act No. 7975.30 As the positions of lower court would not properly rule on a jurisdictional objection if it were properly presented to
municipal mayors and barangay captains are not mentioned therein, they claim they are not it.46 The records show that petitioners only raised the issue of the alleged lack of jurisdiction by
covered by said law under the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.31 the Sandiganbayan before this Court. 1âw phi 1.nêt

Petitioners’ claim lacks merit. In Rodrigo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan,32 Binay vs. Nor can petitioners claim entitlement to a writ of mandamus. Mandamus is employed to compel
Sandiganbayan,33 and Layus vs. Sandiganbayan,34 we already held that municipal mayors fall the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its chief use and not a
under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Nor can Barangay Captain discretionary duty.47 The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither
Mark Anthony Esquivel claim that since he is not a municipal mayor, he is outside the the exercise of official discretion nor judgment.48 Hence, this Court cannot issue a writ of
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. R.A. 7975, as amended by R.A. No. 8249,35 provides that it is only mandamus to control or review the exercise of discretion by the Ombudsman, for it is his
in cases where "none of the accused (underscoring supplied) are occupying positions discretion and judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the Court. When a decision has
corresponding to salary grade ‘27’ or higher"36 that "exclusive original jurisdiction shall be vested been reached in a matter involving discretion, a writ of mandamus may not be availed of to
in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal review or correct it, however erroneous it may be.49 Moreover, as earlier discussed, petitioners
circuit court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas had another remedy available in the ordinary course of law. Where such remedy is available in
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended."37 Note that under the 1991 Local Government Code, Mayor the ordinary course of law, mandamus will not lie.50
Esquivel has a salary grade of 27.38 Since Barangay Captain Esquivel is the co-accused in
Criminal Case No. 24777 of Mayor Esquivel, whose position falls under salary grade 27, the WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.
Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over said
criminal case, as well as over Criminal Case No. 24778, involving both of them. Hence, the writ SO ORDERED.
of certiorari cannot issue in petitioners’ favor.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
For the same reason, petitioners’ prayer for a writ of prohibition must also be denied.

First, note that a writ of prohibition is directed to the court itself, commanding it to cease from the
exercise of a jurisdiction to which it has no legal claim.39 As earlier discussed, the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 24777-78 is clearly founded on law.
G.R. Nos. 146646-49. March 11, 2005 Again, Ana May protested to his proposal, saying he is like a father to her and that he is a
married man with two sons.
ROGELIO M. ESTEBAN, Petitioners,
vs. Petitioner suddenly rose from his seat, grabbed her and said, "Hindi pwede yan, mahal kita." ("I
THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. can’t allow that for I love you.") He embraced her, kissing her all over her face and touching her
right breast.
DECISION
Ana May freed herself and dashed out of the chambers crying. She threw the payroll on the table
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: of her co-employee, Elizabeth Q. Manubay. The latter sensed something was wrong and
accompanied Ana May to the restroom. There she told Elizabeth what happened.
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, assailing the Resolution1 dated December 18, 2000 of the Sandiganbayan (1st On March 9 and July 1, 1998, two Informations for violation of R.A. 7877 (the Anti-Sexual
Division) and Order2 dated January 11, 2000 in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04. Harassment Law of 1995) were filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan, docketed therein
as Criminal Cases Nos. 24490 and 24702.
The instant petition stemmed from the sworn complaint3 of Ana May V. Simbajon against Judge
Rogelio M. Esteban, filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Cabanatuan City on September Also on July 1, 1998, two Informations for acts of lasciviousness were filed with the same court,
8, 1997, docketed as I.S. Nos. 9-97-8239. docketed as Criminal Cases. 24703-04.

In her complaint, Ana May alleged that she was a casual employee of the City Government of On September 18, 1998, petitioner filed a motion to quash the Informations in Criminal Cases
Cabanatuan City. Sometime in February 1997, she was detailed with the Municipal Trial Court in Nos. 24703-04 for acts of lasciviousness on the ground that he has been placed four (4) times in
Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Cabanatuan City, upon incessant request of Presiding Judge Reogelio jeopardy for the same offense.
Esteban, herein petitioner.
The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash but directed the prosecution to determine if the
After her detail with Branch 1, the item of bookbinder became vacant. Thus, she applied for the offenses charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04 were committed in relation to petitioner’s
position but petitioner did not take any action on her application. On July 25, 1997, when she functions as a judge.
approached petitioner in his chambers to follow up her application, he told her, "Ano naman ang
magiging kapalit ng pagpirma ko rito? Mula ngayon, girlfriend na kita. Araw-araw papasok ka dito On September 3, 1999, the prosecution filed Amended Informations in Criminal Cases Nos.
sa opisina ko, at araw-araw, isang halik." ("What can you offer me in exchange for my signature? 24703 and 24704 quoted as follows:
From now on, you are my girlfriend. You will enter this office everyday and everyday, I get one
kiss.")4 Ana May refused to accede to his proposal as she considered him like her own father. Criminal Case No. 24703:

Petitioner nonetheless recommended her for appointment. Thereafter, he suddenly kissed her That on or about the 5th day of August 1997 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, Philippines and
on her left cheek. She was shocked and left the chambers, swearing never to return or talk to within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, JUDGE ROGELIO M.
petitioner. ESTEBAN, a public officer, being then the Presiding Judge of Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cabanatuan City, who after having been rejected by the private complainant, Ana May
On August 5, 1997, at around 9:30 in the morning, Virginia S. Medina, court interpreter, informed V. Simbajon, of his sexual demands or solicitations to be his girlfriend and to enter his room daily
Ana May that petitioner wanted to see her in his chambers regarding the payroll. As a for a kiss as a condition for the signing of complainant’s permanent appointment as a bookbinder
subordinate, she complied. Once inside, petitioner asked her if she has been receiving her in his Court, thus in relation to his office or position as such, with lewd design and malicious
salary as a bookbinder. When she answered in the affirmative, he said, "Matagal na pala eh, desire, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously planted a kiss on her left cheek
bakit hindi ka pumapasok dito sa kuwarto ko? Di ba sabi ko say iyo, girlfriend na kita?" ("So against her will and consent, to her damage and detriment.
you’ve been getting the salary for sometime already. Why didn’t you report here in my office?
Didn’t I tell you, you’re my girlfriend.")5 CONTRARY TO LAW.6
Criminal Case No. 24704 Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.

That on or about the 25th day of June 1997 in in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, Philippines and The sole issue for our resolution is whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Criminal
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, JUDGE ROGELIO M. Cases Nos. 24703-04 for acts of lasciviousness filed against petitioner.
ESTEBAN, a public officer, being then the Presiding Judge of Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cabanatuan City, who after having been rejected by the private complainant, Ana May Petitioner contends that the alleged acts of lasciviousness were not committed in relation to his
V. Simbajon, of his sexual demands or solicitations to be his girlfriend and to enter his room daily office as a judge; and the fact that he is a public official is not an essential element of the crimes
for a kiss as a condition for the signing of complainant’s permanent appointment as a bookbinder charged.
in his Court, thus in relation to his office or position as such, with lewd design and malicious
desire, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously planted a kiss on her left cheek The Ombudsman, represented by the Office of the Special Prosecutor, maintains that the
against her will and consent, to her damage and detriment. allegations in the two (2) Amended Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04 indicate a
close relationship between petitioner’s official functions as a judge and the commission of acts of
CONTRARY TO LAW.7 lasciviousness.

On September 29, 1999, petitioner filed a motion to quash the Amended Informations on the The petition is bereft of merit.
ground that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crimes charged considering that they
were not committed in relation to his office as a judge. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249,10 reads in
part:
On November 22, 1999, before the Sandiganbayan could resolve the motion to quash, the
prosecution filed the following Re-Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 24703: SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:
"That on or about the 5th day of August 1997 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, JUDGE ROGELIO M. xxx
ESTEBAN, a public officer, being then the Presiding Judge of Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cabanatuan City, who after having been rejected by the private complainant, Ana May
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crime committed by the
V. Simbajon, of his sexual demands or solicitations to be his girlfriend and to enter his room daily
public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their
for a kiss as a condition for the signing of complainant’s permanent appointment as a bookbinder
office.
in his Court, thus in relation to his office or position as such, with lewd design and malicious
desire, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously grab private complainant, kiss her
all over her face and touch her right breast against her will and consent, to her damage and In People v. Montejo,11 we ruled that an offense is said to have been committed in relation
detriment. to the office if the offense is "intimately connected" with the office of the offender and
perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. This intimate relation
between the offense charged and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the
CONTRARY TO LAW."8
Information.12 This is in accordance with the rule that the factor that characterizes the charge is
the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information.13Hence, where the information is
which was admitted by the Sandiganbayan. wanting in specific factual averments to show the intimate relationship/connection between the
offense charged and the discharge of official functions, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction
On December 18, 2000, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion to quash the Amended over the case.14
Informations, holding that "the act of approving or indorsing the permanent appointment of
complaining witness was certainly a function of the office of the accused so that his acts are, Under Supreme Court Circular No. 7 dated April 27, 1987,15 petitioner, as presiding judge of
therefore, committed in relation to his office."9 MTCC, Branch 1, Cabanatuan City, is vested with the power to recommend the appointment of
Ana May Simbajon as bookbinder. As alleged in the Amended Informations in Criminal Cases
Petitioner then moved for a reconsideration, but was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Order Nos. 24703-04, she was constrained to approach petitioner on June 25, 1997 as she needed his
dated January 11, 2001. recommendation. But he imposed a condition before extending such recommendation - she
should be his girlfriend and must report daily to his office for a kiss. There can be no doubt,
therefore, that petitioner used his official position in committing the acts complained of. While it is
true, as petitioner argues, that public office is not an element of the crime of acts of
lasciviousness, defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, nonetheless,
he could not have committed the crimes charged were it not for the fact that as the Presiding
Judge of the MTCC, Branch I, Cabanatuan City, he has the authority to recommend the
appointment of Ana May as bookbinder. In other words, the crimes allegedly committed are
intimately connected with his office.

The jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information.16The


Amended Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04 contain allegations showing that the
acts of lasciviousness were committed by petitioner in relation to his official function.

Accordingly, we rule that the Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting the Amended Informations for acts of lasciviousness in
Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the
Sandiganbayan dated December 18, 2000 and January 11, 2001, in Criminal Cases Nos.
24703-04 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, (Chairman), Corona, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Carpio-Morales, J., on leave.


G.R. No. 175457 July 6, 2011 That on or about the 6th day of September 1998, and for sometime prior [or] subsequent thereto,
[in] the Municipality of Borongan, Province of Eastern Samar, Philippines, and within the
RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR., Petitioner, jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [the] above-named accused, Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr.[,] being
vs. then the Provincial Governor of Eastern Samar, and Alexandrino R. Apelado, being then the
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. Provincial Warden of Eastern Samar, both having been public officers, duly elected, appointed
and qualified as such, committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x together and mutually helping x x x each other, with deliberate intent, manifest partiality and
evident bad faith, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally order and cause the
release from the Provincial Jail of detention prisoner Mayor Francisco Adalim, accused in
G.R. No. 175482
Criminal Case No. 10963, for Murder, by virtue of a warrant of Arrest issued by Honorable
Arnulfo P. Bugtas, Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 2, Borongan, Eastern Samar, and thereafter
ALEXANDRINO R. APELADO, SR., Petitioner, placed said detention prisoner (Mayor Francisco Adalim) under accused RUPERTO A. AMBIL,
vs. JR.’s custody, by allowing said Mayor Adalim to stay at accused Ambil’s residence for a period of
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. Eighty-Five (85) days, more or less which act was done without any court order, thus accused in
the performance of official functions had given unwarranted benefits and advantage to detainee
DECISION Mayor Francisco Adalim to the prejudice of the government.

VILLARAMA, JR., J.: CONTRARY TO LAW.

Before us are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Ruperto A. BAIL BOND RECOMMENDED: P30,000.00 each.13
Ambil, Jr.1 and petitioner Alexandrino R. Apelado Sr.2 assailing the Decision3promulgated on
September 16, 2005 and Resolution4 dated November 8, 2006 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal On arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty and posted bail.
Case No. 25892.
At the pre-trial, petitioners admitted the allegations in the Information. They reason, however,
The present controversy arose from a letter5of Atty. David B. Loste, President of the Eastern that Adalim’s transfer was justified considering the imminent threats upon his person and the
Samar Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), to the Office of the Ombudsman, dangers posed by his detention at the provincial jail. According to petitioners, Adalim’s sister,
praying for an investigation into the alleged transfer of then Mayor Francisco Adalim, an accused Atty. Juliana A. Adalim-White, had sent numerous prisoners to the same jail where Mayor Adalim
in Criminal Case No. 10963 for murder, from the provincial jail of Eastern Samar to the residence was to be held.
of petitioner, then Governor Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. In a Report6 dated January 4, 1999, the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) recommended the filing of criminal charges against
Consequently, the prosecution no longer offered testimonial evidence and rested its case after
petitioner Ambil, Jr. for violation of Section 3(e)7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise
the admission of its documentary exhibits. Petitioners filed a Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended. On September 22, 1999, the
Evidence with Reservation to Present Evidence in Case of Denial14 but the same was denied.
new President of the IBP, Eastern Samar Chapter, informed the Ombudsman that the IBP is no
longer interested in pursuing the case against petitioners. Thus, he recommended the dismissal
of the complaint against petitioners.8 At the trial, petitioners presented three witnesses: petitioner Ambil, Jr., Atty. Juliana A. Adalim-
White and Mayor Francisco C. Adalim.
Nonetheless, in an Information9 dated January 31, 2000, petitioners Ambil, Jr. and Alexandrino R.
Apelado, Sr. were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, together with SPO3 Petitioner Ambil, Jr. testified that he was the Governor of Eastern Samar from 1998 to 2001.
Felipe A. Balano. Upon reinvestigation, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a According to him, it was upon the advice of Adalim’s lawyers that he directed the transfer of
Memorandum10 dated August 4, 2000, recommending the dismissal of the complaint as regards Adalim’s detention to his home. He cites poor security in the provincial jail as the primary reason
Balano and the amendment of the Information to include the charge of Delivering Prisoners from for taking personal custody of Adalim considering that the latter would be in the company of
Jail under Article 15611 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, (RPC) against the remaining inmates who were put away by his sister and guards identified with his political opponents.15
accused. The Amended Information12 reads:
For her part, Atty. White stated that she is the District Public Attorney of Eastern Samar and the cited petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s failure to turn over Adalim despite advice from Assistant Secretary
sister of Mayor Adalim. She recounted how Mayor Adalim was arrested while they were Jesus Ingeniero of the Department of Interior and Local Government.
attending a wedding in Sulat, Eastern Samar, on September 6, 1998. According to Atty. White,
she sought the alternative custody of Gov. Ambil, Jr. after Provincial Warden and herein Consequently, the Sandiganbayan sentenced petitioner Ambil, Jr. to an indeterminate penalty of
petitioner Apelado, Sr. failed to guarantee the mayor’s safety.16 imprisonment for nine (9) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and four
(4) months. In favor of petitioner Apelado, Sr., the court appreciated the incomplete justifying
Meanwhile, Francisco Adalim introduced himself as the Mayor of Taft, Eastern Samar. He circumstance of obedience to a superior order and sentenced him to imprisonment for six (6)
confirmed his arrest on September 6, 1998 in connection with a murder case filed against him in years and one (1) month to nine (9) years and eight (8) months.
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Borongan, Eastern Samar. Adalim confirmed Atty. White’s
account that he spotted inmates who served as bodyguards for, or who are associated with, his Hence, the present petitions.
political rivals at the provincial jail. He also noticed a prisoner, Roman Akyatan, gesture to him
with a raised clenched fist. Sensing danger, he called on his sister for help. Adalim admitted Petitioner Ambil, Jr. advances the following issues for our consideration:
staying at Ambil, Jr.’s residence for almost three months before he posted bail after the charge
against him was downgraded to homicide.17
I
Petitioner Apelado, Sr. testified that he was the Provincial Jail Warden of Eastern Samar. He
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 3(e) REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, AS AMENDED,
recalls that on September 6, 1998, SPO3 Felipe Balano fetched him at home to assist in the
APPLIES TO PETITIONER’S CASE BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN.
arrest of Mayor Adalim. Allegedly, Atty. White was contesting the legality of Mayor Adalim’s
arrest and arguing with the jail guards against booking him for detention. At the provincial jail,
petitioner was confronted by Atty. White who informed him that he was under the governor, in II
the latter’s capacity as a provincial jailer. Petitioner claims that it is for this reason that he
submitted to the governor’s order to relinquish custody of Adalim.18 WHETHER OR NOT A PUBLIC OFFICER SUCH AS PETITIONER IS A PRIVATE
PARTY FOR PURPOSES OF SECTION 3(e), REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, AS
Further, petitioner Apelado, Sr. described the physical condition of the jail to be dilapidated and AMENDED.
undermanned. According to him, only two guards were incharge of looking after 50 inmates.
There were two cells in the jail, each housing 25 inmates, while an isolation cell of 10 square III
meters was unserviceable at the time. Also, there were several nipa huts within the perimeter for
use during conjugal visits.19 WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER ACTED WITH DELIBERATE INTENT, MANIFEST
PARTIALITY, EVIDENT BAD FAITH OR GROSS INEXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE IN
On September 16, 2005, the Sandiganbayan, First Division, promulgated the assailed THE CONTEXT OF SAID SECTION 3(e).
Decision20 finding petitioners guilty of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The court ruled that
in moving Adalim to a private residence, petitioners have conspired to accord him unwarranted IV
benefits in the form of more comfortable quarters with access to television and other privileges
that other detainees do not enjoy. It stressed that under the Rules, no person under detention by WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER AS PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR AND JAILER
legal process shall be released or transferred except upon order of the court or when he is UNDER SECTIONS 1730 AND 1733, ARTICLE III, CHAPTER 45 OF THE
admitted to bail.21 ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1917 AND SECTION 61, CHAPTER V, REPUBLIC ACT
6975 HAS THE AUTHORITY TO TAKE CUSTODY OF A DETENTION PRISONER.
The Sandiganbayan brushed aside petitioners’ defense that Adalim’s transfer was made to
ensure his safety. It observed that petitioner Ambil, Jr. did not personally verify any actual threat V
on Adalim’s life but relied simply on the advice of Adalim’s lawyers. The Sandiganbayan also
pointed out the availability of an isolation cell and nipa huts within the 10-meter-high perimeter WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO THE JUSTIFYING
fence of the jail which could have been used to separate Adalim from other prisoners. Finally, it CIRCUMSTANCE OF FULFILLMENT OF A DUTY OR THE LAWFUL EXERCISE OF A
RIGHT OR OFFICE.
VI avers that he cannot be held liable for extending a favor to Mayor Adalim, a public officer.
Further, he claims good faith in taking custody of the mayor pursuant to his duty as a "Provincial
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACQUITTED BECAUSE THE Jailer" under the Administrative Code of 1917. Considering this, petitioner believes himself
PROSECUTION EVIDENCE DID NOT ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND entitled to the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of duty.
REASONABLE DOUBT.22
Petitioner Apelado, Sr., on the other hand, denies allegations of conspiracy between him and
For his part, petitioner Apelado, Sr. imputes the following errors on the Sandiganbayan: petitioner Ambil, Jr. Petitioner Apelado, Sr. defends that he was merely following the orders of a
superior when he transferred the detention of Adalim. As well, he invokes immunity from criminal
I liability.

THERE WAS MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS AND/OR MISAPPLICATION OF THE For the State, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) points out the absence of jurisprudence
LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN CONVICTING ACCUSED APELADO, EITHER AS that restricts the application of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 to transactions of a pecuniary nature.
PRINCIPAL OR IN CONSPIRACY WITH HIS CO-ACCUSED AMBIL. The OSP explains that it is enough to show that in performing their functions, petitioners have
accorded undue preference to Adalim for liability to attach under the provision. Further, the OSP
maintains that Adalim is deemed a private party for purposes of applying Section 3(e), R.A. No.
II
3019 because the unwarranted benefit redounded, not to his person as a mayor, but to his
person as a detention prisoner accused of murder. It suggests further that petitioners were
IN THE ABSENCE OF COMPETENT PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF motivated by bad faith as evidenced by their refusal to turn over Adalim despite instruction from
CONSPIRACY BETWEEN ACCUSED AMBIL AND HEREIN PETITIONER, THE Asst. Sec. Ingeniero. The OSP also reiterates petitioners’ lack of authority to take custody of a
LATTER SHOULD BE ACCORDED FULL CREDIT FOR THE JUSTIFYING detention prisoner without a court order. Hence, it concludes that petitioners are not entitled to
CIRCUMSTANCE UNDER PARAGRAPH 6, ARTICLE 11 OF THE REVISED PENAL the benefit of any justifying circumstance.
CODE.
After a careful review of this case, the Court finds the present petitions bereft of merit.
III
Petitioners were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and
THE COURT A QUO’S BASIS IN CONVICTING BOTH ACCUSED AMBIL AND HEREIN Corrupt Practices Act which provides:
PETITIONER OF HAVING GIVEN MAYOR ADALIM "UNWARRANTED BENEFITS AND
ADVANTAGE TO THE PREJUDICE x x x OF THE GOVERNMENT IS, AT THE MOST,
Section. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
SPECULATIVE.23
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
The issues raised by petitioner Ambil, Jr. can be summed up into three: (1) Whether he is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019; (2) Whether a provincial
xxxx
governor has authority to take personal custody of a detention prisoner; and (3) Whether he is
entitled to the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty under Article 11(5)24 of the RPC.
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party
any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative
Meanwhile, petitioner Apelado, Sr.’s assignment of errors can be condensed into two: (1)
or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
Whether he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019; and (2)
This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations
Whether he is entitled to the justifying circumstance of obedience to an order issued by a
charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
superior for some lawful purpose under Article 11(6)25 of the RPC.
In order to hold a person liable under this provision, the following elements must concur: (1) the
Fundamentally, petitioner Ambil, Jr. argues that Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 does not apply to
accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (2) he
his case because the provision contemplates only transactions of a pecuniary nature. Since the
must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and
law punishes a public officer who extends unwarranted benefits to a private person, petitioner
(3) his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any jointly with said public officer in the proper court which had exclusive original jurisdiction over
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.26 them – the Sandiganbayan.

As to the first element, there is no question that petitioners are public officers discharging official The second element, for its part, describes the three ways by which a violation of Section 3(e) of
functions and that jurisdiction over them lay with the Sandiganbayan. Jurisdiction of the R.A. No. 3019 may be committed, that is, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
Sandiganbayan over public officers charged with violation of the Anti-Graft Law is provided inexcusable negligence.
under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606,27 as amended by R.A. No. 8249.28 The
pertinent portions of Section 4, P.D. No. 1606, as amended, read as follows: In Sison v. People,30 we defined "partiality," "bad faith" and "gross negligence" as follows:

SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.—The Sandiganbayanshall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all "Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which "excites a disposition to see and report matters as
cases involving: they are wished for rather than as they are." "Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or
negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the fraud." "Gross negligence has been so defined as negligence characterized by the want of even
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of but wilfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other
the commission of the offense: persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless
men never fail to take on their own property." x x x31
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification In this case, we find that petitioners displayed manifest partiality and evident bad faith in
Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: transferring the detention of Mayor Adalim to petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s house. There is no merit to
petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s contention that he is authorized to transfer the detention of prisoners by
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawiganand virtue of his power as the "Provincial Jailer" of Eastern Samar.
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads[;]
Section 28 of the Local Government Codedraws the extent of the power of local chief executives
xxxx over the units of the Philippine National Police within their jurisdiction:

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade ‘27’ SEC. 28. Powers of Local Chief Executives over the Units of the Philippine National Police.—
or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers The extent of operational supervision and control of local chief executives over the police force,
mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial fire protection unit, and jail management personnel assigned in their respective jurisdictions shall
court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case be governed by the provisions of Republic Act Numbered Sixty-nine hundred seventy-five (R.A.
may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as No. 6975), otherwise known as "The Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of
amended. 1990," and the rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto.

xxxx In particular, Section 61, Chapter 5 of R.A. No. 697532 on the Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology provides:
Thus, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over petitioner Ambil, Jr. is beyond question. The
same is true as regards petitioner Apelado, Sr. As to him, a Certification29 from the Provincial Sec. 61. Powers and Functions. - The Jail Bureau shall exercise supervision and control over all
Government Department Head of the HRMO shows that his position as Provincial Warden is city and municipal jails. The provincial jails shall be supervised and controlled by the
classified as Salary Grade 22. Nonetheless, it is only when none of the accused are occupying provincial government within its jurisdiction, whose expenses shall be subsidized by the
positions corresponding to salary grade ‘27’ or higher shall exclusive jurisdiction be vested in the National Government for not more than three (3) years after the effectivity of this Act.
lower courts. Here, petitioner Apelado, Sr. was charged as a co-principal with Governor Ambil,
Jr., over whose position the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. Accordingly, he was correctly tried
The power of control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate pertain only to those acts which are necessary to be done to carry out legislative policies and
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for purposes already declared by the legislative body or such as are devolved upon it38 by the
that of the latter.33An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not Constitution. Therefore, in the exercise of his administrative powers, the governor can only
followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may enforce the law but not supplant it.
even decide to do it himself.34
Besides, the only reference to a transfer of prisoners in said article is found in Section
On the other hand, the power of supervision means "overseeing or the authority of an officer to 173739 under which prisoners may be turned over to the jail of the neighboring province in case
see to it that the subordinate officers perform their duties."35 If the subordinate officers fail or the provincial jail be insecure or insufficient to accommodate all provincial prisoners. However,
neglect to fulfill their duties, the official may take such action or step as prescribed by law to this provision has been superseded by Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
make them perform their duties. Essentially, the power of supervision means no more than the Procedure, as amended. Section 3, Rule 114 provides:
power of ensuring that laws are faithfully executed, or that subordinate officers act within the
law.36 The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he does SEC. 3. No release or transfer except on court order or bail.-No person under detention by legal
not lay down the rules, nor does he have discretion to modify or replace them.37 process shall be released or transferred except upon order of the court or when he is admitted to
bail.
Significantly, it is the provincial government and not the governor alone which has authority to
exercise control and supervision over provincial jails. In any case, neither of said powers Indubitably, the power to order the release or transfer of a person under detention by legal
authorizes the doing of acts beyond the parameters set by law. On the contrary, subordinates process is vested in the court, not in the provincial government, much less the governor. This
must be enjoined to act within the bounds of law. In the event that the subordinate performs an was amply clarified by Asst. Sec. Ingeniero in his communication40 dated October 6, 1998
act ultra vires, rules may be laid down on how the act should be done, but always in conformity addressed to petitioner Ambil, Jr. Asst. Sec. Ingeniero wrote:
with the law.
06 October 1996
In a desperate attempt to stretch the scope of his powers, petitioner Ambil, Jr. cites Section 1731,
Article III of the Administrative Code of 1917 on Provincial jails in support. Section 1731 provides: GOVERNOR RUPERTO AMBIL
Provincial Capitol
SEC. 1731. Provincial governor as keeper of jail.—The governor of the province shall be Borongan, Eastern Samar
charged with the keeping of the provincial jail, and it shall be his duty to administer the
same in accordance with law and the regulations prescribed for the government of Dear Sir:
provincial prisons. The immediate custody and supervision of the jail may be committed to the
care of a jailer to be appointed by the provincial governor. The position of jailer shall be regarded
This has reference to the letter of Atty. Edwin B. Docena, and the reports earlier
as within the unclassified civil service but may be filled in the manner in which classified
received by this Department, relative to your alleged action in taking into custody
positions are filled, and if so filled, the appointee shall be entitled to all the benefits and privileges
Mayor Francisco "Aising" Adalim of Taft, that province, who has been previously
of classified employees, except that he shall hold office only during the term of office of the
arrested by virtue by a warrant of arrest issued in Criminal Case No. 10963.
appointing governor and until a successor in the office of the jailer is appointed and qualified,
unless sooner separated. The provincial governor shall, under the direction of the
provincial board and at the expense of the province, supply proper food and clothing for If the report is true, it appears that your actuation is not in accord with the
the prisoners; though the provincial board may, in its discretion, let the contract for the feeding provision of Section 3, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that an
of the prisoners to some other person. (Emphasis supplied.) arrested person be delivered to the nearest police station or jail.

This provision survived the advent of the Administrative Code of 1987. But again, nowhere did Moreover, invoking Section 61 of RA 6975 as legal basis in taking custody of the
said provision designate the provincial governor as the "provincial jailer," or even slightly suggest accused municipal mayor is misplaced. Said section merely speaks of the power
that he is empowered to take personal custody of prisoners. What is clear from the cited of supervision vested unto the provincial governor over provincial jails. It does not,
provision is that the provincial governor’s duty as a jail keeper is confined to the administration of definitely, include the power to take in custody any person in detention.
the jail and the procurement of food and clothing for the prisoners. After all, administrative acts
In view of the foregoing, you are hereby enjoined to conduct yourself within the Solicitor General that the last sentence of paragraph [Section 3] (e) is intended to make clear the
bounds of law and to immediately deliver Mayor Adalim to the provincial jail in inclusion of officers and employees of officers (sic) or government corporations which, under the
order to avoid legal complications. ordinary concept of "public officers" may not come within the term. It is a strained construction of
the provision to read it as applying exclusively to public officers charged with the duty of granting
Please be guided accordingly. licenses or permits or other concessions.43 (Italics supplied.)

Very truly yours, In the more recent case of Cruz v. Sandiganbayan,44 we affirmed that a prosecution for violation
of said provision will lie regardless of whether the accused public officer is charged with the grant
(SGD.) of licenses or permits or other concessions.45
JESUS I. INGENIERO
Assistant Secretary Meanwhile, regarding petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s second contention, Section 2(b) of R.A. No. 3019
defines a "public officer" to include elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or
Still, petitioner Ambil, Jr. insisted on his supposed authority as a "provincial jailer." Said temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exemption service receiving compensation,
petitioner’s usurpation of the court's authority, not to mention his open and willful defiance to even nominal from the government. Evidently, Mayor Adalim is one. But considering that Section
official advice in order to accommodate a former political party mate,41betray his unmistakable 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 punishes the giving by a public officer of unwarranted benefits to a private
bias and the evident bad faith that attended his actions. party, does the fact that Mayor Adalim was the recipient of such benefits take petitioners’ case
beyond the ambit of said law?
Likewise amply established beyond reasonable doubt is the third element of the crime. As
mentioned above, in order to hold a person liable for violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, it is We believe not.
required that the act constituting the offense consist of either (1) causing undue injury to any
party, including the government, or (2) giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, In drafting the Anti-Graft Law, the lawmakers opted to use "private party" rather than "private
advantage or preference in the discharge by the accused of his official, administrative or judicial person" to describe the recipient of the unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference for a
functions. reason. The term "party" is a technical word having a precise meaning in legal parlance46 as
distinguished from "person" which, in general usage, refers to a human being.47 Thus, a private
In the case at hand, the Information specifically accused petitioners of giving unwarranted person simply pertains to one who is not a public officer. While a private party is more
benefits and advantage to Mayor Adalim, a public officer charged with murder, by causing his comprehensive in scope to mean either a private person or a public officer acting in a private
release from prison and detaining him instead at the house of petitioner Ambil, Jr. Petitioner capacity to protect his personal interest.
Ambil, Jr. negates the applicability of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 in this case on two points. First,
Section 3(e) is not applicable to him allegedly because the last sentence thereof provides that In the present case, when petitioners transferred Mayor Adalim from the provincial jail and
the "provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations detained him at petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s residence, they accorded such privilege to Adalim, not in
charged with the grant of licenses, permits or other concessions" and he is not such government his official capacity as a mayor, but as a detainee charged with murder. Thus, for purposes of
officer or employee. Second, the purported unwarranted benefit was accorded not to a private applying the provisions of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, Adalim was a private party.
party but to a public officer.
Moreover, in order to be found guilty under the second mode, it suffices that the accused has
However, as regards his first contention, it appears that petitioner Ambil, Jr. has obviously lost given unjustified favor or benefit to another in the exercise of his official, administrative or judicial
sight, if he is not altogether unaware, of our ruling in Mejorada v. Sandiganbayan42where we held functions.48 The word "unwarranted" means lacking adequate or official support; unjustified;
that a prosecution for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Law will lie regardless of whether unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason. "Advantage" means a more favorable or
or not the accused public officer is "charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other improved position or condition; benefit, profit or gain of any kind; benefit from some course of
concessions." Following is an excerpt of what we said in Mejorada, action. "Preference" signifies priority or higher evaluation or desirability; choice or estimation
above another.49
Section 3 cited above enumerates in eleven subsections the corrupt practices of any public
officers (sic) declared unlawful. Its reference to "any public officer" is without distinction or Without a court order, petitioners transferred Adalim and detained him in a place other than the
qualification and it specifies the acts declared unlawful. We agree with the view adopted by the provincial jail. The latter was housed in much more comfortable quarters, provided better
nourishment, was free to move about the house and watch television. Petitioners readily Sr. fetched Mayor Adalim at the provincial jail and, unarmed with a court order, transported him
extended these benefits to Adalim on the mere representation of his lawyers that the mayor’s life to the house of petitioner Ambil, Jr. This makes him liable as a principal by direct participation
would be put in danger inside the provincial jail. under Article 17(1)52 of the RPC.

As the Sandiganbayan ruled, however, petitioners were unable to establish the existence of any An accepted badge of conspiracy is when the accused by their acts aimed at the same object,
risk on Adalim’s safety. To be sure, the latter would not be alone in having unfriendly company in one performing one part of and another performing another so as to complete it with a view to
lockup. Yet, even if we treat Akyatan’s gesture of raising a closed fist at Adalim as a threat of the attainment of the same object, and their acts although apparently independent were in fact
aggression, the same would still not constitute a special and compelling reason to warrant concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action and
Adalim’s detention outside the provincial jail. For one, there were nipa huts within the perimeter concurrence of sentiments.53
fence of the jail which could have been used to separate Adalim from the rest of the prisoners
while the isolation cell was undergoing repair. Anyhow, such repair could not have exceeded the Conspiracy was sufficiently demonstrated by petitioner Apelado, Sr.’s willful cooperation in
85 days that Adalim stayed in petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s house. More importantly, even if Adalim executing petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s order to move Adalim from jail, despite the absence of a court
could have proven the presence of an imminent peril on his person to petitioners, a court order order. Petitioner Apelado, Sr., a law graduate, cannot hide behind the cloak of ignorance of the
was still indispensable for his transfer. law. The Rule requiring a court order to transfer a person under detention by legal process is
elementary. Truth be told, even petitioner governor who is unschooled in the intricacies of the
The foregoing, indeed, negates the application of the justifying circumstances claimed by law expressed reservations on his power to transfer Adalim. All said, the concerted acts of
petitioners. petitioners Ambil, Jr. and Apelado, Sr. resulting in the violation charged, makes them equally
responsible as conspirators.
Specifically, petitioner Ambil, Jr. invokes the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful
exercise of right or office. Under paragraph 5, Article 11 of the RPC, any person who acts in the As regards the penalty imposed upon petitioners, Section 9(a) of R.A. No. 3019 punishes a
fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office does not incur any criminal liability. public officer or a private person who violates Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019 with imprisonment for
In order for this justifying circumstance to apply, two requisites must be satisfied: (1) the accused not less than six (6) years and one (1) month to not more than fifteen (15) years and perpetual
acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office; and (2) the injury disqualification from public office. Under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law or Act No.
caused or the offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty 4103, as amended by Act No. 4225, if the offense is punished by a special law, the court shall
or the lawful exercise of such right or office.50Both requisites are lacking in petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not
case. exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum
term prescribed by the same. 1avvphi1

As we have earlier determined, petitioner Ambil, Jr. exceeded his authority when he ordered the
transfer and detention of Adalim at his house. Needless to state, the resulting violation of the Thus, the penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan upon petitioner Ambil, Jr. of imprisonment for
Anti-Graft Law did not proceed from the due performance of his duty or lawful exercise of his nine (9) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and four (4) months is in
office. accord with law. As a co-principal without the benefit of an incomplete justifying circumstance to
his credit, petitioner Apelado, Sr. shall suffer the same penalty.
In like manner, petitioner Apelado, Sr. invokes the justifying circumstance of obedience to an
order issued for some lawful purpose. Under paragraph 6, Article 11 of the RPC, any person who WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are DENIED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan in
acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose does not incur any Criminal Case No. 25892 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. We find petitioners Ruperto A.
criminal liability. For this justifying circumstance to apply, the following requisites must be present: Ambil, Jr. and Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section
(1) an order has been issued by a superior; (2) such order must be for some lawful purpose; and 3(e), R.A. No. 3019. Petitioner Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr. is, likewise, sentenced to an
(3) the means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful.51Only the first requisite is indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for nine (9) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to
present in this case. twelve (12) years and four (4) months.
With costs against the petitioners.
While the order for Adalim’s transfer emanated from petitioner Ambil, Jr., who was then SO ORDERED.
Governor, neither said order nor the means employed by petitioner Apelado, Sr. to carry it out MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
was lawful. In his capacity as the Provincial Jail Warden of Eastern Samar, petitioner Apelado, Associate Justice
International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was awarded to Paircargo
Consortium/PIATCO, which Concession Agreement substantially amended the draft Concession
G.R. No. 168539 March 25, 2014 Agreement covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III under Republic Act 6957, as amended
by Republic Act 7718 (BOT law), specifically the provision on Public Utility Revenues, as well as
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, the assumption by the government of the liabilities of PIATCO in the event of the latter's default
vs. under Article IV, Section 4.04 (b) and (c) in relation to Article 1.06 of the Concession Agreement,
HENRY T. GO, Respondent. which terms are more beneficial to PIATCO while manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government of the Republic of the Philippines.4
DECISION
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28090.
PERALTA, J.:
On March 10, 2005, the SB issued an Order, to wit:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution1 of the Third
Division2 of the Sandiganbayan (SB) dated June 2, 2005 which quashed the Information filed The prosecution is given a period of ten (10) days from today within which to show cause why
against herein respondent for alleged violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. this case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused
3019), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. considering that the accused is a private person and the public official Arturo Enrile, his alleged
co-conspirator, is already deceased, and not an accused in this case.5
The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's Decision3 in Agan, Jr. v.
Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. which nullified the various contracts awarded by The prosecution complied with the above Order contending that the SB has already acquired
the Government, through the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), to jurisdiction over the person of respondent by reason of his voluntary appearance, when he filed
Philippine Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the construction, operation and maintenance of a motion for consolidation and when he posted bail. The prosecution also argued that the SB
the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). has exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's case, even if he is a private person, because he was
Subsequent to the above Decision, a certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the alleged to have conspired with a public officer.6
Office of the Ombudsman against several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among
those charged was herein respondent, who was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to Quash7 the Information filed against him on the
for having supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in ground that the operative facts adduced therein do not constitute an offense under Section 3(g)
entering into a contract which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. of R.A. 3019. Respondent, citing the show cause order of the SB, also contended that,
independently of the deceased Secretary Enrile, the public officer with whom he was alleged to
On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause have conspired, respondent, who is not a public officer nor was capacitated by any official
to indict, among others, herein respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there authority as a government agent, may not be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A.
was likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted 3019.
because he died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause.
The prosecution filed its Opposition.8
Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005, respondent was charged before the SB as
follows: On June 2, 2005, the SB issued its assailed Resolution, pertinent portions of which read thus:

On or about July 12, 1997, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Acting on the Motion to Quash filed by accused Henry T. Go dated April 22, 2005, and it
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the late ARTURO ENRILE, then appearing that Henry T. Go, the lone accused in this case is a private person and his alleged co-
Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), committing the conspirator-public official was already deceased long before this case was filed in court, for lack
offense in relation to his office and taking advantage of the same, in conspiracy with accused, of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, the Court grants the Motion to Quash and the
HENRY T. GO, Chairman and President of the Philippine International Air Terminals, Co., Inc. Information filed in this case is hereby ordered quashed and dismissed.9
(PIATCO), did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into a Concession
Agreement, after the project for the construction of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:
I (2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A (3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR government.11
APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE IN GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO
EVIDENCE AND IN DISMISSING CRIMINAL CASE NO. 28090 ON THE At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when acting in conspiracy
GROUND THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses
RESPONDENT GO. under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to
repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt
II practices act or which may lead thereto.12 This is the controlling doctrine as enunciated by this
Court in previous cases, among which is a case involving herein private respondent.13
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A
QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR The only question that needs to be settled in the present petition is whether herein respondent, a
APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE, IN RULING THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION private person, may be indicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the
OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO DESPITE THE IRREFUTABLE public officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died prior to the filing of the
FACT THAT HE HAS ALREADY POSTED BAIL FOR HIS PROVISIONAL Information.
LIBERTY
Respondent contends that by reason of the death of Secretary Enrile, there is no public officer
III who was charged in the Information and, as such, prosecution against respondent may not
prosper.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED WHEN, IN
COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE The Court is not persuaded.
CONSTITUTION, IT QUASHED THE INFORMATION AND DISMISSED
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2809010 It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer with
whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that the
The Court finds the petition meritorious. allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy
is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 provides: liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of
conspiracy between him and private respondent. Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers does not mean that there was no public officer who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019.
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict Secretary
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: Enrile for infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019.14 Were it not for his death, he
should have been charged.
xxxx
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A.
3019, among others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
with a public officer. The law, however, does not require that such person must, in all instances,
disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
be indicted together with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no
longer be charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer has already died, the
The elements of the above provision are: private person may be indicted alone.

(1) that the accused is a public officer; Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment for conspiracy.15 If
two or more persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done by any of them pursuant to the
agreement is, in contemplation of law, the act of each of them and they are jointly responsible a conspiracy to commit a crime is in many cases a fact of vital importance, when considered
therefor.16 This means that everything said, written or done by any of the conspirators in together with the other evidence of record, in establishing the existence, of the consummated
execution or furtherance of the common purpose is deemed to have been said, done, or written crime and its commission by the conspirators.
by each of them and it makes no difference whether the actual actor is alive or dead, sane or
insane at the time of trial.17 The death of one of two or more conspirators does not prevent the Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-
conviction of the survivor or survivors.18 Thus, this Court held that: principals regardless of the extent and character of their respective active participation in the
commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in
x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One person cannot conspire alone. The crime contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all. The foregoing rule is anchored on the sound
depends upon the joint act or intent of two or more persons. Yet, it does not follow that one principle that "when two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through
person cannot be convicted of conspiracy. So long as the acquittal or death of a co-conspirator the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose evil
does not remove the bases of a charge for conspiracy, one defendant may be found guilty of the will actively contributes to the wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as
offense.19 though performed by himself alone." Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other
than his own, "when two or more persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that, as alleged in the Information filed against responsible for all the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy."
respondent, which is deemed hypothetically admitted in the latter's Motion to Quash, he The imposition of collective liability upon the conspirators is clearly explained in one case where
(respondent) conspired with Secretary Enrile in violating Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 and that in this Court held that x x x it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator)
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Hence, the criminal liability incurred by a co- without taking into consideration the close and inseparable relation of each of them with the
conspirator is also incurred by the other co-conspirators. criminal act, for the commission of which they all acted by common agreement x x x. The crime
must therefore in view of the solidarity of the act and intent which existed between the x x x
Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that the avowed policy of the State and the legislative accused, be regarded as the act of the band or party created by them, and they are all equally
intent to repress "acts of public officers and private persons alike, which constitute graft or responsible x x x
corrupt practices,"20 would be frustrated if the death of a public officer would bar the prosecution
of a private person who conspired with such public officer in violating the Anti-Graft Law. Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the
commission of the felony proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by
In this regard, this Court's disquisition in the early case of People v. Peralta21 as to the nature of reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual
and the principles governing conspiracy, as construed under Philippine jurisdiction, is instructive, degree of participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. Of course,
to wit: as to any conspirator who was remote from the situs of aggression, he could be drawn within the
enveloping ambit of the conspiracy if it be proved that through his moral ascendancy over the
rest of the conspirators the latter were moved or impelled to carry out the conspiracy.
x x x A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime except
when the law specifically provides a penalty therefor as in treason, rebellion and sedition. The In fine, the convergence of the wills of the conspirators in the scheming and execution of the
crime of conspiracy known to the common law is not an indictable offense in the Philippines. An crime amply justifies the imputation to all of them the act of any one of them. It is in this light that
agreement to commit a crime is a reprehensible act from the view-point of morality, but as long conspiracy is generally viewed not as a separate indictable offense, but a rule for collectivizing
as the conspirators do not perform overt acts in furtherance of their malevolent design, the criminal liability.
sovereignty of the State is not outraged and the tranquility of the public remains undisturbed.
xxxx
However, when in resolute execution of a common scheme, a felony is committed by two or
more malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy assumes pivotal importance in the x x x A time-honored rule in the corpus of our jurisprudence is that once conspiracy is proved, all
determination of the liability of the perpetrators. In stressing the significance of conspiracy in of the conspirators who acted in furtherance of the common design are liable as co-principals.
criminal law, this Court in U.S. vs. Infante and Barreto opined that This rule of collective criminal liability emanates from the ensnaring nature of conspiracy. The
concerted action of the conspirators in consummating their common purpose is a patent display
While it is true that the penalties cannot be imposed for the mere act of conspiring to commit a of their evil partnership, and for the consequences of such criminal enterprise they must be held
crime unless the statute specifically prescribes a penalty therefor, nevertheless the existence of solidarily liable.22
This is not to say, however, that private respondent should be found guilty of conspiring with motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he shall be deemed
Secretary Enrile. It is settled that the absence or presence of conspiracy is factual in nature and to have submitted himself to that jurisdiction."
involves evidentiary matters.23 Hence, the allegation of conspiracy against respondent is better
left ventilated before the trial court during trial, where respondent can adduce evidence to prove Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of
or disprove its presence. the court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to said
jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is deemed to have
Respondent claims in his Manifestation and Motion24 as well as in his Urgent Motion to submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance gives the court jurisdiction
Resolve25 that in a different case, he was likewise indicted before the SB for conspiracy with the over the person."
late Secretary Enrile in violating the same Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 by allegedly entering into
another agreement (Side Agreement) which is separate from the Concession Agreement subject Verily, petitioner’s participation in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan was not confined
of the present case. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28091. Here, the SB, through to his opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest but also covered other matters which
a Resolution, granted respondent's motion to quash the Information on the ground that the SB called for respondent court’s exercise of its jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be heard now to deny
has no jurisdiction over the person of respondent. The prosecution questioned the said SB said court’s jurisdiction over him. x x x.28
Resolution before this Court via a petition for review on certiorari. The petition was docketed as
G.R. No. 168919. In a minute resolution dated August 31, 2005, this Court denied the petition In the instant case, respondent did not make any special appearance to question the jurisdiction
finding no reversible error on the part of the SB. This Resolution became final and executory on of the SB over his person prior to his posting of bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation. In fact,
January 11, 2006. Respondent now argues that this Court's resolution in G.R. No. 168919 his Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 28090 only came after the SB issued
should be applied in the instant case. an Order requiring the prosecution to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction over his person.
The Court does not agree. Respondent should be reminded that prior to this Court's ruling in G.R.
No. 168919, he already posted bail for his provisional liberty. In fact, he even filed a Motion for As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the instant case involves a contract
Consolidation26 in Criminal Case No. 28091. The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that entered into by public officers representing the government. More importantly, the SB is a special
private respondent's act of posting bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation vests the SB with criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A.
jurisdiction over his person. The rule is well settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in 3019 committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A.
filing motions seeking affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of his person to the 8249. This includes private individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
jurisdiction of the court.27 accessories with the said public officers. In the instant case, respondent is being charged for
violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the
Thus, it has been held that: law, both respondent and Secretary Enrile should have been charged before and tried jointly by
the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of the latter, this can no longer be done.
When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue of a warrant Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it does not follow that the SB is already divested of
of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the court its jurisdiction over the person of and the case involving herein respondent. To rule otherwise
he must raise the question of the court’s jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest would mean that the power of a court to decide a case would no longer be based on the law
opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the defining its jurisdiction but on other factors, such as the death of one of the alleged offenders.
merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person. (State ex rel. John Brown vs.
Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534) Lastly, the issues raised in the present petition involve matters which are mere incidents in the
main case and the main case has already been pending for over nine (9) years. Thus, a referral
xxxx of the case to the Regional Trial Court would further delay the resolution of the main case and it
would, by no means, promote respondent's right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of his
As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA [236 SCRA 78, 86]: case.

"[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly or WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June 2,
impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the 2005, granting respondent's Motion to Quash, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by
Sandiganbayan is forthwith DIRECTED to proceed with deliberate dispatch in the disposition of
Criminal Case No. 28090.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 149311 February 11, 2005 b.) murder of Wong Kam Chong; and

THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, through SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, THE c.) kidnapping for ransom and murder of Chong Hiu Ming.2
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION through DIRECTOR REYNALDO WYCOCO,
STATE PROSECUTORS LEO B. DACERA III, MISAEL M. LADAGA AND MARY JOSEPHINE In the said letter, Director Wycoco likewise manifested that this recommendation was made after
P. LAZARO, petitioners, taking the sworn statements of Mary Ong and other witnesses such as Chong Kam Fai, Zeng
vs. Kang Pang, and Quenna Yuet Yuet. The sworn statements of these witnesses were attached to
HON. HERMOGENES R. LIWAG, in his capacity as Presiding Judge Branch 55, Regional the letter.3
Trial Court, Manila, PANFILO M. LACSON, MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO,respondents.
On May 7, 2001, a panel of prosecutors from the DOJ sent a subpoena to Lacson, Aquino and
DECISION the other persons named in the witnesses’ sworn statements. Lacson and Aquino received the
subpoena on May 8, 2001. The subpoena directed them to submit their counter-affidavits and
AZCUNA, J.: controverting evidence at the scheduled preliminary investigation on the complaint filed by the
NBI on May 18, 2001 at the DOJ Multi-Purpose Hall. However, Lacson and Aquino, through their
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the counsel, manifested in a letter dated May 18, 2001, that the DOJ panel of prosecutors should
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) under it, seeking to challenge the Order dated June 22, dismiss the complaint filed therewith by Mary Ong since there are complaints pending before the
2001 and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated June 25, 2001 issued by the late Judge Ombudsman alleging a similar set of facts against the same respondents. Furthermore, they
Hermogenes R. Liwag of Branch 55 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 01- claimed that according to the Court’s ruling in gr_ Uy v. Sandiganbayan,4 the Ombudsman has
100934. primary jurisdiction over criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of
this primary jurisdiction, he may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of
The facts are as follows: Government, the investigation of such cases involving public officials, including police and
military officials such as private respondents.5
Alleging that she was a former undercover agent of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task
Force (PAOCTF) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Group, Mary Ong filed a The DOJ construed the aforesaid letter as a motion to dismiss and, on May 28, 2001, denied the
complaint-affidavit on January 8, 2001 before the Ombudsman against PNP General Panfilo M. dismissal of the cases before it through an Order that stated the following as basis of the denial:
Lacson, PNP Colonel Michael Ray B. Aquino, other high-ranking officials of the PNP, and
several private individuals. Her complaint-affidavit gave rise to separate cases involving different It appearing that the subject letter is essentially a motion to dismiss which is not allowed under
offenses imputed to respondents Lacson and Aquino. The cases were docketed as OMB Case the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure[;]
Nos. 4-01-00-76, 4-01-00-77, 4-01-00-80, 4-01-00-81, 4-01-00-82, and 4-01-00-84. The
Ombudsman found the complaint-affidavit of Mary Ong sufficient in form and substance and thus It appearing further that respondent’s rank and/or civil service classification has no bearing in the
required the respondents therein to file their counter-affidavits on the charges. On February 28, determination of jurisdiction as the crimes charged herein do not involve violation of the Anti-
2001, said respondents submitted their counter-affidavits and prayed that the charges against Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Unlawfully Acquired Property [or] Bribery, nor are they related to
them be dismissed. respondents’ discharge of their official duties;

Subsequently, on March 9, 2001, Mary Ong and other witnesses executed sworn statements It appearing finally that paragraph 2 of the Joint Circular of the Office of the Ombudsman and the
before the NBI, alleging the same facts and circumstances revealed by Mary Ong in her Department of Justice No. 95-001 dated October 5, 1995, provides that offenses committed not
complaint-affidavit before the Ombudsman.1 NBI Director Reynaldo Wycoco, in a letter dated in relation to office and cognizable by the regular courts shall be investigated and prosecuted by
May 4, 2001 addressed to then Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez, recommended the the Office of the Provincial/City Prosecutor which shall rule thereon with finality;6
investigation of Lacson, Aquino, other PNP officials, and private individuals for the following
alleged crimes: On the very same day that the DOJ issued the aforesaid Order, the Solicitor General received a
copy of a petition for prohibition filed by Lacson and Aquino before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
a.) kidnapping for ransom of Zeng Jia Xuan, Hong Zhen Quiao, Zeng Kang Pang, James Wong of Manila. In the said petition for prohibition, Lacson and Aquino maintained that the DOJ has no
and Wong Kam Chong; jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation on the complaints submitted by Mary Ong and
the other witnesses. They argued that by conducting a preliminary investigation, the DOJ was THE DOJ; AND IN IGNORING THE FACT THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO AVAIL
violating the Ombudsman’s mandate of having the primary and exclusive jurisdiction to OF AN ADEQUATE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY BEFORE THE FILING OF A PETITION FOR
investigate criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. Again, they relied on Uy v. PROHIBITION.
Sandiganbayan to bolster their claim.
III
On June 22, 2001, Judge Liwag issued the Order herein assailed prohibiting the Department of
Justice from conducting the preliminary investigation against Lacson and Aquino. A Writ of PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN CONSIDERING
Preliminary Injunction was likewise issued by the trial court. The dispositive portion of the Order THE NBI COMPLAINT FILED WITH THE DOJ AND THE COMPLAINT-AFFIDAVIT FILED BY
reads as follows: MARY ONG BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AS INVOLVING ABSOLUTELY
THE SAME OFFENSES, RESPONDENTS AND ALLEGED VICTIMS.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Prohibition is hereby GRANTED, and
accordingly a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby ISSUED, enjoining the respondents and IV
their subordinates, agents[,] and other persons acting in their behalf, individually and collectively,
from conducting a preliminary investigation in IS No. 2001-402, insofar as petitioners here are PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN GRANTING
concerned, and directing the petitioners to file their counter-affidavits in said case until such time RELIEF TO RESPONDENT MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO DESPITE THE GLARING FACT THAT
that the Office of the Ombudsman shall have disclaimed jurisdiction over the offenses subject HE IS CHARGED WITH SEPARATE AND DISTINCT OFFENSES BEFORE THE OFFICE OF
matter of the investigations before it, or until such Office shall have categorized the said offenses THE OMBUDSMAN AND THE DOJ.
as being committed by the petitioners not in relation to their respective offices.
V
Let the corresponding Writ of Preliminary Injunction, therefore, issue without bond, as there is no
showing whatsoever in the pleadings of the parties that the respondents will suffer any injury by
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN PREJUDGING
reason of the issuance of the writ prayed for, in accordance with Section 4(b), Rule 58 of the
THE MAIN CASE FOR PROHIBITION BY GRANTING THE SAME DESPITE THE FACT THAT
Rules of Civil Procedure.
HEARINGS IN THE CASE WERE ONLY HELD FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING THE
MERIT OF THE PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.8
SO ORDERED. 7
A perusal of the issues raised reveals that the present petition puts forth one central question to
Hence, this petition was filed before this Court by the DOJ, through then Secretary Hernando be resolved: whether or not the DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation
Perez, the NBI, through Director Reynaldo Wycoco, and the panel of prosecutors designated by despite the pendency before the Ombudsman of a complaint involving the same accused, facts,
the DOJ to conduct the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 2001-402. In their petition, they raise and circumstances. The addition of other names in the second proceedings does not alter the
the following issues: nature thereof as being principally directed against the respondents herein in connection with
substantially the same set of facts alleged.
I
First, however, a threshold question has to be resolved.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISREGARDING
THE CRYSTAL CLEAR AUTHORITY OF PETITIONERS DOJ AND THE PANEL OF STATE Petitioners came to this Court without filing a motion before the trial court to reconsider the
PROSECUTORS TO CONDUCT PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO assailed Order. They maintain that it was imperative for them to do so for the sake of the speedy
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 08, SERIES OF 1990 OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN administration of justice and that this is all the more compelling, in this case, considering that this
AND SECTION 4 OF RULE 112 OF THE RULES OF COURT. involves the high-ranking officers of the PNP and the crimes being charged have already
attracted nationwide attention.
II
Indeed, this Court finds that time is of the essence in this case. At stake here may not only be
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RULING THAT the safety of witnesses who risked life and limb to give their statements to the authorities, but
THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS TAKEN OVER THE NBI COMPLAINT FILED WITH also the rights of the respondents, who may need to clear their names and reputations of the
accusations against them. Procedural laws are adopted not as ends in themselves but as means investigation of these cases, considering that there are already pending complaints filed
conducive to the realization of justice. The rules of procedure are not to be applied when such therewith involving the same accused, facts and circumstances.
application would clearly defeat the very rationale for their conception and existence.9
Section 15, Republic Act No. 6640, known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides:
Now, to the merits.
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. – The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
The authority of the DOJ to conduct a preliminary investigation is based on the provisions of the powers, functions and duties:
1987 Administrative Code under Chapter I, Title III, Book IV, governing the DOJ, which states:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of
Section 1. Declaration of policy. – It is the declared policy of the State to provide the government any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
with a principal law agency which shall be both its legal counsel and prosecution arm; administer unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
the criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted processes thereof consisting in the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage,
investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders and administration of the correctional from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases;….10
system; . . .
The question is whether or not the Ombudsman has in effect taken over the investigation of the
Section 3. Powers and Functions. – To accomplish its mandate, the Department shall have the case or cases in question to the exclusion of other investigatory agencies, including the DOJ. In
following powers and functions: granting the petition for prohibition, RTC Judge Liwag gave the following rationale:

... Since the Ombudsman has taken hold of the situation of the parties in the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction over the matter, it is the feeling of this Court that the respondents cannot insist on
(2) Investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders and administer the probation and conducting a preliminary investigation on the same matter under the pretext of a shared and
correction system; concurrent authority. In the final analysis, the resolution on the matter by the Ombudsman is final.
In the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman itself, the other investigative
... agencies of the Government have no power and right to add an input into the Ombudsman’s
investigation. Only in matters where the other investigative agencies are expressly allowed by
the Ombudsman to make preliminary investigation may such agencies conduct the investigation,
Furthermore, Section 1 of the Presidential Decree 1275, effective April 11, 1978, provides:
subject to the final decision of the Ombudsman. That is the situation. It is not otherwise. To allow
the respondents to meddle with the investigation of similar cases being investigated by the
Section 1. Creation of the National Prosecution Service; Supervision and Control of the Ombudsman would put them to a higher plane than the source of their powers with respect to
Secretary of Justice. – There is hereby created and established a National Prosecution Service such cases. This is, of course, anathema to orderly judicial procedures. This is contrary to
under the supervision and control of the Secretary of Justice, to be composed of the Prosecution ordinary common sense. It would certainly be presumpt[u]ous, if not ridiculous, for the
Staff in the Office of the Secretary of Justice and such number of Regional State Prosecution Department of Justice to be making recommendation as to its preliminary investigation to the
Offices, and Provincial and City Fiscal’s Offices as are hereinafter provided, which shall be Ombudsman in matters being handled by such Office itself. Such recommendation would be pre-
primarily responsible for the investigation and prosecution of all cases involving violations of emptive of the actions of the said Office. Such a situation must thus be disallowed.
penal laws.
The public respondents capitalized on the fact that the Ombudsman may take over, at any stage,
Respondents Lacson and Aquino claim that the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over the from any investigative agency of the Government, the investigation of cases involving public
cases filed against them, to the exclusion of any other investigatory agency of Government officials, including police and military officials such as the petitioners. It is the feeling of this Court
pursuant to law and existing jurisprudence. They rely on the doctrine in Uy v. that the respondents cannot find comfort in that provision of the law. That situation presupposes
Sandiganbayan aforementioned, and contend that the Ombudsman, in the exercise of the said the conduct by other Government agencies of preliminary investigations involving public officials
primary jurisdiction, may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, in cases not theretofore being taken cognizance of by the Ombudsman. If the Ombudsman, as in
the investigation of cases involving public officials, including police and military officials. They the case, has already taken hold of the situation of the parties, it cannot take over, at any stage
likewise claim that it should be deemed that the Ombudsman has already taken over the of the proceedings, the investigation being conducted by another agency. It has the case before
it. Rudimentary common sense and becoming respect for power and authority would thus require this means that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate cases cognizable by
the respondents to desist from interfering with the case already handled by the Ombudsman. the Sandiganbayan is notco-equal with other investigative bodies, such as the DOJ. The
Indeed, as conceded by the respondents, they are deputized prosecutors by the Ombudsman. If Ombudsman can delegate the power but the delegate cannot claim equal power.
that is so, and that is the truth, the exercise by the principal of the powers negates absolutely the
exercise by the agents of a particular power and authority. The hierarchy of powers must be Clearly, therefore, while the DOJ has general jurisdiction to conduct preliminary
remembered. The principle of agency must be recalled.11 investigation of cases involving violations of the Revised Penal Code, this general
jurisdiction cannot diminish the plenary power and primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution specifically vests in the Office of the Ombudsman to investigate complaints specifically directed against public officers and employees. The
the plenary power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance or non-feasance of public Office of the Ombudsman is a constitutional creation. In contrast, the DOJ is an extension of
officers or employees.12 To discharge its duty effectively, the Constitution endowed the Office the executive department, bereft of the constitutional independence granted to the
of the Ombudsman with special features which puts it a notch above other grievance- Ombudsman.
handling, investigate bodies. First and foremost, it extended independence to the
Ombudsman and insulated it from the intrusions of partisan politics. Thus, the Constitution Petitioners cannot seek sanctuary in the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction. While the doctrine of
provided for stringent qualification requirements for the selection of the Ombudsman and his concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter,19 the
deputies, i.e., they should be natural-born citizens, of recognized probity and settled rule is that the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall
independence and must not have been candidates for any elective office in the immediately exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.20 Thus, assuming there is concurrent
preceding election.13 The Ombudsman and his deputies were given the rank and salary equal to jurisdiction between the Ombudsman and the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary
that of the Chairman and Members, respectively, of the Constitutional Commissions, with a investigation, this concurrence is not to be taken as an unrestrained freedom to file the
prohibition for any decrease in their salary during their term of office.14 They were given a fixed same case before both bodies or be viewed as a contest between these bodies as to which
term of seven years, without reappointment.15 Upon their cessation from office, they are will first complete the investigation. In the present case, it is the Ombudsman before whom the
prohibited from running for any elective office in the immediately succeeding election.16 Finally, complaint was initially filed. Hence, it has the authority to proceed with the preliminary
unlike other investigative bodies, the Constitution granted the Office of the Ombudsman fiscal investigation to the exclusion of the DOJ.
autonomy.17 Clearly, all these measures are intended to enhance the independence of the Office
of the Ombudsman. None of the cases previously decided by this Court involved a factual situation similar to that of
the present case. In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government
The Office of the Ombudsman was likewise envisioned by the Constitution to serve as (PCGG),21 the Court upheld the special authority of the PCGG to conduct the preliminary
the principal and primary complaints and action center for the aggrieved layman baffled by the investigation of ill-gotten wealth cases pursuant to Executive Order No. 1, issued by then
bureaucratic maze of procedures. For this purpose, it was granted more than the usual President Aquino, creating the PCGG. While the Court emphasized in Cojuangco that the power
powers given to prosecutors. It was vested with the power to investigate complaints against a of the Ombudsman to conduct a preliminary investigation over said cases is not exclusive but a
public office or officer on its own initiative, even without a formal complaint lodged before it.18 It shared authority, the complaints for the alleged misuse of coconut levy funds were filed
can inquire into acts of government agencies and public servants based on reports in the media directly with the PCGG. No complaint was filed with the Office of the
and those which come to his attention through sources other than a complaint. The method of Ombudsman. Moreover, a close scrutiny of said case will disclose that the Court recognized
filing a complaint with the Ombudsman is direct, informal, speedy and inexpensive. All that may the primary, albeit shared, jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate all ill-gotten
be required from a complainant is sufficient information detailing the illegal or improper acts wealth cases.22 In fact, it ordered the PCGG to desist from proceeding with the preliminary
complained of. The ordinary citizen, who has become increasingly dependent on public agencies, investigation as it doubted the impartiality of the PCGG to conduct the investigation after it had
is put to minimal expense and difficulty in getting his complaint acted on by the Office of the previously caused the issuance of sequestration orders against petitioner’s assets.
Ombudsman. Vis-à-vis other prosecutors, the exercise by the Ombudsman of its power to
investigate public officials is given preference over other bodies. In Sanchez v. Demetriou,23 the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission filed a complaint with the
DOJ against petitioner Mayor Sanchez for the rape-slay of Sarmenta and the killing of Gomez.
As aforementioned, Congress itself acknowledged the significant role played by the Office of After the DOJ panel prosecutors conducted the preliminary investigation, a warrant of arrest was
Ombudsman when it enacted Republic Act No. 6770. Section 15 (1) of said law gives the issued and the corresponding Informations were filed in court by the DOJ prosecutors. Petitioner
Ombudsman primary jurisdictionover cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayanand authorizes claimed that it is only the Ombudsman who has the power to conduct investigation of cases
him to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency, the investigation of such involving public officers like him. The Court reiterated its previous ruling that the authority to
cases. This power to take over a case at any time is not given to other investigative bodies. All investigate and prosecute illegal acts of public officers is not an exclusive authority of the
Ombudsman but a shared authority. However, it will be noted that the complaint for Finally, the second investigation would entail an unnecessary expenditure of public
preliminary investigation in that case was filed solely with the DOJ. funds,and the use of valuable and limited resources of Government, inaduplication of
proceedings already started with the Ombudsman.
In Aguinaldo v. Domagas,24 a letter-complaintcharging petitioners with sedition was filed with
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Cagayan. After investigation by the DOJ panel of From all the foregoing, it is clear that petitioners have not shown any grave abuse of discretion
prosecutors, the corresponding Information was filed in court. The pertinent issue raised by tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the respondent Judge.
petitioners was whether the prosecutors can file the said Information without previous authority
from the Ombudsman. The Court ruled in the affirmative and reiterated its ruling regarding the WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
shared authority of the DOJ to investigate the case. Again, it should be noted that the complaint
in that case was addressed solely to the provincial prosecutor. No costs.

The same factual scenario obtains in the cases of Natividad v. Felix25 and Honasan v. Panel of SO ORDERED.
Investigating Prosecutors of the DOJ26 where the letter-complaint against petitioners public
officers were brought aloneto the DOJ prosecutors for investigation.
Davide Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Tinga, Chico-Nazario and Garcia, JJ.,
In sum, in none of the aforecited cases was the complaint filed ahead with the Office of the concur.
Ombudsman for preliminary investigation. Hence, there was no simultaneous exercise of
power between two coordinate bodies and no risk of conflicting findings or orders. In
stark contrast with the present case, Mary Ong filed a complaint against respondents initially
with the Office of the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation which was immediately acted
on by said Office. For reasons not readily apparent on the records, she thereafter refiled
substantially the same complaint with the NBI and the DOJ.

Not only this.

The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary


investigation over the cases filed against the respondents would not promote an orderly
administration of justice. Although a preliminary investigation is not a trial, it is not a casual
affair either. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining
whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.27 When one
is hailed before an investigative body on specific charges, the very act of filing said complaint for
preliminary investigation immediately exposes the respondent and his family to anxiety,
humiliation and expense. To allow the same complaint to be filed successively before two
or more investigative bodies would promote multiplicity of proceedings. It would also
cause undue difficulties to the respondent who would have to appear and defend his
position before every agency or body where the same complaint was filed. This would
leave hapless litigants at a loss as to where to appear and plead their cause or defense.

There is yet another undesirable consequence. There is the distinct possibility that the two
bodies exercising jurisdiction at the same time would come up with conflicting
resolutions regarding the guilt of the respondents.
Republic of the Philippines Subsequently, on March 9, 2001, Mary Ong and other witnesses executed sworn
statements before the NBI, alleging the same facts and circumstances revealed by Mary
SUPREME COURT Ong in her complaint-affidavit before the Ombudsman.1 NBI Director Reynaldo Wycoco,
in a letter dated May 4, 2001 addressed to then Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez,
Manila recommended the investigation of Lacson, Aquino, other PNP officials, and private
individuals for the following alleged crimes:
EN BANC
a.) kidnapping for ransom of Zeng Jia Xuan, Hong Zhen Quiao, Zeng Kang Pang, James
Wong and Wong Kam Chong;
G.R. No. 149311 February 11, 2005
b.) murder of Wong Kam Chong; and
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, through SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, THE
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION through DIRECTOR REYNALDO
WYCOCO, STATE PROSECUTORS LEO B. DACERA III, MISAEL M. LADAGA AND c.) kidnapping for ransom and murder of Chong Hiu Ming.2
MARY JOSEPHINE P. LAZARO, petitioners, vs. HON. HERMOGENES R. LIWAG, in
his capacity as Presiding Judge Branch 55, Regional Trial Court, Manila, PANFILO In the said letter, Director Wycoco likewise manifested that this recommendation was
M. LACSON, MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO, respondents. made after taking the sworn statements of Mary Ong and other witnesses such as Chong
Kam Fai, Zeng Kang Pang, and Quenna Yuet Yuet. The sworn statements of these
DECISION witnesses were attached to the letter.3

AZCUNA, J.: On May 7, 2001, a panel of prosecutors from the DOJ sent a subpoena to Lacson,
Aquino and the other persons named in the witnesses’ sworn statements. Lacson and
Aquino received the subpoena on May 8, 2001. The subpoena directed them to submit
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the Department of Justice (DOJ),
their counter-affidavits and controverting evidence at the scheduled preliminary
and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) under it, seeking to challenge the Order
investigation on the complaint filed by the NBI on May 18, 2001 at the DOJ Multi-
dated June 22, 2001 and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated June 25, 2001 issued
Purpose Hall. However, Lacson and Aquino, through their counsel, manifested in a letter
by the late Judge Hermogenes R. Liwag of Branch 55 of the Regional Trial Court of
dated May 18, 2001, that the DOJ panel of prosecutors should dismiss the complaint
Manila in Civil Case No. 01-100934.
filed therewith by Mary Ong since there are complaints pending before the Ombudsman
alleging a similar set of facts against the same respondents. Furthermore, they claimed
The facts are as follows: that according to the Court’s ruling in gr_ Uy v. Sandiganbayan,4 the Ombudsman has
primary jurisdiction over criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the
Alleging that she was a former undercover agent of the Presidential Anti-Organized exercise of this primary jurisdiction, he may take over, at any stage, from any
Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Group, investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases involving public
Mary Ong filed a complaint-affidavit on January 8, 2001 before the Ombudsman against officials, including police and military officials such as private respondents.5
PNP General Panfilo M. Lacson, PNP Colonel Michael Ray B. Aquino, other high-ranking
officials of the PNP, and several private individuals. Her complaint-affidavit gave rise to The DOJ construed the aforesaid letter as a motion to dismiss and, on May 28, 2001,
separate cases involving different offenses imputed to respondents Lacson and Aquino. denied the dismissal of the cases before it through an Order that stated the following as
The cases were docketed as OMB Case Nos. 4-01-00-76, 4-01-00-77, 4-01-00-80, 4-01- basis of the denial:
00-81, 4-01-00-82, and 4-01-00-84. The Ombudsman found the complaint-affidavit of
Mary Ong sufficient in form and substance and thus required the respondents therein to
It appearing that the subject letter is essentially a motion to dismiss which is not allowed
file their counter-affidavits on the charges. On February 28, 2001, said respondents
under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure[;]
submitted their counter-affidavits and prayed that the charges against them be dismissed.
It appearing further that respondent’s rank and/or civil service classification has no
bearing in the determination of jurisdiction as the crimes charged herein do not involve
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Unlawfully Acquired Property [or] prosecutors designated by the DOJ to conduct the preliminary investigation of I.S. No.
Bribery, nor are they related to respondents’ discharge of their official duties; 2001-402. In their petition, they raise the following issues:

It appearing finally that paragraph 2 of the Joint Circular of the Office of the Ombudsman I
and the Department of Justice No. 95-001 dated October 5, 1995, provides that offenses
committed not in relation to office and cognizable by the regular courts shall be PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
investigated and prosecuted by the Office of the Provincial/City Prosecutor which shall DISREGARDING THE CRYSTAL CLEAR AUTHORITY OF PETITIONERS DOJ AND
rule thereon with finality;6 THE PANEL OF STATE PROSECUTORS TO CONDUCT PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 08, SERIES OF
On the very same day that the DOJ issued the aforesaid Order, the Solicitor General 1990 OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND SECTION 4 OF RULE 112 OF THE
received a copy of a petition for prohibition filed by Lacson and Aquino before the RULES OF COURT.
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. In the said petition for prohibition, Lacson and
Aquino maintained that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation II
on the complaints submitted by Mary Ong and the other witnesses. They argued that by
conducting a preliminary investigation, the DOJ was violating the Ombudsman’s PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RULING
mandate of having the primary and exclusive jurisdiction to investigate criminal cases THAT THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS TAKEN OVER THE NBI COMPLAINT
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. Again, they relied on Uy v. Sandiganbayan to bolster FILED WITH THE DOJ; AND IN IGNORING THE FACT THAT PRIVATE
their claim. RESPONDENTS FAILED TO AVAIL OF AN ADEQUATE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY
BEFORE THE FILING OF A PETITION FOR PROHIBITION.
On June 22, 2001, Judge Liwag issued the Order herein assailed prohibiting the
Department of Justice from conducting the preliminary investigation against Lacson and III
Aquino. A Writ of Preliminary Injunction was likewise issued by the trial court. The
dispositive portion of the Order reads as follows:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
CONSIDERING THE NBI COMPLAINT FILED WITH THE DOJ AND THE COMPLAINT-
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Prohibition is hereby GRANTED, AFFIDAVIT FILED BY MARY ONG BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AS
and accordingly a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby ISSUED, enjoining the INVOLVING ABSOLUTELY THE SAME OFFENSES, RESPONDENTS AND ALLEGED
respondents and their subordinates, agents[,] and other persons acting in their behalf, VICTIMS.
individually and collectively, from conducting a preliminary investigation in IS No. 2001-
402, insofar as petitioners here are concerned, and directing the petitioners to file their
IV
counter-affidavits in said case until such time that the Office of the Ombudsman shall
have disclaimed jurisdiction over the offenses subject matter of the investigations before
it, or until such Office shall have categorized the said offenses as being committed by the PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
petitioners not in relation to their respective offices. GRANTING RELIEF TO RESPONDENT MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO DESPITE THE
GLARING FACT THAT HE IS CHARGED WITH SEPARATE AND DISTINCT
OFFENSES BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND THE DOJ.
Let the corresponding Writ of Preliminary Injunction, therefore, issue without bond, as
there is no showing whatsoever in the pleadings of the parties that the respondents will
suffer any injury by reason of the issuance of the writ prayed for, in accordance with V
Section 4(b), Rule 58 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
SO ORDERED. 7 PREJUDGING THE MAIN CASE FOR PROHIBITION BY GRANTING THE SAME
DESPITE THE FACT THAT HEARINGS IN THE CASE WERE ONLY HELD FOR THE
PURPOSE OF DETERMINING THE MERIT OF THE PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE
Hence, this petition was filed before this Court by the DOJ, through then Secretary
OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.8
Hernando Perez, the NBI, through Director Reynaldo Wycoco, and the panel of
A perusal of the issues raised reveals that the present petition puts forth one central ...
question to be resolved: whether or not the DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary
investigation despite the pendency before the Ombudsman of a complaint involving the Furthermore, Section 1 of the Presidential Decree 1275, effective April 11, 1978,
same accused, facts, and circumstances. The addition of other names in the second provides:
proceedings does not alter the nature thereof as being principally directed against the
respondents herein in connection with substantially the same set of facts alleged. Section 1. Creation of the National Prosecution Service; Supervision and Control of the
Secretary of Justice. – There is hereby created and established a National Prosecution
First, however, a threshold question has to be resolved. Service under the supervision and control of the Secretary of Justice, to be composed of
the Prosecution Staff in the Office of the Secretary of Justice and such number of
Petitioners came to this Court without filing a motion before the trial court to reconsider Regional State Prosecution Offices, and Provincial and City Fiscal’s Offices as are
the assailed Order. They maintain that it was imperative for them to do so for the sake of hereinafter provided, which shall be primarily responsible for the investigation and
the speedy administration of justice and that this is all the more compelling, in this case, prosecution of all cases involving violations of penal laws.
considering that this involves the high-ranking officers of the PNP and the crimes being
charged have already attracted nationwide attention. Respondents Lacson and Aquino claim that the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction
over the cases filed against them, to the exclusion of any other investigatory agency of
Indeed, this Court finds that time is of the essence in this case. At stake here may not Government pursuant to law and existing jurisprudence. They rely on the doctrine in Uy v.
only be the safety of witnesses who risked life and limb to give their statements to the Sandiganbayan aforementioned, and contend that the Ombudsman, in the exercise of
authorities, but also the rights of the respondents, who may need to clear their names the said primary jurisdiction, may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency
and reputations of the accusations against them. Procedural laws are adopted not as of Government, the investigation of cases involving public officials, including police and
ends in themselves but as means conducive to the realization of justice. The rules of military officials. They likewise claim that it should be deemed that the Ombudsman has
procedure are not to be applied when such application would clearly defeat the very already taken over the investigation of these cases, considering that there are already
rationale for their conception and existence.9 pending complaints filed therewith involving the same accused, facts and circumstances.

Now, to the merits. Section 15, Republic Act No. 6640, known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides:

The authority of the DOJ to conduct a preliminary investigation is based on the Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. – The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code under Chapter I, Title III, Book IV, governing following powers, functions and duties:
the DOJ, which states:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or
Section 1. Declaration of policy. – It is the declared policy of the State to provide the omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
government with a principal law agency which shall be both its legal counsel and appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases
prosecution arm; administer the criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may
processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation
and administration of the correctional system; . . . of such cases; ….10

Section 3. Powers and Functions. – To accomplish its mandate, the Department shall The question is whether or not the Ombudsman has in effect taken over the investigation
have the following powers and functions: of the case or cases in question to the exclusion of other investigatory agencies,
including the DOJ. In granting the petition for prohibition, RTC Judge Liwag gave the
... following rationale:

(2) Investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders and administer the Since the Ombudsman has taken hold of the situation of the parties in the exercise of its
probation and correction system; primary jurisdiction over the matter, it is the feeling of this Court that the respondents
cannot insist on conducting a preliminary investigation on the same matter under the
pretext of a shared and concurrent authority. In the final analysis, the resolution on the of the Constitutional Commissions, with a prohibition for any decrease in their salary
matter by the Ombudsman is final. In the preliminary investigation conducted by the during their term of office.14 They were given a fixed term of seven years, without
Ombudsman itself, the other investigative agencies of the Government have no power reappointment.15 Upon their cessation from office, they are prohibited from running for any
and right to add an input into the Ombudsman’s investigation. Only in matters where the elective office in the immediately succeeding election.16 Finally, unlike other investigative
other investigative agencies are expressly allowed by the Ombudsman to make bodies, the Constitution granted the Office of the Ombudsman fiscal autonomy.17Clearly,
preliminary investigation may such agencies conduct the investigation, subject to the all these measures are intended to enhance the independence of the Office of the
final decision of the Ombudsman. That is the situation. It is not otherwise. To allow the Ombudsman.
respondents to meddle with the investigation of similar cases being investigated by the
Ombudsman would put them to a higher plane than the source of their powers with The Office of the Ombudsman was likewise envisioned by the Constitution to serve as
respect to such cases. This is, of course, anathema to orderly judicial procedures. This is the principal and primary complaints and action center for the aggrieved layman baffled
contrary to ordinary common sense. It would certainly be presumpt[u]ous, if not by the bureaucratic maze of procedures. For this purpose, it was granted more than the
ridiculous, for the Department of Justice to be making recommendation as to its usual powers given to prosecutors. It was vested with the power to investigate
preliminary investigation to the Ombudsman in matters being handled by such Office complaints against a public office or officer on its own initiative, even without a formal
itself. Such recommendation would be pre-emptive of the actions of the said Office. Such complaint lodged before it.18 It can inquire into acts of government agencies and public
a situation must thus be disallowed. servants based on reports in the media and those which come to his attention through
sources other than a complaint. The method of filing a complaint with the Ombudsman is
The public respondents capitalized on the fact that the Ombudsman may take over, at direct, informal, speedy and inexpensive. All that may be required from a complainant is
any stage, from any investigative agency of the Government, the investigation of cases sufficient information detailing the illegal or improper acts complained of. The ordinary
involving public officials, including police and military officials such as the petitioners. It is citizen, who has become increasingly dependent on public agencies, is put to minimal
the feeling of this Court that the respondents cannot find comfort in that provision of the expense and difficulty in getting his complaint acted on by the Office of the
law. That situation presupposes the conduct by other Government agencies of Ombudsman. Vis-à-vis other prosecutors, the exercise by the Ombudsman of its power
preliminary investigations involving public officials in cases not theretofore being taken to investigate public officials is given preference over other bodies.
cognizance of by the Ombudsman. If the Ombudsman, as in the case, has already taken
hold of the situation of the parties, it cannot take over, at any stage of the proceedings, As aforementioned, Congress itself acknowledged the significant role played by the
the investigation being conducted by another agency. It has the case before it. Office of Ombudsman when it enacted Republic Act No. 6770. Section 15 (1) of said law
Rudimentary common sense and becoming respect for power and authority would thus gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
require the respondents to desist from interfering with the case already handled by the the Sandiganbayan and authorizes him to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
Ombudsman. Indeed, as conceded by the respondents, they are deputized prosecutors agency, the investigation of such cases. This power to take over a case at any time is not
by the Ombudsman. If that is so, and that is the truth, the exercise by the principal of the given to other investigative bodies. All this means that the power of the Ombudsman to
powers negates absolutely the exercise by the agents of a particular power and authority. investigate cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is notco-equal with other
The hierarchy of powers must be remembered. The principle of agency must be investigative bodies, such as the DOJ. The Ombudsman can delegate the power but the
recalled.11 delegate cannot claim equal power.

Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution specifically vests in the Office of the Clearly, therefore, while the DOJ has general jurisdiction to conduct preliminary
Ombudsman the plenary power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance or non- investigation of cases involving violations of the Revised Penal Code, this general
feasance of public officers or employees.12 To discharge its duty effectively, the jurisdiction cannot diminish the plenary power and primary jurisdiction of the
Constitution endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with special features which puts it a Ombudsman to investigate complaints specifically directed against public officers and
notch above other grievance-handling, investigate bodies. First and foremost, it extended employees. The Office of the Ombudsman is a constitutional creation. In contrast,
independence to the Ombudsman and insulated it from the intrusions of partisan the DOJ is an extension of the executive department, bereft of the constitutional
politics. Thus, the Constitution provided for stringent qualification requirements for the independence granted to the Ombudsman.
selection of the Ombudsman and his deputies, i.e., they should be natural-born citizens,
of recognized probity and independence and must not have been candidates for any Petitioners cannot seek sanctuary in the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction. While
elective office in the immediately preceding election.13 The Ombudsman and his deputies the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same
were given the rank and salary equal to that of the Chairman and Members, respectively, subject matter,19 the settled rule is that the body or agency that first takes cognizance of
the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.20 Thus, assuming The same factual scenario obtains in the cases of Natividad v. Felix25 and Honasan v.
there is concurrent jurisdiction between the Ombudsman and the DOJ in the conduct of Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the DOJ26 where the letter-complaint against
preliminary investigation, this concurrence is not to be taken as an unrestrained freedom petitioners public officers were brought alone to the DOJ prosecutors for investigation.
to file the same case before both bodies or be viewed as a contest between these bodies
as to which will first complete the investigation. In the present case, it is the Ombudsman In sum, in none of the aforecited cases was the complaint filed ahead with the Office of
before whom the complaint was initially filed. Hence, it has the authority to proceed with the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation. Hence, there was no simultaneous
the preliminary investigation to the exclusion of the DOJ. exercise of power between two coordinate bodies and no risk of conflicting findings or
orders. In stark contrast with the present case, Mary Ong filed a complaint against
None of the cases previously decided by this Court involved a factual situation similar to respondents initially with the Office of the Ombudsmanfor preliminary investigation which
that of the present case. In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good was immediately acted on by said Office. For reasons not readily apparent on the
Government (PCGG),21 the Court upheld the special authority of the PCGG to conduct the records, she thereafter refiled substantially the same complaint with the NBI and the DOJ.
preliminary investigation of ill-gotten wealth cases pursuant to Executive Order No. 1,
issued by then President Aquino, creating the PCGG. While the Court emphasized Not only this.
in Cojuangco that the power of the Ombudsman to conduct a preliminary investigation
over said cases is not exclusive but a shared authority, the complaints for the alleged The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary
misuse of coconut levy funds were filed directly with the PCGG. No complaint was filed investigation over the cases filed against the respondents would not promote an orderly
with the Office of the Ombudsman. Moreover, a close scrutiny of said case will disclose administration of justice. Although a preliminary investigation is not a trial, it is not a
that the Court recognized the primary, albeit shared, jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to casual affair either. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose
investigate all ill-gotten wealth cases.22 In fact, it ordered the PCGG to desist from of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
proceeding with the preliminary investigation as it doubted the impartiality of the PCGG crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be
to conduct the investigation after it had previously caused the issuance of sequestration held for trial.27When one is hailed before an investigative body on specific charges, the
orders against petitioner’s assets. very act of filing said complaint for preliminary investigation immediately exposes the
respondent and his family to anxiety, humiliation and expense. To allow the same
In Sanchez v. Demetriou,23 the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission filed a complaint with complaint to be filed successively before two or more investigative bodies would promote
the DOJ against petitioner Mayor Sanchez for the rape-slay of Sarmenta and the killing multiplicity of proceedings. It would also cause undue difficulties to the respondent who
of Gomez. After the DOJ panel prosecutors conducted the preliminary investigation, a would have to appear and defend his position before every agency or body where the
warrant of arrest was issued and the corresponding Informations were filed in court by same complaint was filed.This would leave hapless litigants at a loss as to where to
the DOJ prosecutors. Petitioner claimed that it is only the Ombudsman who has the appear and plead their cause or defense.
power to conduct investigation of cases involving public officers like him. The Court
reiterated its previous ruling that the authority to investigate and prosecute illegal acts of There is yet another undesirable consequence. There is the distinct possibility that the
public officers is not an exclusive authority of the Ombudsman but a shared authority. two bodies exercising jurisdiction at the same time would come up with conflicting
However, it will be noted that the complaint for preliminary investigation in that case was resolutions regarding the guilt of the respondents.
filed solely with the DOJ.
Finally, the second investigation would entail an unnecessary expenditure of public
In Aguinaldo v. Domagas,24 a letter-complaint charging petitioners with sedition was filed funds, and the use of valuable and limited resources of Government, inaduplication of
with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Cagayan. After investigation by the DOJ proceedings already started with the Ombudsman.
panel of prosecutors, the corresponding Information was filed in court. The pertinent
issue raised by petitioners was whether the prosecutors can file the said Information
From all the foregoing, it is clear that petitioners have not shown any grave abuse of
without previous authority from the Ombudsman. The Court ruled in the affirmative and
discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the respondent
reiterated its ruling regarding the shared authority of the DOJ to investigate the case.
Judge.
Again, it should be noted that the complaint in that case was addressed solely to the
provincial prosecutor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 147097 June 5, 2009 Subsequently, the OSP submitted to the Ombudsman its Resolution3 dated September 18, 2000.
It recommended the dismissal of the cases against petitioners for lack or insufficiency of
CARMELO F. LAZATIN, MARINO A. MORALES, TEODORO L. DAVID and ANGELITO A. evidence.
PELAYO, Petitioner,
vs. The Ombudsman, however, ordered the Office of the Legal Affairs (OLA) to review the OSP
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO as OMBUDSMAN, and SANDIGANBAYAN, THIRD Resolution. In a Memorandum4 dated October 24, 2000, the OLA recommended that the OSP
DIVISION, Respondents. Resolution be disapproved and the OSP be directed to proceed with the trial of the cases
against petitioners. On October 27, 2000, the Ombudsman adopted the OLA Memorandum,
DECISION thereby disapproving the OSP Resolution dated September 18, 2000 and ordering the
aggressive prosecution of the subject cases. The cases were then returned to the
PERALTA, J.: Sandiganbayan for continuation of criminal proceedings.

This resolves the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, praying that the Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition.
Ombudsman's disapproval of the Office of the Special Prosecutor's (OSP) Resolution1 dated
September 18, 2000, recommending dismissal of the criminal cases filed against herein Petitioners allege that:
petitioners, be reversed and set aside.
I.
The antecedent facts are as follows.
THE OMBUDSMAN ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR
On July 22, 1998, the Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman filed ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION.
a Complaint-Affidavit docketed as OMB-0-98-1500, charging herein petitioners with Illegal Use of
Public Funds as defined and penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code and II.
violation of Section 3, paragraphs (a) and (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended.
THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION WAS BASED ON MISAPPREHENSION OF
The complaint alleged that there were irregularities in the use by then Congressman Carmello F. FACTS, SPECULATIONS, SURMISES AND CONJECTURES.5
Lazatin of his Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) for the calendar year 1996, i.e., he was
both proponent and implementer of the projects funded from his CDF; he signed vouchers and Amplifying their arguments, petitioners asseverate that the Ombudsman had no authority to
supporting papers pertinent to the disbursement as Disbursing Officer; and he received, as overturn the OSP's Resolution dismissing the cases against petitioners because, under Section
claimant, eighteen (18) checks amounting to ₱4,868,277.08. Thus, petitioner Lazatin, with the 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman is clothed only with the power to watch,
help of petitioners Marino A. Morales, Angelito A. Pelayo and Teodoro L. David, was allegedly investigate and recommend the filing of proper cases against erring officials, but it was not
able to convert his CDF into cash. granted the power to prosecute. They point out that under the Constitution, the power to
prosecute belongs to the OSP (formerly the Tanodbayan), which was intended by the framers to
A preliminary investigation was conducted and, thereafter, the Evaluation and Preliminary be a separate and distinct entity from the Office of the Ombudsman. Petitioners conclude that, as
Investigation Bureau (EPIB) issued a Resolution2 dated May 29, 2000 recommending the filing provided by the Constitution, the OSP being a separate and distinct entity, the Ombudsman
against herein petitioners of fourteen (14) counts each of Malversation of Public Funds and should have no power and authority over the OSP. Thus, petitioners maintain that R.A. No. 6770
violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. Said Resolution was approved by the Ombudsman; (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), which made the OSP an organic component of the Office of the
hence, twenty-eight (28) Informations docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 26087 to 26114 were filed Ombudsman, should be struck down for being unconstitutional.
against herein petitioners before the Sandiganbayan.
Next, petitioners insist that they should be absolved from any liability because the checks were
Petitioner Lazatin and his co-petitioners then filed their respective Motions for issued to petitioner Lazatin allegedly as reimbursement for the advances he made from his
Reconsideration/Reinvestigation, which motions were granted by the Sandiganbayan (Third personal funds for expenses incurred to ensure the immediate implementation of projects that
Division). The Sandiganbayan also ordered the prosecution to re-evaluate the cases against are badly needed by the Pinatubo victims.
petitioners.
The Court finds the petition unmeritorious. Yes.

Petitioners' attack against the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6770 is stale. It has long been settled MR. MONSOD:
that the provisions of R.A. No. 6770 granting the Office of the Ombudsman prosecutorial powers
and placing the OSP under said office have no constitutional infirmity. The issue of whether said Yes.
provisions of R.A. No. 6770 violated the Constitution had been fully dissected as far back as
1995 in Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman.6 xxxx

Therein, the Court held that giving prosecutorial powers to the Ombudsman is in accordance MR. RODRIGO:
with the Constitution as paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI provides that the Ombudsman shall
"exercise such other functions or duties as may be provided by law." Elucidating on this matter,
Madam President. Section 5 reads: "The Tanodbayan shall continue to function and
the Court stated:
exercise its powers as provided by law."
x x x While the intention to withhold prosecutorial powers from the Ombudsman was indeed
MR. COLAYCO:
present, the Commission [referring to the Constitutional Commission of 1986] did not hesitate to
recommend that the Legislature could, through statute, prescribe such other powers, functions,
and duties to the Ombudsman. x x x As finally approved by the Commission after several That is correct, because it is under P.D. No. 1630.
amendments, this is now embodied in paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI (Accountability of
Public Officers) of the Constitution, which provides: MR. RODRIGO:

Sec.13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties: So, if it is provided by law, it can be taken away by law, I suppose.

xxxx MR. COLAYCO:

Promulgate its rules and procedure and exercise such other functions or duties as may be That is correct.
provided by law.
MR. RODRIGO:
Expounding on this power of Congress to prescribe other powers, functions, and duties to the
Ombudsman, we quote Commissioners Colayco and Monsod during interpellation by And precisely, Section 12(6) says that among the functions that can be performed by the
Commissioner Rodrigo: Ombudsman are "such functions or duties as may be provided by law." The sponsors
admitted that the legislature later on might remove some powers from the Tanodbayan
xxxx and transfer these to the Ombudsman.

MR. RODRIGO: MR. COLAYCO:

Precisely, I am coming to that. The last of the enumerated functions of the Ombudsman Madam President, that is correct.
is: "to exercise such powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by
law." So, the legislature may vest him with powers taken away from the Tanodbayan, xxxx
may it not?
MR. RODRIGO:
MR. COLAYCO:
Madam President, what I am worried about is, if we create a constitutional body which exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law, except those conferred on the
has neither punitive nor prosecutory powers but only persuasive powers, we might be Office of the Ombudsman created under this Constitution." The underscored phrase evidently
raising the hopes of our people too much and then disappoint them. refers to the Tanodbayan's powers under P.D. No. 1630 or subsequent amendatory legislation. It
follows then that Congress may remove any of the Tanodbayan's/Special Prosecutor's powers
MR. MONSOD: under P.D. No. 1630 or grant it other powers, except those powers conferred by the Constitution
on the Office of the Ombudsman.
I agree with the Commissioner.
Pursuing the present line of reasoning, when one considers that by express mandate of
MR. RODRIGO: paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, the Ombudsman may "exercise such
other powers or perform functions or duties as may be provided by law," it is indubitable then
that Congress has the power to place the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the Office of the
Anyway, since we state that the powers of the Ombudsman can later on be implemented
Ombudsman. In the same vein, Congress may remove some of the powers granted to the
by the legislature, why not leave this to the legislature?
Tanodbayan by P.D. No. 1630 and transfer them to the Ombudsman; or grant the Office of the
Special Prosecutor such other powers and functions and duties as Congress may deem fit and
xxxx wise. This Congress did through the passage of R.A. No. 6770.8

MR. MONSOD: (reacting to statements of Commissioner Blas Ople): The foregoing ruling of the Court has been reiterated in Camanag v. Guerrero.9 More recently,
in Office of the Ombudsman v. Valera,10 the Court, basing its ratio decidendion its ruling
xxxx in Acop and Camanag, declared that the OSP is "merely a component of the Office of the
Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control, and upon authority of the
With respect to the argument that he is a toothless animal, we would like to say that we are Ombudsman" and ruled that under R.A. No. 6770, the power to preventively suspend is lodged
promoting the concept in its form at the present, but we are also saying that he can exercise only with the Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsman.11 The Court's ruling in Acop that the
such powers and functions as may be provided by law in accordance with the direction of the authority of the Ombudsman to prosecute based on R.A. No. 6770 was authorized by the
thinking of Commissioner Rodrigo. We do not think that at this time we should prescribe this, but Constitution was also made the foundation for the decision in Perez v. Sandiganbayan,12 where it
we leave it up to Congress at some future time if it feels that it may need to designate what was held that the power to prosecute carries with it the power to authorize the filing of
powers the Ombudsman need in order that he be more effective. This is not foreclosed.
1aw phi 1
informations, which power had not been delegated to the OSP. It is, therefore, beyond cavil that
under the Constitution, Congress was not proscribed from legislating the grant of additional
So, this is a reversible disability, unlike that of a eunuch; it is not an irreversible disability.7 powers to the Ombudsman or placing the OSP under the Office of the Ombudsman.

The constitutionality of Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770, which subsumed the OSP under the Office of Petitioners now assert that the Court's ruling on the constitutionality of the provisions of R.A. No.
the Ombudsman, was likewise upheld by the Court in Acop. It was explained, thus: 6770 should be revisited and the principle of stare decisis set aside. Again, this contention
deserves scant consideration.
x x x the petitioners conclude that the inclusion of the Office of the Special Prosecutor as among
the offices under the Office of the Ombudsman in Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770 ("An Act Providing The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle
for the Functional and Structural Organization of the Office of the Ombudsman and for Other things which are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which
Purposes") is unconstitutional and void. provides, thus:

The contention is not impressed with merit. x x x ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of
the legal system of the Philippines.
xxxx
It was further explained in Fermin v. People13as follows:
x x x Section 7 of Article XI expressly provides that the then existing Tanodbayan, to be
henceforth known as the Office of the Special Prosecutor, "shall continue to function and
The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a remedy meant to correct only errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. This has been
country to follow the rule established in a decision of the Supreme Court thereof. That emphasized in First Corporation v. Former Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals,18 to wit:
decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the
land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has been It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is not the province of the
examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.14 1avv phi 1

extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is extra ordinem - beyond the ambit of appeal. In
certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not go as far as to examine and assess the
In Chinese Young Men's Christian Association of the Philippine Islands v. Remington Steel evidence of the parties and to weigh the probative value thereof. It does not include an
Corporation,15 the Court expounded on the importance of the foregoing doctrine, stating that: inquiry as to the correctness of the evaluation of evidence. Any error committed in the
evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by
The doctrine of stare decisis is one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing certainty certiorari. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its
and stability of judicial decisions, thus: jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, which is tantamount to lack
Time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of
practicethat when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors of the trial court in its appreciation of
facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are the evidence of the parties, or its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its
substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb conclusions of law. It is not for this Court to re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate
not what is settled. Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion the credibility of the witnesses or substitute the findings of fact of the court a quo.19
reached in one case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially
the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice Evidently, the issue of whether the evidence indeed supports a finding of probable cause would
that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided necessitate an examination and re-evaluation of the evidence upon which the Ombudsman
alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the based its disapproval of the OSP Resolution. Hence, the Petition for Certiorarishould not be
parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the given due course.
rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.16
Likewise noteworthy is the holding of the Court in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee
The doctrine has assumed such value in our judicial system that the Court has ruled that on Behest Loans v. Desierto,20imparting the value of the Ombudsman's independence, stating
"[a]bandonment thereof must be based only on strong and compelling reasons, otherwise, thus:
the becoming virtue of predictability which is expected from this Court would be immeasurably
affected and the public's confidence in the stability of the solemn pronouncements Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution and RA 6770 (The Ombudsman
diminished."17 Verily, only upon showing that circumstances attendant in a particular case Act of 1989), the Ombudsman has the power to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of
override the great benefits derived by our judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis, can a public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
the courts be justified in setting aside the same. inefficient. It has been the consistent ruling of the Court not to interfere with the
Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers as long as his
In this case, petitioners have not shown any strong, compelling reason to convince the Court that rulings are supported by substantial evidence. Envisioned as the champion of the people
the doctrine of stare decisis should not be applied to this case. They have not successfully and preserver of the integrity of public service, he has wide latitude in exercising his powers
demonstrated how or why it would be grave abuse of discretion for the Ombudsman, who has and is free from intervention from the three branches of government. This is to ensure
been validly conferred by law with the power of control and supervision over the OSP, to that his Office is insulated from any outside pressure and improper influence.21
disapprove or overturn any resolution issued by the latter.
Indeed, for the Court to overturn the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause, it is imperative for
The second issue advanced by petitioners is that the Ombudsman's disapproval of the OSP petitioners to clearly prove that said public official acted with grave abuse of discretion.
Resolution recommending dismissal of the cases is based on misapprehension of facts, In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto,22 the Court elaborated on what
speculations, surmises and conjectures. The question is really whether the Ombudsman constitutes such abuse, to wit:
correctly ruled that there was enough evidence to support a finding of probable cause. That
issue, however, pertains to a mere error of judgment. It must be stressed that certiorari is a
Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to
lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or
despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. x x x23

In this case, petitioners failed to demonstrate that the Ombudsman acted in a manner described
above. Clearly, the Ombudsman was acting in accordance with R.A. No. 6770 and properly
exercised its power of control and supervision over the OSP when it disapproved the Resolution
dated September 18, 2000.

It should also be noted that the petition does not question any order or action of the
Sandiganbayan Third Division; hence, it should not have been included as a respondent in this
petition.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
G.R. NO. 135687 July 24, 2007 DECISION
(Re: OMB-0-96-2643)
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS, represented by:
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT(PCGG), Petitioner, Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the Order1 of
vs. the Ombudsman dated July 6, 1998 dismissing three complaints filed by petitioner docketed as
HON. OMBUDSMAN ANIANO DESIERTO, WENCESLAO PASCUAL, GAUDENCIO VIDUYA, OMB-0-96-2643, OMB-0-96-2644 and OMB-0-96-2645, and its Order2 of August 31, 1998,
JULIA M. MACUJA, PLACIDO MAPA, JR., JOSE TEVES, ALEJANDRO MELCHOR, RECIO denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
M. GARCIA, DBP BOARD OF DIRECTORS LORENZA N. SALCEDO, JOSEPHINE S.
GARCIA, STOCKHOLDERS OF P.R. GARCIA & SONS DEVELOPMENT and INVESTMENT The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
CORPORATION, Respondents.
On October 8, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13, which
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x created herein petitioner Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans
(Committee).
(Re: OMB-0-96-2644)
On March 6, 1996 and June 28, 1996, Orlando S. Salvador (Salvador), in his capacity as PCGG
PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS, represented by: consultant, executed three separate Sworn Statements stating that among the loan accounts
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioner, referred by the Assets Privatization Trust to the Committee for investigation, report and
vs. recommendation are those of the following corporations: P.R. Garcia and Sons Development
PLACIDO MAPA - Board of Director/Chairman DBP, and Investment Corporation (PRGS), Golden River Mining Corporation (Golden River), and
RECIO GARCIA - Member, Filipinas Carbon and Mining Corporation (Filcarbon).
JOSE TENGCO, JR. - Member,
RAFAEL SISON - Chairman, With respect to the loan account of PRGS, Salvador alleged that the said corporation obtained
JOSE R. TENGCO - Member, from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) an initial loan guarantee of ₱26,726,774.72
ALICE L. REYES - Member, and a straight industrial loan amounting to ₱29,226,774.72 on October 26, 1967 for the purpose
CESAR SALAMEA - Chairman, of redeeming mortgaged properties, rehabilitating buildings and equipment and defraying its
DON PERRY - Vice Chairman, operational expenses.
ROLANDO M. SOZA - Member,RICARDO SILVERIO, SR.,RICARDO SILVERIO, JR.
RICARDO S. TANGCO, Stockholders/Directors of Golden River Mining Corp., Respondents.
Anent the loan account of Golden River, Salvador claimed that the corporation obtained loan
accommodations from DBP beginning from 1975 until 1982 and that as of October 31, 1986, it
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x had a total obligation of ₱43,193,000.00; that out of its five loan accounts, only the first two loans
of Golden River obtained in 1975 and 1977 were sufficiently collateralized, leaving three other
(Re: OMB-0-96-2645) loans without any sufficient collateral, to wit: refinancing loan obtained in 1980 for the amount of
₱14,724,430.00; refinancing loan obtained on March 13, 1982 for the amount of ₱5,551,000.00;
PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS, represented by: and refinancing loan obtained on December 1, 1982 for the amount of ₱7,118,656.52.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioner,
vs. As to the loan account of Filcarbon, Salvador averred that the said corporation applied with the
PANFILO O. DOMINGO - Former PNB President, National Investment Development Corporation (NIDC) a loan guarantee of P27.4 Million on
CONRADO S. REYES - Former NIDC General January 17, 1977; that the loan application was favorably recommended by the President of the
Manager, Philippine National Bank (PNB); that the application was subsequently approved by PNB's Board
CONRADO T. CALALANG, ANTONIO M. GONZALES, NORBERTO L. VILLARAMA, SENEN of Directors on August 17, 1977.
B. DE LA COSTA, ANTONIO O. MENDOZA, JR., IGNACIO C. BERTUMEN,
Stockholders/Officers of Filipino Carbon and Mining Corporation, Respondents.
Salvador alleged that, based on the evidence submitted to the Committee, these three R.A. No. 3019. As to the two 1982 transactions of Golden River, the Ombudsman found that,
corporations did not have sufficient collaterals for the loans they obtained, except with respect to contrary to the claims of herein petitioner, the loan accounts obtained by the said corporation
the loans obtained by Golden River in 1975 and 1977. Salvador also alleged that the above- have sufficient collaterals.
mentioned corporations did not have adequate capital to ensure not only the viability of their
operations but also their ability to repay all their loans. Accordingly, the Committee found the Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Ombudsman denied it in its Order dated
loan accounts of the above-mentioned three corporations as behest loans. August 31, 1998.

The Committee submitted its report to President Ramos who instructed then PCGG Chairman Hence, herein petition.
Magtanggol Gunigundo, sitting as the Committee's ex-officio Chairman, to file the necessary
charges against the DBP Chairman and members of the Board of Directors, the former PNB Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman erred in dismissing, motu proprio, the three complaints
President and former NIDC General Manager, together with the respective stockholders/officers without first requiring respondents to submit their counter-affidavits and petitioner to file its reply
of the three corporations. thereto. Such dismissal, petitioner avers, is premature. Petitioner further argues that even
granting that the Ombudsman feels that petitioner's evidence is insufficient, the Ombudsman
Subsequently, the Sworn Statements of Salvador were used by the Committee as its bases in should have first required petitioner to clarify said evidence or to adduce additional evidence, in
filing separate complaints with the Office of the Ombudsman against herein private respondents accordance with due process.
for alleged violation of the provisions of Sections 3 (e)3 and (g)4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioner also asserts that the Ombudsman erred in dismissing petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration on the ground that it was filed out of time as evidence shows that the said
The complaint against respondents Lorenzo N. Salcedo and Josephine S. Garcia, stockholders motion was timely filed.
of PRGS; and Wenceslao Pascual, Gaudencio Viduya, Julia D. Macuja, Placido L. Mapa, Jr.,
Jose Teves, Alejandro Melchor, Recio Garcia, Rafael Sison, Cesar Zalamea, Don M. Perry and Petitioner contends that the consolidation of the three complaints and the subsequent issuance
Rolando Soza, then officers and members of the Board of Directors of DBP, is docketed as of a single Order dismissing them is erroneous. Petitioner argues that the three complaints
OMB-0-96-2643. cannot be lumped together and a single order issued for their resolution as these complaints
involve different sets of facts and are based on different loan transactions.
The complaint against Ricardo Silverio, Sr., Ricardo Silverio, Jr., and Ricardo S. Tangco,
stockholders of Golden River; and Placido Mapa, Jose de Ocampo, Recio Garcia, Jose Tengco, Petitioner further avers that the pieces of evidence submitted as part of the complaints were not
Jr., Rafael Sison, Jose de Ocampo, Jose R. Tengco, Alice L. Reyes, Cesar Zalamea, Don Perry considered by the Ombudsman when it issued the assailed Orders; that the findings of the
and Rolando M. Soza, then officers and members of the Board of Directors of DBP, is docketed Committee that the subject loans are behest loans prevail; and, that the right of the State to
as OMB-0-96-2644. recover behest loans as ill-gotten wealth is not barred by prescription.

The complaint against Panfilo O. Domingo, then PNB President; Conrado S. Reyes, then NIDC In his Comment, the Ombudsman, citing the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
General Manager; and Conrado Calalang, Antonio M. Gonzales, Norberto L. Villarama, Sene B. as authority, contends that the provisions of Section 15, Article XI of the Constitution, which
dela Costa, Antonio O. Mendoza, Jr. and Ignacio C. Bertumen, officers and stockholders of provides for the imprescriptibility of the right of the State to recover ill-gotten wealth, applies only
Filcarbon, is docketed as OMB-0-96-2645. to civil actions and not to criminal cases. The Ombudsman further avers that prior to its
amendment, Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 provided that the period for the prescription or
Subsequently, the three aforementioned cases were consolidated by the Office of the extinguishment of a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was ten years.
Ombudsman. Subsequently, the said provision was amended in 1982 increasing the prescriptive period to
fifteen years. Applying the Constitution and the law to the present case, the Ombudsman argues
In his assailed Order of July 6, 1998, the Ombudsman, upon the recommendation of the that, except with respect to the two loan transactions entered into by Golden River in 1982, all
Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau, dismissed the complaints against herein the other alleged criminal acts of herein private respondents in connection with the loan
respondents. The Ombudsman ruled that, except with respect to the two loan transactions transactions they entered into in the years 1967 until 1980 had already prescribed in 1995.
entered into by Golden River in 1982, all the offenses alleged by the Committee as having been Hence, private respondents can no longer be prosecuted with respect to these transactions.
committed by herein respondents had already prescribed under the provisions of Section 11 of
The Ombudsman also avers that under Section 2, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 7 (Rules of As to whether or not the subject complaints filed against herein respondents had already
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), the Ombudsman is authorized to prescribed, the Court's disquisition on an identical issue in Salvador v. Desierto9 is instructive, to
dismiss, motu proprio, a complaint even without requiring the respondents to file their counter- wit:
affidavits and even without conducting a preliminary investigation.
The applicable laws on prescription of criminal offenses defined and penalized under the
As to the loan accounts of Golden River obtained on March 13, 1982 and December 1, 1982, the Revised Penal Code are found in Articles 90 and 91 of the same Code. For those penalized by
Ombusman contends that based on pieces of evidence presented by the complainant, the said special laws, Act No. 3326, as amended, applies. Here, since R.A. 3019, the law alleged to have
loans had more than sufficient collateral. been violated, is a special law, the applicable law in the computation of the prescriptive period is
Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides:
The Ombudsman asserts that his findings of fact and his application of pertinent laws as well as
rules of evidence deserve great weight and respect and even accorded full faith and credit in the Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law,
absence of any showing of any error or grave abuse of discretion. and if the same not be known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
Respondents Panfilo O. Domingo, Jose R. Tengco, Jr., Alicia Ll. Reyes, Cesar Zalamea, Placido
L. Mapa, Jr., Conrado T. Calalang, Norberto Villarama and Ricardo C. Silverio filed their The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person,
respective Comments. While the present petition is pending in this Court, respondents Conrado and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
Reyes and Jose Teves died.5 In a Resolution6 issued by this Court dated February 22, 2006, jeopardy."
respondents Wenceslao Pascual, Senen dela Costa, Lorenzo Salcedo and Antonio Mendoza
were dropped as respondents for an earlier resolution of the case after all efforts of petitioner to The above provisions are clear and need no interpretation. In Presidential Ad Hoc Committee vs.
ascertain their correct and present addresses proved to be in vain. Hon. Desierto*, we held:

With respect to the other respondents who failed to file their respective comments, the Court x x x it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the violations
dispenses with the comments in order that the present petition may be resolved. of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made because, as alleged, the
public officials concerned connived or conspired with the "beneficiaries of the loans." Thus, we
The Court shall first deal with the issue of prescription as this was the main basis of the agree with the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period for the offenses with which respondents
Ombudsman in dismissing petitioner's complaints. in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be computed from the discovery of the commission
thereof and not from the day of such commission.
Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The assertion by the Ombudsman that the phrase ‘if the same not be known’ in Section 2 of Act
The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, No. 3326 does not mean ‘lack of knowledge’ but that the crime ‘is not reasonably knowable’ is
from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or unacceptable, as it provides an interpretation that defeats or negates the intent of the law, which
estoppel. is written in a clear and unambiguous language and thus provides no room for interpretation but
only application."
In Presidential Ad Hoc Committee v. Hon. Desierto7 , the Court held that the imprescriptibility of
the right of the State to recover ill-gotten wealth applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill- We reiterated the above ruling in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans
gotten wealth, and not to criminal cases. In other words, the prosecution of offenses arising from, vs. Desierto** thus:
relating or incident to, or involving ill-gotten wealth contemplated in the above-mentioned
provision of the Constitution may be barred by prescription.8 In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the February 1986 Edsa
Revolution that ousted President Ferdinand E. Marcos, we ruled that the government as the
Under Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 195, which took aggrieved party could not have known of the violations at the time the questioned transactions
effect on March 16, 1982, the prescriptive period for offenses punishable under the said Act was were made (PCGG vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 140232, January 19, 2001, 349 SCRA 767; Domingo
increased from ten to fifteen years. vs. Sandiganbayan, supra, Note 14; Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest
Loans vs. Desierto, supra, Note 16). Moreover, no person would have dared to question the
legality of those transactions. Thus, the counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the All the foregoing notwithstanding, and bearing in mind the peculiar circumstances of this case,
date of discovery of the offense in 1992 after an exhaustive investigation by the Presidential Ad particularly the fact that the subject loans are now alleged as ill-gotten wealth and behest loans,
Hoc Committee on Behest Loans. the same remains to be bare allegations with no new evidence tendered to thwart the Order in
question.
As to when the period of prescription was interrupted, the second paragraph of Section 2, Act No.
3326, as amended, provides that prescription is interrupted ‘when proceedings are instituted The complaints herein are plain and simple. There is no allegation even that the questioned
against the guilty person.10 loans were granted "at the behest" of respondent officials in these cases x x x.

The complaints filed against respondents did not specify the exact dates when the alleged x x x x12
offenses were discovered. However, it is not disputed that it was the Committee that discovered
the same. As such, the discovery could not have been made earlier than October 13, 1992, the It, thus, appears that the Ombudsman's basis for dismissing the complaints was not merely the
date when the Committee was created. It is clear, therefore, that the alleged criminal offenses prescription of the complaints, but also the lack of any allegation therein that the questioned
against herein respondents had not yet prescribed when the complaints were filed in 1996. Thus, loans are behest loans.
the Ombudsman seriously erred in dismissing the three complaints filed by petitioner on the
ground of prescription. However, while there was no specific or particular mention that the questioned loan accounts
were "behest loans," the complaints contain allegations consistent with the criteria laid down by
As to petitioner's claim that it is error on the part of the Ombudsman to deny petitioner's Motion Memorandum Order No. 61 issued by President Ramos on November 9, 1992.
for Reconsideration on the ground that the same was filed out of time:
The said Memorandum provides for the following as a frame of reference in determining whether
The Ombudsman is presumed to have regularly performed its official duty in the determination of a loan, which is under scrutiny, is behest:
whether or not the said Motion was really filed beyond the reglementary period as provided
under the pertinent rules of the Office of the Ombudsman. However, this presumption is (a) It is under-collateralized;
disputable. In the present case, petitioner contends that the subject Motion was sent by
registered mail on July 29, 1998, which was the last day allowed for filing of the same. As proof
(b) The borrower corporation is undercapitalized;
of such mailing, petitioner presented a Certification11 issued by the Central Post Office in Manila
stating therein that Registered Letter No. 74220 was sent by the PCGG on July 29, 1998,
addressed to the Office of the Ombudsman in Manila, and that said letter was duly delivered to (c) Direct or indirect endorsement by high government officials, like the presence of
and received on August 5, 1998 by an authorized representative of the Office of the marginal notes;
Ombudsman. The Ombudsman failed to controvert petitioner's submission in any of the
pleadings filed in the present petition. A simple referral to the date that appears on the front page (d) Stockholders, officers or agents of the borrower corporation are identified as cronies;
of the Motion for Reconsideration, indicating the date when the Office of the Ombudsman
received the Motion, would have easily disputed the allegation of petitioners. In the absence (e) Deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose intended;
thereof, the Court finds that the presumption of regularity of the Ombudsman's performance of
his official duties must yield to the evidence presented by petitioner. As such, petitioner's Motion (f) Use of corporate layering;
for Reconsideration of the Order of the Ombudsman dated July 6, 1998 should be considered as
timely filed. (g) Non-feasibility of the project for which financing is being sought; and

Nonetheless, a perusal of the assailed Order dated August 31, 1998 of the Ombudsman shows (h) Extraordinary speed with which the loan release was made.13 (Emphasis supplied).
that there are grounds other than late filing upon which the Ombudsman denied petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration, to wit: In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Hon. Desierto,14 the Ombudsman adopted
the position that to qualify as a behest loan, two or more of the criteria enumerated in
xxxx Memorandum Order No. 61 must be present.
It is therefore erroneous for the Ombudsman to conclude in the present case that the complaints explanation or discussion, whatsoever, as to how it reached its conclusion that the disputed
against PRGS and Filcarbon were bereft of any allegations that their questioned loans are loans are not behest insofar as PRGS and Filcarbon are concerned.
behest, considering that said complaints explicitly alleged the presence of two of the criteria: that
the subject loans are "under-collateralized" and that the borrower corporations are Thus, for a proper disposition of the complaints against PRGS and Filcarbon, the Court finds it
"undercapitalized." necessary to refer them back to the Ombudsman for proper evaluation based on their merits.

Section 2, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 7 of the Office of the Ombudsman, otherwise As to Golden River, the Ombudsman did not err in dismissing the complaint against it with
known as the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, provides: respect to its loan transactions obtained on March 13, 1982 and December 1, 1982. The Court
finds no cogent reason to deviate from the findings of the Ombudsman, to wit:
SEC. 2. Evaluation. - Upon evaluating the complaint, the investigating officer shall recommend
whether it may be: Discussing these two loans, we find that in 1980, Golden River Corporation was granted a
refinance in the amount of P14,724,430 pesos. Such grant in 1982 for P5,551,000.00 is less
a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit; than 50% of the said P14,724,430 pesos, hence, this cannot be said to be granted with
insufficient collateral, taking the same as reference point alone without the previous collaterals
b) referred to respondent for comment; and assets which were admittedly sufficient as admitted by complainant in paragraph b, p. 2 of
the Sworn Statement of Orlando L. Salvador (p. 10, Records, OMB-0-96-2644)
c) indorsed to the proper government office or agency which has jurisdiction over the
case; xxx

d) forwarded to the appropriate officer or official for fact-finding investigation; Likewise, the loans for P7,118,656.52 on December 1, 1982 is not more than 50% of the
additional assets alone which is the money equivalent of the two refinanced loans of
e) referred for administrative adjudication; or P14,724,430.00 and P5,551,000.00 the total of which is P20,275,430.00 pesos. Considering that
the refinancing ratio has a maximum of 70% of the total assets/collaterals, even the last two
loans which were within the prescriptive period are not without sufficient collaterals.
f) subjected to a preliminary investigation.
In other words, collaterals were sufficient in accordance with Sec. 78, R.A. 337, as amended
While under this Rule, the Ombudsman may dismiss a complaint outright for want of palpable
(General Banking Act) x x x17
merit, but a sense of justice and fairness demands that the Ombudsman must set forth in a
Resolution the reasons for such dismissal.
This Court has consistently held that the Ombudsman has discretion to determine whether a
criminal case, given its facts and circumstances, should be filed or not. It is basically his call. He
It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it was
may dismiss the complaint forthwith should he find it to be insufficient in form and substance or,
decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the
should he find it otherwise, to continue with the inquiry; or he may proceed with the investigation
court.15 This Court has held that the constitutional and statutory mandate that no decision shall
if, in his view, the complaint is in due and proper form and substance. Quite relevant is the
be rendered by any court of record without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and
Court's ruling in Espinosa v. Office of the Ombudsman18 and reiterated in the case of The
the law on which it is based applies as well to dispositions by quasi-judicial and administrative
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact- Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Hon. Desierto,19 to wit:
bodies.16 In fact, Section 18 of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989,
makes the Rules of Court applicable, in a suppletory manner, to its own rules of procedure. One
of the requirements provided under Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court is that a judgment or The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers is vested in the Office of the
final order determining the merits of the case should state the facts and the law on which it is Ombudsman. To insulate the Office from outside pressure and improper influence, the
1avvphi 1

based. Constitution as well as R.A. 6770 has endowed it with a wide latitude of investigatory and
prosecutory powers virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention. This court
consistently refrains from interfering with the exercise of its powers, and respects the initiative
A careful reading of the questioned Orders of the Ombudsman shows that there is no express
and independence inherent in the Ombudsman who, ‘beholden to no one, acts as the champion
finding that the complaints filed by petitioner were manifestly without merit. There is no
of the people and the preserver of the integrity of the public service.’20
As a rule, the Court shall not unduly interfere in the Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigatory However, in the remand of the complaints against respondents, orderly administration of justice
and prosecutory powers, as provided in the Constitution, without good and compelling reasons behooves the Ombudsman not to consolidate the three complaints, as the respective
to indicate otherwise.21The basis for this rule was provided in the case of Ocampo IV v. respondents therein would inevitably raise different defenses which would require separate
Ombudsman22 where the Court held as follows: presentation of evidence by the parties involved.

The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Except with respect to the
the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the complaints relative to the loan accounts of Golden River obtained on March 13, 1982, and
functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the December 1, 1982, the assailed Orders of the Ombudsman dated July 6, 1998 and August 31,
dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to 1998 in OMB-0-96-2643, OMB-0-96-2644 and OMB-0-96-2645 are SET ASIDE.
complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if
they would be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or The Office of the Ombudsman is directed to conduct with dispatch an evaluation on the
prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint respective merits of the complaints against herein respondents pursuant to the provisions of
by a private complainant.23 Section 2, Rule II of its Rules of Procedure.

While the Court has previously held that it may interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman in SO ORDERED.
case of clear abuse of discretion,24 the Ombudsman is not guilty of abuse of discretion in
dismissing the complaint against Golden River insofar as the two 1982 loan transactions are MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
concerned. Associate Justice

However, the complaint against Golden River had not been completely disposed of by the
Ombudsman as it failed to discuss the refinancing loan obtained by the said corporation in 1980
for the amount of ₱14,724,430.00. Hence, the complaint against Golden River should also be
referred back to the Ombudsman for proper evaluation of its merits with respect to the
aforementioned loan.

Petitioner contended that the Ombudsman erred in dismissing the complaints without requiring
respondents to file their counter-affidavits and petitioner its reply, or to further require petitioner
to clarify its evidence or adduce additional evidence.

It is quite clear under Section 2(a), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, that it may dismiss a complaint outright for want of palpable merit. At that point, the
Ombudsman does not have to conduct a preliminary investigation upon receipt of a
complaint.25 Should the investigating officer find the complaint devoid of merit, then he may
recommend its outright dismissal.26 The Ombudsman has discretion to determine whether a
preliminary investigation is proper.27 It is only when the Ombudsman opts not to dismiss the
complaint outright for lack of palpable merit would the Ombudsman be expected to require the
respondents to file their counter-affidavit and petitioner, its reply.

Lastly, the Court finds nothing erroneous in the Ombudsman's act of consolidating the three
complaints and of issuing a single order for their dismissal considering that, with the exception of
the complaint regarding the two 1982 loan accounts of Golden River which was separately
discussed by the Ombudsman on their merits, the dismissal of all the other complaints was
based on a common ground, which is prescription.
G.R. No. 163586 January 27, 2009 fact upon which depends the jurisdiction of the RTC. Citing Uy v. Sandiganbayan,4 petitioner
further argued that as she was a public employee with salary grade 27, the case filed against her
SHARON CASTRO, Petitioner, was cognizable by the RTC and may be investigated and prosecuted only by the public
vs. prosecutor, and not by the Ombudsman whose prosecutorial power was limited to cases
HON. MERLIN DELORIA, as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Guimaras; cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.5
the COA-Region VI, represented by its Director; and HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, Respondents. The RTC denied the Motion to Quash in an Order6 dated September 7, 2001. It held that the
jurisdiction of the RTC over the case did not depend on the salary grade of petitioner, but on the
DECISION penalty imposable upon the latter for the offense charged.7 Moreover, it sustained the
prosecutorial authority of the Ombudsman in the case, pointing out that in Uy, upon motion for
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: clarification filed by the Ombudsman, the Court set aside its August 9, 1999 Decision and issued
a March 20, 2001 Resolution expressly recognizing the prosecutorial and investigatory authority
of the Ombudsman in cases cognizable by the RTC.
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by Sharon
Castro (petitioner) to assail the July 22, 2003 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which
dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 69350; and the March 26, 2004 CA Resolution2 which denied the The RTC further held that the Motion to Quash was contrary to Sec. 1, Rule 117, for it was filed
motion for reconsideration. after petitioner pleaded not guilty under the Information.8

The facts are of record. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9which the RTC denied in its December 18, 2001
Order.10
On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged by the Ombudsman before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 65, Guimaras, with Malversation of Public Funds, under an Information which Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari11 with the CA, but the latter dismissed the petition in the
reads, as follows: Decision under review.

That on or about the 17th day of August 1998, and for sometime prior thereto, in the Municipality Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration12 was also denied.
of Buenavista, Province of Guimaras, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the this Honorable
Court, abovenamed accused, a public officer, being the Revenue Officer I of the Bureau of Hence, the present petition, confining the issues to the following:
Internal Revenue, Buenavista, Guimaras and as such, was in the custody and possession of
public funds in the amount of P556,681.53, Philippine Currency, representing the value of her 1. Whether or not the Ombudsman, as of May 31, 2000, when the Information for
collections and other accountabilities, for which she is accountable by reason of the duties of her Malvesation of Public Funds was instituted against the Petitioner, had the authority to file
office, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, taking advantage of her the same in light of this Supreme Court’s ruling in the First "Uy vs. Sandiganbayan" case,
public position, with deliberate intent, and with intent to gain, did then and there willfully, which declared that the prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman is limited to cases
unlawfully and feloniously appropriate, take, misappropriate, embezzle and convert to her own cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
personal use and benefit said amount of P556,681.53, and despite notice and demands made
upon her account for said public funds, she has failed to do so, to the damage and prejudice of 2. Whether or not the clarificatory Resolution issued by the Supreme Court dated
the government. February 22, 2001 in the Uy vs. Sandiganbayan case can be made applicable to the
Petitioner-Accused, without violating the constitutional provision on ex-post facto laws
CONTRARY TO LAW.3 and denial of the accused to due process.13

Petitioner pleaded NOT GUILTY when arraigned on February 16, 2001. Petitioner contends that from the time of the promulgation on August 9, 1999 of the Decision of
the Court in Uy up to the time of issuance on March 20, 2001 of the Resolution of the Court in
On August 31, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and the same case, the prevailing jurisprudence was that the Ombudsman had no prosecutorial
lack of authority of the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation and file the powers over cases cognizable by the RTC. As the investigation and prosecution against
Information. Petitioner argued that the Information failed to allege her salary grade -- a material petitioner was conducted by the Ombudsman beginning April 26, 2000, then the August 9, 1999
Decision in Uy was applicable, notwithstanding that the said decision was set aside in the March powers granted by the legislature to the Ombudsman are very broad and encompass all kinds of
20, 2001 Resolution of the Court in said case. Hence, the Information that was filed against malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public officers and employees during
petitioner was void for at that time the Ombudsman had no investigatory and prosecutorial their tenure of office.
powers over the case.
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited
The petition lacks merit. authority of the Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the Special
Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the
The petition calls to mind Office of the Ombudsman v. Enoc,14 wherein accused Ruben Enoc, et supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman. Its power to conduct preliminary
al. invoked the August 9, 1999 Decision of the Court in Uy15 in a motion to dismiss the 11 counts investigation and to prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the
of malversation that were filed against them by the Ombudsman before the RTC. The RTC Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not intend to confine the investigatory and
granted the motion but upon petition filed by the Ombudsman, the Court reversed the RTC and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to these types of cases. The Ombudsman is mandated by
held: law to act on all complaints against officers and employees of the government and to enforce
their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants. To
In turn, petitioner filed a Manifestation invoking the very same resolution promulgated on March carry out this duty, the law allows him to utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate any
20, 2001 in Uy v. Sandiganbayan reconsidering the ruling that the prosecutory power of the fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or
Ombudsman extended only to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or
deputized to assist him work under his supervision and control. The law likewise allows him to
direct the Special prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction in
Indeed, this Court has reconsidered the said ruling and held that the Ombudsman has powers to
accordance with Section 11(4c) of RA 6770.
prosecute not only graft cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but also those
cognizable by the regular courts. It held:
We, therefore, hold that the Ombudsman has authority to investigate and prosecute Criminal
Case Nos. 374(97) to 385(97) against respondents in the RTC, Branch 19 of Digos, Davao Del
The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and
Sur even as this authority is not exclusive and is shared by him with the regular prosecutors.
unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a
distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular WHEREFORE, the order, dated October 7, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court, branch 19 of Digos,
courts. It has been held that the clause "any illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad Davao del Sur is SET ASIDE and Criminal Case Nos. 374(97) to 385(97) are hereby
enough to embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee. REINSTATED and the Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to try and decide the same. (Emphasis
supplied)
The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, particularly in
Section 15(1) giving the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Similarly relevant is the case of Office of Ombudsman v. Hon. Breva,16 in which, citing the
Sandiganbayan, and Section 11(4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to conduct August 9, 1999 Decision in Uy, the RTC dismissed a criminal complaint that was filed before it by
preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the the Ombudsman. The Court reversed the RTC, for, "given the Court’s Uy ruling under its March
Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as confining the scope of the investigatory and 20, 2001 Resolution, the trial court’s assailed Orders x x x are, in hindsight, without legal support
prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases. and must, therefore, be set aside."

Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the It is settled, therefore, that the March 20, 2001 Resolution in Uy, that the Ombudsman has
Sandiganbayan. The law defines such primary jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman "to prosecutorial powers in cases cognizable by the RTC, extends even to criminal information filed
take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of or pending at the time when its August 9, 1999 Decision was the operative ruling on the issue.
such cases." The grant of this authority does not necessarily imply the exclusion from its
jurisdiction of cases involving public officers and employees cognizable by other courts. The Petitioner would argue, however, that the March 20, 2001 Resolution in Uy cannot have
exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the retroactive effect, for otherwise it would amount to "an ex-post facto law, which is constitutionally
Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute proscribed."17
other offenses committed by public officers and employees. Indeed, it must be stressed that the
Petitioner is grasping at straws.

A judicial interpretation of a statute, such as the Ombudsman Act, constitutes part of that law as
of the date of its original passage. Such interpretation does not create a new law but construes a
pre-existing one; it merely casts light upon the contemporaneous legislative intent of that
law.18 Hence, the March 20, 2001 Resolution of the Court in Uy interpreting the Ombudsman Act
is deemed part of the law as of the date of its effectivity on December 7, 1989.

Where a judicial interpretation declares a law unconstitutional or abandons a doctrinal


interpretation of such law, the Court, recognizing that acts may have been performed under the
impression of the constitutionality of the law or the validity of its interpretation, has consistently
held that such operative fact cannot be undone by the mere subsequent declaration of the nullity
of the law or its interpretation; thus, the declaration can only have a prospective application.19 But
where no law is invalidated nor doctrine abandoned, a judicial interpretation of the law should be
deemed incorporated at the moment of its legislation.20

In the present case, the March 20, 2001 Resolution in Uy made no declaration of
unconstitutionality of any law nor did it vacate a doctrine long held by the Court and relied upon
by the public. Rather, it set aside an erroneous pubescent interpretation of the Ombudsman Act
as expressed in the August 9, 1999 Decision in the same case. Its effect has therefore been held
by the Court to reach back to validate investigatory and prosecutorial processes conducted by
the Ombudsman, such as the filing of the Information against petitioner.

With the foregoing disquisition, the second issue is rendered moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 144492 December 18, 2008 On January 22, 1968, Republic Act No. 5412 (Record, pp. 25-26), known as the "Charter
of the City of General Santos" was enacted creating the City of General Santos where it
LUWALHATI R. ANTONINO, petitioner, is provided that "The National Government hereby cedes to the City of General Santos
vs. the ownership and possession to all lands of the public domain within the city." Later,
HON. OMBUDSMAN ANIANO A. DESIERTO, ROSALITA T. NUÑEZ, AUGUSTUS L. said Act was amended by Republic Act No. 6386 on August 16, 1971 (Record, pp. 27-28)
MOMONGAN, JUDGE ABEDNEGO O. ADRE, PEDRO G. NALANGAN, ASTERIA E. wherein it read that "The disposition of all lands of the public domain within the city shall
CRUZABRA, JULIO C. DIAZ and AGAPITO BORINAGA, respondents. be in accordance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred
forty-one, as amended: Provided, That all incomes and receipts derived from such
DECISION disposition shall accrue exclusively to the city as provided in this Act."

NACHURA, J.: On the other hand, the property subject of Presidential Proclamation No. 168 was
thereafter subdivided into three lots, namely: Lot Y-1 with an area of 18,695 square
meters, Lot X containing 15,020 square meters and Lot Y-2 with 18,963 square meters,
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari1under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure filed by
or a total of 52,678 square meters which is still equivalent to the original area.
petitioner, former Congresswoman Luwalhati R. Antonino (petitioner) of the First Congressional
District of South Cotabato which includes General Santos City (city), assailing that portion of the
Resolution2 dated January 20, 1999 of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) dismissing However, on February 25, 1983, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
the case against private respondents, former city Mayor Rosalita T. Nuñez (Mayor Nuñez), Proclamation No. 2273 amending Proclamation No. 168 (Record, pp. 29-31), which
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Regional Executive Director for provides that:
Region XI Augustus L. Momongan (Momongan), Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge Abednego O.
Adre (Judge Adre), former City Legal Officer Pedro G. Nalangan III (Nalangan), Register of do hereby exclude from the operation of Proclamation No. 168 dated October 3,
Deeds Asteria E. Cruzabra (Cruzabra), Land Management Officer III of the Provincial 1963, which established the recreational and health resort reservation situated in
Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of South Cotabato Julio C. Diaz (Diaz) and the Municipality of General Santos, now General Santos City, Island of Mindanao,
Regional Technical Director of the DENR for Region XI Agapito Borinaga (Borinaga) certain portions of the land embraced therein and declare the same open to
(respondents). disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Act, which parcels of land are
more particularly described as follows:
The facts, as narrated by the Ombudsman, are as follows:
Lot Y-1, MR-1160-D
Presidential Proclamation No. 168 was issued by then President Diosdado Macapagal (Magsaysay Park)
on October 3, 1963 (Record, pp. 23-24). The pertinent provision of which states that:
A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot Y-1, MR-1160-D, Magsaysay Park) situated in the
do hereby withdraw from sale or settlement and reserve for recreational and health resort Municipality of General Santos, now General Santos City, Island of Mindanao. x
site purposes, under the administration of the municipality of General Santos, subject to x x containing an area of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED NINETY-FIVE
private rights, if any there be, a certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in the (18,695) SQUARE METERS. x x x
said municipality and more particularly described as follows:
Lot Y-2, MR-1160-D
Mr-1160-D Municipal Reservation (Magsaysay Park)

The Municipal Government of General Santos Magsaysay Park A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot Y-2, MR-1160-D, Magsaysay Park) situated in the
Municipality of General Santos, now General Santos City, Island of Mindanao. x
x x containing an area of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SIXTY-
A parcel of land (as shown on plan Mr-1160-D) situated in the barrio of Dadiangas,
THREE (18,963) SQUARE METERS. x x x
Municipality of General Santos, province of Cotabato. x x x containing an area of 52,678
square meters.
Thus, leaving only Lot X as that covered by Presidential Proclamation No. 168 and is A Writ of Execution was accordingly issued on November 28, 1995.
therefore reserved for recreational and health resort site purposes.
However, on July 22, 1997, acting upon the "Motion for Exclusion of an Extraneous
As a result of such exclusion, the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop applied for Free Patent with the Subject from the Coverage of the Judgment thereof" and the "Motion for Issuance of
District Land Office and consequently Certificates of Title were issued sometime in 1983. Clarificatory Order" submitted by the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop and jointly by CENR Officer
In 1984, two cases were filed by the local government of General Santos City against the and Regional Technical Director of DENR, respectively, respondent Judge issued
said Heirs of Kusop for Declaration of Nullity of Titles and, on the other hand, the Heirs of another Order [assailed RTC Order] (Record, pp. 53-59) in the above-cited three cases,
Kusop filed a case against the said local government for Injunction and Damages. The stating that:
said three cases were consolidated before the Regional Trial Court of General Santos
City, Branch 22, presided by respondent Judge Abednego Adre. ACCORDINGLY, based on all the foregoing facts, law and jurisprudence, the motion for
exclusion of Lot X, MR-1160-D comprising an area of 15,020 SQUARE METERS is
On May 23, 1991, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of General Santos City passed GRANTED. The movants heirs of Kusop are, however, enjoined to donate to the
Resolution No. 87, Series of 1991, entitled "Resolution Approving the Compromise City of General Santos in keeping with the intent and spirit of the compromise
Agreement to be entered into by and between the City Government of General Santos agreement.
represented by the City Mayor and the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop, re: Magsaysay Park"
(Record, pp. 1506-1507). Significant provisions of the said Compromise Agreement On July 23, 1997, the following private respondents applied for Miscellaneous Sales
(Record, pp. 33-39) state that: Patent over portions of Lot X, to be divided as follows (refer to affidavits, Record, pp. 60-
75):
1. The subject matter of this agreement are Lots Y-1, MR-1160-D and Y-2, MR-
1160-D with combined area of THIRTY-SEVEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED Applicants Area applied
FIFTY-EIGHT (37,658) SQUARE METERS, and from this the HEIRS AND 1. Mad Guaybar - 999 sq. m.;
BENEFICIARIES shall receive a total net area of TWENTY THOUSAND (20,000) 2. Oliver Guaybar - 999 sq. m.;
SQUARE METERS and to the CITY shall pertain the remainder of SEVENTEEN 3. Jonathan Guaybar - 999 sq. m.;
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FIFTY-EIGHT (17,658) SQUARE METERS which if
4. Alex Guaybar - 999 sq. m.;
added to Lot X, MR-1160-D, previously donated to the CITY as stated in par.
7 of the WHEREAS clause, with an area of FIFTEEN THOUSAND AND 5. Jack Guiwan - 999 sq. m.;
TWENTY (15,020) SQUARE METERS (located in between Lots Y-1 and Y-2), 6. Nicolas Ynot - 999 sq. m.;
the CITY shall retain a total area of THIRTY TWO THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED 7. Carlito Flaviano III - 999 sq. m.;
SEVENTY-EIGHT (32,678) SQUARE METERS. 8. Jolito Poralan - 999 sq. m.;
9. Miguela Cabi-ao - 999 sq. m.;
Said Compromise Agreement was signed by respondent City Mayor Rosalita Nuñez, 10. Jose Rommel Saludar - 999 sq. m.;
assisted by respondent Pepito Nalangan III, and the heirs and beneficiaries of Cabalo 11. Joel Teves - 999 sq. m.;
Kusop. 12. Rico Altizo - 999 sq. m.;
13. Johnny Medillo - 999 sq. m.;
As a consequence of the said Compromise Agreement, respondent Judge Abednego 14. Martin Saycon - 999 sq. m.;
Adre issued an Order (Record, pp. 40-52), covering the three pending cases, on May 6, 15. Arsenio delos Reyes, Jr. - 510 sq. m.; and,
1992, the dispositive portion of which states: 16. Jose Bomez - 524 sq. m.

ACCORDINGLY, finding the foregoing "Compromise Agreement" in conformity The following day, July 24, 1997, public respondent Cesar Jonillo, as Deputy Land
with Article 6 in correlation with Article 1306 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Management Inspector, recommended for the approval of the survey authority requested
the same is hereby APPROVED and ADOPTED as judgment in these cases. by the above-named private respondents for Lot X (Record, p. 418).
The parties are enjoined to faithfully comply therewith.
Within the same day, the Survey Authority was issued to private respondents by public 5. Jack Guiwan P-6399 X-5 92-94;
respondent CENR Officer Renato Rivera (Record, p. 419). As a result of which, Lot X 6. Nicolas Ynot P-6388-A X-6 95-97;
was subdivided into 16 lots (refer to subdivision plan, Record, p. 32). 7. Carlito Flaviano III P-6389 X-7 98-100;
8. Jolito Poralan P-6391 X-8 101-103;
On August 2, 1997, respondent City Mayor Rosalita T. Nuñez, assisted by respondent 9. Miguela Cabi-ao P-6392-A X-9 104-106;
City Legal Officer Pedro Nalangan III issued 1st Indorsements (refer to application 10. Jose Rommel Saludar P-6388 X-10 107-109;
documents, Record, pp. 421-500) addressed to CENRO, DENR for portions of Lot X 11. Joel Teves P-6396 X-11 110-112;
applied by private respondents and stated therein that "this office interposes no objection 12. Rico Altizo P-6395 X-12 113-115;
to whatever legal proceedings your office may pursue on application covering portions
13. Johnny Medillo P-6390 X-13 116-117;
thereof after the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 excluded Lot X,
14. Martin Saycon P-6394-A X-14 118-120;
MR-1160-D from the coverage of the Compromise Judgment dated May 6, 1992 per said
court’s order dated July 22, 1997." 15. Arsenio delos Reyes P-6395-A X-15 121-123;
16. Jose Bomez P-6394 X-16 124-127.
Thereupon, public respondents Cesar Jonillo and City Assessor Leonardo Dinopol,
together with recommendation for approval from respondent Rivera, submitted an Sometime on September 24 and 25, 1997, except for lots X-6, X-7, X-15 and X-16, the
appraisal of lots X-1 to X-16 stating therein the appraisal amount of P100.00 per square above-named registered owners sold their lots, through their attorney-in-fact, respondent
meter and existing improvements of residential light house per lot with an appraised Atty. Nilo Flaviano, to the AFP-Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS)
value ranging from P20,000.00 to P50,000.00 (refer to application papers, Record, pp. in the amount of Two Million Nine Hundred Ninety-Seven Thousand Pesos
421-500). (P2,997,000.00) per 999 sq. m. lot (Record, pp. 127-150). Then, Transfer Certificate of
Title Nos. T-81051 to 81062 were issued in the name of the vendee on September 25,
Subsequently, on August 4, 1997, respondent Cesar Jonillo prepared a letter-report 1997 (Record, pp. 151-173).
addressed to the Regional Executive Director of DENR for each of the sixteen (16)
applicants recommending for the private sale of the subject lots to the above-named On the other hand, the registered owners of lot numbers X-6 and X-7 executed a Deed of
applicants-respondents, without public auction (refer to sample letter-report of Exchange with AFP-RSBS, represented by respondent Jose Ramiscal, Jr., consenting to
recommendation in favor of Rico Altizo, Record, p. 77). Respondent CENR Officer, the exchange of lots X-6 and X-7 with lots Y-1-A-1 and Y-1-A-2, respectively, the latter
Renato Rivera, also issued recommendation letters for each of the sixteen applicants two lots being owned by AFP-RSBS (Record, pp. 175-178). While lots X-15 and X-16
addressed to the PENR Officer for the approval of the appraisal of the subject lots and of were exchanged with one office unit or condo unit to be given or ceded to respondent
the private sale (please refer to sample recommendation letter in favor of Rico Altiz[o], Nilo Flaviano (Record, pp. 179-182).3
Record, p. 78).
Based on the foregoing, petitioner filed a verified complaint-affidavit4 before the Ombudsman
A notice of sale was issued by respondent Julio Diaz also on the same date stating against the respondents together with Cesar Jonillo (Jonillo), Renato Rivera (Rivera), Mad
therein that on September 5, 1997 the subject lot/s will be sold (Record, p. 79). Guaybar, Oliver Guaybar, Jonathan Guaybar, Alex Guaybar, Jack Guiwan, Carlito Flaviano III,
Nicolas Ynot, Jolito Poralan, Miguela Cabi-ao, Jose Rommel Saludar, Joel Teves, Rico Altizo,
On September 18, 1997, the following Certificates of Titles were issued by the Register Johnny Medillo, Martin Saycon, Arsenio de los Reyes, and Jose Bomez (Mad Guaybar and his
of Deeds of General Santos City, respondent Asteria Cruzabra, which titles were also companions), Gen. Jose Ramiscal, Jr. (Gen. Ramiscal), Wilfredo Pabalan (Pabalan), and Atty.
signed by respondent Augustus Momongan, as DENR Regional Executive Director, to Nilo Flaviano (Atty. Flaviano) (indicted) for violation of Paragraphs (e), (g) and (j), Section 3 of
wit: Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,5 as amended, and for malversation of public funds or property
through falsification of public documents.
Name of Owner OCT No. Lot No. Record Page No.
The Ombudsman's Ruling
1. Mad Guaybar P-6393-A X-1 80-82;
2. Oliver Guaybar P-6392 X-2 83-85;
In the assailed Resolution dated January 20, 1999, the Ombudsman held that Mayor Nuñez and
3. Jonathan Guaybar P-6389-A X-3 86-88;
Nalangan, among others, entered into the Compromise Agreement on behalf of the city and
4. Alex Guaybar P-6393 X-4 89-91; pursuant to the authority granted to them by the Sangguniang Panlungsod by virtue of
Resolution No. 87; hence, it is not the sole responsibility of Mayor Nuñez and Nalangan but of each of violation of section 3(e) of RA 3019 as conspirator in short-changing the
the entire Sangguniang Panlungsod. Moreover, the Ombudsman opined that the validity of the government in the payment of taxes for the sale of Lot-X to AFP-RSBS.
Compromise Agreement had been settled when the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and
the RTC found it to be in order. The Ombudsman also ruled that the Order of Judge Adre was Let the herein attached Informations against aforementioned respondents be filed with
made in accordance with the facts of the case, while Diaz, Borinaga, Momongan and Cruzabra the proper courts.
were found to have regularly performed their official functions. Accordingly, the charges against
the respondents were dismissed. Thus, the case was disposed in this wise: Charges against respondents ROSALITA NUÑEZ, AUGUSTUS MOMONGAN,
ABEDNEGO ADRE, ASTERIA CRUZABRA, PEDRO NALANGAN III, JULIO DIAZ and
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office finds and so holds that the AGAPITO BORINAGA are hereby DISMISSED, without prejudice to the filing of
following crimes were committed and that respondents, whose names appear below, are criminal cases against private respondents, for offenses committed not in
probably guilty thereof: conspiracy with the herein public respondents, by the proper parties-in-interest.

1. CESAR JONILLO – sixteen (16) counts of Falsification of public document to the SO RESOLVED.6
sixteen (16) recommendation reports submitted;
On February 4, 2000, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was, however, denied
2. RENATO RIVERA – sixteen (16) counts of Falsification of public document relative to by the Ombudsman in his Order7 dated April 26, 2000. The Ombudsman held that since the
the sixteen (16) reports submitted, all dated August 4, 1997; criminal Informations were already filed against the aforementioned indicted and the cases were
already pending before the Sandiganbayan and the regular courts of General Santos City, the
3. MAD GUAYBAR, OLIVER GUAYBAR, JONATHAN GUAYBAR, ALEX GUAYBAR, Ombudsman had lost jurisdiction over the said case.
JACK GUIWAN, CARLITO FLAVIANO III, NICOLAS YNOT, JOLITO PORALAN,
MIGUELA CABI-AO, JOSE ROMMEL SALUDAR, JOEL TEVES, RICO ALTIZO, The Sole Issue
JOHNNY MED[I]LLO, MARTIN SAYCON, ARSENIO DE LOS REYES, and JOSE
BOMEZ in conspiracy with public respondents CESAR JONILLO and RENATO Hence, this Petition, on the sole ground that:
RIVERA– one (1) count each for private respondents and sixteen (16) counts each for
public respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019;
THE OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN THE EXERCISE OF HIS
4. JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., WILFREDO PABALAN, NILO FLAVIANO – as conspirators for PROSECUTORY FUNCTIONS, BY DISMISSING THE CHARGES AGAINST THE
twelve (12) counts of falsification of public documents relative to the twelve (12) unilateral RESPONDENTS DESPITE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF DIRECT
Deeds of Sale; PARTICIPATION AND INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONSPIRACY TO CHEAT AND
DEFRAUD THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF GENERAL SANTOS CITY THROUGH THE
5. MAD GUAYBAR, OLIVER GUAYBAR, JONATHAN GUAYBAR, ALEX GUAYBAR, ILLEGAL DISPOSITION OF LOT X OF THE MAGSAYSAY PARK IN VIOLATION OF
JACK GUIWAN, JOLITO PORALAN, MIGUELA CABI-AO, JOSE ROMMEL SALUDAR, LAW AND ITS CHARTER.8
[J]OEL TEVES, RICO ALTIZO, JOHNNY MEDILLO, MARTIN SAYSON – one (1) count
each as conspirator in the falsification of public document relative to the corresponding Petitioner avers that the Ombudsman ignored substantial evidence pointing to the existence of a
unilateral Deed of Sale executed by their agent in their behalf; conspiracy among all the respondents and those indicted, which led to the illegal and fraudulent
disposition of Lot X of the Magsaysay Park. To prove her claim of a grand conspiracy, petitioner
6. JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., WILFREDO PABALAN and NILO FLAVIANO – twelve (12) outlines the individual participation, cooperation and involvement of each respondent, as follows:
counts of violation of section 3(e) of RA 3019 for short-changing the government inn the
correct amount of taxes due for the sale of Lot-X to AFP-RSBS; and 1. The assailed RTC Order issued by Judge Adre on July 22, 1997 was part of the grand
scheme and was made the basis for the filing of the miscellaneous sales applications of
7. MAD GUAYBAR, OLIVER GUAYBAR, JONATHAN GUAYBAR, ALEX GUAYBAR, Mad Guaybar and his companions. The same Order was likewise used by Mayor Nuñez
JACK GUIWAN, JOLITO PORALAN, MIGUELA CABI-AO, JOSE ROMMEL SALUDAR, and Nalangan as the reason for interposing no objection to the said applications. The
[J]OEL TEVES, RICO ALTIZO, JOHNNY MEDILLO, MARTIN SAYSON – one (1) count assailed RTC Order was issued by Judge Adre almost five (5) years after his Judgment
based on the Compromise Agreement had long become final; thus, it was issued with indicate that Cruzabra was aware and was part of the grand conspiracy to defraud the
grave abuse of discretion and in gross ignorance of the law. Judge Adre, therefore, city. Each of the sixteen (16) OCTs was transcribed and signed by Cruzabra on
violated Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. September 22, 1997. On the same date, Atty. Flaviano claimed and received the owners'
copies of the OCTs; Mad Guaybar and his companions executed a Joint Special Power
2. Mayor Nuñez and Nalangan knew or ought to have known, by reason of their of Attorney (SPA) authorizing Atty. Flaviano to be their attorney-in-fact, for the purpose of
respective offices and as administrators of the properties of the city, that Lot X of the selling their respective lots; and Cruzabra registered and annotated said SPA in their
Magsaysay Park is owned by the city and reserved as health and recreation site. Yet, respective titles. On September 25, 1997, Atty. Flaviano registered with Cruzabra twelve
Nalangan's Comment, filed before Judge Adre issued the assailed RTC Order, stated (12) Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of AFP-RSBS, after paying the Bureau of Internal
that per verification, there was no existing donation from the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop to Revenue (BIR) on the same day the capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax due
the city. Likewise, in their 1st Indorsement dated August 2, 1997, instead of opposing the thereon. On the same day, Cruzabra canceled the OCTs and issued, in lieu thereof,
applications of Mad Guaybar and his companions, Mayor Nuñez and Nalangan endorsed twelve (12) Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) in favor of AFP-RSBS. The remaining
the same and interposed no objection thereto. Said Indorsement was part of the grand four (4) lots were transferred and registered in the name of AFP-RSBS on October 10,
conspiracy and was utilized as a front for the resale of the said property to AFP-RSBS, to 1997 by virtue of deeds of exchange executed by the registered owners in favor of the
the injury of the city. Petitioner submits that Mayor Nuñez and Nalangan also violated former. Petitioner submits that Cruzabra could not have been unaware of the restrictions;
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. instead, she allowed the transfer and registration of the said lots to AFP-RSBS so swiftly,
that it could only be interpreted as part of the scheme to defraud the city.9
3. After Mayor Nuñez and Nalangan issued their 1st Indorsement on August 2, 1997 and
after Jonillo submitted his falsified report on August 4, 1997, Diaz, on the same date, In sum, petitioner ascribes to the Ombudsman grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of his
scheduled the sale of Lot X to Mad Guaybar and his companions on September 5, 1997. investigatory and prosecutory functions, by completely ignoring and disregarding the pieces of
Thus, Diaz issued notices of sale of the subdivided lots of Lot X on September 5, 1997 substantial evidence which clearly establish the existence of a common design among the
without public auction and at the disadvantageous price recommended by Rivera. respondents and those indicted in the fraudulent sale and disposition of Lot X of the Magsaysay
Therefore, Diaz, as a co-conspirator, should be similarly charged with Jonillo and Rivera Park.
for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and for falsification of public documents.
On the other hand, respondents separately raise their respective defenses against petitioner's
4. Borinaga, conspiring with Rivera, filed on June 9, 1997 the Motion for Issuance of a claims, as follows:
Clarificatory Order before Judge Adre, which led to the issuance by the latter of the
assailed RTC Order. Borinaga and Rivera likewise represented to the RTC that upon 1. The Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), contends that,
verification, they did not find in the records any deed of donation executed by the Heirs of in effect, petitioner is asking this Court to review the pieces of evidence gathered by the
Cabalo Kusop. Borinaga should be held liable as an active participant in a grand scheme Ombudsman during the preliminary investigation. This is not proper. In Espinosa v.
to defraud the city. Office of the Ombudsman10 and Youngv. Office of the Ombudsman,11 this Court
accorded highest respect for the factual findings of the Ombudsman, absent a clear case
5. Momongan, by the nature of his office, knew that Lot X is not disposable and alienable of grave abuse of discretion. The OSP claims that the Ombudsman did not commit grave
and is, therefore, not a proper subject of a sales patent application. Despite such abuse of discretion because the respondents, based on their counter-affidavits, have
knowledge and based on the falsified reports of Jonillo and Rivera, Momongan allowed valid and legal justifications, sufficient for the Ombudsman to exculpate them from the
Lot X to be subdivided and sold to Mad Guaybar and his companions by approving their charges.12
miscellaneous sales application and issuing the Original Certificates of Title (OCTs)
covering the subdivided lots of Lot X. In sum, Momongan adopted as his own the false 2. Cruzabra avers that there is no showing that conspiracy exists between her and other
reports, and granted unwarranted benefit and advantage to Mad Guaybar and his respondents charged before the Ombudsman. Petitioner's allegations with respect to
companions, to the injury of the city. Cruzabra refer to recorded transactions which are legal acts. Such allegations did not
discuss how the alleged conspiracy was committed; they are merely conjectures and
6. While the function of Cruzabra in the registration of documents and titles may be bare allegations. Inasmuch as conspiracy cannot be presumed, and there is no
considered as ministerial, the circumstances under which the titles were issued in the convincing evidence to support such allegations, the Ombudsman did not commit grave
names of Mad Guaybar and his companions and eventually, in the name of AFP-RSBS, abuse of discretion. Lastly, Cruzabra claims that the canceled OCTs do not contain any
restriction to transfer the respective lots to AFP-RSBS. As such, Cruzabra submits that it
would be most unfair if she would be made a part of the alleged conspiracy simply Cabalo Kusop, she was authorized by the Sangguniang Panlungsod under Resolution
because she exercised her ministerial functions as Register of Deeds.13 No. 87, series of 1991, after almost one (1) year of committee and public hearings. The
same was also referred to the OSG, which recommended its approval. When the Heirs of
3. Momongan alleges, among others, that as Regional Executive Director of the DENR, Cabalo Kusop filed a Motion for Exclusion of Lot X, Nalangan had no recourse but to tell
he is duly authorized to sign patents and reconstituted patents. Since the standard the truth that, indeed, he found no deed of donation made in favor of the city. While they
procedure and processes were complied with, Momongan simply relied on his admit to have issued Indorsements, they made it clear that the DENR shall undertake
subordinates and on their good faith. He argues that he acted in accordance with law, only what is legally feasible. Mayor Nuñez and Nalangan asseverate that they had no
department guidelines, rules and regulations, and that to require him to scrutinize every intention of giving up the claim of the city over Lot X, as they even filed a case against
phase of a report of a subordinate is a very tall order.14 Mad Guaybar and his companions.21

4. Judge Adre manifests that in the Joint Resolution15 of the Senate Committees on Our Ruling
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation (Blue Ribbon) and National Defense
and Security, dated December 23, 1998, not one of the respondents was recommended The instant Petition lacks merit.
for prosecution in connection with the irregularity involving the Magsaysay Park. Judge
Adre claims that he acted properly, and even sought the opinion of the OSG before the Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989)22 provides:
Compromise Agreement was approved. However, Judge Adre narrated that due to the
vagaries of politics, the judgment lay dormant, as no motion for execution was filed by SEC. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. – (1) All provisionary orders of the Office of
then Mayor Adelbert Antonino, husband of petitioner, after Mayor Nuñez lost in the the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.
elections. Subsequently, the writ was not issued as the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop did not
execute any deed of donation in favor of the city. He declared that the RTC did not lose
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the
jurisdiction over the case when the Motions for Clarification and Exclusion were filed;
Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall be
thus, the issuance of the assailed RTC Order excluding Lot X and enjoining the Heirs of
entertained only on any of the following grounds:
Cabalo Kusop from donating the same to the city in keeping with the intent and spirit of
the compromise agreement, was proper.16
(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or
decision;
5. Borinaga posits that the Ombudsman's factual findings need not be disturbed, as they
are not attended by grave abuse of discretion. He maintains that he acted in accordance
with law; that as the Regional Technical Director is not required to go to the premises of (2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the
the land subject of miscellaneous applications, and he may rely on the data submitted by movant. The motion for reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days from
the CENRO and reviewed by the PENRO.17 Moreover, Borinaga argues that the Motion filing: Provided, That only one motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.
for Reconsideration of petitioner assailing the Ombudsman's Resolution was filed out of
time.18 The Certification19 dated October 1, 2003, issued by Severo A. Sotto, Records Other than the statement of material dates wherein petitioner claimed that she received through
Officer IV of the Office of the Ombudsman, shows that petitioner was personally served counsel the assailed Resolution of the Ombudsman on January 21, 2000, she failed to establish
with a copy of the assailed Resolution on February 24, 1999 by Jose Ruel Bermejo, that her Motion for Reconsideration was indeed filed on time, and thus, failed to refute the
Process Server, and she filed her Motion for Reconsideration only on February 4, 2000. assertion of the respondents based on the aforementioned Certification that petitioner was
personally served a copy of the assailed Resolution on February 24, 1999. There are a number
6. Diaz opines that there is no substantial evidence to prove that he participated in a of instances when rules of procedure are relaxed in the interest of justice. However, in this case,
grand scheme to unlawfully dispose of the lots covered by Lot X. He vouches that when petitioner did not proffer any explanation at all for the late filing of the motion for reconsideration.
he issued the notice of sale, he did so on the basis of the requisite documents submitted After the respondents made such allegation, petitioner did not bother to respond and meet the
to his office.20 issue head-on. We find no justification why the Ombudsman entertained the motion for
reconsideration, when, at the time of the filing of the motion for reconsideration the assailed
Resolution was already final.
7. Mayor Nuñez and Nalangan contend that Mayor Nuñez did not violate the Charter of
the City, because when she entered into the Compromise Agreement with the Heirs of
Even only on the basis of this fatal procedural infirmity, the instant Petition ought to be dismissed. 10. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash
And on the substantive issue raised, the petition is likewise bereft of merit. on that ground has been denied.

Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, and pursuant to R.A. No. 6770, Grave abuse of discretion exists where a power is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious,
the Ombudsman has the power to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of a public whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so patent and gross as
officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or to amount to evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by, or in
inefficient.23 Well-settled is the rule that this Court will not ordinarily interfere with the contemplation of law.26
Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and
compelling reasons that indicate otherwise. The rule is based not only upon respect for the The alleged grave abuse of discretion imputed to the Ombudsman is found wanting in this case.
investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Thus, this Court finds no reason to deviate from the general rule. We concur with the disquisition
Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. A contrary rule would encourage innumerable of GIO I Rubillar-Arao in dismissing the charges against respondents, as approved by
petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman, which Ombudsman Desierto, thus:
would grievously hamper the functions of the office and the courts, in much the same way that
courts would be swamped by a deluge of cases if they have to review the exercise of discretion Hence, without ruling on the validity of the titles, this Office is constrained to limit its
on the part of public prosecutors each time they decide to file an information or dismiss a evaluation of the issue on the participation of each respondent in the titling of Lot X,
complaint by a private complainant.24 whether the same would constitute a violation of RA 3019 and/or other illegal acts.

Of course, this rule is not absolute. The aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorariunder 1. Respondent Abednego Adre – His participation extends only to his issuance of an
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court when the finding of the Ombudsman is tainted with grave abuse of Order excluding Lot-X from the coverage of the Compromise Agreement.
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as what the petitioner did in this case,
consistent with our ruling in Collantes v. Marcelo,25 where we laid down the following exceptions
A review of the terms and conditions of the subject Compromise Agreement confirms the
to the rule:
Order of the respondent that indeed Lot X was excluded. The Order of respondent judge
was made in accordance with the facts of the case. It is even noteworthy that respondent
1. When necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the judge assisted in preserving the claim of the government of General Santos City over Lot
accused; X by enjoining the donation of said property by the private respondents.

2. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or 2. Respondents Nuñez and Nalangan – Said respondents’ participation in the titling of
multiplicity of actions; Lot-X was when they issued or caused the issuance of Indorsements stating therein that
"this office (Office of the Mayor) interposes no objection to whatever legal proceedings
3. When there is a prejudicial question that is sub judice; your (CENRO) office may pursue on the application covering portions thereof (Lot-X)."

4. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; The contents of the Indorsements, as quoted above, cannot be construed as a waiver on
the part of General Santos City on its claim over Lot-X. On the contrary, it has given
5. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; DENR the authority to take the necessary legal proceedings relative to the titling of the
property. Moreover, it should be taken into account that DENR has the responsibility,
6. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent; authority and the power to grant alienable and disposable lands to deserving claimants.

7. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; Based on these circumstances, there is no evidence to prove that respondents Nuñez
and Nalangan gave unwarranted benefit to the claimants by issuing said Indorsements.
8. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; In fact, they protected the interest of the government over Lot-X by immediately filing a
case for nullification of titles upon knowing of the issuances thereof.
9. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance;
xxxx
[5.] Public respondents Julio C. Diaz, Agapito Borinaga, Augustus L. Momongan, Asteria Code directs every person, inter alia, to observe good faith, which springs from the fountain of
E. Cruzabra – Based on the evidences on record, these respondents were in the regular good conscience.31
performance of their official functions. Their participation in the titling of Lot-X was due to
the fact that the documents for titling were submitted to their respective offices as a Finally, petitioner speaks of conspiracy among the respondents and those indicted. However, as
matter of course, and there is nothing that they can do but to follow the established found by the Ombudsman, such conspiracy alleged in the complaint was not supported by ample
procedure upon finding that all the documents for titling were submitted.27 evidence. At best, the evidence adduced was not clear as to respondents' participation in the
acts in question. Actori incumbit onus probandi- the burden of proof rests with the plaintiff or the
Indeed, while the Ombudsman's discretion in determining the existence of probable cause is not prosecution. The inherent weakness of complainant's case is not a ground for the Ombudsman
absolute, nonetheless, petitioner must prove that such discretion was gravely abused in order to to conduct preliminary investigation.32 For it is fundamental that conspiracy cannot be presumed.
warrant the reversal of the Ombudsman's findings by this Court. In this respect, petitioner fails.28 Conspiracy must be proved by direct evidence or by proof of the overt acts of the accused,
before, during and after the commission of the crime charged indicative of a common
Moreover, the elements of the offense, essential for the conviction of an accused under Section design.33 This, the petitioner sadly failed to establish.
3(e), R. A. No. 3019, are as follows:
All told, the Ombudsman did not act with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal
(1) The accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the complaint against respondents.
former;
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
(2) The said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or
her official duties, or in relation to his or her public functions; SO ORDERED.

(3) That he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private
party;

(4) Such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
to such parties; and

(5) That the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable neglect.29

Thus, in order to be held guilty of violating Section 3(e), R. A. No. 3019, the act of the accused
that caused undue injury must have been done with evident bad faith or with gross inexcusable
negligence. Bad faith per se is not enough for one to be held liable under the law; bad faith must
be evident. Bad faith does not simply connote bad moral judgment or negligence. There must be
some dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a
sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will. It partakes of the nature of fraud. It
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self-
interest, or ill will for ulterior purposes. On the other hand, gross negligence is characterized by
the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a willful or intentional manner displaying
a conscious indifference to consequences as far as other persons may be affected.30

As found by the Ombudsman and based on the records, there is no showing of evident bad faith
and/or gross negligence in the respective acts of the respondents. It must be stressed that it is
good faith, not bad faith, which is presumed, as the chapter on Human Relations of the Civil
A.M. No. MTJ-05-1581 February 28, 2005 Thereafter, complainant’s counsel, Atty. Raul Sesbreño (Atty. Sesbreño), filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Warrant of Arrest Against Non-
PETER L. SESBREÑO, complainant, Appearing Accused. Respondent judge, however, did not act on these motions allegedly
vs. because the court had already lost jurisdiction over the case by then.
JUDGE GLORIA B. AGLUGUB, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 2, San Pedro,
Laguna,Respondent. The PPO affirmed respondent’s order and remanded the case to the court for further
proceedings on the charge of Usurpation of Authority.
RESOLUTION
During the hearing of the case on February 14, 2004, Tabazon, Carunungan and Nuñez did not
TINGA, J.: appear. Atty. Sesbreño, however, did not move for the issuance of warrants of arrest against
them. Neither did he object to the cancellation of the scheduled hearing.
Peter L. Sesbreño filed a Verified Complaint1dated March 2, 2004 against respondent judge, Hon.
Gloria B. Aglugub, charging the latter with Gross Ignorance of the Law, Neglect of Duty and The foregoing circumstances brought about the filing of the instant administrative complaint.
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service relative to Criminal Case No. 39806
entitled People v. Enrique Marcelino, et al. Complainant contends that respondent judge violated Sec. 6(b), Rule 112 of the Rules when she
refused to issue warrants of arrest against the accused. Complainant also faults respondent
It appears that complainant filed three (3) separate complaints against Enrique Marcelino judge for allegedly motu proprio reconsidering her Consolidated Resolutiondated May 6, 2003
(Marcelino), Susan Nuñez (Nuñez), Edna Tabazon (Tabazon) and Fely Carunungan and failing to order its transmittal to the Office of the Ombudsman within ten (10) days.
(Carunungan), all from the Traffic Management Unit of San Pedro, Laguna, for Falsification,
Grave Threats and Usurpation of Authority. The three (3) cases were assigned to respondent In her Comment With Motion To Dismiss The Administrative Complaint7 dated March 26, 2004,
judge’s branch and subsequently consolidated for disposition. respondent judge counters that the issuance of a warrant of arrest is discretionary upon the
judge. Since she found no indication that the accused would abscond, she found it unnecessary
After conducting a preliminary examination, respondent issued a Consolidated Resolution2dated to issue the warrant. Moreover, under Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the
May 6, 2003, dismissing the cases for Falsification and Grave Threats for lack of probable cause, Ombudsman Act of 1989, the PPO has been designated as the Deputized Ombudsman
and setting for arraignment the case for Usurpation of Authority. Except for Marcelino who failed Prosecutor. The PPO can take action on similar cases for review and appropriate action. Thus,
to appear during the arraignment, all of the accused were arraigned. Respondent judge issued a she acted in accordance with law when she forwarded the records of the case to the PPO for
warrant for Marcelino’s arrest. review and not to the Office of the Ombudsman as complainant insists.

Subsequently, complainant filed a Private Complainants’ Urgent Manifestation3 dated February 6, Respondent judge further accuses complainant and Atty. Sesbreño of falsification, and the latter
2004 alleging that the accused were also charged with violation of Republic Act No. 104 (R.A. 10) of violation of Rule 1.01 and Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Allegedly,
and praying that warrants of arrest be likewise issued against all of the accused. the affidavit which was attached to the instant verified complaint was not notarized by Atty. Raul
Corro as indicated therein. Further, Atty. Sesbreño was allegedly convicted of Homicide and may
Acting upon this manifestation, respondent judge issued an Order5 dated February 12, 2004 have been suspended from the practice of law.
stating that a charge for violation of R.A. 10 was indeed alleged in the complaint for Usurpation
of Authority but was not resolved due to oversight. However, since the statute only applies to Complainant reiterates his allegations in his Complainant’s Reply To Respondent’s Comment
members of seditious organizations engaged in subversive activities pursuant to People v. Dated March 26, 20048 dated May 11, 2004. He further contends that there is no provision in the
Lidres,6 and considering that the complaint failed to allege this element, respondent judge found Ombudsman Act of 1989 specifically deputizing the PPO to be the "Deputized Ombudsman
no probable cause and dismissed the charge for violation of R.A. 10. Further, citing Sec. 6(b), Prosecutor" as respondent judge contends. He adds that respondent judge failed to comply with
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules), respondent judge denied Administrative Order No. 8 since she has yet to forward her resolution to the Deputy
complainant’s prayer for the issuance of warrants of arrest against the accused and ordered the Ombudsman.
records forwarded to the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office (PPO) for review.1a\^/phi1.net

Moreover, complainant points out that the affidavit attached to his complaint was notarized by
Atty. Corro as certified by a member of the latter’s staff. Complainant also disproves respondent
judge’s allegation that Atty. Sesbreño is in the habit of filing administrative complaints against Respondent judge admitted that she overlooked the charge when she conducted the preliminary
judges, explaining that the latter merely acted as counsel for litigants who filed administrative examination of the complaints. Nonetheless, after reviewing the case, respondent Judge found
complaints against certain judges. no probable cause and ordered the dismissal of the case. Therefore, when respondent Judge
motu proprio ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of probable cause, she was acting in
In another Verified Complaint9 filed on March 18, 2004, complainant further charges respondent accordance with the procedure on preliminary investigation laid down in Sec. 3, Rule 112 of the
with violating Sec. 9(b), Rule 112 of the Rules. Rules on Criminal Procedure.

Respondent Judge filed a Comment With Motion To Dismiss Administrative Complaint10dated Respondent Judge also directed that the records of the case be forwarded to the Provincial
May 7, 2004 clarifying that contrary to complainant’s allegation, she did not conduct a preliminary Prosecutor’s Office on review. Sec. 5 of Rule 112 provides that the resolution of the Investigating
investigation in the case for Usurpation of Authority. What was submitted for preliminary Judge is subject to review by the provincial or city prosecutor, or the Ombudsman or his deputy,
investigation was the charge for violation of R.A. 10. It was her resolution dismissing the charge as the case may be.
for violation of R.A. 10 which was transmitted to the PPO for appropriate action. However, since
the charges for violation of R.A. 10 and Usurpation of Authority were contained in a single It is respondent Judge’s contention that the resolution shall be reviewed by the Provincial
complaint, respondent judge deemed it proper to forward the entire records to the PPO. Prosecutor. She explained that pursuant to the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Provincial
Prosecutor has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the charge of Violation of R.A. No. 10.
Complainant filed a Complainant’s Reply To Respondent’s Comment Dated May 7, 200411 dated
May 20, 2004 substantially reiterating his allegations. However, Sec. 31 of Rep. Act No. 6770 or "The Ombudsman Act of 1989" provides that
prosecutors can (be) deputized by the Ombudsman to act as special investigator or prosecutor
The Verified Complaint filed on March 18, 2004 was treated as a supplemental complaint per the only on certain cases. Such provision is not applicable to the issue at hand. Therefore,
notation in the Memorandum12 dated June 25, 2004. respondent Judge erred when she forwarded the case for review to the Provincial Prosecutor’s
Office. Nonetheless, complainant failed to show that respondent Judge was motivated by bad
In sum, complainant asserts that respondent judge erred in conducting a preliminary faith when she issued the assailed order. At most, she is guilty of judicial error for which she
investigation for the charge of Usurpation of Authority; in not issuing warrants of arrest for failure could not be held administratively accountable absent any proof of fraud or other evil motive.14
of the accused to appear during trial; in issuing her Order dated February 12, 2004 dismissing
the complaint for violation of R.A. 10; and in transmitting the records of the case to the PPO A preliminary investigation is required before the filing of a complaint or information for an
instead of the Office of the Ombudsman. 1awphi 1.nét
offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)
day without regard to the fine.15 Thus, a preliminary investigation is not required nor was one
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends that the instant complaint be dismissed for conducted for the charge of violation of Art. 177 of the Revised Penal Code which is punishable
lack of merit but that respondent judge should be reminded to be more circumspect in the by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or from six (6) months and one (1)
performance of her duties.13 It made the following findings: day to four (4) years and two (2) months.16

A careful consideration of the records as well as the pertinent rules reveals that there is nothing This being so, Sec. 9, Rule 112 of the Rules is applicable. Said section provides:
in the Rules of Criminal Procedure which requires a judge to issue a warrant of arrest for the
non-appearance of the accused during the trial. Hence, its issuance rests on the sound Sec. 9. Cases not requiring a preliminary investigation nor covered by the Rule on Summary
discretion of the presiding judge. More so in this case, the private prosecutor did not move for Procedure.—
the issuance of such warrant.
(b) If filed with the Municipal Trial Court.—If the complaint or information is filed with the
As regards the next issue, Rep. Act No. 10 penalizes a person who, with or without pretense of Municipal Trial Court or Municipal Circuit Trial Court for an offense covered by this section, the
official position, shall perform any act pertaining to the Government, or to any person in authority procedure in section 3(a) of this Rule shall be observed. If within ten (10) days after the filing of
or public officer, without being lawfully entitled to do so, shall be punished with imprisonment of the complaint or information, the judge finds no probable cause after personally evaluating the
not less than two (2) years nor more than ten (10) years. Violation thereof is cognizable by the evidence, or after personally examining in writing and under oath the complainant and his
Regional Trial Court but subject to preliminary investigation. witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, he shall dismiss the same. He may,
however, require the submission of additional evidence, within ten (10) days from notice, to
determine further the existence of probable cause. If the judge still finds no probable cause Furthermore, as the Order dated February 12, 2004 confirms, it was the dismissal of the charge
despite the additional evidence, he shall, within ten (10) days from its submission or expiration of for violation of R.A. 10 that was elevated to the PPO for review. It was imprudent, however, for
said period, dismiss the case. When he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest,
l^vvphi1.net respondent judge to transmit the entire records of the case to the PPO knowing that the charge
or a commitment order if the accused had already been arrested, and hold him for trial. However, for Usurpation of Authority was included in the records of the case. Respondent judge should
if the judge is satisfied that there is no necessity for placing the accused under custody, he may have ensured that at least one complete set of the records remained in her sala so that the
issue summons instead of a warrant of arrest. prosecution for Usurpation of Authority would not be held up. Injudicious though her actuation
was, we do not agree with complainant that respondent judge was motivated by an evil intent to
Under the foregoing section, if a complaint or information is filed directly with the Municipal Trial delay the case.
Court, the procedure laid down in Sec. 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules shall be observed. If the
judge finds no sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial, he shall dismiss the complaint or This brings us to the issue of whether respondent should have transmitted her Order dated
information. Otherwise, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused February 12, 2004 dismissing the charge of violation of R.A. 10 to the Office of the Ombudsman
had already been arrested, and hold the latter for trial. However, the judge is given the discretion instead of the PPO. Complainant asserts that since the charge of violation of R.A. 10 is
to merely issue summons instead of a warrant of arrest if he does not find it necessary to place cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, the Office of the Ombudsman has the primary jurisdiction to
the accused under custody. review the resolution of dismissal.

It is thus not obligatory but merely discretionary upon the investigating judge to issue a warrant This issue is answered by Administrative Order No. 820 entitled Clarifying and Modifying Certain
for the arrest of the accused even after having personally examined the complainant and his Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman, which provides "that all prosecutors are now deputized
witnesses in the form of searching questions for the determination of whether probable cause Ombudsman prosecutors." Moreover, "[R]esolutions in Ombudsman cases21 against public
exists. Whether it is necessary to place the accused in custody in order not to frustrate the ends officers and employees prepared by a deputized assistant prosecutor shall be submitted to the
of justice is left to the judge’s sound judgment.17 Provincial or City Prosecutor concerned who shall, in turn, forward the same to the Deputy
Ombudsman of the area with his recommendation for the approval or disapproval thereof. The
Moreover, the judge is not required to transmit the records of the case to the prosecutor for Deputy Ombudsman shall take appropriate final action thereon, including the approval of its filing
review. in the proper regular court or the dismissal of the complaint, if the crime charged is punishable
by prision correccional or lower, or fine of not more than ₱6,000.00 or both. Resolutions involving
In this case, respondent judge, following the foregoing procedure, found probable cause to hold offenses falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan shall be forwarded by the Deputy
the accused for trial for the charge of Usurpation of Authority and forthwith set their arraignment Ombudsman with his recommendation thereon to the Office of the Ombudsman."
and the pre-trial. There is nothing irregular in the course of action taken by respondent judge.
Thus, respondent judge did not err and was, in fact, merely acting in accordance with law when
Neither is there merit in complainant’s contention that respondent judge should have issued a she forwarded the case for violation of R.A. 10 to the PPO. The fact that the PPO remanded the
warrant of arrest against the accused for their failure to appear during the initial presentation of case to the court for further proceedings instead of forwarding the same to the Deputy
evidence for the prosecution for the charge of Usurpation of Authority. The issuance of a warrant Ombudsman as required by Administrative Order No. 8 is quite another matter. In any event,
of arrest for non-appearance of the accused during trial is discretionary upon the judge. Indeed, respondent judge should have taken the necessary steps to remedy the lapse in order to
there is nothing in the Rules which requires a judge to issue a warrant of arrest for non- preclude delay in the disposition of the case.
appearance of the accused during trial.
In sum, for liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation of
Respondent judge concedes, however, that due to oversight, she failed to rule on the charge of the judge in the performance of official duties must not only be found to be erroneous but, most
violation of R.A. 10 in her Consolidated Resolution dated May 6, 2003. Nonetheless, she asserts importantly, it must be established that he was moved by bad faith, dishonesty or some other like
in her Comment With Motion To Dismiss Administrative Complaint18dated May 7, 2004 that she motive. Respondent judge’s actuations are hardly indicative of bad faith or any motive to delay
conducted a preliminary investigation for the charge of violation of R.A. 10 and dismissed the the case which characterizes the offense of gross ignorance of the law.22
charge after taking into consideration the affidavits and evidence presented. Complainant does
not dispute the fact that indeed a preliminary investigation was conducted for this charge.19Thus, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant complaint is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
when respondent judge dismissed the complaint for violation of R.A. 10, she merely did so to Respondent Judge Gloria B. Aglugub is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the
correct an oversight. performance of her duties in the future. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 158543 July 21, 2004 robbery, malicious mischief and slight physical injuries against the Punzalans, including one for
Attempted Murder filed by Dela Peña against Rainier and Randall Punzalan and fourteen others
ROSALINDA PUNZALAN, RANDALL PUNZALAN and RAINIER PUNZALAN,petitioners, (I.S. No. 97-11528); and one for Grave Threats filed by Dela Peña against Alex "Toto" Ofrin (I.S.
vs. No. 97-11520-21).
DENCIO DELA PEÑA and ROBERT CAGARA,respondents.
In their counter-affidavit,8 the Punzalans argued that the charges against them were fabricated in
order to dissuade them from testifying in the Attempted Homicide and Illegal Possession of
Firearm cases instituted by Rainier against Plata and Cagara, respectively.

Subsequently, Robert Cagara also filed a complaint for Grave Oral Defamation, docketed as I.S.
DECISION
No. 97-11522, against Rosalinda Punzalan, mother of Rainier, alleging that on October 16, 1997
at the Office of the Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City, Rosalinda approached him, and within
hearing distance of other people, told him, "Hoy Robert, magkanong ibinigay ng mga Plata sa iyo
sa pagtestigo? Dodoblehin ko at ipapasok pa kita ng trabaho."9 In her defense, Rosalinda denied
having uttered the alleged defamatory statements.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On July 28, 1998, the Assistant City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City dismissed the complaint for
Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is the June 6, Grave Oral Defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan,10 holding that Cagara failed to show that the
2002 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals and its May 23, 2003 Resolution which denied petitioners’ alleged defamatory statements would cast dishonor, discredit or contempt upon him. He also
motion for reconsideration. found that the statements were uttered by Rosalinda in a state of distress and, hence, were not
actionable.11 The charge of Attempted Murder against Rainier, Randall and 14 others was also
The Punzalan and the Plata families were neighbors in Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong City. At around dismissed by the Assistant Prosecutor because complainant Dela Peña’s claim that he
11:00 p.m. of August 13, 1997, Dencio dela Peña, a house boarder of the Platas, was in front of accidentally shot Rainier forms part of the defense of Michael Plata in the Attempted Homicide
a store near their house when the group of Rainier Punzalan, Randall Punzalan, Ricky Eugenio, case previously filed by Rainier against the latter.12
Jose Gregorio, Alex "Toto" Ofrin, and several others arrived. Ricky Eugenio shouted at Dela
Peña, "Hoy, kalbo, saan mo binili and sumbrero mo?"2 Dela Peña replied, "Kalbo nga ako, ay Dela Peña and Cagara separately appealed to the Department of Justice. On March 23, 2000,
pinagtatawanan pa ninyo ako."3 Irked by the response, Jose Gregorio slapped Dela Peña while then Justice Secretary Artemio Tuquero issued a Resolution modifying the July 28, 1998 Joint
Rainier punched him in the mouth. The group then ganged up on him. In the course of the melee, Resolution of the Assistant City Prosecutor by ordering, among others – (1) that the charge of
somebody shouted, "Yariin na ‘yan!"4Thereafter, Alex "Toto" Ofrin kicked Dela Peña and tried to Grave Oral Defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan be downgraded to Slight Oral Defamation;
stab him with a balisong but missed because he was able to run. The group chased him. (2) that the charge of Attempted Murder against Rainier, Randall and 14 others be downgraded
to Attempted Homicide; and (3) that the charge of Grave Threats against Alex "Toto" Ofrin be
While Dela Peña was fleeing, he met Robert Cagara, the Platas’ family driver, who was carrying downgraded to Other Light Threats. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:
a gun. He grabbed the gun from Cagara and pointed it to the group chasing him in order to scare
them. Michael Plata, who was nearby, intervened and tried to wrestle the gun away from Dela WHEREFORE, the resolution is hereby MODIFIED. The City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong
Peña. The gun accidentally went off and hit Rainier Punzalan on the thigh. Shocked, Dela Peña, City is directed to file information for three (3) counts of slight oral defamation against
Cagara and Plata ran towards the latter’s house and locked themselves in. The group ran after Rosalinda Punzalan; information for two (2) counts [of] other light threats against
them and when they got to the Platas’ house, shouted, "Lumabas kayo d’yan, putang ina ninyo! Alexander "Toto" Ofrin; information for attempted homicide against Alexander "Toto"
Papatayin namin kayo!"5 Dela Peña, Cagara, and Plata left the house through the back door and Ofrin, Rainier Punzalan, Jose Gregorio Lanuzo, Avelino Serrano, Lito dela Cruz,
proceeded to the police station to seek assistance. Emmanuel Nobida, Randall Punzalan, Mark Catap, Ricky Eugenio, Alejandro Diez,
Vicente Joven Manda, Herson Mendoza, Mark Labrador, Alex Pascua, Edwin Vivar and
As a result of the incident, Rainier Punzalan filed a criminal complaint against Michael Plata for Raymond Poliquit; information for malicious mischief and theft against Rainier Punzalan,
Attempted Homicide6 and against Robert Cagara for Illegal Possession of Firearm. In turn, Plata, Mark Catap, Alejandro Diez, Jose Gregorio Lanuzo, Alexander "Toto" Ofrin, Herson
Cagara and Dela Peña filed several counter-charges7 for grave oral defamation, grave threats,
Mendoza, Emmanuel Nobida, Edwin Vivar, Avelino "Bobby" Serrano, and John Does; The resolution dated 06 June 2000 and 11 October 2000 is hereby affirmed insofar as it
and to report action taken within 10 days from receipt hereof. directed the withdrawal of information for two (2) counts of other light threats against
Alexander "Toto" Ofrin.
SO ORDERED.13
SO ORDERED.17
Petitioners, Rosalinda, Rainier and Randall Punzalan, together with their co-respondents, filed
separate motions for reconsideration. On June 6, 2000, the Secretary of Justice set aside the Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied.18 Hence, the instant petition raising the
March 23, 2000 Resolution and directed the withdrawal of the Informations against the movants. following assignment of errors:
He ruled, among others, that the Oral Defamation case should be dismissed because the
alleged defamatory statements were uttered without malice as Rosalinda was then in a state of I
shock and anger. Anent the Attempted Homicide case filed by Dela Peña against Rainier, the
Secretary held that the allegations in support thereof should first be threshed out in the trial of THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS
the Attempted Homicide case filed by Rainier against Michael Plata. He added that Dela Peña REVERSIBLE ERROR IN SETTING ASIDE THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE
failed to prove that Rainier, Randall and his companions intended to kill him. The dispositive HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE DATED JUNE 6, 2000 AND OCTOBER 11,
portion thereof reads: 2000.

Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the appealed resolution is REVERSED. The II


resolution dated March 23, 2000 is set aside and the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong
City is directed to withdraw the separate informations for slight oral defamation, other
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
light threats, attempted homicide, malicious mischief and theft against all respondents
THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT, MORE LIKELY THAN NOT,
and to report the action taken within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
SLIGHT ORAL DEFAMATION HAD BEEN COMMITTED AND WAS COMMITTED BY
HEREIN PETITIONER ROSALINDA PUNZALAN.
SO ORDERED.14
III
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Resolution, but the same was
denied in a Resolution dated October 11, 2000.15
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
ALLEGATIONS OF RESPONDENTS AND THEIR WITNESSES, WHICH SHOULD BE
On January 11, 2001, respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals praying GIVEN WEIGHT, ARE SUFFICIENT TO PROVE INTENT TO KILL SUCH THAT
that the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong be directed to file one count of Slight Oral Defamation PETITIONERS RANDALLL AND RAINIER PUNZALAN MUST BE PROSECUTED FOR
against Rosalinda; one count of Attempted Homicide against Rainier, Randall and 14 others; and ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE.19
two counts of Other Light Threats against Alex "Toto" Ofrin.16
The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether or not there is sufficient evidence to sustain a
On June 6, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment as follows: finding of probable cause against petitioner Rosalinda Punzalan for Slight Oral Defamation and
against petitioners Randall and Rainier Punzalan for Attempted Homicide.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is granted and the questioned
Resolutions of public respondent dated 06 June 2000 and 11 October 2000 are set aside The petition is impressed with merit.
insofar as it directed the withdrawal of informations for slight oral defamation against
Rosalinda Punzalan and attempted homicide against the respondents Alexander "Toto"
The pertinent law in relation to this case is Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which
Ofrin, Rainier Punzalan, Jose Gregorio Lanuzo, Avelino Serrano, Lito de la Cruz,
provides:
Emmanuel Nobido, Randall Punzalan, Mark Catap, Ricky Eugenio, Alejandro Diez,
Vicente "Joven" Manda, Herson Mendoza, Mark Labrador, Alex Pascua, Edwin Vivar,
and Raymond Poliquit. Section 1. Petition for certiorari. – When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of its or his jurisdiction, and there prosecutor. An investigating prosecutor is under no obligation to file a criminal action
is no appeal, or any plain speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a where he is not convinced that he has the quantum of evidence at hand to support the
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts averments. Prosecuting officers have equally the duty not to prosecute when after
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the investigation or reinvestigation they are convinced that the evidence adduced was not
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Thus, the determination of the persons to be
and justice may require. prosecuted rests primarily with the prosecutor who is vested with discretion in the
discharge of this function.
A petition for certiorari is the proper remedy when any tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave Thus, the question of whether or not to dismiss a complaint is within the purview of the functions
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, nor any of the prosecutor and, ultimately, that of the Secretary of Justice.
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. Where the error is in the judge’s findings and
conclusions or to cure erroneous conclusions of law and fact, appeal is the remedy.20 The reasons of the Secretary of Justice in directing the City Prosecutor to withdraw the
informations for slight oral defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan and for attempted homicide
Lack of jurisdiction and excess of jurisdiction are distinguished thus: the respondent acts without against the other respondents other than Rosalinda Punzalan is determinative of whether or not
jurisdiction if he does not have the legal power to determine the case; where the respondent, he committed grave abuse of discretion.
being clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps his authority as determined by law,
he is performing a function in excess of his jurisdiction.21 In the case of Meat Packing Corp. v. First, in the charge of slight oral defamation, the records show that the defamatory remarks were
Sandiganbayan,22 it was held that grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical uttered within the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City. The Court of Appeals in its
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, when the power is exercised in an Decision dated June 6, 2002 stated the settled rule that the assessment of the credibility of
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent witnesses is best left to the trial court in view of its opportunity to observe the demeanor and
and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of conduct of the witnesses on the stand. The City Prosecutor, the proper officer at the time of the
law. It is not sufficient that a tribunal, in the exercise of its power, abused its discretion; such occurrence of the incident, is the best person to observe the demeanor and conduct of the
abuse must be grave.23 parties and their witnesses and determine probable cause whether the alleged defamatory
utterances were made within the hearing distance of third parties. The investigating prosecutor
We now resolve whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in his found that no sufficient evidence existed. The Secretary of Justice in his Resolution affirmed the
Resolutions dated June 6, 2000 and October 11, 2000. Under the Revised Administrative Code, decision of the City Prosecutor.
the Secretary of Justice exercises the power of direct control and supervision over the decisions
or resolutions of the prosecutors. "Supervision and control" includes the authority to act directly As to the charge of attempted homicide against the herein petitioners other than Rosalinda
whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; to direct the Punzalan, the Secretary of Justice resolved to dismiss the complaint because it was in the
performance of duty; and to approve, revise or modify acts and decision of subordinate officials nature of a countercharge. The Department of Justice in a Resolution dated June 18, 1998 had
or units.24 already directed that Dencio Dela Peña be likewise investigated for the charge of attempted
homicide in connection with the shooting incident that occurred on August 13, 1997 making him
In the case of People v. Peralta,25 we reiterated the rule that the right to prosecute vests the a party to the case filed by Rainier Punzalan. This resulted in the resolution of the Secretary of
prosecutor with a wide range of discretion – the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, Justice that the complaint of herein respondent Dencio Dela Peña should be threshed out in the
the exercise of which depends on a variety of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors. proceedings relevant to the shooting incident that resulted in the serious injury of herein
Likewise, in the case of Hegerty v. Court of Appeals,26 we declared that: petitioner Rainier Punzalan.

A public prosecutor, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a criminal In the case at bar, therefore, the Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion
information where no clear legal justification has been shown, and no sufficient evidence contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals. It is well-settled in the recent case of Samson, et
of guilt nor prima facie case has been presented by the petitioner. al. v. Guingona27 that the Court will not interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations or
reinvestigations and leave to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the
We need only to stress that the determination of probable cause during a preliminary exercise of determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause
investigation or reinvestigation is recognized as an executive function exclusively of the
for the filing of information against an offender. Moreover, his findings are not subject to review
unless shown to have been made with grave abuse.28

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 6,
2002 and the Resolution dated May 23, 2003 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, directing the
withdrawal of the informations for slight oral defamation and attempted homicide against the
petitioners, is REINSTATED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 171175 October 30, 2009 the aforesaid defendants, the said decision became final and executory. On November 22, 1999,
a writ of execution was issued by the MCTC to enforce the decision. On February 29, 2000, the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, money judgment was likewise satisfied with the public auction of the lot owned by Cecilia Duca
vs. covered by TCT No. 233647. On March 1, 2000, a certificate of sale was issued in favor of
ARTURO F. DUCA, Respondent. Jocelyn Barque, the highest bidder in the auction sale.

DECISION On October 19, 2001, Cecilia Duca filed an action for the Declaration of Nullity of Execution and
Damages with prayer for Writ of Injunction and Temporary Restraining order against Sheriff IV
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: Vinez Hortaleza and Police Officers Roberto Vical, Alejandre Arevalo, Emilio Austria, Victor
Quitales, Crisostomo Bonavente and Calanayan. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
2000-0304-D.
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
which seeks to set aside and annul the Decision1 dated November 23, 2005 rendered by the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 28312. When the said case was heard, Cecilia Duca testified to the effect that the house erected on the
lot subject of the ejectment case is owned by her son Aldrin Duca. In support of such claim she
presented Property Index No. 013-32-027-01-116131 (Exhibit "B"). At the back of the said exhibit
The CA decision reversed the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City,
is a sworn statement showing that the current and fair market value of the property, which is a
Branch 44, in Criminal Case No. 2003-0194-D3 which affirmed an earlier decision4 of the
bungalow, is P70,000.00 with the signature affixed on top of the typewritten name Aldrin F. Duca
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan, convicting respondent
and subscribed and sworn to before Engr. Reynante Baltazar, the Municipal Assessor of San
Arturo Duca of the crime of falsification under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.
Fabian, Pangasinan, on December 10, 2001. The signature on top of the typewritten name
Aldrin F. Duca is that of Arturo Duca. According to the prosecution, Arturo made it appear that
The facts as found by the CA are quoted as follows: the signature is that of his brother Aldrin who was out of the country at that time. Aldrin arrived in
the Philippines only on December 12, 2001, as evidenced by a certification from the Bureau of
It appears that Arturo Duca, together with his mother, Cecilia Duca, were charged of the crime of Immigration, Manila. Arturo even made it appear that his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) No.
Falsification of Official Document defined and penalized under Article 172, in relation to Article 03841661 issued on December 10, 2001 is that of his brother Aldrin. That because of the
171, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code in an Information which reads: misrepresentation, Cecilia and Arturo were able to mislead the RTC such that they were able to
get a TRO against Sheriff Hortaleza and the policemen ordering them to stop from evicting the
"That on or about December 10, 2001 in the Municipality of San Fabian, Province of Pangasinan, plaintiffs from the property in question.
Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused confederating
together and mutually abiding each other, with intent to cause damage, did then and there, Both accused denied that they falsified the signature of Aldrin Duca. Cecilia testified that she had
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cause the preparation of a Declaration of Real Property over a no participation in the execution as she was in Manila at that time.
bungalow type residential house covered by Property Index No. 013-32-027-01-116131 of the
Municipal Assessor’s Office of San Fabian, Pangasinan by making it appear that the signature On the other hand, Arturo testified that the signature atop the name Aldrin Duca was his.
appearing on the sworn statement of owner is that of Aldrin F. Duca when the truth of the matter However, he intersposed the defense that he was duly authorized by the latter to procure the
is not because the latter was abroad at that time having arrived in the Philippines only on said tax declaration.
December 12, 2001, and it was accused Arturo F. Duca who affixed his own signature thereon to
the damage and prejudice of the undersigned private complainant Pedro Calanayan."
On April 3, 2003, the MCTC of San Fabian-San Jacinto rendered a decision, dispositive portion
of which reads as follows:
Upon being arraigned, both the accused pleaded ‘not guilty’. Then trial on the merits ensued.
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Arturo F. Duca guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
The evidence for the prosecution shows that sometime in 1999, Pedro Calanayan (hereinafter the crime of falsification defined and penalized under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and
"Calanayan"), private complainant herein, filed an action for ejectment and damages against hereby imposes upon said accused a prison term of two years, four months and one day to six (6)
Cecilia F. Duca, Ruel F. Duca, Arsenio F. Duca and Vangie F. Duca before the 4th Municipal years of Prision Correccional and a fine of P2,000.00. Accused Cecilia is acquitted for lack of
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of San Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan, docketed as Civil Case No. evidence.
960 (SF-99). The case was decided in favor of Calanayan. There being no appeal interposed by
The accused Arturo F. Duca is hereby ordered to pay to the complaining witness actual If Arturo did not state in the Tax Declaration in what capacity he was signing, this deficiency was
damages in the amount of P60,000.00 moral damages of P150,000.00 plus exemplary damages cured by Aldrin’s subsequent execution of Exhibits "6" and "7".
in the amount of P100,000.00 plus cost.
The RTC’s conclusion that the special power of attorney executed by Aldrin was a mere
SO ORDERED." afterthought designed to extricate Arturo from any criminal liability has no basis since from the
very start, it has been duly established by the defense that Aldrin had verbally instructed Arturo
Dissatisfied with the decision, Arturo Duca appealed. On March 24, 2004, the RTC of Dagupan to cause the execution of Exhibit "B" for the purpose of registering his house constructed on his
City, Branch 44, rendered a decision, disposing the case as follows: mother’s lot for taxation purposes.6

"WHEREFORE, the decision dated April 3, 2003 of the 4th Municipal Circuit Trial Court, San Hence, the instant petition anchored on this sole ground:
Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan convicting accused Arturo F. Duca of the crime of Falsification
defined and penalized under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and imposing upon said PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND
accused an imprisonment of two years, four months and one day to six (6) years of Prision HAD ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION WHEN IT RESOLVED PRIVATE RESPONDENT
Correccional and a fine of P2,000.00, and ordering him to pay to the complaining witness actual ARTURO F. DUCA’S APPEAL WITHOUT GIVING THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
damages in the amount of P60,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P150,000.00 plus THROUGH THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD
exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 plus cost, is AFFIRMED. THEREON.7

x x x. Petitioner argues that the prosecution was denied due process when the CA resolved the
respondent’s appeal without notifying the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General,
SO ORDERED."5 of the pendency of the same and without requiring the Solicitor General to file his comment.
Petitioner contends that once the case is elevated to the CA or this Court, it is only the Solicitor
Aggrieved with the ruling of the RTC, Duca elevated the case to the CA via a petition for review. General who is authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People. Thus, the CA
On November 23, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed decision acquitting Duca of the crime gravely abused its discretion when it acted on respondent’s appeal without affording the
charged and reversing the RTC decision. The CA held: prosecution the opportunity to be heard. Consequently, the decision of the CA acquitting
respondent should be considered void for being violative of due process.
However, the prosecution failed to establish the fact that Arturo was not duly authorized by Aldrin
in procuring the tax declaration. On the contrary, the defense was able to establish that Arturo In his Comment,8 respondent argues that there was no denial of due process because the
Duca was duly authorized by his brother Aldrin to secure a tax declaration on the house erected prosecution was properly represented by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor and a private
on the land registered under their mother’s name. prosecutor who handled the presentation of evidence under the control and supervision of the
Provincial Prosecutor. Since the control and supervision conferred on the private prosecutor by
the Provincial Prosecutor had not been withdrawn, the Solicitor General could not claim that the
xxx xxx xxx
prosecution was not afforded a chance to be heard in the CA. According to the respondent, he
should not be prejudiced by the Provincial Prosecutor’s failure to inform the Solicitor General of
From the foregoing testimony, it can be deduced that Arturo could not have falsified the Tax the pendency of the appeal.
Declaration of Real Property under Property Index No. 013-32-027-01-116B1 (Exhibit "B") by
making it appear that Aldrin Duca, his brother, participated in the accomplishment of the said
The petition is impressed with merit.
document since he was actually acting for and in behalf of the latter. It must be noted that as
early as June 2001, Arturo has already been authorized by Aldrin; albeit verbally, to register the
house in the latter’s name as he cannot do it personally as he was abroad. This authority of The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the CA and the Supreme
Arturo was confirmed by the latter’s execution of an Affidavit dated January 19, 2002 confirming Court is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Section 35(1), Chapter 12,
the procurement of the said tax declaration (Exhibit "6") as well as a Special Power of attorney Title III of Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code explicitly provides, viz.:
executed on June 17, 2002 (Exhibit "7"). Thus, what appeared to be defective from the beginning
had already been cured so much so that the said document became valid and binding as an SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. – The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the
official act of Arturo. Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in
any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. x x x It shall copy of the said Resolution. The failure of the CA to require the Solicitor General to file his
have the following specific powers and functions: Comment deprived the prosecution of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case.

(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal Pertinently, Saldana v. Court of Appeals, et al.16 ruled as follows:
proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the When the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to
Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. (emphasis supplied) due process is thereby violated (Uy vs. Genato, L-37399, 57 SCRA 123 [May 29, 1974]; Serino
vs. Zoa, L-33116, 40 SCRA 433 [Aug. 31, 1971]; People vs. Gomez, L-22345, 20 SCRA 293
Jurisprudence has been consistent on this point. In the recent case of Cariño v. De Castro,9 it [May 29, 1967]; People vs. Balisacan, L-26376, 17 SCRA 1119 [Aug. 31, 1966]).
was held:
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are
In criminal proceedings on appeal in the Court of Appeals or in the Supreme Court, the authority ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State’s right to due process raises a serious
to represent the People is vested solely in the Solicitor General. Under Presidential Decree No. jurisdiction issue (Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, L-300026, 37 SCRA 420 [Jan.
478, among the specific powers and functions of the OSG was to "represent the government in 30, 1971]) which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings." This provision has fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is
been carried over to the Revised Administrative Code particularly in Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12 void for lack of jurisdiction (Aducayen vs. Flores, L-30370, [May 25, 1973] 51 SCRA 78; Shell Co.
thereof. Without doubt, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines in all vs. Enage, L-30111-12, 49 SCRA 416 [Feb. 27, 1973]). Any judgment or decision rendered
criminal cases.10 notwithstanding such violation may be regarded as a ‘lawless thing, which can be treated as an
outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head’ (Aducayen vs. Flores, supra).17
Likewise, in City Fiscal of Tacloban v. Espina,11the Court made the following pronouncement:
The State, like the accused, is entitled to due process in criminal cases, that is, it must be given
Under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court all criminal actions commenced by complaint or the opportunity to present its evidence in support of the charge. The doctrine consistently
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The fiscal represents adhered to by this Court is that a decision rendered without due process is void ab initio and may
the People of the Philippines in the prosecution of offenses before the trial courts at the be attacked directly or collaterally. A decision is void for lack of due process if, as a result, a
metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts, municipal circuit trial courts and the regional trial party is deprived of the opportunity to be heard.18
courts. However, when such criminal actions are brought to the Court of Appeals or this Court, it
is the Solicitor General who must represent the People of the Philippines not the fiscal.12 The assailed decision of the CA acquitting the respondent without giving the Solicitor General
the chance to file his comment on the petition for review clearly deprived the State of its right to
And in Labaro v. Panay,13 the Court held: refute the material allegations of the said petition filed before the CA. The said decision is,
therefore, a nullity. In Dimatulac v. Villon,19we held:
The OSG is the law office of the Government authorized by law to represent the Government or
the People of the Philippines before us and before the Court of Appeals in all criminal Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the
proceedings, or before any court, tribunal, body, or commission in any matter, action, or accused alone. The interests of society and the offended parties which have been wronged must
proceeding which, in the opinion of the Solicitor General, affects the welfare of the people as the be equally considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice; and an
ends of justice may require.14 acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice; for, to the society offended and the party
wronged, it could also mean injustice. Justice then must be rendered even-handedly to both the
Indeed, in criminal cases, as in the instant case, the Solicitor General is regarded as the accused, on one hand, and the State and offended party, on the other.20
appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines and as such, should have been given the
opportunity to be heard on behalf of the People. The records show that the CA failed to require Further, the CA should have been guided by the following provisions of Sections 1 and 3 of Rule
the Solicitor General to file his Comment on Duca’s petition. A copy of the CA Resolution15 dated 42 of the 1997 Rules of Court:
May 26, 2004 which required the filing of Comment was served upon Atty. Jaime Dojillo, Sr.
(counsel for Duca), Atty. Villamor Tolete (counsel for private complainant Calanayan) and RTC Sec. 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. – A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the
Judge Crispin Laron. Nowhere was it shown that the Solicitor General had ever been furnished a Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified
petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of said court give the lower court an opportunity to rectify its errors, this rule admits of exceptions and is not
the corresponding docket and other lawful fees, depositing the amount of P500.00 for costs, and intended to be applied without considering the circumstances of the case. The filing of a motion
furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a copy of the petition. The petition for reconsideration is not a condition sine qua non when the issue raised is purely one of law, or
shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be where the error is patent or the disputed order is void, or the questions raised on certiorari are
reviewed or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time the same as those already squarely presented to and passed upon by the lower
after judgment. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other court.24 (emphasis supplied)
lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court
of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition The CA decision being void for lack of due process, the filing of the instant petition for certiorari
for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no without a motion for reconsideration is justified.
case to extend fifteen (15) days.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of the CA in
Sec. 3. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. – The failure of the petitioner to comply with CA-G.R. CR No. 28312 is hereby SET ASIDE and the case is REMANDED to the CA for further
any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the proceedings. The CA is ordered to decide the case with dispatch.
deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which
should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. (emphasis SO ORDERED.
supplied)

Respondent appealed to the CA from the decision of the RTC via a petition for review under
Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Court. The respondent was mandated under Section 1, Rule 42 of
the Rules of Court to serve copies of his petition for review upon the adverse party, in this case,
the People of the Philippines through the OSG. Respondent failed to serve a copy of his petition
on the OSG and instead served a copy upon the Assistant City Prosecutor of Dagupan
City.21The service of a copy of the petition on the People of the Philippines, through the
Prosecutor would be inefficacious for the reason that the Solicitor General is the sole
representative of the People of the Philippines in appeals before the CA and the Supreme Court.
The respondent’s failure to have a copy of his petition served on the People of the Philippines,
through the OSG, is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition as provided in Section 3,
Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the CA has no other recourse but to dismiss the petition.
However, the CA, instead of dismissing respondent’s petition, proceeded to resolve the petition
and even acquitted respondent without the Solicitor General’s comment. We, thus, find that the
CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering
its assailed decision.

On a procedural matter, the Court notes that petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 without filing a motion for reconsideration with the CA. It is settled that the writ of
certiorari lies only when petitioner has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Thus, a motion for reconsideration, as a general rule, must be filed before
the tribunal, board, or officer against whom the writ of certiorari is sought. Ordinarily, certiorari as
a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the
respondent tribunal, to allow it an opportunity to correct its assigned errors.22 This rule, however,
is not without exceptions. In National Housing v. Court of Appeals,23 we held:

However, in Progressive Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we held that while


generally a motion for reconsideration must first be filed before resorting to certiorari in order to
G.R. No. 180010 July 30, 2010 WHEREFORE, finding the accused CENITA M. CARIAGA, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of MALVERSATION for which she is charged in the three (3) separate informations
CENITA M. CARIAGA, Petitioner, and in the absence of any mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences her to suffer:
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. 1. In Crim. Case No. Br.20-1293, an indeterminate penalty of from FOUR (4) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY of PRISION CORRECCIONAL as minimum to SEVEN (7) YEARS, FOUR
DECISION (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION MAYOR as maximum and its accessory
penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine of Two Thousand Seven Hundred
CARPIO MORALES, J.: Eighty Five (P2,785.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Cost against the accused.
In issue in the present petition for review is one of jurisdiction.
2. In Crim. Case No. Br. 20-1294, an indeterminate penalty of from TEN (10) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY of PRISION MAYOR as minimum to EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS, EIGHT (8)
By Resolutions of May 28, 2007 and September 27, 2007, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of RECLUSION TEMPORAL as maximum and to suffer the
No. 29514, "People of the Philippines v. Cenita Cariaga," dismissed the appeal of Cenita
accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification and to pay a fine of Twenty Five
Cariaga (petitioner) for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Thousand Six Hundred Twenty Seven (P25,627.00) Pesos. She is ordered to indemnify
the Provincial Government of Isabela Twenty Five Thousand Six Hundred Twenty Seven
Petitioner, as the municipal treasurer of Cabatuan, Isabela with a Salary Grade of 24, was (P25,627.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Cost against
charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cauayan City in Isabela with three counts of the accused.
malversation of public funds, defined under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
3. In Crim. Case No. Br. 20-1295, an indeterminate penalty of from TEN (10) YEARS and
The Information in the first case, Criminal Case No. 1293, reads: ONE (1) DAY of PRISION MAYOR as minimum to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of RECLUSION TEMPORAL as maximum, and to suffer the
That on or about the year 1993 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto in the Municipality of accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine of Twenty Thousand
Cabatuan, Province of Isabela, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- Seven Hundred Thirty (P20,730.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
named accused, [C]ENITA M. CARIAGA, a public officer, being the MunicipalTreasurer of insolvency. The bailbonds are cancelled. Costs against the accused.
Cabatuan, Isabela, and as such is accountable for taxes, fees and monies collected and/or
received by her by reason of her position, acting in relation to her office and taking advantage of SO ORDERED.
the same, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, misappropriate and
convert to her personal use the amount of TWO THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY FIVE
Petitioner, through counsel, in time filed a Notice of Appeal, stating that he intended to appeal
PESOS (P2,785.00) representing the remittance of the Municipality of Cabatuan to the Provincial
the trial court’s decision to the Court of Appeals.
Government of Isabela as the latter’s share in the real property taxes collected, which amount
was not received by the Provincial Government of Isabela, to the damage and prejudice of the
government in the amount aforestated. By Resolution of May 28, 2007,4 the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner’s appeal for lack of
jurisdiction, holding that it is the Sandiganbayan which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction
thereon. Held the appellate court:
CONTRARY TO LAW.1 (underscoring supplied)
Concomitantly, jurisdiction over the offense is vested with the Regional Trial Court considering
The two other Informations in the second and third criminal cases, Nos. 1294 and 1295, contain
that the position of Municipal Treasurer corresponds to a salary grade below 27. Pursuant to
the same allegations except the malversed amounts which are ₱25,627.38 and ₱20,735.13,
Section 4 of [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249], it is the
respectively.2
Sandiganbayan, to the exclusion of all others, which enjoys appellate jurisdiction over the
offense. Evidently, the appeal to this Court of the conviction for malversation of public funds was
Branch 20 of the Cauayan RTC, by Joint Decision of June 22, 2004,3 convicted petitioner in the improperly and improvidently made. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
three cases, disposing as follows:
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by Resolution of September 27, 2007.5Hence, The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments,
the present petition for review, petitioner defining the issues as follows: resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original
jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. x x x (emphasis, italics and
I. WHETHER . . ., CONSIDERING THE CLEAR AND GRAVE ERROR COMMITTED BY underscoring supplied).
COUNSEL OF [PETITIONER] AND OTHER EXTRA-ORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES,
THE APPEAL OF… [PETITIONER] WRONGFULLY DIRECTED TO THE COURT OF Since the appeal involves criminal cases, and the possibility of a person being deprived of liberty
APPEALS BE DISMISSED OUTRIGHT…OR BE ENDORSED AND TRANSMITTED TO due to a procedural lapse militates against the Court’s dispensation of justice, the Court grants
THE SANDIGANBAYAN WHERE THE APPEAL SHALL THEN PROCEED IN DUE petitioner’s plea for a relaxation of the Rules.1avvphi1

COURSE.
For rules of procedure must be viewed as tools to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that
II. WHETHER . . ., IN CONSIDERATION OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE IN A CRIMINAL any rigid and strict application thereof which results in technicalities tending to frustrate
CASE, NEW TRIAL BE GRANTED TO THE PETITIONER TO BE UNDERTAKEN IN substantial justice must always be avoided.9
THE SANDIGANBAYAN (ALTERNATIVELY IN THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT) SO
THAT CRUCIAL EVIDENCE OF PETITIONER…BE ADMITTED.6 In Ulep v. People,10 the Court remanded the case to the Sandiganbayan when it found that

Petitioner, now admitting the procedural error committed by her former counsel, implores the x x x petitioner’s failure to designate the proper forum for her appeal was inadvertent. The
Court to relax the Rules to afford her an opportunity to fully ventilate her appeal on the merits omission did not appear to be a dilatory tactic on her part. Indeed, petitioner had more to lose
and requests the Court to endorse and transmit the records of the cases to the Sandiganbayan had that been the case as her appeal could be dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction – which
in the interest of substantial justice. was exactly what happened in the CA.

Section 2 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides: The trial court, on the other hand, was duty bound to forward the records of the case to the
proper forum, the Sandiganbayan. It is unfortunate that the RTC judge concerned ordered the
SEC. 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals. x x x. pertinent records to be forwarded to the wrong court, to the great prejudice of petitioner. Cases
involving government employees with a salary grade lower than 27 are fairly common, albeit
An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate regrettably so. The judge was expected to know and should have known the law and the rules of
court but shall be dismissed outright. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) procedure. He should have known when appeals are to be taken to the CA and when they
should be forwarded to the Sandiganbayan. He should have conscientiously and carefully
That appellate jurisdiction in this case pertains to the Sandiganbayan is clear. Section 4 of observed this responsibility specially in cases such as this where a person’s liberty was at stake.
Presidential Decree No. 1606,7 as amended by Republic Act No. 8249, so directs:8 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all The slapdash work of petitioner’s former counsel and the trial court’s apparent ignorance of the
cases involving: law effectively conspired to deny petitioner the remedial measures to question her conviction.11

xxxx While the negligence of counsel generally binds the client, the Court has made exceptions
thereto, especially in criminal cases where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the
client of due process of law; when its application will result in outright deprivation of the client’s
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade ‘27’
liberty or property; or where the interests of justice so require. 12It can not be gainsaid that the
or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers
case of petitioner can fall under any of these exceptions.
mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial
court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case
may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as Moreover, a more thorough review and appreciation of the evidence for the prosecution and
amended. defense as well as a proper application of the imposable penalties in the present case by the
Sandiganbayan would do well to assuage petitioner that her appeal is decided scrupulously.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29514 are
SET ASIDE. Let the records of the cases be FORWARDED to the Sandiganbayan for proper
disposition.

The Presiding Judge of Branch 20, Henedino P. Eduarte, of the Cauayan City Regional Trial
Court is warned against committing the same procedural error, under pain of administrative
sanction.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 180010 July 30, 2010 WHEREFORE, finding the accused CENITA M. CARIAGA, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of MALVERSATION for which she is charged in the three (3) separate informations
CENITA M. CARIAGA, Petitioner, and in the absence of any mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences her to suffer:
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. 1. In Crim. Case No. Br.20-1293, an indeterminate penalty of from FOUR (4) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY of PRISION CORRECCIONAL as minimum to SEVEN (7) YEARS, FOUR
DECISION (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION MAYOR as maximum and its accessory
penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine of Two Thousand Seven Hundred
CARPIO MORALES, J.: Eighty Five (P2,785.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Cost against the accused.
In issue in the present petition for review is one of jurisdiction.
2. In Crim. Case No. Br. 20-1294, an indeterminate penalty of from TEN (10) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY of PRISION MAYOR as minimum to EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS, EIGHT (8)
By Resolutions of May 28, 2007 and September 27, 2007, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of RECLUSION TEMPORAL as maximum and to suffer the
No. 29514, "People of the Philippines v. Cenita Cariaga," dismissed the appeal of Cenita
accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification and to pay a fine of Twenty Five
Cariaga (petitioner) for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Thousand Six Hundred Twenty Seven (P25,627.00) Pesos. She is ordered to indemnify
the Provincial Government of Isabela Twenty Five Thousand Six Hundred Twenty Seven
Petitioner, as the municipal treasurer of Cabatuan, Isabela with a Salary Grade of 24, was (P25,627.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Cost against
charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cauayan City in Isabela with three counts of the accused.
malversation of public funds, defined under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
3. In Crim. Case No. Br. 20-1295, an indeterminate penalty of from TEN (10) YEARS and
The Information in the first case, Criminal Case No. 1293, reads: ONE (1) DAY of PRISION MAYOR as minimum to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of RECLUSION TEMPORAL as maximum, and to suffer the
That on or about the year 1993 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto in the Municipality of accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine of Twenty Thousand
Cabatuan, Province of Isabela, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- Seven Hundred Thirty (P20,730.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
named accused, [C]ENITA M. CARIAGA, a public officer, being the MunicipalTreasurer of insolvency. The bailbonds are cancelled. Costs against the accused.
Cabatuan, Isabela, and as such is accountable for taxes, fees and monies collected and/or
received by her by reason of her position, acting in relation to her office and taking advantage of SO ORDERED.
the same, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, misappropriate and
convert to her personal use the amount of TWO THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY FIVE
Petitioner, through counsel, in time filed a Notice of Appeal, stating that he intended to appeal
PESOS (P2,785.00) representing the remittance of the Municipality of Cabatuan to the Provincial
the trial court’s decision to the Court of Appeals.
Government of Isabela as the latter’s share in the real property taxes collected, which amount
was not received by the Provincial Government of Isabela, to the damage and prejudice of the
government in the amount aforestated. By Resolution of May 28, 2007,4 the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner’s appeal for lack of
jurisdiction, holding that it is the Sandiganbayan which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction
thereon. Held the appellate court:
CONTRARY TO LAW.1 (underscoring supplied)
Concomitantly, jurisdiction over the offense is vested with the Regional Trial Court considering
The two other Informations in the second and third criminal cases, Nos. 1294 and 1295, contain
that the position of Municipal Treasurer corresponds to a salary grade below 27. Pursuant to
the same allegations except the malversed amounts which are ₱25,627.38 and ₱20,735.13,
Section 4 of [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249], it is the
respectively.2
Sandiganbayan, to the exclusion of all others, which enjoys appellate jurisdiction over the
offense. Evidently, the appeal to this Court of the conviction for malversation of public funds was
Branch 20 of the Cauayan RTC, by Joint Decision of June 22, 2004,3 convicted petitioner in the improperly and improvidently made. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
three cases, disposing as follows:
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by Resolution of September 27, 2007.5Hence, The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments,
the present petition for review, petitioner defining the issues as follows: resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original
jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. x x x (emphasis, italics and
I. WHETHER . . ., CONSIDERING THE CLEAR AND GRAVE ERROR COMMITTED BY underscoring supplied).
COUNSEL OF [PETITIONER] AND OTHER EXTRA-ORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES,
THE APPEAL OF… [PETITIONER] WRONGFULLY DIRECTED TO THE COURT OF Since the appeal involves criminal cases, and the possibility of a person being deprived of liberty
APPEALS BE DISMISSED OUTRIGHT…OR BE ENDORSED AND TRANSMITTED TO due to a procedural lapse militates against the Court’s dispensation of justice, the Court grants
THE SANDIGANBAYAN WHERE THE APPEAL SHALL THEN PROCEED IN DUE petitioner’s plea for a relaxation of the Rules.1avvphi1

COURSE.
For rules of procedure must be viewed as tools to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that
II. WHETHER . . ., IN CONSIDERATION OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE IN A CRIMINAL any rigid and strict application thereof which results in technicalities tending to frustrate
CASE, NEW TRIAL BE GRANTED TO THE PETITIONER TO BE UNDERTAKEN IN substantial justice must always be avoided.9
THE SANDIGANBAYAN (ALTERNATIVELY IN THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT) SO
THAT CRUCIAL EVIDENCE OF PETITIONER…BE ADMITTED.6 In Ulep v. People,10 the Court remanded the case to the Sandiganbayan when it found that

Petitioner, now admitting the procedural error committed by her former counsel, implores the x x x petitioner’s failure to designate the proper forum for her appeal was inadvertent. The
Court to relax the Rules to afford her an opportunity to fully ventilate her appeal on the merits omission did not appear to be a dilatory tactic on her part. Indeed, petitioner had more to lose
and requests the Court to endorse and transmit the records of the cases to the Sandiganbayan had that been the case as her appeal could be dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction – which
in the interest of substantial justice. was exactly what happened in the CA.

Section 2 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides: The trial court, on the other hand, was duty bound to forward the records of the case to the
proper forum, the Sandiganbayan. It is unfortunate that the RTC judge concerned ordered the
SEC. 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals. x x x. pertinent records to be forwarded to the wrong court, to the great prejudice of petitioner. Cases
involving government employees with a salary grade lower than 27 are fairly common, albeit
An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate regrettably so. The judge was expected to know and should have known the law and the rules of
court but shall be dismissed outright. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) procedure. He should have known when appeals are to be taken to the CA and when they
should be forwarded to the Sandiganbayan. He should have conscientiously and carefully
That appellate jurisdiction in this case pertains to the Sandiganbayan is clear. Section 4 of observed this responsibility specially in cases such as this where a person’s liberty was at stake.
Presidential Decree No. 1606,7 as amended by Republic Act No. 8249, so directs:8 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all The slapdash work of petitioner’s former counsel and the trial court’s apparent ignorance of the
cases involving: law effectively conspired to deny petitioner the remedial measures to question her conviction.11

xxxx While the negligence of counsel generally binds the client, the Court has made exceptions
thereto, especially in criminal cases where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the
client of due process of law; when its application will result in outright deprivation of the client’s
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade ‘27’
liberty or property; or where the interests of justice so require. 12It can not be gainsaid that the
or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers
case of petitioner can fall under any of these exceptions.
mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial
court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case
may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as Moreover, a more thorough review and appreciation of the evidence for the prosecution and
amended. defense as well as a proper application of the imposable penalties in the present case by the
Sandiganbayan would do well to assuage petitioner that her appeal is decided scrupulously.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29514 are
SET ASIDE. Let the records of the cases be FORWARDED to the Sandiganbayan for proper
disposition.

The Presiding Judge of Branch 20, Henedino P. Eduarte, of the Cauayan City Regional Trial
Court is warned against committing the same procedural error, under pain of administrative
sanction.

SO ORDERED.

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