ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS removed from office if they should commit acts for which they may not
removed from office if they should commit acts for which they may not otherwise be held
Introduction
 Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable
to the people, serve them without utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act
with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. (Art. XI, Sec. 1, Constitution)
 Public trust must be discharged by its holder not for his own personal gain but for the benefit
of the public for whom he holds it in trust. By demanding accountability and service with
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, efficiency, patriotism, and justice, all government
officials and employees have the duty to be responsive to the needs of the people they are
called upon to serve. (Abakada Party List v. Purisima – K1)
 Public office is personal to the incumbent and is not a property which passes to his heirs.
Actio personalis moritur cum persona – a personal right of action dies with the person.
Heirs cannot prosecute a deceased protestee’s counter-claim for damages against the
protestant for that was extinguished when death terminated his right to occupy the contested
office.
 To ensure accountability of public officers and employees, the Constitution has adopted
measures and means which there are incentives for deserving officers and employees, such
as the mandate given to the CSC to adopt a merit and rewards system and other such
schemes that may be adopted by Congress to assure it is rewarding to work in the
Government.
 As for the sanctions for erring and recalcitrant officers and employees, there is the mechanism
of impeachment for the highest officials of the land, the institution of the Office of the
Ombudsman, the provision for creation of a special court to deal generally with graft and
corruption in the government, the requirement for the filing of SALNs, as well as the
provision on recovery of ill-gotten wealth.
 And there is also the mechanism for transparency in regard to transactions of the government
as a means of letting the people know what is being done, or otherwise. The power to govern
is a delegated authority from the people who hailed the public official to office through the
democratic process of election.
Laws intended to ensure accountability of public officials:
 R.A. No. 1379 (1955) or An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State of Any
Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by Any Public Officer or Employee
and Providing for the Proceedings Therefore – for forfeiture of unexplained wealth
 R.A. No. 3019 (1960) or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act – criminal
prosecution for graft and corruption
 R.A. No. 6713 (1989) or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees – code of conduct for public officials and employees
 R.A. No. 9184 (2013) or the Government Procurement Reform Act – law on
government procurement to ensure regularity, transparency and accountability in
relation to the procurement of infrastructure projects, goods and consulting services.
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Impeachment
 A method of national inquest into the conduct of public men. It was adopted as a means by
which the superior officers of the government, with long and definite terms of office, may be
legally accountable.
 Refers to the power of Congress to remove a public official for serious crimes or
misconducts as provided in the Constitution.
 Its roots can be traced in Athens and was adopted in the US through the influence of
English common law on the Framers of the US Constitution.
 The “ultimate legislative check on the other two branches.”
 A political exercise meant to ensure that such public officials may be made to answer in
regard to certain acts that the people, through their representatives in Congress, may deem
serious enough to warrant their removal.
 A manner by which the people may assert their supreme authority to demand that officials
own up to their misdeeds, if any there be.
 The impeachment process involves trial and eventual rendition of judgment performed by
the Congress. The Court has characterized impeachment as a political exercise, not a
judicial proceeding. It has also been remarked that the exact nature of an impeachment
proceeding is debatable.
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Impeachable Officials and Offenses
 The President, Vice-President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on
impeachment for, and conviction of:
 Culpable violation of the Constitution
 Treason
 Bribery
 Graft and Corrupt
 Other high crimes
 Betrayal of Public Trust
 All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but
not by impeachment.
 In several cases, the Court gave the impression that even Deputy Ombudsmen may not only
be removed through the process of impeachment.
 In Cuenco v. Fernan, a case for disbarment of a sitting Member of the Court, it was held that
to grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Member’s
incumbency, would in effect be to circumvent and to run afoul of the constitutional
mandate that Members of the Court may be removed from office only by impeachment
for and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI (2).
 In Jarque v. Desierto, the Court once more stated that the Ombudsman “or his deputies must
first be removed from the office via the constitutional route of impeachment” before being
held to answer either criminally or administratively, like in disbarment proceedings.
 Then, in Lastimosa – Dalawampu v. Mojica, the Court dismissed the complaint for
disbarment against Mojica who was then the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas.
 In Office of the Ombudsman v. CA, the ghost of its pronouncements past came back to
haunt the Supreme Court since the Court of Appeals used the same as basis for its disposition,
 even as said lower court “took pains to point out that the 1987 Constitution, the law experts all
indicate that the Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer.
o After taking a hard look at the issue, the Court declared that “from the foregoing, it is
immediately apparent that, as enumerated in Sec. 2 of the Article XI, only those
stated (above) are the impeachable officers.
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Impeachable Offices Removable Only By Impeachment
 The doctrine that impeachable officers can only be removed by impeachment originated from
an obiter dictum in Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, a case where the question was about the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over a municipal mayor.
 The holding of the Court that removal of impeachable officers by a mode other by
impeachment was based on its reading of a passage from former CJ Fernando’s book. CJ
Fernando states that judgment in cases of impeachment shall be limited to removal from
office and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust, or profit under the Republic
of the Philippines, but the party convinced shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
prosecution, trial, and punishment, in accordance with the law.
 The obiter became doctrinal when it was adopted by the Supreme Court in a case involving a
Member of the Court itself, Justice Fernan, who was sought to be disbarred. It was held that
there is another reason why the complaint for disbarment must be dismissed:
o Members of the Supreme Court must be members of the Philippine Bar and may be
removed from office only by impeachment.
 To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Member’s
incumbency, would in effect be to circumvent and to run afoul of the constitutional
mandate that Members of the Court may be removed from office only by impeachment
for and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI (2).
 It could be seen that the doctrine has become a sort of immunity from prosecution or any
other proceeding in so far as impeachable officers are concerned. They could not be
proceeded against until and unless they have been first removed following conviction in an
impeachment proceeding.
 This doctrine was subsequently applied or invoked in several cases involving the
Ombudsman, Deputy Ombudsman, Members of the COMELEC, and the President.
 All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but
not by impeachment.
 The doctrine only has application while the impeachable officer is still in office.
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Grounds for Impeachment
 The President, Vice-President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on
impeachment for, and conviction of:
 Culpable violation of the Constitution
 Treason
 Bribery
 Graft and Corrupt
 Other high crimes and Betrayal of Public Trust
Culpable Violation of the Constitution
 Refers to a willful and intentional breach of a provision of the Constitution.
Treason
Art. 114. Treason. —
Any person who, owing allegiance to (the United States or) the Government of the Philippine Islands,
not being a foreigner, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid or comfort
within the Philippine Islands or elsewhere, shall be punished by reclusion temporal to death and shall
pay a fine not to exceed P20,000.
No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses at least to the same
overt act or on confession of the accused in open court.
Likewise, an alien, residing in the Philippine Islands, who commits acts of treason as defined in
paragraph 1 of this Article shall be punished by prision mayor to death and shall pay a fine not to
exceed P20,000.
(As amended by E.O. No. 44, May 31, 1945).
Art. 115. Conspiracy and proposal to commit treason; Penalty. —
The conspiracy or proposal to commit the crime of treason shall be punished respectively, by prision
mayor and a fine not exceeding P10,000, and prision correccional and a fine not exceeding P5,000.
Art. 116. Misprision of treason. —
Every person owing allegiance to (the United States) the Government of the Philippine Islands, without
being a foreigner, and having knowledge of any conspiracy against them, conceals or does not disclose
and make known the same, as soon as possible to the governor or fiscal of the province, or the mayor
or fiscal of the city in which he resides, as the case may be, shall be punished as an accessory to the
crime of treason.
Bribery
Art. 210. Direct bribery. —
Any public officer who shall agree to perform an act constituting a crime, in connection with the
performance of this official duties, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received by
such officer, personally or through the mediation of another, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor
in its medium and maximum periods and a fine [of not less than the value of the gift and] not less
than three times the value of the gift in addition to the penalty corresponding to the crime agreed upon,
if the same shall have been committed.
If the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an act which does not
constitute a crime, and the officer executed said act, he shall suffer the same penalty provided in the
preceding paragraph; and if said act shall not have been accomplished, the officer shall suffer the
penalties of prision correccional, in its medium period and a fine of not less than twice the value of
such gift.
If the object for which the gift was received or promised was to make the public officer refrain from
doing something which it was his official duty to do, he shall suffer the penalties of prision
correccional in its maximum period and a fine [of not less than the value of the gift and] not less than
three times the value of such gift.
In addition to the penalties provided in the preceding paragraphs, the culprit shall suffer the penalty of
special temporary disqualification.
The provisions contained in the preceding paragraphs shall be made applicable to assessors, arbitrators,
appraisal and claim commissioners, experts or any other persons performing public duties.
(As amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 872, June 10, 1985).
Art. 211. Indirect bribery. —
The penalties of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, and public censure shall be
imposed upon any public officer who shall accept gifts offered to him by reason of his office.
(As amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 872, June 10, 1985).
Graft and Corruption
Particularly dealt with by the R.A. No. 3019 (1960) or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer
and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
1. Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a
violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in
connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced,
or influenced to commit such violation or offense.
2. Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit,
for himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the
Government and any other part, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to
intervene under the law.
3. Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present or other pecuniary or material
benefit, for himself or for another, from any person for whom the public officer, in any
manner or capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain, any Government permit
or license, in consideration for the help given or to be given, without prejudice to Section
thirteen of this Act.
4. Accepting or having any member of his family accept employment in a private enterprise
which has pending official business with him during the pendency thereof or within one year
after its termination.
5. Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party
any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
6. Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act
within a reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining,
directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material
benefit or advantage, or for the purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue
advantage in favor of or discriminating against any other interested party.
7. Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
8. Director or indirectly having financing or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or
transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in
which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest.
9. Directly or indirectly becoming interested, for personal gain, or having a material interest in
any transaction or act requiring the approval of a board, panel or group of which he is a
member, and which exercises discretion in such approval, even if he votes against the same or
does not participate in the action of the board, committee, panel or group.
10. Interest for personal gain shall be presumed against those public officers responsible for the
approval of manifestly unlawful, inequitable, or irregular transaction or acts by the board,
panel or group to which they belong.
11. Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit in favor of any
person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege or advantage,
or of a mere representative or dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled.
12. Divulging valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by his office or by him
on account of his official position to unauthorized persons, or releasing such information in
advance of its authorized release date.
High Crimes and Betrayal of Public Trust
 The Court had occasion to observe that they “elude a precise definition.” The framers [of the
Constitution] could find no better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public
trust and other high crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative examples of both,
without arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard therefor.
 In a case involving a Deputy Ombudsman who may be removed based on the same grounds
for impeachment, the Court came up with the discussion as to what might constitute betrayal
of public trust:
o The catch-all phrase betrayal of public trust that referred to all acts not punishable
by statutes as penal offenses but, nonetheless, render the officer unfit to
continue in office could be easily utilized for every conceivable misconduct or
negligence in office.
o In other words, acts that should constitute betrayal of public trust as to warrant
removal from office may be less than criminal but must be attended by bad faith
and of such gravity and seriousness as the other grounds for impeachment.
 This standard of betrayal of public trust, while discussed in relation to a non-impeachable
official, may just provide the Court sufficient basis in the future to exercise its power of
judicial review if the conviction by the Senate based on this ground may be assailed for being
an overarching standard which is too broad and therefore to abuse and arbitrary exercise by
the legislature amounting to grave abuse of discretion.
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Impeachment Process
 An undertaking entrusted to Congress, with the House of Representatives given the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment, and the Senate having the
prerogative to try and decide on the fate of the official impeached.
1. Before the House of Representatives, a verified complaint may be filed by any Member
or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof.
2. It shall be included in the Order of Business and referral to the proper Committee for
determination of its sufficiency in form and substance.
3. If they find the complaint sufficient, they will prepare the Articles of Impeachment for
action by the House. A vote of at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the
Committee, or override its contrary resolution.
4. If the Articles of Impeachment is approved by the House, then it shall be endorsed to
Senate for trial. If at least 2/3 of the total membership of the House files the verified
complaint or resolution of impeachment, the same shall constitute the Articles of
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
 The Senate is given the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When
sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation.
 When the President is on trial, the Supreme Court Chief Justice shall preside, but shall not
vote.
 Conviction could only be had with the concurrence of 2/3 of all the Members of the
Senate.
 As to the number of members of the legislature who can initiate an impeachment, the present
Charter specifies 1/3 of the House membership to impeach and 2/3 of the Senate to
convict.
 Through the expanded judicial power or certiorari jurisdiction under Art. VIII, Sec. 1 of
the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court could intervene in what was once considered as a
purely political exercise if the Court feels that there has been a grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the impeachment court.
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One-Year Bar Rule
 Proscription against more than one impeachment proceeding being initiated against the same
official within a period of one year.
 The purpose is: (1) to prevent undue or too frequent harassment and (2) to allow the
legislature to do its principal task, legislation.
 The reckoning point for the one-year period takes place by the act of filing and referral to
the Committee on Justice, or the filing by at least 1/3 of the total membership of the
House. This is when the one-year bar rule commences.
 Subsequently, the Court held that the act of the House of Representatives endorsing
simultaneously two separate impeachment complaints filed on different dates does not
contravene one-year bar rule on initiating impeachment proceedings.
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Effect of Impeachment
 Though impeachment may be loosely equated with being found guilty, the term itself simply
connotes the act of formally charging or indicting someone.
 Impeachment alone without conviction does not lead to removal and perpetual
disqualification from holding any office under the Republic of the Philippines.
 In the case of former President Estrada, for instance, he was impeached but he never got
convicted because the proceedings before the Senate were aborted.
 Conviction in an impeachment proceeding is without prejudice to the guilty party being held
liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law.
 A person already resigned from office is no longer subject to impeachment because the
most important object for which the remedy was given was no longer necessary or
attainable. But this view does not seem to have been generally accepted, because, among
other reasons, removal from office is not the only object of impeachment; disqualification to
hold office also follows as a consequence of conviction.
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Judicial Review of Impeachment Proceedings
 Even as impeachment is a responsibility that Congress has to attend to, this is not something
that is considered a purely political question.
 Since the Constitution itself provides certain guidelines and limitations on the power, then it is
within the province of the judiciary, especially within its expanded judicial power to
determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional provisions.
 In the Court’s jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-
justifiable political question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If
there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of
the government properly acted within such limits.
 As to what the Court may properly look into and not when it comes to impeachment
proceedings, it held that the grounds for which impeachment may be had partake of a political
question:
o The first issue foes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which
this Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue would
require this Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable
offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution
has left to the sound discretion of the legislation.
o The framers could find no better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of
public trust and other high crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative
examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard
therefor.
 Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justifiable political
question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power under Section 1,
Article VIII.
 Accordingly, the Court deemed it appropriate and necessary to determine if the Rules
promulgated by the House of Representatives relative to the one-year bar rule was in
accordance with the Fundamental Law.
  On the specific issue about the meaning of the word initiate relative to the one-year bar on
impeachment proceedings, the Court declared:
o Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment
proceedings are deemed initiated:
1. If there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified
complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or
2. Once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee of
Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in
substance, or
3. By the filing or endorsement before the Sec-Gen of the House of
Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at
least 1/3 of the House members.
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Effects of Conviction
 Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party
convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment
according to law.
 Thus, the twin effect of conviction would be removal and perpetual disqualification.
 The President cannot extend executive clemency to someone who has been convicted in an
impeachment proceeding.
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Sandiganbayan
 The Sandiganbayan, together with the Office of the Ombudsman, was introduced by the
1973 Constitution. The legislature was tasked with the creation of a special court with
jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and other
offenses committed by public officers and employees, as may be determined by law.
 Since the adoption of the Constitution, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan had been
expanded by Congress.
 The Sandiganbayan was considered to be a regular court within the meaning of the term in
R.A. No. 6975.
 Courts of special jurisdiction, which are permanent in character, are also regular courts. The
Sandiganbayan is a court with special jurisdiction because its creation as a permanent anti-
graft court is constitutionally mandated and its jurisdiction is limited to certain classes of
offenses.
 Accordingly, it could not issue the writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, and quo
warranto.
 Congress enacted R.A. No. 7975. In Sec. 4(c) thereof, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
was expanded to include petitions for issuance of writs of mandamus, prohibition,
certiorari, habeas corpus, injunction, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction.
 Under Section 1, P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has been
declared by law as a special court of the same level as the Court of Appeals and
possessing all the inherent powers of a court of justice.
 Those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan, provided that they hold the positions enumerated by the law. In this
category, it is the position held, not the salary grade, which determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
 The Court has also ruled that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Student Regents of
State Universities in cases involving estafa.
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Ombudsman (formerly known as Tanodbayan)
 The Batasang Pambansa shall create an office of the Ombudsman which shall receive and
investigate complaints relative to public office, including those in GOCCs, make
appropriate recommendations, and in case of failure of justice as defined by law, file and
prosecute the corresponding criminal, civil or administrative case before the proper
court or body. (Art. XIII, Sec. 6, 1973 Constitution)
 Under the present Charter, the institution was considerable strengthened, being specifically
labeled as independent.
 The Ombudsman himself is appointed by the President after having been vetted by the
Judicial and Bar Council.
 The term of office for the Ombudsman and the Deputy Ombudsmen is fixed at 7 years.
 May be removed by impeachment; has the right to appoint the officials and employees of
the Office of the Ombudsman.
 Further adding to the independence of the Ombudsman is the grant of fiscal autonomy. Its
approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released. (Art. XI, Sec.
14, Constitution)
 It is also given the authority to promulgate its rules of procedure.
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Historical Background of the Ombudsman
 The concept of Ombudsman originated in Sweden in the early 19th century, referring to an
officer appointed by the legislature to handle the people’s grievances against
administrative and judicial actions.
 He was primarily tasked with receiving complaints from persons aggrieved by
administrative action or inaction, conducting investigation thereon, and making
recommendations to the appropriate administrative agency based on his findings.
 He relied mainly on the power of persuasion and the high prestige of the office to effect his
recommendations.
 It has also been explained that the reason for the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987
Constitution and for the grant to it of broad investigative authority is to insulate said office
from the long tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate judges’ and fiscals’ offices,
and others involved in the prosecution of erring public officials.
  The Ombudsman Act makes perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
encompasses all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance that have been
committed by an officer or employee during his tenure of office.
 With the advent of the present Charter, a new Office of the Ombudsman was created by
constitutional fiat.
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Independence of the Ombudsman
 Being the protector of the people, and supposedly an “activist watchman” at that, the office
must necessarily be independent, otherwise it might get stymied in the performance of the
duties and functions entrusted to it.
 In Gonzales III v. Office of the President, the Court initially upheld the constitutionality of
Sec. 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 granting President power to discipline Deputy Ombudsmen and
Special Prosecutor, but later on ruled that subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline
and removal by the President cannot but seriously place at risk the independence of the
Office of the Ombudsman.
o The fear of external reprisal from the very office he is to check for excesses and
abuses defeats the very purpose of granting independence to the Office of the
Ombudsman.
 The concept of Ombudsman’s independence covers three things:
1. Creation by the Constitution – the office cannot be abolished, nor its
constitutionality specified functions and privileges, be removed, altered, or modified
by law, unless the Constitution itself allows, or an amendment thereto is made.
2. Fiscal autonomy – the office may not be obstructed from its freedom to use or
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dispose of its funds
3. Insulation from executive supervision and control – those within the ranks of the
Jurisdiction and Other Functions
office can only be disciplined by the internal authority.
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Guardian and Activist Watchman
 It has powers, both constitutional and statutory, that are commensurate with its
daunting task of enforcing accountability of public officers.
 The Ombudsman can act on anonymous complaints and motu proprio inquire into alleged
improper official acts or omissions from whatever source, e.g., a newspaper. Thus, any
complainant may be entertained by the Ombudsman for the latter to initiate and inquiry and
investigation for alleged irregularities.
 The Court has also held that the Department of Justice can no longer conduct a preliminary
investigation if the same is already pending before the Ombudsman.
Section 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result
thereof.
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient.
2. Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the
Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any
government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite
any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in
the performance of duties.
3. Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at
fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and
ensure compliance therewith.
4. Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions
entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and
report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action.
5. Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of
its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents.
6. Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due
prudence.
7. Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the
Government and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high
standards of ethics and efficiency.
8. Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or
duties as may be provided by law.
1. Investigatory Power
2. Prosecutory Power
3. Public Assistance Functions
4. Authority to Inquire and Obtain Information
5. Function to Adopt, Institute and Implement Preventive Measures
 The power to investigate and prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and
unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.
 The Court further pointed out that the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not
be equated with the limited authority of the Special Prosecutor under Sec. 11 of RA 6770.
 The Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Its power to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute is limited to criminal cases
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
 The Ombudsman has also been recognized to have the authority to refer cases involving
nonmilitary personnel for investigation by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs.
 The Office of the Ombudsman may also deputize public prosecutors, and for which it may
discipline them for refusal to abide by its instructions. When a prosecutor is deputized, he
comes under the supervision and control of the Ombudsman which means that he is subject
 to the power of the Ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse or modify his
(prosecutor’s) decision.
 The Ombudsman has authority to investigate a charge of multiple murder alleged committed
by a provincial governor. The clause ‘any [illegal] act or omission of any public official’ is
broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public official. The law does not qualify
the nature of the illegal act or omission of the public official or employee that the
Ombudsman may investigate.
 The Ombudsman does not have any authority over GOCCs without original charters.
 In the same way, the Office of the Ombudsman does not have jurisdiction to entertain a
money claim against a public official in his personal capacity. It falls within the
jurisdiction of ordinary courts.
 The Ombudsman also has no jurisdiction to investigate members of the judiciary in
relation to the discharge of their duties and responsibilities. That authority belongs to the
Supreme Court.
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Relief from Ombudsman Decisions
 As a rule, the Ombudsman should be given enough leeway to do his job and should not
unnecessarily be intruded into by the courts.
 Its findings would generally be upheld in the absence of a clear grave abuse of discretion.
Hence, the policy of non-interference adopted by the Supreme Court.
 Even as the Ombudsman has the full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case
should be filed, the Supreme Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman’s action
when there is an abuse of discretion, in which case Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may
exceptionally be invoked.
 The mode of questioning the disposition of the Ombudsman depends on the nature of the
case, whether it is administrative or criminal.
 In administrative cases, the decision is to be elevated to the Court of Appeals through a
Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
 In criminal cases, it is by a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 directly to the
Supreme Court.
 In Fabian v. Desierto, the Court invalidated Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act in so far as it
provides for direct appeal from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases.
 There could be no action for annulment of judgment relative to decisions of the
Ombudsman.
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Special Prosecutor
 The Tanodbayan under the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution but it
was not transformed into the Ombudsman. Instead, it was made a lesser office than that of the
Office of the Ombudsman. Indeed, it had become a subordinate of the Ombudsman, under
his supervision and control.
 The Special Prosecutor is a mere subordinate of the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) and can
investigate and prosecute cases only upon the latter’s authority or orders.
 The Special Prosecutor cannot initiate the prosecution of cases but can only conduct the
same if instructed to do so by the Ombudsman.
 Even his original power to issue subpoena, which he still claims under Section 10(d) of PD
1630, is now deemed transferred to the Ombudsman, who may, however, retain it in the
Special Prosecutor in connection with the cases he is ordered to investigate.
 It has been held that Congress has the power to place the Office of the Special Prosecutor
under the Office of the Ombudsman, and Congress may remove some of the powers
previously granted to the Tanodbayan and transfer them to the Ombudsman.
 The Ombudsman Act made the Special Prosecutor an organic component of the Office of
the Ombudsman. And it has not been granted the same degree of independence in the same
way that Deputy Ombudsmen had been insulated:
o The grant of independence is solely with respect to the Office of the Ombudsman
which does not include the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the Constitution.
 The Special Prosecutor cannot preventively suspend an official or employee even if the
Ombudsman has designated the former to act in his stead.
 The Special Prosecutor could not file an information without the prior approval of the
Ombudsman.
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Ill-Gotten Wealth
 An evaluation on the matter reveals the following guidelines in the determination of the
reckoning point for the period of prescription of violations of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act)
1. As a general rule, prescription begins to run from the date of the commission of the
offense.
2. If the date of the commission of the violation is not known, it shall be counted from the
date of discovery thereof.
3. In determining whether it is the general rule or the exception that should apply in a
particular case, the availability or suppression of the information relative to the crime
should first be determined.
If the necessary information, data, or records based on which the crime could be
discovered is readily available to the public, the general rule applies. Prescription shall,
therefore, run from the date of the commission of the crime.
Otherwise, should material law prevent the filing thereof or should information about the
violation be suppressed, possibly through connivance, then the exception applies and the
period of prescription shall be reckoned from the date of discovery thereof.
 The wealth that rightfully belongs to the people should duly be accounted for, both civilly and
criminally. And while the former does not prescribe, the latter does, then there should be
equitable means by which the rules of prescription are not simply applied mechanically and
literally.
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Financial Inhibition
 No loan, guaranty, or other form of financial accommodation for any business purpose may be
granted, directly or indirectly, by any government-owned and controlled bank or financial
institution to the President, the Vice President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the
Supreme Court, and the Constitutional Commissions, the Ombudsman, or to any firm or
entity in which they have controlling interest, during their tenure. (Art. XI, Sec. 16,
Constitution)
 The funds belonging to government financial and banking institutions should also be
assiduously cared for.
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Statement of Assets and Liabilities

 A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may
be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth.
 In the case of the President, the Vice President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the
Supreme Court, and the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional offices, and
officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the
public in the matter provided by law. (Art. XI, Sec. 17, Constitution)
 The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) provides for every public officer to
periodically file his statement of assets and liabilities.
 The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA
6713), similarly requires the submission of declarations of their assets, liabilities, net worth,
and financial and business interests including those of their spouses and of unmarried children
under 18 years of age living in their households.
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Citizenship and Residency Requirements

 Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times, and
any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an
immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by the law. (Art. XI, Sec.
18, Constitution)
 Having dual citizenship has been included among the disqualifications for local elective
position. However, the Court has held that such provision should be read to mean dual
allegiance.
 With the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act (RA 9225), natural-born citizens
who may have lost their citizenship are now allowed to retain or regain their status as such
natural-born citizens by taking an oath of allegiance to the Philippines. And if they want to be
in public service, they are also required to renounce all foreign citizenship.
 Finally, it is to be remembered that for the highest positions in the Government, like those of
the President, the Vice President, Members of the Congress, Members of the Supreme Court,
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman and the Deputy
Ombudsmen, it is not enough that the occupants be citizens of the Philippines. They must be,
by constitutional fiat, natural born citizens.