PhilosophyofKnowledge 10015854

FORE WORD
In preparing this volume the following intentions have been

,
princip ally in mind : to provide a text which covers the standard

topics treated in a course in epi stemology and at the s am e time to
present these a s living questions ; to provide a generous a mount
of hi storical information on what representative thinkers have held
on these questions ; to provi de extensive reference to those aspects
of the pro blem of knowledge whi ch have emerged in contemp orary
philosop hy ; to provide a book whi ch actually deals i n a directly
reflective philosop hi cal manner with both classi cal and contem
p or ar
y problems .
The a im then i s both i nformati onal and p hiloso phical and a

, , ,
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central philosophi cal point conveyed b oth directly a nd obliquely

, ,
is that reflection in the philosophy of knowledge is still goi ng on .
Therefore an attempt has been made to gi ve a more Op en and

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unfinished air to the discussions than is customary with a text

book Footnotes a re deliberately more frequent than i s usual with
.
,
the a im of convi ncing the student of the current and continuingly

di alecti c al character of the i ssues and also with the sheer i nforma
,
ti onal i ntention of acquain ti ng him with the l i terature ; they are
meant as an integral pedagogical part of the course .
Although the bo ok has been written from a defin ite phi los oPhi
cal sta ndpoi nt every effort has been made to render it easily uti
,
liza ble by those who do no t share this standpoint A s i nd i cated

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,
all standard topi cs i n the customary epistemologi cal course are

treated in a relatively straightforward manner and i t i s hop ed th at
,
an instructor who prefers to confine himself to these topics with ,

vi i i For eword
o ut bothering abo ut less fam iliar matters will be able to d o so ,
simply by selecting the proper secti ons Conversely one who wants .
,
to roam far ther afield should find ample material from which to
choose It is unlikely that every topic in the book could be covered
.
in a cour se of normal length .
My primary debt of gratitude in connection with this book is to

Mr Phi li p Scha rp er an outstanding editor whose suggesti on orig
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, ,
in a lly in spired it and whose en couragement and generously co op

era tive atti tude made its w riti ng a pleas ant task My thanks also .
go to Dr Bernard B Gilligan of Fordham University for many

. .
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illuminating and extremely help ful conversations on the philosophy

of von Hildebrand Finally I should li ke to seize what seems to
.
,
be a good Opp ortun ity to s i gnalize the anci ent debt which I owe
to Rev D avi d C Cronin S J of Fordham University in whose
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, . .
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classe s my preoc cupation with epi stemological problems w as long

ago aw a kened ; generati ons of Fordham students will join me in
their esteem for thi s philosopher an irrepressible mind and a class ,
room teacher s ui generis .
Grateful acknowledgment is made to Fordh a m University Press

for thei r p ermission to reprint material in Chapter X whi ch first
appeared in my The Philos op hy of Ga bri el Ma r cel 1 9 62 ; and to ,
Interna ti ona l Phi los op hi ca l Q ua rter ly for p e rm i ssion to us e the ,
paragraph on Proust in Chapter V which first appeared in an

, ,
“ ”
article Recent Anglo A merican Vi ews on Percep ti on IV 12 2
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14 1 .
KE NNE TH T GALLAGH E R
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CONTE NTS
STAT US OF K NOWING
Wo nd er
Scep ti cis m
The E xis tentia l As p ect
A na logy o f K no w led g e
Method i n E p is temo logy
CRITICAL D OU BT
Subjecti vis m
The E s ca p e R o ute
N
P OI T OF D E PA RT URE
“ ” “ ”
Ins i d e a nd O uts i d e
The B i—p o la r i ty o f C o ns ci o us nes s
B ei ng -i n-a - Wo r ld
The E p is tem—
o log i ca l C i rcle
The Ques ti o n a s Irr ed uc i ble B eg i nni ng
4 . T H E P ROB LE M OF P E RCE P TIO N: I

“
Na i ve Rea lis m
L ocke a nd R ep res en ta ti o na lis m
‘
x Contents
B er k eley
C o n temp ora ry Vi ew s
b) S ens e-D a tum Ap p roa ch: A Wa y O ut?

1 ) M o o re, R us s ell, B ro a d
2) Ay er a nd P heno mena lis m
c ) L i ng uis tic A na lys is

I ) S tebbi ng s P a r a d ig m Ar g ument
’
2 ) Os te nsi ve Sig nifica ti o n

3) W i ttg ens tei n Ry le a nd O rd i na ry La ng ua g e
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P ROBLE M OF P E RCEP TIO N: II
Scho la s ti c So luti ons : P r eli mi na ry

Vi r tua l R ea lis m
E va lua ti o n o f Vi r tua l Rea lis m
Summi ng Up
“ ”
P uzzles A bo ut O bjecti vi ty
SE ARCH FO R TH E U NCO NDITIONAL

The P r imi ti v e A s s e r ti o n
F irs t P r i nc ip les
The P r i or i ty f the F irs t P ri ncip les
o
C a us a li ty a nd D eter m i n is m
The C r i ti que of H ume a nd K a nt
E vi d e nce, C er ti tud e a nd D o ubt
7 . CONCE P TUAL KNOW LED G E
C o ncep tua lis m

Mea ni ngs a nd Ins ta nces
J ud gment
C o ncep ts as Crea ti ve App r ehens i o ns
8 . TH OU GH T AND EXP E RIENCE : I
D e w ey , P ra g ma tis m a nd Tr uth
So cia l a nd H is tori ca l D i mens i o ns
ntents xi
Ind ucti o n
H ume s O bjec ti on
’
Ay er s Ta uto logy Vi ew
’
Vo n H i ld ebra nd a nd Philos op hica l Ins ig ht
O n the Na ture of E vi d ence

K i erk ega a rd a nd S ubjecti vi ty
F r ee Cer ti tud e
INTE RSUBJEC I IVE K NOWLE DGE

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11
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“
O ther Mi nd s ”
D irect K no w led g e o f the O ther

I a nd Tho u
RE MAIND E RS
The P hi los op hy o f Science
Mora l a nd A es the ti c E xp erienc e
TH E STA T US OF KNO WING
WONDE R
All men by nature desire to know Aristotle begi ns his meta
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physi cs wi th this thought and he s eems to b elieve that this urge

to know not only can be realized but actually i s realized in his
“
o w n work Not without reason has he been called the
. master of
”
those who know .
But two generations earli er Socrates had built hi s ow n p hilo

sophical career on a somewhat different foundation the convi ction ,
that no man had knowledge H i s interpretation of the Delphi c

.
“ ”
oracle s pronouncement that No man alive is wiser than Socrates
’
came down to just this : no man had knowledge but other men ,
thought they knew while Socrates alone knew that he d id not

know This was hi s sole clai m to pre emi nence and it may strike
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1 -
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us as a rather meager one .
At fir st s i ght we would seem to have here two rather sharply

opp osed views of the human condition : on the one hand an a fii r
mation of a universal and realizable desire to know on the other ,
a seem i ng afii rma tion of universal ignorance a s the natur al pre

d ica ment oi man But there is still another aphori sm which will
.
.
help to reconcile these two approaches .
Philosophy says Plato begi ns in w ond er It is primar ily wonder

, , .
2
( to tha uma zein ) and no man w ho lacks this capacity ca n ever

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attain to philosophical insi ght Si nce this sentiment is derived from

.
1 Pla to , Ap o logy, 2 1—2 3 .
2
P la to , Thea e tetus , 15 5 .
4 The Phi los op hy of Know led g e
Socrates and shared by Aristo tle ,
it may well repay a closer exam
imation .
The wonder which i s spoken of here should not be thought

“
of as equivalent to a ny sort of curiosity or need to collect
i nformation ; nor is it like the bewilderment o ne might feel in the
face of an elaborate mechanism whether the mechani sm of an ,
IBM 705 or the clockwork of a carbon molecule Philosophical .
wonder i s not primarily before the complicated and abstruse but ,
before the simple the obvious the close at hand It is the obvious
, , .
whi ch is most unfathomable and it is i n the region of the near at

,
hand that the great phi losop hical ques tions have emerged and in
which they continue to dwell .
What is change being motion time space mind matter? O f

, , , , , ,
such questions has the career of p hilosop hy been made A mong .
them all perhaps the p aramount one is that w hich Socrates s ingled
,
out for
p rimacy at the beginning through his adoption of the
maxim Know thyself : Who am I? What doe s i t mean to be a
“ ”
self and to be just this s elf which I uniquely am? Here we have
,
a perfect coincidence of the obvious and the mysterious : the

maxim Know thyself turns us to that whi ch is at the same time
“ ”
nearest at hand and yet most distant

, .
And with this we m eet a t once the ambiguous compenetration

of the near and the far whi ch characterizes every genuine exPeri
ence of philosop hi cal wonder Wonder b egins with the obvious .
,
” “
but it is as if it begins with a di stancing of the obvious an ,
endeavor to retain the immediacy of the ques tioned d atum while

bathing i t in a n aura of absolute stran geness In one sense no thing .
,
c ould s eem odder than to question a thing which i s already present
to us : for if it is p resent then we know it as present and it would

, ,
e ven seem that we have already to kno w what it is in order to
a s k what it is This i s the ecu li a rity of whi ch Plato speaks in the

.
p
Meno To find something w e ar e looking for we must already
3
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k no w what we are looking for ; therefore to find the answer to our ,
” “
question about what things are we must be able to rec ognize it ,
3 Meno , 80 ; Thea etetus , 196—200 ; cf . Pha ed o, 7 3 .

The Sta tus f Kno w ing
o 5
as the right answer and s o must a lready know it A paradox no

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d oubt and probably a crucial one for it dire cts our attenti on to
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“ ”
different meanings for knowing .
St Au gustine provides a famous example in Confes s ions X I

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when he says What is time? If no one asks me I know ; if I wish
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”
to explain it to someone who asks I d o not know Philosophy , .
consists largely in aski ng these questions a bout what I alr eady

“ ” ” “ “ ” “
know Of cour se I know what I mean by I
. self being , , ,
“ ” ” “ ” “ ” “ ” “ ” “
re a l ,mind matter change ,
time thing and s o on , , , , .
That is if no one asks me I kn ow ; I simply inh abit their obvious

, ,
ness their commonplace ness This kind of obviousness however

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, ,
is really a very derivati ve realm ; it is a realm in which a s s ump

tions conceptual and linguistic schemes objectified systems of
, ,
thought social and cultural custom have interposed themselves

, ,
between reflection and origi nal experience What I know is what .
“ ”
everybody knows and hence what nobody really knows , .
“
When therefore the philosopher withdraws from the obvi ous
, ,
of the commonplace he does s o in order to restore himself to the,
freshness of existence as it actually wells up in i ts perpe tually

renewed origin It is this obvious towards whi ch he moves in
.
wonder He is trying to think existence primordially It is a lways

. .
there to be thought always powerfully a nd overwhelmi ngly there

, ,
always giving itself to thought b ut always not yet thought And ,

.
thus the philosopher feels man to be as Hei degger has said the
, , ,
“ ”
strangest of beings nearest and farthest from the secret of ,
things .
4
Now this cond ition of the philosopher should not be t a ken as a

misfortune Rather it is a privilege Socrates p osi tion is not re a lly
. .
’
as contrary to Ari stotle s as it might seem Granted that all men ’

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by nature desi re to know perhaps the first step towards the kind ,
of k nowledge that Aristotle h a d in mind is the Socratic re a lization
that we do not yet know— that the world of the everyday is a

re alm of s eemi ng knowledge .
Perhaps every advance into philosophical knowledge remains

4Mar ti n H eid gg A n Int d u ti n t M t p hy i
e t a ns by Ra lph
er , ro c o o e a s cs , r .
M nh im ( New H v n : Ya l Uni Pre s

a e
pp 146 15 1
a e e v . s , .
— .
tributary to man s experience of himself as the strangest of beings
’
.
Thi s exp erience may even be as we shall s ee itself a kind of , ,
knowledge perhap s the hi ghes t kind Wh at is clear at any rate i s

, .
, ,
that the desire for philosophi c al knowledge of whi ch Aristotle

spoke cannot be pursued in the attitude of the commonplace
within which everyday thought operates The element of wonder .
b efore the mystery of existence i s a constituent of the philosophical

ques tion and no phi losophical knowledge is possible ex cept in
functi on of that wonder .
Philosop hy does not consist so much in a s et of formulated

answers as it does in the entering into a certain kind of question .
Philosop hy is the a w a kening out of acceptance just a s Plato ,
emphasized for his own p urposes in the myth of the cave It i s .

5
the turning away from what everybody knows towards the real “
a s it is deli vered to my lived consciousness Wonder then has thi s .

, ,
strange double asp ect of placin g me before my experience yet

-
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p lac in g me before i t as somethi ng altogether s trange .
From thi s point of view it mi ght be said that the philosophy

,
of knowledge is co extensive with philosophy The search to

-
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explore and express the ri chness of reali ty i s always concomi tantly

an effort to deci de what I k no w in any given area Philosophy is .
essenti ally refl ection A nd reflecti on i s essentially cri tic al I c a nnot

. .
,
therefore have a metaphysi cs which i s not at the same time an

,
epi stemology of metaphysics ; nor a psychology which is not an

epi stemology of psychology ; nor even for that matter a sci ence , ,
which is not an epi stemology of sci ence That is every philos oPhi .
,
cal sci ence ( and i ndeed every science of any kind ) when fully
,
cons tituted and ideally achieved would contain a built in epi ste -
mology in the sense of a cri tical reflection up on the status of its

own assumptions procedur es and conclusi ons
, , .
In an other sense however there i s a real point in treati ng

, ,
epi stemology as itself a speci al manifestation of the philosop hical

quest In this sense the enterpri se of Descar tes of which we shall
.
, ,
speak in the next chapter introduces a rad ically new epoch in the
,
5 Rep ublic, B k VII

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The Sta tus o f Kno w ing 7
history of thought For it repre sents the stage at which philos 0 phi
.
cal wonder makes itself its own object Now instead of simply
.
.
wondering at the reality of change or time or self phi losophy ,
w onders at k no w i ng itself Man s question turns back upon itself

’
. .
A new era begins in whi ch he makes hi s own s ea rch to know the

obj ect of a further search : how do I know that I can know? By
what right do I question? Perhaps my wonder has no right to exist
— perhaps it is useless and I am forever shut off from the realit
, y
I seek to know With thi s question philosophy may be consi dered
. .
,
to come in to possession of its own essence for it would seem that ,
there is now here further to go .
With the Greeks and the Medievals thought stretches beyond ,
the taken for—granted in the object towards the really real With
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Des c a rtes and the moderns thought seeks to surp a ss the t a ken
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for granted which might be part and parcel of thought i tself to

-
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allow its own pellucid li ght to appear to itself A t this stage the .
general problem of knowledge emerges as a separate pre occupa -
tion : knowledge becomes problematic to itself .
TH E SITUATIO N OF CO MMO N SE NSE

The historical movement of reflective thought which culmin ates
in the emergence of the separate problem of knowledge can be
.
analytically retraced A t the initial phase of both histori cal and

.
ana lytical processes i s the situation in which common sense finds

itself The posture of common sense is a confident one mainly
.
“ ”
because it i s an uncritical one The man in the street ( whi ch .
is not the name for a sp eci al p lebei an brand of human but simply '
means everyone when he is not d eliberately p hilosophiz ing ) finds

himself in possess ion of a large stockpile of items of knowledge ,
about which he is securely certain and which he would think it

frivolous to question Maritain is no doubt right when he points
.
out that this store of common sense beli efs i s a mix ed one com
6 -
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pri si ng on one level such primary insights as the principle of non

i
6
Ja cques Ma r ta in The D eg rees of K no w led g e, tra ns
, . by Gera ld B .
Phela n ( New York : Scri b ner ) , 1 95 9, pp 82- 84 . .

contrad iction but reaching d own through many more dubious
,
soc i al convictions to a grab bag of i ntellectual remnants What all .
the various levels have in common i s that they contain items of

k nowledge whi ch the possessor regards as a terminus and i n which
his thought comes to rest .
Common sense thi nks i t knows lots of things : I e xist ; I have a

body ; I have a past with whi ch I a m in contact through my
,
memory ; my five senses put me in touch with an external world

whi ch is outside me and independent of me but which I can ,
understand as i t is i n i tself ; other men exist— there is experience

beyond my experience ; there i s a past of humanity history ; I am ,
certain of vari ous moral and p olitical principles by which I live

and conduct myself in respect to the rest of humanity ; a nd so —
forth The last item however suggests what is too easily over
.
, ,
“ ”
looked that common sense has an historical and cultural coefli
,
cient : much of what was perfectly plain to the Greek mind in the
age of Hesiod is s o much nonsense to the modern democrati c man .
O nce thi s is reali zed we w a lk more wari ly in describing the men

,
” “
tal condition of common sense as certitude .
C ommon sense i s well aware that i t is often deceived that mis ,
takes are p oss ible Op tical illusions errors in judging di stance or

.
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color and such total vagari es as hallucinations are common

,
enough Yet common sense does not us e the existence of these

.
erroneous beli efs to question the status o f its true beliefs A man .
may be very frequently deceived but until he uti li zes hi s deceptive

,
exp erience to call the nature of hi s veridi cal experience into ques
tion he is still comfortable within the confines of common sense
, .
For that reason the modern man i s not comp letely at home in
,
the p osture of co mmon sense For the di scoveries of science d o not

.
allow him to let them merely coexist wi th his beliefs about the
reality o f his familiar world O nce he has le a rned from science
.
“ ”
that the world as i t is out there by i tself is a swirl of atoms he ,
cannot help being puzzled as to how thi s world fits with hi s own
perceptual p i cture He sees colors hears sounds feels warmth and
.
, ,
cold But app arently in the universe that sci ence investigates these
.
don t really exist T hen he inevitably i s driven to wonder about

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The Sta tus o f Know ing 9
the status of the things he does perceive Are they inside hi s head .
,
a mere private universe qui te different from nature as it really is ?

,
O nce this di s tinction between appearance and reality has

wedged its way into consciousness it need not stop at factual d if
’
ficulties For in grasping this distinction consciousness grasps

.
,
itself as a subject distinct from the objects of its knowing and then ,
i s tumbled into the whole radical d ifii culty of how it can ever be
sure that it has reached the real object and not s irnply an apparent
object If knowledge aspires to s ee things as they re ally are how
.
,
do we know we have reached things as they really are ? In fact ,
how do I know that I am not totally confined to appearances and ,
that there is an ything at all beyond appearances ?

Just here is where epistemology is not only possible but neces
sary A thought which has reached this stage of reflection cannot
.
be satisfied by a return to the unr eflecting assurances of common

sense but must press forw ard to a new pl a ne The certa inty which
, .
epistemology now seeks is made possible by a doubt— i t is a cure

for a doubt ; which is to say it i s essentially reflective E very one of
, .
the assertions of common sense can be summoned before the

reflective question When epistemology settles or allays these
.
doubts we may get a reflexive certitude which is more entitled to

,
the n a me than the incurious acceptance of the pre philosophical -
man .
SCE P T ICISM
The objection i s naturally raised at thi s point that i n acting thus

epistemology is proposing a chimerical goal for itself For if we .
,
are to demonstrate the validity of our knowledge we will already ,
be making use of our knowledge and therefore already p resuming

its validity Some like E tienn e Gilson have therefore argued that
.
, ,
there is no problem of knowledge s ince the critical question can ,
not be consistently raised : real ism for them is an absolute pre

7
, ,
sump tion of thought and any attempt to justify realism already

,
E tienne G ils on Rea lis me tho mis te cr i ti que de la co nn a is s a nce,

’
7
,
et
( P a ri s : I Vri n ) , 1947
. .
I0 The Phi los op hy of Know led g e
represents a concession if not a surrender For this position
,
.
,
knowing puts us in touch with the real and that is the end of i t ,
.
Th ere is more than one w a y Of respond i ng to this objection TO .
begin with we may start by acknowledgi ng the posi tive insight

,
conta ined in it Wh at it stresses is the unconditional attachment of

.
thought to reality and thi s surely requires stressing The existence

,
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of knowled ge and the partial transparence Of knowledge to i tself

,
i s an ulti mate and irreducible given Thought ex i sts and the exi st
.
,
ence of thought testifies to i ts own Op enness to bein g No deni al .
or doubt of thi s Openness can be successfully carried through .
That is why the p osition of the absolute scepti c is the most vul
nera ble in the whole domain of hilosophy What the absolute
p .
sceptic contends is that m a n s mind is i ncap able of attaining

’
truth— that we can kno w nothing for an Objective certainty but are
confin ed to the fr ee play of our ow n subjective Opinions Unfortu .
mately for him however the very attempt to express his pos i tion
, ,
involves him in a d enial of it For he holds at least one judgment

.
to be objectively true— hi s own He holds it as obj ectively true

.
( and not a mere subjecti ve Opinion ) that man cannot know Objec
tive truth ; he i s certain that he c a nnot be certain The tradition al .
a ccusati on that the s cep tical position is self nulli fying and literally-
absurd s eems fully justified .
NO matter how he twists and turns the scep tic ca nnot help ,
implicitly denying what he is explicitly affir ming Supp ose he .
contents hi mself with merely d o ubti ng whether our thought puts us

in touch with re ality E ven so he does not escape incons i stency
.
, ,
for this doubt Of his is not a frame of m ind in which he merely

happens to fin d himself ; it is he maintains the correct posi tion
, , ,
and he argues with me that I ought to give up my dogmatism and

“
espouse his co nscientious refraining from judgment Yet to hold .
“ ”
”
his po si tion as correct or right is to believe that in this one
case he has reached the objective state of affairs and seen what
the prop er response to it is E ven if he goes to the heroic length Of
.
remain ing s ilent of taking no position at all still he does not

, ,
escape inconsistency For he has not lost the power Of speech

.
possibility of ad opting this answer we have also seen that thought ,
is irrevocably Open to being .
TH E EXISTENTIAL ASP E CT
Allowing proper weight to Gilson s position d oes not entail ’
accepting it wholly however for there is much to be said in

, ,
rebuttal We may hold with Marit a in for instance that the ai m of

.
, ,
epistemology is not so much to answer the questi on of w he ther I

can know but to d is co ver the cond itions und er w hich I ca n know
, ,
the ex tent a nd li mi ts of my kno wi ng T hi s seems a proper d efini .

10
tion of the ai ms and scope Of the philosop hy of knowledge and it ,
does not involve us in any inconsistency O n this progr am epis te

mology does not vindi cate my right to affir m but it maps out and
.
,
circumscribes the range of that right .
Nevertheless it will not entirely d o to stop here While there is .
much justice in the in sistence that realism is a presupposition of

thought and that i t cannot consistently be questioned there is also ,
something highly signific a nt in the fact that men have thought it

“ ”
p ossible to question this un questionable Maybe they have
-
not .
been justified maybe the question has not been a rea l question
,
but only a psychologi cal morass in which a confused mind found

itself But it is nevertheless a fact s i gnificant for epis temology that
.
the kind of knowledge available to man will allow him to get into
this p sychological morass Perhaps not every sort of knower would
.
be subject to the extremes of sceptical doubt : the possibili ty of

sceptici sm is therefore the revelation of somethi ng important about
man s mode of knowing
’
.
Man can get himself into the plight which some ep istemologists
assure us i s epistemologically anomalous the plight of worryi ng ,
whether he is not totally estranged from the tru th whether hi s ,
” “
mind s acts of knowing are not empty This is not merely an
’
.
academic issue for man s desire to know i s not just a matter of

,
’
10 Ma ri ta i n ,
op . ci t.
, p 73. .
wwled e
g The Sta tus o f Know ing 13
disinterested curiosity or a drive for formal correctness It is a

, .
” “
matter of existential concern What can I know ? is just another .
” “ ”
side of the metaphysical question What is ? or What is real ? ,
“
Here we ask How far can I be attached to w ha t is real ? How can
’
”
I assure myself of my contact with being? Man s knowledge is an ’
attempt to exp res s to himself hi s attachment to being The fact .
that i t is the prey to doubt is then an ontologi cal revelation of , ,
the nature of man and inevitably relevant to epi stemology .
Ontologi cally the ground of doubt is in man s fini tud e Unless

’
.
,
man were the kind of being he is he would have no epistemologi ,
cal problem But bec ause he is li mited in the way he i s this

.
,
limitation extends to his entire being even apparently to the , ,
knowledge which he c a n really be sai d to possess Man is not a .
being with li mitations ; he is limited being That is there are not two .
,
factors in man one entirely being and the other a kind of limiting
,
boundary— but even in the respect that he is he i s not Man s , .

’
whole being is shot through wi th nothin gness ; his knowledge arises

out of that being so that even where that knowledge is one might
, ,
“ ”
sa
y
, quite indisputable the little worm of noth i ngness can beg
,
i n
to gnaw on it Let us say that we know that the world exists : but
.
wait and before long there flowers wi thin that a fli rma tion the
,
blo s som of no thingness and doubts : perhap s I am wrong perhaps

'
I am deceived perhaps I am only d reaming , .
Without elaborating too far it may be pointed out that the role ,
of nothingness in knowledge is only one man ifestation of a s ectre

p
which threatens man s being in various gui ses T hink of the role of
’
.
death time separ ati on fr om others loneliness failure Opp osition

, , , , ,
to my will s in despair— all experiences in which the presence Of

, ,
nothingness is searingly felt In keepi ng wi th more than one con .
temp orary philosop her we may single out t he modali ty of time as,
especially crucial For time as the mode of human existence can

.
, ,
not be regarded as negl gible to the understa nding of human

i
knowing .
Man s knowing is a function of his mode of existing and his

’
mode of existing i s essentially temporal Man s existence is always .

’
not yet accomplished : he is the unfinished being who i s in the
- -
,
process Of making himself Man is not man in the way a stone i s a

m
.
stone or a table a table Th ese things are sim y identic al with .
themselves complete realized solid wi thout a fissure in their

, , , ,
existence They are what they are But as both Kierkegaard and
. .
Sa rtre agree in emphasizing man i s not what he is : he must ,
become what he i s To be a man i s not to be a simple self

.
11
identity in the manner of a stone a table an atom Man s ’

‘
, , , .
exi stence is Open to the future because it is Op en in the present ;

man is not at any s ingle moment i dentical w ith himself in pos ,
sess i on Of hi s own being That man exists tempor ally i s not only a
.
statement about an extent of ti me but a statement about human ,
existence at any moment of time Man i s a becoming whi ch never .
at any moment coin cides with itself : man is not what he i s Time .
is possible because man is not a s h ple self identity but a being -
forever non coin ci dent with himself

-
If this i s s o if man never simply coincides with himself but is

, ,
always other than himself beyond himself then man s knowledge , ,

’
“ ”
too can never be a matter of s i mple p ossession
, Just as man .
does not inertly coinci de with his being s o he does not coincide ,
with his knowled ge Just as man s being is a p erp etual becoming

.
’
,
an achi evement s o hi s knowledge is a p erpetual achi evement a

, ,
prize ceaselessly rewon O nce we grasp in all nai vety the truth
.
that time i s a re al component of human exi stence we will never ,
be incli ned to approach ep istemology without reference to it And .
once we ceas e to think of knowledge as something we either

“ ” “ ”
have or do not have as a static acqui sition many difficulti es , ,
will app ear in a new light If knowledge is a modality of human .
existence then it is s ubject to the same limitations as that exi st

,
ence ; just as man i s not what he i s s o he does not know what he ,
knows .
11
Thi s i s a conti nui n
g theme w i th Ki er kega ar d . It i s the centr a l s ub ec j t
Of hi s The Sick nes s unto D ea th ; s ee es p . the Op eni ng li nes o f thi s es s a y .
See a ls o Jea n P a ul Sa rtre, B e i ng a nd No thi ng nes s , tr a ns . by H a zel B a rnes

( New Yo k : r Philos ophi ca l L ibr a ry ) , 195 6, p lx ii . v .
The Sta tus o f Know ing 15
The p athos human existence consists in man s struggle to ’

Of
surpass the nothingness in hi mself and to found hi mself in stead

fast being SO too the pathos of human knowledge is in its strug
.
, ,
gle to found its elf unreservedly in the ste adfastness of certitude .
I wan t unres ervedly to be and I want unr eservedly to know My

, .
effort to be certa i n is one side of my effort to be I want to anchor .
myself beyond the nothingness of doubt But every struggle to be .
and every struggle to know t a kes p lace under cond itions whi ch
plunge it again into becoming This doe s not mean that the whole
.
process i s futile that the cyni c s vi ew of life or the sceptic s view

,
’ ’
of knowledge is justified What it means is that epistemology must

.
begin with a double recogni tion : huma n k now led ge exis ts but i t ,
ex is ts s ubject to the co nd i tio ns of hu ma n ex is tence O ne who begins .
by erecting a false i deal of knowledge as a set Of Objectified formu

las a tempor a lly straddling the min ds which thi nk them will tend ,
inevitably ei ther to a sterile and abstract dogmatism or to the

abject frustration of the scep ti c That human knowledge i s subject
.
to the conditions of human existence cannot destroy its cognitional

value It is only because of our integral human exi stence that we
.
know at all and our mode of existence which makes knowledge

, ,
possible cannot be regarded as a threat to it

, .
ANAL O G Y O F KNOWLE D GE
”
For what after a ll does it mean to know ? T his is a questi on
, ,
which many will feel should have been asked at the beginning but ,
there are certai n advantages in postp oning it unti l now What is .
“ ”
immedi ately clear is that there can be no question of a defini tion
of knowledge s i nce to de fine s omething is to render i t in terms of
,
something else which i s more si mply i ntelligible ; that is i mp ossible

in the case of what is i tself simple and ultimate Since knowing is .
a n ultimate and irreducible event it cann ot be conveyed in terms ,
” “
more fundamental than i tself Syn onyms like awareness or .
“ ”
consci ousness of serve some expli cative pu rpose but cannot take
us very far What is however desirable is to indicate the p ossible
.
, , ,
range of appli cability whi ch this word has for thi s will prevent us ,
from i dentifying knowledge with some particular brand Of knowl

edge .
We speak of kn owing how to do things ( drive a car type ) ; ,
”
knowing that certain facts are true ( Columbus di scovered
” “
America two and two are four ) ; and also Of s imple knowing
,
by acqu a intance ( the location of our house or the identity of a ,
fr iend ) These common uses only begin to indicate the divers i ty Of

.
possible s ignifica tions in the word sin ce each contains a further ,

“
diversity i n itself and reveals various ambiguities to our inspecti on .
We may be undecided for ex ample whether the word know led ge

, ,
” “
deserves to be applied more to the one who knows how to find
his way in a certain neighborhood because of a lifelong acquaint
ance with it or to one who knows how to read and follow a street
” “
map Of it ; who really k nows the route ? O r we wonder whether
the child s knowledge of the fact that his mother loves hi m is
’
knowledge of fact or knowledge by acquaintance and if we have ,
” “
d ifli culty in classi fying thi s and myriad other sorts of knowing ,
we may eventually wonder whether they should even be called

“ ”
knowing .
Many a man will deci de in the end that only a certain variety
“ ”
of knowing i s really deserving Of the term knowledge Thi s is .
what Bertrand Russell does when he reserves the term for the
brand of knowledge available to the scientist and allots it to others
only to the degr ee that they approximate scientific status A .
12
milder form of this restri ction might be the precep t of Vere Childe
that to deserve the designation k nowledge must be communi cable ,
in a symbolic manner Thus by definition I could not be said to

.
, ,
k no w something except insofar as it was capable of being emb od

i ed in an objectified form Thi s is in some ways close to the
“
13
.
familiar contention that the only real knowledge i s that which i s

“ ”
available to a ll and publi cly verifia ble — s o that the face which
12 B er tra nd Rus s ell, H uma n K no w led g e ( New York : Simon a nd Schus
ter ) , 1 94 8, pp X I, 52
. .
13
Vere Child e, Soci e ty a nd K no w led g e ( New York : H a rp er a nd
The Sta tus o f Know ing I7
the world p resents to the artist or the poet has no cognitional

v alue since i t i s not there for a neutral Observer
, .
In Spite of the superficial plausibility of these contentions it is ,
agai nst just such an unwarranted initial restricti on of knowledge

that the epistemologist must resolutely set himself Paradoxical as .
it may sound we cannot begin the philosophy of knowledge by

,
deciding what knowing is and then discover what measures up to

this defini tion On the contrary what is requi red is an initi al
.
,
”
openness to the multifaceted meaning of k nowledge as that is
discerned by critical review We must hold open the door to the . .
possibility that the ways of knowing may be multiple and that each
of these ways may be thoroughly enti tled to be denomi nated by
“
”
the term knowledge .
This point can b e put more strongly Not only ma y the w ays of .
-
knowing be multiple it seems that we ought to expect that they ,

”
be multi ple To expect that knowing would have one univocal
.
or identical meaning is actually what is incongruous The T homistic .
philosopher especi ally ought to be prepared to s ee this It i s hi s .
doctrine O f the analogy of being which prepares the ontological

ground for this expectation It is a fundamental premise of .
” “
Thomism that being is not a uni vocal term b ut rather an ,
analogous one that i s it means somewhat the same thing and

, ,
somewhat a d ifferent thing in its various uses The s imila ri ty .
which binds beings together and allows them all to be desi gnated
by the same term i s not the possession of some uni -
” “
vocally or identically shared property but rather a communi ty ,
of resemblance All things are ali ke in that they a re being but

.
,
they differ also i n Virtue of their being Therefore their mode of .

,
being makes them like every other thing but also makes them ,
different from every other thing .
Now i f there i s an analogy of being we also ought to expect ,
that there is an analogy of knowledge Whatever knowledge is .

14
,
14 L . M . Regi s , O P . .
,
E p is temo logy , tra ns . by Imeld a B yrne ( New or Y k
Ma cmi lla n ) 19 59, p 6 7 For
, . . a n o ta ble a ttem t o n the
p p a rt Of a thi n er k
i n the Thomi s ti c tr a d i ti on to exp lore the a n a lo
gi ca l r a nge of know l d ge e ,
s ee B a rry Miller , The Ra ng e o f In te llect ( Lond o n : G eoffrey Cha pma n ) ,

and however imposs ible it may be to define it what is clear is ,
that it is oriented to being If know led ge is to mold i ts elf o n the .
co nto urs of bei ng i t too mus t be a na logo us If the being of

,
.
person stone beauty justice thought color number is only

, , , , , ,
analogously similar then the kn owledge which is the orienting Of

,
consciousnes s tow ar ds person stone beauty justice thought , , , , ,
color number must be analogously kn owledge To regard i t as a

, ,
.
shortcoming of our knowled ge of another person that it cannot be

expressed in terms satisfying to the scientist i s equivalent to treat
ing a person and a s cientific object as univocally being ; to ask
that be auty provide credentials acceptable to the neutral observer
is to a s k it to be what it is not .
Man s kn owing as Heidegger rightly says is a letheia : It is

’
, ,
- 15
the unveiling of bei ng In as many ways a s there is the unveiling of.
being there are that many ways of knowing Tradi tionally epi ste
,
.
,
mology has tended to confine itself to sense perception and intel

lectu al cognition the latter being s omewhat nar rowly conceived
, .
But this does not appear sufli cient Knowledge is the event by .
which human consciousness emerges into the light of being We .
cannot prescribe in advance how being is to be reve a led The .
proper initial attitude for the philosopher of knowledge is a kind

Of humili ty before e xperience which is simply equi v alent to a total ,
Openness It is an attitude not unlike that which William James

.
“ ”
called radical empiricism and which he so nobly cultivated ,
himself ; or that which José Ortega y Gasset has referred to as

16
“ ”
absolute positi vi sm which is not to be confused wi th the shallow
,
positivism of those who arrogate to themselves this title .

17
196 1 ; the grow ing i nteres t of mod ern Th omi s s i n the ques ti ons O f t a ffec
tive a nd p oe tic k
now led ge, a n d i n the co ni ti ona l i m ort O f
g p a lue v ex e
p
ri ence, i s in d ica ted i n the i nteres ti ng firs t cha pter of thi s b oo k .
15 Mar i n H eid egger, B ei ng a nd Ti me, ra ns

t t . by John Ma cqa rrie a nd
Ed w ar d Robi ns on ( New or : H a rper ) , 1962 , p 2 5 6 Y k . .
16
Willia m Ja mes , E s s a ys i n Ra d ica l E mp iricis m ( New Yo k :
r Lo ngma ns ,
G reen 19 1 2 .
17
é O t ga y
Jos r e G a s s et Wha t is P hi lo s op hy ? tra n s by
, , . Mi ld red A d a ms
( New York : W W . . Norton 1960, p 12 5 . .
20 The Phi los op hy of Know led ge ' MW 01
utterance 111 judgment but epistemology is really concerned with

,
the question of the ground of judgment The truth value of judg .

-
ments is really decided i n terms of evidence a nd the real pre ,
occupation of epi stemology is with the question Of evidence Thi s .
question is wider than the ques tion of judgment It is even possible .
that there may be a real s ense to saying that I know more than I
ca n express in judgment .
Thomistic philosophers are in e ffect conced ing this in their , ,
“ ”
discussion of conn atural knowledge Connatural knowledge is .
18
knowledge which arises because of an affini ty Of the knower for

the realm about which he judges For example the artist knows .
,
what is right in a picture even though he has not studied aestheti cs ;

or the good man knows virtue in a manner distinct from that Of
the e thical theorist But this means that there is an evidence avail
.
able to the arti st and the good man which is lacking to the
theoretic al knower and therefore the epistemological question Of
,
the value of judgment is really a question of the admissibil ity of

evidence We can go further : the wife s knowledge Of her hus
.
’
band s love is expressed in her whole lif e and not merely in the
’
occasional expli cit judgments in whi ch i t might crystallize Could .
there even be kinds of knowledge whi ch we could not even express

in judgments at all ? Such might be the poet s knowledge of nature ’
,
the p olitical hero s knowledge of his own calling or the lived

’
knowledge Of the body in percepti on .
A s soon as attention is turned from the judgment to the evi

dence up on whi ch it is reared a ny overly narrow p reoccup ati on ,
with the form of thought is left behind The question of evidence .
is not simply a questi on Of p redicating concepts of sense p a rti cu -
lars It i s a question of the emergence to view of dimens ions of

.
- -
the real And thi s emergence may easily overflow the bounds we
.
have habitually s et for cogni tion There is a constant tendency to .
treat ideas judgments and reasoni ng a s cogni tive and other facets
, ,
of e xperi ence as co ni tion a ll i relevant But a s Gabri el Marcel

g y r .
,
18 On onn tu li ty
c Milla ra
p i t h
, p t 7
s ee; n d J que M
er , o i t i n. c .
, c a . a ac s ar a ,
Th R ng
e f R
a n ( N w Yo k
e o S i bne ) 196 1 pp 2 2 29
ea s o e r : cr r , , .
— .
The Sta tus f Know ing
o 21
among others has brought home to us we need o nly think of the

, ,
revelatory role of love or of hope to see the a rtifici ality of these

di vis i ons Love can be a prin ciple of knowledge an i nstrument
.
19
,
of vision Far from bei ng irrelevant to the question of knowledge

.
,
love can be the me a ns by which a certai n kind of knowin g can

occur One who loves another person k no w s him better than one
.
,
who does not Perhaps the reality of another i s only fully there
.
for one who loves him And conversely my love for another per
.
,
son can Open the possibility of a kind of self knowledge which - -
would otherwise be inaccessible to me O ne who does not love .
another may not kno w himself .
None of what is said here can be taken as anything more than

tentative and propaedeutic for cle a rly these truths if they are
, ,
truths need considerable buttressing They are only advanced by

, .
way of anticipation at this poi nt and in order to set the tone for
,
the most appropriate mood to undertake the critique of our

knowing There is every reason to think that the judgment occu
.
pies a special place in human knowledge and to a large extent it ,
is true that epistemology must p a y sp eci al attention to it But it .
must be seen as included wi thin the question of evidence And .
further the judgment itself must not be conceived after the fashi on
,
of a p ure logi cian or grammarian The judgment is the expression .
of the self s assi milation of reality It cannot really be appreciated

’
.
ap art from the total dynami sm of the subject by which reality i s

revealed to me A conviction of thi s will prevent any premature
.
imp overishment of exp eri ence on the p ar t of the ep istemologi st ,
a nd it will also prescribe the method he will follow in his critical
revi ew .
This question of method is the last i ntroductory poi nt and

should not need laboring The philosop hy of knowledge as the
.
,
attempt to assess the cogni tive worth of experi ence ought not to ,
be overbur dened with the paraphernalia of technical terminology ,
nor with the elaborate presuppositions of any philosop hi cal

19
G a bri el Mar cel, H o mo Via tor tra ns , . by E mma Cr a ufor d ( Chi ca go :
H enry Regnery 195 1 .
22 The Phi los op hy of Kno w led g e
system It should look as dire ctly as possible to experience and it
.
should use ordinary language T his is not to s a y that it can ever .
succeed in being wi thout p resuppositions since even ordinary lan ,
guage embodies theoreti cal catego ries But it will avoid approach .
ing its task wi th a thought schema alr eady consciously prepared ; -
to do this would be to insert that schema between reflecti on and

the reality it i s seeking to reach .
Russell s accep tance o f the normative character of sci enti fic

’
knowledge commi ts this fallacy for not only does it tend to exempt ,
thi s knowledge from criti cal review but i t casts the shadow of the
”
“
taken for gr anted across the whole of human exp erience and
- -
hi des it from our reflective gaze The same charge may be levelled .
at the ad mirable work of Louis Regi s w ho carri es on his ep is te ,
mological revi ew within a fully constituted framework of T hom i s tic

categories In order to survey knowledge we must comprehend
.
20
,
it Regis holds against the prior comprehension of the meaning of

, ,
i mmanent action the di stinction of act and p otency matter and

, ,
form substance and accident and s o forth Thi s will not do It

, , . .
immediately turns us away from exp erience towards interpretation .
Li kewi se Frederick Wilhelmsen s p rop ens ity for approaching the

,
’
subject in a str enuously psychologi cal manner and mingling the

explanation of the what of knowledge wi th the how ( couched in
the Thomistic language of species intentions immateri al forms , , ,
and so forth ) blunts his epistemologi cal point Right here seems .
21
, ,
to lie on the si de of those like Fema nd van Steenberghen who

stress the need of ep i stemology to build a ll analyses on a d es cr ip ti ve
method and to confine i tself to non technical terminology If -
.
22
Georges v a n Ri et i s correct it is useless to search the p ages of ,
St T homas for a solu tion to the epistemological problem for this

.
,
problem d id not exi st for St Thomas . .

23
20 Regi s , op . ci t .
, pp 1 5 1s s
. .
21
F red eri c k D . Wilhelms en Ma n s ,
’
K no w led g e o f Rea li ty ( E nglew oo d
C liff s , N J . . : Pr entice-H a ll ) , 195 6 .
Fernand va n Steenb ghen E p i

22
er , s te mo logy , tr a ns . b y Rev . Ma rtin Flynn
( New Yo rk : Jq s Wa gner ) 1949 pp .
, , . 22— 2 5 .
Georges Ri et, L ép is temo log ie tho mis te

’
23 va n ( Louvai n : E d i ti ons d e
l Ins ti tut Sup
’
é ri eur d e Philos ophi e ) , 194 6 p 6 36 , . .
The Sta tus f Know ing
o 23
On the s a me general terms it is not too fruitful to answer the

,
epistemological p roblem in language and categori es borrowed

exclusively from St Thomas for these categories were di scovered
.
,
in answer to quite different purposes either metaphysical or p sy

,
chologi ca l
. It is unlikely that St Thomas would continue to
.
address himself to the question with an excessive reliance on these

terms if he were alive today If we are to justify the existence of
.
epistemolo gy a s a separate and indep endent inquiry we ought to

,
cultivate a deliberate independence of a terminology which may be

illuminating i n other d irections but is a p t to be blinding here By
, .
the time we get through mastering typ ical technical notions w e ,
have left the freshness of experience far behind ; at length instead

,
of dealing with existence a s it gushes p ristinely forth we find our

,
selves closeted with brochures descri bing it at third hand What .
ever price may be paid in foregoing the precision which technical

language can provide it seems to be compensated by our avoid
,
ance of the airless atmosphere to which it confines us .

TH E CR ITICAL DO UB T
TH E P ARAD OX O F E RROR
With the refutation of absolute sceptici sm epistemology only

'
tands at the threshold Of i ts philosophical undertaking For to s a y .
hat we cannot doubt the capacity Of the human mind to attai n

uth ( i ts Openness to reality ) is not the same as saying that we
” “
annot d oubt anything that common sense is sure of A mi tigated .
ce ti ci s m far from being absurd is rather the first counsel for

p , ,
rui tful reflection E rror exists. T his means that one datum with
.
es ect to human knowledge is that it is capable of cO exis ting -

p
ith error Not all of our knowledge i s on equ a lly firm footing
. .
herefore the critical enterpri se in which epi stemology undertakes

,
0 review the value of our hab i tual knowledge can be construed as
m attemp t to discri minate between what is solid and what is

ra i le in our common sense convi ctions
-
T h d i fli u lt is how
g e . c
y ,
ver to find a criterion i n terms of whi ch thi s discrimi nation can

,
e made What i s the hallmark of well grounded knowledge which

.
-
ill serve to distin guish it from spurious knowledge ?

“ ”
O ne of the most radical and ingenious attempts to answer thi s

ues ti on w a s that made by René D escartes D escartes conce i ved
1
.
he plan of using doubt to overcome doubt One way of deci ding

.
hat i s uncond ition a lly certain and in dubitable i s to s ee how much

an be doubted If we systematically attempt to call i nto doubt as
.
uch of our knowledge a s we possibly can we will eventually ,
1
1 5 96—1 650 .
The Cri ti ca l D oubt 25
reach a point that is impervious to doubt and then our knowledge ,
can be bui lt on the bedrock of absolute certitude D oubt pushed .
far enough will eventually uncover what is indubitable if such ,
exists His suggested procedure which h a s the attracti on of a n

.
,
“
uncompromi sing rigor has been referred to as the universal
,
”
methodic doubt It i s universal because it will be extended with
.
”
out limi t or until it becomes self limi ting ; it is methodic because

,
-
,
it is a means whi ch reflective philosophical thought utilizes as a

method of attai ni ng truth ; it is a doubt not in the sens e of a lived ,
quandary but as a calling into question performed by thought

,
- - -
.
Sometimes D escartes starting point is mistakenly regar ded as a

’
-
vers ion of absolute scepticism but actually he is at the preci sely

Opposite pole to sceptici sm What the scep ti c wonders about i s
.
Whether we can attain any truth ; what Descartes wonders about i s

w hy we should ever fail to attai n truth For him the p roblem of .
the philosophy of knowledge i s not how we can know but why we

should ever fall into error E rror is a scandal for thought T here i s
. .
no question for D escartes that the mind is c apable of attaini ng
truth ; he had probably as much confidence in the capacity of

thought as any man who ever li ved and hi s procedure could wi th ,
more accuracy be regarded as that of a rationali st than that of a

sceptic He i s so convinced that the mind ought to be reaching
.
truth that error becomes a complete anomaly for him And it .
would not be too hard to s ee error as D escartes s a w it For we .
must remember that error is quite a different thing from i gnorance ,
which is merely not knowing It is easy to s ee that a limited

-
.
thought mi ght be i gnorant of many thi ngs ; it mi ght not s ee them -

.
That presents no p ressing p roblem But error does not consi st in .
failing to see something ; i t consi sts in thinking I know what I do

not k now or in thinkin g I do not know what I know
, .
O nce this incongru i ty dawns on us we will be arrested by the ,
paradoxical character of error A s a comp ari son : If I were asked

.
,
“ ”
DO you see the book on the table from where you are sitting?
I would a nswer ei ther Yes qui te easily or NO I can t s ee it
“ ” “ ’
, , ,
”
from here In the first c ase I would be seeing in the second not
.
,
26 The Phi los op hy of Know led ge
seeing ; the firs t case would be analogous to knowledge the second
-
,
to ignoran ce— but neither would entail error But surely a man .
who is seeing something knows that he i s seeing it and one who is ,
not seeing something knows that he is not see ing i t T herefore how .
,
is error even p ossible ? The same situation i s repeated whatever

“ ” “
kind of seein g is involved If I really s ee the answer to an
.
algebraic problem I have sol ved it and know the answer ; if I

,
can t figure it out I do not know the answer In the first case
’
,
.
I have knowledge in the second ign orance— in neither case do I

,
have error If I really s ee the correctness Of phi losophical reason

.
ing I assent to its conclusions ; if I do not s ee it I do not assent

, ,
.
In the fir st case knowledge in the second ignorance ( not know

, , ,
-
ing ) — but again But obvi ously people do make mistakes

in mathematical problems an d obvi ously phi losophers do disagree
( which should not be since disagreement implies error and not
,
only ignorance ) .
Th ere is a sp ontaneous tendency to dismi ss this dilemma with

the exp ostulation that i t i s a p seudo quandary ; it is simply that we
-
become inattentive or careless an d that we are not alert to the

,
full condi ti ons of the problem Thus a man who looks quickly
.
,
may mi stake a shadow on the table for a dark covered book or -
one workin g out a problem may mistake a 3 for an 8 E rror the .

,
suggestion is made intrudes because we go about our thinking

,
rather carelessly Now although from one standpo int this just
.
pushes the whole problem back one step further ( how can inat
tenti venes s infect it i s rather close to what Descar tes
himself was d i sp osed to believe E rror is essentially inattention
. .
But then knowledge i s essenti ally attenti on And one who wishes .
to avoid error and to attain uncondi tional knowledge has only to ,
rouse himself to an unfla gging effort of attention Thi s is really .
what D escartes hi mself attempted to do If I ask i n resp ect to .
” “
every one of the assents whi ch I give to the p urported truths
“ ”
which I know whether thi s assent is really justified I am as king
, ,
“ ”
D o I really s ee what th i s assent impli es that I s ee? If I have
the hardihood to wi thh old assent in every case in which I cannot
a fli rm upon attenti ve ins ecti on that the evidence to warr a nt this
p
started Descartes on the path of dubiety A s a student at the .
Jesuit college of La Fleche he had recei ved the usual traini ng in

,
Scholasti c philosop hy common to the curri culum of the day ( a day

now wi dely s tigmatized as the decadence of scholasticism ) TO put .
it mildly he was not impressed Th e widespread conflict among

, .
the philosophers of the p ast caused him the same dismay that it
has caused many a mind before and since That there shoul d be .
such a cacophony of voi ces on issues that mattered so much to

man was distressing indeed .
As to whether the conclusions Of the philosophers could be

doubted the answer was clear : i t i s the easiest thing in the world
,
to d oubt what has been endles sly doubted by philosophers them

selves Philosop hical d i s a greement i s a kind of mutual disparage
.
ment of philosophic al evi dence on the part Of philosophers them

selves The reason for the possibili ty of such doubt w a s not far to
.
seek The philosop hy Of the p ast had been too ready to admit
.
probable or merely plaus ible reasoni ng into a domain that should

have been reserved purely for neces s a ry ins ight What p hilosop hy .
seeks is certitude and certitude is only possible on the bas i s of

coercive evi dence ; only neces s a ry reasoning should have a part in
the philosophi cal venture O nce anything else is allowed to partici
.
ate we get the hodge odge of plausibilities and M la us i biliti es

-
p , p p
whi ch p hilosophy had become .
Nor was it one whit more difficult for Descartes to treat as less
“ ”
than certain the knowledge of the sci ence of hi s d a y since it w a s ,
largely built on the shifting sands of phi losophy i tself This we .

,
must remember would have been easier in a day when science was
,
s o largely dependent on inherited A ri stotelian notions of physic s .
Let anyone ask himself how hard it would be for him to treat a s
less than indubitable the fact that there are four fundamental ele
“
ments water earth air and fir e that each Of these has i ts natural
, , , , ,
” ” “ ”
place ( that of fire being up and that of earth bein g down )
,
and he will at once p erceive that the conclusi ons of science could
not offer much resistance to the critical doubt .
But surely,one may feel there remains a whole s et of ordinary

,
beliefs that still stands after these spe culative constructions have
The Cri ti ca l D oubt 29
"
been swep t away Perhaps we might treat the rough laws w hich
.
common sense makes for itself about the pred i ctable and reliable
behavi or of bodies as only highly p robable ( as Hume was to do
.
'
later ) and p erhaps we might fai rly easily succeed in imp ugni ng
,
the reliabil ity of our senses whi ch s o frequently subject us to

illusions but still that the bodi es about whi ch the senses and the
, ,
roughly approxi mate laws sp eak exist an d have t heir being i nde
pendent of us is not this evi dent? That other persons exist whose
, ,
life and consci ousness are not min e is not thi s undeni able? Or that ,
my ow n past exists my p ast whi ch my memory retains and assures

,
me of how can this be disputed ? But let us li sten to Descartes

,
himself on this score .
He will admi t that i t seems unreasonable to doubt many thin gs ,
“
For ex a mple there i s the fact that I am here seated by the fire
, , ,
attired in a dre ssing gown having this paper in my hands and ,
other similar matters But he goes on : .
At the s ame time I mus t rememb er tha t I a m a ma n a nd th a t con ,
sequently I a m i n the ha b i t of sleep ing a nd i n my d rea ms representing

,
to my self the s a me things o r s ometim es ev en les s p rob a ble thi ngs th a n .

,
d o tho se w ho a r e i ns a ne in their w a k ing moments H ow often ha s i t .
ha pp ened to me tha t i n the ni ght I d reamt tha t I found myself i n thi s

a rti cula r la c e tha t I w a s d res s e d a nd s ea ted ne a r the fire W hils t i n
p p , ,
rea li ty I w a s lyi ng und res s ed in b ed " At thi s moment i t d oes ind eed
seem to me th a t i t i s wi th eyes a wa k e th a t I amloo ki ng a t thi s p a p er ;
tha t thi s hea d whi ch I move i s n ot a sleep th a t it is d elibera tely and
'
Of set u
p pr o s e tha t I exten d m
y h a nd a n d
p ercei ve i t; wh a t h a p p en s i n
sleep d oes not a pp ea r s o clea r nor s o d is tinct a s d oes a ll thi s B ut

.
.
in think ing over thi s I remind my self th a t on ma ny occa s i on s I ha ve

i n s leep b een d eceived by s imila r illus i ons a n d i n d w elli ng c a refully on
,
thi s refl ecti on I s ee s o ma nifes tly tha t there ar e n o certa in i n d i c a tions

by whi ch w e m a y clea rly d i s ti ngui s h wak efuln es s from s leep th a t I a m
los t i n a s toni s hm ent An d my a s toni s hment i s s uch tha t i t i s a lmos t
.
c a pa ble of p ers ua d ing me tha t I now d rea m .

2
2 D es ca rtes Se lecti o ns , ed i t . R a lph M . E a to n ( New Yo k :r Scri bner

’
s ) ,
1 927 , pp 9 0—9 1 A ll p a ge r eferences to Des ca rtes

. . a re from thi s v olu me ,
a nd a r e fr om the Med i ta ti o ns .
This is the famous dream doubt of Descartes His p oint is .
easy to grasp When I dream I seem to find myself among objects

.
which are real independent of me a nd out Of my control And

, ,
.
yet they are not real and indep endent of me How do I know that .
I am no t always dreaming that the world which I believe to have

,
i ts bei ng outs i de me i s not really a figment of my imaginati on? As

fo r my body which seems so irresistibly real the body whi ch I
, ,
inh abit in a dream seems e qually re al and i s but the i nsubstantial

“
wisp of fantasy This is P ros pero philosophi sing : We are such
.
l
” “
stuff as dre a ms are made on ; or the mood of Schopenhauer The ,
world i s my idea This is philosophy at play with a vengeance

. .
But it i s more than that For it carries a melancholy note though

.
,
a muted one For what expir es in the collapse of the world in to

.
dream is not only the cloud capped towers and the gorgeous pal
-
aces but also the people in them : my fri ends my beloved ones
, , ,
the ersons i n whose reality I had counte d mys elf blessed ar e now
p ,
figures met in a dr eam not other than me at all but hollow pro
,
ecti ons Of myself

j .
Yet thought still clamors for its rights E ven if I am dr eaming .

,
still there are truths whi ch withstand the general catastrop he ,
truths whi ch I ca n still afli rm as unconditional Tw o and two are .
four whether I am awake or asleep ; a square has four sides i n

,
both the dream world and the world of common sense Is there .
any w ay in whi ch the methodic doubt can bre a k the defenses of

such seemi ngly impregn able truths ? Well ,
As I metimes ima gine tha t o thers d eceive thems elves in the things
so
which they thi nk they know bes t how d o I k now th a t I a m not d e

,
cei v ed ever tim e tha t I a d d tw o a n d thr ee or c ount the s i d es o f a

y ,
s u a re or j u d ge Of things still s im ler if a n thi n s im ler ca n b e

q , p y g p ,
i m a gined ? 3
If I sometimes mak e errors in mathematics without realizing it ,
what assurance do I have that I d o not always make errors ? This

3 Ibid .
, p 93.
.
The Cri ti ca l D o ubt 3I
cons i deration i s somewhat weak and Descartes in seeking to, ,
reinforce i t now reaches the extremity of his methodi c doubt

, .
Thi s is the hyp othes i s of the evil geni us by which he manages at ,
one stroke to shake the foundati ons Of every ostensible item of
knowledge he has including mathematical truths Why should there

, .
not be some higher power who i s toyi ng with me for hi s ow n

'
purpos es and who causes me to be filled with a ll manner of base

less convictions ? Perhap s I a m even the only person in existence
and my entire experience is p hantasmagori cal a film Of illusion
'
,
. .
p rojected by some p ower m ali gnantly bent on per etually dccci v

p
'
ing me and to whi ch no Object whatever corresponds outside of

,
myself :
I s ha llthen supp os e s ome evil geniu s not less

p ow erful tha n d e
cei tful ha s em lo ed hi s whole ener i es i n d eceivi n me I su os e

, p y g g pp ,
then tha t a ll the thi ngs tha t I s ee a r e fa lse ; I p ersu a d e mys elf tha t
,
nothing ha s ever exi sted of a ll tha t my fa lla ci ous memory rep res ents
to me I c on s i d er tha t I p os s es s n o s ens es ; I i ma gi ne th a t b od y figure
.
, ,
exten s i on m ov ement a nd p la c e a re b ut the ficti ons of my mi n d W ha t

,
“
.
,
then ca n b e es teemed a s true? P erha p s nothing at a ll unless tha t there

, ,
i s nothing i n the world th a t i s cert a i n .

4
But what then ? Is this equi valent to a state of paralysis ? Is

there anything that can escape th i s universal collapse ? Strange as
it seems there is : ,
B ut how d o I k now tha t there i s not s omethi ng d ifferent from thos e

things tha t I ha ve j us t co ns id ered of whi ch one ca nnot ha ve the
,
s li ht e t d ub t ? I m elf a m I n ot a t lea s t s omethi ng? B u t I h a ve

g s o
y s ,
a lrea d d eni ed th a t I ha d s en s es a n d b od y Y et I hes i ta te for w h a t

y .
,
follows from tha t ? A m I s o d ep end ent on b od y a nd s ens es tha t I ca n

n ot ex i s t wi thout thes e? B ut I w a s ers u a d ed th a t there w a s no thi ng i n
p
a ll the w orld th a t there w a s n o hea ven n o ea rth tha t there were n o
, , ,
mi nd s nor a ny b od i es : w a s I no t then li k ewi se p ers u a d ed tha t I d i d

,
n ot ex i s t ? Not a t a ll; O f a s uret I m self d id ex i s t s i nc e I p ers u a d ed

y y
4
Ibid .
, p 95. .
32 The Phi los ophy of Know led g e
mys elf of something B ut there i s s om e d eceiver or other very
‘
ow erful a nd very cunn in g w ho ever employ s hi s i ngenui ty i n d eceiv

p ,
i ng me T hen wi thout d oub t I exi s t al s o if he d eceives me a n d let hi m

. ,
d ecei ve me a s much a s he will he ca n never c a us e me to b e nothing ,
s o long a s I thi nk th a t I a m s omething SO th a t a fter h a vi ng refl ec ted .
well a nd ca refully ex ami ned a ll things we mus t come to the d efini te ,
c onclusi on tha t thi s prop osi tion : I a m I exi st i s necess a rily true each , ,
time tha t I pronounce i t or tha t I menta lly c onceive it, _

.
5
This then is the rock upon which D escartes doubt finally comes
,
’
to rest : cogi to ergo s um -I think therefore I exist No ma tter ho w

,
.
far the a ci d of d o ubt ea ts , it ca nno t cons u me tha t w hi ch i s the
co nd i ti on f or i ts ow n exis tence: the ex is tence o f the d o ubter . My

exi stence as a self then is the ultimate indubitable whi ch no
, ,
doubt can eradicate E ven if I am universally decei ved the act of

.
,
being deceived is an act of thinking and it delivers up the exist

'
ence Of the one who think s and is deceived .
Some clarification of D escartes po i nt is required First Of a ll

’
.
,
it must be noted that in respect to the content of the cogito what ,
i s delivered to him is si mply hi s thinking self The impli ed com .
lete formula is : cogi to ergo s um cogi tons I think therefore I am

p , .
,
a thinking being What the cogi to renders indubi table is just that
.
which is necessary to constitute it as cogito— and thi s means the

exi stence of a mind a consci ous substance It does not guarantee
, .
the existence Of a body Q uite otherwise When he reached the . .
cogito Descartes was not at that point assured of the real exist
,
ence Of hi s body which mi ght s ti ll fall on the decep tive side of his
,
exp eri ence It may be a body which only seems to be real a dre a m
.
,
body Much more reasonin g will be necessary before he can infer

.
any other status for his body .
5Ibid pp 96 97 A
.
, m k bly i mi l p int h d b n m d b y St
.
— . re ar a s ar o a ee a e .
A ugus tine tw elve centuri es ea rli er i n hi s d i a log a ga i n s t the s cep ti cs ( C o ntra

A ca d emicos ) . L et us a cce
p t your b eli ef , s a ys A ugus ti ne, tha t I am uni
ther e rema i ns
“
v ers a lly d ecei ved , and i nelucta ble tr uth :
yet fa llor , o ne
er go s um, I a m d eceived , ther efore I exi s t A ugus ti ne d id n ot go o n

” “ ”
— .
,
how ever, to ex tr a ct the method ologi ca l corners tone of hi s thought from

thi s truth, a s d i d D es ca rtes .
The Cri ti ca l D o ubt
'
33
But what is there from the beginni ng given absolutely given , ,
a s the condition for doubt itself is that I as a thi nking being a m

, , , .
More briefly it ma y be observed that when Descartes speaks of

“
thinki ng he is not referring exclusively to reasoning proper ;
,
seeing hearing feeli ng pleasure or pain willin g cons i dered as

“
, , , , ,
conscious Operations are all included within this term E ven

, .
though the status of their Objects may be in d oubt the consci ous ,
Operations are not in doubt Thus the mirage of which I am

.
,
( decepti vely ) aware may be unr eal but my a ct of being ( d ecep ,
tively ) aware of it is real .
The o bjection is sometimes r ai sed against D escartes that the

cogito does not actually represent hi s only original indubitable ,
that it is actually the prod uct of an inference an d therefore pre ,
s up oses that the premi se upon whi ch the inference i s made i s

p
anteced ently known What this objection supposes is that the
.
“ ”
therefore in D escartes aphorism indicates that we are dealing
’
with an enthymeme a suppressed syllogi stic inference which

, , ,
“
expanded into f ull form would read like this : All beings whi ch
,
think exist ; I th ink ; therefore I exist Here both the premise and
, .
the rules for the syllogism are prior to the syllogism a nd the cogito
itself would require the previous jus tification Of bo th Of them .
T his Objection however is not well taken The cogito is not

, , .
reached as the result of an inference a nd the ergo i s not the ergo ,
of the syllogi sm What Descartes mean s is that m full personal

.
y
existence is delivered to me in the act of doubting I do not find .
“ ”
doubt and then infer that there must be an I who doubts ; rather ,
“ ”
this I is d elivered in the act of doubti ng It is not inferred ; but .
co— immediately present ; thi nking is the ego in its m a nifestation .
The awareness of doubt is the awareness of myself doubting The .
ego s exi stence is therefore known intuitively and not inferentially

’
,
.
SUB E CTIVISM
J
It is app a rent that the pli ght in which Descar tes finds himself
with the discovery Of the co gito is not an entirely comfortable one .
While it gives hi m an irrefrangible certitude it does s o at the ,
expense of minimizing to a degree the scope of this certitude For .
the subject which Descartes has un covered in the cogito is a p urely

private i solated subject At this stage he is certain of the exist
,
.
,
ence of absolutely nothi ng but himself as a thinking be ing E vi .
d ently this is unsatisfactory and he is faced with the task of

,
making hi s way out to the world which is other than himself

starting from a purely private ego The task will prove to be
.
imposing one not only for D escartes but for many a modern
,
philosopher .
The d ifli culty must be stated in all sharpness in order for i ts

magnitude to be appreciated What is presumed in Descartes con
.
’
ce tion of ment al life as thi s is de velo ed in his mature thought

p , p ,
i s that the data of consci ousnes s are purely subjective states This .
is impli ed in hi s ability to conceive all the data Of exp erience to be

without self certifying objective reference E ven if nothing what
-
.
ever exi sted bes ides myself I could still have ex actly the same
,
experi ences that I am now having ; therefore the fact that I am

now having these exp eriences does not p rove that they exi st as
anything other than my ow n states of consciousness ; therefore
finally since consciousness a s conce i ved by D escartes does not
,
have an i mmediate objective reference to anything other than

myself if such reference is to be establi shed it must be as the
, ,
result of some kind of reasoning .
What we have met here in a stark form is the problem of s ub

ecti vi s m his problem a formidable indeed s nce
j T . i s o ne i i t ,
amounts to thi s question : if all of my consciousness initi ally has

the ex clusive value of a subjective state of my ow n individual
psyche how do I ever learn the nature of anything other than
,
myself or even rise to the awareness that there i s anything other

than myself? This question cann ot be taken li ghtly for in one form ,
o r an other it i s the questi on with which modern hi loso hy h a s

p p
been wrestling si nce D escartes It i s a question which arises i n
.
a ll its acuteness when we conceive of consciousness in a certain
manner the manner in which Descartes conceived i t But the

, .
vinced solipsists have existed they have for evident reasons never
, , ,
earned themselves a place in the textbooks of the history of

philosophy .
The awkwar d ness of solipsism is amusingly illustrated by an

episode recounted by Bertrand Russell Russell tells us Of a letter .
6
he once received from the logi cian Mrs Christine Ladd Franklin ,
.
,
ass uring hi m that s he was a solipsist and expressing surprise that

lots of other people were not also s olip si sts " Nothi ng could better
“
illustrate the academic character of thi s positi on— and yet it is not
only useful but essenti al to take notice of it For granted that .
,
nobody psychologically and exi stentially could sustain a stance of

solip si sm the problem for the epistemologi cal ideali st or s ub
,
ectivi s t is how given s conception of consciousness he can

j h i
, ,
logi cally avoi d it If a ll consciousness is subjective how can I

.
,
e ver be co nscious of anythi ng other than myself ? It really seems
that a single mi nded ide alist would fin d great difficulty in avoid

-
ing speculatively the solipsistic conclusi on What actually hap

, , .
pens as will be s een i s that those who begin by adopting an

, ,
ostensibly subjectivist star ting point eventually believe themselves -

,
to have discovered some feature of consci ousness which is exempt

from a p urely subjective status and which a ls o has Objective refer
ence Unless they were to do s o they would be perpetu a lly con
.
,
fined to their own indivi dual psyches .
TH E ESCAP E RO UTE
To c all Descartes conception of consciousness a subjective one

’
is to oversimpli fy and to do scant justice to hi s thought and i n an ,
attempt to present a rounded picture of D escartes we would have ,
to give a far better balanced expositi on than the present one We .
may offer the excuse that the pres ent examination is interested i n
only certai n aspects of his thought That there really is a s ub .
jecti vi st
p e ri l in his approach is indicated clearly enough by the ,
6 B er tra nd Russ ell , op . ci t.

,
p 180
. .
The Cri tica l D o ubt 37
“
u rgency with which he himself sought to escape it If he had .
stopped with the cogito he would have had merely the certitude ,
-
Of the solipsist but no thinker is content to stop there What is

,
.
needed is an escape route from the cul de s ac Of subjectivism and

-
- -
,
it is interesting to observe the route which Descartes took .
He reasons that by a careful reflection on the first truth ( the

cogito ) he will be able to di scern what in it guarantees its truth
and thus to use this feature as a criterion for further ce rtitude .
Why does he find it impo ssible to reject the truth of his own
existence? B ecause he tells us he perceives i t so clearly and
, ,
”
d istinctly that doubt is rendered impotent But if it were thinkable .
that a reality which was thus given clearly and d istinctly might
nevertheless be falsely given hi s certitude would be bas eless Then , .
in the very recogn i tion of the indubitability of this clear and

di stinct given is also contained the recognition that noth ing which
“
given clearly and distin ctly can be false A ccordingly we can
“
.
,
establish as a general rule that a ll things which I perceive very

”
clearly and very distinctly a re true .
7
Needless to say a great de al of criticism has been levelled at

,
this procedure of Descartes some Of it misguided It has Often , .
been supposed that this passion for clarity is simp ly a transposition

into philosophy of Descartes own fabulous skill in and admiration ’
for mathematics Whatever psychological justice there may be to

.
thi s it is not quite c orrect to equate D escartes emphasi s on clear

,
’
and distinct ideas with a predile ction for defin ition and exactitude .
The somewhat unfortunate phr ase refers princip ally to the evi
dential character Of a datum rather than to its exactitude ;
Descartes is concerned with what he elsewhere c alled the simm
,
” “
e ,
which others have thought of as the self e vident the self given -
,
-
,
the luminous the intelligi ble What he i s continually emphas izing

, .
8
7 D es ca rtes , op . ci t .
,
p . 10 8 .
On thi s , s ee Norma n Kemp Smi th , S tud i es i n the Ca r tes ia n P hi los op hy

( New York : Russ ell a nd Rus s ell ) , 1 962, pp 35 —37 It i s a fa ct how eve ,
. .
,
r
tha t hi s ow n exa mples
.
rt
tend to b e a her a b s tra ct : extens i on , sh a pe , mo
ti on, a nd the li e k .
”
is the intuitive character of knowin g : what I see I see The clear , .
and distinct is that which shines in its own light His stand is this : .
9
however much p ositive non derivative reality is contain ed in a ,

-
clear and di stinct idea that content is rea l; the distincti on between,
subjective and objective is suppressed and thought reaches what ,
has unqualified cogni tional value .

10
The question i s do I possess any other un—derivative positive

, , ,
and self luminous notions besides that Of my own existence ?

-
D escartes finds another such idea in my idea of the infinite be i ng ,
God The meaning Of this i dea i s p erfectly lumin ous ( clear and
.
d istinct ) If s o it has i n resp ect to whatever positive content it

.
, ,
contains unqualified reality Thi s i dea exists There must be that

, . .
in reali ty which s ufli ci ently accounts for whatever positive reali ty

this idea contai ns But I am a li mited being ; therefore I cannot
.
,
be the adequate cause of my idea of the infini te Nor can I regard .
thi s as an i dea which I put together by combinin g other ideas of

which I m ight be the adequate cause NO combi nation of finite .
asp ects will ever give ri se to a notion of the infini te R ather just .
the opp osite for Descartes The notion of the infinite is not really
, .
negative— it i s posi tive I could not even recogni ze something as .
li mi ted unless I had a p rior standard against which to measure i ts

limi tati on Thi s is more easily seen in his concepti on of God as
.
11
Perfect Being ; p erfection i s the primordi al notion and the recog

ni ti on Of the beings of experience as i m— erfect is only possi ble i f
p
I p ossess the more fully p os i tive notion Of the Perfect Then the .
only adequate cause for the existence of the infini te perfect being ,
i s the infini te p erfect be i ng , .
9 It i s true th a t b e co ncei ved Of a uni ver s a l s ci ence i n w hi ch a ll thes e

si mp les or lum i nous i ns i ghts co uld be lin k ed by a n eces s a r
y cha i n Of
i ntui ti ve i nfer ences , i n w hi ch a ll huma n know led ge could b e w eld ed to
g ether , b ut tha t i s n ot e s s enti a l to the pres ent co ntext .
1°
D es ca rtes , op . cit .
, p . 1 15 .
Ib i d 1 1 8, 139 14 2 D es ca r tes ment i s

’
a v ers i on O f the o nto
11 —
.
, pp . . a r gu
logica l ar
gume nt O f St A ns elm w hi ch ha s b een
.
, p ted i n va ri ous forms
a cce
by philos op her s li e L ei bn i z,
‘
k Sp i no za , a nd H egel, b ut w hich i s re ected by j

St T homa s a nd the Schola s ti c
. tra d i ti o n i n gener a l .
The Cri tica l Do ubt 39
There still remains the question of the external world H ow .
do I overcome the doubt as to the re al existence of material things

o utside of me and independent of me ? To do this D escartes has
recourse to two things : the nature of the perfect being and the
nature of my sense experience My sense experience i s not a con
.
scious creation of myself On the contrary the data which present

.
,
themselves to me i n pe rcep tion a re often imp osed up on me against

my will and desire As a s ens er I am a receptive consciousness
.
,
a nd therefore not an active cause The data wh i ch I sense must .
therefore ow e their existence to some cause other than myself .
But why could not this cause be God Himself rather than bodi es ?
As far as Descartes can s ee such a possibility i s incompatible
,
with the nature of Go d as a perfect be i ng A s perfect He is per .

,
fectly veracious and cannot be the author of any d ecepti on But .
I have an irresi stible belief that the experiences I have of bodies

a re imposed on me by the bodi es themselves and there is no way ,
I can extricate myself from such belief If thi s belief were not a .
true one if they were simply dr eam ideas i mplanted i n me by

,
-
God He would seem to be the author Of a uni versal and i nvincible

,
illusion on my part and thi s is incompatible with H is perfect truth

,
fulness Therefore D escartes concludes :

.
He nce we must a llow tha t corp orea l things exis t H owever they a re .
,
erha s no t ex a ctl wh t w rc ive b the s en ses s i nce thi s com

p p y a e p e e
y ,
p r eh en s i on b
y the s en s es i s i n m an
y i n s ta n c es v er
y o b s cure a n d con
fused ; but we mus t a t lea st a d mit tha t a ll things which I conceive in

them clearly a nd d i stinctly a re trul
y to b e rec o ni zed a s extern a l
g
Obj ects 12
.
We should not fail to note that Descartes return of the external ’
w orld to good stan di ng is an e xtremely qual ified one and does not ,
” “
apply to all that common sense includes under the term world .
Si nce God would only be gui lty o f deception i n the case where my
convicti ons were invincibly erroneous then it is only those features ,
12 Ibid .
, p . 154 .
of bodies whi ch clear ly and d istinctly belong to them whi ch are
certified as objectively real Which are these? They are those .
“
p roperties which are comprehend ed in the Object Of pure mathe
mati es This means extens ion and motion

. .
Whatever other features seem to belong to bodies either reduce

to these or else lose the character of being cle a r and d istinct .
Su ch things as co lor warmth sound pain resistance coolness , , , , , ,
taste and the lik e are not so evidently properties of bodies that
, ,
I am unable to di ssociate them from bodies It is qui te possible

”
.
to re a lize that these thi ngs are subjective experiences which I

attribute to bodies but which do not essentially belong to the clear
a nd d i stinct idea of body The only pro erty which so belongs is
p .
extens i on and therefore the world whi ch D escartes veraci ous

,
’
God has underwr itten is a geometrical uni ver se of matter in mo

tion This is the source of the famous Cartesian duali sm It ha s
. .
now turned out that the essence of mind is thought the essence ,
of matter e x tens i on E verythi ng th a t i s not real in the way that

.
matter in motion is re al can only be real in the way that con ,
sci ous nes s i s The repercussions of such a view are tremendou s

.
and multi directional Descartes di chotomy cemented the mechan

-
.
’
ical view of the universe which made possible v as t advances in

“
science ; but by treating the human self as a ghost inh abiting a
”14
machine it rai sed the mind matter problem in an extremely
,
-
exacerbated form .
D REAM AND RE AL IT Y
For purposes it is not ne cessary to follow out all the rami

our ,
fica ti ons Of D escartes thought but only those whi ch are perti nent
’
for the p hilosophy of knowledge The main questi on whi ch must .
be asked is about his point of departure : has he correctly described

human consciousness ? We will not be overly concerned about the
13 Ibid .
,
pp . 1 16- 1 17, 1 5 4 ss .
G ilbert Ryle s phra s e, The Co ncep t f Mi nd ( New York :

’
14
o Ba rnes
Noble ) , 1949, pp 15- 16 . .
The Cri tica l D oubt 4]
particular escape route which he found from his own s ubjectivist

beginni ng b ut about that begi nning itself Is Descartes translation
,
.
’
of the actual position in which human consciousness finds itself an
accurate and adequate one? Is the firs t indubitable for human

consciousness the experience Of itself as an isolated and individual
ego?
This question is a crucial one and upon the ans wer to it depends
the rest Of what happens in epistemolo gy In the philosophy Of .
knowledge everything depends on the point of departure If Des

, .
cartes is right in his point of dep a rture then we begin with him ,
in subjectivism and then must decide whether he really overcame

it and if We th ink he did not we must try to find our ow n escape
, ,
route This is what ensuing philosophy tended to do If we wi sh

. .
to avoid the subjectivist d ifli culty we must concentrate on the ,
view of cons ciousness which produced it This i s what contem .
ora r philosophy is doing The question requires a full airing a nd

p y .
,
the entire next chapter will be d evoted to it .
Some bri ef cons i derati on may be gi ven to the specific language

in w hich D escartes couched hi s doubt as to the Objectivity of the
” “
external world in particular to hi s dream doubt D escartes really
, .
“
does seem to be asking How d o I kn ow that I am not always
”
doing what I ordinarily mean by dreaming? A nd yet if this is
what he means his question borders on nonsense O ur ordin ary
, .
dream state is identified by comp arison with our waking con

s ci ous nes s We only know it as dream by comparing it with the
“
consistent organi zed coherent world in which we ar e veri dically

, ,
conscious of ourselves and reality It would be literally nonsensical

.
to ask : how do I k now that waking i s not what I ordi narily mean
by dreaming because if it were I wouldn t know what I ordinarily

, ,
’
mean by dreaming It makes no p ra ctica l sens e to wonder if waking

.
is dreaming ; if I could make a cri ti cal examination of my exp eri

ence in dreaming it would ceas e to be a dream Therefore Des
, . .
,
cartes is not in the condi tion of the man who p inches himself to
make sure that he is really awake ; thi s man s problem is a prae ’
tical one whi ch is soluble in p rinciple .

T herefore
we should perhap s take D escartes to mean something
a little less Vulnerable This can be put as follows Supp ose the
. .
waking state is just a s shut off from re a lity as the dream i s Not .
”
that it i s a dream in the ordi nary sense but that it i s as purely
,
subjective in its ow n way as the d ream Then our plight could be

.
e xpressed as a kind Of p roportion : just a s dream image is to s ense :
Object so sense Object i s to x And even di agrammed :

,
.
Dream image Sense O bject
Sens e O bject x
In oth er words perhaps in relation to the really real the
, ,
sense object is a n illus i on E ven this belief is not altogether precise

. .
It might only be t a ke n as emp hasizing that there is something more

real in a being than can be given to us by the senses that sense ,
.
p erception is a pale and part i al revelation of reality But there is .
nothing p articularly new about thi s way of regarding sense percep

ti on Plato had done it long before D escartes ; and in a way any
.
,
one who subscribes to the superiori ty of intellectual i nsight would
have to give some weight to it Of itself this belief would not

.
derogate the Objectivi ty of the reality given to the senses— it would

o nly consign it to an inferior place From one standpoint this i s
.
what D escartes is doing He differentiates between the s ensible

.
and the i ntelligible at the exp ense Of the former ; hi s criterion for
objectivity is preci sely intelli gibili ty ( clearness and distinctness ) .
He must then be classified among those who esp ouse Plato s dis ’
tinction between ep is teme ( knowledge of the intelligi ble and

’
necess a ry ) and d oxa ( knowledge of the sensory and contingent ) .
T hus far D escartes is only d i sti nguishing between the other

,
as given clearly and di stinctly to thought and the other as given

obscurely and confusedly to the senses Yet in the proportion dia
.
ra mme d above D esc artes may equally well be taken as em ha

g ,
p
sizing the s ubjecti ve status of the sense object and not merely i ts
confused character The comparison with the dream in other
.
,
words could be used to stress the p urely p rivate character of sense

,
awareness O n this basis Descartes i s claim ing not that the objec
.
TH E POIN T OF DEPA R T UR E
NSIDE AND
“
I O UT SID E
evaluation of Descartes should center not on his methodic

A ny
doubt but on the accuracy of his description of co nsciousness .
Give or take a few nuance s the employment oi the methodi c

,
doubt is inevitable in epistemology for i t i s s imply the critical ,
method self consci ously used and criti cism is the business of
-
,
epistemology The real question is whether Descartes in turni ng

.
,
the light of critici sm upon consciousness ha s really succeeded i n ,
tracing i ts authentic outlines Contemporary philosophers w ho

.
,
by and large disagree with the C artesian viewpoint concentrate ,
their fire on his analy sis of the structure Of consciousness a nd

the present chapter will follow suit .
By way of preface we may begin wi th an ad moni tion which

,
is elementary but whose usefulness extends much further than its

,
appli cation to Descartes thought For concealed at the base of

’
.
,
all subjectivi sm i ncluding D escartes is a false image of conscious

,
’
ness which thwarts all attempts to break thr ough to reali sm Thi s .
.
” “
is the image of consciousness as a container in whi ch reality i s .
p resent O nl.
y rar ely of course would things be stated quite thi s
, ,
.
baldly but the attitude i s op erative even when it does not find i ts
,
way into verbal formulation It is a perfectly natural attitude a s

.
,
is evidenced by our everyday manner of stati ng the relati on b e

tween consciousness and its object What I am aware of I a m .
,
” “
prone to s a y i s in my awareness ; what I am not aware Of i s
,
“ ”
outside my awareness Real ity as present to me at any given
. .
The Point of D ep a rture 45
moment is within my consciousness Sometimes we go on to say .
“
that it is i n my mind A nd sometimes the image is pushed to the
.
” “
clearly untenable li mit of saying that it is in my head .
However spontaneously we may fall into this way of speaking ,
it is nonetheless ruinous For having posed matters in thi s way

.
, ,
I am stuck wi th the image and with i ts consequences The cons e .
uences are d ire indeed For the briefest reflection will give rise
q .
” “
to an inevitable question If what I know is in my consci ousness
.
,
then how does it ever allow me to make contact with what is

“ ”
outside my consciousness My consciousness i s my conscious
.
ness a subjective occurrence in me ; hence if the reality whi ch I

,
“ ”
know is within my consciousness it is within me and my knowl , ,
edge therefore leaves me locked up insi de myself .
There is no need to think that D escartes proceeded according

to this explicit image ( if he had its shortcomings would have ,
been more evi dent ) The point is that his way of stating the prob
.
lem his way of describing consciousness is only possible if the

, ,
i mage is implici tly Operati ve i n his thought Hi s problem i s that of .
“ ”
winning thr ough to the other and certifyin g the varied status
“
”
of the other This must mean that he does not regard the other
.
as a pri mitive datum for consciousness and hence that reality as ,
present primitively to consciousness is not present as other but as

“ ”
within the consci ousness of the subject : i ts credentials Of other
ness have s till to be verified Many a modern philosopher has been
.
trapped into a si milar subjectivi st beginni ng by thi s i mplicit con

ce ti on of consciousness as a contai ner O nce the image i s i d enti
p .
fied it may be summarily dealt with For if anything is clear it i s

, .
,
clear that we cannot seriously compare consciousness to a con

tainer or receptacle .
To demonstrate this we need only con trast the manner in which

a co ntain ed thing i s li terally in a container wi th the manner in
” “
which the known thing i s in the knower A li teral relation of .
contai ner and contained is a relati on between two spati a lly exter
nal Objects When an orange i s in a crate i t makes p erfect sense
.
,
to say that the orange is from one s tandpoint still outs id e the
crate That i s the orange is not within the wood of the crate ; it is
.
,
.
surrounded by it but it i s nevertheless still spati a lly juxtaposed to

,
it O range and crate are touching one another and hence exter
.
,
nally related : it is perfectly possible to mark off the limits of each ,
to say just where the crate stops and just where the orange sta rts .
Now o bviously thi s is not so wi th the relation of consciousness to

its object When I am aware of the orange I cannot tell where my
.
awareness leaves off a nd where the orange begins I cannot

” “ “
.
“
point to some p o int in space and s a y Here I as knowing subject , ,
”1
stop and here the Object as known begins My awareness is not
, .
juxtaposed in space to thi s orange not touching i t not outsi de it , , .
True my head and the orange are sp ati ally related to each other
,
but this only proves that consci ousness is not goin g on ins i de
”
my head My consciousness does not stop at the limits of my
.
head at my eyeballs or halfway between my head and the orange

, , .
My consc i ousness is not sp ati ally related at all to the orange .
T hi s in sight may be e xpressed i n alternate ways We may use it .
to brin g out the non spatial character Of consci ousness and the
-
“ ”
absurdi ty Of talking as if the known Object is in the conscious
ness of the knower O r we may take the opp osite tack and aceon
.
tuate the interiori ty of known and knower If we should like to .
”
continue to speak the language of being in here we must recog ,
nize that this relati on cannot be understood from the s ide Of the
conta iner /conta i ned relation but that it is a totally s ui generis,
interiori ty The known is i n the knower if you li ke but to the

.
, ,
limi t of interiori ty— which is identification The known Objec t is in .
the subject in such a way that it i s impossible to di stingui sh the

limits of knower and known ; the knower in so far as he knows is
identi cal with the known Object in s o far a s it is known .
Th i s is the line which Scholasti c p hilosop hy has tradi ti onally

taken in an effort to emphasiz e the non subjective character of
,
-
knowing Whi chever way the position is phrased and they are
.
,
only verbally different the fact remains that it i s senseless to treat

,
A nd thi i
1 w h th we
s e t lki ng O f p e c ptua l
s so e n i u ne
er or
ar a r e co sc o s ss
i ntellectua l co ns ci ous nes s .

The Poi nt of Dep a rture 47
the relation of consciousness to its Object through the distorting

image of the preposition in Thi s i s no light observation for
” “
.
,
many a philosophical problem has arisen just because of a philos -
O her s inattentiveness to the tra s et by his own language If we

’
p p .
realize that any problem which a ri ses in regard to consciousness

from the direction of thi s image is a pseudo problem w e will have -
,
made a signific a nt a dvance .
TH E B I-P OLARIT Y OF CO NSCIOUSNESS

As a matter of fact much of the advance that contemporary
,
philosophy has made beyond the C artesian li nes has consisted

simply in reclai ming ground lost because of this image O nce we .
”
recognize that there is no p roblem Of getting outs i de of con
scious nes s , we have recovered an essential vantage point To be -
.
conscious is alre a dy to be outside oneself We do not have to .
break thr ough the conta iner of consciousness because conscious ,
ness i s not a container The circle of awareness includes the other

. .
Thi s i s what vari ous contemporary thi nkers are saying in one form
or another .
It i s al so what the Scholastic phi losopher h a s tradi tionally said

a gainst D escartes ep i stemology Here is where the counter analys i s
’
-
.
of consci ousness begins D escartes analys i s i mplies that consc i ous

’
.
ness i s pri mari ly self consciousness and only deri vatively con
-
s ei ous nes s of the other The prim i tive indub i table is the cogi to
.
s e lf and I must i nfer by means of the i ntell i gi bi l i ty conta ined i n it

,
the exi stence of the other .
Thomism has always held the contrary : the self i s only known
reflexi vel i n the knowing of the non self If thi s does not reci sely
y p
-
.
claim that the k nowledge Of the other is p ri mary and self con
- -
sci ous nes s deri vative it at least impli es that knowledge of self and
,
other are co tem oraneous and i ndi vi s i ble I only know myself in
-
p .
knowing the other In the consciousness of the objects whi ch my

.
aw areness encounters I am reflexively aware of my own ego ; but

,
my ego i s not a datum given in a ny sense p ri or to the object -

nei ther temp orally nor epi stemologically prior It is given along .
with it and unless the object is given the ego i s not given I
'
.
, ,
“ ” “ ”
lea rn to say I ; and I learn to s a y I in distin guishi ng myself
from what is other than myself It is at least si gnificant that even .
t
“ ”
D escartes has to app eal to a hyp othetical other i n order to be
the author of hi s own decepti on : the evil genius i s the hyp othetical
other who causes me to be decei ved univers ally .
It is the standard Vi ew of the Scholastic authors that self

knowledge cannot be separated from kn owledge of the Object In .
speaki ng of the min d s knowledge of itself St Thomas consistently

’
, .
does s o by regarding it as graspi ng itself as a potency in a certain

“
order the order of cogni tion But Potenci es ar e only known by
, .
,
” 2
reason of their acts and acts by reason of their objects ; hence it
,
is clear that the intellect only knows itself in knowing i ts objects .
For i t i s ma nifes t tha t by knowing the i ntelligible obj ect "the intellect] ,
und ers ta nd s a ls o i ts ow n a ct of und ers ta nd ing a nd b y thi s a ct kn ows ,
the intellectu a l fa culty 3

-
St Thomas
. often rei terates thi s
T he h um a n i ntellect i s n ot i ts ow n a ct of und ers t a nd i ng n or i s i ts ,
ow n es s ence the fir st obj ect of i ts un d ers ta nd in f th i s O bj ect i s th e

g or ,
na ture of a ma teri a l thing A nd therefore tha t whi ch i s fir st k nown by

.
the huma n intellect i s a n obj ect of thi s k ind a nd tha t which i s k nown ,
second a rily i s the a ct by which tha t Obj ect i s k nown ; a nd thr ough the
a ct the i ntellect i ts elf i s k n own
4
.
St T homas makes it clear that when he sp eaks of hi s mind s ’

.
knowledge of itself he is thinki ng of it as knowing i tself as a

,
capacity for truth ; this ii npli es that it only knows itself in knowi ng
itself a s thi s cap aci ty for truth that i s as the cap aci ty for reaching , ,
the other Unless it had alr eady reached the other i t c ould not
.
,
2 D e A ni ma I, lect 8,
,
. n . 111 .
3
S umma Theo log ia e, I, q 14, . a . 2, ad 3 .
S umma The o lo g ia e, I, q 87 , . a . 3 .
know itself as thi s capacity for reaching the other This is unmi s .
takably implied i n the famous passage from D e Veri ta te q 1 A 9 , .

, . .
T ruth is k now n
the intellect ina smuch a s the intellect reflects upon
by
i ts a ct; not only i n a s much a s i t k now s i ts act b ut in a s much a s i t k nows
,
the rela ti ons hip of i ts a ct to the thi ng whi ch rela ti onship c a n not be
,
known unles s there i s k nown the n a ture of the a ctive p rinc iple whi ch ,
i s the i ntellect i tself whose n a ture i s to b e conf orm ed to thi ngs ; hence
,
the intellect k nows truth i na s much as i t refl ects up on i tself .
There
is no question then of the intellect knowing itself a s a
“
p urely private ego It knows itse

. lf as an openness to the real a s an ,
a ttainment Of the real ; unless it had reached the other and thus ,
transcended the status of a private ego i t could not know either ,
the nature Of truth or the nature of itself .
This is a theme which many a contemporary thinker echoes in

hi s own way : the empi ri cal ego is never given in isolation from an
Object and can therefore never claim a more p rivileged status in
”
being than the Object E dmund Husserl s notion of i ntentionality
.
’
w a s origi nally put forward to emphasize this very fact : the nature
Of a conscious act i s such that the act is a reference to another .
It in tends or tends out to its other ; the intelligibility of consci ous

-
,
ness is its intentionality In Husserl s words all consciousness i s

5 ’
.
,
“ ”
consciousness of To be aware is to be aware of something and
.
,
that of whi ch I am aware has a status irreducible to awareness and

is just as indubitably real as my awareness A pur ely subjective .
awareness is not empi ri cally veri fiable ; we do not have to win our
way out from subjectivity to objectivity for we never find our ,
selves within pure subjectivity D O not forget that Descartes .

’
cogito self was an i nd i vi d ua l thinking subject a nd that he claimed

-
,
in effect that I can be i ndubitably aware of myself a s an indi vi dual

thinking ego without being indubi tably aware of the existence of
anything else This is exa ctly what seems to be unfai thful to
.
actual exp erience .
And thi i n turn i a v

5
s i n f the Old e S hola ti d tri ne f i nt n
s er s o o r c s c oc o e
ti ona li ty .
I do not discover myself as an indivi du al self except in rela tion
to what i s other than my self Consciousness is bi p o la r : it is es s en .
— t
ti a lly relati onal T O say consciousness is fir st of all to say self

.
aware oi non self Both p oles are empirically given Consci ou s

- - -
.
6
‘
ness is given as this bi polar relation Then we cannot remove -

.
one term of the relati on without eli mi nating the relationship itself .
Descartes thought that he could call the existence of the Objective

pole i nto doubt and still have the existence of the s ubjective pole ,
but i f the empirically given subject is essentially a relational sub

jcet this cannot be done To attempt it would be something like
, .
trying to eliminate convexity and retain concavity ; the concave

and convex ar e two si des of one relati on and are not separately ,
intelli gible Subjectivity and objectivity are two sides Of one bi

.
polar relati on and are not separately i ntelligible .
In order to make his analysis stand up it would appe ar to be ,
necessary for Descartes to be able to give an empirical meaning

“ ” “ ”
to ego or self which ex cludes a ll reference to Objectivity If .
he i s re ally thinking about the self Of experience then he should ,
be able to p oint to this self in such a way that he is not s i multa

neous l o i nting to the non self The trouble is that it is not poss i
yp
-
.
ble to do so The empiri cal subject is not anterior to nor more

.
i ndi sputably real than the empirical object I discover myself as .
subject by separating myself from the pole Of the other ; I come to

“ ” “ ”
consciousness of self by identifyi ng i t against non self The -
.
“ ”
I of e xperience is known refl ex ively by di fferenti ating i tself
”
from the non I Therefore i n knowi ng a self I also know a
-
.
,
“ ”
non self and hence Descartes discovery of the I co uld not be
-
’ “
“ ”
a discovery of the self alone If I means anything it means it a s .
,
“ ”
desi gnated against non I -
.
O nce again we must remind ourselves that these remarks hold

,
good against Descartes for he believed himself to be talking about

,
“ ”
the emp iric al ego ( the I as actually experi enced ) and not about ,
some p ostulated Absolute E go whi ch others have sp eculated to ,
underlie both the subjective and objective p oles of exp erience and ,
6 A lthough i t i s , s econ d a r i ly , to s a y s elf-a w a re-oi —s elf—a w a r e-o f-no n-s elf .

with these parents in these cultural surroundi ngs and so forth
, , .
The only ego which escap es this placement is one which I thi nk
of ; purified of all empirical intrus i ons the ego is contentless a nd ,
emp ty and therefore in Marcel s View inevi tably tends to d eteri

, ,
’
orate into some thing purely formal as it di d with Kant Such an , .
ego cannot be said to ex is t at all .
“ ”
What i s given to me beyond a ll cavilli ng is the I Of experience ;
”
but the I of experience is given as a focal point wi thin an
“
“
englobing situation and hence the real indubitable is the confused
,
”
a nd global experi ence of the world inasmuch as it is existent
9
.
What i s real is the altogether The cogito is di scovered by a .
retreat from the altogether ; far from being the p rimary datum it ,
is a derivative constructi on and in danger of bei ng a mere abstrae

tion Pure subjectivity is contentless subjectivity ; as existi ng sub
.
ectivit I am not pure subjectivity but a being b par ti cipati on

j y y ,
- -
.
This i s a key word in Marcel I am not an exi sting subject who .
a ls o partici ates in reality I am not a being plus partici ation : I

p p .
am a being by participation My existence may have more than

- -
.
10
one level but at every level it is parti cipation whi ch found s the
,
experience of subjectivity Marcel will not only disti nguish a level .
of incarnati on ( actualized via sensation and the experien ce of the
body as mi ne ) but more significantly a level of communi on in ,
whi ch I come to myself as spir itual subject through my participa

“ ”
tion in a communion of spiri tual subjects E sse es t co esse is .
-
true above all on the level of spiri tu al being : I am only an I in the

,
face of a thou T he prOp er beginning of metaphysics he says i s

.
“
, ,
“ ” ” “
not I think but we are The exp eri ences of love hOpe and
, .
11
, ,
fidelity whi ch are the actualizati ons of my particip ation i n com

,
muni on are not intelligi ble on C artes i an terms Fi n ally Marcel .

,
allows that I am a being beyond a situati on that my existen ce con - - -

,
9 Meta p hys ica l Jo ur na l, tr a ns . by B erna r d W a ll ( Chi ca go : Regnery ) ,
195 2 , p 32 2 . .
1 ° The M s te
y f B e ing v ol I ch VI
ry o , .
, . .
11
The Mys tery of B e ing v ol II tra ns by René H a gue ( Chica go : Reg
, .
,
.
nery ) 1 95 1 p 9
, , . .
tains a vector Of transcen d ence ; yet even here it i s p a rticipati on

which is decis ive For the acts whi ch found me as subject in
.
-
communion are al so the acts by which I expe rien ce the pull of

transcendence .
Perhaps no one has carried the rejecti on of the cogito self -
farther than Mart in Heidegger or made a gr eater attempt to found

philosophy on a new basi s Th e termi nological Obscuri ty for which .
he i s famous is actually a consequence of hi s striving to express

the tot ally unique mode of e xi stence whi ch belongs to human
reali ty Hei degger has in common with Marcel the conviction that
.
the starting po int for phi losophy c annot be located withi n k nowl
edge ; that i s if the self i s conceived along p urely cognitive lines
, ,
it always tends to become a purely thi nking subject and hence a

world less subject for whom the existence of the other becomes
-
problematical What is wanted is a recognition of the reflexive

.
12
a ctivity as app ended to the profounder reality which Hei degger
has named D a s ei n Instead of talki ng first about knowledge we

.
,
s hould talk about the human reality through whi ch there is the
ground of the possibility of kn owledge Man is D as ein there .

,
being the there of being the being thr ough whi ch being is re
, ,
vealed .
We should not pose man s knowledge as a problem of knowing ’
the world for man s knowledge comes to itself as the cognitive

’
side of a b emg thr ough whom there is world There is no question .
th at man s being is Open to the world for it is only his being that
’
,
allows the question Of world to be r ai sed As soon as there is .
Das ei n there is world for D a sei n i s being in the world Thi s ,

- - -
.
phrase i s hyphenated says Hei d egger because we are dealing wi th

, ,
a unitar y phenomenon The world is a correlate of D a s ein and .

,
Da s ei n is this openness to the world We should not sp eak as if .
there ar e tw o entities alongside Of each other between whi ch , ,
some relati on has to be vali dated The world itself i s not an 13

.
entity whi ch can be desi gnated as could an i tem withi n the world .
12 B i g nd Ti m p 86 A full d i cus i n i on pp 78 90 Of thi w k

e n a e, . . s s o s .
— s or .
13 Ibid .
, p 81. .
The world is a primary phenomenon which is always there in ,
ts tota lity for Da s ei n ; the world is a referential totality of mean

ng and it i s there in every relation Of D as ei n toward any and
,
very specific worldly item E very Object whi ch my action em .

14
loys incorporates in it a totality of meanings the reference to ,
hich is already there for me as an acting being and which

“
lllOW S me to perce ive thi s Object as something to be employed .
hi s relati onal total ity of significance cannot be d i scovered or

eri fied within the world for it is the world D as ei n always fin ds , .
his world as already—here And it finds itself as the correlate of .
e world A world less subject is never given It is therefore non

.
-
.
ense for Da s ein to rai se the questi on Of the being of the world ,
or thi s implies that it discovers itself as a world less subject -

.
D esc a rtes did not h ave suffi cient gr asp of the uni queness Of the
Ode of be ing of Da s ei n ; he lumped it under the heading of
.
15
” ” “
substance tr eati ng it merely as a speci al ki nd of thing along
,
ith o ther things He then had the problem of how this substance
.
ould make contact wi th other substances But Das ei n is not .
d equa tely grasped according to the notion of substance D as ei n .
” “
s not a thing : things are only there for D a s ei n because D as ei n
r imord i all has a world What comes first then i s not a con
y .
, ,
ci ous nes s Of things nor consci ousness of a thinkin g substance;

,
ut being correlated to world Probably we should not even s a

y .
hat consciousness comes fir st for consciousness always emerges ,
nto a scene where Da s ein and world are alr eady correlated Con .
scious nes s tends to translate this correlation i nto a cogn i tive rela
ion between subje ct and object but it cannot be represented by ,
Obvi ous ly w orld

14 here d oes no t mea n the phys ica l uni vers e . We
k
s ho uld ta e i t o n i ts o wn ter ms , or if a na lo s ar e need ed , thi n
g kr a ther of the
w a y w e ta l k a b out the
“
w orld of s
p or ts ,
”
the
“
bus i ness w orld , or the
”
methi ng li ke the mos t i nclus ive use of the term
“
p o li tica l w or ld . It i s so in
thi s ma nner : H eid egger s ’
w orld is
“
the w orld o f a ll w o rld s .
”
Thi s i nclud es
the no ti on o f a phy s i ca l w orld , r a ther th a n b ei ng i nclud ed w i thi n i t . See
es
p p p 7 9 92
. .
, of B ei ng a nd Ti me; a full d i scus s i on i s i nclud ed i n pp 9 1 .
14 8 Of thi s b oo k .
15 Ibid .
, p 13 1 . .
The Poi nt of D ep a rture 55
thi s means D a s ein ex s i sts ; i t transcends i tself it is always outside

.
-
,
of i tself .
All thi s is ultimately possible because D a s ein is the bearer of

, ,
the quest on of Being D a s ein raises the q uestion of the being

i 16
.
of the entiti es it meets because i t i tself is a transcending in the

” “
directi on Of Being The world is the gatherin g of entiti es under
.
the aegi s of Being The absolutely pri mary word i s the word
.
“ ”
Being ; the exi stence of D a s ein i s the speaking of that word and ,
in sp eaking it Da s ein polarizes the enti ties of experience and i n

,
hab its a world Da s ein then is not first of all a knower or a

.
, ,
reflective consci ousness but a mode Of exi sting by whi ch the ,
Being of beings can be revealed To know oneself thus is not to .
be awar e Of an indi vidu al thinking substance .
José O rtega y Gasset i s yet another p hilosopher who breaks

with the purely private self of D escartes H is fundamental concept .
“ ”
is the category Of my life and it is chosen because he feels i t to ,
translate the fundamental exp erience Of human exi stence more

faithfully than purely cogni tive language and to byp a ss the maze
”
which we enter as soon a s we begin talking of subject and
“ ” ” “
object For lif e is a border notion It i s two pronged and i n
.
-
.
-
no d anger of giving rise to the subjectivist d ifli culties about how

“ “
I get outsi de myself For to live means having to be outside .
”
of myself Life is inconceivable in purely subjectivi st terms
17
.
,
since it is a commerce or ex change between self and non self -

.
This is cle a rly borne out in b i ologi cal lif e although naturally there ,
i s no question of conceiving the meanin g of the notion wi th p ri

mary reference to this O rtega si mply i nsists that if philosophy .
wants to di scover the most radi cal reality of human exi stence as
its p oint of dep arture it ulti mately d i scovers the self as the d y
,
nami c exchange with the other .
16
On thi s , s ee Ti me , p p 244 —2 5 2 See a ls o hi s L e ttr e s ur
B e ing a nd . .
l H uma nis me, texte a llema nd e tra d ui t et pr s ent p a r Roger Muni er ( P a r i s

’
é é
Aub i er , E d i tio ns Monta i gne ) , n d , p p 57 , 5 9 , 63 . . . .
17
Ma n a nd P eop le, tr a ns . by Wi lla rd R . T r as k ( New Yo k :
r W W . .
Nor ton ) , 195 7 , p 48 . .

I am not a thin king substance for having said no more than ,
that I have not yet comprehended my mode Of exi stence as I

”
actually undergo it : a substance could be conceived as closed
“
i n on itself completed in its own borders But I simp ly do not

, .
experience myself in these terms I am an out going exi stence ; for .

-
“
me says O rtega ( in words almost identical with Marcel ) exi st
, ,
”1 8
ing is first and foremost co existing The world and my thought -
.
are in active correlation ; The consequence of this for O rtega i s , ,
“ ”
that I am not able to claim that I k now reality as it i s i n i tself ;
the world is not my thought yet it is not given a s independent of ,
my thought The p ri mary fact is not the self or the world but
.
,
myself as Open to the world or the world a s delivered to my ,
unfolding exi stence " My life is exactly the clashing of these two
9
cymbals I may burrow into my consciousness a s deep as I like

.
,
but I will never find anything more than my life ; and my life is
never pure subjectivity or p ure objectivity but always enco unter , ,
always the clash of the two cymb a ls .
With these sentiments Maurice Merlea u Ponty is in profo und ,

-
agreement A gainst D escartes he holds that human consciousness

.
,
“ ”
is not self contai ned ; no matter how deeply we penetrate into
-
ourselves we always find a reference to the other Nor i s this

, .
20
relation to the other merely cognitional : i t i s a relation Of being ;

it i s a pre—conscious and ontological i ntentionality For this reason .
,
he also agrees wi th O rtega that it is futile to try to di scover the

“ ”
world as it is in i tself Revelation Of real ity is made to the .
human subjec t and the human subject is always a s i tua ted subject
, .
Sp ecifically it is a bo d y s ubject Merlea u Ponty here uses pra c

,
-
.
-
tic ally the same words as Marcel : we are our own body R efl ec .
21
ti on seeks to di scover the authentic lineaments of the real but ,
reflection i s always up on the unreflected The opaci ty p resent in a .
18
Wha t is P hi los op hy ? , p 2 0 8 . .
19 Ibi d .
,
pp 1 9.7— 2 02 .
20
S e ns ( P a ri s : Na gel) 1 94 8 pp 1 43 s s
e t no n -s ens , , . .
21
P heno me no logy o f P er cep tio n tr a ns b y C olin Smi th ( New , . Yo k r
H uma ni ti es Pr ess ) 1962 p 20 6 , , . .

The Poi nt of Dep a rture 57
o ur finite and bodily mode Of existence i s never bani shed by

thought : my knowledge i s a lways conditioned by my existence ,
and hence when we speak of the real we will always be speaking

of what it is as bei ng for us - -
.
O bviously under these conditi ons i t is also futile to try to dis

“ ”
cover a pure subject My thought and my subjectivi ty ar e em
.
bedded i n a situated existence : man and the world form the most
radical sort of ges ta lt The world is my field of existence and my
.
22
subjecti vi ty does not transcend my existence My exi stence is .
bodily existence and my body is a dialog with the world The

,
.
cogito self of Descartes is not something that can be pointed to in

-
experience It could only be pointed to if our thought were totally

.
transp arent to itself but this is just what the Obscure ch a racter of
,
human existence precludes The pure thinki ng subject could only .
come forward if thought could totally bani sh the unr efl ected but ,
thi s hum an thought cannot do A ctually Merlea u Ponty will hold .

,
-
that even if it could do so it would be contentless since it is from

, ,
the si de Of our existence that meani ng ori ginates Our exi stence is .
an Openness to the world and meaning is the face which the world
,
presents within the Openness whi ch we are The subject enters the .
world as a question and the world always has the character Of a

,
reply We a re thi s questioni ng existence ; the body itself is in

.
23
set ted into reality as a living questi on Therefore the self which .
d iscovers its own source in a questioning existence has discovered

more than a subject .
O ne Of the most interesting of the alternatives to D escartes

’
point Of dep artur e is that proposed by Father Auguste Brunn er .
A p urely private ego he agrees cannot serve as the ini ti al ind ubi
, ,
table in the philosop hy of knowledge for it i s not experi enced but ,
is simp ly an abstraction On the other hand merely stressing .

,
22
Sens et no n -s ens ,
pp . 1 70— 1 72 . For an excellent p r es enta ti on O f thi s ,
see Remy C Kw a nt, O S A , The Pheno me no log ica l Phi los op hy of
. . . .
Merlea u Po nty ( Pi tts burgh : D uques ne Univ Pres s ) , 1963, pp 64—69

-
. . .
23 A a i t
g n for a n excellen p res enta ti on of thi s , s ee Kw a nt, op ci t pp . .
, .
2 1- 27 .
58 The Phi los op hy of Know led ge "
being i n—a world or i ntentionality is not s ufli cient either The
- - . .
intentionali ty of consci ousness is also an abstraction ; it i s a pale “
and p arti al apprehensi on of the concrete reality which is rea lly

the primary consci ous experi ence : the fact that I exi st in dialog
with a community of persons Here i s where Brunner begin s : with .
dialog The self whi ch reflection d i scloses is a self already

.
24
involved in a dialog with other persons The reflection whi ch dis .
”
closes the self has alre ady di sclosed the thou for the self of ,
” ” “
e xp eri ence is an I in the face of a thou and never anything
“
else .
E ven D escartes after all had to use language and should have
“
, ,
reco gnized that language is essenti ally s oci a l It IS ir oni c that .
D escartes i n wonderi ng whether p erhap s he alone existe d used

, ,
language to do the wondering— and that language is empirically

not a creation o f my rivate c ogi to self but a bequest of other
p
-
p ersons whose ex i stence I am tr yi ng to use i t to quest i on Lan .
guage i s clearly a border reality ; i t i s not the prop erty Of any -
p art i cular self but e x i sts on the fronti ers o f dialog It is a

p henom .
enon of di alog The first i ndubitable therefore i s not that I exist

.
, , ,
but that di alog exi sts My doubt i tself i s framed by di alog for i t
.
,
i s framed by language whi ch i s a p roduct of di alog E mp i ri cally .

,
I find myself within language Therefore the thou i s already given .

,
to me It i s empi ri cally given that language i s not a product of my

.
indivi dual self ; hence if the i ndivi dual exp resses hi s ow n exi stence
,
in di alog he has exp ressed more than his ow n exi stence D i a log
, .
,
Brunner holds gives me the thou as a primary p henomenon It

, .
also gi ves me the ex i stence Of the world as that about whi ch di alog
”
i s carri ed on : di alog contai ns the address of the I to the thou
“
,
” ”
but it also contain s the other of the I a nd thou to whi ch “ “ “
,
“ ”
d ialog refers The other the world then i s met as a thi rd in ”
“
.
, , ,
respect to whi ch a di alog beween p ersons i s held .
24 The F und a men ta l Q ues tio ns f Phi lo s op hy ( St Loui s : B H er d er )

o . .
,
1937 , 1 833 F or fuller tr ea tment s ee B r unn er s L a co nna is s a nce

’
a
pp . .
h uma i n e ( P a ri s : Aub i er ) , 19 4 3 ; a nd the expo s i ti on o n Va n Ri et, o

p . ci t .
,
pp 6
. 13— 62 1 .
not be vitiated by a susp ect p remise Thi s urge of philosophy to
.
establish its ow n foundations ha s driven certain think ers like

E dmund Husserl to an indefatigable and pe rp etual beginni ng over -
.
For the dilemma seems to be that if we begin with pure awareness

as our basis we seem to beg the question and if we begin wi th
, ,
anything other than pure awareness we seem to introduce M me

,
d i a tely the appearance reality distinction and to place awareness

,
always at one remove from its object T hus we may be thought to

.
be condemned ei ther to answer d oubt by appe aling to a place

where it is already answered or to make the answer to it impo s
,
sible.
In reply to this d ifli culty one point may be briefly made P er

, .
“ ”
haps the charge of begging the question is not entirely to the
point in a philosophical arena Somewhere along the line philos
.
,
o h
p y is probably inevitably going to beg the po i nt For i nst an ce .
,
“ ”
if we as k H ow do I know what I think I know? it i s not really
reprehensible to reply that in this or that case I really do know .
For if the answer to this question is possible at all it must already ,
be present to my experience Therefore when I appeal to the

.
,
privileged porti on of my experience to demonstrate that in this

case at least I really do know what I think I know I am not re ally ,
begging the ques tion— o r if I am it is inevitable The answer to

, .
such a question must either be alr eady available or it i s not avail

able a t a ll O bviously I cannot go outsi de of my knowledge in
.
order to justify my knowledge and s o the ground for the jus tifica
,
tion of knowledge must already be implici tly present to my knowl

edge And in calling attention to it I do not commi t a fallacy
.
, .
“
T hus in answeri ng the question How do I know that I am not
,
”
the only existent? I am not proceeding fallaciously when I s a y
“ ”
I know it because I know that other persons exist I am bringing .
into full focus a datum which is there but whose obscurity has
,
made the question p ossible Somewhere along the line a ny attempt

.
,
to deal wi th the ep istemologic a l problem is going to have to as

sume s ome privileged instances where my knowing does put me
in indi sputable touch with reality ( or it is not going to get an
The Point of D ep a rture 6]
answer at all ) The only vali d objection would be that a thinker

.
ha s foun d thi s where i t does not really exist For ex ample i f I

.
,
Were to mak e the scientific world view the absolute beginning for
-
my review of knowledge if I were to treat this as an i nstance of

,
'
where knowi ng achieved an ori ginal and primary contact w i th the

real it wo uld not be h a rd to show that this was erroneous : for the
,
s cientific p icture of the world derives from and p resupp oses a
whole prior contact of my awareness with the real and cannot be

used as an original justificati on of the truth value of awareness .
Nor is there any initial necessity to thi nk of the search for a

beginning or for a privileged contact with the real in the s i ngula r .
We cannot decide beforehand that there is only one such contact ,
for consciousness may in a plurality of instances reach a p rivi leged

d atum in whi ch the a ppear a nce /reality di s tinction is surp assed At .
least we have no reason for ruling out thi s possibili ty The begin
,
.
ning of epi stemology does not have to function as a p remise from

which ensuing truths are deduced Some tend to treat i t in thi s
.
way whi ch explains their anxiety to discover an absolutely un

,
“
questionable premise The beginn ing of epistemology need be
.
singular only if truth is delivered deductively ; if it is the product

of direct encounter of tho ught and the re al there is no reason why
,
the encounters should not be multiple .
TH E QUE STION AS IRRE D UCIBLE B E GINNING
The need to find a unified beginning is felt by the philosopher

not so much because of the nature of knowledge as because of
the nature of hi s o w n criti cal p ursuit He wants to bri ng the

-
.
bewildering variety of questi ons with which he is forced to deal

back to some kind of uni ty He w a nts to s ee knowledge whole
.
,
and thus is driven to bring it back to i ts own foundati ons The .
search for foundations is not actually a search for some privileged

item of knowledge but for the ground of the p ossibili ty of knowl
.
,
edge There mu st be someth i ng about knowledge which makes it

.
possible to answer the question of its truth value Knowledge -

.
,
which makes the distinction between appearance and reality pos
sible must also contain the ground whereby this distinction is
,
surpassed It must as knowledge in its own foundations a lready

.
, , ,
surpass the di stincti on between app earance and reality .
Now human kn owledge is also complicated by other factors as

, ,
we have seen Human knowledge is the knowledge of an existing

.
subjec t a being in a world ; it is the knowledge of a be ing which i s

,
- - -
not pure knower We must therefore reconcile tw o things : human

.
kn owledge must arise out of exi stence out of an extra—cogni tional ,
source and must yet a s arising out of that source contain the
,
grounds for surpassing it .
Human knowledge has its foun dation in existence ( which in

man is extra cognitional ) and yet i n that foundation must find the
-
grounds for surpassing the a ppea r a nce/reali ty distinction T his .
means that man s mode of exi stence must contain the gro unds for
’
surpassing that distin ction M an s existence whi ch seems al ien and

.
’
external to his knowledge must itself be such th at it i s the ground

,
of hi s knowledge a n d of any absolute which is attained by his
knowledge For to surpass the a ppea ra nce/ rea lity distin ction is to
.
reach an absolute ins ight Here then we emerge to a surprising .

, ,
conclusion : man s contingent existence must be the ground for his

’
contact with the absolute This is unexp ected For we might think
. .
that our finite and situated mode of existence would if anything , ,
impede and p revent absolute cognition If this were so there .

,
would be d i scontinuity between our cognition and our existence ,
and our situation would be an accidental and inexp licable append

age to our knowledge But if the foregoing reasoning is ri ght our
.
,
situated and perspectival mode of existence does not exclude us

from the absolute but i s actually what provides access to the
absolute .
We may approach matters in the following way The ep is temo .
logi cal problem is the problem of surpassing the distinction be

tween appe ar ance and reality and of justifying the hyper individu al -
value of our knowing Now it may be taken as a cardinal principle

.
that that which makes the a ppea ra nce/reali ty distinction possible

is not itself dubitable Here Descartes view i s beyond reproach

.
’
doubt cannot be ultim ate for doubt is generated because of the

,
possibili ty of distinguishing between what appe ars to be and what

really is D oubt i nhabits the chasm which is O pened between these
.
two It mi ght at first appear that once this chasm has opened for
.
our k n owledge then nothi ng can close it Yet thi s is not so For
, . .
there must be that in our knowledge whi ch a llows this app earance
reali ty di stinction to appear and the ground of the distinction
,
cannot itself fall on the side of appearance .
For Descartes the a ppe a ra nce/rea lity di stinction is s ufli ci ently

,
grounded in the exp erience of myself as an indivi dual thinking

“ ”
subject ; that is the i ntelligible p arad i gm for reality is that con
,
ta ined in my reflective grasp of myself as a thinking being and the ,
reason that the reality of other things may be called into doubt
is that they do not exhibi t this same intell igibility The notion of .
appearance on this View arises because I apprehend everything

, ,
besides my individual thi nking self as a fall ing away from the -
paradigmatic mode of reality which belongs to the self Thus we .

,
may say that the self is uncondi tionally re al for i t i s the ground ,
for the distinction between app earance and reali ty But if the .
criticism of the C artesian viewpoint is well taken ( and that is the

present contention ) this will not do The cogito self cannot s ufli
.
-
ci entl
y ground the ap pearance / real i ty distinction s i nce i t is not ,
itself an irreducible beginning We must go back behind it The

. .
self of exp erience i s not a private thinking substance but a self ,
which is transcendentally related to a world a fundamental ges ta lt ,
i n which self and other are configura ti ona lly uni ted What then is .
the irreducible cogniti onal beginning in terms of which the d i s

,
ti nction between app earance and reality is both rai sed and sur
passed ?
It i s the ques tion It i s my exi stence as a questioning bei ng
.
which generates the appearance/reality disti nction If I get down .
to the core of my knowing to the foundation upon whi ch my exi st

,
ence as a knowing being i s built what I find i s the questi on A t

, .
the absolute center of knowing there i s the ques tion Nothi ng can
, .
64 The P hi los Op hy f Kno w led g e
-
o
go back behind this— no doubt no scep ticism no error can con

, ,
jure it away ; nor can any subsequent knowledge be grasped except

a s a reply to the pri mordial questi on whi ch I a m A s a knower I .
inhabit the question ; I exist questioni ngly O nly because I can call
.
experience into the li ght of the question can I di stinguish betw een
app earance and re ali ty B efore this distincti on comes my existence
.
as a ques tioning being But this means that the questi on takes
.
p recedence over the ap pearan ce re ali ty d i stinction that whatever ,
intelli gibility is contained in the question is contained i nd ubita bly .
The i mportan ce of thi s can be overlooked because we are in

the habi t of regarding a question as something merely negative :
I do not know something and therefore I question A s such the
, .
,
question seems to be the pure absence of cognitional v alue It .
seems to occupy the terr a in of i gnorance to have no more i ntelli

,
g ibili ty than a negation What. i s pro osed here is that thi s i s not
p
s o th a t the question is actually the rimordial form of cogni tion
, p .
Meaning is first given to us in the form of the question ; man s ’
exi stence is thi s question The question is not as we usually

.
,
picture i t a blank negative po se d in the face of a soli d block of

,
reality To picture it thus is to emp ty the questi on its elf of value

.
,
to represent it a s a c ipher oriented towards a fullness Because we .
do this we find i t hard to grasp what one could mean who as

,
s igned cogni tive value to the questi on as such One only knows .
,
we feel what he can a s s er t; that is why ep i stemology i s often

,
thought to be a revi ew of proposi ti ons or judgments : a prop osition

i s the publi c form of an asserti on and only asserti ons are cogni
,
tiona l Q uesti ons express what I do n o t know But i n putting

. .
things thus we neglect to advert to the f a ct that underlying all

assertion i s the need to assert Why do I assert anythin g? Because
.
i mpli ci tly I have p revi ously questi oned The ri mordi al questi on
p .
is the ground for the existence of any assertion whatsoever T hi s .
i s what we overlook A s O rtega Gasset says the ulti mately

.
y ,
astoni shing th ing i s that man has problems at all Why should we .
have p roblems why should we questi on? In asking thi s questi on

, ,
thought sees that i t can go no further Man ha s problems because

.
he exi sts questi oningly .

The Poi nt of D ep a rture 65
If the question is the p rimary form of cognition then whatever ,
i s contained in the question is indubitably real But the questi on .
contains much more than the Car tesi a n cogito Surely it contai ns .
the self but not in an exclusi ve or even prominently thematic

,
w a y : it contain s the self as open towards the other The self which .
comes to itself i n the question comes to i tself a s op enness to the
other The other is just as present in the question a s is the self

. .
That i s the justification for Heidegger s and O rtega s viewing of

’ ’
the wor ld as the correlate of my exi stence Being is present to me .
questioningly : what is given in the question is bein g in its ques

tiona bili ty This is not playing with words for this p resence of
.
,
being in its questionabili ty is my ultimate assurance of i ntelligi

bili ty Reality is given to me as correlative to the question : then
.
,
in inhabiting this question I inhabit meaning and there is no , ,
escape from it I a m this dwelling in meaning becaus e I a m the

.
,
question The revelation of the world as questionable is its revela

.
tion as intelligible : thi s i s cogni ti on prim ar y cogniti on and it i s

, ,
given in the question The world is the correlate of my exi stence

.
because the world is the totality of enti ties as incorporated i nto

the question : because my thought is Open to Being i n its question
ability it i s the correlate of the world as i ncluded within the ques
,
tion of Being Se lf and world are the two sides of an experience

.
which is questi oni ngly op en to Being .
More than this what is given in the question is the fact that w e
,
quest on The question comes to itself utters itself in la ngua ge

i
.
.
, ,
Then i t is we w ho speak and we who question As the questi oner .

,
I am part of a communi ty of questioning beings We exist ques .
“
tioni ngly Thus He i degger will say that language is the house of
.
being : ma n as questioning existence ra i ses the question of the

” 25
, ,
Being of the beings he meets but he rai ses thi s question in lan ,
guage and thus Being dwells in l a nguage C onversely man dwells

, .
,
in the intelli gi bili ty of bei ng by dwelling in language Here Brunner .
i s ri ght Wh ere thought starts is w i th the questi on ; but the question

.
find s v oice in language The full intelligi b ili ty of the questi on i n

.
H eid egger, L e ttr e l H uma nis me, p 2 4

’
25 s ur . .
clud es the community of questioni ng beings w ho give voice to it
it includes di alog In inhabi ting the questi on I am op en to the
.
,
“ ”
thou who addresses me and who dwells wi th me in l an guage .
Contained in the question i s much more than the thinking sub

“ ”
stan ce of Descartes : the appeal a nd response of the I and
“
thou being in its questi onability the world about which I raise
, ,
the question of its being It can now also be pointed out how my
.
existence may be the foundation of my relation to the absolute .
For even on a pre —cogni ti onal level I exist questioningly : human ,
reality i s in serted into the world a s a li ving question As he comes .
to the consciousness of himself man grasp s his existence a s a ,
questioning ex istence But a ques tioning existence i s turned to the

.
absolute It is the p resence of the absolute the presence of being

.
,
in i ts questi on a bili ty Then man s prop erly human mode of exist

.
’
ence is thi s Openness to being .
If these contemp orary thi nkers are ri ght it m i ght be wondered ,

.
why Descartes s a w th ings so differently In s o far as such ques ; .
tions can be answered the answer probably i s that he d i d not carry

,
his e x amination back far enough He remained too much wi thi n .
” “
what Husserl ha s called the natural view of things which t e
26
gards the human entity as simply one among others even while ,
trying to subject thi s view to criticism When he got back behind .
“
the natural view he s till had not modified his concep tion of the
,
knower and when he resuscitated the self it was the self of the
,
“ ”
natural view with the other enti ties omi tted a n isolated thi nk —
“
ing substance If we carry reflection back to i ts ultimate ground

.
in human reality we di scover human reality a s a uni que Op enness

,
to being : both as exi stent and as knower I am a question i nserted ,
into re ality My pri vilege i s not to be a thinki ng substance but to

.
,
be th i s unique openness to reali ty My claim to a privileged status .
cons i sts in my b eing the s cene for thi s di sclosure of reali ty .
Descartes di d not s ufli ci ently recognize that the questi on i s more
26
E d mund H us s er l, Id ea s ; G e nera l In tr o d uctio n to P ure P he no meno logy ,
tra ns . by W R
. . B oyce G i bs on ( New York : Ma cmilla n ) ,
1 93 1, pp . 1 0 1— 1 06,
1 2 5— 12 7 .
TH E PR O B LEM OF PER CEP TION: I
NAIV E RE ALISM
A ny philosopher of knowledge will have some kind of problem

about p erception For the general realization of the bi polar natur e
.
-
Of consciousness doe s not settle every questi on that can be raised

about the objectivity of the whole range of data present to
consciousness The area of perception is especially replete with
.
perplexi ti es .
A t the star t we all stand in the comfortable assurance of com

mon sense whi ch proceeds on the assump tion that the world
,
presented to us through sens e percep tion is purely and simply

“ ”
there even when we are not sensing it It i s there a s such in
, .
,
the exact mann er it i s sens ed in complete independence of our

,
consci ous awareness Thus when my auto speeds over the highway
.
,
and I tranquilly behold the p anorama of si ghts sounds and smells , ,
which make up the countrysi de it does not occur to me to think ,
anything else but that I am perceivin g what is there as such when

I am not perceiving it I am awar e of the green of the grass the
.
,
solid ity of the hills the blue of the s ky the noise and clatter of
, ,
other cars the drone of an airplane overhead the resistance

, ,
of the road against the car wheels the gi ganti c collective shape of
-
,
the trees the motion of clouds the heat Of the July s un the
, , ,
mingled scent of pine and ga soline fumes A nd a ll of this is there .
for me as extended in space as a dense distance— as far as I can

,
see there stretches the voluminous expanse whi ch seems to s ur

,
round and contain me and my awareness This panorama is a .

The Problem of Percep tion: I 69
s uccessive one for the spee d ing car keep s introducing me to new
,
Vistas an d le aving others behind But it does not for a single .
ment enter my head that a s I leave each vista behind as the scene ,
which I beheld a moment ago vanishes from my view that it ,
ceases to exi st I assume just the oppos ite I assume that the scene
. .
upon whi ch I looked a second ago still st a nds there in a way i n

whi ch it stood there for me ready to be presented to someone e lse
,
( or to me if I choose to return )
, .
A s sume is even a poor word for I do not consciously as sume

“
,
thi s at all ; it is hardly a cognitional act o f any kind The O bj ectivi ty .
of the landscape i s a ki nd of hab i tation for my ow n being The .
s cenes w hich ar e U ahead on the road loom up for me alre ad y ;

p
my present consciousness i s a k ind of living towards the imp ending -
future s o that the objectivity towards whi ch I live i s at the base

,
of my re s ent consciousness T he absent other i s still there for

p .
me whether i t is the other I just beheld or am yet to behold The

, .
naive consciousness ( which simply means lived consciousness ,
unreflective non theoretical consciousness ) is sustai ned by the

,
-
“ ”
p ure thereness of that amongst which it moves and consequ ently
doe s not dream of questioni ng thi s thereness ; its o wn self presenc e -
would slip away if it d id so for it finds itself out there among

,
-
,
th ings .
“
Naive realism as it is called is si mp ly this lived acceptanc e
, ,
Of tot al objectivity— or the p hilosophical affirmation of the cogui

tive value of this lived acceptan ce It is often sai d that naive real .
ism holds that the preci se qualities which we sense ar e forma lly
there independent of sensation but this may be a wrong way of,
”
i t The language Of qu alities is p robably not apt for
“
p utting .
expressing the pos i tion of lived nai ve consc i ousness fer the latter ,
i s p rimarily a n a cti ng c onsciousness and moves among things not , ,
quali ties A thing i s for it a unified center o f action which i s s et

.
, ,
over agai nst my action ; it is that against which I act and which ,
reacts upon me It is both the conditi on for and obstacle to my

.
action Th os e philosophers are doubtless right w ho like John

.
,
Dewey and Max Scheler ascribe our o riginal conviction of Objec

,
70 The Phi losop hy of Know led ge
“ ”
tivity to the feeli ng of the resistance of the w orld My action .
a nd my will do not flow freely I meet im ediments and that is

p .
,
how I first become aware of myself ; an actor meeting counter

actors As an actor I am a unified center and things as counter
.
, ,
actors are unified centers met by me As resistant their reality is .

,
not conferred upon them by me ; therefore as resi stant they are ,
un u ali fiedly real and objective

q .
Since thi s i s the context in whi ch naive consci ousness meets the
world then a ll features Of that world tend to share the pure
,
“ ”
thereness of the world towards which action thrusts A s soon as .
“ ”
we begin to t alk about qual ities a nd to wonder whether these
are objective or not we have taken a step back from action for
, ,
qu ali ty is a theoreti cal term Action does not advert to qualities

. .
For it the separate features of the world are not met as separate
,
features but incorporated i nto the unity of the resi sting thing
, .
Green rough smooth warm blue solid sweet shrill soft round
, , , , , , , , , ,
large loud are experienced as imbedded in the resi stant matrix

, ,
” “
which i s the field of my acti on and not experienced as qualities ,
.
” “
When nai ve consciousness goes o n to distinguish an I from the
other it automatically includes these features on the side of the
,
independent other The fir st reflective consciousness is only a regu

.
la riz a ti on of the s i tuati on in which the acting consciousness fin d s

itse lf Whether this is justified or not is a question that may well
.
,
be rai sed but i t would seem that we must at least reali ze what
,
underli es naive reali sm .
LOCKE AND RE P RES E NTATIONALISM
As it happ ens when critical reflection got around historically to

,
os mg the problem of reflection it q uickly forsook the reali stic

p ,
outlook of co mmon sense C onsequently some of the p oints now

.
,
to be made in the course of an ex aminati on of the problem of

p p
erce tion as i t arose h i storically may seem to be somewhat in the
n ature of back tracking from the i nsistence on the bi polari ty of
- -
consciousness contained in the last chapter This i s inevitable .

,
l hwm
h The Pro blemof Percep ti on: I 71
s ince the thinkers who ini tiated the di scussion Of this problem d id
not begin with an acknowledgment of the bi polarity of conscious -
ness On the contrar y it was they who gave the subjecti vist out
.
,
look its most pop ular formulation the s o c alled image theo ry ,
-
“ ”
of perception Nevertheless it is useful to begin the examination

.
,
of the problem historically with th ese thinkers rather than in a ,
directly analytic way and this not only because of the i ntrinsic
,
interest to be foun d in their writings For the truth is that their .
viewpoin t is not merely a contingent historical peculi arity of their

own but it is o ne which reco mmends i tself to any human mind
,
When operating at a cert ai n stage of reflecti on .
It i s the vers ion of the British philosopher John Locke which

"
,
1
d efined the status of the di scussion for those who followed We .
shall have to concentrate on the mos t cursory p resentation of a

small segment of the thought of a man who was extremely influen
tial— i nfl uenti a l it may be out of all proportion to the p rofundity
, ,
of hi s thought and app arently because he expressed s o well a

,
viewpoi nt i nevitable in reflection .
His a im is similar to Descartes : to justify the us e of unders tan d

’
ing and to s et knowledge on a firm footi ng His aim li ke Des

,
.
,
cartes i s to carry thought back to i ts ow n foundations But he

’
.
,
010655 does not accept the elevati on of the intelligi ble over the sensible .
Rather he regards a ll intelli gi bility as derivative from the senses

,
.
“
His famous compari son of the mi nd of man at birth with a ta bula
ra s a a blank tablet upon whi ch nothi ng ha s yet been written is
, ,
” “
meant not only to di spense wi th any recourse to innate ideas ,
but to prep are the explanation of how meani ng is put together by

an elaboration of sensory data We k now nothing which has not .
been derived from the senses ; the only origi nal writing upon the
tablet of the mind i s that whi ch i s inscribed by the senses Locke .
is thus an empiri cist in the most fa mili ar philosophical meani ng

“
,
of that word : a sense em ir i ci st one who holds that all content

p ,
of thought i s eventually reduci ble to a sense reference -

.
1 1 632— 1 704 .
72 The Phi los op hy of Know led ge z
While many interesting contributions to the psychology of,

knowledge are made in the course of Locke s attempt to trace out ’
how we build up our complex thought meanings fro m simple -
beginni ngs it is hi s w a y of conceiving the objects of this

,
experience which p rovides the key to his epistemology What w e . ,
“
know according to Locke i s an idea This is a highly significant
, , .
word with which to begin for it immedi ately gets us entan gled i n , ,
the image theory of perception Most people would say they are .
aware of things For Locke however the Object of aw areness i s

.
, ,
an idea No more than with Descartes does this mean ex clusively

.
“ ” “
a concept Rather it is : the object of understanding whenever
.
a man thinks ; I have used it to exp ress whatever is me a nt by

p h antasm notion spec i,es or w hatever i t is which the mind can
, ,
be employed about in thinking An idea again is the , ,

“
immediate Object of perception The p remises here s ee m to be

”3
.
those which are operative in all such begi nnings : that Of which I
am aware i s present to my awarenes s ; it i s therefore present wi thin
my awareness ; if it is wi thin my consciousness it is a mental ,
datum ; therefore it is an idea So data like white round cold .

, , , ,
mo ving solid sweet p ai n ful extended are all ideas

, , , , , .
Now Obviously one who begins here with Lo cke has the imme
,
di ate problem : if what I am immediately aware of in perception i s

an idea and if an i dea is a mental event and hence subjective
, ,
then in what sense is my percep tion a revelation of anything o ther

than myself? Is reality at all like my i dea? H OW do I k now it is if ,
I never know extra mental re a lity but only id ea s ? The experience

-
,
of seein g blue feeling something smooth tasti ng somethin g sweet

, , ,
hearing a shrill noise feeli ng heat are experi ences going on in , ,
me— but how d o I kn ow that they reveal anything of the ways

things are in themselves ? When I am not sensi ng things are they ,
really blue smooth sweet shrill ho t soli d extended shaped ?

, , , , , , ,
( New York : Scri b ner s )

ed i t by Sterli ng La mprech t ’
2 L ock e Selecti o ns , .
,
1928 p 95 All references to Lo cke a re to thi s volume ( Quota ti o ns a re from

, . .
hi s E s s a y C o ncer n ing H uma n Und er s ta nd i ng ) .
3 Ibi d .
, p.2 05 .
Here is Locke s problem It is an acute one How do I know

’
. .
th at my ideas resemble things ? Are bodies really like the ideas I

have of them ? We cannot si mply assume that they are
we not thi nk ( a s p erha p s usu ally i s d one ) th a t they a re

ma y
ex a ctly the i m a ges a n d re s embla nces O f somethin g inh erent in the
s ubj ect ; mo s t of thes e of s ens ati on b eing i n the m in d n o more the
lik eness of s omethi ng exi s ting wi thout us than the n a mes th a t sta nd ,
for them ar e the li k eness of our idea s w hi ch yet up on hea ri ng they ,
area p t to ex ci te i n us
4
.
Ideas are my ways of subjectively reacting to the i nfluences which

odies bring to bear on me Th ey are the rep resentati ons i n my
b .
cons ciousness of bodies outside me mental copies or i mages of ,
these bo d ies But are they good copies? How far d o they resemble
.
the origi nal ? Here Locke di stingui shes Wh at I d irectly know are “
ideas but in respect to some of these ideas I can infer tha t they
, ,
really d o resemble qualities which are foun d i n the objec ts them

Selves The re are certain qualities whi ch belong essenti ally to
.
bodi es a nd which are i nsep ar able from them so that a b ody co uld
, ,
nei ther be conceived nor exi st wi thout these qu alities : su ch are ‘
solidity extens i on figure motion or rest and numbe r Th ese

, , , , .
Locke denominates primary qu a lities and he concludes that Our

” “
,
ideas of such quali ties represent what is found as such in bodi es

themselves Not all ideas are s o objectively well founded Such
. .
features as color sound taste are not essentially contained in the

, , ,
Concept of body ; they are s i m l sensations caused in us by the

py
p rimary qu a lities and by no means o n an equally Objective footing .
T he i d e a s p rim arof
y q u a li ti es o f b od i e s a r e res emb la n c es of them a nd ,
their p a ttern s d o re a lly exi st i n the bo d i es thems elves ; but the i d eas ,
p ro d uc ed i n us b
y th es e s e c o n d a ry q u ali ti e s h a ve n o r esem b la nce,of
them a t a ll There i s nothing lik e our i d eas exi s ting in the bodi es them
.
selves They a re i n the b od ies we d en omi n a te from them only a

.
, ,
4
1 bi d .
74 Phi los op hy of Know led g e The
p ow er to
p r o d uc e thes e s ens a ti ons i n us : a nd wh a t i s s weet b lue or ,
wa rm i n i d ea i s b ut the certa in bulk figure a nd moti on O f the in

, , ,
sens ible p a rts i n the bod i es thems elves whi ch w e c a ll s o ,

.
5
If we wi sh then to sp eak of color sound taste as being

, , , , ,
”
“
objective the most we can mean i s that there is a p ower in
,
objects s ufli ci ent to cause these subjective impressions in me

.
.
There is some reason w hy we s ee the grass as green rather than ,
red ; taste sugar as sweet and lemon as sour ; hear a grating noi se
rather than a melo d ious one But apart from our conscious experi .
ence these things a re not there as such

,
T ak e awa y the sens a ti on of them ; let not the eyes s ee li ght or colours , ,
nor the ea rs hea r s ou nd s ; let the a la te n ot t a s te n or the n os e s mell;

p ,
an d a ll c olours ta s tes od ours a nd so und s a s they a re s uch p a rti cula r

'
, , , ,
i dea s va ni s h a nd c ea se an d are red uced to th ei r c a uses i e bulk

, , , . .
,
figure a nd moti on of p a rts

, .
6
What Locke leaves us with then i s a geometri cal universe in

- _
, , ,
whi ch the Objective real i ty Of the world i s reduced to the bulk

” “
and motion of extended bodies and everythi ng else i s r elegated to .
the su bjective He was by no means alone in this way of seeing

.
things D escartes as we saw sai d essentially the same thing ;

.
, ,
Galileo Hobbes Newton all concurred and thi s vi ew bec am e in

, , ,
7
,
fact the standard scientific and p hilosophi cal belief throughout the
1 8th century It i s not too much to say that it is the view whi ch is
.
most i mmediately superi mp osed by our culture on the p rimi tive

n ai ve view ; with the pe rmeati on through every educated and quasi
educated mind Of the scientific way of conceivi ng the world many ,
people tend at the level of thei r exp ressed beliefs to assume the
, ,
truth Of this outlook E very h igh school student knows that of .

“
” ”
course the s ky i sn t really blue sugar isn t really sweet water ’
,
’ “
,
5 Ibi d .
,
p 2 07
. .
6
Ibid .
7
O n this , s ee E . A . B ur tt, The Me ta p hys ica l F o und a tio ns o f Mo d ern
Phy s ica l S c i ence ( New York : D oubled a y A nchor B oo ks ) ,
195 4 .
76 The Phi los op hy of Kno w led g e J eP'
h
T
BE RK E LE Y
The term refutation should be used sp aringly in philosophy ,
but one case where it is clearly applicable i s to Berkeley s rebutt al

’
to Locke It certainly seems just to s a y that if we begi n where

.
Locke began we should logically finish where Berkeley finished

, .
George Berkeley bishop i n the Iri sh Anglican church was

, ,
9
promp ted by the hi ghest Spiri tual moti ves in his philosophizing .
Vi ews li ke that of Locke mi ght not be as d irectly rep rehensible a s .
those s a y of the materiali st T homas Hobbes ( who reduced mind

, ,
to the motion of atoms ) but they played into the materialists ,

’
“ ”
ha nds through their grantin g a mysterious material substance
co equ al autonomy with the re a lity Of mind He who undertakes to
-
.
overthrow materi ali s m may make out a splendi d cas e for himself
if he can simp ly show that what the materi ali st mean s by matter
does not exist ; thi s i s what Berkeley p roposed to do Locke s .
’
“
material substance supp osed to be independent of mind i s a
, ,
myth If genuine reality is spiritual then all specious objections to

.
, ,
the exi stence of God and the immortality of the soul fall away .
A nd it i s the easiest thing in the world to show that real ity i s

spiritual .
Let us just tak e Locke at his own word : what we kno w d irectly
are ideas Berkeley does not qu a rrel wi th thi s— he emphasizes i t
.
to the utmost degree What we know d i rectly— color sound taste

.
, , ,
resistance pain pleasure joy desire sorrow extens i on a ll these

, , , , , ,
—
things are contents of consci ousness They a re as consci ously .

,
known i deas But if thi s i s so then the ground is cut from under
, .
,
Locke s ensuing reasoning Berkeley will fir st ask Lo cke up on

’
.
what ground he makes anything si gnifican t out of his di stinc ti on

between primary and secondary qualiti es Is this di stinction based .
up on exp eri ence ? When d i d I ever exp erience a body whi ch had
the p rimary qualiti es without the secondary? The answer clearly , ,
i s never Then thi s i s not a difference between ways of exp eri enc
.
9 1 685— 1 7 5 3 .
The Pro blem of Percep ti on : I 77
ing : all qu ali ties as gi ven a re on even terms— they are all ideas .
What re a son then is there to give one type of idea a privilege not
, ,
accorded to another? 10
Not only is there no basis in experience for Locke s granting a ’
privileged objectivity to ideas of primary qu alities but what he is ,
defending is s i mply unthinkable For if what we know directly are .

,
” “
ideas then what can it mean to di scover which ideas represent
,
” “
things a s they are in themselves ? How would we ever d i scover
which ideas ar e good copies of reality?
The way we ordin arily go about deciding whether something i s
a good copy or not is by comparing the representation to the
original : this photograph is a goo d copy of John Smi th if it really
resembles him and thi s we learn by comp aring photograph to

,
man But the difficulty Of p roceedi ng like this with our perceptions
.
leaps to the eye : how can we compare our ideas to the originals
if we never perceive the origin a ls but only ideas ? Not only thi s ,
b ut what do we even mean by as k ing whether thi s idea resembles

the original? For what could an idea resemble except another idea?
Locke s whole program then is illusory for it is trying to do the
’
, , ,
impossible .
Aga in I ,whether thos e supp osed o ig i na ls or externa l things of

a sk r , ,
which our i d ea s are the p ictures or rep resenta ti ons b e thems elves per ,
cei v a b le or no ? If the a re then th y ar e i d e a s a nd w e h a ve i n d

y g,a e e ,
our
point : but if you s a y they a re n ot I a pp e a l to a ny one W hether i t ,
be s ense to as s ert a c olor i s li k e s omething whi ch i s i nvi sible ; ha rd or

s oft li k e s omethi n i nt a n ible ; a nd s o of the rest 11
g g .
Berkeley will go still further E xistence he states is a ctually .

, ,
inconceivable except in terms of ideas For whatever we know we .
know in terms of experience E very assertion we make can only .
have meaning for us if i t applies to something in our actual

B er keley Se lecti o ns , ed i t . by Ma ry Whi to n k
Ca l ins ( New York : Scri b
’
ner s ) , 192 9, p . 129 A ll
. refe ences r to B er k ele
y a re to thi s v olu me .
( Thi s
q uota ti on from Pr i ncip les o f H uma n K no w led g e ) .
11 Ibi d .
,
p 12 8
. .
experience Grant however that experience always terminates in
.
, ,
“ ”
ideas and then the statement that anything else exi sts becomes
,
empty All we can mean by exi sting is what we directly exp erience
.
as exi sting What we experience i s psychic mental Therefore says

.
,
.
,
”
Berkeley esse est percip i — the only mea ni ng for being is
,
“ ” “
“ ”
being perceived ? Actually his complete formula should read
“ ”
esse es t aut p ercipere aut p ercipi — to be is e ither to perceive or
to be p ercei ved ; for he allows that there are two ways of being
as a mi nd or as the Object of mind I exist and the Objects of my .
,
consci ous experience exi st ( my ideas ) But that is a ll I can mean .
by exi stence .
To mean something by a word I must be able to use it to p oint

to som
,
”
e i tem Of my experience ; but the word existence must
ei ther point to an experi encing self or to the ideas whi ch i t is
experiencing and in either case we are in the realm of the spiritual
,
.
” “
The concep tion of something called matter which is completely
outs i de of mind whi ch exists in a w ay other than mind and i nde
,
pendent of it is a pseudo notion If we do not believe thi s let us

,
-
.
,
make the effort to conceive of something existin g unp erceived T o .
i magi ne th ings exi sting unperceived is si mply to imagine oneself

perceiving them and thus still to confine their reali ty to what it is
,
for perception .
B ut, sa surely there i s nothing ea s i er tha n for me to ima gine

y y ou ,
trees for i ns ta nce in a p a rk or b ook s ex i sting i n a clos et a nd nob od y
, , , ,
b y to p erceive them I a nswer you ma y so there i s no d ifficulty i n i t

.
, , .
B ut wh a t i s a ll thi s I b eseech you m ore tha n fra ming i n your mind

, ,
certa in i d ea s which you c a ll b o k a nd t e a nd a t the s a me time o s r es ,
o mi tti n o fr a me the i d ea of a n one tha t ma

g t y y p erc eive them ? B ut
d o no t you yours elf p erceive or thin k of them a ll the whi le? Thi s
therefore i s nothing to the purp os e : i t only s hew s you ha ve the p ow er
of i ma gini ng or formi n g i d ea s i n our m i n d ; b ut i t d oe s n ot s hew
, y
tha t you ca n conceive i t p os s ible the obj ects of your thought ma y
ex i s t wi thout the m i nd
13
.
12 I bi d .
, p 126
. .
Ibi d p 1 36
13 .
.
, .
The Pro blem of Percep tion: I 79
NO wonder then at Locke s concep tion of material substance

, ,
’
”
as an I know not what underlying exp erienced quali ties — for a
“
material substance is in p rinciple unk nowable Locke should have .
no ticed that his reasoning involved him in the strange result that
matter as such turned out to be an unobservable ; it alway s t e
“
mained an I know not what a useless appendage to what was ,
directly given— mi nd and its ideas O nce we s ee that matter con .

,
sid ered as an inde endent entity is a ridi culous ficti on than all
p , ,
sorts of fooli sh problems are avoided such as the worry over ,
whether my ideas correspond to anything other than themselves ;

”
the reason is that there is no external world independent of ideas
“ ”
for these ideas to correspond to .
Much confusion is sometimes aroused in a fir st acquaintance

with the doctrine of Berkeley It i s thought for instance that he .
, ,
is declaring that the world is an illus i on life a dream and so forth , ,

.
This is not really the poi nt at all He i s not denying that the world .
exists that thi ngs are real He is really asking what we mean by
, .
the statement that the world i s real When I say this apple really .
exi sts that it is real what do I mean? What do I mean by the

, ,
14
“
apple about which I am s o sure that it exi sts ? The apple i s thi s
red round fir m smooth fragrant sweet crunchy thing here
, , , , , ,
before me But every attribute I apply to it in th is descrip tion

.
,
Berkeley would ins i st is an i dea a way i n wh ich I am consciously , ,
experi enci ng Therefore all I mean by the apple i s a s et of i deas

.
,
( exp eri enced data ) whi ch form a constant constellation l n my

experience If I insi st that the apple is re al that i t exists Berkeley
.
, ,
i s far from denyi ng it He w ill only ask me to oin t out some

p .
feature which i s contained i n the term apple whi ch i s more than

an i dea .
That is why Dr Sa m Johns on was missing the point when.

,
stoutly ch amp ioning the interests of common sense he kicked the ,
”
stone and ex claimed Thus do I refute Bishop Berkeley " His “
point Of course was that the stone was a massive material thing
, , ,
14
Ibi d .
, pp 12 4— 1 25
. .
stubbornly there i n spite of Berkeley s abstruse attempts to dis ’
solve i t i nto the thi n air of ideas Th i s would not have fazed Ber
.
“
keley in the sli ghtest ; he would merely have asked What d i d you ,
experience when you kicked against the stone ? A feeling of resi st

ance which I declare is an i dea ; a feeling of pain whi ch every
, ,
body admits i s a n idea Y ou s a w visually a gray shap e felt a

.
, , ,
rough surface and heard a thuddi ng noi se All i deas Th erefore

, . .
the stone you contend i s undoubte d ly there i s ( undoubtedly )

there But what is i t but the experi enced unity of diverse ideas
.
so that you have not refuted me but confirmed me Berkeley was .
very definite in arguing that he has no quarrel with what the plain
ma n meant by matter matter as actu a lly experienced ( which could
,
be regarded as a facet of experience and therefore a facet of ,
” “
mind ) ; hi s only quarrel was with the mythical material substa nce
of
p hilosophers which was su p posed to be some totally unthinki ng
” “
and unthought x apart from exp erience altogether This was not .
only an unverifia ble— for how could we verify in terms of exp eri
,
ence what is in principle beyond experience— but it i s actually

inconceivable .
I de y n therefore tha t there i s unth i nk i n s u bs tra tum of th e obj ects

an
y g
of sens e a nd i n tha t a ccep ta tio n tha t there i s a ny m a teri a l sub sta nce
, .
B ut if b y m t i a l s ubs ta nce i s mea nt only sens ible b od y tha t whi ch

a er —
i s s een a nd felt ( a nd the unp hilos ophi c a l p a rt of the w orld I d a re ,
m ea n n o m ore ) — then I a m m ore certa i n of m a tter s exi s tence

’
sa
y ,
tha n you or a ny o ther philos opher pretend to be .

l s
The objection is also raised that if Berkeley identifies being with

being perceived then he is i mplying that when thi ngs are not per
,
ceived they do not e xist D oes this mean that when I walk o ut of
.
the room the perce ived objects which fill it simp ly cease to be ?
,
Not necessarily for they can be perceived by some o ther mind

, .
Berkeley is not contending that my ind ividual mi nd confers reality

on things But suppose no one is there ? What about the buildi ng
.
Ibi d p 309 ( Three D i a log ues B etw een H y la s a nd P hi lo no us )

15 .
, . .
The Problem of Percep tion: I 8I
when it is vacant at night deserted by everyone with no perceiver , ,
there at all? Does it still exi st? Berkeley could still say yes for he ,
allows not only the possibility but the necessity that there is an
absolute mind which is at every moment perceiving the data which
I perceive so that even if no finite mi nd is perceiving them they
, ,
ca n still be sai d to exist .
As a matter of fact the quasi independence of sensations is the,

-
” “
basis of Berkeley s proof for the existence of God He certainly
’
.
doe s not hold that my ideas derive their origin from me : they are
not in my power but rather impose themselves upon me regardless
of my o w n will This i nci d entally is why those persons also err
.
,
who accuse Berkeley of being unable to di stinguish dream and

reality He distingui shed these in about the same way as anybody
.
else distinguishes them : the dream world is d i sorganized ar bitr a ry

“
-
, ,
s ubject to my control ; the real world is orderly predi ctable funda , ,
mentally beyond my voli tional control I am not at liberty to .

16
ex erience anythi ng I like and this is the sign that my i deas ar e

p ,
imposed upon me by some superior source .
sens ib le things ca nnot exis t otherwi se tha n i n a mind or sp iri t .
Whence I conclud e not that they ha ve no rea l exi stence but tha t
, , ,
seeing they d epend not on my thought a nd ha ve an exi s tence d i stinct ,
from being p erceived by me the e mus t be s ome o ther Mi nd w h ein ,

r er
they e is t A s sure theref ore a s the sensi ble wo rld rea ll

x .
, y ex i sts s o , ,
s ure i s there a n i nfini te omni resent S i ri t w ho c ont a i ns a n d su orts

p p pp
it .
17
B i shop Berkeley reality appears as a community of spirits

To , ,
( thinking beings ) among whom one spirit is primary the source ,
” “
of the experience of the others We may still use the word matter .
16
I bid
p 1 4 1 ( Pr i ncip les )
.
, . .
Ibid p 27 6 It mi ght b e w ond ered w ha t w o uld ha pp en to Bi shop

17
. .
, .
k
Ber eley s p hi los ophy i f he d i d not bri ng i n the exi s tence of Go d but con
’
fined hi mself to w ha t i s d ir ectly gi v en i n exp eri ence a s he concei ved i t In .
a
phenomena li sm i s the w or ing
w a y, k out of th e a ns w e r to thi s ques ti on :
i t i s B er ele k
y w ith the a b s olute emoved r .
'
if we like but if this is to have real meani ng it i s simply the term

, ,
for certain aspects of the exp erience of Sp i ri ts : the asp ect under
which experience has the features usually called quanti tative Far .
from being independent of mind matter i s simply one aspect of

,
mind .
In evaluating Berkeley we are faced wi th the central di fli culty

,
of deci d ing how to i nterpret him He may mean e i ther :

.
1 ) That of which I am di rectly aware is my o w n idea This is .
certai nly what Berkeley first seems to mean And if this is taken .
as his consi stent p osition then he has all the difficulties of a strict
,
subjectivi sm If a ll my consci ousness terminates in myself how

.
,
can I use a ny i tem of that knowledge to get beyond myself? It

might be suggested that his vi ew applies only to sensations and ,
that he could do what D escartes d i d : us e an intelli gible ar gument

for God to extricate hi mself Yet he himself argues agai nst the
.
existence of abstract terms and is quite sensi st in orientation He

, .
does not develop the argument from intelligible evidence although ,
he accepts unquestioningly the concepts of cause and substance

( the latter when applied to spir itual substance ) We might defend .
him by saying that he is s imp ly relying o n the i mme d iate primacy

of the e xperience Of the self and usin g the self as the norm for the
assertion Of a ny existence but thi s would be more an argument

,
offered in hi s behalf than a reasoni ng he himself developed .
As matters stand i n his ow n writings he cannot be absolved ,
from the charge that on hi s own theory Of knowledge he cannot

, ,
us e Go d to find hi s w a y out Of subjecti vism for on the subjectivi st ,
assump ti on his idea of God also has only subjective value Begi n
, .
ni ng with the assumption that all Of my p ercep ti ons are i deas I ,
“ ”
do not yet have an other and I urgently need some means to
,
bestow the coeffici ent of otherness on these i deas E ven if Berkeley .
thinks he ha s succeeded in reaching thi s i n resp ect to the absolute ,
”
th i s only vali dates o ne o ther ; at thi s stage there i s still the alter
native of concei ving hi mself to be alone i n the face of an absolute
who imp oses hi s i deas upon him The reali ty Of other human selves
.
and the multiple real ity of the non human i s to s a y the least
-
, ,
not coercively establi shed Since to exi st entails ei ther perc

.
84 The Phi los op hy o f Know led g e
Reflection the findings of either physics or biology could
on
easily give ri se to thi s sort of consideration Si r Arthur E ddington s .

’
famous p arable of the two tables is a vivid p resentati on of the

“ ”
difli culty as i t is engendered by p hys i cs ( although he himself does

not accep t i t as i nsurmountable ) Here he sits he tells us begin .
, ,
18
ni ng hi s task of writing hi s book on the nature of the physical

world But troubles arise i mmediately for strange to say he is
.
, , ,
simultaneously sitting at and leaning on two tables The table ” “

.
at which he sits i s for common sense a rather bulky black Object

, , ,
hard a nd resi stant extending continuously in sp ace for a distance

,
of about thr ee feet solid and still quite fillin g the space w i thi n i ts
, ,
surfaces w ith a matter called wood But the sci enti st when he .
,
looks sees no such table The table of the physici st is mostly

, .
emp ty space withi n which atoms of infinitesimal size are swi rling
,
about in incredibly rapid motion without ever touchi ng one

another Which is the real table ? If the table of percepti on is re a l
.
,
the sci entific table is unr eal ; if the scientific table i s real the table ,
of perce ti on is unr e al Prompted by the unprecedented practical

p .
success of the sci entific vi ew many infer forthwith that i t i s the ,
scientific table whi ch i s really there and that the features presented ,
to p erception are not Objective data Not only i s color in E dding .

,
” “
ton s phrase mere mind sp inning but s o are the other secondary
’
,
-
quali ties and so in a true sense are even extension and the con
, , ,
tinuous character of the perceived table which do not corresp ond ,
to a state of aff airs obtai ning outside of me .
A similar d i fli cult dilemm a could be reached on the basi s of the

conclusions of biolo gy For what the physiologi st has to tell us
.
about the nature and origi n Of perception does not seem very easy
to reconcile with the conviction of the man in the street that he
perceives a public world which i s i ndependently there Percep tion .
,
and this means a ll percep tion and not merely optical aw a reness , ,
we now know to begin with a stimulus whi ch derives from a

hys i cal body moves through an intervening medi um and
p , ,
i mpi nges on a nerve ending An impulse is then trans mi tted to a .
18
A S E d d i ngto n Th N tu
. .
f th P hy i l W ld ( New Yo k : M c
,
e a re o e s ca or r a
milla n ) 192 9 p ix
, , . ss .
cortical center and a modification s et up on the brain cells As an -

.
accompaniment of this cortical activity sensation occurs Various , .
questions for the ep istemology Of p ercep tion are raised O bvi ously .
the cortical activity of the brain cells is nothin g like the molecular -
activity of the body which transmitted the original stimulus ; it is

not even li ke the light waves whi ch caused the neural reaction
-
.
But then how can my sensati on which is s irnply the a ccomp a ni

“
ment of a cortical activity give me the awareness of something

which is completely unlike itself ? 19
T he d ifli culty does not stop here For the physiologist knows .
that by an artificial stimulation of my brain cells he can cause me -
to perceive colors hear sounds experience scents when there are

, , ,
actually no objects p resent at all D oes it not then begin to seem .
as if what I a lw a ys am actually experi encing is a sensation which

accompanies a brain state ? O n this basi s sensation is s o far from
-
,
putting me in touch with what is other than myself that it doe s not
even take me outs i de of my own body .
Wi th this sort of evidence we ma y feel ourselves to be faced

with a somewhat harrowing dilemma : we ei ther relegate science ,
with its unparallelled store of verified fact to the status of a useful ,
ficti on ; or we co nsign the rich and variegated display of p erception

to the cenacle of our individual minds It is sometimes overlooked .
how far reaching the second alternative would be For in attributing .
to ourselves what perception attributes to the world we would ,
“ ”
have to say not only that the table is not really solid the s ky ,
“ ” ”
not really blue the melody not really sound i ng but also that
,
“
,
the sunset i s not really splendi d the symp hony not really majesti c , ,
”
the p ainting not really beautiful If the secondary qual ities are .
“
”
subjecti ve then surely what have been called the terti ary quali
,
“
ties ( beauty goodness and the like ) are also subjective What
, , .
” “
the s un re a lly is i s a gaseous a ssemblage of molecules the
, ,
19
Some mi ght even b egin to ta l k as if I a m r ea ll
y con s ci ous o f my ow n
bra i n s ta tes , but
-
a li ttle further r efl ecti on w o uld rev ea l the fo oli s hnes s o f
thi s, for my ow n bra i n i s nev er the ob ect o fj my a w arenes s .
20
For a rev i ew of the h
p y s io lo gi ca l op ini on s , s ee R J H i rs t, The Pro b
. .
lems o f P ercep tio n ( New York : Ma cmilla n ) , 1959, pp . 14 5 ss, 2 79 ss .

86 The P hi los op hy
symphony re a lly is a series of distur b an ces of the a ir ,
“
ing really is a collection of chemicals It can hardly .
that a certain d epressi on settles on the spiri t when the obli gation
is felt to talk in this manner And this depression is not irrelevant
.
to the epi stemologi cal question For it should begin to be clea r .
that the question of Objectivity cannot be raised apart from the

e xi gence of the inquiring cons ci ousness If the aesthetic cons cious .
ness i s di ssatisfied with a certain way of conceiving the nature of

reali ty this dissati sfaction must be reckoned with for to shunt it
, ,
aside would not silence its demands .
More to our immedi ate point is the quand a ry in which

ti s m finds i tself directly upon the enunciation of its own thesis .
Sci entism i s obviously one version of representationalism ; it is

rep resentationalism brought up to date A s such it suffers from the .
fatal we ak ness of i nconsistency to which all representationalism is

subject What sci entism conten d s is that my sensations are purely
.
subjective caused i n me by the real objective entities— bodi es con

,
cei ved as science conceives them But the d ifli culty just will not .
down : if my sensations are subjective then how do I know that ,
there really a r e bodies i ndependent of them? If scientism is right ,
then its position vitiates the evi dence up on which it cla ims to be
ri ght For example the physiologist says that I perceive thi s table
.
,
the way I do because certain li ght waves are refracted from the -
table impinge on my retina and cause a cortical reaction There

, , .
fore the table as I actually p erceive it is a subjective collocation

of sensations aroused i n me because of brai n activity ; what I am -
actually aware of i s my ow n sensati ons and nothi ng in dep endently ,
objective But when the physiologist says the light waves are
.
21 -
refracted from the table i mpinge on my eye and s o on he is

, , ,
talking about the t a ble whi ch I perceive : thi s table ri ght here .
Thi s table however p recisely a s it can be experi enced and pointed

, ,
21 Some w i ll go s o fa r as to a s s ert tha t w ha t I a m a w are o f i s i ns i d e my

hea d , w hi ch i s o bvi ous ly nons ens e . We ha ve o nl
y to a s k ours elv es w ha ti s
the co mp ar a t ve my hea d
i s i ze O f the ta ble w hi ch I p er cei v e a nd to con
vince our s elves th at the p ercei ved ta ble i s n ot i ns i d e my hea d — i f w e a re

not con vi nced by the immed i a tely gi v en extem a li ty .
The Problem of Percep tio n: I 87
to , is on his own theory simply a collocation of subjective sensa

, ,
tions Then hi s position amounts to the absurd clai m that sensation

.
a rises because a collocation of sensations causes me to hav e
sensati ons .
There seems absolutely no way out of the rep resentationalist

predi cament For rep resentationalism is actually founded on a
.
“
premise which nullifies i ts ow n conclusions The rep resentationalist .
a ssumes not only that there are th i ngs independent of experi ence ,
but that I really d o experience them at least to the extent that I ,
“ ”
can call them bodi es and can know how they interact with my
body ( also assumed as something independent of sensations ) i n
order to give rise to sensations But he then turns around a nd .
declares that all I directly know are my own sensations Then the .
e xtern al body which he declares to be ca us i ng his sensations is _
its elf a sensation And the anomaly does not stop there Th e
. .
physiologist says that sensations are simply accompaniments of

brai n states But what is the brain on his premi se ? All I know
-
.
,
about the brain I k now thr ough p erception Percep tion is of s ub .
ective sensations hen the br n itself in the only way ever

j T ai . I ,
co me into contact with it ( thr ough my perception ) is a colloca ,
tion of sensati ons In other words the scientific representationali st

.
, ,
or any representationalist is in the impossible position of holdi ng

,
that I both d o and do not kn ow more than my own sensations .
Because of the patent untenability of representationalism it ,
must be regarded as a halfway house on the road of ep istemolog

ical sp eculation Most contemporary philosophers s o reg ar d it
.
,
and tend to move ei ther to a p osition of complete phenomenalism

or back to a more direct realism We will look b riefly at some of .
their p ositions .
b) SE NSE -D A T UM A PP R OA CH : A WA Y O UT?
1) Moore , R us s ell B roa d

,
Oneavenue of escap e from the impasse of both representation

a li s m and Berkeleyan idealism might seem to be to question the
starting point which they both take for granted That is the belief .
,
88 Phi los op hy of Know led g e hePr The
that what we are di rectly aware of is our own idea This a s s ump .
tion immedi ately places the discussion on a subjectivist footing

and causes most of the ensuin g trouble A valiant attempt to .
bypass i t and to c ar ry the whole discussion back to a more

unquestionable basis was made by those who esp oused the epis te
mologi cal p rimacy of the sense datum The notion of a sense “
.
”
datum was introduced by George Moore and Bertrand Russell as a

“ ”
kind of neutral indubitable up on which both epistemologi cal
realist and idealist could find common ground Prior to any deci .
22
“ ”
sion as to whether the patch of red of which I am aware was an
idea or an independent material Object all disputants might at least ,
agr ee that I am immediately awar e of the red p atch and that it

certainly exists We do not have to a s k yet whether it exists as an
.
idea or a material object for the distinction between i dea and ,
materi al object is not cogni ti onally primitive ; it comes later after ,
I begin to di scern the differences among the data which really are
primitive .
What is p ri mitively given to awareness is that I am aware and ,
aware of somethi ng ( a red patch a shrill sound a sweet ta ste ) ; , ,
the p recise status to be assi gned to that Of whi ch I am aware i s

only determined posteriorly What Moore thought to be beyond .
doubt was that awareness reaches something and that what it

reaches i s not identical wi th awareness Thus he argues again st .
,
“
Berkeley in his The Refutation of Ideali sm that rather than
, ,
“ ” “ ”
the esse of the perceived datum consi sti ng in i ts percipi the ,
datum of which I am aware necessarily has a status not reducible

to my aw areness of i t My awareness of blue green yellow has .
23
, ,
something in common : awar eness ; but it has something which

differentiates it : the Objects in respect to which awareness takes
place blue gr een yellow There i s therefore a distinction between
, , , .
awareness and its Objects and hence it is imposs ible to claim a s ,
22 G eor ge Moore , P hi lo s op hica l S tu d i es ( New Yo k :

r H a rcourt, Br a ce ) ,
1922 ; B er tr a nd Rus s ell, The P r o ble ms o f Phi lo s op hy ( New Yo k :
r H enry
H olt) , 1 95 9 ( fir s t p ubli s hed i n F or a b ri ef d i s cus si on of s ens e-d a tu m
theory , s ee H irs t, op . ci t .
, pp 26—73
. .
23 Moore op ,
. ci t .
, p.1 3 .
Berkeley did that the very being of the datum is the being of
,
awareness At the very least Moore contends there i s no w a y to

.
, ,
show that the existence Of the datum logically implies awareness

Of the datum ; and he ends his essay by adop ting a strongly realisti c
position : awareness is and must be i n all cases of such a nature

“
that i ts object when we are aware of it is precisely what it would

, ,
”24
be if we were not aware
,
Russell concurs with thi s ( in his .
earlier works ) holding that it is p erfectly conceivable that the

,
sense data which we perceive exist precisely as such whe n we are

“ ”
not erceivi ng them a n d i nventing the term sens i bilia to denot e
p ,
such unsensed sense data .

25
It is evi dent that the original intention of the sense datum -
theori sts was strongly realistic They thought that they ha d dis .
covere d a way to cut straight through the subjectivist thicket and

affirm that consci ousnes s reaches i mmediately and directly some
thing other than itself In this vein Moore exclaims that there is .
,
no question of how we get outside the circle of sensation ; to be

conscious is a lrea d y to be outside that private cir cle C onsc i ous .
26
ness is transcendent from the start But an interesting development .
occurs in later sense d atumtheory It is somewhat foreshadowed -

.
in the us e to which the sense datum was very qui ckly put For it .
cannot escape us that what the sense datum theorist says i n regard -
to perception could just as well be said of hallucinations and

dream experiences In these too consciousness can be analyzed
-
.
, ,
into a n a ct/ Object correlation This in fact was felt by many to .

, ,
add to the strength of the sense—datum view ; it not only derived

s u port from but h elped to make i ntelli gi ble what occurred in
p
delusive perceptions Thus in a relational experience ( the round .
,
p enny from a certain angle looks ellip tical ) or in hallucinatory

experiences ( seeing p ink elep hants ) it w a s felt that two things
could be said : I am not seeing a p hysical object and yet I am ,
27
seeing something What I am seeing is not nothing hence there

.
,
24 Ib i d .
, p 29 . .
25 Russ ell, Mys ticis m a nd L og ic, pp 1 4 3— 145 . .
26
Moore , p 270p . ci t.
, . .
27
In p hys i ca l rea li ty there i s no elli ti ca l
p p enny a nd no p i nk ele
p h a nt.
is a meani ng to saying that it really exists ; it w a s r ega r d ed as a
mo logica l o bject na med a s ens e

“
f
s o rt o ep is te o f a wa renes s a nd
d a tum From here it is a rather short step to the belief that what
.
I am seeing in a ll cases of percepti on is a sense datum D elusive .
experiences are as subjecti vely undergone qualitatively indis

, ,
tingui s ha ble from ve ridical expe riences : the red I dre a m about
and the red I s ee are identical ; if there really were pink elephants
they would look to those w ho perceived them the way they now
look to those who sufl er from hallucin a ti ons So it was conclud ed .
that the i mmed i a te object of both delusive and veridi cal experience
w as the same— a sense datum Whatever I go on to say about.
“ ”
material objects I must s a y on the basis of that of which I am
directly aware— sense data .
But s ee what has happened here If a sense datum is common .
to both veridical and delusive experience it evidently cannot ,
underwrite an immediate contact wi th a world of independently

existing material objects In later theory the sense datum begins
.
,
“ ”
to function as a kin d of third thing i nterp osed between aware
ness and physical Objects In this manner many of the difli culties
.
,
i t was introduced to elim i nate filter back into the theory Some .
of these a pear in a famous pr oponent of the doctr ine C D

p , . .
Broad .
Broad attempts a continued adherence to realism but has d if ,
ficulty fitti ng it into his sense datum assump tions He i s sure that
-
.
we are justified in ordi nary language in saying that we know the

“ ” “
truth of such statements as I hear a bell or There are rats in
”
the attic since the si tuati ons in which they are justified cle a rly
,
sometimes arise Yet the notion of the bell as a materi al object

.
“ ”
contains hyp otheses which are not and cann ot be verified through
direct percep tion Common sense assumes that the bell as a
.
material object i s a unity a completed entity that i t endures

, ,
through a stretch of time that i t is p ublicly available to other

,
observers None of this is p ercep tually verifiable What a re gi ven

. .
to perception are sense data multiple momentary a nd fleeting

, , ,
.
The notion of an object is constructed upon the basis of these

92 The Phi los op hy of Knowled g e
experience E ach language may have its appropriate us e but the
.
,
question of utility is not a question of truth It may be more useful .
to measure in meters than yards but that does not mean that one ,
“
who describes a distance as one meter is right a nd one who ,
”
describes it as inches wrong Ayer leans to the belief that .
for ordinary p urposes the materi al object language is perfectly

s atisfactory while for technically exact p hilosophical purposes
, ,
the sense datum language has the advantage

-
.
At first sight this may be consi dered as an attempt to d ismi ss

,
the whole issue as a pseudo problem ; a not unwarranted attempt

-
,
for there does seem to be something tantalizin gly unreal about the
p roblem of
p ercep t i on If we look again
. though A yer may appear , ,
to be open to the charge levelled against him that he really believes

that the sense datum theory is factually ri ght Does he not really
-
.
30
believe that what we actually p erceive are sense data? O nly on

this basis could it be claimed that there i s no d ifference between
the beli efs of the materi al object theo rist and the sense datum
- -
theorist O nly if we alr eady believe that there is no more in the

.
meaning of material object than what the sense datum people find -
there could we contend that thei r assertions are indistinguishable .
Ayer ultimately seems to hold that material Object statements can

be exhaustively translated into sense data statements and hence -
are reducible to sense data statements H is lingui stic phenome

-
.
“
n ali s m
”
amounts to the view that what we mean by phys i cal “
” “ ”
Object is simply constant p atterns of sense data Knowing .
that cert ai n data are conjoined in a systemati c and recurring

manner we s ignalize this recurring p attern by a name and regard
,
” “
it as a n object But there is no more in the meani ng object than
.
“ ”
in recurring p atterns of sense data Hence Ayer is sti ll in the .
,
older traditi on of p henomenalism even though he tries to state it ,
i n a more unexcep ti onable manner And i t can even be averred .
that of i ts own nature the se nse datum theory tends equally well -
to ei ther total realism o r phenomenali sm that i n fact the two are ,
rather hard to distin guish given the sense datum assumption

,
-
.
30 J L Aus tin, S ens e a nd S ens i bi li a ( Oxford : Cla rend on P res s ) , 19 62 ,

. .
pp . t
5 6, 59, 106— 107 ; a nd H irs , o p ci t , pp 1 16—1 1 7 . . . .
In general , p henomena lis m ho ld s tha t the no ti o n o f a n o b ect j

is a logica l cons tructi on o f tho ught , ra ther tha n s omethi ng in an
y
w a y d irectly gi ven to What is directly given is a exp er i ence .
31
stream of discrete experience which usu ally turn out to be a ,
stream for sens e : either sensations in the older more subjectivi st , , ,
view Of John Stuart Mill ; or sense data in the neutral manner of

” “
the contemporaries For Mill a materi al object was si mply a
.
”
“
p ermanent poss i bility of sensati on : thought d i scovers con 32
s ta nci es and redictabilit in our subjective experiences and attrib

p y
utes this to an independent ground or grounds which i t c alls ,
Object The object then i s the conceived foundation for the

.
, ,
“
orderly occurrence of my sensation Thus to s a y that the other .
,
”
side of the moon exists when no one is looking at it just means
“
that If I went through the seri es of sensations which I call
traveling through space in a certai n directi on I would have the ,
”
series of sensations I call seeing the other side of the moon .
Ayer s earlier theories are in principle qui te close to thi s

’
,
although of a more lingu i stic turn .
The phenomenalist s contention is that he can suffici ently

’
de s cribe all that is truly gi ven to exp erience in his terms and that “
every other w a y of speaking i s sup erfluous since it must reduc e ,
to phenomenali st terms in order to be significant The rebuttal to .
phenomenali sm would have to rest on asking ourselves whether

this claim is true 1 ) Ca n he successfully reduce all statements to
.
an exclus i ve reference to sense data? 2 ) Ca n he assert in hi s -
language everything that object language wi shes to express ? The

rebuttal to phenomenali sm on both counts i s quite strong .
R J H irst s Objection in pa rticular seems well taken Hirst

’ 33
. . .
, ,
argues that phenomenali st language a lways turns out to be

“
tainted by reali sti c material object language That i s the phe -
.
,
"
nomena li s t alway s surrep titiously utilizes language whi ch rei ntro
duces material Object assumptions back into his ow n descriptions

-
.
For —
good exp os i tion , s ee H irs t,
31 a o
p . ci t , pp
. 74 .1 10 .
32 J ohn Stua rt Mi ll , A n E xa mi na tio n o f Sir Wi llia m H a mi lto n s P hi lo s o

’
phy Ch XI, . .
33 U i —94
p c t , pp 90 . . .
The phenomen ali st after all ha s a rather i mposing ta sk : he must
, ,
”
translate the meaning of object comp letely into sense datum -
language without relinqui shing any part of what the material

object statement means to assert Now the p ublic cha ra cter of the .
,
o b ect,
j i ts p erma nence a nd i ts ,
ca us a l e fiica cy d o
‘
no t lend them
s elves eas i ly to s uch tra ns la ti on .
If re a lity consists exclusively in sense data and the awareness of

them it seems incredi ble that the continual agr eement betw een n
,
the sense experience of different observers is possible The only .

:
s ufli ci ent gr ound for the harmony of the e xperiences of d ifl erent l
Observers seems to be that there is a common object difl erent t

fr om the sense data themselves which is the ground for the exp eri
encing Of the sens e data ; dreams of different people cann ot be s o "
harmonized precisely because there is no common object E ven t

, .
“
to talk of observers as the phenomenalist continu a lly does is to
, ,
v
introduce object l a nguage for the Observer is not reducible tO

,
l
“
sense data When he says that the statement Th ere is a car in the
.
“
garage right now is equivalent to If you were experiencing '
garage li ke sense data you would be experiencing car like sense

-
,
-
”
data he has not totally l ai d the ghost Of the object since the
, ,
“
you he still requires is not reduci ble to sense data but rem ai ns
as an inexpungible vesti ge of an object .
Finally and most pressingly the phenomenali st is faced with

, ,
the seemingly insur mountable fault that his way of sp eaking loses
contact wi th the character of actuali ty whi ch the ord inary object
language statement unmistakably exhibi ts For when I s a y of an .
“ ”
absent Object that There is a car in the garage right now I ,
mean to refer to something which a ctua lly is an actu al member ,
o f the world as i t here an d now exists But the phenomen alist .
must translate categori cal statements about Objects into hyp o

t hetical statements about sense data— and thus he loses the
t he mati c actu ali ty which attaches to the former This defect would .
b e especi ally glaring in the case of a n assertion a bout the state Of

t he world before man existed ; D inosaurs existed before man 34 “
S e D M Arms t ong P p ti n nd th Phy i l W ld ( New Yo k

34 e . . r , erce o a e s ca or r
H um ni ti
a P ) 1 96 1 p 5 3 nd H ir t p i t p 107
es res s , , . a s , o . c .
, . .
There is only one table for the meaning of the word table is ,
derived from the world of direct percepti on ; I cannot ask whether

the table Of direct perception is real or not because i f it i sn t ,
’
“ ”
there aren t any real tables There is no scientific table for table
’
.
,
is a word for which science has no us e and no application ;

science may talk of atoms or electrons but nothing it says about ,
these can cast doubt on the reality of tables as I perceive them .
”
The p a ra d igm for the reality of such objects as tables is found
“
in the world of direct perception It is altogether mi sleading to .
app ly the vocabulary of one realm to another This would be .
easily seen in the reverse case if someone were to try to cast

doubt on the reali ty of atoms and electrons on the ground th at
” “
they cannot be perceived The reality of atoms and electrons is .
the real i ty they have for scientific d iscourse ; their use i n science
is the paradigm of thei r reali ty and it would be fooli sh indeed to
rep robate them because they are not real a s are objects of per
ce ti on C onversely i t i s absurd to re robate lan guage about the
p .
p ,
reality of p ercep tual objects on the ground that science does not
find i t appropriate .
Stebbi ng s p oi nt i s easy to s ee and s he reiterates it enthus i a s

’
tically Language derives i ts meaning from ordinary usage ; the

.
fact that it ha s such meaning is given i n its usage and the fact that
it must apply to something i s also clear sin ce i t deri ves i ts mean ,
ing from so applyi ng I mus t mean something by chair table .

” “
,
“
,
”
“ ” “ ” ” “
house red , sweet solid etc for I us e the words and
, ,
9, 66
, .
, ,
the reality of the referent i s given in this use of the word There .
fore the word cannot be used to cast doubt on the reality of its
,
object Thus Stebbing roundly rebuts E ddin gton s amusi ng account

.
’
of the difference between the exp erience of the ordinary man and
the scientist in the adventure of walking through a doorway :
I a m t
s a nd i n thres hold a bout to enter a room It i s a compli
g on a .
ca ted b us i nes s In the fir s t la ce I mu s t s hove a a i n s t a n a tmos her e

p.
g p
p re s sin
g w i th a force of fourteen p ound s on every squ a re inch of my
b o d y I mu s t m a k e a la nd ing on a p la n k tr a velli ng a t twenty miles a
.
second a round the s un— a fra ction of a second too ear ly or too la te ,
the pla n k would be miles a wa y The pla nk ha s no s olid i ty of

substa nce T o s tep on it i s li k e stepping on a sw a rm of fl ies Sha ll I
. .
not s lip through ? etc

36
.
This is mere obfuscation in Stebbing s eyes For what we mean ’
, .
”
by solid is precisely derived from our experience of such things
“
as planks as solid If they aren t soli d then what do we mean by

.
’
“ ”
solid ? The question of the solidi ty of anything lives Off the
paradigmati c perceptual experience and it i s nonsensical to try to
question whether it really applies to the Objects of that experience .
I do not even know what I am talking about if it does not apply , .
2 ) O s tens i ve Significa ti on
Thi s view could apparently be generalized to the as sertion that

” “
I cannot consi stently questi on the reality of the Objects of ordi
nary experience for the p aradi gmati c meaning of reali ty is dis
,
covered in perceptual experience , and if they are not real then I ,
do not even know what I mean by reality Somethi ng like this is .
done by other writers of whose views the version of Martin Lean

,
is a good and convenient representative .

37
His counterattack is against Broad s claim that we never experi ’
ence objects but only sense data and that ordinary language
, ,
conta ins unverifia ble hypotheses about the items of experience .
Le an will have none of this contending that it is simply based on ,
a n erroneous view of language What we directly perceive is just

“
what common sense believes us to perceive— p ubli c independent ,
objects He insists that language is completely ostensive and ca n

.
contain no unr ecognized hypotheses and point to no unobs erv

ables Its meaning is in i ts usage : a word in itself is only a sound
.
,
and we confer meaning on it by the way we us e it Therefore .

,
“ ”
the word physical object must have a valid reference for it is a ,
.
word in p erfectly good E ngli sh usage Nobody can question the .
common sense convi ction that we really perceive Objects unless he

-
36 Ed d i ngto n, op . ci t.
,
p 342
. .
37
Ma rti n Lea n, Sens e Percep ti o n a nd Ma tter ( New York : H uma ni ti es
Pres s ) , 1 96 3, pp 1 6 —24. .
think s he has some privileged meaning for the word object But .
if object means anything it means something that can be pointed

,
to in experience for the whole meani ng of language is conferred

,
o n it by i ts pointi ng to exper i ence If it were not to poi nt to

.
experience i t would have no meaning ; if it does have a mea nmg ,
it does point to experience— and hence its mere use validates the
reality of that to which it points .
There is no doubt a very genuine attractiveness about thi s way

of stating thi ngs for the tantaliz i ng nature of the problem of per
,
ce tion does at length generate the thought that there i s something

p
“
fishy about i t We are p rone to s a y
. Well after all what would
, , ,
an object be which did carry the earmark of i ts ow n objectivity?

Where do I get the privileged i dea of objectivity by means of
which I can question the objectivity of that of which I am now
aware? If these tables and chairs are not objective what would it ,
”
mean for me to b e aware of what is Objective? There seems
-
,
then a genuine component to this view And yet there are marks
,
.
against i t For one thing it is clear that a version such as Lean s

.
,
’
rests on a completely ostensive theory of language It i s question .
able whether such a theory can mean anything more by the word
“ ”
Object than the p henomenalist means In order to d o so it .
,
would have to be able to p oint to more than the phenomenali st

can point to The argument between Lean and Broad would seem
.
to turn on the unresolved and i n effect unr ecognized di spute a s

, ,
to what exactly the noti on of a p hysical object entails and how

much Of it can be simply verified i n sense perception Broad is .
equivalently holding that there are concep tual elements i nvolved

in the notion of an Object and that therefore what i s gi ven to the
senses is not an Object but something ( sense data ) on the basi s
of which we infer o r construct the notion of an object Lean .
si mply begins wi th the common sense conviction that we do per

-
cei v e objects and tri es to defend th i s convicti on while remain ing ,
with in the confines of his ostensive theory of l a nguage He will .
say against Broad for i nstance that we do not merely s ee a

, , ,
“ ”
s u rface o r a temporal slice we see something which ha s a
,
I 00 The Phi los op hy of Know led g e
“
ties— constructions They must have reality in a way parallel
.
to the reali ty of physical objects : They are meaningfully utilized

in language and are re al to the exact extent and in the exact man
ner that the lan guage employing them requires Perceptual lan .
” “
guage is ostensive and s o perceptual objects are real as osten
,
s i vel
y indicatable ; sc i entific language is formal and scient i fic ,
“
enti ties are rea as constructions which make the formal laws of
science poss ible .
But I immediately bog down in confusion if I think of the

reality of p erceptual Objects by the methods of science or try to ,
validate the objects of science by means of perception or if I try ,
to compare the two I cannot comp are the incomp arable I cannot
. .
comp are the color blue to the formula m for the one is a per 2
,
ce tua l enti ty and the other a formal rule Note that this ap roach
p p .
tends to regard percep tual objects as more primarily real and to ,
consider scientific entities a s abstractions While it has found .
considerable favor among scientists themselves o ne cannot escape ,
a certain queasiness in accepting it as the definitive solution .
3) Wi ttgens tei n , Ry le , a nd
“
O r d ina ry L a ng ua ge
Perhap s the best known and most fasci nating attempt to deal
“
with philosophical problems in terms of the pri macy of ordinary
”
language is that of Ludwig Wittgenstein Wi ttgenstein agrees that .
problems li ke the d ifli culty about perception ari se out of language

” “
a nd he views hiloso hical anal sis principally as a thera y
p p y p
which will bring to light and dissolve these lingui sti c neuroses In .
this therapeutic process ordinary language must occupy a place

,
of
p rimacy for
,
i t i s fr om i t that our words derive thei r meani ng .
” “
Yet he cann ot rest content with a s imple ostensive theory of
meaning which i s entirely too short s ighted NO doubt meaning
,
-
.
derives from use and a word means just what we use it to mean .
“ ”
But the uses of words go far beyond simple p ornting; try gras p
“ ” “ ”
ing the meaning of if or but ostensively for example To ask , .
what a word is is similar to asking what a certain piece is in the

The Problem of Percep tio n: I I 01
game of chess A pawn simply is what it does in the game of

.
39
chess ; it has no properties occult or latent bes i des the ones which
fit it for its role in the game Analogously a word is what it does.
,
i n the game of language .
Of course one could think of variant l a nguage games and

,
-
,
Wittgenstein amuses himself by doing so but ordinary language ,
ha s a primacy because it i s the game we all play Words are more .
complicated p ieces just as language is a more complicated game

, ,
but the bewildering diversity of their uses i s no more mysterious

than the fact that things which are a ll equally tools can do ” “
” “
such bewilderingly different things The meani ng of a word .
40
even of a single word— is a chimera : a word is everything i t does .
Wittgenstein s view has relevance for the problem of perception

’
,
since this can be regarded as ar ising from a failure to app reci ate
the diverse manner in which words s igni fy O ne who imagines .
”
that ordinary language words and sci entific words si gni fy or
-
mean in the same way will find himself faced with the exasp erating
“ ”
p roblem of which ones s i gni fy the real object : the words ( and
their presumed targets ) will be in comp eti tio n with each other .
But once we realize that the language ga mes of science and of -
common speech are qui te different affai rs we will be no more ,
inclined to feel that we must decide between them than to feel

that we must decide whi ch i s the rea l queen of spades the poker —
,
pinochle or hearts queen

, .
In a simil ar manner Gilbert Ryle den i es the right of the s cien

,
ti s t to derogate the reali ty of secondary qualiti es and to clai m that

reali ty can be described only in terms of the primary qualities
whi ch he himself finds useful For the truth of the matter is that .
41
39 Lud w i g W ittgens tei n ,

Phi los o p hica l Inves tig a tio ns , tran s . by G . E .
M . A nscombe ( a b i -lingua l ed iti o n ) ( Oxford : B a sil B la ckw ell) , 195 3, p .
47 .
40
Ibid
p 6 .
, . .
41 G
i lbert Ryle, D i lemma s ( C a mbri d ge : Ca mbri d ge Univer s i ty P res s ) ,
1960 pp 82— 85
, . .
scientific words do not function in the same mann er as ordinary
language words They do not d es cri be at all A phys i cist s view of
. .
’
nature differs from the ordinary man s i n somewhat the same w a y ’
that an accountant s Vi ew of a university d iffers from the under

’
g ra d u a te s f
’
If the accountant
"2
i s thorough enough everythi ng in ,
the undergr aduate s world will be referred to by him but this doe s
’
,
not make them comp etitive and certainly doesn t turn the under ,
’
g raduate s world ’
into a bubble com p ar ed to the true reali ty Thus .
,
there are not two books the librarian s and the accountant s si de
,
’ ’
by si de A balance sheet must be constituti onally speechless about

.
-
some things ; it does not d es cri be at a ll and what is reache d ,
descriptively must remai n inaccessible to i t Just so the p hys i cal .

,
theorists neither describe ordinary tables and chairs nor rivals to

them they don t describe at all A ctually the language of the
—
’
.
physi cist presupposes the world of the ordin ary man and the real ,
question is not whi ch is real but How are the concepts of physical
,
“
”4 3
theory logi c ally related to the concepts Of everyday discourse ?
It must be sai d in favor of app roaches like Wi ttgenstei n s and
’
Ryle s that they seem to afford a breath of fresh a ir and one that
’
,
often does seem to come from the mouth of an escape tunnel -

.
Some genuine promise i s undoubtedly held out by li ngui sti c .
analysis And yet Of themselves they do not i mpress as s ufli cient

.
anyone who i s not prep ared to regard the entire problem of per
ce ti on ( and indeed of hilosophy at large ) as a matter of the
p p
way in whi ch we us e words Not many would be prepared to .
concede thi s much for language in some way i s felt to be a

,
wi ndow openi ng beyond itself ; these approaches tend to pull the

shades and turn it i nward E ven after we untie the li n gui sti c .
knots the question is still left over : what i s the ch ar acter of the
,
reality whi ch allows i tself to be the subject of such diverse

references ?
42
Ib i d .
,
p 75
. ss .
43 Ib i d .
, p 91
. .
1 04 The Phi los op hy of Know led g e
tions than others in the n aive realism of our everyday convictions .
C ertain basic points are common to the sta ndard Scholastic treat
ment of this subj ect however and as a preliminary to the main
, ,
issue they should be noted

, .
First of all there is the elementary observation that the problem

,
“ ”
cannot be argued in terms of the errors of the senses for the ,
“ ”
senses do not err at a ll The question of the truth or falsi ty Of
.
percep tion is a question whi ch takes us beyond sensation i tself .
For the same reason that the senses do not properly sp eaki ng , ,
”
contain truth they cannot be charged wi th falsehood Sensation
“
, .
does not judge— i t merely rep orts on data i mmediately present to

it The possibility of error only ari ses wi th judgment for judgment
.
,
asserts something about the datum immedi ately present to sensa

tion and what it asserts may be either s o or not so Until there
, .
”
is assertion there is not in a full sense any deception We
, , ,
“
.
“
speak of the senses de ceiving us in the cas e of optical illusions -
,
or shades of color for ex ample but this is an abbreviated way of

,
—
speakin g If I jud ge that one line is longer than another and it is

.
,
not I err ; but my senses which si mply grasp the visual appear
, ,
ance d o not err E rror will be found to cons ist in goi ng beyond
, .
immedi ate data of sensation and falsely going beyond .
A judgment whi ch confined i tself to a mere expression of what

w a s i mmedi ately present to sensation would also be immune from
“
error If I were to content myself with rep orting that this lin e
.
”
app ears longer than the other to me this would be no error but ,
simple truth— i t really does appear longer When the color bli nd .
-
p erson is charged w i th havi ng defecti ve sensation the charge i s ,
re ally levelled against his judgment His sensation merely reports .
what he i s now experi encing He really is exp eriencing a red .
datum But when he judges he spontaneously goes beyond the

.
,
“
i mmedi ate report of the senses an d declares Thi s patch of cloth
”
is red ; this means that he talks about an o bject which is p ubli c
( 1 wh i ch possesses for everyone the ro
p p erty which he i s ex eri
p
cueing If he were to confine his judgment to the datum itself he
.
,
“
would s a y I am now experiencing a red datum and he would ,
The Pro blem of Percep tion: II
- I 05
not be wrong The point is th at our jud gment always Sp ontane

.
ous ly takes us beyond the immediate our assertion outruns the ,
sensation and the ga p between the scop e of the judgment and the
,
report of the senses i s what makes error poss ible This i s an .
obvious remark but it quickly calls our attention to the fact that
,
” “
the whole question about the Objectivi ty of sense p ercep tion
cannot be settled in terms of percep ti on alone .
Of course we may still charge the senses with error meaning

, ,
that they present us with data on the basis of whi ch we are mi sled
i nto judgi ng erroneously It is with this in mind that a second
.
“
standard p o int i s usually made by Scholastics regarding the con
”
d i tio ns of a reli able act of perception Given the phys i co physio .
-
logical setting of sensati on it is suggested that we must recognize

,
that certain requirements have to be met before we can rely on

our sense experience to gi ve trustworth testimony Se nsati on
y .
appears to involve a stimulation of a bo d ily organ by a phy s ical ,
object through a medi um of action and certain conditions are

, ,
requi s ite on the part of all these e lements The Object must be .
p roperly proportioned to our kind of senses : infra red colors or -
micros coPi c Objects are not s o proportioned ; nor are sens i ble
objects which are too distant or o therwise unfavorably given .
Secondly the organ of sense must be a normal and healthy one

, .
Flagrant failures to fulfill this condition are found in the case of

blindness deafness or color bli ndness ; but there are more mod
, ,
-
crate damages possible including temp orary aberrations such as

, ,
the morbi d state Of a sick man s al ate because of which hi s taste

’
p
sensation is di storted or the abnormal conditi on of an eardrum
,
which has just suffered a heavy blow Finally since the Object i s .
,
perceived through a medi um the prop er medium for thi s per

,
ce ti on must be present : color i s pro erly perceived in sunlight

p p ,
rather than under a photogr apher s red l a mp sound in the op en ’

-
, ,
a i r rather th a n underwater O dditi es like the bent a pearance of

.
p
a partially submerged c a r may be explained from thi s direction
the oar i s be ing perce ived through a duali ty of medi a— a ir and
water— in which the behavior of li ght varies .
As a thir d prelimi nary we may cite the famili a r di stincti on
,
between p rop er and common sensibles Proper sensibles are those .
data which are perceived by one sense alone : color sound odor , , ,
for ex ample Common sens i bles are those which can be presented
.
to more than one sense : extension and motion ( whi ch can be

p erceived by s i ght and touch and perhaps other senses ) T
,
h i s .
d istincti on is deemed to be useful i n explainin g various common

sensory illusions For when we p erceive and judge of a common
.
sensi ble by employi ng one sense alone we seem to be qui te liable ,
“ ”
to error T hus the man who p erce i ves that the railroad tracks
.
,
converge on the horizon i s judgi ng abo ut shape ( a common

sensible ) by means of sight alone ; so too with the pe rcep tion Of , ,
the o ar bent in water T hat i s why the chi ld who p lays the game
.
of clos ing hi s eyes and guessin g what objects are by means of

“
their feel al one i s easily mix ed up The correction for the se .
errors i s c orrespondingly simple since if we deli berately test our ,
single sense Observati ons by bringing the other senses into play
-
,
we soon set things to right .
C ons i derations like this serve a purpose i n clearin g the ai r of

a certain initi al confusion But i t must be emp has ized that they by
.
no mean s advance the philosop hical understanding of percepti on

very far For they all take place withi n the common sens e con
.
-
ce tion of sensation and i ts object and they leave qu i te untouched

p ,
the question of the s ta tus of the object whi ch i s reached in sense

percep tion Reference to the conditions required for p ercep tion or
.
to the d istinction between the p roper and common sen sibles may
help to explain some practi cal puzzles whi ch ari se for common
sense but it bears wi thi n i t assump tions of a qui te Obscure sort
,
.
What exactly is meant by a norma organ or a prop er “

,
“ ”
medium? D oes thi s refer to anything more than the w a y a standard

observer p ercei ves ? Why i s the standard observer convinced that
the green he sees in the carpet i s really there and the red which “
the color blin d p erson sees i s not ? Because hi s organ of sight

-
normal Which means what? That most p eople s ee thi ngs the way
.
he does ? Yet this doe s not touch at all the question of the status of
what i s seen .
cathedral exhibited as the day progressed Now . w hi ch of these
was the rea l color of the cathedral?
VIRT UAL RE AL ISM
Q uestions like the foregomg arouse the suspicion that we are

putting things wrongly Maybe i n dealing with something like
.
” “
color we should not even be asking which is the real color of
,
the object That mi ght involve us in the seemi ngly i mpossible

.
attempt to single out which of our numberless color perceptions -
“ ”
of a certain Object was ri ght all the others being presumably
,
not quite right There is something very di ssatisfying about this

.
way of speaking T his di ssati sfaction leads many a philosopher to

.
the conclusion that in dealing with such data as color we are not ,
dealing wi th intrinsic properties of the Object at all but with data ,
which are essenti ally re la tiona l O n this View we should not a s k

.
,
” “
what color an object is i n itself because the datum of color ,
already entails a reference to an observer an d to the conditions

“ ”
under whi ch his observation occurs The color of an Object is .
an abstraction : there i s only the color viewed in some relational

context by a viewer s ituated at a certain p erspective wi thi n that
“ ”
context When we have said color we alr eady have spoken of
.
,
a reference to a p erceiver and of the condi tions of his p erceivi ng ;

” “
therefore we should not go on to a s k which is the real color of
an Object Thi s seems to be like asking how thi s object would look
.
to an observer who was si tuated nowhere and for whom there were
no conditions of his seeing— a question of doubtful v alidi ty Color .
,
say these p hilosophers i s a relational reality It is the face which

, .
the world presents to a gi ven observer under given co ndi ti ons .
A s with color s o wi th other sens i ble p rop erti es What shall we

,
.
sa of sound taste warmth odor ? V ery much the same thing

y , , , .
They are not in trin s i c properties of an object in total isolati on

from an Observer but data whi ch are present in the interaction of
,
obj ect and observer Sound is a datum which i s there for the
.
consciousness of an Observer in interaction with the world Then .

The Problem of Percep ti on: II I09
the lamented tree whi ch falls in the mi ddle of the forest falls
soundlessly since sound is the consciously experienced s ide of an
,
interaction and where the interaction i s mi ssing sound i s mi ssing

, , .
Such is the view of those p hi losophers among them many Scholas ,
” “
tics who hold what may be called criti cal vir tual reali sm This
,
.
is the position that sensed qualities are fully Objective only for
consciousness and only virtually objective independently of con
,
s ci ous nes s This is to be contrasted wi th nai ve realism and w ith

.
”
“
critical formal reali sm which holds that sensed qualiti es are
,
formally Objective indep endent of all conscious experi ence The .
latter holds that the preci se formality of color sound taste exten , , ,
sion motion and the rest are present even when consci ousness
, , ,
is not going on Now this is what vi rtual reali sm d eni es f the

.
full meaning Of color or sound entails a reference to an Observer ,
then it cannot be formally real ized ap art from that reference .
O n this view we would have to s a y that the gr ass i s not for

,
mally gr een outs i de of experience stones hard flowers redolent , , ,
sugar sweet or sounds loud What thi s vi ew does should be clearly

, .
understood It reduces the world outside of consci ousness to a

.
quali tatively barren state It does not however introduce com

.
, ,
lete arbitrari ness into erce t i on For i t holds that wh ile these
p p p .
qualities are not formally present beyond perception still they are ,
vir tua ll
y present T hat is there is a p ower in the object i nde
.
,
pendently of p erception whi ch accounts for the formality whi ch i s

present when percepti on occurs Why do I percei ve grass as green .
,
lemon as b itter roses as sweet smelling? O bviously this is not a

,
-
matter of whi m Then there is some determination i n the Object

.
which in i nterrelation with my sensory organ gi ves ri se to my

, ,
experience of these data and not to others It i s qui te conceivable .

,
however that thi s same Objective determination might i n i nter

, ,
relation with an observer with different sensory organs and under

different p ercep tual conditi ons generate the experi ence of a for ,
m ally different datum for hi s consciousness .
O ne or two e xplanatory p o ints should b e made Fi rst let i t be

“
.
.
,
remembered that virtu al reali sm wants s till to be regar ded as an

1 I0 The Phi los op hy of Know led g e .
i mmed i a te realism a nd in no way an indir ect reali s m That is it:

,
.
,
i s not denying that in knowi ng we imme di ately know a non self -

.
“ ”
There is no pretense that I fir st know my own idea and then
have to argue to the fact that an object corresponds to it What I .
know is not a subjective mo d ification of myself It i s an object . .
This rose here red soft and sweet is an object not a collection
, , , , ,
of my i deas ; the green of the grass is Objective and s o is the ,
sound of the locomotive In knowin g then I am i mmediately .

, ,
beyond the sp here of my own i ndividual self T rue the data under .
,
d iscussion are o nly formally objective for percepti on but they ,
a r e formally objective for percepti on T o say that color sound .

, ,
taste Odor are relationally objective is not to s a y that they a re

, ,
subjecti ve .
Thi s i s where v irtual realism differs from the theory of John

Locke Locke held that the second ar y qualities were as experi
.
,
“
enced ,
ideas and hence subjective and he then had to cope
, ,
with the p roblem of how well these ideas resembled the quality in
the object Now this may well have been a deficiency in hi s own
.
way of stating th ings and he may have been driving at a point ,
quite si milar to the virtual reali sts But the fact remains that on .
his Vi ew as expressed i n his own language he does not thi nk that ,
we immediately know objects The critic a l virtual re ali sts hold .
that awareness i s alway s of the other and does not reach this other
inferenti ally Nor d o they have to ask whether the sensed data
.
“ ”
resemble the object as it ex ists un sensed ; formally objective -
qualiti es do not resemble virtually Objective quali ti es What is real .
apart from sensation is an Object whi ch is determinate and sens

ible ( able to be sensed ) and a determi nate subject which is capable
of sensing : consci ousness is the actualization both of the capaci ty
of the subject for sensing an d the capac i ty of the Object for being
” “
sensed A s such it i s not something subjective but th e a ctuali
.
, ,
z a ti on of an object s presence to a subject

’
.
Secondly and very i mp ort a ntly attenti on must be called to the

, ,
way in which thi s posi tion has been presented The reader will .
I I2 The Phi los op hy of Know led g e
be the Object : even for an angelic k nower there would objec
in ,
ti vely be a d is ta n ce between Louva i n and Brussels

1
.
b ) Secondly some Scholastic authors rely on the fact that

,
science gi ves us no reason to doubt the obje cti vity of primary

qualities Thi s is in contrast to the view of sci ence on secondary
.
qualities which it finds quite di sp ensable Wh at underlies this

, .
second vi ew is the recognition that for imme di ate consciousness

many if not all quali ties are exp erienced as Objective : the gr een
, ,
of the grass i s experienced as just as much a qu a lity of the object
as its extension for ex ample Therefore the only reason we have

, .
,
to doubt the Obj ectivi ty of a ny quali ty i s that this doubt is imp osed
upon us by some other facet of our knowledge or experience But .
science has succeeded in demons trating that phenomena of color ,
sound and the other secondary qual iti es can be understood by

,
considering bodi es as atomic structures in contact through an

electromagneti c medium with my physiological body ; at no point
do the secondary qualiti es enter into thi s descrip tion T hey are .
causally e xplained as arising from the interaction of entiti es whi ch

are s ufli ci ently concei ved without their aid A nd s o many philos .
O her s draw the conclus i on that there is nothing to be said against

p
the Objectivity Of p rimary qu ali ties and a great deal to be said
a gainst that of secondary quali ties They accep t the scientific .
p i cture as hard core p hilosophical datum Fr Gustave Weigel will

-
. .
for instance that the scientific vi ew makes speculation in this

sa
y , ,
area unnecessary R J Hirst is not inclined to put forth much .

2
. .
effort in behalf of secondary quali ties because science has no “
”3
need of them O ther authors tell u s that sci ence gives no ground
.
4
to doubt the objectivi ty of primary qualities i mplying the decisive ,
ness of the scientific outlook for ep istemology .
Va n Steenb er ghen op ci t p 2 1 7
1
,
. .
, . .
2 G u ta v
s e W ei gel S I a n d A r thur Ma d d en K n o w le d g e Its Va lues a nd
, . .
, , ,
L imi ts ( E nglew ood C liffs N J : P renti ce H a ll) , 196 1 p 19 , . .

, . .
3 O
p ci t p 3 18
. .
, . .
4 J se h D
o p H a s s et S I R
.o b ert A Mi tchell S I J Dona ld Mo na n
t ,
. .
, .
,
. .
, .
,
SI
. . The P hi lo s o p hy of H uma n K no w i ng ( Wes tmi ns ter Md : New ma n
, , .
Pres s ) 195 5 p 15 1
, , . .
The Pro blem of Percep tio n: II 1 I3
EVALUATIO N O F VIRT UAL RE AL ISM
Criti cal vi rtual reali sm deci des the p roblem of percep tion by
holding that in spati al qualiti es I know what formally belongs to
the Object as i t is i n it self apart from p ercep ti on while i n second ,
ary qualities I know what is only vi rtually in the Object ap art

,
from p erception The virtual re alist will be seen to begin habitually

.
with the assump tion that percep tion i s the work of a bodily con
scious nes s that i t takes lace b means of the causal i ty Of sensory
, p y
o r ans Now whoever begi n s Wi th this as an assump ti on is not so
g .
much val i dati ng the objectivi ty oi primary qualiti es as he i s

a s s umi ng i t For a sensory organ i s a S at i al organ and if we be gin
.
p ,
by assum ing that percep tion is ca us ed by Spati al organs then our ,
question has been answered before i t has hardly been rai sed .
5
So me might p rotest that thi s i s a jus tified procedure S ince there i s

“
no way of getting behind the role of the sensory org a ns i n con

s ci ou s nes s ; i n e i stemology we must begin somewhere and that
p ,
will turn out to be wi th the role of the organs in sensation With .
out even s triving to settle the legi ti macy of thi s stan d we only wi sh ,
to p oint out that a ny one who does begin here has Obviously
already granted Spati al qu ali ties a formally real status : if Spati al
Organs are at the o r igin of p ercepti on then they must be formally ,
real indep endent Of p ercepti on .
Conse quently i t i s not even necessary for these apologi sts to go

,
on to rai se ar guments in favor of the formal reality Of the p rimary

qualities O ne who believes that sensory organs play a causal role
.
in p ercepti on must be referri ng to the Sensory organs that we are “
a ll famili ar wi th— and these are s ati al G i ven thi s i t i s not at all
p .
,
necessary to Show that because th ere is homogenei ty between

o rgan and object no di storti on i s i ntroduced i nto erce t i on F or
p p .
5 Of co urs e, the p m
r o b le of s eco nd a r y
.
qu a li ties mi ght a ls o be r e a r d ed
g
mea ning for “ ”
as fini s hed w i th at thi s
p oi n t, Si nce o ur s en s or y o r ga n no r
ma lly i nclud es Seco nd a ry qua liti es , a nd hence a n a s s er ti on o f the r ole of
the b o d y mi ght b e tho u ght to i nclud e as

p a r t O f i ts me a ni ng the contrib u
“ ”
ti on o f the s eco nd a r
y qua li ties i nvolv ed i n i d enti fyi ng a s ens ory org a n .
once consciousness is seen as origina ti ng in an interaction between
organ and Object the formally Spati al character of both of these
is assumed O therwi se when V a n Steenberghen Shows the homo
.
,
6
neit between hand and table in respect to extension he would

g e y ,
merely be correlating two objects of consciousness ; that tw o Ob

ectS of consciousness have a homogeneity would of itse lf prove
j
nothin g about what is true independently of consci ousness In .
“ ”
order for his po int to have weight about a reality in i tself ap art
from consciousness he must already believe that consci ousness
,
o ri ginates in thi s Spati al contact that the hand of whi ch he speaks

,
i s not Simply an object Of consciousness but an organ by which

consci ousness i s generated— and hence he must a s s um e that this
spatial organ is real i ndependent of consciousness Likewise when

, .
,
he Speaks of the lack of homogenei ty between the eye and color ,
thi s could only be evi dence agai nst the objectivi ty of color if he
assum es that the eye of familiar conscious exp erience is causally
involved in the production of vision ; but this assumes a t lea s t i ts
formally spatial reality In other words the virtual re a l i sts are
.
,
p osin g the whole question of sense qualities w i thin a context which

Simply takes for granted extensi on as a formal reali ty i ndependent
of consci ous ex erience altogether
p .
Sometimes it appears that the virtual realists are exerting stren

n ous eff orts to prove that the objects of p ercep ti o n are formally
extended a fact whi ch does not need p roving at all It is evi dent
— .
that the desk the pi ece of pap er the rock which i s the object of
, , ,
my perception is in itself as such extended No argument is, , .
needed to bring that out But i t is also evi dent that the Objects of
.
p ercept i on are color ed sounding a n d Odorous T hi s

, p iece of
,
pap er .
whi ch I p ercei ve is not only rectangular but w hite; thi s grass which
I p ercei ve is not only two i nches hi gh but green No argument .
either p roves or disproves that S ince it i s given Then what has, .
V a n Steenberghen p roved whi ch warrants hi s statement that not

every knower would have to p erceive thi s grass a s gr een but that ,
6 Op . ci t
.
, pp 2 1 5 2 17 , 2 2 2 22 3
.
- -
.
II6 The Phi los op hy of Know led g e
ing it i s very l ikely to w ind up ill the position of Immanuel Kant
,
.
7
Kant s view is based on his distinction between noumena and

’
phenomena The noumenon is reality in itself the phenomenon "

.
,
reality as it presents itself to consci ousness Since human knowl .
edge is not i n toto creative of its object Kant assumes that it is ,
legitimate to Speak of reality as it is in itself ap art from all rela ,
tion to consciousness But every conceivable consci ousness ( hum a n

.
or otherwise ) i s a de finite k ind o f consci ousness with a deter ,
minate structure Reality as it presents itself to a knower must

.
,
then present i tself according to the conditions under which he can

,
know Whatever determines his mann er of knowing also deter

.
mines to that extent the manner in whi ch Objects are known by -
hi m T urn ing to human knowledge Kant found that the a p ri ori

.
,
forms ( or structural determinati ons cons tituting my consci ousness

“
independent of all actual content ) which specify my kind of know

ing are the forms of space and time What determines my way of .
knowing i s that whatever I know I must know sp ati ally and tem
p or all
y A n
y re ality whi ch cannot be
.
p resent in this way i s never ,
present to my consci ousness and s o i s never kn own ; conversely , ,
any reality whi ch is present to my consci ousness must confo rm to

the condi tions under which something ca n be present and hence ,
mus t be known spati ally and temporally .
Underlying e xp eri ence i s a noumenal subject and a noumenal

Objective ground E xp eri ence is the p roduct of a relation between
.
these two ( whi ch must forever remain inexpli cable ) E verything .
present to my exp eri ence is p henomenal This word must not .
“
mi slead uS Kan t does not me a n to s ignify that i t i s illusory or
“
decep ti ve but only that i t is reali ty as present accordi ng to the
,
conditions of my manner of knowing In knowing phenomena I .

,
know o bjects not illusi ons or merely subjective occurrences The

, , .
rocks trees water animals people whom I experience are real

, , , , ,
just as real as the self of my exp erience but they are phenomenally ,
real T hat is the qu ali ties which I find in them are objective not
.
, ,
7 W itho ut , o f cours e , n eces s a r i l

y s ub scr ib i n
g to the full ra nge of Ka nti a n
philos op hy i n p a r ti cula r hi s meta p hys ics
, .
The Pro blem of Percep tion: II II7
subjective but they are objective i n them as p henomena That is

—
.
why the accusation of some that Kant has a subjective theory “
of space i s m i sgui ded S ace i s subjecti ve as a fo r m o f our know

p .
ing but it is Objective in the sense that it informs every Object Of

,
my exp eri ence Sp ace is real in the sense that it is a qualification

.
of human e x erience : the objects I e x eri ence really are S ati al

p p p .
What about noumena ? Here no answer is possible T he noumenon .
is the trans experienti al Objective ground of my experienci ng

-
things the way I do and because i t is trans experiential I can s a y

,
-
,
nothing about it What I mean by space is this indi catable feature

.
of m henomenal e x erience ; as long as there is human ex eri

y p p p
ence there i s Space Whether the noumenal ground whi ch i s ex
, .
erie nce d by me in a s ati al manner could be presented in another

p p
ma nner to another knower I cannot say , .
O nce experience is viewed a s phe n omenal i n thi s way the d i s ,
tincti on between p ri mary and secondary qualities loses much of i ts

point What i s given to me percep tually is e xp erienced as fully
.
real : thi s grass i s green sweet smooth e xtended moving All

, , , , .
these properti es are real ex actly as they are exp eri enced as being
real : forma lly where they are exp erienced as bei ng What about .
the grass ap art from experience ? Th is i s a confused question This .
grass preci sely is the grass as experienced and it makes no sense ,
to ask about i t ap art from exp erience If I mean what about the .
-
noumen a l ground of this p ercep tual exp erience apart from experi ,
ence then there i s no more reason to think of i t as extended than

,
to think of i t as having the secondary qualities .
T here i s no clear reason why the vi rtual reali sts Should check
their reason ing Short of a Kanti an conclusion If exp eri enced data .
are relati onal then it would appear correct to view them all a s
,
relational No argument seems to p revent thi s but only the con

.
,
vi cti on that our e x eri ence of ourselves a s s atial i s a rock bottom -

p p
inexpli cable whi ch reveals a datum that is real i ndep endent of all
consci ousness E verything stands or falls on the truth of thi s con
.
vi cti on .
The other reasoning which is at the basis of virtual realism s ’

I I8 The Phi los op hy of Know led ge
conferring of formal reality on the primary qualities ma y be more
briefly handled i e the scienti fic evidence whi ch seems to lead in
, . .
,
thi s directi on It cannot be too o ften reiterated that sci entific data
.
cannot be decisive o n thi s issue for reasons whi ch have alr eady ,
been p ointed out No scientific statement can provide an ultimate

.
ground for judgi ng the nature of p ercepti on for every scientific ,
statement is built upon a perceptual foundation It can have no .
more Objectivi ty than p erception has and can not be used to test ,
the fundamental objectivi ty of perception The fact that science .
has no need of secondary quali ti es and can co nfine i ts description

of reali ty to the quanti tative language of the pri mary qualities does
not establi sh ei ther that secondary qualities are un real or that -
the world independent of consciousness is ch a racterized formally

by primary qu alities .
The long entrenched opinion to the contrary is now increasingly

-
recogni zed as the hyp ostasizing of an abstraction Because sci ence .
left asi de all secondary qual ities and attended only to the quantita
tive aspect of reality there grew up a propensi ty to treat thi s
,
“ ” “ ”
quanti tative asp ect as a thing or collection of thi ngs exi sti ng
i n i tself Part of the ep i stemological advance wi thi n sci ence itself
.
in recent times has consi sted in reco gnizi ng the abstract character
of i ts own way of conceiving reality and repudi ating the p rojection
Of thi s abstraction as an autonomous reality This repud i ation was .
facili tated because the progress of Sci entific theory had finally
reached the point where not only had sci ence been able to di spense
with the secondary qualiti es in its descrip tion of reality but it now ,
found itself denuding the Object even of the primary qualities .
T hus Werner Heisenberg could s a y of the atom as i t was con

,
ceive d by a h sical theory wh i ch he h i mself had been i nfluen tial

p y
i n brin ging into bei ng that it had nei ther color sound nor
, , ,
extens ion nor any of the quali ties whi ch the bodies of p erceptual
,
exp eri ence have It is now a matter of the most extreme p erplexity
.
8
to deci de just what i s the status of such an entity Some regar d i t .
8 W erner H ei s enberg, P hi los op hica l P r o blems o f Nuclea r Sci ence ( New

York : P a ntheon ) , 195 2 , pp 3 8, 86 . .
I20 The P hi los op hy o f h
T
ePo
r
altogether before its object My p a i n is just as much Obj .
there i ndep endently of my judgmental consciousness as is a table

or a chair We are i n the habi t of thinking of p ain joy sorrow
.
, , ,
and the like as subjective exp eriences but for the jud ging con
, ,
s ci ou s nes s they are found there other than itself as judging

, , ,
.
b ) For p ercep tual consciousness every quality is just where it ,
is experienced as being This is a matter of direct experi ence Th e

. .
t
green is for perception just where it i s experienced— in what I

, ,
call grass ; the blue is in the Sky ; the gurgling in the brook ; the
scent in the rose The only question that can be raised in thi s area
.
is the p sychological one of whether I a m sure where I experience

these qualiti es and this i s often obscure Do I really experience
, .
the sweetness i n the sugar— o r do I exp erience it in my tongue ,
or do I ex erience i t in the encounter between sugar and ton ue ?

p g
T his i s a factual question which may often be hard to answer .
But wherever I do exp erience the quali ty that i s where it is and , ,
nowhere els e .
10
From here on things become less clear For my habitual con

,
.
,
vi cti on is not Simply that ever thing is objective i n respect to judg

y
mental consciousness but that the Objects of p ercep tual conscious
,
ness are completely objective Whence do I derive this conviction ? .
What appe ar s to happen is that my lived consciousness i s integral ,
and that I assimilate the p erceptual data to the i ndependence of

the Objects of judgmental consciousness That is just as the object .
,
judged about is altogether independent of the act Of judging s o ,
the perceived object i s posited as altogether other than the tota l

consciousness which i s aware of i t I assimilate perceiving to .
10
Supp o s e I ex
p eri ence the p a i n i n an a mp uta ted li mb ? E v en SO, o ne
of tw o thi ngs : 1) I d re a ll i nce i t there— w hi ch ca nnot b e d e

y o ex
p er e
cla r ed a n i m o s s i bilit exce t b a s s um i n h a t I ca nno t feel a

p y p y g t p a in w her e
a b o d il a
y pp end a e no lo n er ex i s ts
g g w h ich i s o nly a n a s s ump tion a nd
,
ex a ctl the a s s um ti on i n u e s ti on ( For a for ceful ex o s i ti o n O f thi s ,

y p q p .
s ee E A B urtt,
. . op . ci t
.
,
p . 2) I a m p s ycholog ica lly mi s ta k en i n thi n k
i ng tha t I exp er i ence i t ther e : I r ea lly ex
p eri en ce it els ew here a nd i mme
d i a tely i n te rp r et i ts loca ti on thro ugh p a s t r ecollecti o ns .
The Problem of Percep tion: II 121
j
u dging and
,
then the p erceived Object has the same independent
status as the judged object I then come to believe that if my
.
indi vidu al perceiving consciousness were not there the objects ,
which I perceive would still be there exactly as they are for

percep tion .
E ndless d ifli culti es are raised by this belief R ather than attempt .
ing to deal wi th them let us only try to Sp ecify what is involved

,
in thi s claim for the independence of perceptual objects If I claim .
that tables rocks chair s clouds are there independently of indi

, , , ,
vi du al perception what do I want to assert? A re they there a s

,
they are for consciousness ? But then I am hypostasizing the pure

“
outside View which is the one which is there for an observer
, .
Are they there for thems elves ? But then they are not there a s they
are there for consciousness— for for consci ousness they are there
,
for us Furthermore to speak of these things as be i ng there for

.
,
”
themselve s is d ifli cult to do in the case of tables rocks and , ,
“
clouds The only way of be ing for itself that is clear to me is my
.
o w n way— consciousness s way ; surely though I don t qu i te mean

’ ’
, ,
that these Objects are there for themselves as consciousness is there

for itself But how can they be there i ndependent of all other
.
”
consciousness without be ing i n a ny way for themselves ? “
We now begin to realize that the ep istemological assertion

overflows into me taphy sical territory In order to assert fully that
.
perceptual objects are independent of all i ndividual consciousness ,
we ought to know what we mea n by this assertion Yet as soon as .
we try to spell out what we mean by i t we must theorize as to ,
the nature of their indep endent exi stence Are they something .
analogous to consci ous selves a la the monads of Lei bniz ? Are

,
they data for an absolute experience a la Hegel? Are they s ub ,
stances a la St Thomas ? The dire uncertainty in the face of all

, .
these questions may be utilized i n bri ngi ng us to the reali zation of

the limits of the self contai ned character of the ep istemologi c al
-
inquiry To a l a rge extent we can separate the epistemologi cal

.
,
question from others such as the metaphysical but we eventually

, ,
reach the limits of this separation Unless I know what I mean by
.
“ ”
saying that material obje cts exist unp erceived I cann ot be said
to know the truth of that statement in anyth ing but a most rudi
mentary way But in order to know wha t I mean I must make an
.
,
attempt to co nceive the mo d e of existen ce of these ind epen d ent

objects and then I am in a theory of being rather than a theory
, ,
of knowledge .
It is not too much to s a y that the problem of perception remains

the most unresolved in the whole of epistemology In fact it would .
,
be somewhat di singenuous to s a y anything else A p erp etual start.
ing from scratch seems to a fli ict our inqui ries here Thi s should .
not be taken a s a defeat for thou ght however since the reco gni
, ,
tion of this plight and the restless effort to surmount it is rather an

indication of the genuinely philosophi cal limit Situation whi ch we-
reach here If we were to s um up what can be salvaged as epi s te

.
mologi ca l currency from a very fluid s ituation we might li st the ,
following :
1 ) Perceptual consciousness i s n ever pure subjecti vi ty It always .
contains an actualizati on of the presence of a non self as well as -
our own presence to ourselves .
2 ) Perceptual consci ousness never stands alone but is always ,
incorporated into the total relation to the other whi ch includes

elemen ts which go beyond p erception .
3 ) Perceptual data always exist just exactly where they ar e

exp erienced a s ex isting .
4 ) Perceptual consci ousness seems to put uS i n contact wi th a

multiplici ty of non selves ; in s o far as it i s incorp orated i nto a
-
total a cting consci ousness it presents us with multiple centers of

,
res i stance.
How much further than this we can go with security is debat

able A quite consistent p i cture oi reality can be p resented by a
.
vie w whi ch regards all p ercep tual objects as existing in their full
and formal reality only for human consciousness This could be .
done either in a Kanti an manner or by reg a rding percep tual

,
“
objects a s events which are there at the boundary of a subject
124 The Phi los op hy of Know led g e WP"
p o i nts.It re a lly seems to be only a

p rejudice wh i ch throws the
secondary quali ties out of reality Illusions are not conclusive .
,
either since they only prove that these qualities a re condi tioned l
,
by circumstances not that they ar e un—real When we see a roun d

,
.
p e nn y from a certain angle as elli ti cal the e xplanation is again

p ,
the relational character of the datum We are seeing a round .
penny turned—a t a certain—angle to my eye : a total circumstantial

- - - - - -
datum What w ould be amazing would be that the p enny from thi s
.
angle still looked round for th i s would nullify the reality of space
,
and of the whole context of relations which the penny has to other
entities I am never perceiving the penny but a whole contextual
.
,
relati on out of which I concentrate on a single member To exist

,
.
sp atially is to exi st p ers p ecti va lly but that is only confusing if we

,
fail to see that p erspective i s itself an objective datum True it i s .

,
not a property of an object apart from a viewer but neither i s it a ,
p pro erty of a vi ewer It is a

p roperty
. of an object a s vi ewed from - - -
here The intelligi bi lity of perspective implies a reference to a

.
determinate object and i s therefore a revelation of that object .
The same can be sai d about the perspectival character of second

ary qual i ties .
To hold that sensory p ercep tion puts me in touch w ith quali ti es

which exist formally i n an indep endent object we would have to ,
hold several things : a ) The concep tion of an object as i t exists i n

itself ap a rt from all relations i s a meaningful concep tion b ) The
, , .
conception of primary and second a ry qualities existin g apart from

all relation to consciousness i s a meaningful concep tion c ) There .
i s nothi ng i n e xp erience that would eli mi nate th i s p ossibili ty It .
may be safely declared that sensory illusion and scientific evidence ,
the only two reasons usually adduced for the elimi nation of objec
tivi ty are not conclusive T herefore the decision on this questi on
.
comes down to our stand on the fir st two p oints E ven i f the possi .
bili ty of the first two points i s deni ed there is at least one more ,
alternative that one could adopt who wanted to hold the strict
re a li ty of sensory qualities That i s the belief in an Absolute
.
Consciousness transcen d ing our ow n in which all these qual i ties

are perp etually held fast ; on this View o ne way to sustain naive ,
reali sm would be by esp ous i ng A bsolute Idealism .
P U" " LE S AB O UT OB] E CTIVIT Y
Tw o more po ints ma y be made i n conclusion First the question .

,
of objectivi ty i s usu a lly di scussed i n complete neglect of the con -a
s ci ous n es s wh i ch a s s er ts th i s objectivi t We too eas ily overlook

y .
the fact that every asserti on of objectivity i s in function of a cer -s
tain exi gence of the consciousness whi ch makes i t C onsequently .
we overlook the keen di ssatisfaction felt by certain realms of

consci ousness i n the face of the Kanti an or virtual reali st disp os al
of s econdar qual i t i es S ec i fically what would the a es theti c co n-
y p.
,
L
s ci ous nes s feel i f i t were told that s econdary quali ties were onl
y
vi rtually objective ? Suppose we were to tell Marcel Proust remem ,
beri ng in ecstasy the taste of his aunt s madeleine cake the azure
’
Veronne River the long a go p eal of the church bells and the
,
-
,
scent of the ha wthom blossoms along the lanes of the child hoo d
village of Combray that secondary quali ties were not as formally
,
real as extensi on a n d motion would that make contact wi th the

—
reali ty of hi s exp erience? A nd if i t d id not in what way is i t a , .
sati sfactory Vi ew of p ercep tion ?

The aestheti c consc i ousness seems to e xp eri ence itself a s a p ro
f ound though stammering affirmati on of a sp lendor i t find s i n
, ,
the most i rres i sti bly objecti ve manner The world whi ch i t cele.
brates i s for i t glori ously there a nd i t will just not take no for
, ,
an answer Now the exi gence whi ch th i s consciousness feels to

.
assert absolute reali ty cannot be brushed asi de by a consci ousnes s

operating at a diff erent level or i n a di fferent w a y The sci enti s t .
just cannot tell the arti st that the sunset i s not really a ri ot of color
”
nor a benedicti on of beauty ; nor can the neutr al observer the “
,
sensory knower the down to earth man or any other than a

,
- -
,
poeti c c onsciousness The assertion of reality i s always a functi on

.
of a certai n e xi gence and the tendency to overlook thi s introduce s

,
”
a fantasti c confus i on i nto the roblem of “
-
p p ercep t i on What re .
-
x
fiection can do is to mediate and harmonize the various exigences
and the vari ous realms of consciousness but it can do this only if , ,
as reflection it inhabi ts these re alms and feels these exigences

, .
Up to the present day epistemologi cal di scussions about the ob

,
ects of perce tion have not done thi s Progress in this quarter is
j p .
u rgently called for .
Secondly reflecti on must also apply itself to the conti nued ex

,
“
p lorat i on o f the meani ng of object which is at stake i n thi s
d iscussion something never quite clear E ven the aestheti c con

,
.
sci ous n es s is not sure what it means when it says that i t wants its
w orld to be there to be there for itself ; i t wants somehow to

,
- -
, ,
a fli rm the glori ous and overri ding reali ty of the objects i t encoun
t ers but i t is not really sure what it means by this yearnin g

, .
Philosophical reflection must delve into the in articulate yearning

of thi s and other levels of consciousness For consciousness must .
recognize something puzzling and elus ive about i ts convi ction of

the reality of percep tual objects Not only i s a perceptual object
“ ”
.
an amalgam of an i ndefinite number of persp ectival vi ews but it ,
is involved totally in ti me No one has yet fully incorp orated time

.
into the di scussion on percep tion I feel that I experi ence objects
.
and that these objects are real indep endent of my percepti on But .
each object i s a temp oral unf olding and therefore in demanding ,
that the object be real I am deman ding that each temp oral p er
,
s ective be relatively unr eal I want it to be for itself— and yet -

p .
how can I conceive the for itself real i ty of a rock with an i nfinity
-
of
p oss i ble s p atial perspec ti ves and a cont i nu ity of re al tem oral
p
moments ? It would seem that in asserting the reali ty of objects I ,
a m always asserti ng more than ers ectives : I am asserting the

p p
ingathering of persp ectives i nto a unity whi ch is somehow there
in and for itself Yet how can this apply to non human thi ngs ?
.
-
Perhap s a clue may be gotten by consi dering the non consci ous -
uni tary asp ects of cons ciousness such a s the way our bo d ily ex
,
eri ences are there for us Physiologi cally our body is not a datum
p .
for consciousness ; what does i t mean for the body to be there ,
a nd yet not consciously there ? The possibilities for questioning

TH E SEA RCH FOR
TH E UN C ONDITIO NA L
TH E P RIMITIV E ASSE RTIO N

Although the objectivi ty of sense perception can be placed upon
fir m grounds there is no denying that there i s a residue of uncer
,
t ai nty in this area If nothing else it is clear that the objectivi ty

.
,
here vindicated is comp atible with a relatively vast amount of

error ; sensory illusion of one kind or another i s famili ar to every
o ne T herefore i t makes obvious sense to say that the objects of
.
sense p ercep tion may o ften a pp ea r to be other than what they

really a re T hat whi ch i s known in sense p ercep tion i s not gi ven
.
in such a way that it can underwrite an uncondi tional certi tude

about reali ty apart from the immedi ate percep ti on .
The m ind fin ds itself restive under these ci rcumstances for its

,
ineluctable urge is the ur ge to the absolute We ar e not at all

.
satisfied to rest wi th the rather adulterated bran d of sensory objec

tivi ty but wi sh to p ress on to a n area in wh i ch we can leave all
,
qualification behind Is there p resent in human experi ence any

.
knowledge about whi ch we will no longer have to fear that things

may be other than they seem? Is the security of uncondi ti onal
assent forbi dden to us ? O r is there not open to thought an a fli rma
ti on which it can make with altogeth er unqualified assurance ?
Now if there i s su ch assuran ce i t can only be founded on a
,
datum i n which the di stinction between appearance and reality i s

surpassed If there i s to be absolute certitude there must be an
.
,
absolute datum one given in such a way that wi th respect to it

,
The Sea rch for the Uncond i tiona l 129
”
we need not even cannot ask whether things be other than they
, ,
seem As long as it is thinkable that things be other than they

.
seem then it is thinkable that our knowledge of them be not true

,
to what they reall y are The search for the uncondi tioned therefore
.
resolves itself into the search for the absolute datum .
Such a datum is given to us through the idea of be ing By .
”
the term being we designate all that is and all that can be We
“
,
.
designate the tota lity of reali ty whether actual or possible Man ,

.
,
star stone amoeba are all beings ; red sweet hard loud are
, , , , , , ,
beings ; satyrs uni com s mermai ds are beings ( be ings of fantasy ) ;

, ,
numbers lines points are beings ( beings of abstraction ) ;

, , ,
thoughts acts of will emotions are beings The idea of bei ng

, , .
applies to everythi ng which is and to every d ifference between

everything whi ch is : d ai sies and grasshoppers are both beings and ,
whatever makes a dai sy different from a grasshopp er is also a

being Thus green leafy with a yellow and white flower contain
.
, , , ,
ing chlorophyll are modes of being ; brown many legged winged

, ,
-
, ,
ar e modes of bei ng The notion of be i ng a plies to every whole

p
.
individual and to every p art of that whole There is no excep tion .
whatever to the i dea of bein g : God i s a being and so i s a gamma ,
ray Absolutely nothing fa lls outside the s 0 0 pe of this notion

. .
Whatever i s not nullity is being , .
Supp ose there are things which we have never known and never
will— planets forever unseen typ es of life never encountered , ,
Descartes evi l genius or some peculiar thi ng so foreign to us that

’
we cannot even begin to imagine i t E ven so we know one thi ng .

,
about it in advance— the i dea of being app lies to it Whatever we .
do not know about i t w e do know t hat if it i s at all i t is included

, ,
withi n our concep t of being The i dea of being is not then limited .
, ,
to e xp erience It applies to every being wh i ch p arti c ip ates in ex

.
eri ence and to anyth i ng that could partici ate in e x erienc e but
p p p
al so to things whi ch could never be part of our e x erience T h i s
p .
idea is absolutely universal and no exception to it whatsoever i s ,
thinkable Moreover in respect to it no di stinction between

.
, ,
appe arance and reality is possi ble It may make sense to s a y .

maybe thi s o nly looks red and isn t really red but it makes no ’
,
sense to say maybe this red only s eems to be being and really
,
“
,
”
is not The id ea of bein g then provi des the fulcrum up on which
.
, ,
absolute certitude turns .
We have already suggested that the absolute Uncon d itional

underlying thought is the reality of the question i tself as the
ground of all kn owledge and what is said here is not meant to ,
controvert this Bein g i s deli vered to us fund a mentally as question

. .
What we are seeki ng now is as it were the first irruption of the , ,
question into the order of affi r matio n And we cannot go far .
wrong if we begin by sayi ng that one thing we may a fli rm nh oou a
d iti onally is our right to a ffirm T his is not p layi ng wi th words .

1
,
for it i s a way of recognizing that that whi ch allows the question

of the truth or falsity of i ndi vidu a l assertions to be ra i sed is of a
different order from the object of these assertions That whi ch .
allo w s the di stinction between the truth and falsi ty of assertion i s

the questioni ng gr asp of experience But the question as turning .
,
to exp erience i s i mmediately diffracted i nto a duali ty in the order

,
-
“ ”
of asserti on For i t gr as s e x eri ence as at a certai n distance
.
p p
from its ow n ultimate and inexpressible i ntelli gi bi lity That up on .
whi ch assertion bears i s twofold : it is not a sheer exi stent whi ch ,
would leave no di stance between i tself and the question and thus
obli terate the latter .
T h i s d istance of e xp eri ence from the question is rendered in the

order of asserti on as a di stance of e xperi ence from i tself and ,
e xpressed in the p rimiti ve asserti on that something i s or some

” “ “
thi ng exi sts No asserti on may escap e that formula and that
.
,
formula entails the diffraction of the intelli gibili ty of the question

” “ ”
“
into a what and a that In the order of asserti on the i denti ty .
1
. T hi s p oi nt i s s tr ongly ma d e b y one of ma j or thi nker s of the mo d
the
ern T homi s ti c movement, J o s ep h Ma r écha l S I i n hi s monumenta l s ix
, . .
,
v olu me w or k L e p o i n t d e d ep a r t d e
,
’
la me ta p hys i que See C a hi er I p 3 5

’
.
,
.
,
a nd C a hi er V , p 37 7 For a n exp o s iti on

. . of Ma recha l s ’
tho ught, s ee the
exh a us ti ve a nd re ma rk a ble s urve
y of 1 9th a nd 2 0th centur y Thomi s ti c
ep i s temolo gy b y G eorges Va n Ri et, L ép is te mo log i e tho mis te 26 3—300
’
pp , . .
being O ne who thought himself cap able of denying this principle
.
w ould obvi ously have surrendered all r i ght to think at all The .
p ri nc i p le i s readi ly converted i nto the Princi le of C ontradi cti on :

p
Nothing can both ex i st and not exi st O nce again the recogni tion .
,
of th i s truth is involved i n the recogn i ti on of any truth whatever :
the very poss ibility of asserti ng i s gr ounded i n the realization that

to assert and deny are not i dentical We cannot both assert and .
d eny the truth of a p rop ositi on But what i s asserted or deni ed is .
being The ground therefore for the recognition that an assertion

.
, ,
a nd den i al of the same ro os i t i on is i m oss i ble is the recogni tion

p p p ,
of the imp oss i b il i ty that what i s asserted both e xist and not exist
2
.
2 ) Thi s pri ncip le i s equally i ndub i table once i ts i mp ort i s ,
clearly understood What i s asserted is not some relatively shape

.
”
les s confidence such that E veryth ing exists for a reason or
,
“
,
”
Go d created everything for a p urp ose whi ch p iety may fairly
“
,
accep t ( and perhap s consequent thought lend credence to ) but

”
something much more bas i c Reason i n thi s p ri nciple has noth .
“
” “ ”
ing to d o with purp ose or goal and therefore carries no
“
connotation either of God s p rovi dence or the benevolence of ’
” “ “ ” “ ”
“
Nature Reason here means ground or account and what
.
,
is asserted i s just that thought must apprehend a suffi ci ent ground

for the fact that something exi sts Up on insp ection this p rinciple .
wi ll be found to be as ir reducibly i ntelli gible as the first If there .
is a difference between being and not being then wherever we -

,
have being there must be that which s ufli ciently accounts for the
,
2Th i s p ri ncip le i s often formula ted to i nclud e a refer ence to ti me : Noth

i ng ca n b oth b e a nd no t b e a t the s a me ti me a nd i n the s a me r es p ect
”
.
j
Although thi s s eems us t a s unexcep tio na ble, i t i ntrod uces i nto the p ure
i ntelli gi b le cla r i ty of the p r i nci l
p e so me of the op a ci ty of our know l d g e e
a b o ut ti me i ts e lf . In o r d erfor the p ri nci ple so for mula ted to b e d i r ectly

i ntelli gi ble i t m i ght be
, thought to i nclud e a n mp ti on o f th e extremely
a ssu
”
s er i a l ti me a t w hi ch s i multa neous
“ “ ”
s u s p ect noti o n o f a oi nt o r i ns ta nt i n
p ,
ex i s ti n g a nd n o n -ex i s ti ng a r e d eemed i mp os s i ble It w a s H egel w ho d i rected

.
a ttenti on to the li mi ta ti o n o f the

p ri nci le w h en tem or a ll
p p a
y pp li ed , tre a t
i ng the p r oces s o f b ecomin g a s found ed up o n a s ort o f d yna mi c vi ola ti on o f
thi s pr i n ci p le T here i s n o n eed to ta e up hi s

. k r es erva ti on s here, a lthou
gh
they a r e ver y much to the poi nt i n meta phys i cs .
The Sea rch for the Uncond i ti ona l I33
fact that here there is being and not nothing Anything else would .
be absurdity If there were not that which s ufli ciently di stinguished

.
being from nothing then being would no t be sufficiently distin

,
u i s hed from nothi ng ( an obv i ous vi olatio n of the insight con

g
ta ined in the principle of identity ) But if be ing is different from .
nothing then there i s that which s ufli ciently differentiates it If the

, .
absence and the p resence of being are not identi c al then where ,
we have presence of being rather than the absence of being there ,
must be a ground or reason for the presence of being rather than

its absence O nce again to s a y anything else would be to reg a rd
.
,
exi sting and non existing as identi cal

-
.
Since the principle of s ufli ci ent reason amounts to the demand

of thought that th e order of exi stence be intell igible there is a ,
sense in which it m ight be applied wherever there is an act of

existing Thus it might even be thought of as appli cable to the
.
,
i n finite be ing Go d E ven here we could s a y that if the infinite

, .
bei ng exists then there must be a s ufli cient reason why He exists
,
.
If He i s d i stinct from nothing there must be that whi ch s ufli ci ently

,
differentiates Him from nothing Go d i s said to exi st a s e of him.

,
self ; H i s nature is to exi st Thi s does not ex actly mean that in the
.
real order God s essence i s the ground of hi s exi stence It means

’
.
that H is existence i s not di stinct fro m H i s essence and that it is ,
graspe d by us as an intelligible terminus in whi ch thought may

come to rest O f course from our standp oint we could express
.
, ,
thi s by sayi ng that for our kn owledge we s ee God s essence as the ,

’
s ufli ci ent reason for Hi s existence ; but that only means that if we
understand w ha t God i s we cannot ask w hy He is Thi s could be

,
.
put in more Thomi stic terms : since in God essence and existence
” “
are identical He i s esse Then our thought which rai ses the issue
, .
o f the s ufli ci ent reason for the e x i stence of God recogn izes that
the nature of God is existence As supremely actual there i s no .

,
severance of the ground of His existing from His ex i sting ; He

exists because He is ex istence So that God is gr asped by us as
.
H i s ow n suffici ent reason for existi ng .
Yet this same statement c a nnot be made about contingent

134 The P hi los op hy f Know led g e
'
beings We cannot say of man stone tree animal or any other

.
, , , ,
familiar object that they are thei r own ground of being They come .
i nto being a nd they pass out of being ; they begin to be Whatever .
begi ns to be obvi ously does not exi st of i ts ow n nature What .
exists of its ow n nature exists neces sarily ; what exists necessarily

cannot not exist Therefore what begins to be d oes not exist
-
.
,
necessarily It i s said to be contin gent in different to existence

.
, ,
meaning simply that its nature is comp atible either with exi stence
or non e xi stence-
John Jones does not exist beca us e he i s John
.
Jones— for it i s not o nly thinkable but p redictable that one day
he will not exi st ( just a s one day he d i d not exi st ) Therefore .
exi sting a s John Jones is compatible with the possi bility of not
existi ng Certai n typ es of being are suscep tible of exi sting or
.
not exi sting : then when they d o e xi st the s ufli ci ent ex lanati on for
-
p ,
their existence cannot be that they are this kind of being ( or this
kind of indivi dual ) But the fact remains that there mus t b e some
.
'
s ufli ci ent reason why this being wh i ch co uld not be here and now -
is It is not its ow n s ufli ci ent reason for existence ; nevertheless it

.
requir es that whi ch accounts for its standing outs i de of nothing .

3
It has become i ncreas i ngly common among Tho misti c writers

to disp arage the valu e of the p rinciple of s ufli cient reason on the ,
grounds that it is an i ntrusion of essentialism into a meta physi “ ”
” “
cal terrain whi ch should be reserved for a properly existenti alist
thought The p ri nciple there i s no doubt does not go back in i ts
.
4
, ,
explicit formulation to St Thomas and Thomists who are con .

,
3
No t only
p a ss i ng a w a y i n a complete s ens e, a s
b eginni ng to be a nd
the a pp ea r a nce a n d d i s a ppea r a nce o f i nd i v i d ua l uni ti es b ut a ny s ta te of ,
cha nge
gi ves the s a me reas onin
g For no b ei ng i ns ofa a s i t i s cha ngi ng i s
. r
its ow n gro und o f bei ng E very s ta te o f a cha ngi ng bei ng i s conti ng ent : i t
.
w a s n ot a moment a go a nd w i ll n ot b e a moment from no w Ther efo re the .
gra sp ing of a bei ng as cha ngi ng i s the gr a s p i ng of i t a s not i ntelli gi ble i n

i ts elf— a s es s enti a ll r e erred
y f to s omethi ng o ther tha n i s elf t .
4 See, for i ns ta nce, Jos ep h O w ens , A n E lementa ry Chris tia n

Me ta p hys ics ( Milw a ukee : B ruce ) , 1962 , f . n .
pp . 7 6—77 . A his tory of thi s
pri ncip le as w ell a s a cri tici s m of i ts ra ti o na li s t cha r a cter is conta i ned in

John E . G urr , S I The Pr i ncip le o f S uffici en t Rea s o n i n S o me Scho la s tic
. .
,
Sys tems , k
1 75 0—1 90 0 ( Milw a u ee : The Ma rquette U niver s i ty Pres s ) , 195 9 .
fici ent re a son for its existence Since it is not its own s ufli ci ent .
reason and s ince nevertheless there must be one ( or negation as

, , ,
such would be an intelli gible terminus ) then it refers itself to

“
another as to the ground of its own exi stence Then an efli ci ent .
”
cause withi n the p urview of thi s principle i s simply an extrinsic
, ,
sufficient reason for the coming to b e of something ( or of any - -
feature or state of a thing ) This exact meaning must be kept in .
mind for cause as will be seen is sometimes taken to mean

,
“
, ,
something quite different Ul timately what the metaphysical prin .

,
ci le o f causality amounts to is that the order of becoming and

p
existence must be i ntelligi ble ; that no phase of the process of
contingent exi stence is intelligible in itself ; and that therefore
contingent existence is always r ela ti ve existence essentially re ,
ferred qua exi sting to another

, .
5
TH E P RIORIT Y O F TH E F IRST P RINCIP LES
In View of what has been said it should be clear why the tra d i ,
“ ”
tiona l way of spe a king about first principles is well founded .
”
a ) They are called p rinciples in keep ing with the philo “
“
sophical conception of a principle as that from which something
”
else flows or derives What deri ves from these p rinciples i s
.
thought i tself They are the sources from which the possibility of
.
every specific thought ari ses .

6
b ) For that reason i t is only a matter of nomenclature whether

”
they be called first p rinciples or last principles They are the “
.
beginning of thought the source (p rincip i um) from which thought

,
arises ; but they are also ultimate in the sense that every particular ,
assertion can be reduced to them as resting i ts ultimate intelligi

5 Note tha t the p ri nci
p le d oes not s ta te th a t ever y effect requi res a
ca us e,
”
w hich w ould b e an e mp ty ta utolo gy ( s ince w e d o no t k no w w ha t
a n effect is ex cep t by a lr ea d
y concei vi ng it in r ela ti on to ca use ) b ut tha t
mi ng
“ ” “
ev ent r equi res requi res
ever
y a ca us e, or every process o f co to-be
-
a ground i n a nother .
5 T hey ma y be ca lled firs t pri ncip les o f though for tha t r ea s on, but they t
a r e a ls o fir s t p ri ncip les i n res p ect to b ei ng, s i nce they hold goo d of b ei ng .
The Sea rch for the Uncond i ti ona l I3 7
”
bili ty upon them There is no claim that they are first in a
.
“
chronological sense as if the first judgment a child made w ere

,
“
that Nothing can both be and not be the point is only that the
intell igibility of these p rincip les is p resent in every judgment in ,
cluding the one whi ch is chronologi cally first .
0 ) T hey are often called self evident i n the sense that they -
,
nei ther can be nor need to be justified in terms of further evi

dence With these princip les thought reaches an ultimate ground
.
, ,
and it would be nonsensical to speak of justifying these principles

in terms of sense percep tion induction or anything else Thi s , , .
“ ”
self evi dence need not mean that these principles arise i n abstrae
-
tion from expe rience but only that they are the ultimate light i n
,
terms of w hich exP erience is apprehended by thought They are

'
.
,
o f cours e not self evi dent as urely

-
verbal utterances but as
, p
immediate transpositions of the direct encounter with being There .
“ ” ”
is no way to prove o r demonstrate them for every demon ,
s tr a ti on would resup o se them Normally demonstration consists

p p .
,
in educi ng reasons for belief i n a proposi t i on wh i ch i s relatively

les s known than the evidence which is brought forward to demon
strate i t But if this were attempted i n the case of the first prin
.
ci les the absurdity would soon ap ear For the recogn i tion of the
p ,
p .
principle of identity e g would be involved in recognizing the

, . .
,
“ ”
cognitive value of any premi se offered to prove i t Any premi ses .
offered to demonstrate the first principles would already implicitly

Contain them .
That is why it is sometimes said that these principles are

”
virtually innate They are virtually there pri or to any judgment
.
whatsoever including the first formed by an i nd ivi dual m ind Thi s

,
.
“
naturally does not mean that we are born wi th the words Nothi ng
can bo th be and not be inscribed on our souls But the po int i s .
that we are born with minds and that part of the very structure ,
of the mind i s the ower ( vir tus ) of recogni zing the truth of the
p
first principles Mi nd would not be m i nd without thi s native
.
endowment .
Suppose someone suggested that these principles could be

formed by induction That is by realizing that A c a nnot both be
.
,
” “
a n d not be B cannot bo th be and not be C cannot both
, ,
be and not be I finally conclude to the generali zation that

,
“ ”
Nothing can both be and not be Here we must distingui sh : no .
doubt the exp lici t principle o f contrad iction as a uni vers a l for ,
mula is derived by a quasi induction from experience in this

,
-
way There sur ely must be many p eople who live and d ie wi thout
.
making this explici t reflecti on and hence without kno w ing the
uni versal p rinciple St Thomas s insistence that we kn ow even the
. .
’
first principles from exp e rience must be interpreted in this way :

the explicit assurance of these fir st principles is won from experi
ence itself Yes but on the other h a nd I could not even make the
.
,
individual judgments from whi ch I induce the uni versal principles

unless I already i mpli citly recognized the truth of these principles .
What app ears to be true i s that I recognize implicitly in individual , ,
cases the truth of these prin ciples ; if I d i d not I could not even
, ,
make the in dividu al judgments I would always have to be worry .
ing that the indivi dual judgment could simultaneously be true and
“
fa lse Thus in any individual assertion ( the child s Th i s i s my
.
,
’
” “ ”
mother This dog bites
, there is already operative the ,
pri nciple of contradi ction in which it is recognized that ass erting

and denying are not equivalent .
It is also enti rely plausi ble that the intelligi bility even of these
first principles cannot be justified s imply as a universal as perhaps ,
a rati onali st mi ght contend ; p erhap s I cannot claim that they are ,
indisputably evident wi thout impli ci tly referring them back to the

,
experience from which they were ori ginally drawn In this manner .
some seek to vi ndi cate the in dispensable role of sense percep ti on

in our knowledge The vi ndi cation has point if the clai m simply i s
.
7
that we discover even absolute intelligibili ty thr ough di rect exPeri e
7 P eter H oenen , S I . .
, Rea li ty a nd J ud g men t A cco r d i ng to S t . Tho ma s ,
tra ns by H enr y T i bli er S J
.
, . .
( C hi ca go : Regnery ) ,
1 95 2 , ma kes a
grea t
p oi nt o f i n s i s ti ng o n the fa c t
p ri nciples a re roo ted i n s ens e
tha t the firs t
exp er i ence Now tha t thes e p r i nciples a s a n y pri nci p les a ri s e out o f our
.
, , ,
exi s tenti a l encounter w i th r ea li t ( a nd n ot v i ce v er s a ) ther e i s n o need to

y ,
co ntes t; bu t a s H oenen hi ms elf a d mi ts

"
the i n te llig i bi li ty o f the p r i nciples

,
d eri ves fr om the li gh of the mi nd i ts elf ( p t On thi s b a s i s , i t i s ha rd .

1 40 The Phi los op hy f Know led ge
o
for what we are asserti ng to have me a ning it must be possible for

us to conceive already a t hought for wh i ch the first princi les
p
would not be true But such a thought i s in conceivable and there
.
,
fore the assertion of i ts possibility is meaningless The fir st p rin .
ci le s then are absolute in a ri gorous sense ; they are absolute as

p , ,
cogni ti ve and not merely factual The attempt to deny them would
, .
reaffirm them No doubt this indubitability is still subject to the

.
exi stential structure of our human condition but this does not ,
“
make them objects of faith They are cognition al absolutes a p .
p rehended by a being wh i ch i s not an existential absolute ; th i s

apprehension may always necessitate an effort to close the gap
“
between e xi stence and i ntelligibility but this is not faith in any ,
useful sense of the term .
CAU SALIT Y AND D ET E RMI ISM N

Perhaps the most i mportant philosophi cal requirement with
resp ect to the p rinciple of causality is that it be distinguished from
“ ”
the similarly denominated law of causali ty as this i s often con
cei ved b
y both common sense wisdom and sc i ence Th e sc
-
i enti fi c .
“
law of causality can be vari ously formulated E very event is .
necessarily connected with some antecedent event given whi ch i t ,
” “
must occur ; or E very occurrence is the consequence of some
,
antecedent without whi ch i t could not have occurred and given

”9
which i t had to occur Sometimes thi s is concei ved rather nar
. .
row l : the event of the breaking of the wi ndow i s co n nected w i th

y
the antecedent moti on of the rock through the a i r ( which i s con
nected with the antecedent moti on of the hand and s o on ) ,
.
Sometimes the concep ti on becomes more sop hi sti cated and i t is

assumed that the only a d equa te causal explanation of any given
event i s not some localized occurrence but the enti re antecedent
course of the universe In either case i t i s clear that the scientific
.
,
law of causali ty i s equivalent to the principle of determini sm For .
See Robi ns on i bi d p os i ti vi s t s ment m

’
9
, .
,
p . 25 3 . For a s ta te a nd cr i ti ci s
of
p r inci ple s ee Phili p p
thi s ,
ra n M o d er n Sci e nce F k , a nd i ts Phi los op hy
( Ca mbr id ge : H a r va rd Uni ver s i ty Pres s ) , 1 949, p 5 4 s s . .
The Sea rch for the Uncond i ti ona l 141
it holds that given the antecedents the results will neces s a ri ly ,
follow In its ideal expression it assumes the grandiose proportions

.
,
of Laplace s declaration that given the pos ition and motion of

’
,
every elementary particle in the un iverse at a ny moment of time '
and given a mind sufli cient to comprehend this then the enti re ,
course of future history could be predi cted for every moment of

time .
Now thi s scientific principle carries built in epistemological puz -
zles of its own but the present intenti on is only to distinguish i t

10
from the philosophical principle of causal ity with which it could

be confused The philosop hi cal principle merely insists that given
.
any contingent entity or event there must be some extri nsic suf
ficient reason for i ts existence It by no means says that this cause .
has to be a member of a temp orally antecedent series nor that i t ,
“ ”
has to act neces s a r i ly The notion of a free c ause i s not a
.
philosophi cal contradi ctio n although it is a contradi ction s ci en ,
“
tifica lly A sci entific
. cause i s equivalent to a necessary ante
cedent and therefore a free ( non necessary ) cause would be a
,
-
p atent c on tradiction T his must be kept i

. n m i nd or the news that ,
many contemporary sci entists under the influence of the H ei s en ,
berg pri nciple of indeterminacy rep udiate the notion of causality ,
would be startling indeed .

11
TH E C RITIQUE OF H UME AND K ANT
Theforegoing stipulation is also useful in considering D avi d

Hume s famous arguments agai nst the validi ty of causality What
’
.
12
Hume w as primarily combatting was really the common sense -
E speci a lly w hen i t i s p ut i n th e form tha t s imi la r co ns e quents follow

1°
from s imi la r a nteced ents for here ther e i s the ques ti on of w hether a n
,
exa ctly s i mi la r a nteced ent ev er occur s in na tur e .
11 A ccord i ng to the p ri ncip le of i nd etermi na cy i t i s i ntri ns ica lly impos

s i ble to a s s er t tha t a n electro n h a s , s i multa neous l , a d efini te os iti on a nd
y p
y ; i f thi s i s a ccep ted s tri ct d etermi ni s ti c ca us a li ty ca nnot be held
v eloci t ,
a t the s ub a tomi c level s i nce the cond i ti ons u on w hi ch i t r es ts a r e no t

-
, p
fulfilled .
12 H ume Se lecti o ns , ed i t . b y Cha rles W . H end el Jr( New

, . York : Scri b
’
ner s ) , 1927, pp 22— 3 9 ( . . From A Tr ea tis e of H uma n Na ture ) .
I42 The Phi los op hy of Know led ge
notion of a cause according to which event A makes event B
,
happen ; for example for common sense to s a y that the mo ving,
”
stone caused the window to break means two things : 1 ) there
was a p ower in A ( moving stone ) which made B ( breaking
window ) happen 2 ) this connection was a necessary one such
, ,
that given a si milarly movi ng stone and a similarly constructed ,
window a simi lar breaking would occur Now Hume in keeping

, .
,
with his sensory epi stemolo gy first asks where we get the notion ,
“ ”
of this power It is not drawn from observati on a n d cannot be
.
verified through observation What we observe is the sequence of .
events the movi ng stone and the breaking window ( or the a p

,
ro a chin fire and the feeli n g of heat ) ; we do not o bs er ve some

p g
“
occult power which acts between o ne and the other A s for the .
”
necess ity of thi s event we sur ely d o not observe thi s e ither We , .
observe the sequence but not its necessi ty Where then do we , .

, ,
get the notion of necess ity? We get it from the habit we develop
o f exp e cti ng event B to occur whenever event A occur s We have .
observed such sequences many times before and i n each case ,
event B follows event A they are constantly conjoin ed Because —

.
of this whenever we witness event A o ur mind automati c ally

, ,
anticip ates event B ; we can t he lp anticipating i t Thi s however ’

.
, ,
is a p sychological necessity in us not an objective necessity in ,
thin gs We project thi s p sychologic a lly inevitable exp ectati on i nto

.
the objective sequence and treat i t a s an inevi table conn ection

in events While understan dable thi s projection cannot be logic a lly
.
,
validated For the two events are physi cally distinct and there is
.
,
nothing inconceivable about the consequent be ing different from

what it normally i s What i s there to p rove then that the concept
.
, ,
of cause has objective validity and is not simply a subjecti ve

category?
Immanuel Kant s answer to this reasoning i s one of the most
’
influential in the history of philosop hy a nd actually forms the

foundation for his ow n thought ; in following i t we must not lose 13
,
K a nt Se lectio ns t M G reene ( New Yor k : Scri b ner s )

’
13
, ed i . by T . .
,
19 29 , pp . 122— 130 , 145— 15 5 .

( Selections from The C r i ti que o f P ure
Rea s o n .
distinguishing between subject and object ; in a completely chaotic
“ ”
exp erience I co uld not even s a y I for there would be no ground
,
” “
to distinguish the I from anything else Contrariwi se experience .
,
of objects just i s the experience of the necessarily connected a nd
orderly Therefore if one of the categories according to which my

.
,
exp erience of orderly sequence is possible is the category of cause

( necessary connection of events ) then this category must neces
,
s a ril
y apply to objects : it is the co nd i ti o n for the experience of
objects .
Note what this reasoning of Kant s does to his ow n satisfaction

’
” “
at least : it completely vin di cates the validity of cause wi th
respect to phenomena but i t also restri cts the appl ication of this
,
”
category to phenomena Cause for Kant means the lawful con
.
“
necti on between phenomenal sequences ; then if I am to have
orderly phenomenal exp erience the category of cause must be

valid— of that exp eri ence But thi s is a very far cry from showing
.
its validity in respect to what is beyond phenomenal experi ence .
Its validity consists in being a condition for phenomena Then to .
a s k whether i t appli es a
p
absurd Therefore we cannot try to make noumenal use of this
.
,
concept of cause— to p rove by i ts me an s fo r e x ample the ex istence

, ,
of God or the free causati on of will To do so would be to seek to

.
,
extend beyond experi ence a notion whose entire meaning consi sts
in being a ti ssue by whi ch exp eri ence is bound to gether Kant .
therefore denies all metaphysical value to the p rinciple of causality .
What Kant holds in effect is that I only have genuine k no w led ge

, ,
“ ”
in resp ect to what i s an object and that the complete meaning
,
of object i s a synthesi s of sense intuiti on and formal concep t I .
“ ”
know what I can integrally lay hold of But the categories alone .
d o not give me anythi ng to lay hold of : they do not have a ny

content They are only pure forms or rules according to whi ch
.
things can be lai n hold of T hey demand comp letion through intui
.
tive content and can only be filled in from the s i de of sense intui
tion Then when I try to use these categori es beyond sense
.
exp erience my thought is emp ty— I think nothing I only make

, ,
”
as if to think something .
The Sea rch for the Uncond i ti ona l 1 45
An evaluation of this po sition must attend to the exact meaning

of the philosophical principle of causality Kant does not really .
refute this pri nciple because he does not really engage it We may .
begin by allowin g Hume s statements their proper desserts It is

’
.
true that we d o not perce ive causes ; we only p erceive sequences .
The noti on of cause is formed as a result o f the dem a nd which

the mind makes upon experience ; it demands that succession as
such be intelligible since a s mind it is the i nsight that all being
, , ,
is intelligible The philosophi cal pri nciple of caus ality is simply

.
this demand applied to temporal events which results in the reali

,
za tion that becoming as such is essentiall relative It is only one

y .
w ho like Hume w a s prepared to deny the right of mind to make

, , ,
an
y dema n ds upon reality and to reduce all experience to pass i ve
sense percep tions who would be prepared to accept non p ercep ti
,
-
bili ty as non validity

-
.
We must also di stinguish the general p hilosophical p rinciple

from the realization of w ha t is the cause of any specific contingent
event Hum
. e would be on fairly secure grounds if he were merely
pointing out the difference between our realization that every event
has a cause and our decisio n as to what this cause w a s— whether
an immediately prior temporal event or not This i s by no means .
as metap hys i cally certain We can hardly claim to be able to

.
identify the specific cause of an event wi th the same absolute cer

tainty that we can assert that i t must have such a cause Finally .
,
it goes without saying that any statement about the necessi ty with
w hich that cause operates is completely outside the province of
the p rinciple of causal ity itself T herefore nei ther the reasoning
.
,
of Hume nor Kant is conclusive against the phi losophi cal question
of causality Hume s osture i n parti cular i s p atently clumsy H i s
’
.
p , ,
.
whole effort can be construed as a search for the ca us es of our

belief in resp ect to the notion of cause— givi ng clear enough indi ca
tion that he thinks there must be causes for it and thus sapping
the life out of his ow n conclusions .
Kant i s on somewhat more plausi ble ground when he contends

“ ”
that the categories alone d o not give us an object or thing
and hence that their metaphys i cal us e does not provide kn owledge
in the s ame sense as phenomenal kn owledge Thi s seems at least
‘
psychologically valid although it does not justify the repudiation

,
of meta hysics to whi ch he went o n E ven if we can use the

p .
” “
category of cause metaphysic ally to p rove a first cause of
”
phenomenal being we do not reach thi s way an object in a fully
,
satisfactory sense God i s surely not an object for our knowing in

.
the s a me sense as p henomenal objects In one way He is much .
mo re intelligible i n another much less— but in any case He is not

,
intelligible in the same way Then metaphysical knowledge is .

,
signi ficantly different from phenomenal knowledge So much may .
be conceded without surrendering the cognitional v alue of the

first p rinciples .
The answer to all philosophical doubt a s to the validi ty of the

-
first principles must invoke the absolute nature of the i dea of

being upon whi ch they are based With thi s i dea the disti nction .
,
between appearance and reality i s surpassed So likewise is Kant s .

, ,
’
distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal Whatever else .
the noumenal reality in i tself may be it must be such that the

- -
,
idea of being applies to i t— and whatever intelli gibili ty i s base d

upon the idea of being Far from deri vi ng its m . eaning fr om the
si de of the phenomen al the category of cause is an extensi on into
,
the phenomenal of a trans p henomenal category It may well be -

.
that as this category i s commonly employed it i s hampered by

intrusions from the i maginati on and that its metap hysical us e is
cons i derably viti ated ; to this extent the distaste of many con
15
temp orary philosophers for it has not a little justification .
The remedy for this ho wever would see m to be its p urification

, ,
rather than its repudiation The justification of the category of .
cause i s the same as that of all metap hysical notions : the level of
insi ght s ufli ci ent to ques tion them is a level at whi ch they are neces
s aril
y val i d We .could not p ose the quest i on of the vali di ty of the
first principles unless we i nh abited the absolute center of thought
For thi ng , the a s i -s a ti a l ex tem a liza ti on v is a

15
o ne u v is o ne a n other
q p
o f ca us e a n d e ffect, or a ga i n the tend ency to p i cture the a cti v i ty o f no n
phenomen a l ca us a li ty b y s tri c tp a ra lleli s m wi th phenomena l a c i vi ty, a rriv t

k
i ng a t a ind o f gho s tly mecha nics
“
.
”
find no difli culty at all in withh olding our assent Why i s this ? It .
is because the evi dence s ufli ci ent to warran t the assent is clearly
miss ing Reality i s not present to my thought in such a way that
.
I can feel secure in an assent to thi s prop os i tion Whereas if .

,
someone were to say of the room in whi ch I sat There a re ,

“
”
ex actly three windo ws in this room my agreement or d i sagr ee ,
ment would soon be forthcomin g And this for the s imple reason .
that the evidence to warrant the assent i s easily available .
So wi th a ny p oss ible type of judgment The evi dence may vary . .
The ki nd of evidence needed to w a rrant one assent mi ght not be

sufficient to warrant another but every time I judge I orient my
, ,
thought in the direction of the w a y in which real ity i s p resent I .
exp erience my thought as thi s attemp t to take my bearings on the

p resence of being T hi s is the fou
. n dati on for the frequently r e
p ea ted declar ati on that be i ng has domi nance over thought M y .
thought exp eri ences i tself as essenti ally submiss i ve as an attemp t ,
to bow down to evi dence I do not decree what i s I discover it

.
, .
My thought i s then a pursuit an openness to the real and not a

, , ,
“ ”
pure spontaneity Bein g imposes i tself upon me and coerces my
.
thought There i s clear justification for thi s w a y of sp eaking

.
,
although i t rai ses some real diffi cul ties as we shall see later , .
For the p resent attention will be directed to the notion of the

,
”
ra n e of evi dence If evi dence i s the w a y being i s present to rue
“
g .
,
it clearly may vary greatly and the sort of assent warranted by this
,
varying presence will also vary gr eatly Shall we reserve the .
name certitude for those assents which are absolutely war

ranted and regard every other assent as simply hi ghly probable?
This i n e ffect is what Descartes p rop osed doi ng and i t i s the
, , ,
incli nati on of anyone of a rati onal i st temp er E i ther the feeli ng is .

, ,
“
somethin g i s absolutely certai n or i t i s not certain at all Thi s .
View ha s obvious merits and yet there i s a lot to be said for the
,
'
”
famili ar View whi ch classifies certitude into various typ es Con “
.
“ ”
s i d ered as warran ted assents there seem to be various pos itions
,
'
o f the mi nd wh i ch are not uncond i tional and yet whi ch are not
satisfactorily lump ed together as mere high degrees of prob

”
ability .
The Sea rch for the Uncond i ti ona l I49
For one there is some reason to speak of p hys ical certi tude
, ,
which is an assent bas ed upo n the evidence of the habitual behavior

of physic al bodies often formulated into the s o called laws of
,
-
“ ”
nature Th us what of the attitude of the outfielder who i s waiting

.
,
under the fly ball poised to catch i t? It does not seem s ufii ci ent to
-
,
describe the cognitional side of hi s readiness as an Opi nion that it .
is highly probable that the b all will d escend He is certain of it . .
Yet the evidence which warrants his certitude is not such that the
opposite occurrence is unthinkable For the evidence ( the normal .
course of nature ) cont ai ns a provi so not usually adverted to As .
the positivist might state it the provi so i s : if the future resembles

,
the pas t this b a ll will descend ; as it might occur to a believer

,
if God concur s and lets the natural ends of physical be i ngs b e

achieved then this ball will descend ( but of course miracles a re
, ,
possible ) O n either view the opposite is concei va ble and there

.
,
fore physical certitude di ffers in kind from metaphysical certitude ,
” “
where the Opposite is strictly unthinkable Thus the laws of .
nature such as gravity chemi cal comb inati ons or thermodynami cs

, , ,
( even if they are interpreted in a completely coercive way and not

merely as conventional genera lizations as is now the fashion ) , ,
always retain a less than abso lute character There is always a

- -
.
certain distance between the nature or essence of thi ngs and their
activities While assent based upon this sort of evidence may be

.
denominated certi tude it is certitude against the backgroun d

“
,
of a con d ition .
If we were to carry matters further and in quire in to the force

“ ” “
of s uch moral certitudes as my a ssurance that The bus driver
” “
will not deliberately crash this bus or the chi ld s trust that My ,
’
”
mother has not poisoned my oatme a l further hesitation might ,
a rise In some respects we mi ght wonder whether we should

.
17
,
talk of certitude here at a ll It is true that from the point of View .

,
of lived convicti on these assents are not subject to active doubt

,
.
It is not a worki ng ques tion for me as I board the bus whether or
17 Note tha t mora l in mora l

“
certi tud d o not r fe to th g od n
e es e r e o es s
or the b a d nes s of the a ct of the a g nt b ut

e , nly t the f t tha t h i
o o ac e s a
r a ti ona l a
gent,
a r es ons i ble
p p er s o n, hence a
“
mora l a gent .
not the driver intends to crash it ; it does not even occur to me as -
a conscious p ossibility to have an opinion about Yet the motive .
for this kind of un—thinking confidence is simply the norm al

behavior of persons and persons ar e free agents and free agents
, ,
ar e capable of deviating from norms E ven so if I met someone .

,
a s I came into class who told me that he had seen an acci dent
,
outside the building and described it in shocked detail my fir st

, ,
“
reaction would not be one of suspicion ( Watch out for this
fellow he may be trying to put one over on
,
This way lies
paranoia My reaction would rather be one of belief Warranted
. .
belief We might s a y for we a re relying ( without even noticing it )

, ,
“
on the general principle that People do not lie without reaso n .
Still this does not obliterate the implicit condition in such certi
,
tude : if this being behaves as a rational being normally does I ,
may rely on him There are however pathologi cal liars and a
.
, , ,
trust in testi mony must be duly circumspect .
An i nteresting situation arises in this area We m ight be prone .

,
” “
at fir st to regard mo ral certitude as a rather weak variety, and
,
often rightly so But there are special cases O ne source of moral

. .
certitude is testimony as has been seen Normally thi s kind of

, .
ce rtitude is rather diluted Supp ose though we were to a s k our .

, ,
selves what is our mental attitude as we expres s to ourselves such

“ ” “
propositions as There is in France a city ca Hed Pari s or There ,
”
once lived a man called Julius Caeser H o w certain are we of the .
truth of such prop os iti ons ? As certain it would seem as we 18

, ,
are of any poss ible p rop os itions An y proviso or cond ition ha s .
dwindled to the vanishin g point Most people would s a y that they .
are more certain of the truth of these prop os itions than they are ,
of the law of gravity A n d yet thi s sort of truth i s based

sa
y
, .
exclusively on testimony ( for one who has not been to Paris or

been a contemporary of Juli us C aesar ) It is interesting that what .
seems like a poor sort of certitude can reach a conviction that

18
On this , s ee John H enry C a rd i na l New ma n A n E s s a y i n A id
, o f a
G ra mma r f A s s e nt ( Lond on a nd New

o Yor k : Longma ns Green a nd , ,
190 3 p 18938 ( Cha pter VI Secti on

,
. .
,
accurate d efinitron Of the fanatic to s a y that he is one w ho is
certain about everything : he m ai ntains his Op inions as if they were
certitudes and he treats differences from himself or from his
“ ” ”
truths ( his fixed ideas ) as proof of the bad faith of others .
In a democracy esp eci ally it i s the fir st political virtue to a cknow l

, ,
edge the amb i guous character Of political truth and to commit

oneself to a p os i ti ve toler a nce o f the opinion of others .
E ven Op inion i s someti mes forb i dden territory since there are
,
innumerable questio ns in which our inability to render an opinion

is complete For example in a modern complex society issues of
.
, ,
economy and fin ance can become so abstruse that the only proper
cogni tion al response is d oubt : a susp ension of judgment NO ob .
ligation is l ai d upon us to pass a verdi ct on everything Thi s i s .
a point which publi c opin i on p olls frequently ignore assuming in,
their professional inqui sitiveness that everybody has a right to

Opinion about everything Only evidence warrants a cognitive
.
response of either certitude or Opinion Lack of evidence ( o r

, .
largely in conclusive evi dence ) warrants only doubt While this i s

.
,
in one sens e a shortcomin g of thought the recogni tion of it is not

, ,
a shortcoming but somethi ng extremely s alutary perhaps even the

, ,
i ndispensable prerequ is ite for genuine truth and authentic political

C ON CEP T UAL KN O WLED GE
UNIVE RSALS
The first epistemological problem that some would like to raise

in respect to concepts is simply whether they exist or not It is a .
fairly Spontaneous inclination on the part of the co mmon sense -
” “
mind to abjure the reality of such invisibles If seeing (or .
sens ing ) is believing then not seeing ( or not sensing ) is not

,
beli evin g ; such is the initial state of mind and such often remains
,
the fin al state of mind When thi s state of mind is raised to the

.
“
level of a philosophical position it is known as pure sense
,
empir icism which is the contention that the only elements

,
“
p resent to experience are particular sens o ry data and that con
” “ ”
ce ts
p or universals either do not exist or are empty
“” “
Those who speak of concepts or universal ideas do so in
the opposite conviction that bes i des the momentary and individual
data which are p resent for the senses at any moment of our experi
ence there are a lso present aspects of reality whi ch a re just as
,
“ ” ” “
strictly data ( that is givens irreducible and indi sputable
, ,
p resences ) ,which are not equatable with sense data but which are
unmistakably there .
Thus w hen I am sittin g at my d esk lookin g about the room and

,
.
,
out the window it is no doubt true that present to my conscious

,
ness ar e a whole stre a m of p a rticularized sensory det a ils : the

p ar ticul ar shade o f mahogany reflected in the parti cular light which
i s sl a nting through the win dow the smoo thness of the desk top
, ,
the uniquely shaped ink blotches on the blotter the delicious odor
-
,
of the trees wet by the rain the slightly di stracting tapp ing of the
,
window blind moved by the cool breeze All these data a re

-
.
p resent to m y senses i n a perfectly

p a rticularized w a : it i s always
y
thi s color this warmth this smoothness thi s shape this motio n
, , , ,
whi ch I perceive at a ny and every moment T hese details are .
p resent to me before all naming and before an

y more com lex
p
act on my p art ; they could just as well be pre s ent in their sense ,
i mmedi acy and they are p resent to a p urely sensory knower such
, ,
as a young infant or an animal There is then a complex of .

, ,
transitory p articulars perp etually present to my sensory organs .
But besi des thi s there i s present to me the awareness of the fact
,
“ ”
that that upon which I lean i s a table the shade i s known as ,
” ”
“
shade the mahogany color known and named as such the
,
“
,
“ ”
cool breeze mentally hailed as cool breeze In brief I have .
,
na mes for what my senses e xperi ence My senses may not name .
” “ ” “ ” “ ” “
them but I do I name thi ngs red white blue flag dif
.
, , , ,
” ”” “ “
ficult ,
e a sy
“
sweet ,
large pleasant
, p ainful
,
etc
39
My ,
9, 66
, .
sensory experience is pre nominal ; as a ch ild I experlenced many

—
or all of these things in a purely sensory m a nner witho ut naming

them In nami ng them I am poi ntin g to what the senses can no t
.
”
p oint to but what is in a re a l sense th ere — because it can be
( mentally ) p oi nted to .
E very time I n a me somethi ng this name or word expresses a

meani ng which I gr asp a s being fulfilled in that which I e xp erience .
“ ”
In nam i ng thi s table I grasp i t as fulfilli ng or mani festing a
,
certain meaning whi ch is just as much there for my thought a s its

color is there for my sense of si ght ; in calling the datum which i s
”
there for my sense of s i ght color or red mahogany I am
“ “
or , ,
not simply percei vi ng thi s vi su al p articular I a m aware of a ,
generali zed meani ng present through the p articul a r .
T o name what I perce i ve i s to do more than p erceive This .
grasp ing or conceivi ng in a con cept ( con cep tum ) gras p s s ome - -
thi ng ; i t doesn t gras not in g T o use a fai rl neutral term we

’
p h y .
,
may call what i t grasp s a meaning Th i s i s what Socrates and .
Plato originally me a nt by an ei dos : the meaning manifested in “ ”

156 Phi los op hy of Know led g e
The
in stances There is somethi ng really and objectively similar in all

.
” “
these leaves and that i s the meaning green which they manifest
, .
We are now in possessi on of a twofold insight : the meani ng

apprehended in the concept is objectively real and yet it is real ,
in a way which transcends sensory p a rticulars It i s not itself real .
as a sense particular i s real For thi s reason it is called a uni

.
”
versal Thi s simply signifies that the meaning grasped through
.
the concept i s not a sense particular : it is a one in many a unitary

- - -
,
meaning capable of being multiplied in many instances As multi .
plied ( that is in s o far as there exi st instances of this meaning )

,
it is found in each instance : each le af really mani fests the mean

ing
A t thi s poin t the spontaneous materialism which affli cts us
,
all may rebel We protest that we cannot dis cover this universal
.
‘‘
” “
e idos Of red or the uni vers al meaning tree anywhere ; all we
,
e ver seem to d iscover are the parti cular in stances The s o called .
-
concept seems to be simply a notion which we build up in our

thought but which has no appli cation to extra mental reality ; the
,
-
latter seems to be composed entirely of parti cular s Some have .
“ ”
d isclaimed the very exi stence of univers al concepts ; o thers ,
while admitting that they exi st for thought deny that there is
really a ny universal asp ect in things Now while there is no deny
.
ing that a certai n incredulity on this score seems to be both natural

a nd healthy there is a lso no denyin g that if anyth i ng can be qu i te
,
cogently shown in philosop hy i t is the existence nature and Ob

, , ,
ecti ve reference of universal i deas Many T homistic philoso hers

j .
p
are o f the opini on that Thomism is fundamentally based on the
v alue of abstract ideas ; if s o it is based on a rather firm found a
,
tion But let it be noted that the s tress on the value of concepts is
.
not a peculiar possession of any one philosophical system The .
ins ight originates with Socrates a nd Plato is adopted and adapted ,
by Ari stotle and passes o ver into the ma instea m of the p hi los ophia
,
p e rennis What
. di vides a d here nts of this doctrine i s often not
epis temological at all but the metaphysical or psychologi cal as pects
,
of the doctrine It would seem that the ep istemological i ssue

.
Co ncep tua l Know led g e 157
comes down to this : are our universal ideas one way of making
contact with the non self? Or conversely is a genuine feature Of
-
,
re ality revealed to us through concepts ? Stress will be put in the

following discussi on on this way of asking the question and d if ,
fer ences between Aristotelianism Platonism a nd other systems , ,
mrmmrzed .
NOMINALISM
O ne way of cavi lli ng at the Objectivity of ideas may be given
short shrift the claim that they do not even exi st In spite of the
, .
fact that some splendid minds have talked as if they held thi s
belief nothing is easier than to show its falsity For what is given
, .
beyond peradventure of doubt is the fact that we us e l an guage ,
and that we us e it in a certain way We na me things And n a mes . .
” ” “ ” “
do not name particulars O ur names desk . man triangle , ,
“
,
” “ ” “
door ,
building tree are called in grammar common
, ,
nouns meaning that they are applicable to whole classes of things

, .
But of course the word is not itself the i dea or concept ; it is the
utter a nce of a n inw a rd mental act of conceiving but i s not iden ,
tical with that act Thi s is easily shown by the fact that many
.
d ifferent words ( as mere vocables ) could express the same mean

“ ”
ing : what I now express by the word dog could just as well be
expressed by the word glip which is right now meani ngless We
” “
.
have only to consi der that the meaning whi ch in E ngli sh i s ex

” “
p ressed by the word man is as a matter of fact ex ressed by quite
p
“ “
different words : in French by homme in German by d as ,
” ” “ ”
Mann in Latin by vir in Itali a n by uomo in Greek by
, , ,
f
“
anthropo s a nd s o forth Here the s ound s v ary but the idea re
.
,
m ai ns the same proving a disti ncti on between the two We reach

, .
the realization then that ideas exist and that they are not iden
, , ,
tical with words .
We may add that the na ture Of an idea i s revealed in the w a y

'
m which it i s used If they are used as s ignifiers of a common

.
“ ”
quali ty found in many subjects they can be called common or ,
universal For the M e bein g it is not even necessary to go
.
,
very far into the nature of ideas We need o nly the recognition that
.
ideas exist and that they function in a certain way ( as signifying

,
a quality which can be found in many ) Thi s alone is sufficient to

.
s ubstantiate the clai m that we actually do conceive un iversal
meani ng : we do us e i deas and the way we use them demonstrates

,
their universal character .
A n in genious way to bring out the impossibility of carrying out

a denial of the role o f i deas is sim ly to make the attempt to
p
e limi nate them and co nceive of e xperience without reference to
them Thi s is what Plato did in his di alog Thea etetus and the
.
,
results are shattering to the pure sense emp iricist If we take the .
latter with complete seriousness and consistency the self defeating ,

-
c haracter of hi s belief becomes gr aphically evident .
Let us suppose that there exi sts in hum a n consciousness no thing

besides sensory experience— no ideas no uni versal aspects nothing
, ,
that is not present in the way a datum is present for the senses .
W hat i s left of experience ? Thi s amounts to asking what is experi

e nce fo r the senses as such ( el i minati ng all the elements whi ch a s
a matter of fact are contributed by the concepts which the

e m iricist also w a nts to reduce to sense data )
p W hat the senses .
ex peri ence i s just a com lex of diverse and transitory

p p articul ar s ;
e very sense datum precisely as sensed i s unique in time space , ,
and quali ty The scuser as such i s i mmers ed in this strea m of

.
“
immediacy .
Perhaps we might be able to think of hi m as glea ming a certain

o rder out of this sequence through habit and association as ,
a ni mals do But one thi ng he would not be able to d o : he wo uld

.
no t be able to Sp ea k about his experience fo r speak ing ent a ils a

,
certain tr a nscending of the stream of immediate par ti culars It .
“ ”
e ntails first the deliberate distancing of one s ow n experience in ’
o rder to communicate it ; and secondly a s we have seen it ent a ils

, ,
the us e of language to do thi s Objectifying Words by iso lating .

,
the common elements of our sensor ily fleeting experience render ,

1 60 Phi los op hy of Know led g e The
themselves This procedure i s perfectly natural to man but also

.
”
perfectly fallacious for i t consists in looki ng for ideas T hey
, .
tufia fo ut to b e undiscoverable because invis ible .
“
Th e fallacy however is that this kind of looking gua rantees
, ,
failure from the beginni ng We are asking the questions which his
.
“
hearers mistakenly asked Plato : Where i s the eidos
“ “
H ow big i s the eidos What color h ai r does the eidos
‘
man have? Is this ideal man thi n or fat? etc The Mpli ca
’ ” “ ” ‘ ’
.
” “
tio n of course is that there exists no idea man but only indi
, ,
vidu al men .
T hese questi ons which seem s o persuasive at first are re ally

, ,
pointless They are equivalent to asking about a nd searching for

.
an i dea a s if it were not an idea but a sens ory item An idea is .
no the only thing that can be some where is a particul a r -
sens ory item A n i dea is not an individual ( that i s the thing we

.
continually fail to grasp ) and hence it does not exist as does an

individual To take inventory of our experi ence and look for the
.
“ ” ” “ “ ” “ ”
idea man table blue is like looking for the number thr ee
, , ,
i n a haystack An i dea i s re al i n the manner of an idea What

. .
manner is that? The manner revealed to us in our use of language .
If we want to look for i deas we must loo k for them in the

-
,
” “
region in which they are real : the region of thought To fin d an
m
.
idea and to be sure that it exists is sim y to turn to thought and

to d iscover the constituents which make it to be what we know it
to be O ne of these constituents is the apprehension of meanings
.
ideas T hen ideas exist in the mode Of thought and it i s futile to

.
,
look for them in any other manner The temptation to this futility .
seems to hold a p ermanent fascination for the human min d but it ,
must nevertheless be resisted .
CONCE P T UALISM
A position somewhat more plausi ble than the nomin alist s is the ’
stand of the conceptualist He agrees that ideas exist and he also

.
agrees that their reality must be searched for i n thought SO much .

Co nc ep tua l Know led g e 1 61
does he agree with thi s that he cann ot see that they have any
status at a ll excep t for thought An i dea he acknowledges is a .
, ,
universal datum But the o nly way a univers al datum can ex is t i s

.
for thought Ou tside of thought a ll re a lity i s that of in d ividuals

.
, .
The concep tuali st therefore dichotomizes experience into existin g
p articula r s o n the one hand and uni ver s a l thou ht co ntents on th e

g
‘
other He denies that the universal character Of ideas ha s a real

.
reference Our thought seems to him to transmute into a uni versal

.
datum what in itself is thr ough and through individuated Thus .

,
each le a f whi ch I perceive in the tree exi sts with its ow n shade of
gr een each in d ividuated from every other : that is what is re al
,
“ ”
o utside of my thought When I form the idea green I have a
.
,
universal notion but in the thing itself there is nothing correspond

,
ing to this datum but only the ind ividu al sense p articular
,
-
.
It is a little d ifli cult to deal With conceptu ali sm witho ut seemin g

to concede ei ther too much or too little value to it There is .
” “
Obviously a sense i n which the conceptu a list is right a nd tr ad i ,
tiona l phi losophy could be construed Often enough as emphasiz i ng
hi s point : that only in di vi du al s exist In a way thi s i s the great.
p oin t which Aristotle and St T homas thought they were

. ma k ing
against Plato T hought data do not exist a s they do for thought
.
-
except —for thought This is why the Aristotelian T homi st Scholas

.
- -
“ ”
tic tradition repudiates Plato s notion of the Ei d ea ( Forms ) a s
’
eternally real apart fr om their indivi dual embodiments Uni versals .
precisely as universal are no t ex tramental .
Nevertheless there is also a redoubtable obstacle to the con

,
ce tu a li s t pos ition E ven though the datum as exp li ci tly universal

p .
has re a lity only as p resent to a thought process ( for example the -

,
”
universal idea man has existence only for thought and not
“
outside of thought ) the fact remains that there are objective

,
similarities amo ng indi viduals E ach individual instance of man .
really does resemble each other i nstance in ex hibiting the common

meanin g
. E ach patch of red deserves to be called red ”
s o that
“
,
”
the univers al meaning red really is manifested identically
“
thr ough its instance s T his Objective similarity it is easy to over

.
,
I 62 Phi los op hy of Know led g e The
look also implies that each individual instance re ally does embody
,
a meaning ; we only recogni ze that different in stances embody the

same meani ng if we antecedently recognize that each instance
,
does in fact embody a meaning .

1
The meaning whi ch we conceive as an e xp li cit un iversal in our

thought has s o me status outside our thought for there are objective ,
similarities among indivi du als ; objective si milarities among i ndi

vid u a ls cann ot be founded on what makes them individual ; there
fore objective similarity is a sure sign Of a real foundat ion for

,
univers ali ty A sure s ign of it we repeat but not its first con
.
, ,
firma tion For the first s i gn of the objectivity Of meaning i s the

.
recogni tion of any one i nstance as embodying a meaning As soon .
as upon seeing even one patch of red I cogn ize it as embodying a

, ,
specific color v alue I grasp that color value as multipli able and
-
,
-
therefore u niversal ; so that I do not have to know man y actual

instances of a meanin g to know that a s meaning it can be multi
pli ed .
Where then do matters stand ? The facts are these Particular

, , .
instances re a lly do yi eld meanin gs to my thought In fact indi .

,
vidu ally d ifferent instances yield i dentical meanings . There i s no 2
gainsaying this ; it is not inf erence but simple description of ,
exp erience Then there i s no gainsaying that the meaning which I

.
conceive as a universal thought content ha s s ome appli cation -
beyond thought This i s the absolute minimum which is gu a ran

.
teed and it is enough to overturn concep tualism and to vindi cate

,
s ome sort of realism The fact is that p a r ticular instances can be

.
and are dealt wi th by thought a nd serve the p urposes of thought .
If thought makes use of universals and if particular instances lend ,
cla s s i f
In o th er w ord s , w e d o a rr iv e u nivers a l i d ea s by yi ng
1 no t at
i ns ta nces w hich ma ni fes t mea ni ngs for

, we mus t firs t reco gnize tha t ea ch
d o es ma ni fes t a mea ni ng b efore w e ca n recogni ze them a s s ep a r a ble i nto

cla s s es ; a nd thi s pri or r eco
gni ti o n a lr ea d
y enta ils the co ncep ti on o f a uni
v er s al . Th erefore, the r ecogni ti o n of uni vers a ls p r eced es cla s s ifica ti on a nd
d oes not d eri v e from i t .
2
D i ff erent i ns ta nces gi v en to p recep i on yi eld the i d ea t red , or loud ,
”
or
“
ma n , or hou s e, or ta ble, etc
” “ ” “ ”
.
We insist upon asking what is the relation between this u ni versal
meaning and i ts in dividual embodiments ; how the idea can be one
and many at the same time ; how the individuation of the universal
meaning takes place The essenti al thing to cli ng to is that we do
.
use ideas in the descri bed manner and that this i mpli es that things
are already such as to serve the p urposes of thought : that there
fore there i s a real sense in which the p articular does not have its
“ ”
being entir ely aside from the meaning that it is a carrier of ,
me ani ng Sometimes the last point is stated by saying that the

.
universal exists in the in dividual and then we are in hot water

“ ”
,
again For having used thi s language we begin pokin g about in

.
3
, ,
the indivi dual instances in an effort to turn up the univers al mean

ing which is in it and naturally we don t succeed We co ntinue
“ ”
,
’
.
to have on our hands meani ngs ( uni versals ) and instances ( indi
Vid u a ls ) and no matter how we scour the latter to find the former ,
“ ”
we fail To seek the meaning red i n this patch here p resent to
.
“ ”
my vision or to seek the meani ng man in this figure now ambling
,
towards me is inevitably to revive the conceptualist suspicion that

after all an ind ividual i s no thing but an i ndivi dual What could
, .
a n indivi dual be but an indi vidual ?

”
In this i n d ivi dual man will
“
be found bones blood and muscles but no universal meani n g

, , ,
“ ”
man And so with every instan ce
. .
But it must be plain that we are proceeding fallaciously here .
”
A universal i s not in the particular in any way that could allow
us to find it by proceeding on these lines It is not concealed in the .
parti cular in some way The p oint is rather that the particular as .
particular is alr eady if viewed in the proper way the m a nifesta

, ,
tion of the universal A comparison may help to make thi s clear

.
,
and to obviate the tendency to view the matter in a naively mate

3 Someti mes thi s i s ev en s a i d
to b e the grea t contri buti on of A ri s totle,
th a t w her ea s P la to s a i d tha t the or ms exi s ted a a rt
p
”
F
fr om i nd ivi d ua ls ,
t tt “ ”
Ar i s to le s a i d tha hey only exi s ted i n i nd i id ua ls The i na pprop ri a tenes s v .
a nd va cui
y o f thti s la n ua e i s
g g qui te comp lete, s i nce i d ea s o bvious ly exi st
nei the r 66
1n
°
nor
“
out
”
of s ens o ry insta nces .
Co ncep tua l Kno w led g e 1 65
m an ner as if we were searching for the ore of universality

ri a li s tic —
contai ned in the dross of particularity .
Le t us ask what happens when a carpenter sets about maki ng a

table He begins with a cert ai n ideal model Of this table which he
.
already has in hi s mind and which is there before the physi cal
,
product After he finishes operating up on his materials wood

.
-
,
n ails varnish— his idea is now embodied in the phys i cal product
, .
There now e xists a phys i c al table What is the relation between this
“
p hysical table and the idea in the c a rpenter s mind which brought
’
it into being? E vidently we can s a y that the table mani fes ts his
” “
idea and embodies it D oes this mean that the idea is in the
.
table ? We would hesitate before putting it this way sin ce it seems ,
to irnply that if we carefully too k the table apart we might find

the idea If we did spe a k that way we might begi n to puzzl e our
.
,
“ ”
heads over how the mental idea could be in the physical table .
A nd possibly to wonder how if i t ca nnot the table could really

,
'
manifest the idea But if we sti ck to what is indisp utable we skirt

.
,
such false problems The table really does m anifest the carpenter s
.
’
idea .
Furthermore if we meditate more closely and adopt the po int

,
of view of an observer who comes along and beholds the finished
table we can easily appreciate how this observer could recogni ze

,
the physical Obj ect as manifesting a certain meani ng He co uld .
further reco gni ze that this meaning which the parti cular in stance
manifested w as not exhausted by this particular ins tance but ,
rather could be repeatedly embodied in many other p a rticular

instances ( the carpenter could keep making tables corresponding
to the idea which served as the model for this one ) Then thi s
”
Observer in recognizing thi s physical particular as a table has
simultaneously recognized that the meani ng table here embodied “ ”
transcends i ts in d ividual embodiment— that it i s a uni vers a l in

respect to its embodiments a uni tary meaning whi ch is not ex
,
ha us ted by i ts man ifestati ons but is inde finitely multipli able He .
recognizes in other words that the particular ma nifes ts the uni

, ,
I6 6 The Phi los op hy of Know led g e
versal and he recogn izes that the universal i s just as re al as the
p a rti cular which mani fests it D oes he also feel that the univers al .
“ ”
is i n the p articular and begin to have a maze of problems about
,
how the carpenter s idea can be in the physic al table ? Not unless
’ “
he is fond of paradoxes .
In largely the same way it is paradoxical to r a ise questions ,
” “
about how our uni versal ideas can really be in physical things .
It is enough that we recogni ze p ar ticular instances a s ma ni fes ti ng

meanings to realize that some meanin gs have Objective reference .
” ” ” ” “ “ “ “
We s a y that this is an instance of water rock man red , , , ,
“ ”
” “
, ,
“
loud sweet animal a n d s o forth ; and in doing s o we simply,
recognize that the i ndividual i ns ta nce yi eld s a datum for thought l

,
and that therefore thought s way of conceiving it i s founded up on’
reality We don t s i mply discover particul a rs ; we discover mean

.
’
ingful parti culars O ur thought then deliberately tu rns away from

.
the p articularization to the meaningful ch a racter of which it i s a

particul arization ; but i t must already be meaningful if we are
to d i scover it a s such and therefore our thought contents are
,
-
grounded i n the meaningful p articular .

‘
Some may s till insist on rai sing the issue of how a uni vers a l can
be said to be embodied in a particular An attempt may be made .
to make thi s understandable but before doing s o it should be ,
reiterated that the previ ous comp arison is the standard of reference .
We mi ght just a s well a s k how the idea of table can be embo died
in a particul a r table— but the fact is it i s s o embodied and we , ,
should hold on to that fact An e xplanation designed to make the .
“
how more comprehensible may be legitimate but must a lways
remain secondary .
Thi s p roblem happens to have be en the primary if not the ,
exclusive way in which the epistemological problem presented

,
4 T hi s w ould re ma i n true w he her w e t ta ke _

a P la tonic or Ar i s t
oteli a n
vi ew of th e s ta tus Of mea ni ng E ven i f the mea n ing i s o nly p o te n tia lly

.
there, a nd ca n be a cti v a ted v a ri ou s ly b us i t s ti ll r em a i n s tr ue tha t i ts

y ,
p o tenti a li ty fo r b ei ng thou ght ch a ra cterizes the p a r ti cula r i nd epen d ently

of our a ctu a ll
y thi nki n it
g .
168 Phi los op hy of Kno w led g e
The
manner in which universals are drawn out of sense experience ,
bea rs upon supposed processes carried on by the mind which are

wholly non conscious and wholly unavailable for direct awareness
-
,
it mus t retain a hypothetical character How can it seri ously be .
contended that an appe al to the ghos tly mech a ni cs of the elec
trolyti c acti on of an agent intellect s p eci es s igna q uo and so , , ,
forth help to make the objective reference of concep ts more com

prehensible? TO justify the e vident by means of the hypo thetical
is not a useful undertaking What we k now is that p h a ntasms a re
.
parti cular and concepts universal and that nevertheless concepts

do refer to phantas ms The theory Of abstracti on is in the main a
.
detailed statement of this : it i s a c ar eful enumeration of the condi

tions of the cognitive situation but it leaves us none the wiser a s
,
“ ”
to how i deas came to be which may in any case be an unan , , ,
s w er a ble questi on .
JUDG MENT
The position is often held that i t is only with the judgment that
we reach existence the order of ideas being at one remove from
,
” “ ” ” “ “ ” “
actual existence Concepts like grass green wicked cold
.
, , , ,
“ ”
po i son and so forth do not attach the mi nd to an existing state
,
of aff airs but represent ways in whi ch i t could be s o attached

, .
” “ “
When we advance to the judgment This grass is green This ,
” “” “
man is wicked It is cold out
, Poisons are dangerous we
, ,
insert these meanings into an existential context The judgment .
a fii rms
“ ”
,Thus it is Until this affir mation i s made the mi nd has
.
,
not reached existence in a proper sense .
Now no one can question that the judgment represents a cogui

,
tive addition to the idea and yet some qualifications must be made
,
.
There should be no inference that ideas by themselves a re merely

“ ”
free fl oa ting meanings detached from all existenti al setting
-
,
.
O n the contrar y the reason that the idea as such does not reach
,
existence is that it is fully immerse d in exi stence The idea is a .

Concep tua l Kno w led g e 1 69
mental reference : as reference it refers to a world of actuali ty At .
the stage of idea it might even be claimed that the mind has not
,
yet withdrawn from reali ty It must lea r n that not all ideas are .
equally referential or referential in the same way A nd it w ould

, .
seem that in this disengagement the judgment ha s a hand So that , .
the judgment is not only what reaches existence but some sort of ,
judgment is involved i n the recogni tion that every idea does not
equally reach existence In other words the cogn itional pre .
,
eminence of the judgment is not just that it reaches existence but ,
that it is the instrument for the emergence Of existence as such ,
whether reached or un reached In a way it i s also the judgment

-
.
whi ch reaches essence s 1nce the d istinction of essence and exist

,
ence only emerges in the judgment .
This i s not said to countermand the irnp orta nce of the judg
ment but only to emphasize the existenti al foundation common to
,
all thought O nce the fissure between essen ce and existence has
.
emerged in the judgment it i s the judgment which t e attaches the

,
-
concept to existence The judgment is thus i nvolved in the di s en

.
a ement of meanin g from the immediate as well as being i n

g g ,
volved in di scriminating the various ways in which meanings can

“ ” “ ” “ ” “
be t e inserted
-
centaur blindness larger V , , ,
“ ”
justi ce are not re inserted in identi cal w ays )
,
-
.
What the judgment basically does therefore is not to examine , ,
the relation between ideas as disengaged meanings but to seize a ,
present Object in terms of these ideas It app lies the idea to the .
“
singular whi ch confronts it in the existential present Thi s man .
” “ “ ”
is wi cked is not a comp arison of the ideas man and wicked
,
but a seizure of the s ingular through an i dea an afli r ma ti on that ,
”
Thus it i s wi th a singular object now p resent to me Someti mes .
the affi rmation may be a bare exi stenti al such as This man ,
“
”
exists or Scorpions are real but even when existence is not
, ,
the issue it is at least a concomitant theme A dmittedly this is a .
basic statement applying most Obvi ously to one particular sort Of

,
judgment and skipping somewhat lightly p ast such judgments as

I 70 The Phi los op hy of Knowled g e
” “
It is better to suffer than do injustice Circles are round , ,
“ ”
T he square root of 9 is Gravity is a universal factor and ,
a host of others Some excuse may be given by app eali ng to the

.
p rimar y p ositi on of the singular existenti al judgments ; unless we
made these there would be no way Of making or justi fying the

,
exi stential reference of the others .
In thi s conn ection the p roblem is often raised about how the
,
intellect can know singulars In order to a fli rm a meanin g of a

.
s ingular it would have to know the s ingular and since it knows

, ,
through concep ts ( whi ch are uni versals ) there appears to be a

p u zzle about how it can achieve this feat The famili ar answer is .
that i t knows the s i ngular by a convers i on to the sensory phantasm .
We may take thi s to mean : sheer immediacy is contain ed i n the

senses and the s ingular is always given imme d iately True
, .
enough the sin gular which the mind i s usually after is not the
,
“ ” “
singular Of the sensory data ( the singular man or dog i s not
“ ”
“
the same as that of red or furry ) but its presence is exp eri
” “ “ ”
enced thr o ugh the sensory data The words thi s or that
.
derive their application not from concepts i t might be said but , ,
fr om the sheer here and nowness of sense experi ence

- -
.
This view i s acceptable up to a poi nt but not comprehensive , .
There are many reasons to think that if i t i s meant to rule out

“
non sensory i ntuit i on it begs the question O bviously i f by intel
-
, .
,
”
lect I mean the faculty of conceptualiz ation then the intellect
, ,
cannot know s ingulars This however i s a tautology : it simply

.
, ,
states that the faculty by whi ch I know in a non singul a r way -
( universals ) is the faculty by whi ch I know in a non singular way -

.
Thi s deci des nothing about how I d o k now in a sin gular way It .
seems correct enough to s a y that the senses play a conspicuous

role in my knowledge of si ngulars wi thout thereby p recluding that
the singular may be present to me in a non sensory way a s well -
.
Subjective and intersubject ive exp erience in the i r sp ecifically non ,
sensory aspects ma y in fact be a more i mp ortant source of im

,
medi acy than the senses themselves .

granted that it may be what we ai m at by means of our
li gibili ty,
defini tions this is a far cry from holding that our definiti on con
,
ta i ns the essence T hi s questi on is a many sided one and various

.
-
,
cl a rifications are in order What may be sai d in a prelimi nary way

.
is that the referential character of the concept does not ip s o fa cto

establi sh i ts exact coincidence with the essence Of things It does .
,
however provide one solid reason for saying that we do know

,
“ ” “
essen ces If to know an essence means to know things as they
.
”
are our thought surely knows essences since it is aware of itself
, ,
“
as a pure reference to things In maki ng such judgments as This
.
” ” “ “
table is brown It i s windy today
, The game w a s postponed
,
on account Of ra i n my j udgment is aware of itself as a completely

,
self effacin g reference to the reality about which I judge which

-
,
makes no d ifference whatever to the Object in tended T his much -

.
is clear .
Some of the d ifli culty that arises when we try to go fur ther stems
” “
from thinking Of knowing too much by an alogy with seeing .
This an
’
alogy is both spontan eous and useful but i t has its built in ,
-
limits If knowi ng is li ke seein g I could begin to feel that if I

.
,
“ ”
k now an essence I ought to be able to enumerate its features
,
” “
as I could the features of an object I w as looking at The trouble .
is that we do not fin d that the trai ts of essence are as av a ilable

for listing as this image mi ght suggest If we regar d a possi ble .
enumeration of featur es as a requirement of knowing essences we ,
may well hesitate to think that we know essences Another fre .
quent manner of conceiving our knowledge of essence as the ,
”
grasping Of the content of the known thi ng can also confuse ,
“
matters For we might thi nk that if we lay hold of a conten
.
we ought to be able to unpack it and insp ect i t— and this we often

find ourselves unable to do But know mg is not seeing and it is
.
not grasp ing contents ; knowing i s just— knowing .
To reali ze that both these images are faulty is to make some

start in understanding how the claim to know essences does not
entail the claim of a perfect equation between thought and real ity .
It will then not sound s o peculiar to say that I c a n know what

Co ncep tua l Kno w led g e 1 73
things are wi thout being able to unfold and display their explicit
content Surely I kno w the essence of red stone man d og water
.
, , , , ,
justice s ky ; just as surely I cannot define them if called upo n to

,
do s o The p aradox of this claim is reduced if we cease to thi nk

.
of knowing in terms of clearly defined vi ewing and simply take it ,
“ ”
on its own unique terms O ur knowing admits Of depths If we
. .
must use metaphors ( and we probably must ) perhaps we might

think of our k nowledge of the essence of a thing as exhibiting
progr essive stages of saturation This is still an i mage and has .
,
its own limi tations b ut it has at least the merit of avoiding any
,
ei ther/ or connotation The essence is not something I either know

.
o r do not know but an intelligible concentrate which may be

,
p resent in weaker or stronger manner .
Now if our knowledge of essences consists in the progressive

precip itation of mean ing in experi ence it clearly can not be under ,
stood in terms of definition To be awar e of the essence Of a thin g

.
“
is not to be able to define it The View th at thi s is what knowin g
.
”
essences consists Of rests on the conception Of an essence as a
“
content which our d efinition can enclose Perhap s only with .
artifacts could there be such a perfect equation between definition

and essence An artifact really i s exhaustively known in our d efini
.
tion of it for its only meaning is the meaning we co nfer on it

,
.
T here i s no antecedent reality in an ar tifact at all : w ha t it is is

exhaustively available to our thought s ince our thought i s the ,
meas ure of its re al ity A watch a table a hammer just are what
.
, , ,
they are for human thought But the reali ty of natural things i s not
.
” “
meas ured by our thought and thei r essence is not accessible
,
to us in the same manner What is water tree ness justi ce a .

,
-
, ,
man a stone, color a cow ? Their meaning transcends our thought

, ,
to the exact extent that their being transcends it O ur thought does .
not measure thei r reali ty but seeks to measure i tself by them Yet .
” “
we can still be said to know their re a lity since this effort of ,
thought to me a s ur e itself by these objects is a lready a knowledge

of itse lf as op en to them : it is the first precip i tate of meaning in
”
experience This intelligible soluti on of thought may become
.
“
more and more saturated with meaning but it is from the begin ,
“ ”
ning knowledge of essences We may therefore sp eak of essences .
” “
as being gi ven from the beginning but in a manner which allow s ,
for an i ndefinite p urification .
T homis tic p hilosophy has alway s held that complex essences are
reached by a great effort bu ilt up by a process which includes
,
judgment and runs the whole gamut of reas oning Sometimes an .
Opposite impress ion is given when there is gli b talk of tree ness -
or a nirna li t o r when class conce ts like dog cat mountain are

y , p , , ,
” “
Offered as ex amples of how the intellect knows what the senses
cannot Yet i t should always be kept in mind that these concepts
.
are simply meanings whi ch the intellect ha s been able to precipi

tate out of experience at a gi ven stage in the process of thought .
They are the means by whi ch thought restores itself to an experi

ence now rendered more resp onsive to its needs Thr ough these .
” “
ideas we may be tr uly said to know essences s ince our judg ,
ment in us ing them experiences itself as the active ass imilation of

, ,
the real .
But experience is on go ing and these ideas are the creative

-
,
instruments by which thought restores i tself to an on going experi -
ence Thr ough these concep ts thought sp ans the flux of experience
.
while re plunging into exp erience T hese concepts are not ways of
-
.
fleeing from time into a secure realm of static abstractions but ,
ways by which thought re enters time but re enters it thought -

,
-
fully What else does St Thomas mean by the oft repeated refrain
. .
-
that in order to know the intellect must return to the phantasms ?

,
7
We would do better to thin k of this as a return to experience ,
”
however rather than as a return to phantasms for St Thomas s
,
“
, .
’
phrase suggests a devaluation of experi ence to the level of sense

experience which may be quite unsound What is emp hasized is
, .
that the meaning of an idea is not s omething whi ch can be grasped

in abstracti on from experience It is the paradox of human thought .
7 S umma Theo log ia e I, qu 84 , , . a . 7 .

I 76 The Phi los op hy of Kno w led g e
ens to screen the spirit from its own experience How many men
.
.
dwell unreflectively in such concepts as people s democracy liber ’
a li s m hi gh stan dard of liv ing capitali st warmonger s our way of

, , ,
life? O nce p hilosophers were content to conceive nature in terms

of s ub stantial forms natur al motion appetites and four elements
, , , .
All categories in which thought simply comes to rest detach it from

experience the very exp erience which the categories were devised
,
to unders tand The genuine meaning which concepts have they

.
have in s o far as they are beams cast i n the di rection of experi ence .
To k now their meaning is as St T homas suggests to turn to the , .

,
experiences which they illuminate In s o far as it genuinely uses .
concepts thought grasp s i tself as referential

, .
The in teres ting po i nt is that human thought gr asps itself a s

referential a nd inadequate C ould we even say that it is referential .
as inadequate ? T hat is in knowing itself as imperfect as seeking

9
, ,
fulfilment thought gr asps its reference to what surpasses itself

,
.
Shall w e then s a y that we can know the essences of things only

inadequately? But this quickly tends to be reduced to the banality
” “
that we kn ow essences partially which in tur n suggests that ,
there are a few or many pieces miss ing from our knowledge The .
i mp licati on is that if thought progressed far enough in the direction

of sup l i ng the missing pieces ( which it is assumed are of the
py
same order as the pieces which are present ) it would eventually ,
attain complete and adequate knowledge Yet this is erroneous . .
Thought is not inadequate because it is partial It is inadequate .
because it is nonori gina ti ve The only knowledge that would be .
adequate is the knowledge that ma kes a thing Th us our knowl .

,
edge Of an artifact is perfect in s o far as the artifact is something

that owes its being to that knowledge We know what a table i s . ,
because we mak e a table to be what it is Now it is obvious that .
9 Thi seem to b i n th thought f M é h l

s s e pe i t w h n b g un d o ar c a , o . c e e ro s
bj cti vi ty of k n w l d ge i n th d yn mi m f th e i nt ll t b y w hi h i t
“ ”
th e O e o e e a s o e ec ,
c
i rel t d
s a e
p,u u i
ast t t n rsnd nt li
, tyo; i n M
a ar ech a l
ra vi w obj c
s ce e rea
’
s e , e
tivi ty d o es no t d eri ve from sens e, b ut fr om the fulfilment by s ense

p ar ti a l
rea li t
y of the ultima te exi gence w hi ch i s the
’
t
i ntellec s ma in s pri ng See .
p oi nt d e d ep a r t d e la me ta p hy s i que, C a hi er V, pp 23 1— 232, 2 6 1—2 62

’ ’
Le . .
Co ncep tua l Know led g e 1 77
in respect to the realiti e s of our experience we do not m ak e them ,
i n to to In s o far a s the i r being is no t ori ginated by us they will

.
,
always transcend the p ower of our thought to know O ur thought .
i s always after thought A s such i t is a mo d e of knowing whi ch is

-
.
“ ”
es s enti a ll
y inadequate No amount of su pl ing
p y . m i ss i ng p i eces
will ever fill in thi s i nadequacy for the necessity o f p roceeding i n ,
”
the manner of supplying p ie ces is already an i nadequacy Th e
“
.
s ignificant contrast then i s not between knowi ng somethi ng par

, ,
ti a lly and knowing it completely but between knowing something ,
o n rn a trvel
g y and knowing i t derivatively .
NO matter how much I know about water a stone a bird I “ ”

, , ,
know them i nadequately O nly if I created them would I know .
them adequately for then my knowledge would be the measur e of

,
thei r being Really in so fa r as I know things at all I know them

.
, ,
by calling them into the origin ali ty whi ch is my thought We d o .
not originate the be ings o f exp eri ence but when we think we d o , ,
the nex t best thin g : we address them in their originality and hail
them i nto the origi nal p ro cess of thought It i s right to speak of .
“
exp erience as a given from which thought sets out But experi .
ence i s not given as a p ossession as an inert i tem which we can ,
envelop It i s gi ven as an ofiering Thought is aware of itself as a

. .
response to an app eal O ur concept i s a substitute for the o rigina

.
tive knowledge whi ch would know things i n creati ng them It is .
itself a creative act and not a copy of somethin g already there

,
“ ”
i n sense .
10
It is surely wrong even to talk of thought and experience a s ,
if the two were jux taposed in some way A n exp erience i n which .
thought played no part i s just a s unthinkable a s thought in whi ch

exp erience pl ayed no p art Thought does not come to exp erience .
from the outsi de Thought as question i s there from the begin

.
, ,
ning ; concep ts are the crystallizations of questioning thought in

exp erience A s such thei r meaning is d i alecti cal T hat i s it i s the
.
,
.
,
product of a reciprocal exchange with experience The concept .
For a vi vi d ve r s i on of thi s , s ee Rous s elot, o

p . ci t .
, p . 98 ss .
I 78 Phi los op hy of Know led g e
The
lights up e xp eri ence but experience in turn illuminates the con

,
cep t The an alogy here is with the i dea of the arti st which makes
.
,
the arti sti c process possible but which only comes to birt h in that
,
process It is the w ork wh i ch reveals the artistic idea— even though

.
it is the artistic i dea whi ch i s the source of the work Just s o it .

,
is e xperi en ce which reve al s the me a ning of concepts even though ,
it is the concep t whi ch makes exp erience p ossi ble .
Try to think o f the meaning of stone man justice color liber ty , , , , ,
tiger pur ity apart from their experiential reference and this state
, , ,
ment will become clear Unless we concei ved meanings we would

.
not have the exp erience we have ; but having the experience reflects
back up on and alters the very concepts which are its own found a
tion Unless the artist had hi s creative idea he could not proceed
.
,
to the exp erience of pai nting his picture ; but as he appli es the
p igments to the c a nvas the unfolding p icture alters the very idea
,
”
whi ch is brin gin g i t to birth Because man conceives of freedom
.
”
and democracy he constructs a society on the basis of these
ideas ; but then the develop ing society mani fests to him what he
really means by freedom an d democracy In i ts ow n way every .
,
concept is a creative i nstrument which both transmutes exp erience

and is transmuted by it .
The virtue o f thought i s that it is able to carry forward much

of the meani ng it has brought to birth in e xperience It is only thi s .
carrying forward whi ch allows p rogres s to be made at all This i s .
where objectification acquir es positi ve v a lue s ince thi s i s what ,
permits deductions interrelations systematizati ons But at no

, ,
.
point may the objectification be taken as anything but a p rinciple

of elucidation Knowledge may enrich itself by commerce among
.
concepts but the whole order of concepts must tur n back to the
,
c a nvas of exp erience or ri sk total academici sm Th i s i s what

. .
Bergson w a s driving at in his distincti on between p ens ee p ens ee ’ ’
and p ens ee p ens a nte : i nert accompli shed thought and thought as
’
the ceaseless interchange wi th experience .

times ” “
society or beauty if we are content to classify the
, , ,
realities thus known as either substanti al or accident al Sufli ce it .
fo r this to be pointed out without attemp ting the monumental

,
task of explorin g this question a t length .
O ur discussion will be confined to the more famili a r and

straightforward question of what it means to know the essence of
substantial individuals This question includes several p resupp osi
.
tions It p resupp oses first that there are individu al uni fi es of a

.
” “
basic kind substances For our purposes we may take substance
, .
,
to mean a bei ng existing as a complete and unitary prin ciple of

” “
action a nature of a certain kind We experience ourselves most
, .
,
people would feel as such fundamental natures : not sup erficial

,
aspects of some more fundamental entity but autonomou s centers ,
of activity When we Observe the rest of reality we seem to find

.
,
ex amples of other such fundamental unities at least an alogous to

ourselves : dogs and cats seem to be individual unifi es of a funda
ment al kind ; s o do rosebushes and o ak trees ; chemistry di scovers -
,
even at the inanimate level a whole range of molecules and ele

,
ments which seem to pro vide exa mples Of natures basic sour ces
” “
,
of activi ty .
Now the ques tion Of whether we can know the essence of

such thi ngs p resupp oses also that they are a s fundamenta l unities , ,
determinate in kin d It is not only a metaphysical principle but a

.
” “
simple fact Of Observation that action follows b ein g Not just .
anythin g does just anything Characteristic activities belong to.
different types of bei ng ; that is principally why we Sp eak of differ

ent types of being— because we presume a fundamentally diverse
substantial nature to underli e fund amenta lly diverse activity Rose .
bushes don t practice ascetici sm ; monkeys don t wri te Op eras ;

’ ’
acorns don t develop into cats There are in nature prior to any
’
.
,
human intervention ( and providing the indispensable conditi on

for the possibility of any effective human intervention ) funda ,
mental determi nati ons in the entities we encounter which assure a

non ar bitrary character to their activity These fundamental deter
-
.
mina ti ons in the indivi dual unity a s unity we call the essence “ ”
Tho ug ht a nd E xp eri ence: I I 81
Of the being So much is presupposed even in order to raise the

.
question of whether we can know the essence Of substances Di s .
regardin g the d ifli culties which could be raised let us proceed on ,
the assumption of the validity Of these presuppositi ons We will .
“ ”
ask only whether the cl a im that we can know essences entails
the claim that our knowledge gr asps the fundamental d etermina
tion which makes this being to be what it is : is there a p erfect
equation between our cogni tion and the fundamental determina
tion in the being which char acterizes it p rior to a ll cognition?
It is apparent almost at once that we must draw back fr om the
cl ai m that there is such an equation We have seen already that .
it is an essential characteristi c of conceptual knowledge that it is

derivative ; as such it i s never the measure of the reality Of what
it knows If to know a thing through and through is to make it
.
,
not to make it is not to know it through an d through This i s .
” “
apparent whether we feel that the things of experience ar e made
at all It is even more apparent if we do believe that they are in
.
1
fact made— created by God On such a beli ef then the only idea
.
,
which adequately knows thi s plant thi s d og this man this atom , , , ,
” “
is the divine idea whi ch measures i t in its origi n The essence of .
these beings is equivalent to the fundament al ontologico intelligible -
determination a s conceived in the di vine mind Thi s i s why Josef .
Pieper wilL assert that far from St Thomas claiming that we can
- 2
.
k no w essences by me a ns of de finitions he holds that we cannot ,
know essences at a ll In thi s sense of essence only creative knowl

.
,
edge can kn ow the essence Of things .
Sometimes the recogni tion of this i s confined to our grasp of

the thing qua indi vidual : we cannot know it is allowed what , ,
d ifferentiates Jo hn from James or Rover from Fido but only the ,
universal essence of man or d og But thi s is not enough On

“
. .
the mea ning of essence now in question we cannot even know the ,
generic or sp ecific essence The gap here i s not between knowledge

.
1 If they ar e n ot ma d e they
,
a re not known a t a ll , by a n one
y .
2 Josef Pi ep er , The S i lence o f S t Thoma s tr a ns b y John Murr a y, SJ

.
, .
a nd D a ni el O connor ( New
’
o r : P a ntY k
heon ), 1 95 7 , pp
5 0—67 . .
1 82 Phi los op hy of Kno w led g e The
o f individuals and knowledge of u niversals ( in Aristotle s manner )

’
.
It is between knowledge as derivative and knowledge as origina

tive : in s o far as the essence of man dog rosebush a moeba , , , ,
means the fundamental determination of these thi ngs in thei r

o ri gin our knowledge does not coincide even with the generic
,
” “
essence The essence in this Sense is hidden in the abyss of the
.
divine knowledge and it would be rash to claim that we can

,
plumb that abyss .
Th ere is still much left however to the belief that we can , ,
know the essence of sub stantial bei ngs To know their essence .
mean s first of all to know them according to the category of

essence Thus what is the difference between merely p erceiving a
.
,
“ ” “
cow and knowing it as a cow ? Do I know the essence cow
,
”
ness ? Well at least I know this perceptible datum as a being
, ,
which looks like this Manifested in the sensory experience I

.
,
grasp a certain fundamental s tructure ; I seize this sensory appear

an ce as the mani festation of a mode of be i ng whi ch exhib i ts a
unity for my thought Then I understand that the appearance and

.
activity which my senses p erceive in this case is not a haphazar d

o ne but that it ossesses a certain necessity My penetration of
, p .
this necessary structure may admit of many degrees At first .
encounter I may simply subsume these perceive d data under the

,
” “
heading of a thin g —but doing only so much I still can claim ,
to know the essence E ven if I don t know the name Of what I

.
’
a m looking at it is still
“ ”
something which looks lik e this It is
, .
,
then the notion of thing or being which provi des the basis for our
,
knowledge of individual substances .
We can hardly claim to know the essence of horse water rabbit , , ,
sodium rosebush amoeba in the sense that we can plumb it to

, , ,
its depths or that we can define it In their depth these things ar e .

,
the manifestations Of a divine idea ; in the essence as con ceived in

that idea the full richness of actual and potential being of these
,
things is meted out to them by th i s idea No definition could po s .
s ibl
y enclose thi s meaning T his meaning is a s o urce.of their .
rea lity ; defini tion is never a source of meaning Nevertheless the .

,
essence We do not know God s idea of horse nor can we define
.
’
,
a horse But in a sense we know the essence of horse for our idea
.
,
is a transcendence of sense experience towards the gr ound of the

uni ty discernible in that experience .
Some may feel dissatisfied wi th this explanation for i t seems to

'
leave our knowledge of essences in a fluid state whereas often the ,
insi ght into essences is thought to be the basis for the stability and
permanence proper to knowledge But we must tread carefully
.
here We may first di stinguish two things : our knowledge of

.
generic structures as precipitated out of the experience of individ

ua ls and our kn owledge of the individuals which we feel to
,
” “
embody those structures T ake the process by which we k now
.
a rosebush First of a ll we may simply noti ce it as a thing that

.
” “ ”
looks like this a thi s somethin g Then we may find out that its
,
-
.
name is rosebush From here we can go on either to enumerate

.
the detailed featur es which are constant concomitants of this per

ce tu al structure ( its leaf pattern petal arrangemen t cell com
p , ,
posi tion etc ) as scientific knowledge does ; or we can grasp it

, .
” “
p hilosophically a s an instance of what is me a nt by plant lif e .
In this case we see it as a speci al perceptual manifestation of

“ ”
i mmanent activity at the physiological level The meani ng con .
ta ined in this notion i s a p ellucid one perfectly di stin gui shable ,
from other meanings : in s o far a s we can apply thi s meani ng to

the rosebush we know in a permanent and unchangin g manner
, , ,
certain thin gs about it : it is living it is self perfective i t is a

,
-
,
natur al uni ty of heterogeneous parts Whatever p os i ti ve meaning.
is embodi ed in the gnos eological essence thus concei ved I know

as permanently applicable to the indivi dual which embodies this
essence .
The only remaining issue is : 1 ) D oes any gi ven instance really

embody thi s i ntelligibili ty ? 2 ) Does any given instance embody
o n l this intell i ibili ty ? The first questi on in S i te of various obsta
y g p ,
cles we may take to be successfully answerable But what about

, .
the second question? E ven if I am sure that I am dealing with an

indivi dual which is really a rosebush how can I be sure that there
,
Tho ug ht a nd E xp eri ence: I 1 85
is not more meani ng in it than this ? If it is a rosebush then I ,
cannot s a y it i s inert or a mere aggregate : if it manifests the mean

” “
ing I conceive when I conceive rosebush then Obviously it ha s ,
that meaning and anything I can s a y on the basi s of this meani ng

,
will apply permanently and stably to it Yet how do I know that .
in its ultimate ontological essence it does not embody more than

this meaning? Perhaps potentially thi s individual whi ch manifests
merely vegetative life to me is also a conscious being even though ,
it does not mani fest thi s p otentiality as yet After all if I placed an .
,
amoeba and a human embryo at the unicellular stage side by side ,
all I could say about them both i n so far as I knew them accord
,
ing to the actu ality they presently manifested would be that they ,
were physiologic al forms of life Yet one of these the human .

,
embryo has the potentiality of becoming much more th a n this of

, ,
developing into an actually conscious and even thinking indi vidual .
When I Observe the two mi cros copic cases I know that they are ,
a t leas t phys i ologi cally alive ; but I do not k now that they are
a t mos t physiologically ali ve For the physiologic al indivi dual ma

.
y
( and in one case does ) bear wi thin it the potentiality for some
more .
If I formed my gnoseologi cal e ssence of man at the single cell -
s tage I would completely overlook the w ealth o f the ontologi cal

,
es sence Wh
y
. could not the same possibility be present i n my
“
knowing of plants animals or inanimate beings ? Why could
”
, ,
they not c a rry ontologically more meaning than they reveal ? The
answer to this seems to be that there i s no way I can be sure that
they do not carry such meaning To a large extent the tendency.
5
,
to assume that reality lives up to the boundary line s drawn by

my thought is a product of a tendency to s ee essences from the
side of cla s s ifica tion If I draw my lines carefully enough I ca n be
.
,
sure that the genera i nto whi ch I classify things do not overlap .
But in order to know that individu als whi ch are carriers of these
genera do not overlap I must assume that reality stops within
,
5Th e rele a n e f this to the p o

v c o of evoluti on i too ob io us to n
r ces s d s v ee
s tr es s i ng .
my boundary lines The trouble is that the classifying tendency
.
,
right from its incep tion in Ar istotle is often preoccupied with

.
a r tifa cts
“ ”
where hard and fast lines can be dr awn Chairs an d
, .
”
“
tables are eternally different ; what is one is not the other nor ,
will a chair ever become a table But that is because an artifact is .
wholly formed to the measure of our concepts Classification is .
comfortably at home here Those natural existents however which .

, ,
have their measure outs i de of us c a nnot be trusted to confine ,
themselves to our generic concepts In regard to natur al beings .

,
classification is at best an outline of the present and not a precept

for the future .
Perhaps there is a great deal more in the individual rosebush ,
d og atom o r amoeba than I can comprehend Normally I pro

, , .
,
ceed on the assum tion that if a being does not manifest a certain
p
p erfection it does not possess it
, even potentially— but this is not
an absolute necess i ty What occurs is that I detect certain intelli .
g e facets in the activity of beings : sometimes an event only

ib l
” “ “
gives me the meani ng motion sometimes it gives me self ,
” ” “ “
motion sometimes consciousness some times thought It is
, , .
app arent to me that between these mea nings there is an i rreducible

” “ ” “
i ntelligible d ifl erence T he difference between life and matter.
,
“ ” ” “
or between vegetative lif e and co nsci ous life is just as irre
d uci ble as that between red and green I have all manner of stable .
and unchanging kn owledge on the bas i s Of these differences and ,
in resp ect to a ny individual beings which stri ctly and exclusively

embody these meanings .
But there is the catch H ow d o I know that any i ndividual .
embodies in its ontological essence o nly these meani ngs ? H OW

, ,
6
6A p oi nt a long s imila r lines i s ma d e b y Nicola i H a rtma nn Ne w Wa ys of ,
O n to log y tra ns by Rei nh a rd K uhn ( Chi ca go : Regnery ) 1 95 3, pp 1 10- 1 12

, .
, . .
H a r tma nn hold s for a hi era rchica l gra d a ti on i n bei ng, but d i s ti ngui s hes
b etw een a s tra tifica ti on o f ca tegor i es a nd a s tr a ti fica ti o n o f i nd i vi d ua ls ex
hibi ti ng thes e ca te ori es

g . T he ca tegori es thems elves ( i n a ni ma te ,
orga ni c,
p sychic a nd , s pir i t ) ,
a re d i s cr ete , b ut this d oe s no t rule o ut a geneti c con
ti nui ty ; the ca tego ri es do no t s ha d e off i nto ea ch o ther, but the a c ua lt

i nd ivi d ua ls or s tr uctur es ca rrying the ca tegor i es ma y .
tended to dissociate knowledge from action and to elevate the ,
former at the exp ense of the latter? Contemplation ( theoria ) was

viewed by Plato and A ristotle as the supreme good of man man s ,
’
particip ation in the ineff able life of the gods and actio n was ,
looked down upon as extraneous to the true life of the soul Why .
was thi s so ? Th e answer D ewey suggests is that philosophy came

, ,
into being a s a regularizati on of the quest for secur ity whi ch pre
o ccupied primi tive man At the mercy of a cap ri cious and cruel
.
nature p ri mitive man first sought relief from the perpetual risk
,
of action in magic and the pro i tiation of the holy But no e fforts
p .
to bani sh risk are completely availing wi thin the sphere of action

itself whi ch is always p arlous and unpredictable T herefore man
,
.
now retreats to the realm of thought where at least he feels that , , ,
he can find relief fr om the ceaseless perils of life E ven action can .
afford an awareness of the difference between the recurring and

the unlooked for but when philosophy comes on the scene it
, ,
erects thi s disparity between the ordinary and the extraordinary

into a difference between two rea lms It decides that theory reaches .
the immutable the antecedently real tr ue Being ; while action is

, ,
sunk in p rocess contingency non being The thought whi ch seeks

, ,
-
.
8
genuine k nowledge Should turn to the contemplation of this

s uperior realm of stable bei ng and leave behind the swirling con
fusion of temporal process If it p erseveres it will discover norms

.
,
for knowing and coercive rules for conduct whi ch are a nteced “
ently re real pri or to all human thought— and its true good
-
will consist in co nforming itself to these transcendent standards .
The quest for certainty is then simply one side o f a quest for
security whi ch as Dewey paints it appears distinctly pusillan i
, , ,
mous What he s uggests is that the whole procedure is mi staken

.
and has prevented man from m a king contact with the wealth of
his own experience A new era must begin Acti on must be al
. .
8 v
D ew ey i s thi n ki ng of s uch i ew s a s P a rmeni d es d eclar a ti on tha t cha nge
’
w a s a n illus i on a n d tha t true B ei ng w a s i mmuta ble; follow in g hi m, Pla to

r
d is ti ngui shed b etw een the r ea lly ea l d oma i n of i mmu a ble forms a nd the
“ ”
t
i nferi or r ea li t
y of tempora l exp eri ence .
Thoug ht a nd E xp eri ence: I 1 89
lowed to evolve its ow n standards and not forced to conform to

”
what is fix ed in the antecedent structures of things O ur i deas .
9
are not privileged glimp ses into transcendent standards ; they are
facets of our a cti on T hey are concep tions Of t he possible cons e
.
uences of our Operations Where thought begins is where m a n

q .
begi ns— with reality as immediately exp erienced This p ri mary .
experience o f reality is not itself cognitional ; it gives us ma teri a ls

for cogni tion Thr ough our activi ty we transform the unruly
.
plethora of directly experienced reali ty into the ca rrrer of human

values It is only then that we can be said to know i t Ideas are
. .
the instruments by which we effect this transformation .
O ften D ewey gives a quasi b i ological cast to this position -

.
Man s ways of knowin g a re the instruments he has developed in

’
the course of an evolutionary process and thei r worth derives from

their efli ciency i n furthering his adaptation to the envi ronment “
Ideas are workin g hypotheses or anticipatory plans for projected ,
action In a smuch as these anticip atory plans are frui tful and
.
10
render experience responsive to our needs they are true But their ,
“ ” ”
being true does not signi fy that they are gli mp ses i nto essences
which are conceale d somewhere behind exp erience ; it signifies that
they are instruments for the successful transformation of exPeri
ence Therefore the cri terion for the truth of an i dea is not some
.
antecedently re al essence to which our concep t conforms ; it is the

value of the cons equences to which thi s idea leads or would lead
in experience Knowledge and action are not then d irected to
.
, ,
'
different realms of reality They are dir ected to the only realm
.
there is reality as actually expe ri enced and knowledge i s only

— —
a kin d of anti cip atory doing .
For a long wh ile many Scholasti c philosop hers a s well as many

, ,
other p hilo sophers who defended the tradi ti onal concep t of truth ,
have been repelled by the pragmati c app roach and have exerci sed
themselves i n calli ng attention to i ts defects The obvi ous aspect .
of relativism inherent i n the theory makes the i r distaste easy to
9 Op . ci t .
, p 72. .
10 Ib id .
, p 167 . .
u nderstand There is re ason to think however that this attitude is
.
, ,
no w
p ass i ng and that tra d iti onal p,
hiloso p hy wi ll henceforth view
Dewey s theory in a more favorable way recognizing it a s in
’
, ,
some ways both a confirmation of and advance up on its own

,
vi ews of the nature of the concept What D ewey is say ing is not .
too diss imi lar to what Thomism stresses against rationali sm : that
the meaning of concepts i s not present to us ex cept in an interplay
wi th experience It is surely only the thinker at the lowest rung of
.
“
the ladder who envi sions phi losophy as a set of ideas which have
yi elded up their meaning without remainder and need only to be
conscienti ously handed on T radition i s not transmission ; one
“
.
”
can o nly hand on an idea as an idea not as an inert thing
“
, .
Much of the d ifli culty with Dewey arose because of vocabulary

d ifferences a n d diff erences i n mtent If w e take the trouble to .
li sten to what he is saying it will often be s o obvi ous ( di scounting

,
the soci ologi cal p olitical religious bias evident in his a pproach )
- -
that one may well wonder how it could be questioned .
"
“
Is it not true that our idea Of w ha t things are is often if not ,
exclusively a concep tion Of the consequences of the possible ways

,
o f acting with or upo n them ? What does my idea of water wood , ,
grass horse amount to ? In one sense it i s based on an appear

, , ,
” “
a nce ,
what the thing looks like Beyond this what else do I .
,
mean by for examp le water?

“ ”1 1
,
It is something whi ch will give
,
me a cool wet feeling if I plunge my han d i nto i t; if I light a fir e

,
under it it will give off steam ; if I push i t it will move rapidly

, ,
a wa from my hand and yet con tinually surround it ; if I drink it

y ,
it will refresh me ; if I bathe in i t i t will cleanse me ; if I subject ,
it to electrolysis I may break it down into elements E very one of

,
.
”
these statements is a statement in respect to acti on To k no w .
water then is to an ti cip ate the consequences of a certai n seri es of

, ,
actions from and upon an a ppe arance unity There is surely no -

.
particular difli culty with this A similar po int could be made in .

“
regard to our knowledge of artifacts : what a watch or a chair is is
11 Ibi d .
, p 15 8
. .
c onsequences But obviously thi s view presupposes in multiple

.
ways the traditional meani ng for knowledge Fi rst it ret ai ns the .

,
pure notion of a w a renes s : no more than anyone else i s Dewey able

to swallow up the irreducible act of awareness in action Knowl .
edge cannot entirely be reduced to the consequences of action for ,
there is an inexp ungi ble necessi ty that we be a w a re of the couse

uences of action and this mea ni ng for k nowing ( awareness )
q ,
remains s ui generis Secondly there is the p oint that many have

.
,
raised : we must be able to know that we have reached couse

uences which are frui tful Th i s would see m to enta il the r ecogn i
q .
tion of at least some types of consequences as fruitful in them

selves ; otherwise the p rocess of reference to further consequences
would proceed endlessly and knowledge would be by definiti on
impossible What I mean by calling my judgments true cannot s im
.
ply be that they work out because I must know it as true that they
,
work out Third ly while my kn owledge of what I mea n by water

.
, ,
e
g. may
.
,be largely in te rms of the consequences of projected or
possible actions that this meaning really applies to an object re

,
mains true indep endently of any activi ty .
The conf usion arises because D ewey fails to distinguish between

truth and our knowledge of the truth Granted that in many cases .
we could not know whether a p rop osi tion was true or false without
testing its consequences the fact remai ns that W hat I mean by
,
calling i t true or false is that my judgment conforms to the way

things are That my judgment does conform I may know only
.
,
af ter I test i t but i ts tr uth i s no t confer red by the test but o nly
, ,
disclosed T his is extremely obvious and yet it is relevant to

.
,
Dewey s other main p oint th a t knowing does not co ns i st in con

’
forming to an antecedent standar d but i n consequent utility Wh at .
is unmist a k ably antecedent to my knowledge i s the structure of

reality whi ch will determine the eventual fruitful or non/ fruitful
character of my idea My kn owledge does not create the conditions
.
of i ts ow n frui tfulness T his i s the antecedent recogn i ti on which

.
the pragmatic theory of truth must mak e .

The superiori ty of the Western View of reality over the tribal

view was conclusively d emonstrated says Vere Childe when , ,
Britis h bullets penetrated the supposedly infalli ble magic armor of

their trib a l Opp onents Yes but the fact that the truth of the .
12
,
Western View w a s thus vind icated only means that its truth came
to be k now n thr ough being tested ; but that reality will vindicate
one View and repudiate the other i s due to the antecedent structure
of the real itself The truth of my idea may be measured by i ts

.
consequences but the consequences are measured against the

,
antecedent natur e of reality This reali zati on is i nevitable unless .

,
we were to m a intain the li terally insane view that human thought

creates ex ni hi lo the nature of the real D ewey is really far from .
denying it ; it is only that his attention is fix ed elsewhere and he

speaks in neglect of it T here are many o ccasions where he makes .
it plain that our thought must take account of antecedently re al

con d itions But this means that there i s a structure in the real
.
in d ependent of all thought on our part In his own words natur e .

,
“ ”
is potenti a lly intelligible and he i s joined in thi s a cknow led g ,
13
ment by many who espouse a p ragmati c or sociological View of

truth But thi s admission is enough to make it plain that the prag
.
matic theory must be inserted into a larger fra mework in order to

mak e i ts own point To recognize the potential intelli gi bility of
.
nature is to recognize that our knowledge i s measured by a mean

i ng which tr a nscends it : our actu ali z ati on of the me a ning latent i n
nature cannot proceed arbitrarily Clearly then D ewey does not .
,
and cannot deny that our knowledge must conform to an anteced

12
Child e, op
p 1 13
. ci t
.
, . .
V ere Child e s remar k tha t the as s ump ti on

’
1 3 D ew e
y op
,
cit
p 2 1
. 5 C f .
, . . .
of a ll in qu iry i s tha t rea li ty ha s a p a tter n ( op ci t si mi la rly C I

p . .
, . . .
Lew i s M i nd a nd the Wor ld O rd er p 343 , d ecla res tha t the r equi rement for
, , .
the p o s s ibi li ty o f know led ge i s tha t the w or ld b e or d erly, tha t i t b e s us cep

“ ”
tible to o r ga nized know led ge See too the fur her s ta temen s of D ew ey, pp .
, ,
t t .
148, 1 64 167 w hi ch gra nt s ome s ta n d i ng to pre-exi s i ng cond i ti ons The

, ,
t .
a lterna tive to s uch a cknow led gments i s a ctu ally cha os B ut i t i s not seen .
clearly en ou gh tha t e en a v mi ni ma l k
a c now led g ment of thi s kind conced es
the mo s t i mporta nt point to the tra di ti ona l theory of truth .

1 94 Phi los op hy of Know led g e
The
ent realm of meaning He is really concerned with the manner in

.
which we bring this potential me a ning to light ; his decision is that

for man action is an instrument of knowledge O ur knowledge of .
nature is princip ally a product of our abi lity to act upon nature .
E ven s o some m i ght take exception to this approach since it

, ,
confines our knowledge to nature itself and seems to preclude any

transcendent us e of concepts If our knowledge is principally of the
.
consequences of action the full range of intelligibility seems to be

,
limited to the realm of action and Dewey is quite consistent in

,
“ ”
the naturalism which rules out metaphysics Could we allow full
.
scope to his approach and still admit metaphysics into the realm
of knowledge ? D oe s D ewey s approach admit of being completed
’
in the d irection of metaphysics ? There does not seem any com

’
pelling reason to deny the possibility All that i s required is that

.
we s ee human knowledge as the ri sing towards an absolute out of

a n experi enti al ambience What D ewey leaves unexplained ( what
.
no genetic or naturalistic theory can explain ) is the origin al

contribution of thought by whi ch man i s impelled to think experi
ence at a ll This original impulsion i s a lrea d y a participation in an
.
absolute and renders all naturalism in adequate Surely it is right

, .
to say that thought only comes to recogni ze its own participation

in the absolute through a continuing di alog with experience
but what it reads out of exp erience is not just experience but ,
experience as held fast in the questionability of being The more .
I search the more I am able to be come aware of re ality as inex

,
ha us ti bly searchable Then there is no contradiction in viewing

.
thought s orientation to time as simultaneously an orientation to

’
the absolute— for its w a y of being oriented to time is a way o nly

possible for a being oriented to the absolute Human thought is .
not oriented to the absolute by means of the brittle clari ty of
concepts but by means of thei r unclarity For o ur thought the s i gn

.
,
of de th i s d ar kness A thought oriented to e xperience is nearer

p .
to the presence of this darkness and mystery than a thought pre

occupied wi th glossy concep tual security .
But once they are supplied with such foundation the inco rporation ,
would not appear to be very d ifii cult No tradi tional p hilosopher .

17
,
however he may sometimes talk really feels that he can read ,

“
”
off essences in the manner that Dewey abhors O ur knowledge .
of essence is a product of a continual traffi c with eX e ri ence D oes

p .
” “ ” “
Dewey preclude a resulting k nowledge of natures or essences ?
He h imself may neglect it but his philosophy like all thought , , ,
presumes the antecedent structur e of the real Our knowledge of .
“ ” ” “
human nature or ani mal nature would then be the gnoseologi
cal deposit Whi ch experience has left in thought But on the bas i s .
of this deposit of actual i ntelli gi bility we may claim to say various

“
permanently true things about man For example we may know .

,
him as a person and kn ew that certain behavior towards him is

“ ”
forever incompatible with his worth as a person We don t read “

.
’
”
off the essence of person but we do awake progressively to it i n
,
the confrontation with experi ence Having awakened to it we are .

,
then i n the presence of meani ng whi ch is not ep hemeral but
enduring Nothing that Dewey says ca n eliminate the possibility

.
“
of thi s ; much that he says i s enlightening in showing us how thi s
awakening i s to be pursued Fi nally much of what he says is a .

,
salutary warni ng against a premature beli ef that it ha s been con

summated ; we are still in the p rocess of finding out what man i s ,
just as we are still in the process of finding out wh at reality as a

whole is .
O bviously many of the questions rai sed by Dewey s approach

’
come up in the field of ethics in which tra di tional philosophy has ,
” ” “
reli ed on the natural law approach If the natures of things .
are as elusi ve as Dewey indicates small room would seem to be ,
left to settle ethical questions by measuring human actions agai nst
17 For a s m
y p D ew ey by r epresenta ti ves of tra d i
a theti c d i s cus si o n of
ti ona l p hi los ophy s ee John D ew ey : H is Tho ug ht a nd Influence ed i

,
by , t .
J ohn B lew ett, SJ ( New or : . Y k F r

o dh a m Uni ers i y P res s ) , 1 960 , a nd v t
Robert J Roth, S ] J ohn D ew ey a nd Self-Rea liza ti on ( E nglew o od Cliffs ,
.
NI . . : Prenti ce-H a ll) , 1962 .

the nature of man But even here the di sparity between Dewey
“
and Thomi stic philosop hy is more apparent than real No natural .
law advoc ate with a ny sop hi sticati o n applies this method in a '
p seudo deductive
-
fashion but alwa s
y p roceeds
, circumstant i ally
and historically ; conversely no D ew eyi te can really i gnore
,
“ ”
essences since this i s the p resumed criterion to which exp eri ence
,
converges Nei ther Thomi st nor D ew eyite would think it desirable

.
that man act in an i nhuman way Dewey stresses the role of .
experi ence in deci ding what is the prop erly human conduct ;
Thomi sm stresses the imp erium of man s nature in enforcin g an
’ “ “
unconditional sanction to thi s demand for genuinely human action .
SOC IA L AND H IST O RICAL D IME NSIONS
The c ontemporary mind finds it natural to pose speculation

about the relation of thought and experience in terms of the social
and histori cal character of thought It w a s Hegel who fir st empha
.
sized the omni—historical character of concrete reali ty and the ,
1 9 th century learned i ts lesson well as the ideology of Marx an d ,
the biology of D arwin show A s a result we c annot today con

“
.
,
cerve of any existent in i solation from its historic al di mensi on ,
and knowledge is no exception E pistemology may cons i der the

.
hi stori cal d imens i on of k nowledge in two way s : first as a di fficulty ,
in the way of the claim that we reach objective truth secondly as , ,
a contri bution towards the understanding of the meaning of

objectivi ty .
It i s the first questi on which has usually p reoccupi ed epis

temologi s ts H ow can a thought whi ch is ci rcumscribed i n time and
.
culture mount above time to a stable and independent order of

truth? At the very least we must wonder about thi s and more ,
” “ “ ”
than one will be incli ne d to vi ew objectivi ty and hi stori city as
mutu ally exclusive ; a tho ught consti tuted by soci al and hi stori cal
processes is in thi s Opinion es s entia lly doomed to relativi sm For
, , .
the w a y things appear to it from i ts soci al and histori cal perspective

is not necessarily the way they will appear to a thought in a

” “
different social and histori cal p ersp ective ; what is true today is
not necessarily true tomo rrow or the next day or for all men
, , .
Now two poi nts may be quickly made : it is qu ite evident that
human thought is soci ally and histori cally conditioned ; it is by
no means evident that this leads to relativism After all in this case .
,
what i s histori cal is tho ught: not dress custom or conduct but , , ,
tho ught What makes thought historical is not the same thing that
.
makes it thought The task for the philosophy of knowledge is to

.
do justi ce both to the historic al character of thought and to its

cognition al char acter T hat it can have both is plain from the out
.
s et,
for the power of thought to recognize its own social a nd
historical li mi tations i s i n a sense already evidence for i ts tran
, ,
s cen d ence of those l i mi tations .
It is only from the standpoint of a hyper scrupulous ration ali sm -
that the hi storic al character of thought should app ear as a scandal

and a threat For one who regards hi s i deas as mental properties
.
“
whose content can be publicly di splayed the noti on of a develop ,
” ” “
ment of truth is very trying He feels that one either has or .
“ ”
does not have these ideas either possesses or does not possess
,
the truth Yet if an idea really is a creative app rehension then it

.
, ,
“ ” ”
is not somethi ng one has at all any more than the artist has ,
hi s creative idea To acknowledge thi s i s not to surrender the

.
domain of truth but to occupy i t more effectively The unity of

, .
knowledge is not destroyed by its being subject to growth and

development any more than the uni ty of the in dividu al self is
,
destroyed by the development of the individual consciousness .
“ ”
The meani ng of development can probably most easily be
brought out by reference to the development of i ndivi dual con
s ci ous nes s D evelo ment is not a rocess of the a d d i ti on of items
.
p p
to an originally meager supply It is the simulta neous tra nsfor .
mation and preservation of previous states The adult s consci ous .

’
ness is not related to hi s childhood consciousness simply by way

o f additi on or re lacement ; it is at once continuous with a nd
p
this d ifli culty is one manifestation o f the larger puzzle about how
a thought which arises out of a non cogniti onal background can -
be truly objective Wi th good reason then Kar l Mannhei m one

.
, , ,
of the pi oneers in the field de fined the sociology of knowledge a s ,
“
the analysis of the relationshi p between knowledge and exi st
”19
ence . Instead of attendin g to such non cognitional i ntrusi on s -
as diet physiology temperament neuros i s economics or other

, , , , ,
possible factors the sociologist concentrates on the soci al deter

,
minants of thought But the problem is the same : how can a .
thought whi ch is es s entia lly perspectival reach an absolute ?

That this is not i mpossi ble i s insisted upon often enough by
those sociologi sts of knowledge who p rotest that they are not
defending relativis m Any opinion which held that our thought
.
20
was tot a lly determined by soci al influences would destroy its own
value as knowledge ; sociological relativism of this type i s as self
refuting as any total relati vism Describing the social historical .
-
dimens i on of a proposi tion does not settle its truth or falsity What .
has to be decided is this : ca n the notion of truth or falsity really

apply to p ers pectival thought? We might begin to dr aw the teeth
out of what strik es too many as a grave d ifli cult merely by aski ng
y
a counter question : why not? Just examine the sup position which
-
is the foundation for the objection It apparently rests on the .
beli ef that objective knowledge i s equivalent to absolute knowl

edge Or that the absolute must either be reve aled absolutely or
.
not at a ll Failing this all other knowledge is robbed of v al ue and

.
,
“ ” “ ”
cons i gned to a subjecti vist or relativist status What can be .
the justification for this very strange belief? Is it supposed to be a

contradicti on that an absolute be revealed persp ectivally? To hold
so woul d appear to be a flagran t p eti ti o p ri ncip ii C I Lewis . . .
19 K a rl Ma nnheim , Id e o logy a nd Utop ia , tra ns . by Loui s W i rth a nd Ed i

w a r d Shils ( New Yo k :
H a rco urt, B ra ce ) , 195 2 , p 2 37
r . .
Se e P a ul Kecs k emeti , in the i n r od ucti on to Ma nnh eim s E s s a ys

t the
’
20
“
on
Soci o lo gy f Kono w le d g pp
e 2 8— 2 9 W ern e
r Sta r, . . k a d d s a s tron
g d i s cla i mer
of rela ti vi s m, p 1 5 2 s s ; a nd o f cours e Scheler w a s
. . s trongly a nti -rela ti vi s ti c.
E ven Ma nnhei m ,
w ho i s a ccus ed of rela ti vi s m by Sta r k t i es
,
r to es ca p e i ts
clutches , o p ci t 1 7 1
. .
,
p . .
points out in a somewhat d ifferent connection the fact that A ,

21
presents different persp ectives to x y and z i s no argument ,
against the existence of A but rather an argument for it A si milar

thought promp ts We rner Stark to adop t the device : To the
”
absolute through the relative He means this in the manner of .
22
Max Scheler from whose writings the contemporary sociology of

,
knowledge may be s a id to spring ; for Scheler the perspectival ,
” ” ” ” “ “
manifestation of essences like man justice or good , ,
were obscure revelations of an eternal ei d os ( an ideal archetyp e )

which could be descried through them But a similar statement .
23
could be made in respect to the Absolute which is the ground of

all existence even if we frame this merely hypothetically If there
, .
i s an Absolute Source of existence i t can obviously not be ,
reve aled a bs olutely to fini te existents ; yet it is nonsense to think

that this would logically preclude all approach of the finite to the
Absolute What it does mean is that every revelation is at the
.
same time a concealment .
The possibility that man s perspectival knowledge can reach

’
insights with enduring value sounds presumptuous largely because

it is too often discussed in generalities without reference to the
many s imple instances where the p ossibility is evidently ac tualized .
O nce our consciousness has awakened s ufii ciently we are able to ,
“
understand very well the truth that Kin dness is better than
” “ ”
cruelty Hi tler s slaughter of the Jews w a s a monstrous crime
’
, ,
” “
or the falsity of Slavery is preferable to freedom Conceit is a ,
”
moral virtue or Children o ught to despi se thei r parents To
,
.
sa
y that we know these truths i s not even to say that we have a
“ “ “ ”
clear idea of ki ndness or slavery — the exact meani ng of
terms like this i s a will 0 the wi sp Yet we nevertheless know ’
.
,
that the truths enunci ated in these propositions i n some sense

21
Lew i s , op . ci t .
, p . 1 7 8s s . Lew i s
’
s thought i n thi s w or k ,
how e v er , ha s
s tr on g ele ments o f rela tiv i s m .
22
Sta rk , op . ci t .
p 19 6
, . .
23
See Star k ’
s s umma ry of Scheler s w or
’
k , D ie Wis s enfo rme n und d ie
G es ells cha ft o p ci t
p 32 85 s . .
, . .
2 02 The Phi los op hy of Kno w led g e
transcend time Kindness is o nly p er sp ectiv a lly revealed to me
.
but on the basi s of th i s revelation I know that no future soci al

p ers p ective will warrant an y one to judge truly that cruelty is
better than kindness It does no good to argue that many i ssues
.
are much more obscure than thi s for the existence of obscure ,
cases must be understood from the vantage p o int of non Obscure -
cases and not vi ce versa Nor can the lack of a consensus be

, .
conclusive What we are trying to vindicate i s the p os s i bi li ty Of

.
enduring insight arising out of p erspectival knowledge and there ,
i s no call to be Optimisti c about its frequency an d certainly no call

to assume that thi s i nsight wi ll have the supp ort of a social con
sensus The basi c theoreti cal issue is sometimes confused with the
.
practical one of how we can decide between divergent p ersp ectives ,
which is qu ite a different question Since no human agent i ndi .

,
vidual or p olitical transcends the p erspectival condition it is the

, ,
part Of poli ti cal wi sdom to refrain from impos ing any perspective
by coerci on— but that i s quite a d ifferent thing from the admi ss i on
that one perspec tive is as good as another We know very well from .
our ow n indi vi dual consci ousness that at some moments our vis i on
is clearer than o thers ; we would not s a y about ourselves that all

“
our O i n i ons are equally enlightening nor should we say it about

p ,
humanity in general .
The more ontologi cally rich are the categories the more they ,
will be subject to development It i s d ifli cult to credit that notions .
“ ” ” “ ” “ ” “
like substance thi ng kn owledge
, matter good
, I , ,
“
,
” “
,
”
“ “ ” “ ” “
person God, necessi ty freedom
, love have some , ,
“
,
uni vocal p acket Of meaning which i s transferred through the ages .
“ ”
T ake a concep t l i ke substance which begins with A ri stotle and ,
continues thr ough St Thomas Descartes Spinoza Hegel a nd .

, , , ,
the mode m s When the modern Thomi st uses the word does he
.
mean the same thing as Ari stotle ? The answer seems to b e yes
”
and no A nd thi s does not si gnify that he means the same thi ng
.
p lus a few more th i ngs T h e successive tran sformati ons under

.
gone by the word do not allow us to i dentify some uni vocal core
mum a genuine psychological jus tification for saying that our
,
” “
knowledge feels truncated unless it is d eali ng wi th things a nd
that a thing is a triplex of concep t sense and action That i s why
, ,
.
Kant withheld the label of k novv

“
led ge from metap hys i cal con
ce ts s i nce they did not bear upon things i n th i s sense
p , .
Now with this in mind we ma y confer a very p osi tive cogni

ti ona l relevance on the social and historical dimensions of human
” “ ” “
existence For if metaphysical categories like being
. soul , ,
”
“
Go d immortal ity
,
”
freedom
,
“
love p erson
,
”
and so ,
”
,
”
for th are to afford us the s ame assurance a s phenomenal kn owl

edge they must be filled i n with some kin d of content— they must
,
“ ”
begi n to bear upon something approximating a thing Now .
obviously this content cannot come from the sideof sense i ntuition
as such which cannot exhibi t these notions It might come how
, .
,
ever from action of a superi or kind An d here i s where the soci al

, .
and hi storical dimensions become extremely relevant For it is .
through hi s hi gher acti vity as a social and historical bei ng that

man gives a vi si ble manifestation to the meaning creatively a ppre
hended in these philosophical concepts H i s grasp of himself a s a .
trans phenomenal bei ng is weakened and rendered cogni tiona lly

-
unstable unless he can read it back out of hi s existence Therefore -

.
,
the histori cal p rocess by wh i ch he creates an a uthentic human

exi stence for himself i s i ntegral to the cognitive grasp of the tran
s cen d ent dimension of reali ty .
In line wi th the analogy we have used before : as the arti st

cannot a fli rm his creative i dea except as he embodies i t on canvas ,
s o man cannot affir m the transcendent character of hi s ow n
exi stence except as he embodies it in history and soci ety Or to .
revert to the comparison wi th in dividual consciousness : A man

”
says I at five and at fifty But his meaning for that word ha s
“
.
radically develop ed and i s inseparable from the life process in -
which he has learned i t; s o too humani ty recognizes itself as

, ,
“
man thro ughout human history but it must learn what it mea ns
”
,
to be man and that meaning is insep arable from the historical

,
Thoug ht a nd E xp eri ence: I 2 05
process Can anyone seri ously contest that we are in a better

.
25
position today to understand what i t means to be a p erson than

was say a slave in phar aoh s E gypt? Man knows what it mean s to
, ,
’
be a person by makin g hi mself a person .
We could s a y simil a r things about the other categories : we con

vince ourselves of i mmortality by bringi ng forth immortal works ,
of love by creating the climate i n whi ch i t ma flo w er of freedom

y ,
by producing a free society Most audaci ously could we even say .

,
that in order to know God we must ma ke God? That is we must , ,
make the reality of God i n stant in human exi stence We must -

.
bring God forth from hidi ng and let H im appear as the ultimate
meani ng of human exi stence Such a conviction seems to have .
animated the thought of Teilhard de Chard in His phenomenology .

26
of man is a phenomenolog of man as a movement to the end o f

y
history The intelligibility of the end falls across the present
. .
Perhaps only at the O mega Po int d o we really know God truly ,
but we may speak less and less stammeringly as we move toward

that point And thus the historical growth which propels this
.
movement is an integral par t of our cogni tion .
In speaking thus in tryi ng to do justice to the relation of hi story

'
and knowledge we must bew are of any vulgar Optimism which

,
“
reduces the whole di scussion to the s ingle word progress ,
.
“ ”
Progress is a word to beware of in p hilosophy for there is a ,
sense in whi ch philosophy is more a continual thinking at the

ori gin than it is a progress Certainly there is no guar antee that a
.
thin ker who app ears later on the histori cal scene than ano ther
automati cally stands at a better vantage point for the vi si on of -
philosophical truth ; as an ex ample nothing sai d above would ,
commit us to the belief that Si dney Hook is a better philosophi cal

guide than Plato Things are not that s irnple Just as there are
. .
25
Cf . Micha el P ola nyi , The S tud y o f Ma n ( Chi ca go : Univ ers i ty of Chi
ca goP ress ) , 1 95 9, pp 82— 83. .
26 See Pi erre T ei lha r d d e C ha rd i n, The P henomen on o f Ma n , tr a ns . by

B erna rd W a ll ( New York : H a rp er a nd 1959 .
The
moments of great purity i n the consciousness of
individuals by which the rest of their exp eri ence can be measured
so the gr eat thinkers represent moments of great purity
intensi ty in the consciousness of humanity What history does is to
.
p ool the e x erience of the

p p ast and to Of f er it as a fuller o
pp or
tuni ty for philosophical penetration .

2 08 The P hi los op hy o f Know led g e
infer from an Observation of either few or many instances ( i n any
case not all i nsta nces ) that someth in g is true of all i nstances of
,
thi s class We do thi s i n an everyday manner when we state con

.
” “
fid ently such famili ar facts as that All men laugh All dogs ,
“
bark or All unsupported objects fall to the ground Nobody
, .
has ever observed a ll men a ll dogs or a ll unsupported o bjects ;

, ,
the observati on is i mp ossible in these and mo st cases— which is

another reason why complete in duction i s relatively useless But if .
we haven t observed a ll cases of a class how do we know with

’
certitude that they mus t exhibit a certai n trait? Why couldn t there ’
be non barking dogs or unsupp orted objects which remai n com

-
forta bly susp ended in mi d a ir ? -
Yet p hysi cal science and indeed all systemati c knowledge re

, ,
lies very heavily on incomplete in duction Medi cine speaks of the .
properties of a malaria or typhus germ ; bi olo gy of the normal

structure of a human cell ; chemistry prescri bes the atomi c structure
of molecules and lists the wei ghts of elements i n a table Yet .
nobody has o bserved or could observe a ll typhus germs all cells , ,
or a ll elements of a certain ki nd H OW then b Observing only

y .
,
some can we prescribe for what i s true of all ? How can we

,
distinguish a val i d inducti on from a hasty generalization ? Nobody

would on fai r consi deration grant much value to such p retended
, ,
“ ” “
generaliz atio ns as All Iri sh are drunkards All doctors are ,
” “ ”
quacks or All politici a ns are cyni cal We would counsel a
, .
person w ho made such statements that he was judgi ng on the

basis of a few i nstances and p roceeding fallaci ously When then .
, ,
are we validly inducing and not gener alizing hastily?

In one sense this question simply means : in what cases are we
proceedi ng according to the proper and reco gnized c anons of a
certai n field ? Thus the hasty generalizati ons cited above s in
,
against the cardi nal r ule of a ll induction which states that the ,
existence of even a single nega ti ve instance destroys the uni vers al

character of the conclusi on Any pretended induction whi ch vi o
.
lates this r ule i s immedi ately to be tossed out of c ourt That much .
is easy to see To go further in establishing the correct procedures

.
Thoug ht a nd E xp eri ence: II 2 09
of induction in given ar eas requi res prolonged consideration and ,
practi ti oners of the sep arate sciences and of the logi c of d iscovery
have devoted much time to it .
Mill s method of agreement and diff erences is one exa mple of

’
an attempt to lay down general criteria Actually though thi s .

, ,
way of stating the question has largely to d o wi th the proce dures

valid in a certai n sci ence and i s princip ally to be settled by the
practitioners of that science .
The philosophic al question proper only begins where this one

leaves off : after a valid scientific conclus i on has been discriminated
from an invali d one what is the s ta tus of the knowledge thus
,
acquired ? Is i t merely probable is it certain or what? For instance

, , ,
let us say that a chemist can successfully tell the diff erence betw een
the right and wrong way of determini ng the structur e of a molecule
and can wri te its formula The philosop hical issue i s
.
arrived at the scientifically correct conclusion is the knowledge ,
which i s t hus gained a bs olutely certain or is i t simply highly

probable ? Thephilosophical question does not have to do with the
t i htnes s or wrongness of procedures with in science but with the
g ,
question of the status of the knowledge which can be reached with

this s ort of procedur e .
H U ME S O B E CTIO J N
’
The best known attack ever mounted agai nst the neces s i ty of
conclusi ons reached inductively was that made by D avid Hume i n
the course of his quar rel with the pri nciple of causality Hume s .
1 ’
point may be ep itomized in thi s w a y : experi ence is always of

p arti culars and,
therefore i t is always at one remove from any
generalization that can be made about it What is given to us i s a.
stre a m of p ercep tual p ar ti culars No doubt they are linked in

.
certai n customary sequences but they are still given a s p articulars

,
.
When we try to raise ourselves to an entirely different level and
1 H ume S e lectio ns , pp 3 4—38

. .
( Fr om A Tr ea tis e of H uma n Na tur e ) .
decree as to how this sequence mus t appear we have dealt our ,
”
selves a n extra card Laws of nature pretend to be vali d for all
.
cases both observed and unobserved but where do we find the

,
—
a bs o lute warrant for thi s ? What makes us sure that the cases we
“
have not observed must be like the cases we have observed ? All
” “
unsupported objects fall to the ground All hydrogen combines ,
wi th oxygen to form water — are these really certa in pronounce

,
ments or only satisfyin g probabilities ?

Hume s poin t can be made especially striking by relating it to
’
“ ”
time For every law Of both common sense and science feels
.
itself to be a p ronouncement about the unobserved events of the

past and future as well as about Spatially remote and unobservable
,
events But as such accord ing to Hume it is proceeding on the

.
, ,
assumption that the future mus t res emble the p res ent and thi s ,
must remain forever an assumption What makes us so confident .
that it must be true ? Just because something has happened in a

certain manner in the past i s no guarantee that it will happen in
that manner forever afterwards Perhaps ten thousand years from .
now ( or ten seconds from now ) the law of gr avi ty will no longer
hold good Our mind boggles at the possibility— but who can
.
p rove that it ca n t be ? O r why shouldn t the behavior of bodies

’ ’
alter altogether s o that fire no longer burns pap er and hydrogen

, ,
and oxygen no longer combine to give water? We cannot appeal

to the past to p rove what will happen in the future .
Nor can we even say that in the p a st the future always resembled
the past for that o nly rep eats the issue Just because the past future
, .
resembled the past p ast how does that p rove that the futur e
,
future will resemble th e future past? Always involved here s a y s ,
Hume is an a s s ump tion No app eal to exp erience can ever justify
, .
the assumpti on for every appeal to experi ence t e—introduces the

,
“
assumption A pseudo gener alization such as the appeal to the

.
-
,
“ ”
uniformity of nature will not help either since thi s s imply hallows ,
as a fact the very pri nciple whose validity is at stake This i s the .
question : ho w can experi ence ever provi de the evidence for a

pronouncement about what is in principle beyond experi ence ( as
2 I2 Phi los op hy of Know led g e The
the kind of nature we call hydrogen or oxygen there will be ,
the typical activity proper to this nature .
Putting things in this way opens up the poss ibili ty of a cri terion
for a valid induction Whenever on the basis of Observation of
.
particular instances we may di scern that a certain featur e or a

,
certai n way of actin g belongs to the nature of which this particular

is an instance we may then induce that a ll i nstances possess ing
,
thi s nature will exhibi t this feature or this mode of acting For if .
,
it is founded in the nature of this being i t will be shared by all ,
who have the same nature Thus we may safely conclude by .

,
“ ”
incomplete induction that All men are risible ( even though we
have not observed all men ) since laughing is a property seen to
be grounded in the combined animal and rational nature of man .
We can s a y this it is felt of all possible past and future in stances

, ,
of this nature since it is a property of such a nature Such a state

, .
” “ ” ”
ment could not be made about white or short or strong
which are not necessarily connected with the essence rational
”
animal Wherever we can glimpse the connection between prop
.
erty a nd nature i n this way we may feel secure in our induction

, .
Yes but the trouble is that this simply tends to transp ose the
—
problem : how do we k now that a certain feature or action belongs

to the very natur e of a thing? In the case of man we may seem to
” “
have a privileged example but suppose we take the essence tiger
,
or
“
swan Is All tigers have stripes or NO swan s are green
.
” “ ” ” “
an ex ample of a valid induction and does it give us absolute cer

tain ty? This amounts to as king whether havi ng stripes is a ”
necess ar y property of the nature of tiger We might hesi tate a long .
while before saying s o— even though we may never have Observed

a non s trip ed tiger Supp ose an ofl spring were born to tiger parents
-
.
whi ch was completely non striped Most people would probably -

.
accord him the p rerogative Of ti gerhood in spi te of his deficiency .
“ ”
And couldn t there just possibly be green swan s ? Or would we
’
draw the line at that?

What i s at any rate clear is that we begi n to get into a rather
, ,
nebulous area once we pass beyond Obvious examples dr awn from .

Tho ug ht a nd E xp eri ence: 11 2 I3
man s ri sibility or tool making ability The criterion i s still the

’
-
.
same ( the necessary connection between feature and nature ) but

the Opportunity to apply it is only slight The trouble is that we .
”
have comparatively little insi ght i nto the nature of tigers swans , ,
horses water atoms or the whole panorama of non human

, , ,
-
enti ties and so very little capacity to judge what does or does not
,
comport with their nature It therefore seems that even on the

a ssu m
.
p hiloso p h i cal ption that there a re

p ermanent natures there ,
i s ample reason to believe that o ur inductive knowledge of them is

” “
extremely limited In the case of the physi cal laws whi ch are
.
based on these natures we must also stop short of clai mi ng an ,
unconditional necessity E ven if the uni verse is a system of per

.
manent natures ( which Hume overlooked ) the most th at thi s

would unconditionally warrant i s a certi tude as to the exi stence of
necessary laws and no t a certitude that our knowledge had formu
,
lated them i n any p articular i nstance It would seem that reasoning .
which i s i nductive in the usual sense a nd no thi ng more is going to

be confined to an approximate and probable conclus i on .
A YE R S TAU T OL O GY VIEW
’
To many minds there is a compar atively easy way out of this

puzzle about induction that along the lines s o luci dly exp ounded
,
by the logi cal p osi tivist A J Ayer Ayer s p osition s imply i s ,

. . .
2 ’
that as i de from definitions all truths about exp erience are cor ,
ri ible i n pri nci le and hence merely robable C onversely every

g p p .
,
truth which is not corrigible i n principle i s simply a definition and

hence tautologous Thus supp ose we a re p uzzling our heads over
.
,
the question of whether gold has to be yellow Ayer would simply .
sa
y that th i s i s a matter of the way we dec i de to us e words If we .
“ ”
i nclude as p art of our meaning for gold the quality of bei ng
“
y ello w it i s the clearest thing i n the world that All gold i s
yellow If we don t if we content ourselves with defining gold
.
’
,
2 Alf d Jul A y
re L gu g
es T th nd L g i ( New Y k : D
er , an e P ub
a e, ru a o c or ov r
li ca ti ons ) , md
. .
, pp 72
.
,
9 4—9 5 .
w ithout any reference at all to its color ( s a y by reference to i ts
atomic we ight and s tructure ) and if we are willing to let this be
what we mean by gold then there is no reasonin g at a ll which
,
would ever sufli ci ently establish that whatever fulfills this d efini
tion mus t unconditionally also be yellow E very time we discover .
that an instance of this defini tion is also yellow we ar e really ,
discovering something ; but because we are we c an not s a y that ,
this connection mus t hold good in every future case O ur assertion .
”
is corrigible — future experience may show that something can
“
have all the other properti es Of gold and yet not be yellow .
” “
So with green swans or non striped ti gers — to a s k whether
“ -
these things are p ossible i s just to ask whether you would be will
ing to call such things tigers or swans ; and to a s k thi s i s just to
as k how much you include in the de finition o f tiger or swan .
“ ”
Someone who roundly asserts that No swans are gr een is simply
declaring that he will not acknowledge that any green thing is a
swan O r suppose a chemi st came upon an element which gave all
.
the other reactions of hydrogen and yet stubbornly refused to

combine wi th oxygen into water In all l ikelihood he would at
.
,
length decide that thi s element could not be hydrogen but some
hi therto undi scovered element ; whi ch wo uld only indicate that he
mus t be able to say that All hydrogen combines with oxygen to
“
form water because otherwise he will not recognize it as

,
hydrogen .
But then a ll pretended i nductive generalizations are really d efi

“ ”
niti ons .All gold i s yellow would not be a statement about
exp erience but a statement about how I have deci ded to use words .
I include the prop erty of being yellow as a defining characteristic

of gold— and hence I can safely declare that all gold i s ellow If
y .
i t i sn t it is not what I mean by gold No experience can correct

’
, .
my statement s ince it is not a statement about experi ence In a .
” “
par allel way if I were to in vent a word bra ble to signi fy tables
,
“
” “ ”
whi ch are brown then the statement All br a bles are brown
,
is unconditionally true and no experience in the futur e can ever

,
contradict it or make me rescind it But it i s true because it is a

.
2I6 The Phi los op hy of Know led g e
Ayer wants to reduce all me a ni n g to what is available for the
senses ; but these meanings are not s o avai lable Scholasti c philos o .
h
p y ,
i n pressing for thei r non t a utologous necessity is-
really ,
holdi ng that we can know more than i s available in and for the
“
senses Thus the p rop osition E very event requ ires a cause i s not
.
a tautology but a statement about exp erience which necessarily

,
“ ”
holds good It i s not preci sely reached by inducti on in the usual
.
sense ; the universal meanin g is not the result of an extrapolation

of p a rticular observations but discovered wi th necessity in each
,
parti cular instance .
Here it seems a definite concession must be made to the op in

ion of those like Ayer Induction considered si mply as enumera
.
tion will app a rently never give necessi ty That i s the intelligibility .
,
which cons i sts in add ing up p articulars a nd n othi ng more is

excluded from the domain of necessity Where what appears to be .
enumerative i nduction leads to necessary conclusions it will turn ,
o ut that something more than th i s was involved T hus even in the .

,
“
ex ample All men laugh this is not a conclusion reached by the
, ,
extrap olation of a merely enumerative i nduction It is an i ns ight .
into the relation between rationali ty and ri sibili ty an insight for ,
which enumeration mi ght provide a favorable occasion but whi ch ,
is theoretically poss ible on the basis of a single case .
Wh at is usually called induction then i s really an amalgam of , ,
enumeration a n d i nsight Where the latter i s not possible where

.
—
“ ”
the meanings dealt with are too Op aque ( swans or tigers for “
, ,
example ) induction can never ri se beyond p robabili ty When we

—
.
ca n ri se be ond robab il i ty then some role must be allowed for

y p ,
insi ght That i s the p arti cular must be cap able of being the vehi cle
.
,
for a revelation which is at once exi stential an d intelligible Ayer .
would not admi t this but his reason for refusing to do s o i s the
,
verifia bili t
y p rinc ip le wh i ch ,tends to beg the whole question : if
we assume that this is the cri teri on for meaningful statements ,
then necessary statements about experi ence are of c ourse elim , ,
in a ted But why assume it?

.
C o uld we not go much further than the habitual reply of

Tho ug ht a nd E xp eri ence : 11 2I7
Scholastic p hilosophy , whi ch is usually confined to the meta p hys i

cal
p rincip les and certa i n large d i st i ncti ons between inani mate
things plants animals and men? There would seem to be a whole
, , ,
range of meani ng which we can kn ow i n a manner other than what

Ayer suggests His fundamental mistake is to equate knowing w ith
.
d efini ti on This app roach incli nes us too hastily to the beli ef that
.
a ll defin i tions have the same status I can de fine terms an w a I

.
y y
like and then whatever I go on to s a y on the basi s of these d efin i
,
tions i s irrep roachable— but not i nformative about exp e rience We .
tend to forget that the possibili ty would sti ll be op en that some of

our defini ti ons reach uni ties which exi st as such beyond our
thought even if others are merely verbal We forget this because
, .
the approach from the si de of defini tion turns us away from experi
en ce d real i t towards the attem t to e xpress it verbally If we
y p .
recognize that any definition is s imply an attempt to envelop s uc

ci nctl
y features wh i ch have been e xperienti ally encountered we ,
may think differently .
If we can k no w reali ty w i thout be ing able to define it then ,
some exp erience may provide a foundati on for necessary truth It .
surely seems accurate to s a y that we can know by acquai ntance

whole swathes of experience long before we can define them ( if
we ever can ) I know what it means in a sense to thin k exi st
.
, , , ,
will hope remember live rejoice admire disapprove and so

, , , , , , ,
” “
forth entirely apart from any defini tion And because I know
,
.
these thi ngs I know with necessi ty certai n truths about these
,
processes which are not tautologous Thus I may be said to know .
that Memory involves an i denti ty through time and I can d is

“
cover by laborious penetration Oi my direct ( but Obscure ) knowl

“
edge of rememberin g that Memory is not to be equated wi th
mechanical rep etiti on which is what Bergson did in one of the
,
most acute p hilosophical reflections ever carried out The first .
proposi tion I may know rather eas ily the second only after pro ,
found thought ; but in each case I know two thi ngs : there i s an
“
exi stenti al reality reached by my concept memory and the ,
ro
p p os i ti on I now enunc i ate i s neces s a r i ly true about this real i ty .
T his proposition is not a matter of definition and not a tautology .
It is an insight that has been reached by bringing into sharp focus

the intelligible components and consequences of a meaning usually
present in an obscure mann er .
“
I do not begi n with a definition of memory and then see
“ ”
what it contai ns I begin with the experience of memory and
.
,
a s I bri ng it into clearer focus I have the insight that the ex eri
, p
”
“
e nce I undergo i n remembering is an intelligible constellation
whose figure I can discern at least to some extent Likewise the .
,
“
b a sis for my apprehension Of the truth of the proposition Moral
values are not reducible to self interest or O ne man should not
” “
”
utilize a nother as a mere thing i s not the fact that I perceive that
the predicate is contained in the definition I have ass i gned to the
subject It is the fact that as my thought turns to the lived exP eri
.
e nti a l encounter with man or mora l value it is able to lay bare the ,
s trata of meaning contained in these experiences O ur thought .
reaches n ecessary insight in exp erience and about experi ence That .
this i s possi ble Ayer s theory notwi thstanding is attested only in

,
’
the doing of it .
V O N H IL D E B RAND AND
P H IL OSO P H ICAL INSIGH T
Probably no one has contri buted more to our understandi ng of

thi s point than ha s D ietri ch von Hildebrand in whose writin gs i t ,
is a main theme In keeping with the phenomenologic al school

.
4
from which he derives von Hildebrand stresses that all p hilo

,
”
s ophical thought must gr avitate around a given which i s embed
“ ”
ded in lived experi ence T his no tion of a given should not be
.
co nstrued as a dogmati c club to silence discussion The poi nt is .
o nly that reflective thought takes its rise from a fuller ex eri enti al
p
”
source and must be faithful to that source The given i s not .
“
necess ar ily what i s plainly available to everybody It may be a .
4 Di t i h
e r c n H ild b
vo nd Wh t i Phi l p hy ? ( Milw uk : B u )
e ra , a s os o a ee r ce ,
1 960, Cha p ter s IV, VII .

The
out that the insight into the necessary reference of moral values
”
to p ersons is really an ins ight It i s not p art of the definition of
.
moral value that it can e xi st only in persons The fact that I .
p sychologically encou n ter moral values in persons would not make
the proposition tautologous ; I discover aesthetic values in p ersons

too but they are also found in non personal be ings My real i zati on
,
-
.
of the essential and necessary connection between moral value and
person is a di scovery of the meaningful character of a special

dimensi on of being This is an exp eri entia l d i scovery since the
.
,
” “ ” “
meaning of justi ce moral value or love is not an arbitrary
,
construction but the grasp of something re a lly p resent as an intel

ligible unity i n experience These p roposi tions are indubitably
.
referenti al to a di mension of the re al But the interesting thing i s

.
that the reality to which they refer can yield up insi ghts i nto its
structure which are nei ther tautologous no r corrigible by futur e
experi ence .
Remember here that the discussion centers on the lived eu

counter with these realities and not on our concepts of them When .
“ ” ” “ “
we sp eak about moral values justi ce , generosi ty or , ,
“ ”
purity we are not speaking pri marily about the co ncep ts with
which we de al with these exp eri ences but about the exp eri ences ,
“ ” ”
themselves ; just as when we Sp eak of red or green we are
”
sp eaking of the encountered reality of colors Generosity and .
“
“ ” ” ”
p ur i ty are as d ifferent as red and green even though the i r ,
intelligible structure may be more complex A s our thought brings .
thi s intell igi ble structure i nto focus it i s able to enumerate truths
,
about i t in its unity which are just as eternally and necessarily

“ ”
true as the statement Red is not gr een The latter p rop osition .
is not a tautologous definition or a mere deci si on to us e words in

a certai n way but a statement about a non verbal facet of reality
,
-
.
”
In like manner the statement generos ity i s not p uri ty i s not a
“
,
tautology but an insight into a non verb al difference in exp eri ence
-
.
“ ” “ ”
The addi tional factor i s that generos ity p urity and simi lar
, ,
givens are complex uniti es and that they are intelligible a s complex .
” ”
Red and green do not yi eld up meani ngs readily due to thei r ,
Tho ug ht a nd E xp eri ence: II 22 1
e x treme simplici ty ; red is not green i s about as far as we can go

i n this case But the intelli gi ble complex i ty of love mo ral Value
.
, ,
generos ity p uri ty and s o forth is an extremely frui tful one : i t

, , ,
a llows not only the s i mple recogni ti on o f irreducible un itary dif "
ferences but the further necessary i ns ights p rovided by the pro

, ,
g r es s ive
p enetrat i on of this un i ty i n i t s com lex character
p
The fact that von Hildebrand speaks of these th ings as givens
“ ” “ ” ”
and stresses the objectivi ty of such essences and the eternal
character of the truth they underwrite may cause needless con
“ ”
fusion As we have seen the notion of a given should not be
.
,
understood in a rationali stic manner T hei r intell igibility is char .
a cteri zed by depth ; the are i nvitat i ons to ex lore further Nor
y p .
“ ”
does the fact that they make necessary i nsight p ossible mean
that once we delve them out of experience we can di sregard ,
experience thereafter and merely peer into their timeless structure

to comp rehend them further Someti mes von Hi ldebrand S p eaks
.
” “
as if this were the case but actually to p enetrate a given essence
,
of th i s sort is not to turn away from ex eri enc e but towards i t

p .
It is not unfai thful to von Hildebrand s pos i ti on to say that the

’
“ ”
given i s always not yet given or not quite given Surely it makes
- -
,
- -
.
” “
insights p ossible and surely it underwrites eternal truths which
,
we do not have to keep re verifying and whi ch are not subject to

-
correction But just as these insights are origi nally the products of
.
a close focus ing up on e xp erience s o their retention is a product ,
of a continu ing adhes i on to e x erience

p .
The meaning contained i n the concep ts of person justi ce or , ,
love i s not an acqui si tion snatched out of e xperi ence and wrapp ed
in mental cellop hane ; it is the intelli gible epiphany of a certai n
“ ”
mode of experi ence To explore these essences I must continu
.
ally rejoi n i n thought the exp eriences from whi ch their meaning
”
shines forth T his me a ning i s not given in the sense that I ca n
.
“
unfold its expli ci t content from the beginnin g ; i t i s given in the

sense that i t i s only wi th reference to i t that certain i nsights are
“
p oss i ble. For e x am le : even though the full meaning of
p love is
never available to me still such truths as that love entails b enevo
,
lence or that love is a value response o r that love is not reducibile
, ,
to an instinctual urge are eternally vouchsafed to me even in my

,
limited p enetration of thi s exp erience E ven so this does not mean .
,
“ ”
that once I see these truths I retai n them as permanent intel ,
“
lectual p roperty ; really to see them I must continually t e see ,
-
them I must dwell thought fully in the experiences in whi ch

— -
” “
t heir truth is mani fest The gi ven is not a permanently acquired
.
p remise from which I deduce consequences ; it is a mean i ng

emergent and clung to in actual exp erience As exp eri ential i t .
n evertheless generates unconditional certitude In this way it dif .
f ers from other e xp erientially encountered meanings which do not

warrant certitude .
5
-
A s has been p ointed out this vi ew p resupposes that there is ,
more i n experience than Ayer would acknowledge It a lso implies .
t hat there is much more in experi ence than Scholastic p hilosop hy
i s i n the habit of adverting to TOO often the latter rests content .
“
with the Nihil est formula and conceives experience in terms
of i t A few words are i n order here If thi s formula were really
. .
t aken li terally there would be nothing to di stin guish Scholasticism

,
f rom p u re sense empirici sm Now and then some Scholastics .
“
themselves fall i nto the groove of speaking as if the something
”
more in exp eri ence beyond the data given to sense are notions
like cause substance necessi ty and s o forth T his gives a quasi
, , ,
.
Kantian concept of exp erience which completely neglects the

abundance of meaning whi ch is nei ther sense datum nor a cate
gory of this sort For one thing the whole reality of personal
.
,
exi stence i s overlooked Willing rejo i ci ng lovi ng hoping resp ond

.
, , , ,
i ng admir ing envyin g and thei r o bjects are every b it as i rreducibly

, ,
“ ”
g i ven as are sense p hantasms St T homas stresses that we have . .
a dir ect knowledge of the soul through i ts activities ; we know that

i t exi sts even though we ma y know little of i ts whatness
” “
,
No .
”
d oubt a notion of soul i s a relat ively late intellectual arrival the ,
5 Sometimes v on H ild eb r a nd s
p ea ks in a r a ther ob ectified
j ma nner o f th i s
eid os
”
as i mp os i ng i ts elf on me ,
as i f i t w er e a n a te mp ora l ex terna l thi ng ,
b ut thi s ma nner of s peech i s t

not i n egra l to the d octri ne .
unfortunately just as surely true that i ts wording faci li tates thi s

,
mis i nterpretati on Some of the difficulty would be avoided if we

.
s imply understood the formula to mean that the prop ortionate

object of our thought is being as it is revealed through the senses .
This i s d i stinctly less excep ti onable though still unsati sfyi ng A c ,

.
tua lly the genuine residue of meaning i n the formula s eems to be
little more than the in si stence that my i ncarnate s ituati on is the

vehicle of my knowing and that i t colors and conditions all my
knowing Thi s is a fair enough statement but it could be put in a
.
,
manner less Op en to misinterpretati on It i s not true to s a y that all .
our knowledge of Spiritual reality i s indirect as the formula could ,
be taken to i mply Nothing i s closer to us than our interpersonal

.
exi stence and this is a spi ri tual mode of e xi stence O f course if .

,
on e wants to emphas i ze that it is the sp ir itu al mode of exi stence
of an i ncarnate being that i s unobjectionable ; we h ave no direct

,
awareness of the mode of existence p roper to dis incarnate spiri ts .
Yet then the statement that we know prop erly and prop ortionately
”
the essences of materi al thi ngs wi dens to mean that we know
“
p ers o n s best— which is rather far from its original i m licati on

p .
We now stipulate that a p erson i s the essence of a materi al thing :

a highly unillumin ating manner of speaking .
The last i nterpretati on i s suggested by T homi sti c p hilosop hers

who wish to preserve the exp eri enti al orientation of Thomism and
yet bri ng it into a lignment wi th the clear truth of exp eri ence Thus .
de Fi nance prop oses that what our intellect i s pri marily ordered to
“ ”
is not just the essence of material things but other p ers ons . ,
6
It would seem just as legi ti mate a procedure to stop using the

formula O nce we us e it we are stuck with it For once having
.
, .
employed the formula we are imp elled to try to squeeze all experi
enti a l data in to this mold T he atti tude i nh erent i n i t i s what led
.
“
A ri stotle to try to underst a nd man in terms of a material thing ,
albei t a material thing of a speci al kind It is a thankless task to .
try to understand how we can rightly rep resent a person beauty , ,
6 Jos e
p h d F i n n SeI B i ng nad Sub j t
ce,i i ty .t a n s by W No ei s a ec v , r . . rr
Cl k S J C
ar e, . . Cu
, nt VI 1 63 17 8; e p 169
r os s rre s, — s e . .
Thoug ht a nd E xp eri ence : II 225
justice number generosi ty VTI law charm history ambi tion

, , , , , , , ,
“
and a mill ion other reali ties as the essence of a material thing .
”
NO doubt the one who holds thi s formula goes o n to ackn owledge
that we can h a ve an i nadequate grasp of a ll being ; but this
acknowledgment i s consi derably quali fied when we realize that he
ordinarily means by thi s s imply that we can grasp reality according
to the very general principles made possible by the concep t of
being The re a l point is however that we can have an immediate
.
, ,
experienti al contact with reali ties whi ch are not sense data and not
usefully understood from the side of sense data .
There is very l i ttle doubt that Thomi stic philosop hy i mplici tly
recogn izes this truth but its habi tual terminological dependence
,
“ ”
o n a d eli neati on of exper i ence as hantasms on the one hand
p
and generali zed intellectual concepts on the other imp ai rs thi s
recognition Historically there i s no doubt that it has not exploited
.
this recognition If a constri cting vocabulary or formul as with very

.
limited usefulness stan d in the way of a p hilosophical appreciation

of e xpe ri en ce it would seem the course Of wisdom to relinqu i sh
,
them and move on .

EX ISTEN TIAL TR U TH
ON TH E NATURE OF E VID E NCE

We have already met the fairly standard definition of truth as
the confo rm i ty between mind and reali ty In this relationship of
.
conformi ty it is natural to think of reality as having the initiative

,
.
Thi s i s what the concepti on of e vidence likewi se suggests : reality

“ ”
imposes itself upon me and in the presence of the evidence I

, ,
submit In submitting I confirm to what i s and thus my judgment

.
,
-
,
may be denominated tr ue There is not the sli ghtest question that

.
this way of conceiving thi ngs has a permanent vali dity but the ,
m a nner in whi ch we sp ontaneously express i t may be both highly

questionable and highly mi sleading Impli ed in it is what might be
.
“ ”
c alled a billbo a rd theory of evi dence It is as if the m ind stands
.
off and reads e vi dence whi ch is osted before it and then the
p ,
assent is inevitably forthcoming The problem of error then be

.
comes that of comprehending how anyone could fail to read evi

dence posted plainly on the bi llboard of reality .
T here can be l i ttle doubt that there is Op erative in this concep

tion Of things another in stance of o ur succumb ing to the intellec
tu a l temptation which Bergson ha s called irrevocably to the atten
tion of philosophers the temptation of substi tuting a mental
—
scheme or image for the reality which we are trying to compre

hend O ur thought has an habitual rel i ance on the i magination
.
,
and the imagination i s prim arily a faculty of sp atial representation .
If we try to deal by means of Sp atial imagery wi th a reali ty whi ch

i s essentially non sp ati al d i fii culty is bound to arise That appears
-
, .
to be what happens i n the case of the familiar conception of the

The
we had not adverted to this And we are better off even though we
.
ma y go right on using the image Philosophical reflection often

.
a mounts to thi s go i ng beyond a disto rt i ng image ry What we find .
when we thus go beyond may be relatively less communi cable

than what preceded it but it is nearer to the adequation of thought
,
with reality .
Th i s bri ef ex cursus on the nature of evidence should be useful

as a reliminary to the present chapter for i t br i ngs out what
p ,
mi ght be c alled the unstable structure of evidence Paradoxically

“ ”
.
,
i t m i ght be s ai d that the s tatus of evi dence i s not e nti rely evident .
Modern existential thought can be interpreted as an attempt to

exp loit thi s realization in one imp ortant directi on It begins on .
grounds not unli ke those explained above For the juxtapos i tion of .
mind and evi dence i s conceived in one famil i ar form as the juxta
, ,
p os i ti on Of subject and Object Knowledge i t i s said cons i sts in a

.
, ,
judgment which a subject makes about an object Almost i mmed i .
ately ( through thi s Sp a ti a liz ing tendency ) there ari ses i n our mind
the concep ti on of a subj ect standing off an d characteri zing an
object whi ch i s j ux taposed to his subjectivity and his thought The .
i mpli cati o n i n th i s ( whi ch often passes unnoti ced but whi ch is all ,
the more influential for being unn oticed ) i s that subjectivity is

irrelevant to truth If the object i s juxtap osed to my thought if the
.
,
evi dence i s p osted out there then the only function of the subject
,
i s to be a p ure vi ewer of this object A pure viewer however i s

.
, ,
One i n whom all the irn ed iments to viewing have been removed
p
and whose gaze is turned pelluci dly to what he vi ews But the .
i mpedi ments to v i ewi ng are not from the si de of the Object which ,
S imply ofiers i tself to View They are from the si de of my s ubjec

.
ti vity Perfect knowledge would then consist in the reducti on of

.
, ,
the subject to a c ip her : a perfectly tran sparent eye open i ng on a
world of objecti ve evi dence .
Some thi ng like th i s i s what E dmund Husserl the founder of ,
phenomenology declared to be the ideal of knowledge If aware

,
.
ness i s other than its object then p ure awareness i s purely other
“
than its object ; and p henomenology aimed at the delineation of

”
these essence s or evi denti al structures which o ff ered themselves
“
E xis tentia l Tr uth 229
to the view Of a subject w hich conscientiously red uced his own

contribution to nullity and converted himself into a pure viewer ,
“ ”
or what Husserl called a transcendental subject 1
.
Actually Husserl can be regarded a s simply extrapolating and

,
making expli ci t an atti tude whi ch i s exceedingly common E veryone .
is famili ar with the Shi bboleth that if we Want to get at truth we ,
“ ”
must be obj ective i n o ur inquiry ; we must not let personal
p rejud i ce p
, ass i on interest ,
o r emotion swa
y our
, judgment but ,
s ee things as they really are A arently then the knower who

pp .
, ,
sees things as th ey really are is the one who eliminates from his
scruti ny every intrudi ng element of subj ectivity whi ch could mar
and di stort his vision O n thi s bas is the knower who reaches
.
,
“
objectivi ty is the characterless cipher subject It should not pass -
.
unnoticed how clearly thi s rather stran ge conclusi on i s linked to

the concep tion of knowing as vi ew ing If knowledge c an not be .
adequately seen in terms of this analogy then there is from the ,
star t something wrong with the reasoni ng whi ch po ses the question
in terms of it .
There is no denying that thi s conception of things has a genui ne

basis i n our knowledge We do experience knowing as an uncond i
.
tional d esire to explain w hat is I do not want to be trapped by .
wi shful thinking ; I want to know reali ty just as it is in i tself ,
regardless of my ow n wi shes Furthermore I recognize thi s desire

.
,
as one of the things that is best and nobles t in me thi s desire to ,
”
sa
y y
“
ea come what may E ven if the truth hurts
. even if i t ,
crushes me I want to know it I experience my judgment as thi s

,
.
aspiration to leave its object untouched to abdi cate completely ,
before what is affirmed Unless my knowledge reaches the real

.
ex actly as it i s in i tself unless the act of judgi ng makes no differ

,
ence whatsoever to what i s judged then i t i s not knowledge at all ,

.
Co gn i ti vely I am thi s aspi ration towards p ure transcendental

, ,
subjectivi ty thi s abnegation in the face of the evi dence There i s

,
.
See E d mund H us s erl, Id ea s p 14 It i s i nteres ti ng to ob s erve tha t ulti

1
, . .
’
j
ma tely H us serl s s ub ect ma na ges to b e not s uch a cip her a fter a ll s i nce i t ,
j
emer ges a s th e cons ti tuter o f the o b ecti v e p a nora ma w hi ch, a s p ure n ow er , k
i t b ehold s .
not the slightest doubt of this And yet And yet the question
. .
of truth also conta ins the question of the origin of e vidence I

“
want to submit to what is there But how comes it that there i s .
anything there ? E vidence i s the way reality is p resent to my

thought But why is reality present in the way in which it i s ?
.
C ogni tively my judgment is an assent to the given But why is

,
.
there anything given ? This is a rather crucial sort of question and ,
it is the sort of question whi ch the existentialist will as k E ven if .
I were to agree that my cognitional i deal would be to convert

myself into a transcendental subject for whom there was a pure
v i sion of reality as evi denti ally present there would still re main ,
the question of what subject carries out this conversion A s an .
existing human being I may be a pursui t of the i de al of pure

,
cogn ti onal meaning but I am not the achievement of it The tran

i
, .
s cend enta l subject remains for me an ideal wh i ch pro els my r e

p
flecti on ; but my reflection i s the work of an e xi sting subject .
2
Furthermore thi s trans cendental vi ewing would have to be

,
conceived of as p urely p a s s i ve : a pure abnegation before what i s -

.
The trouble is that for a p urely passi ve consciousness there seems

_
no reason to think that there would be anythi ng present at a ll .
The only reason that there is anythi ng present to hum an con

sci ous nes s is that from another standpoint I am no t a pure
, ,
viewer but an acting existin g being My re ality as existent i s the

, , .
s ource for the given whi ch i s there for me as kn ower Fi rst I exi st .
,
then I know All cogni ti on al consciousness then occurs against a

.
, ,
pre cogni tional or extra co gni tional background T herefore even

- -
.
,
if as knower I want to a fli rm objective evidence ( the w a y reality

; ,
is present ) my mode o f e xi sting has a hand in de termining the

way reality i s present Subjectivity cannot be consi dered ir relevant
.
to truth for subjectivi ty is not irrelevant to evidence Thus the

, .
,
central existentialis t contention may be summed up in this way

2 It w ould s ee m tha t the tr a ns cend enta l s ub ectj mus t be cons i d ered a s
either : 1 ) A ctua lly con s tituti ve a nd therefore s u remely a cti v e a s a s ort
,
p ,
of a b s olute s elf 2 ) P ur ely for ma l a mer e n a me

.
, fo r the s tr ucture of certa i n
as
pe cts pres ent to cons ci ous nes s as w i th K a nt, a nd p erha p s too H us s erl
, , , .
3 ) P ur ely i d ea l, th e ultima te term of a n i d ea lly rea liz ed refl ecti on .

reason The development of this theme by Kierkegaard resulted
.
from his violent reaction to the rati onalism of Hegel Hegel had .
5
conceived of reality as through and through rational : logic was the

static form Of rati onali ty and hi story its dynami c unfoldi ng ,
.
Time and h i story are then the outward manifestati ons of a , ,
rationali ty in whi ch human thought also participates The Sign of .
rati onality is system s i nce to understand is to s ee things as

,
a r ti cula ted w ho les Then man s reason progresses towards expli ci t

’
.
,
understand ing in s o far as i t p rogresses towards a comprehensive

conceptual system Kierkegaard seems to have felt that Hegel t e
.
garded this conceptual adequacy as self enf orcing : that i s gi ven -

,
the rationality of a system of co ncep ts the assent to its truth would ,
be automati cally forthcomi ng Human reason was simply a phase .
or moment in the coming to—explicit rationality of the Absolute - -
Idea and hence for ma n to form adequate concepts was the same
thi ng as a fii rming thei r appli cation to reality That the A bsolute .
exists and has ente red in to history were two truths which Hegel
thought could be validated s imply by exhibiting the fact that an
adequately rational system in co rporated them .
Against thi s Optimi sm Kierkegaard ch a mpi oned the Vi ew that

,
concep tual adequacy woul d never be enough to enforce as sent in

man Man is not jus t reas on he is exis ti ng reas on His existence
.
, .
6
ins erts a wedge between his thought and the Idea His existence .
estranges him from reas on ; at leas t it means he is not just reason , .
His existing through time i s not just a stretching out of a timeless

abstracti on it is an i rreducibly unique di mension One idea may
, .
“ ” “ ”
necessarily imply another ; two p remi ses may necessarily i mply
a conclusi on ; but no i deas and no premises necess a ri ly imply man s ’
automatic assent There is a gap between existence and re as on

. .
Reason can not close this ga p because reason is always the reason
At le t w e m y pea k f the ti n li m o f Ki k g
’
5 as a s d H g l o ra o a s er e aar s e e ,
a
v i on f th mas t w hi h m ny H g li n w uld n t
er s o e er
gnic a e e a s o o reco ze .
6 On thi s , s ee A K i er k eg a a r d A n tho log y , ed i t . b y Rob ert B reta ll ( Pri nce

ton : P r i nceton U ni ver s i ty P res s ) , 1 947 , pp . 20 1- 2 07 This p a s s a ge i s fr om
.
C o nclud i ng Uns ci en tific P o s ts cr ip t All . references to Ki er k e a a rd

g w i ll b e
to thi s conv eni ent ed i ti o n .
E xis tentia l Tr uth 2 33
of an existing being Man i s not a syllogism nor a moment in a .

,
self articulating s ystem Th ere can be a system of abstracti ons but

-
.
,
there i s no system of exi stence Man exists and hi s existence .

,
places him in an extr a concep tual order where the validiti es of -
concepts are not dec i sive Only abstractions are airtight but a b .
,
s tr a cti on s do not ap l to ex i stence and to the thought which “
py
thinks exi stence A S an exi stent I am not the embodiment of an
.
abstraction or of a r easoning p rocess Therefore when I try to

t -
.
,
think exi stence no concep tual process can be automatically vali

,
dating for me .
Kierkegaard cons i dered Socrates to be an e xemplary rep resenta

tive of thi s insi ght and the doctrine of remini scence to be his
,
expression of it For stripp ed of i ts mythic al accoutrements what

.
7
, ,
the doctrine Of remi n i scence s i gnifies is that man both does and
does not belong to the truth He i s exi sti ng reason A s reason he .

-
.
,
p ar tic i pates in the truth ; as existing , he is se p arated from the truth .
If he w ere totally estranged from the truth if he were in no sense

'
already a ttached to it he would not even be able to seek it; if he ,
were totally co inci dent wi th it he w ould have no need to seek it ,

'
Furthermore when he does seek i t when he does strive to

, ,
“
assimilate into his exi stence the i ntelligibility whi ch he remem
”
bers he never succeeds in achievi ng a p erfect co inci dence with
,
that i ntelli gibili ty H i s philosop hi cal inqui ry cannot be conceived

.
as a search for self—val idating arguments We may building up on .

,
Kierkegaard i llustrate th i s by means of Socrates arguments for

’
the immortality of the soul as given i n the Pha ed o Not even to ,

.
Socrates d o these arguments have the character of self enforci ng -
processes ; there i s always Something left over s ome ga p between ,
evi dence and assent But Socrates fills i n this ga p from the s i de of
.
“ ”
hi s own exi stence He does not feel the objecti ve uncertai nty as
.
a factor against the arguments It i s almost as if it were part of .
the evi dence a n intimation of the abyss of exi stence whi ch i s the
,
source for our hOp e of i mmortali ty These arguments for the .
7
I b id T h i
1 5 5— 157 a e i s fr o m Ph i los op hi ca l F r a g me n ts Cf
, pp . . s p a ss g .
. .
—2 1 7 C l d i U i n tific Pos ts cr ip t )
a ls o
pp 2 1 0.
( o nc u n g n s c e .
i mmortality the soul are not processes whi ch could be gi ven to
of
an abstract thinker for the evidence upon which they rest i s a

,
.
function of th e exigence or demand of the exi sting consciousness

for whom they arise Socrates ow n hopeful confidence has a hand
’
.
in constituting the evi dence upon the basis of which he i s able to

“
sa
y yea to these arguments .
Actually there is no a rgument for imm ortali ty which could be

constructed in such a way that the subj ectivity of the arguer would
not be implicated For thi s argument is spoken directly to the
.
“
exi sting subject H is assent to the immortali ty of the soul i s not
.
deta chable from the a fli rma tion Yea I will live forever The ”
,
.
argument for immortality is a translation into cogni tional terms of

the exp erience of oneself a s s p iri t A man cannot a fli r m himself as
.
Spi rit a bs tra ctly but only a s a free s i ngular subject What Socrates
, , .
attempts to do in these arguments is to bring b efore his eyes the

rationale of hi s whole life the ration ale of his existence O nly for
, .
Socrates or for one who lives as Socrates do these proofs contain

, ,
”
evidence Only because as existent his life is pervaded by a
.
, ,
trans cendent appeal can he give co gni ti ve expression to the evi

,
dence for immortality O ne who lived hi s life otherwis e would have

.
”
no such evi dence available to him A man at Kierkegaard s so .
’
”
called aesthetic stage of exi stence whose li fe w as dissipated into ,
a seri es of transitory sensations would not be able to see the

,
evidence requ i site for these arguments For the element of depth .
which characteriz ed Socrates existence i s a component of the

’
evidence whi ch w a s there for his knowledge It i s implicated in .
“ ”
the gi ven which reflection discovers It therefore cuts across the .
simpli sti c dichotomy between subject and Object in know ledge .
This evi dence may be an unqualified revelati on of reali ty but it i s ,
a revelation which is only there for an existing subject a nd not for

a neutral observer .
Ki erkegaard hi mself may be accused of s lighting the truly cog

n i ti o na l character of thi s ki nd of revelation and of treati ng it too
“ ” “
much like faith i n the stri cter sense We will call it existential .
236 Phi los op hy of Knowled g e The
could be carried still further If certain truths emerge by being .
i ncorporated into my existence then it may not be amiss to s a y ,
I a m these truths We may then d i stinguish in the fashi on of

.
Gabri el Marcel between truths which I have and truths which I

am It is to Marcel that we will next turn for a further explication
.
of the notion of existential truth .
MARC E L : P ROB LE M A ND MY STE RY

Marcel s thought does not in any sense derive from Kierke
’
g a a rd s and therefore
’
,
an
y simi lar i ties between them should n ot
be put down to a genealogic al relati on ; if anything they serve to ,
in di cate that there is someth ing authentic in the thought of each .
Marcel s views are most p rofitably explored from the standp oi nt

’
“ ”
of his already class i cal d i stinction between a problem and a
“ ”
mystery a distinction peculi a rly well suited to epistemologi cal
,
presentation .
10
The differences between problem and mystery are manifold but ,
all have their root in Marcel s vi ew of the typ e of datum to which ’
each questi on is d irected A p roblem i s an inqui ry whi ch is initiated .
“
in resp ect to an object i n Marcel s semi technical us e of that ,
’
-
term E tymologically an O b ject is something whi ch is thrown in

.
,
-
front of me someth ing which I encounter as e xternal to me and

,
over against me In an objective s ituation I am here and the

.
,
Object is there complete and Op en for i nspection For the reason

, .
that I meet the Object a s j uxtaposed to myself an d as not involving

10
G r a teful k
a c now led
g ment is m a d e
m U ni v ers i ty P res s for to Fo
r d ha
m i s s i on to r e r i nt the follow i n g s ev er a l a es w hi ch com r i s e a rt o f

p er
p p g p p
C ha p ter III of the a utho r s The Phi los op hy o f G a br i e l Ma rcel ( New Yor k
’
F or d ha m Uni vers i ty Pres s ) 1962 F or Ma rcel s s ca ttered trea tment o f thi s

, .
’
j
s ub ect, s ee B e i ng a nd H a v ing , tra n s . by K a ther i ne F a rrer ( B os to n : B ea con
Press ) , 195 1, p l oos s , l l 7s s , 1 2 6s s ; The My s tery o f B e i ng , vol I, p
. . . . . .
2 o4s s ; a nd the entire tex t of the e s s a y O n the O ntolo gi ca l My s ter y, p ub

“
“
li s hed i n The P hi los o p hy o f E x is tentia lis m ( New o r : C i ta d el Pr es s ) , Y k

1 96 1 .
Exis tentia l Tr uth 23 7
myself I can envelop it in a clear and di stinct idea which deline

,
ates i ts l imits Wi th this clarity comes p erfect transmittability and

.
,
with the transmi ttab ility the object begins to lead that p ubli c and
independent life which is the p rivilege of the world of the p rob “
lema ti c Marcel does not fail to notice the p eculiar co inci dence
.
“
that the Greek roots of the word problem are p erfectly cor
respondent to the Latin roots of object : a pro blema is some ”
-
thing whi ch is thrown in my path something whi ch is met along,
A problem then is an inqu i ry which is s et on foot in respect

, ,
to an object which the self app rehends i n an exterior way Such .
would be a problem in algebra or the p roblem a mechanic faces

,
i n fix in g an automobi le The engine and the man are two quite

.
i solable entities ; the engi ne is something complete and enti re out

s i de of him which he may literally i nspect from all si des Not
, .
eve ry object naturally presents a spatial externality of thi s sort

, , ,
but the problemati c datum i s always rega rd ed as juxtaposed con ,
verted as it were into a possessed thing Thus the attempt to

, ,
.
,
solve the equation 2x 3x 2 would be a p roblemati c i nquiry

2
even though the elements are essentially mental rather than sp ati a l .
The p oint is that the data as p resented do not i nclude myself ; i n

conceivi ng the numbers I do not conce i ve myself : I retreat from
,
them and regard them i ntently as posed i n front of me The area .
of the roblematic covers a w i de range of human knowledge The

p .
mechanic and the mathematician may stand p erhaps as typ es of , ,
the domination of nature whi ch the p roblemati c knowledge of

science m a kes p ossible Science embodi es the ultimate achievement
.
of
p roblemat i c knowledge From the theor i sts of cybernetics to the
.
researcher pursui ng the links between cigarette smoking and can -
cer science i s uniformly the application of the mind to an o bject

'
in Marcel s stri ct sense of thi s word But it is not only science

’
.
which fulfills the notion of a problem A bored student doi ng a .
“
crossword p uzzle in class a reader frown ing over a whoduni t a
, ,
clerk consulting an orderly Ofii ce file all are engaged in solving ,

The
problems In each case the data of the questions are such that I
.
,
ca n e ffectively di vorce myself from them and concentrate upon
them as manipulable external objects .
A mystery on the other hand i s a question i n which what is

, ,
gi ven cannot be regarded as detached from the self There are .
data whi ch in their very natur e cannot be set over against myself ,
for the reason that as data they involve myself If I ask What i s .
”
being? can I regard being as an object which i s thrown across
my p ath ? No for being as datum includes me ; i n order to con
, , ,
cei ve being as a datum I must conceive it as including me I

, .
cannot get outs i de of being i n order to ask questi ons about it in

a purely external way The attemp t to isolate what is before me
.
fro m what is in me breaks down completely here Being then is .

, ,
not a problem at all but a mystery If I deci de to treat i t as a

, .
problem to stand on all fours with it and approach it as just one

,
-
more manipulatable Object I no longer have hold of my original

,
questi on A mystery i s a question in which I am caught up In the

. .
area of the p roblemati c the status of the questioner is completely

,
prescinded from and only the object i s called i nto ques tion But if
, .
”
I ask What is being? the question recoils up on my own status as
“
a questioner Who am I who question being? A m I? A t thi s point

.
“ ”
the problem of being i mpinges up on the intri nsic conditi ons of
its ow n poss ibil ity and becomes the mystery of being For the .
condition of a problemati c research is that the subject wear the

regalia of unquestionabili ty and i t i s o nly th is p rivilege which
,
qualifies him to render the object totally intelligible But to ques .
“ ”
tion bei ng is to questi on myself as questioner That is thi s being .
,
at which I would like to di rect questions is not an Object gi ven to

a non Obscure subject which may direct all its uncertainty outward ;
-
for here in questioning the Object I call myself into question

, .
Being is not an object I can insp ect from a ll si des If I were to .
have a clear a nd di stinct notion of being I would be completely ,
an object for myself ( since being envelops me and in order to ,
objectify being I would have to objectify myself ) But I cannot .
objectify myself ; I cannot observe myself fro m the outsi de The .

may mention others My body in s o far as it is mine cannot be

.
.
adequately rendered in problematic categories ; the body which the

physiologi st studi es is an Objective structure available for an oh
server but the body as mi ne S imply is not accessible in this man
,
ner In fact my s itua tion as a whole is non objecti fia ble a nd

.
,
-
refuses to be reduced to a problem I cannot pass judgment on .
the world as if I am a spectator ; every judgment on the world as

a whole is passed on my world since I qualify it through my
parti cipati on A gain su ffering and evi l only a r e what they are
.
,
inasmuch as they i nvolve me ; looked at from the outside evil ,
seems the mere malfunctioning of a mechanism that i s to say it —

,
i s not seen as evi l at all So too with love and with knowledge
. .
We will s ee at greater length in the next chapter that the co

presence of love cannot be regarded as the juxtap osition of two
objects In effect We have already seen in the refutation of
.
”
,
“
sceptici sm that knowledge is a mystery : if I ask what is kn owl
”
edge ? I can in no sense get outsi de my ow n knowi ng in order to
describe it in an exterior way The act through which I would like
.
to objectify knowledge i n order to study i t is already an act of

knowledge So i t is app arently with most truly philosophical
.
, ,
questions They bear on non objectifia ble data realities which it i s

.
-
,
forever i mpossible to e xternal ize Freedom time sp ace sensation .

, , ,
all seem to fall under th i s classi fication .
The second characteristic of a problem derives immediately

fro m the first A problem admits of a s oluti on By use of the
. .
“ ”
prop er techni ques a period can be put to our inqui ries Wi th
, .
dili gence ( expended at the p rop er hour ly compensation ) the

mechanic will eventually put his finger on the defective part of
” “
the engine and declare confidently : There is your trouble In .
the algebraic problem the inqui rer may by suitable manipulations

, , ,
reach the ready conclusion that x 2 At that p oint the problem .

,
is fini shed over and d one wi th Final results have been attained
,
.
and further thought i s unnecessary The possibility of a solution .
i s directly linked to the Objectified nature of the datum ; because

the datum is isolable it is subject to being circumscribed and
,
di ssected by one who ha s the necessary skill Its solvabili ty i s not .

E xis tentia l Truth 24I
what makes it a problem ; but because it i s a problem it is solvable , .
“
A nd because it is a p roblem the notion of a result app li es to i t
,
”
i n the s trictest sense The noti on of a technique is stri ctl cor

“ ”
.
y
relative to thi s kind of definitive result and that is why the ,
”
p roblematic can provide the arena for the exp ert the man who ,
“ ”
knows how who has mastery of a style of techniques fitted to
-
,
w rest results from objects whi ch he has at hi s mental di spos al .
“ ”
But the notion of a result cannot be appli ed i n thi s sens e to
the region of mystery Here i t is not p ossible to reach the point
.
“
where I can s a y That is done with the point at which fur ther,
thought i s unnecessary There i s no Q E D in a mystery What is

. . . . .
b eing? What is freedom ? What is the self ? These questions cease

lessly renew themselves They are not susceptible of a solution in
.
a s ens e univocal with that of a problem O n the contrary there i s

'
.
,
the prevailing impressi on of an i nexhaustible profundity of depths ,
which no amount of thought can ever fathom The best that we .
can do is to locate ourselves wi thin the mystery but thi s can ,
har dly be sai d to constitute a solution .
The thir d characteri stic of a p roblem is based upon the fact that
a n Object is conceived of as indifferent to me ; i t i s s i mply there
“ ”
for anyone .Because thi s i s s o it follows that the self as con
,
scious of an object i s just anyone a n anonymous impersonal —
mind for which any other mind might just as well be substituted .
The object is what is thrown in front of a purely logico sensory -
subject A s a logi co sensory subject I am perfectly i nterchange

.
-
able wi th anyone else : I share the neutrali ty of the object itself .
But since the mystery involves my singular self then I c a nnot ,
prescind from that self in p ursuing i t The datum about whi ch I .
rai se the questi on includes my S ingulari ty and hence the process ,
by whi ch I explore the datum includes my Singulari ty .
T RA NSCEND ENCE AND P RO O F

Now the rep ercuss ions of Marcel s distinction are man ifold but
’
i ts s i gnificance for ep i stemology can be appreci ated by con een

“
tr a ti ng on i ts conse quences fo r the noti on of evi dence We have .
The
seen that as this noti on is usually presented it presumes some kind

o f d i chotomy between subject and object If however there is a .
, ,
kind of evi dence which transcends this dichotomy whi ch is in ,
fact only available in so far as this dichotomy is transc ended the ,
consequences are drastic indeed NO longer can we visuali ze the

.
“ ”
knower as an autonomous subject in the face of or merely
evaluatin g evidence The knower of mystery is not a sp ectator
.
but a p articipator : s ome evi dence is only available to the partici

pant and not to the neutral observer As exi sting subject I am
.
,
essenti ally be ing by—particip ation I am founded by thi s participa

-
.
tion and I have no priority to the participation in terms of

,
which I can require it to p resent its credentials The participation .
is the foundation for my subjectivity ; my kn owledge i s p osterior

to p articip ation T herefore there is no way in which my knowl
.
,
edge can evaluate the parti cipation in a purely ex teri or way since ,
it i s not available for ins p ection in thi s way If evidence i s the .
ground of cognition still p articipation is the ground of evi dence

,
.
In the region of mystery what my thought doe s is to try to

recover and express a p ar ticipation which is there prior to
thought The thought which attempts this expression must do s o
.
by returning to the p arti cip ation itself Thi s means that W e ar e

.
“ ”
not dealing with a proof in the ordinary connotation of that
“ ”
word It means that the sort of proof which is typi cal i n the
.
area of p roblem cannot be transferred to the region of mystery

and so cannot be regarded as the norm for all reasoni ng In a .
problem we c a n demonstrate ; in a mystery we can only mon

”
strate A typical example of this ha s already been cited in the
.
case of Socrates arguments for the immortality of the soul To

’
.
”
p rove the i mmort a lit
y of the soul does not cons i st in demon
“ ”
s tr a ting that a certain property belongs to one class of object
it consists i n showing o r mons tra ting that a certain mode of
“ ”
existing Opens beyond the phenomen a l T hat this is true can only
.
be comprehended by a kn ower who in habits thi s mode of existing .
A n even more obvious ex ample is the questi on of the e xistence

of God The tradi tional attempts to p rove the ex i stence O f God
.
The
Sometimes the impression is given that we argue syllogi stically

to the existence of God ; but obvi ously the notion of being cannot
function in the same way in a syllogi sm as can a li mi ted concep t
Thomi s ti ca lly stated it i s a transcendental idea ( it includes
,
everythi ng and every difference between every thing ) and hence

,
Sp ans the di stincti on between subject and p redicate and is pres ,
ent in all terms of the syllogism But not only that the genuin e
.
,
notion of being also Sp ans the di chotomy between subject and

Object Hence i ts meaning i s not available i n a p urely Objectified
.
way If I want to know what I mean by being I cannot p rescind

.
,
“
from my own subjectivi ty for then I have a p seudo notion be
,
-
,
”
i ng as Object O n the bas i s of this pseudo —noti on no argument
.
,
for the e xistence of God i s poss i ble O nl y a genuine noti on of .
being will p rovide the approach to this proof And such a gen .
ui ne notion must i nclud e my own existence .
It would be perfectly possible for me to fulfil all the require

ments Of a phenomenal community of knowing subjects wi thout
encountering the evi dence for an authenti c noti on of being As a .
member of such a community I require merely orderly sense

,
p erce p t i on and the app aratus of logi cal thought ; I could not claim
”
rationality in the ordinary sense wi thout thi s endowment But log .
ical thought a s s uch does not provi de me with the genui ne notion
of being Logical thought i s the mode by whi ch a subject charac
.
terizes an object But bei ng i s not an Object That i s why it i s easy

. .
”
enough for a knower who is rational in the ordinary sense to
“
fail to gi ve meaning to the arguments for or assertions Of God s ’
“ ”
existence O rdinary rational ity i s a soci al prop erty It does not
. .
o f i tself reveal to us the trans temporal abyss conta ined i n the

-
noti on of being R ather the opp osi te O ne who i s accustomed to

. .
have hi s attention turned in the directi on of the phenomenal

servi ceabili ty of thought will treat as s imply vacuous any thought
whi ch cannot justify i tself in these terms The real then becomes .
i dentified wi th the p ubli cly veri fiable T hi s i s what happ ens in .
the case of the logi cal p osi tivi sts for whom any questi on of a
,
“ ”
truth whi ch surpasses the phenomenal and verifiable is s irnply
E xis tentia l Truth 245
meani ngless The existence of God ( among other things ) surely

.
cannot be verified in thi s manner and hence the assertion of ,
God s existence becomes meaningless

’
.
Now how do we rise to the affi rmation that there is such a

thing a s truth beyond the verifiable ? It must be by contact with
the potentially infinite intelli gibility contained in the noti on of
being Thi s i ntelli gibili ty however is available only as including
.
, ,
me i n my unique singularity A notion of being which lea ves o ut .
subjectivity will as de Finance has po inted out deteri orate into

, ,
12
a pure Kantian form an empty concept whi ch could never serve , ,
as a po int of departure for an argument for God .
When Marcel and others say in a deli berately inflammatory ,
“ ”
way that theodicy is atheism
, they mean that by not differen ,
13
ti a ti ng its mode of approach from ordi nary scientific knowledge ,
” “
philosophy may treat God as a somethi ng alongside of other
somethings a sp ecial ki nd of Object for thought That is the basi s
,
.
“
for the oft quoted remark : When we speak about God it is not
-
,
about God that we Speak To speak a bout someone is to refer .
“ ” “
to him as absent a third person an it But God is not an , ,
.
absent third He is absolute presence or as Marcel says Ab so

.
, , ,
lute Thou Whatever is true of the infini te being i t clearly

.
14
,
could not be correct to represent Hi m as outs id e the finite The .
plenitude of being includ es me T herefore the thought which .

,
seeks the infinite cannot approach it as it approaches things

which a re somethings alongside of other things And the
“
.
knower who affir ms the infinite cann ot be an anonymous epi s te

mological subject but a uni que S ingular self What Marcel calls
,
.
”
the ontologi cal exigence the yearning for the plenitude of
“
,
being is the ulti mate face which p ar ticip ati on presents to my

,
thought My p roof of God is my translation of this experience

.
”
into language T hi s insight as to the cogni tive imp ort of the

.
exigence for being is of course fundamentally Augustini an and , ,
0p . ci t .
, p . 167— 1 6 8 .
13 Me ta p hys ica l J o ur na l p 64 , . .
l i n voca ti o n p 5 3
‘
Du f
’
14 r e us a . .
,
The
P ascalian in character We have only to rec all A ugustine s cry

’
.
“ ”
Show me one who longs and he wi ll understand what I mean
, ,
and the revelatory us e whi ch Pascal made of man s experience ’
of hi ms elf as an i nfinite lack It even goes back to Plato for

.
,
whom the philosopher s quest was an élan to the absolute a n

’
upward ris ing of the whole self in which his need and poverty
,
were the dynamic principles of di scovery .
F REE CE RTIT UD E
For some the approach of Kierkegaard and Marcel will seem

,
to be the substitution of an arbi trary emotion ali sm for intelli gi

bili ty a kind of usurpation by w i s hful thi nki ng of the proper
,
place of reason O n the surface it may sound li ke this an d we

.
,
must always be on our guard against reducing it to this in fact .
However what is involved is precisely the question of the

,
cri teri on for in telligibility Mar cel does not regard mystery as
.
confus ed or uni ntelligible It i s hyper intelli gi ble Parti cipatio n is

.
-
.
a s ource of meani ng ; mystery is the li ght whi ch issues from

parti cipation We have s o far spoken mostly of the mystery of
.
being but this may be particularized further What Of such

, .
experi ences as love hop e a dmi rati on despair fideli ty? Are they
, , , ,
cognitive revelations ? The logi cal pos itivi st and many others , ,
would treat these as merely psychologi cally s ignificant and d is

m i ss their role a s revelation of reality But to do s o presupposes.
that they have a no rm exteri or to the exp eri ences by which to ,
measure the meani ng of the exp eriences— and this can be denied .
Hop e reveals something of the ultimate nature of ma n— but only

to the hop er or to one whose thought inh abi ts the realm of the
,
hop er The truth here d i scovered is a truth which a certain kind

.
O f thought will refuse to acknowledge Yet the issue always comes.
back to whether this refus al can be jus tified wi thout begging the
question .
The objection may be raised that if mystery is not demon

” “
s tra ble that the knowledge here gathered may be only an i llu
To des i gnate thi s state of aff airs we may emp loy the somewhat ,
“ ”
startli ng term free certitude Startli ng because certitude is .
,
Often thought to be necessi tated or else not really certi tude But .
thi s may easily be a cons equence of the sp atial schema which we

usually frame for ourselves What Marcel holds is that the i ntel .
ligible evidence contained in the exp eriences of hope or joy i s

truly there but not there for an impersonal o b server a merely
, ,
logi co sensory subject but only for a s ingular self Then it i s only
-
, .
there for freedom It i s i ndubi tably there— for one who resp onds
. .
”
Shall we call this knowledge ? Why not if kn owledge i s the ,
opennes s of thought to reali ty? Why not if there is no other way ,
for thi s type of evidence to b e present?

A question whi ch immediately ensues is as to the range of
”
this kind of certitude since Marcel s ow n explorati ons by no
,
’
means exhaust the wealth of revelations possible in the area of

my stery The full ex amination of the an swer to this question is
.
quite beyond the scope of thi s book but the area most clearly ,
indi cated is in moral and aesthetic e xperience which will be ,
briefly dealt with .
What Marcel s conception of mystery as knowledge comes

’
dow n to is that there is that in human exp erience in vir tue of

whi ch man can a fiir m himself as tra ns p henomenal Man i s not -
.
o nly a bein g in a s i tuation

- -
but a being beyond a situati on In
-
,
- - -
.
fact the great philosophi cal questions can be brought b ack to this
o ne questi on : how does man a fii rm hi mse lf as a being beyond -
his situation ? Marcel s central point ( and it is not unli ke that of

-
’
o ther e x istenti alists ) i s that this a fli rma ti on cannot be made by
a mere subject—in general The transcendent value of human ex

-
.
eri ence cannot resent i tself to a mere logico sensory subject -

p p .
T hus the issues of God freedom and i mmortali ty and a ll the

, , , ,
o ther questi ons the bring in their tra i n cannot be rai sed or
y ,
settled by an impersonal kn ower Reality a s evidential p resents .
a different countenance to thi s kind of knower than to a knower

who thinks out Of the ontological exigence Thi s exigence there .
,
“ ”
fore functi ons as a ki nd of bli nded intui tion of plenitude w hi ch
,
E xis tentia l Truth 249
is a source of illumination and therefore a source of evidence .

18
This intuition is not an Object of vis i on but a pri nc iple of vision .
For the sake of explanation we may liken i t to the creative ,

“
”
i ntuition of the artist The a rtist s idea i s not something which
’
.
exists ready made and pre dates its embodiment It comes to be

- -
.
in the artistic process This is a strange and paradoxical truth .

,
“
but a truth nonetheless When the poet or artist S its down to .
write or paint he does not alr eady have in his possession a co r

, n
lete d idea which he then s i mply transfers to paper He does not

p .
first invent his idea and then embody it : he invents it by embody

ing it Yet the strange thing i s that his obscure intui tion actually
.
g u i d es the process in wh i ch i t comes i nto full being .
The po et may not already kn ow his idea prior to writing but ,
as he goes along he elimin ates passages whi ch do not adequately

express this idea Thus he i s judgi ng his work relentlessly in
.
,
the l i ght of a n i dea whi ch does not even exi s t until the work
reveals it to him The creative idea is not li ke a recipe or blue
.
p rint wh i ch is mechanically followed : it comes to be in the work

i tself It i s like a light shed on the work from whi ch i t is then
.
read back Just s o thinks Mar cel man has a creative i ntuition
.
, ,
of be ing ( of plenitude of the transcendent d imens i ons of his own

,
existence ) : this i s not an object of vi si on but a hi dden light ,
which i s shed upon exp erience and then read back out of experi
ence E xp eri ence i s the revelation of man but it is also the revela
.
,
tion of the transcendent to which human existence opens .
Again however if we ask whi ch subject can a ffirm thi s d imen

, ,
sion the answer must be the subject whi ch belongs to the creati ve
,
intui tion The transcendent is present to human exp eri ence pre
.
ci sel
y as appe al Just s o the ar tistic i dea i s p resent to the artist s
.
,
’
consciousness as an app eal by which he is haunted : he can only

am rm the e x i stence of the app eal freely in so far as he responds ,
to it He could not a s pure sensory consciousness or imp ersonal

.
,
i ntellectual knower assure hi mself that hi s consciousness con ,
18 On the
“
b li nd ed i ntuition, s ee B ei ng a nd H a vi ng p
,
. 1 1 8, Mys tery of
B ei ng , v ol
. I, p 13 . .
ta ined this ap peal : the only subject who can a fli r m the appe a l is
the one which responds to it This realm of subjectivity is ca lled
.
forth by the appeal and does not exist in separation from it .
Here too p articipation founds subjectivity : the subjectivity of

, ,
the artist is not an autonomous ego but exists o nly in the appeal
,
and respo nse of the aesthetic process Just so the only thought
.
,
which can a fli rm a tr a nscendent dimension in man s existence i s

’
one whi ch participates in th at transcendence .

strike us as hard to come by For is not subjectivity just what is
m
.
ost private most i ntimate most non communicable of all

, ,
-
things ? Sur ely I know that I exist as a subject for I am in a ,
privileged position with respect to my own exPeri ence : I a m my

“ ” ”
own in si de But thi s i nside of mine my interior cons cious
.
“
,
ness is one would think available for me alone No one is

, , , .
present to my consciousness in the way that I am No one can .
read my mi nd— my consci ousness is that which is concealed from

the probing scrutiny of others My body is observable by others .
,
but not my mental p rocesses In the same way one might think.
,
that if there really are other subjects still their subjecti vity is ,
just as concealed from me as my subjectivity is from them Th en .
how can I be sure that there are other selves if I d o not dir ectly
observe them? Ca n I possibly d irectly experience any subjectivity
besides my own? We would be inclined to say no But then .
,
whence do I derive the assurance of the existence of such s ub

ectivi ti es ? From o ne stand oint thi s roblem is man i festly more
j p p
” “
perplexing th a n the problem of other o bjects since it adds a ,
completely new dimension to my claim to make contact with what

is other than myself .
Yet from another standp oint it is easi er to get at than the

more general problem E ven though I may be p erplexed as to
.
how I can be certain that other selves exist I do not seem to ,
experience much diffi culty with the mea ning of the asserti on that
they do T hat i s I have a p erfectly good notion of what it means
.
,
to exist as a self and I exp erience no great barrier in conceivi ng

,
what i t would mea n for other selves to exi st Thi s i s i n sharp .
contrast to the difficulty I feel when I try to imagin e the inde

pendent existence of a cloud a leaf a stone an atom or a lump
, , , ,
of earth I may be convi nce d that these things do exist i nd e end

.
p
” “
ently but I am very confused as to what it feels like to exi st in
,
this way There is no such obstacle in grasping the meaning of

.
the exi stence of other selves for the mode of existence here ,
asserted is the mode of exi stence which I myself actually exp eri
Inters ubjecti ve K now led g e 25 3
ence We stand then in a peculiarly ambi guous condition of

.
, ,
assurance and uncertainty in respect to thi s question .
The questi on i s not a particularly old one in the history of

philosop hy and it may fir st be dealt with in the form of the
,
“
problem Of other minds which was fir st p osed by John Stuar t ,
Mill a nd which has become what mi ght be called the traditional

form of thi s questi on Let it be noted th at the problem of other
.
“
”
minds is significantly though subtly different from the problem, ,
“ ”
of other selves A mind is conceived specific ally as the interior
.
psychic concomitant of a bodily process If my retin a is stimulated .
by a light wave I may perceive the color red ; or if the tymp anum
-
,
of my ear i s set vibrati ng by a sound sti mulus I may hear a shrill -

,
noise ; Any witness may Observe the stimuli a n d my outw ard rea c
tions and a physiologist may even observe and measure my neural
,
and cortical reactions ; but no wi tness may observe my conscious

perception of red or shrill That is ava ilable to me alone What i s . .
true in the case of sensations is apparently even more true in the

” “
case of emotions or thoughts : I may be observed in a fit of
pique or a brown state but this Observation is restricted to my ,
grimaces and bodily postures and does not extend to an awarenes s ,
of what I am feelin g and thinking .
Thi s line of reflecti on led Mill to hi s problem of why if it i s ,
true that we cannot di rectly observe the interior life of conscious

” “
nes s Of another we ever can be said to know that other minds
,
“ ”
really exi st His answer is the analogy argument which w a s
.
,
once standard but has lately lost favor The circumstances of the .
2
Situation are thi s : O nly outward behavi or is available for observa

tion and it must therefore be that outward behavior gives us the
,
2 For cri ti ci s m of the a na logy a rgum ent, se e Max Scheler, The Na ture
o f Sy mp a thy b y Peter H ea th, i ntr o by W ern er Sta r ( New H a ven
, tr a ns . . k
Y a le U ni ver s i ty P res s ) , 19 5 4 , p 2 39s s ; John W i s d om, O ther Mi nd s ( Cx
. .
k
for d : B la c w ell ) , 1 95 2 , p 6 8s s , p 194 s s ; L oui s A rna uld Rei d , Wa ys o f
. . . .
K no w led g e a nd E xp er i ence ( L ond on : A llen Unw i n ) , 1 9 61, p 2 3 7s s ; . .
W W yli e
. Spencer , O ur K no w led g e o f O ther M i nd s ( New H a ven : Ya l
e
Univ er s i ty Pres s ) , 1930 p 5 5 88 ,

. .
basis for our inference in respect to the inner concomitant This .
i s possible because i n one instance our own life we have a privi , ,
leged access to the i nner concomitant We then proceed by this .
reasoning : In my ow n case I re alize that certain bodily processes

are accompanied by inner conscious processes ( unified under the
“ ”
term min d ) and therefore I decide that when I observe these
bo dily processes in others I may infer that they are accompanied ,
by mental processes not d irectly observable by me My certainty .
that others exist is a product of an analogical inference which sets

out from my own existence and its known connection wi th my
bodily actions .
3
Now in Spite of an initial plausibility this view is Open to various ,
objections which rather conclusively refute it and whi ch have more ,
or less led to its abandonment Of these objec tions we will men .

,
“
tion o nly two First of all there is what might be called the mirror
.
,
”
argument which has been very frequently employed aga inst i t
, .
4
What Mill has contended is that I argue to the co nsciousness of

others by supplying a mi ssing link in a chain Of analogy which
begins with my own behavior a patent fallacy In order for me to , .
argue that behind the bared teeth and squinting eyes which I now
observe i n thi s face confrontin g me there is a feeling of kindness
and good humor I would on Mill s terms have had to observe
, ,
’
,
my own inn er feelin gs as united to si milar outward conduct : I

would have had to observe myself smilin g But that of course .
, ,
I do not d o I don t know how I look when I smi le or am angry

.
’
, ,
or emb ar rassed or s a d In my own cas e I have the i nner feeling

, .
,
but not the outer vi ew If I wanted to have the outer view of .
myself in the gri p of these emotions I would have to observe my ,
facial and bo d ily contortions in a mirr or— hardly a standard pro

ced ure T herefore I do not comprehend that certai n bodily behav
.
ior is the Sign of ano ther mind by comparing it to my own bodily

3 John Stua rt Mill , A n E xa mi na tio n of Si r Wi llia m H a mi lto n s P hi los o
’
p hy Cha p XII
, t . .
4
See Scheler , op . ci t .
, p . 240 ; Rei d , op . ci t .
, p . 2 3 8; Sp encer , op . ci t.
, p .
interpretation This view itself i s an assumption and a very shaky
.
,
one It will help to begin wi th the confidence that much more can
.
be given to direct exp eri ence than the sense datum theorist or the -
phenomen alist will admi t .
A ctually anyone beginning with the phenomenalist viewpoin t

,
h as a literally imposs ible task in reaching another self O n the .
phenomenalist s assump tion o nly transitory and discrete sense

’
,
data are available to consciousness Given this assumption even .

,
the mea ning of the assertion th at other selves exist becomes doubt
”
ful If on the phenomen ahs t s basis an Object is simply a logical
.
,
’
,
“
construction out of a s et of sense data then so is a subjec t What ,

.
it would mean to reach another self as a logi cal construct i s very

hard to imagine Not only would thi s construct be in d i s tingui s h
.
able from the object construct but it would have in dependent -

,
reality o nly in the meani ngless Pickwickian sense of all phenome

“
n ali s t objects .
Yet even if we start with the expectation that much more can
,
be directly given to us in experience than impoverished sense data J

,
there i s still a very special d ifli culty in wondering how another

mind can be di rectly given Here we may cons ult the exhaustive .
and entertaini ng presentation of the problem which was made by

John Wi sdom Wisdom s d iffi culty co mes down to this : O nce we
.
5 ’
have made the p lausible distinction between the inside and the out
side of experience ( mi nd and body ) how can we ever be sure that ,
any outs ide i s the Si gn of any insi de ? That is if we di stin guish ,
between any emotional state and its bodi ly expression and s a y ,
that the second is obs ervable while the fir st is not how given this , ,
Spli t can the second ever be t a ken as a sure Sign of the presence
,
of the first ? For exam le I might hold as an obvi ous fact that the
p ,
p ai n which I feel i s not to be identified with the gnashing teeth ,
rolling eyes and clenched fists whi ch m a ni fest this p ain outwardly
, .
What I mean by saying that I am in p ai n i s my excruciating non ,
outward feeling SO w ith gaiety delight sorrow disappointment

.
, , , ,
5 W i s d om ,
op . ci t .
, p 84
. .
Inters ubjecti ve K no w led g e 25 7
anxiety or any psychi c state— w e may distinguish the mental state

,
from the bodily manifestati on .
Then ,says Wi sdom what p oss ible guarantee do I have that thi s
,
bo dily state in another corresp onds in hi m to a mental state such

as it would corresp ond to in me ? I a s s ume it does but do I know ,
that i t does ? Since I don t Observe his emotional s tate i t always

’
seems at least logi cally conceivable that it i s very different from

what it would be in me given si milar bodi ly man ifestati ons Here
, .
I s ee someone rolling his eyes clenchi ng his fists and screaming , ,
a nd I s a he i s in a i n But how do I kn ow that thi s is not the

y p .
way in which he exp resses delight? I don t observe hi s felt p ain I ’
only infer it Similar ly a mother playing wi th her baby may

.
,
Observe what she takes to be all the outward signs of joy : laugh
ter waving arms gurglin g Yet can s he be logi c ally certain that
, , .
these p arti cular gesticulati ons are not the manner i n whi ch thi s
particular being expresses his gr ief? Isn t it concei vable that the ’
mother is infl i cting the tortures of the d amned up on her baby and
that he is expressing it in this unfortunate manner whi ch misleads
his doting parent? O bvi ously this sort of question here bears on
,
the accuracy with which we can read the inner life of the o ther
and not on the question of how we can know that there is another
there Yet it could be easily gener a lized for we might think of the
.
,
misreadi ng being extended without limit s o th at we could misread ,
a s consci ous responses what were only the resp onses of a n
automaton .
The bizarre character of such reflection inevi tably forces the

suspicion that there must be something fundamentally wrong wi th
posing the problem of other s elves qui te i n thi s way NO doubt the .
mind bo d y di stinction i s vali d and no doubt there i s an i rreduci ble

n
,
diff erence between mental and p hysi cal p rocesses Yet to treat the .
body as a kin d of facade behind which the exi stence and natur e
of min d has to be veri fied seems to get things off on the wrong
foot We might try to recover a certain balance even within thi s

.
”
framework by suggesting a king and three sages typ e of i nference
“
to Other minds Perhap s one might hold we do not infer i mmedi

.
, ,
ately to the inside of others but go through our o w n That is I

, .
,
can infer that the other understands my inner life Thi s could .
happen somewhat as follows : Suppose I am i n a position where

someone i s causing me pain let us say a dentist dr illing my teeth
, .
E yes tearing and blinking knuckles white face contorted I finally

, , ,
compl a in that it hurts I may reason as follows : if he understands

.
” “
by the word pain what I understand by it he will d o what I ,
” “
would do if I understood what he meant by the word pain and
he told me that I was hurting him The dentist stops dri lling I . .
then infer that he and I mean the same thing by the word pain .
” “ ”
If he thought that by pain or hurting I meant pleasure or
deli ght he would smile cheerfully and keep blas ting away The
, .
” “
fact that he d oes nft indi cates that the word p ain signifies a
real ity about which he and I feel the same The ex ample of course .
, ,
could be extended to take in not only pain but pleasur e joy s or

“
, ,
row and so forth What happens i s not that I infer how another
, .
feels but that I infer how he would act if he knows how I feel
,
.
6
Suppose while still remaining with i n thi s gener al assumption of

,
”
“
an i ndir ect knowledge of o thers we try to s i tuate the problem ,
”
of other min ds against a wider backgr ound The child certainly .
becomes aware of the existence of others before he makes the

di stinction between mind and body : he knows himself as a member
of a class of which there a re other members Subsequently one .
,
ma y suggest he re a lizes that he has a mind and he wonders

,
“
whether hi s natural belief that the other members of the class

likewi se d o is well founded H ow mi ght he assure himself of this ?
.
7
O ne route to this assurance might be the res p o ns i ve ch a racter

'
6
The mple gi v en here i nclud es la ngua ge w hos e cr uci al i mp orta nce
ex a ,
i s clear B ut i t mi ght b e p r oved w i thout b ri ngi ng i n la ngua ge a t a ll If I

. .
merely w i s h the d en ti s t w o uld s top yet refra i n fr om s a yi ng a nythi ng while

, ,
my p hys i ca l s ymptoms a re i d enti ca l a nd if he a ctua lly d oes s top I i nfer

, ,
tha t he und ers ta nd s my phys i ca l symptoms H e d oes w ha t I w o uld w is h .
hi m to d o if he und er s tood my i nner life D oes thi s p rov e tha t I ca n rea d

.
his i nner li fe ? A t lea s t i t s how s a certa in mutua li ty betw een us w hich I ,
mi ght a s s ume could j us t a s w ell run from my s i d e to his

, .
7
The ens uing rema rks ow e much to the d i s cuss i o n of Spencer o p ci t , . .
,
2 0 —4 8 w ho ma k es ma n i nter es ti ng a nd i n s tructi ve p o i nts o n thi s i ss ue

pp .
, y .
ness finds itself in language Then in fin ding itself it does not find .
only itself .
The objection may be raised that thi s awareness of others as

respondents does not explain our rich and detailed awareness of
i nd i vi d ua l selves since i t is rather in d iscrim inate and generalized
, .
T he point is valid enough but the questi on may als o be asked how ,
we know our own selves a s individual and unique beings It i s too .
“ ”
easily assumed that the meani ng of I is clear but the meani ng ,
“ ”
of thou is obscure The truth may rather be that the profound
.
“ ”
meaning of I is equally hidden that here too the revelation is , , ,
” “
a reciproca l one Perhaps I only become I in the encounter
.
“ ”
with thou and p erhaps ap art from that encounter the only
“ ”
referent I have for I is a tatterdemalion succession of psychic
states Many modern philosop hers have come to believe that this
.
is the case If something of the sort is true then the problem i s not
.
,
“ ” “
of other m inds or even of other selves but just the problem
” “ ”
Of p ersons Not even other p ersons for if these philosophers
.
,
are right the category of person alr eady includes a reference to

,
the o ther and for one who k nows himself as a person there can
, ,
not be a problem of other persons .
DIRE CT K NOWLE D G E OF T H E O TH E R
Before following up the suggestion cont ai ned in the preceding

sentence it will be interesting to insp ect some views whi ch make
,
the transi tion to it easier The primary drawback to the approaches.
” “
outli ned above i s that they regard our awareness of other mi nds
as in dir ect E ven where an attempt i s made to a void the errors of
.
“ ”
the analogy explanation the assumpti on continues to be that ,
the reality of other minds is not an i mmediate datum but is known

through an inference of some sort Now one way of undercutting .
this whole difficulty is Obviously to make the Oppos ite assumption

to assume that the other i s gi ven dir ectly and does not have to be
argued to at a ll This alternative may strike us as outlandish if we
.
“
are accustomed to conceiving experience in terms of sense per
Inters ubjecti ve Kno w led g e 2 6I
ce
p ti on; But in equating experience with sense exp erience we
tend to forget that we could be led rather qui ckly to a red uctio
a d a bs ur d um For if only what i s given immed i atel to the “ ”
.
y
senses is a primary datum then the only primary data are the ,
discrete and multiple snippets of color sound scent an d s o fo rth , , ,

.
O n this vi ew not o nly must we s a y that w e d on t p erce i ve other

’
,
selves directly but also that we don t even perceive tables chairs
,
’
, ,
“
or trees directly : we don t p ercei ve things at all Wi th thi s the ’
.
,
ep istemologi cal bark i s once again stranded in the back w aters of

phenomenalism Actually the plight of p henomenalism i s ex tremely
.
grave for if the only hard datum is the di screte s ensory i mmed i
,
ate then i t becomes extremely difficult to s ee how the entire p a s t

,
does not disapp ear from the cata log of the immediately known ,
and with it the continuing p ersonal i dentity of the knower O nce .
the circle i s broken and the suspi ci on dawn s that direct percep tion
“ ”
may in clude much more than sense data it will not seem such
a n i mplaus i ble claim that we may know other selves d irectly .
O ne phi losop her who p ressed this cl ai m was Max Scheler .

8
Scheler s thes i s w a s that exp r es s i on was a p rimary datum and that

’
as such i t was the direct revelati on of the other self It i s non .
s ense to s a y that we infer the ex istence of the other analogic ally ,
for the child who recognizes and resp onds to the warmth and
friendliness of his mother s face i s completely i ncapable of such an ’
inference Rather the warmth and kindliness are express ive

.
,
phenomen a just as much di rectly gi ven as the color of the

,
mother s hair or the size of her face What we percei ve are not
’
.
”
“
bodies or min ds but integr al wholes : our distincti on between
“ ”
“
the body and the se of the other p ost dates this primary
” -
erc ept i on O nce we break out of the bonds of an emp i rici sm

p .
which i s essenti ally unfai thful to exp eri ence we will s ee that our ,
primary experi ence is that of configur a ti onal uniti es Therefore .

,
there is no p roblem of how I i nfer the reality of a mind b ehind a

”
bodily facade since I only arrive a t calling thi s thing a body by
,
Op p 239
8
. ci t .
, . .
2 62 The Phi los op hy of Kno w led g e
s ubtrac ting something from the original experience By adopti ng .
a certain attitude I can s ee the bared teeth and squ intin g eyes as
,
purely a physiological fac a de ; but from a different posture I see ,
a smi le I cannot comp ose the s mi le out of purely p hys i ological

.
“ ” “
features for the smile i s not accessible from the mental stance in
,
“
which I am able to identify somethi ng as a p ur ely physiologi cal
”
feature Neither can I break it dow n i nto phy si ological elements
.
9
.
The smile is a n ori gin al phenomenon of exp ressiveness .
Scheler goes even further His contenti on i s that far from it .

,
“ ”
being self evi dent that I c annot experience another s experience
-
’
it i s perfectly natural for me to do s o The apparent impossibil ity .

l o
of it is assumed because I think too e xclusively with reference to

“ ”1 1
another s bodily states when thinking of hi s experience
’
It i s .
true that I cannot feel hi s pain or experience hi s sensation of

seei ng or hearing A s p ar t of the bodily complex these are tied to
.
,
the purely private nature of the bodily complex But the si tuation .
chan ges in regard to the hi gher spiritual states the emotions ,
proper There i s no reason why I c a nnot e xperi ence a nother s

.
’
” “
gri ef or joy I do not argue to these or infer their presence
.
behind a corporeal fa ca de In some cases we may even sp eak says .

,
Scheler of o ne emotion shared by two selves A father and mother

, .
standing together by the bod y of their dead child have their grief
in common There are not here s im y two consciousnesses but
.
m ,
two consciousnesses sharing one identical sorro w They exp erience .
“ ”1 2
it as our sorrow In the face of such experi ences the problem
.
,
“ ”
of other minds loses all standing .
Si milarly Scheler addu ces the nature of s y mp a thy a s a patent

,
example of reaching the experi ence of the other Sympathy is .
somewhat different from the parents Shared gri ef for I may ’

,
symp athize wi th another s gr ief wi thout actually feelin g that grief ’
myself My sympathy in another s gri ef ( or joy ) cannot be

.
’
9 I b id pp 26 1— 262
.
, . .
10
Ibid , pp 244 - 247
. . .
11 Ibi d .
, p 25 4
. .
12 I bid .
, pp 12 — 13
. .
being in i tself (en s oi) All negation i s i ntroduced into reality by
- - -
.
consci ousness : consciousness is not i ts object ; its pure being for -
itself and not being its object is the source of a ll negation The
- - - .
i n—itself which i s purely o ther than consci ousness escapes all

negations and i s conceived by Sartre as a massive self identity a -
,
kind of soli d block of being .
All th i s is menti oned in order to lead up to the revelation of the

other as Sartre conceives it Consciousness the for i tself exists
, .
,
-
,
as a kin d of pure sp ontaneity which faces the inert passivity of the

ii i i tself lik e a god in Splendid isolation All the world i s a stage
-
.
a nd it is the soli tary player In fact as the soli tary actor ( the .
,
i n itself is inert ) it confers the character of bei ng a stage upon

‘
-
,
the in i tself It ma k es a world wherei n i t can act This is what

-
. .
“ ”
Sartre calls the p roject of consciousness by whi ch it constitutes ,
the arena in whi ch it dis ports But now in a typically fl a mboyant

l
.
,
manner Sartre introduces the jarring presence of the other The

, .
other s presence announces itself a s my shame Supp ose says

’
.
16
,
Sartre I am engaged in some reprehens i ble activity s a y kneeli ng

, ,
down and looki ng through a keyhole In this s ituation the for i tself .
,
-
is a p ure spontaneo us loo k ing a t an object ; at this moment i t -
projects its world i n an absolutely autonomous way Its frivolity .
is lik e the extreme of a fia t which constitutes its world and i ts own

freedom Suddenly while I am in this ri d iculous posture I he ar
.
, ,
footsteps round the corner and look up to see two co ntemptuous

eyes p eering down at me At once my world collapses Now I am .
_ ,
.
not vi ewer but viewed I feel myself looked at and my autonomy.

,
and spontaneity ooze away I am no longer a for itself but for .

-
,
a nother I fee l the muscles i n my jaws tighten my mouth dry u

.
p , ,
my body become a ludicrous and unwieldy bulk— I feel myself

congealing to the rigidity of the i n i tself The other is the gorgon s -
.
’
head whi ch turns me to stone .
Shorn of all sp ecifically Sartrean trimmi ngs thi s is still a ,
powerful example of what would be meant by the direct experience
16
Ibi d .
, pp.2 2 1 222
-
, 25 9—
2 63 .
Inters ubjecti ve Know led g e 2 65
I
of the other This is no inference no argument by analogy The

.
, .
other is there as directly as my shame H i s presence is s o directly .
felt that i t causes my ow n to shrivel Far from having to a rgue to .
his exi stence from my own I would gi ve a nything to be freed fr om ,
this utterly obtrus ive presence so that I mi ght gather up the p ieces ,
of my ow n shattered existence 17
.
With these two examples as beginn ings it will occur to man y ,
that thi s approach could be broadened to include v ari ous other

instance s What sympathy and shame do is to d istill into a very
.
pure form a quali ty which i s wi dely though more weakly pres ent , ,
i n experi ence We need only think of such states as a d mir ation

.
,
loyalty expectation or anxi ety ; or such conditions as loneli nes s or

, ,
boredom whi ch are testimonies in reverse to the re ality of the

,
other Much could be done to show that these experi ences are
.
phenomenologi cally unintelligible excep t in relation to another

self Lo nelin ess i s an especially clear ex ample of this The eXperi
. .
s
ence oi loneliness i s built upon the exp erience of the other but
.
the experience of the other as now absent Reference to the o ther .
is to such a degree an ontologi cal dimensi on of the self that in the

complete absence of all others my bein g is still tur ned towards the ,
absent There i s no possibility of expl a ining thi s i nferentially or

.
of reduc i ng it to different terms T his cons i deration was in Scheler s

’
.
mind when he declared that an imagi nary Robinson C rusoe who

had never in all hi s life perceived a ny beings of his own kind
would still be sai d to know the thou and p ossess the noti on of
communi ty Scheler s p osition is that the knowledge of the
.
18 ’
nature of community and the existence of the thou in general i s

a n a p r i ori factor gi ven as an irreduc i ble background ,
to any
encounter wi th in dividual p ersons given one might s a y a s a —
, ,
1 7
We need n o t fo llo w Sa rtre i nto the co n s e u ences
q w hi ch he d r ew from
s uch ca ses . H e beca me s o ob ses s ed w i th the
“
loo k ”
as the revela ti on o f the
other th a t in
hi s thought, huma n rela ti ons b ecome a mutua l s ta ri ng d ow n
“
-
”
“ ”
r oces s , the th i cons i s ten tly r egar d ed a s ei ther a thr ea t or a n o ppor
p o er s
tuni ty for a ppr opri a ti on, a nd the w hole p os i ti v e s id e of i nter s ub ecti vi y i s j t

la rgely los t .
13 0p . ci t .
, pp 2 34 -
2 35
. .
266 The Phi los op hy of K now led g e
structural comp onent of the human p erson The sphere of the thou .
is just as essentially and irreducibly a sphere of the fundamental

” “
being of man as is the sphere of the external world Seen in this .
light the human p erson is a reference to a thou and h i s coming

, ,
to self consciousness is mediated by this reference and i mpossible

-
without it .
I AND TH O U
most promisin g area of escape from the problem of other

The
selves seems to lie i n the direction of s uppres s mg the assumption
”
upon whi ch it t es ts T his is the assumption that the intelli gibility

.
“ ” “
contained in the I is anterior to that contained in the thou If .
” “
this is not s o if on the contrary the meani ng of I is a function
,
”
of th e thou then it i s clearly i nconsistent for the I to raise the
,
question of the existence of the thou Among the philosophers .
who press for this solution the most prominent name in the last ,
century was that of Josiah Royce A ccording to Royce the self .

,
w a s through and through a s ocia l entity : whatever meaningful

“ ”
content I have for the word I I build up out of an original ,
experience of relationship .
I a m t self conscious a nd then second a rily consci ous of my

n ot fir s -
fellow On the contra ry I am conscious of mys elf o n the whole as i n

.
, , ,
rela ti on to s ome rea l or i d ea l fellow a n d a p a rt from my consci ousness ,
of m
y f ellow I h a ve o nl
y s ec ond a r
, y a nd d erived sta tes a n d h a b i ts of
self cons ci ousness

-
.
19
And again
Spea k ing i n p sychologic a l terms one ca n s a y tha t our finite self ,
consci ousnes s i s no primitive p os s es s ion a t a ll but i s the h a rd ear ned -
19
Jo s i a h Royce, S tud i es o f Go o d a nd E v i l ( New o r : A p leto n ) , 189 8,
p Y k
p . 2 0 1 See a lso The Wo r ld a nd the Ind i vid ua l, Second Ser i es ( New
. or : Y k
Ma cmilla n ) , 1 900, pp 2 45 — 2 77
. .
ch ar acter of the self in more general terms but Marcel a nd Buber ,
put their stress upon the singular ch ar acter of the thou Whatever .
22
“ ” ” “
the I i s it is as unique ; whatever establishes the I i n its
,
uniqueness establishes it i n its authenti c bein g Whatever questions .
“ ”
are posed about the other are either p osed by a generalized I “
( say ,
an e p istemological subject i n—general or a social self
) or by -
,
“ ”
the I in a ll its u niqueness Many have had a tendency to .
” “
approach the problem of other selves from the side of a merely
”
generalized I Marcel and Buber dri ve towards the unique and
“
.
” “
unr epeatable I and attack the problem in terms of it But what .
” “
they dis cover is that the unique and unrepeatable I only knows
”
itself as such in the face of a thou Apart from my relation to .
”
the thou I am not aware of myself as a unique self at all— I am
,
a mere bundle of sensati ons series of exp eriences or logical think, ,
ing subject Here i s a paradoxical discovery : the unique is a cate

.
” “
gory of c ommunion If I want to s a y I in the most in tense an d
.
“
fully re a lized way I must s a y thou ,
The unique dimensi on of .
” “
existence represented by the I only emerges to consciousness i n
“ ”
so far as there is an encounter with a thou .
Thi s means that my full experien ce of selfhood does not have

priori ty over others but is a co—emergent of communion If any
, .
thing it is the other who has pri ori ty : the tho u gi ve s me to myself
, .
What Marcel and Buber have discovered is the thou a s an ori ginal
di mension of existence They make a fundamenta l d istinction
.
” “ ”
between an I it relation and an I thou relati on They make
- -
.
this as an ontologi cal distincti on and not merely a psychologi cal ,
one : that is we cann ot represent thi ngs as though there is one

,
“ ”
identi cal I variously related to others but existing i n the same ,
“ ”
ontological manner through the various relations R ather the I .
is a relational category and its status in being varies wi th its

,
22 A conv eni ent p la ce to meet B ub er

’
s though t on thi s is I a nd Tho u,
tra ns by Rona ld Smi th ( New
. or : Scrib ner s ) , 1 9 5 8 es Y k
p p 3 s s T hi s
’
, . . .
“
I thou theme i s s ca tter ed hr ough Ma rcel s w hole w or , b ut s p eci a l refer
-
”
t ’
k
ence ma y b e ma d e to The My s tery o f B e i ng vo l I, p 1 7 638, Me ta p hy s ica l , . .
Jo urna l, p 2 1933, a nd Du f d l in voca ti o n pp 5 0—5 2

’
. re us , . .
Inters ubjecti ve Know led g e 2 69
“ ”
relation: the I of the I i t relation is ontologically different -
” “
from the I of the I thou relation -
.
23
Certainly we may see what is meant by sayi ng that an I

“ ”
” “
which was refiexively conscious of itself in an I it relati on would -
”
not be conscious at the s ame ontologic a l level as the I which was
“
” “
reflexi v el
y c onscious in the I thou rela tio n What this amounts -
.
to then is that the thou introduces us to a new dimension of being

, , .
In my relation with another person be i ng i s revealed to me in a ,
mann er in which it is not reve aled in any relati on with a non

” ” “
personal reali ty Things or objects are not there for me i n the
.
w ay in which a thou is there They are always to a certain extent .
“ ”
absent — truncated alien presences O nly in a person al encounter
,
.
do I undergo the full exp erience of presence ; and this i s a twofold

as sertion : only i n a person al encounter am I really present to
myself through the p resence of a thou Self presence and the
, .
-
presence of a th ou are two sides of one coming to presence which - -
is the creative achievement of human commun i on .
Thi s must not be taken to mean that wherever I am as a matter

of fact dealing with a human person I actually do encounter a ,
thou The tragedy of the human condition is exactly that the

. t
i
experience of the thou i s s o fugi tive and tenuous Clearly the .
“ ”
p resence spoken of here does not refer to sim ly phys i cal
p
” “
presence The table or chai r is wi th me in that sense O ther
. .
human beings who are occupying the same regi on of space with
“
me do not automatically become thou s my fellow workers i n ’
the office the p eople sitting across from me on the subway or

, ,
standing shoulder to shoulder in the elevator even those wi th ,
whom I am ostensibly talking can be mere absent thirds The

” ” “ “
.
genuine experience of the thou is a relatively rare and p rivileged

o ne T hat i s why Marcel will concentrate on such e x eri ences as
.
p
love hope or fidelity which are themati cally centered on the thou
, , ,
in the fullness of his presence It i s in exp eri ences like these that
‘
the full ontologic al originality of the thou can be appreciated .
23 B ub er , op . cit .
, p 3, 1 2
. .
2 70 Phi los op hy of Kno w led g e The
For the thou to whom I am related in love cannot be grasp ed

”
in the manner of a thing about which I speak He is preci sely .
i ncommensurate with all descriptive language Lo ve does not b ea r .
“ ”
on a content or a characterizable o bject The beloved being is .
not a repository of certain predi cates in which I can summarize

the foundation for my affection Love bears on an uncharacter .
24
iz a ble p resence It Opens me to the mystery of the sin gular Pre

. .
ci sel
y in so far as a being is beloved he is beyond all inventory ,
which I could take of him to explain why he is beloved O bjects .
can be ch a racterized ; objects can be given predicates ; in fact an

“ ”
object ( in the sense of Buber and Marcel ) just is the presumed
structure upon which I can hang my s et of predicates But that .
which I cha racterize that to which I assi gn predi cates is always

, ,
”
that about which I am Speaking : it is sp oken of in the third
” “
p erson A
. thou is not that about which I speak but the one to ,
whom I speak : it is ad d ressable only in the second person -

.
Presence second p ers onnes s cannot be approached from the side

,
-
,
of objectified structure It therefore rep resents an origin al revela

.
tion of being a revelation whi ch is inaccessible by any other route

,
.
This last remark will help in answeri ng a question whi ch i s

bound to come up at this point : in what sense can the experien ce
“ ”
of the thou be called knowledge ? It may be thought that I have
added very little to my store of expressible information through
the experience of love or fidelity and there may be the renewed ,
suspici on that these are only p sychologi cally interesting states of an

indivi du a l subject Now it may be allowed at the outset that if
.
” “
knowledge is i dentified wi th information this objection is well ,
” “
taken For a ll information bears on objects and a thou is not
.
,
an object but a presence All information too is conceived as .

, ,
transmittable through the ordinary channels of language to any

p roperly equ i pped observer : but the truth of the thou is not
“ ”
transmittable to an observer at all but to the I whi ch is co ,
present wi th it and which is a participant not an observer

, ,
.
24
Ibi d .
, p 17
. .
principle of knowledge Still he does not know her better in
.
,
the sense that he has been impelled to study her personality more
closely and observe features which others might just as well ob
serve but d on t bother to He knows her in a manner
’
.
” “ “
one who loves her can know her For her being or her person .
is not an alr eady reali zed objective reality viewed by him from a
-
more advantageous pe rspective : it is a creative category The boy s .

’
love i s the creative invocation of her being : it is a participation

in the mystery of her un i queness He does not s ii nply see better .
traits which are already actually there : he calls forth perfections

which are virtual in her— and virtual in the order of freedom .
26
Her beauty her charm her goodness are not for hi m the same
, ,
traits available for others : they are assimilated into the mystery of
her uniqueness a nd app eal to him a s revelation of that mystery .
His resp onse is a hop e a summons Naturally love is imp elled to

, .
declare i tself for the declaration makes more i n stant the qu aliti es
,
-
which it p erceives Love desires to call forth perpetually the beauty

.
whi ch its privileged vision s ees to bring to birth what is already ,
born This is true not only of the love between man and woman
.
,
but equally and perhaps more plainly true of other sorts of love .
A ristotle made the same po i nt albei t intermittently in respect to , ,
friendship Consider too the love of parent for child where these
.
, , ,
features are thematic The mother and father in going out towar ds
.
,
the person of their child know themselves to be going out towards

,
a being whi ch is largely vi rtual and latent ; they ar e enraptured by

a sin gularity which they are conspiri ng to bring into being No thing .
could better illustrate the twofold character of love as both creati on

and resp onse My love calls forth the bein g of the other ; but I
.
love the other because I have found in him a being which I d es ire
to call forth into the approval of my love .
” “
Do I in thi s manner k now hi s uni queness ? If this means can ,
” “
I enumerate what makes him unique the answer must be no , .
26
Thi s i s s o ev en if his lov e i s unr equi ted or un ro cla irned
p .
Inters ubjecti ve Kno w led g e 2 73
E numeration cannot reach the unique ; for enumerati on adds up

“ ”
properties and p rop erti es are alway s multipliable Objectified
, .
thought or indeed conceptual thought must fall short of the

, ,
singular But I reach his uniqueness in the only way it can be

.
reached in the same way that he reaches it For this p erson does
—
.
“
not know hi s own uni queness objectively Hi s way of being .
present to himself cannot be reduced to an aggregate of traits ; he

does not know himself as a what but as inexpressible presence
” “
, .
But what quickens this presence and unfolds i ts fullness is the

” “
encounter with a thou T hus the uni que I stands at th e bound ar y
.
of givi ng and receiving Love knows the unique because it is a

-
_
.
creator of the uni que .
A s a consequence there is another way in whi ch the I thou

,
-
relation i s cogniti onal ; it is an instrument for my self knowledge -

.
The encounter with the thou is not only a revelation of the thou ,
“ ” “
but a revelati on of myself As we have seen the I of the I .
,
”
thou relation i s met only W ithin thi s relation In relation to the .
thou I know something about myself that I could not otherwi se

know O bvi ously this does not mean that I can enumerate more
.
attributes of myself But the unchar a cteriz a ble presence of the

.
thou is also a revelation of an abyss of existence within myself .
“ ”
The whole I thou exp erience i s s o to speak bottomless It
-
, ,
.
occurs in a realm that i s transcendent in relation to objectified

knowledge In s o far a s I belong to this experience I belong to a
.
,
re alm of bei ng whi ch is Sp ecifically inexh austible T hat is why .
Marcel will s a y To love a p erson i s to s a y to him Thou at least

“
,
‘
”2 7
shalt not d i e Th is is not to be understood as some kind o f
.
’
objective i nformati on whi ch I have come across ; it i s s imply the

tr an slation into language oi the experience of presence with which _
communi on is flooded It will do no good to s a y that nevertheless

.
he w i ll d i e since all thi ngs come to an end for the prop heti c ,
affirmation of love i s precisely a proclamation that the beloved
27 The Mys tery o f B e ing , vo l . II, p 62

. .
The
as beloved is exempt from the penalti es of thingness The thou i s .
not a thing That is why the I thou relation can pro vide the
.
-
”
basi s for a privileged kind of knowledge .
O nly to the extent that I can affir m myself a s spirit as trans ,
“ ” “
phenomenal can I be sai d to have knowledge of the i mmortality
,
”
of the soul ( whi ch i s a rather unsatisfactory objectified phr a s e )
'
Then the experi ences which enable me to grasp the unique mean
ing of non thingified personal exi stence occupy a crucial p osi tion
-
for this sort of knowledge The tradi ti onal proof for the immor
.
“ ”
tality of the soul ( as simple and spi ritual ) proceeds as if we

could have an objective gr asp of the soul as a sp eci al sort of
thing wi th attri butes implying natural i mmortali ty But once the .
soul i s approached in the objectified mode of thought we are i n ,
danger of coming to rest i n an i mplication of concepts At best .
we have proved that the soul i s a rep osi tory or an efli ci ent cause of
“ ”
universal ideas and that thus i t i s immaterial But an i t which is .
not materi al i s a rather negative notion and rather vulnerable to

the formali st reduction of Kant The posi tive i ntelligibility of
.
existing as a person rather than a thing i s given in the experience

, ,
of commun i on O nly a thought which cl i ngs to commun i on remain s

.
attached to the meaning which makes the a fli rma tion of immor

tality possible It is not an object called the soul whi ch is immortal ;
.
it i s we who are immortal We here together bound in love we

”
.
, , ,
grant and bestow the mutual tokens of i mmuni ty from death .
Immortali ty i s not a c onsequence implici t in the concept of i m

“
”
materi ali ty it i s a promise sp oken to those exi sting in communion
, .
Love i n being a revelati on of the thou i s also a revelation of my

, ,
self and the trans phenomenal character of my being H ow do I

,
-
.
a fli rm th i s ? O nly so far as I
p art i c ip ate in commu ni on Love is .
“ ”
the active refusal to treat itself as subjective It is charged with .
cogn itive p otenti ali ti es to the preci se extent that i t is love O nly a .
reflection which plunges i nto communi on can make this a ffirma

tion whi ch is why communi on i s a source of knowledge
, .
Fi nally for the same reason in the Op ini on of both Marcel and
, ,
“ ”
Buber the I thou relation i s cogni tive i n yet ano ther w a y The
,
-
.
R EMAINDER S
Certai n of the p roblems in epistemology which are very much to

“
the fore in contemporary speculation have not yet been touched

on nor could very much be done wi th them i n a book of a fairly
,
general character Since they are so i ntrinsically interesting and

.
import a nt however and since they will call for s o much continu
, ,
ing attention on the p art of the philosop hers of the future it does
,
not seem fitting to p ass them by unnoticed The following brief

.
di scussi ons are thereby app ended not in the belief that they do
,
justice to their subjects but only as indicators of territory still to

,
be explored .
T H E P H IL O SO P H Y OF SCIE NCE
It is well known that most of the important problems in con
temp orary p hilosophy of science are epi stemological i n on gm and
ch ar acter .
Since its inception in the m echani cal approach to natur e of

Galileo classi cal physics had tended to p roceed on the relatively
,
uncritical acceptance of the categori es natur al to that approach .
O ri gi nally sci ence had been s et on this path by the growing ex a s

era ti on wi th the futil i ties of A ri stotlei a n physics s o force fully
p ,
expressed by Francis Bacon at the end of the 1 6th century It was .
all very well for A ristotle s p urely contemplative philosophical eye

’
to stress a teleologi cal appreci ati on of nature but this viewp oi nt

,
had not advanced the interests of humanity one iota Re ally to .
“ ”
know nature ought to confer on man the power to intervene
Rema ind ers 2 77
effectively in nature and to wrest its processes to human a d va n

tage In keeping with a now fami liar outlook men began to feel
.
,
that to kn ow nature and to control it were convergent ideals .
What good to assert in A ristotle s manner that the natures of

,
’
” “
things acted for ends if thi s led either nowhere or up a blind —
alley? It would be much better to seek out how events happen than
1
to rest comfortable in the presumed knowledge of w hy they hap

pen The search for the how led to a sear ch for effi cient causes
.
,
the actual agencies involved in the step by step occurrence of

physical processes .
Thi s gave modern science a strong an a lytical turn the ambiti on ,
being to dissect a process into the serial activities which com

prised it A nalysi s once ini tiated must be p ursued to the end for
.
“
science could not feel it was understanding the ultimate how of
natural processes until it could discover the ultimate phys i cal com
p onents efli ci entl
y causing activity It led therefore to a reinstate .
, ,
ment of the atomic theory at the center of sci entific operations .
The ultimate e fficient causes at work in p hysi cal p rocesses were

these smallest elements of matter i nfluencing each other in the ,
only way they could be plausibly concei ved as influencing each

other as chunks of matter — in other words through mech a nical
, ,
forces Since it is apparently i mpossible to conceive of mechani cal

.
2
forces acting otherwise than in a un iform and necessary manner ,
the outlook of classical p hys i cs inevitably became determini sti c .
When Laplace delivered hi s famous p ronouncement in the 1 8th

century that for a hypothetical mind i n p ossession of information
,
as to the pos i tion and veloci ty of every ulti mate p arti cle in the
universe the whole future would be predictable he was merely
, ,
epitomizing a belief inherent in classical p hys i cs as such .
1 The bli nd a lle for i ns ta nce of the expla na ti o n tha t fire tend s upw a r d
y ,
“
b eca us e i ts n a tur a l
pla ce i s up , or the bli nd a lle
y tha t the hea venly
b o d i es tra vel i n mo ti on b eca us e the s p her e i s the p er fect figure
ci rcula r .
2 T he re emi nence of ma th ema ti cs i s d i rectly connected w i th b oth the

p
-
a na l ti ca l s ea r ch for mea s ur a ble cons ta nci es of i ntera cti on a nd w i th the

y
o nl
y k i n d o f un i ty p oss i ble i n a m echa n i ca l s ys tem the uni ty o f la w s w hi ch ,
a li ed to i nte ra l s ecti ons o f thi s s ys tem

pp g .
O bjective re ality came to be envisaged in the image of the new
mechanics and this vi sion seemed to be justified by the unprece
dented prosperity of theory and practice which it made poss ible
for the burgeonin g science For classical physics no tions like .
,
mass velocity posi tion volume pressure force and the like were
, , , , ,
ultimate characteristi cs of an independently existing matter and ,
no t s i mply abs tract instruments by which man made his way in the
” “
world O n the contr a ry the world was the world which cor
.
,
responded to these categori es and whatever featur es could not be ,
reduced to these were relegated to a subsid i ary mental and hence ,
subject ive status ,

.
This we have seen was the fate of the secondar y qualities

, , ,
”
and it was also the fate of the notion of quali ty in general The .
new science was a science of quantity ; quali ties could find a place
within it only to the ex tent that they had measurable correlates :
thus red and green as experienced are qualitati vely and therefore
,
i nc ommensurably di fferent but thei r correlated light waves are

,
-
measurable and therefore scientifically admi ssible O nce this a p .
proach is followed generally it is a short step to the belief that ,
“ ”
these demoted qu alities are not as really real as their ass umed
quantitative bas i s The real world becomes by sci entific consensus
.
, ,
a system of geometrically conceived material p a rticles in mo tion .
We have already seen some of the epi stemologic al d ifli culties

whi ch arise out of thi s view notably the d ifli culties inherent in the
,
representationalist theory of perception There i s no need to go .
over these again The present remarks will be chiefly concerned

.
not wi th philosophy s problems wi th the views of science but wi th

’
science s confusion about i ts own views For what has occurred

’
.
,
i n modern science is that the advan ces withi n science itself have
forced a confused re evaluation of many or a ll of the convictions
-
of classical phys i cs The picture of the atomic universe as an

.
inde finite number of s ub mi cros copic bill i ard balls soundlessly

-
clicking together according to the rules of mechani cs can no

longer be held to be the portrai t of the real world Not only has “ ”
.
the image of the atom as a solid chunk of matter been found

280 The Phi los op hy of R
n
ewf
"
manner in which their reali ty ought to be conceived is a m

extreme perplexity The natural thing to do would be to
.
them as re al in the same way that chairs tables rocks an , , ,
familiar objects are real only on a smaller scale This was the ,
.
older view and the one which ha s now run into appar ently i nsu
,
p era ble difli culti es T here has occurred . in contemporary ph y s i cs

”
what might be called a crisis of explanation Physics has found“
.
itself called up on to speak of the entities with which it deals in a

w a y that casts doubt both on the i r mode of reali ty and on i ts own
mode of comp rehending Three sources for the confusion may be .
bri efly cited :

1 ) Most familiarly there is the Uncertainty Principle of Heis
,
enberg according to which it is impossible to state at the same

,
3
time the position and velocity of an electron E xperimentally this .

,
“
imp ossibili ty derives from the fact that any qu a ntity of light suffi
ci ent to detect i ts po si ti on would modify its veloci ty and con ,
v er s el
y any quantity
, o f li ght which would leave its veloci ty un af
fected would not be s ufli ci ent to reveal its position A s far as the .
factual part of this situation goes it is indisputable : our ins tru ,
ments of detection in this case thwart the discovery they seek to

make p ossible But so far forth the imp ossibili ty might be t e
.
,
garded as a limitation on our instruments O ne might continue to .
clai m that the electron ha s a p osition and velocity even though ,
man is too clumsy to detect it Thi s i s the View whi ch E instein .
defended but the weight of contemp orary physi cal authority is

,
against him A ccording to the interpretation held by Hei senberg

.
and the Copenhagen school this imp ossibility is an imposs ibili ty ,
i n p rincip le It i s in princip le i mposs i ble to assert that the electron

.
has a definite pos i tion and veloci ty at the same ti me Briefly their .
,
reasons are as follows : at the s ub mi cros c0 pi c level we do not -

,
have a right to attribute a ny features to entities unless we can

3
See W erner H ei s enberg, Phys ics a nd P hi los op hy ( New Yo k : r H a rp er
T or chb o ok s ) , 1962 , es p cha p ters III
. a nd X For
. a
p op ula r ex
p la na ti on, s ee
I . W N . . Sulli v a n , The L imi ta ti o ns f Sci ence ( New

o Yo k :
r Mentor B oo ks )'
1949, p 69ss . .
Rema i nd ers 28I
verify them exp erimentally ( s ince these entities are not i tems for
observation alone ) ; but i f we assume that the electron does have
'
a definite velocity and position simultaneously the results Of an ,
experiment conducted on this assumption will not tally with ex

ecta ti ons ; if on the other hand we i ntroduce the concept Of
p , ,
“
probability into posi tion and velocity ( as qu a ntum physi cs
does ) our observations will tally wi th exp ectations In other
, .
words if it i s right to assert that an electron has a simultaneous

,
position a nd velocity then the vali dity Of quantum physics i tself

,
( which i s firmly established ) would have to be relin quished .
Therefore i t i s not possible to speak of the electron having S i mul

ta neously defini te positi on and veloci ty .
Now to some ears such a statement may seem so outlandi sh

,
as to invite instant di smi ssal— e verything we may in sist must be , ,
s o mew here and movi ng at s o me speed at any i ven time Yet to

g .
mitigate this kind of protest we need only remind ourselves that

,
thi s i s s o only if the electron is an Obj ect li ke familiar objects ,
and that is ex actly the question Thoughts and ideas for instance .
, ,
do not have to be confin ed to any definite point Of place When I .
have the i dea Of writing my idea i s effectively in my hand and

,
in my head at the same ti me O r more p ertinently we might ask

.
,
”
ourselves at what p osition a wave i s s ituated The wave as s uch .
18 not locali zable at a definite positi on T hese elementary consider .
ations solve nothing of course but they bring us back to the i ssue
, ,
.
If we concei ve an electron to be real a s macroscop i c o bjects ar e

real then the uncertainty pri nciple as well as other statements i n
, ,
quantum p hys i cs becomes altogether Opaque ; but s ho uld we con

,
s i der an electron in thi s w a y?

2 ) Secondly there is the famous p aradox in regard to the
,
nature Of light whi ch now assumes the same unr esolved status i n
,
physics that the grace and free will controversy assumed in theol
-
o
gy
. U nt il the contem p orary era i t had been largely accep ted that
,
light was prop agated i n waves O nly if thi s w a s SO could various

.
ro
p p erties , i nclud i ng the p henomenon Of i nterference be at a ll ,
explicable But there i s now equally incontrovertible evi dence in

.
another di recti on ; the photoelectric effect for instance is only to , ,
be explained if light d oes not travel i n waves but is emi tted in

” “
discrete energy packets called quanta There is then appar
-
.
, ,
ently conclusive evidence for the fact that light must be conceived
as consisting both i n waves a nd in quanta Yet how can this be .
imagined? A wave is a continuous p henomenon quanta are dis ,
crete H ow can the same entity be the subject Of such contra di c

.
tory predi cates ? C ertainly no image that we can form can ever
succeed in representing such an entity— which is tantamount to
saying that its reality cannot be comparable to that Of perceptual
Objects .
3 ) Finally we may ci te the d iscovery which began the whole

,
trouble Max Planck s di scovery of the fact that atoms existed only
,
’
in discrete energy states An atom may exist at h igher or lower

-
.
energy levels but these levels have d iscrete values and the atom
, ,
does not occupy levels i ntermediate between them To appreciate .

4
the anomaly of this we may think by analogy of a pot Of water

,
being heated which i nstead Of p assing continuously through a

,
progress ion Of temp erature states existed now at 3 0 C now at ,

°
.
,
5 0 C and now at 80 C without ever being at the interveni n g

°
.
,
°
.
stages Not only is there discontinui ty Of energy but many feel

.
,
that there is title to t alk of dis co ntinui ty Of posi tion ; at least there ,
is no title to s a y that an electron successively Observed at two

different p ositi ons had to pass through intervenin g positi ons be
tw een the Observati ons O bviously if such remarks ar e genui nely
.
,
applicable to the atom and its comp onents an atom cannot be ,
real i n any way analogous to the reali ty Of everyday Objects and

the questi on Of its mode Of reality i s very much Open .
O ne way Of understandi ng the bas i s of such diffi culties as the

foregoing i s to s ee them as manifestati ons of the breakdown Of the
“ ”
sp ectator vi ew Of nature wi thin science Classical phys i cs had .
regarded itself as a p ur e witness Of natural events to which its ,
TO p la i n thi s p eculi a ri ty cons i s tently w i th the cons tella ti on p i cture

4
ex
Of th e a to m, the noti on O f a
“ ”
j
qua ntum ump of a n electron to a new orbi t
i s w ell know n .
2 84 The Phi los op hy of Know led ge
that it would refuse to get colder than that Actually the existence .
,
of an absolute zero is a consequence Of our decision to mea s ure
heat and to measure it in a certain way The very conception of

,
.
an Ide al Gas scale logi cally entails that there will be a lower li mit ,
for in such a scale temp erature uni ts are defined with reference
-
to the pressure Of an ideal gas and it is imp ossible that pressure

,
fall below zero ; hence any temperature defined wi th reference to

decreasing p ressure must have a lower limi t Thus the statement .
,
about absolute zero i s not a descriptive statement about a brute

fact Of nature but is a consequence Of our theory Most scientists
,
.
would probably agree with Ryle s Opinion that scientific concepts

’
“ ” ”
are theory laden rather than descriptive E ven the atom i s
-
.
‘‘
not an Object Of inspection wh i ch i s divergently inter reted by

p
classical a nd contemp orary physics but an Object into whose ,
conception theory enters essenti ally : the atom Of classic al physics

and the atom of contemporary physi cs are two significantly differ
ent Objects .
In one Obvious resp ect the changed attitude Of science is a

he a lthy sign For it bespeaks an end to the Mperi a lism Of
.
“
method which had too long caused the scientist to di smiss as

unreal those features Of reality which were not available through
hi s sort Of cognition T here is much more di spos i t ion on the part
.
Of contem orary philosophers Of science to recognize the abstract

p
character Of their own method and to refrain from hyp ostasizing
the traits Of reality with which thi s method is exclusively p reoccu
p i ed As
. E dd i ngton has pointed o ut it would be a basic error
,
7
for
one who uses a fis h net with two inch holes to declare d o ma ti
g
-
cally that all fish in the ocean are larger than two i nches Just s o .
,
the scienti st whose method i s abstractly quantitative can only

“
cato those features in the ocean Of reality whi ch can be
caught by this method Ins truments have bui lt in li mi tations and
.
-
,
the theory which is the prime instrument Of science allows it to

6 D i lemma s pp 90—9 1
, . .
The P hilo s op hy o f Phy s ica l Scie nce ( C a mbri d ge : Ca mbrid ge Uni vers ity
7
Pr es s ) , 1949, pp 16, 62 . .
Rema i nd ers 2 85
select out Of the matrix Of exp erience only certain aspects The .
philosophically reflective s c1entis t will not succumb to the tendency

to project the abs tract results Of hi s quanti tative method into inde
pendent re ality nor to derogate the cogni tional value Of other
,
aspects Of experience to which his method by definition prevents , ,
his access It is one Of the achievements Of contemporary philos

.
o h
p y Of scien ce to have roused itself from a dogmatic rut a nd
progressed towards this acknowledgment .
MORAL AND A ESTH ETIC E XP E RIE NCE
If a brief treatment Of the problem Of science is presump tuous ,
s o i s a mere glance at the cognitive status of moral and aesthetic
experience Yet not to glance at all in this direction would be to

.
omit one Of the important topics of current epistemological inter

est and so we will once again be sketchy rather than default
, .
The issue may be p ut thus : in what sens e do moral and aesthetic

experience give us knowledge ? DO these experiences merely tell
us something about our indivi dual selves i n our individuality or
do they allow us to stand i n the presence Of a facet Of reality
which i s really there and otherwi se inaccessi ble? Nobody is in
the habit of claiming extra individual value for his experiences Of
-
pain or di sapp ointment or fatigue or anger and upon sophi sti

, , , ,
ca ted reflecti on it might be felt that moral and aesthetic feelings
are no more revelatory of reality than these Yet we must beware .
Of proceeding too qui ckly here Just because certain feelings are
.
” “
non cognitional does not mean that a ll are We should not too
-
.
hastily dichotomiz e knowledge and feeling for there is the clear ,
possibility that certain knowledge may only be obtai nable through

feelin g Unfortunately even common sense has a tendency to do
.
8
just this to expand a concern to eliminate emotion which may

—
,
be desirable in certain ar eas to a total rejection of the cognitive

,
alue of experiences in which emotion shares at all But this is a .
8 Loui s Rei d , Wa ys o f K no w led g e a nd E xp er i ence, p 81 . .

f alse Objectivity It assumes that all facets of reality are accessi
.
ble from the same mental vantage point— and there is nothing -
self evident about th i s assumption It may be that if I want to get

-
.
the scientific pi cture of the physical universe or to get the details

Of an auto acci dent I must discount the prejudi cial influence Of
,
my ow n emotions or of others interests But that does not p rove ’

.
that if I want to know whether justice or beauty is extra-individual ,
I must eschew all emotional i nvolvement and assume the attitude

Of a neutral Observer— for this may guarantee my inabili ty to
Observe what is really there .
Our discussion will l a rgely content itself with making that

d is tinction clear without attemptin g the e x tremely di ffi cult task
,
Of decid ing how I can determine whether a particular pi ctur e i s

beautiful or more beautiful than another or whether a specific
, ,
course Of conduct is right or wr ong Q uestions like thi s are Of .
considerable everyday interest and even urgency but they are ,
better left to the philosophy Of art or to ethics Our question is .
more like asking whether the phi losophy Of a rt and ethics have
anything to argue about— whether their disputes have cognitional
status at a ll It is a question Of the rea lm Of reality into which we
.
are introduced by moral and aesthetic experience Is there any .
conclusive Obj ection to co nsidering this as ex tra ind ividual ? The -
logic al posi tivist has a si mple answer to this question his emotive ,
“
”
theory Of value O nly statements which can be sensibly verified
.
ar e meani n gful and co gni tional accord i n

g to him; other statements
,
do not in spite Of their propositional form make assertions about

, ,
reality but ar e equivalent to exclamations Promises ought to be .

9 “
” ”
kept or Beethoven s Fifth is beautiful are on thi s basis no
’
, ,
” “
more revelatory Of reality than is the exclamation O uch " They
are more refined express ions of approval or disapproval but ar e ,
revelations Of subjective ind ividual reactions only .
Now the Obvious d ifli culty once thi s i ssue i s rai sed is in deciding
who settles it E very answer to a di sputed question must be given
.
9 Ayer L a ng ua g e Tr uth
, , a nd L ogic, cha t
p e r VI .
grant co gnition scop e beyond hi s confines : E rnst Ca s sirer sought -
to enlarge the K anti an notion Of a synthesis s o that every symbolic ,
unification of experience found a cognitive place from sci ence to ,
myth T M Greene tri es to show that the moral and aesthetic

.
11
. .
realms p ossess the Kantian characteri stics Of Objectivi ty i n their

ow n way and d eserve the title Of cogniti on Yet Greene ad mits 12
.
that the consci ousness for whi ch these characteristics are p resent
is not the subject ih general Of phenomenal knowledge but a
- -
,
”
sp ecial cultivated consci ousness and s o again we tend to b e
“
—
,
come ci rcular .
It i s not evident that there is any way out Of this circle The .
univers a lity which we desire to characterize knowledge seems to

be an aspiration an ideal to which the indivi dual consciousness
,
refers i tself and from whi ch it seeks to draw sustenance If we .
were to confuse this asp i rati on to uni versality wi th either a re al

or potenti al unanim i ty on the a rt of a factual hum a n community
p ,
it would be difficult to grant cognitive status to moral and aestheti c

experience Dietrich von Hildebrand follows the path Of insisting
.
that the reali ty Of moral values in p arti cular but also Of aesthetic ,
values must be vi ewed without reference to any consensus For

, .
v on H ildebrand a value is an autonomous datum as irreducibly

, ,
given as any in terms Of which anyone would seek to justify it : it

justifies i tself thr ough i ts ow n luminous presence and no one w ho ,
really stands in the presence Of a value would feel i t necessary

that others also acknowledge i ts presence .
13
Martin Hei degger too i nstead Of trying to break the circle

, , ,
jump s into it The poet Hei degger holds i s the voice Of the holy
.
, , .
14
Poetic experience is the revelation Of the trans p henomenal depth -
11 See Erns t C a s s ir er , A n E s s a y on Ma n ( Ga rd en Ci ty : D oubled a y

Anchor B oo ks ) , 1 9 5 6, pp 1 5- 4 1, 87—97
. .
12 Theod ore Greene Mor a l A es thetic a nd Re lig io us Ins ig ht ( New

Meyer , , ,
k
B r uns w i c : Rutger s Univ er s i ty P r es s ) 1 95 7 , es p pp 2 4—2 8, 5 9, 7 7 , . . .
13
D i etri ch von H ild ebr a nd C hr is ti a n E thics ( New ,or : D a vi d McKa ) ,
y Y k
1 95 3 , pp 34 —6 3, 169— 2 81
. .
“
14
See the es s a y on H old erli n a nd the E s s ence of P oetr y i n E x is tence
a nd B ei ng , tr a ns . by W erner k
B ro c ( Chi ca go : H enry Regnery 1949 .
2 89
Of D a s ei n but i t i s a revelation accessible only to the poet and to

,
hi s genuine audience He w ho has ears to hear he hears— and

.
,
that i s the end Of it We might extend thi s as Hei degger does not
.
, ,
to moral experience Man s exp eri ence Of h imself as one who is

.
’
called upon to actuali ze mora l values is the exp erience Of himself

as a being transcendent in relation to p henomenal exp eri ence But .
this call i s p resent a s call as app eal and hi s aflir ma tion Of thi s
, ,
re alm Of being always has the character Of a resp onse His asser
-
.
tion that he inh ab its a unique moral realm is inseparable from hi s

d ecis i o n to inhab i t that realm E xp eri ence in this r ealm is cogni
.
tiona l but it is cogni tional a s ap pe al Perhap s I may a fli rm some

, .
thing about my exi stence from within the moral and aestheti c
realm whi ch I cannot a fli r m w i tho ut that realm and yet thi s ahi r
,
“ ”
mation is never automatic ally imposed on me It shares wi th
”
exi stenti al knowledge the character Of being a free certitude ,
us further reason to bel ieve that man s freedom i s

’
never absent from asserti on Of transcendent dimens ion Of

his being .
R EPR ISE
Let us now briefly retrace the steps we have followed in thi s

philosophical exploration .
Th e ep i stemological question we found arises from the funda

, ,
mental ambivalence Of the human s ituation : man both is an d is

not present to hi s ow n exp erience This non coincidence of man s
.
-
’
existence with itself the mark Of his finitud e and temporali ty has
, ,
as its cognitive counterpart the non coincidence of his knowledge-
with itself : just as man i s not what he is s o he does not know

“
what he knows This cognitional non co incidence ma y be regarded

.
-
as a fissure between thought and experi ence and also a s an ,
estrangement Of thought from itself The p hi losop hy of knowledge

.
i s an attempt to p erm i t thought to come in to explici t reco gnition

o f its o wn essence ; it i s thought s e ff ort to e xpress and exh i bit to
’
itself the grounds Of steadf ast certitude Knowledge i s tied to .
“
ex res s i on : to know i s not o nly to experi ence but to express
P
one s experience to oneself The judgment i s a p ivot a l form of
’
.
expressi on but the real p reoccup ati on of epi stemology i s with the
,
ground Of judgment : the nature range and origin Of e vid ence

, , .
While human thought is characterized by the a ppeara nce/ re a li ty

di stinction this distinction cann ot render all thought null sin ce it
, ,
cannot consume i ts ow n foundati on : m an s questionin g exi stence ’

.
Wi th this realizati on subjectivism i s overcome The subject which

, .
rai ses the ep istemologi cal question is the subject whi ch exi sts out
of the
p rim ord i al quest i on and thus alread y surpasses the i solated
Car tesian ego T here can be no irreducible p roblem of the exi st
.
2 92 Phi los op hy oi Know led g e
The
o f kn owledge is aff ected by the non coincidence of thought w ith

-
i tself a nd the fissure between man s thought and his ex is tence an d

’
,
“ ”
they should not be rega rded as automatically self validating in -
an abstract way Kant s Objection that these prin ciples cannot have
.
’
a transcendent us e would o nly be v alid if they were purely formal

rules empty Of content TO recognize that they are more than this
, .
“ ”
depends on recognizing that the idea of being really has content;
this recognition in turn cannot be achieved except by the singular
, ,
subject in all hi s singularity and contingence Hence the recogni ti on .
of the concretely absolute character of the first p rinciples is a
continual achievement Of thought a lived transmutati on of exist

,
ence into thought which is at the same ti me an appropriation Of

intelligibility by my existence .
It was not held that the primitive asserti on provides the sole
trans temp oral assurance p ossible for thought As a fli rmer I am
-
.
,
a total Op enness to the real The content Of a fii rma tion however

.
, ,
ari ses from the s i de of my existence I a fli rm the presence Of real

.
i ty In th i s a fli rma tion concepts play a key role Nevertheless

. .
,
concepts cannot be sati sfactorily looked upon as merely regi stering

what is already contained in experience cons i dered pre concep tu -
ally Ideas are creative app rehensions Of p resences They are an

. .
attempt to take up my total exi stence into the order of expression .
The i r universal ch ar acter is also an expression Of p resence : a

revelation Of reality as sp ecifically mind ful as answering to mind-
,
.
In this light the controversy between rationalist and emp iri cist as
to whether there is anything more in ideas than in experience is a
vain one : it i s based upon the error Of thinking that the intelli gi
” “
b ility of a concept must be either dep endent up on or inde
“
p endent Oi experience But if

. a concept is a creat i ve a
pp rehen
sion then li ke the ar tist s creative i dea its mean ing explicitly
, ,
’
emerges i n a p erpetual dialectical interplay with experi ence Like .
the arti s ts s idea it both transcends the temporality Of processive

’
experience a nd i s only revealed in i t Here seems to reside the

.
relevance Of such views as p ragmati sm sociologi sm and b istori ,

Rep ri s e 29
ci s m The meaning of our concepts explicitly emerges to view a

.
w e read them back out of the very experiences which they mak
possible : the conviction of the adequacy Of this explicit meanin

becomes firmer as the canvas Of existence reveals it more plainly
This di alectical relation by no means elim inates the os s ibili t
p
Of trans temporal ins ight or makes every judgment liable to futur
-
reversal Just as the artist while not able to give an exhaustiv

.
,
acc ount Of hi s creative idea can recognize what is compatible w i t

,
it so though man cannot give an exhaustive account Of hi s con

,
” “ ” ” “ “
ce ts ( such as person li berty justice etc ) he v ertheles
p , , ne , , .
can when hi s consciousness is sufficiently developed r ecogniz

, ,
what is compatible with them T hus the perspectival character 0 .
thought including its soci al and historical dimens ions does no

, ,
eliminate the possibility Of truth but rather is integral to it just a ,
the p rocess Of painting is integral to the recognition Of the crea tiv

idea A concept ( at least one which is not purely formal ) is not
.
brittle thou ght checker with clearly marked outlines but a p leni
-
,
tude Of potential meaning To know the meaning Of a c oncep t i

.
no t equivalent to be ing able to defin e it and hence the di chotom ,
set up by logical positivism between merely tautologous necessar

judgments and essenti ally co rri gible empiri cal statements is a fals
one : if ideas are creative a rehensions we may have genuin
pp ,
trans temporal i nsights into experi ence

-
.
Since the content of a fli r mati on arises from the side of on

-
exi stence the character Of knowledge must be analogical Ther

,
.
range Of presence S ince presence i s a functi on Of my mode 0

,
existin g Perceptual Objects sci entific entities persons moral val

.
, , ,
ues and the transcendent dimens ion Of exis tence cannot be presen
,
in a univoc al manner If for ex ample the I thou exp erience is

.
, ,
-
unique way in which the self i s op en to the non self it ha s a -

,
irreducible and irreplaceable cogni tional value The meani ng 0 .
evi dence is manifold Some evi dence may be in function of m

.
S i ngular subjectivity Hence the sear ch for certi tude cannot b

.
construed as a search for relief from the weight of singular ex ist

ence Such a search is a ques t n ot for ass ur ance but for t e as sur
.
-
ance and woul d risk taking refuge either in formalism or in a

,
social consensus .
Now there IS some legitimate place even for this latter since for ,
“ ” “ ”
man seeing is seeing together It is clear that man is most .
“
comfortable in de aling with things a thing being a triplex of ,
concep t s ense and acti on A s such a thing tends to be a correlate

, , .
,
Of a social convergence It i s no acci dent tha t man feels most at

.
”
home in usin g the word knowledge in the re assuring realm Of
“
-
science and every day practicality where the applicability Of ,
” ”
“
thing is clear cut But transce ndence is not a thing : hen ce it
-
.
is known only analogously For instance even though a man may

.
,
” “
contend that he knows that the soul i s i mmortal he still fears ,
” “
to d i e This fear would be literally insane if kn owing in the
.
re alm Of the transcendent meant exactly the same thing as kno w

”
i ng in the phenomenal realm : o ne who was afra i d to enter a
room in which he knew a pleasant time awaited hi m would be
“ ”
p sychot i c E ven
. the not i on of a proof undergoes a mod ificat i on
in the region Of he trans cendent for every affirmation Of the
t ,
transcendent involves the resp onse of my freedom It i s the most .
concrete Of all affirmations and sup remely requires my creative

,
pa rti cip ation in the truth whi ch I pronounce Perhaps a s man .
fashi ons hi s human exi stence more and more in the image of his
creative intuition Of transcendence thi s social convergence will ,
besto w on knowledge Of the transcendent something Of the psy

”
cholo i ca l securit Of our knowledge of things if history
g y ; s o ,
has a very p os itive contribution to make to knowledge .
In conclusi on it should be emphasized that the view here

,
enunciated does not lead to arbitrarin ess Just because there are .
different typ es of things which are sayable we cannot conclude ,
th a t everyone has a right to say what he pleas es It is a correct .
instin ct whi ch leads us to as sociate knowledge with the attribute

Of universality What is always contras ted to knowledge through
.
,
o ut its range is an asserti on which has o nly intra individual value

,
-
.
In e ffect what we have emphasized is that there is a universality

R ELA TED R EADING
The p rima ry s ources ma ny Of the second a ry s ources germane to

a nd
the subj ect ma tter of ea ch ch a ter h a ve b een m enti oned i n the notes
p
to the cha pters ; for the most p a rt the follow ing bibli ogra phy d oes not ,
d upli c a te b oo k s a lre a d y menti oned b ut a d d s further r ela ted m a teri a l ,
a n d i s me a nt to b e s u lem ent a r i n a limi ted a nd selective w a y

pp y .
Numb ers refer to the cha p ters .
Henri Bergson A n Introd uctio n to Meta p hys ics tra ns T E

,
-
, . . .
H ulme New Y or k a nd L ond on P utn a m 1 9 12

, , , .
W Ma cneile Dixon The H um n Si tua ti n New Y ork Oxford

.
,
a o , ,
Univers i ty P res s 19 5 8 , .
D . M . he H i era rchy o f H ea ven a nd E a r th, New

Y ork H a rp er 1 95 3
“
, , .
José Ortega y G a s set Wha t is P hi loso p hy ? tra ns Mild red , , .
Ad a m s New Y o rk W W N orton
,
C O 1 960 , . . .
,
.
L M Regi s O P
. . E p is temo logy tr a ns Im eld a Choquette
, . .
, , .
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ca r tes to K a n t New Y or k Ra nd om H ou s e 1 9 63
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W illia m A Luijp en E x is tentia l P henomen o logy P ittsburgh

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D uques ne U niver s ity P res s 1 9 60 , .
W illi a m J Richa rd s on S J F r om P heno me no logy to Thoug ht

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T he H a gu e Ma rtinus Nijhoff 1 9 64 ( on H ei d egger )

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John V C a nfield a nd F ra nk lin H D onn ell Jr Re a d i ngs i n the

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1 9 64 .
298 Rela ted Rea d i ng
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P i ttsb urgh D uquesne U nivers ity P ress 1 95 9

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Thom a s E H ill C n temp o ra ry Theori es of K no w led g e New

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York Ronald P res s 19 6 1

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John A P a ssmore A H und red Yea s of P hi los op hy Lond on

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G reen a nd CO 1 9 17 2 vols vol II .

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H a rry R Kloek er S J Tho mis m a nd Mod ern Tho ug ht New

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-
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Jacques Ma rita in D is ti ng uis h t Uni te or The D eg re of ,

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K no wled g e new ly tra ns und er s ti pervis ion of Gerald B

, . .
P hela n New Y ork Scribner 1 9 5 9

, , , .
Cofl ey , op . cit .
, vol . I .
t enne Gils on The Chris tia n Phi los op hy

E i ,
o f St . Tho ma s
A qui nas tr a n s L K Shoo k New Y ork
, . . .
, , Rand om H ouse ,
1 95 6, pp 1 87— 2 4 8 . .
Yv s e m n
Si o , In trod ucti o n a l O n tolog i e d a
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C o nna i tre, P a i rs ,
D esclée d e B ro uw er 1 934
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St T hom a s Aquina s O n Tr uth a nd Fa ls i ty a nd on H uma n

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K no w led g e, Chi ca g o , Reg nery , 1 94 1 ( S umma Theolog ia e I .

, ,
qu . 1 6 , 1 7 , 84 —88, p ep a d for r re the Grea t Books Found a tion ) .
Geor e g B o s
a , The L i mi ts of Rea s o n, New York H arp er 1 96 1 , , .
Irving L rowitz P hi los op hy Sci nce a nd the Socio logy of

. Ho , , e
K no w led g e Spri ngfield Ill T hom a s 1 96 1

, , .
, , .
Willi a m Ja mes P ra g ma tis m a nd fo ur essa ys from The Mea n

,
i ng of T u th New Y or k Meri d i a n B oo k s 1 9 5 5
r , , , .
Ra ym ond Kli b a ns ky a nd H J P aton ed i t P hi los op hy a nd . .

, .
,
H is to ry New Y or k H a rp er T orchboo k 196 3

, , , .
Jacques Ma quet The Sociology of K no w led g e trans John F, , . .
L oc ke B o ston B e a c on P res s 1 95 1 ( a critica l a na lys i s o f

, , ,
K ar l Ma nn hei m a nd P i tirim Sorok i n )

H ei nri ch Ri c k ert Scie nce a nd H is t y ; a C i tiq ue of P os i ti is t
, or r v
E p is tem logy tra ns George Rei s man New Yo rk V a n No s

o , , , ,
trand 1 9 62, .
Fred eri c k C op les to n S J C o n temp or a y P hi los op hy S tud i es , . .

,
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i n Log i ca l P s i ti vis m a nd E is ten tia li m W estm ins ter Md

o x s , , .
,
New man P ress 195 6 ,

.
Ab solute , k nowled ge as op en to , Ca us a lity
62 , 12 8— 13 1 , 1 40 , 1 4 6, 1 94 p hilos op hi ca l p rincip le Of , 1 35
Ab s tra cti on , theory of 1 67— 1 68 , 1 36
Acti o n ,
a nd k nowled ge 15 1 187 , ,
a nd s ci ence, 140 —14 1
19 1 rt tud e 9 2 7
Ce i , ,
An a logy a b s olute 1 2 9— 1 30 ,
Of b ei ng , 17
“
free 2 4 6—25 0 ,
”
Of nowled ge 1 5— 1 9
k , typ es o f 147 1 5 1 ,
-
An a ly ti cal p ropo s iti on s ,

2 19 Chi ld e Vere 1 6 1 9 3
, , ,
A p ri o r i 1 16, 1 4 3— 1 4 4 , 1 99
, Circle ep i s temolog ica l 5 9—6 1
, ,
r t te
A i s o l , 3 , 1 5 6, 1 6 1 2 7 6—27 7 ,
Co gi to 2 7— 3 3 1 63
, ,
St Augu s tine 5 3 2 2 3 1 24 6
.
, , , ,
C omm on s ens e 7—9 6 8— 69 , ,
Ay er A J 9 1—9 5 2 1 3 2 18 2 86
, . .
, ,
—
,
a s cre a tive a p p rehens i ons 1 7 1 ,
17 8
t
d is i ng i s u hed from s en se 15 2
Ba con , Si r F ra nci s ,
27 6
,
15 7
B e1ng
a nd ri ence 177— 1 7 8 190
exp e
a s a b ol s ute i d ea 1 2 9 14 6 , ,
C o ncep tu a li sm 1 60— 1 63
, ,
not an Objectified notion , 23 8,

C o nn a tura li ty know led g e b y 2 0
,
, ,
2 44 —24 5
C o n s c i ous nes s
r son H enri 17 8 2 17 2 26
Be g , , , ,
b i p o la ri ty Of 4 7—5 1
-
B erk eley Georg e B i s hop 7 6 83

,
-
d iverse rea lms Of 1 2 5— 1 2 6

, ,
, ,
B ro a d C D 90—9 1 97—9 8 ,
2 87
.
,
B runn er Au guste 5 7—5 8

, ,
in ten ti ona lity of 49
B ub er Ma rtin 2 67— 2 7 5
,
, ,
j ud gmenta l and pe rcep tu a l ,
B urtt E A 1 2 0
1 1 9— 12 1
. .
, ,
no t a conta i ner , 4 4—4 7

Ca s i s rer , E rns t ,
2 88 n o t a thing 67 ,
3 02 Ind ex
Cons ci ousness ( Co nt ) . Exi stenti a l asp ects of k nowing ,
of s elf 4 9 5 0 ,
— 12— 1 5
structure Of 44 s s , . Exi stenti a li sm ,
2 2 6—2 5 0
Contra d i cti on p ri ncip le , of 13 1
132 de F i na nce Jos ep h 2 24 245 , , ,
C rea tive cha a r cter of k nowled ge ,

F initud e 13 ,
17 1—17 8, 18 3 , 2 04—2 0 5 , 2 4 9 F orms P la to s theory of 4 2

,
’
, ,
1 60,
25 0 1 63
C i r teri on Of truth ,
2 4 , 24 6— 24 7 F ound a tio ns of k nowled g e , 6 1—62
G ils on E ti enne 9— 1 0 1 1
D es c a rtes , René , 7 , 6 3 , 1 4 8,
, , ,
a nd “
Given 22 1
a ll of C ha p ter 2 ,
G od
D etermi ni sm , 1 4 0— 14 1
kn owled ge of 242—24 6 2 7 5
D ew ey John 69 , 1 87— 1 97
, ,
ontolog ic a l a r gum ent for 38

, ,
,
D i a log , 5 7— 5 8, 65 — 66, 2 95
G orgi a s 1 1
u t 15 2
Do b
,
,
Greene T M 2 88
critic a l 2 5 s s
. .
, ,
.
,
d re am d oub t 2 9— 3 0 -
, , 4 0—43 Ha rtm a nn Ni cola i 186
, ,
D u a li sm C a rtes i a n 4 0
, , H eg el, G W F . 5 1 , 13 2 , 197,
. .
,
2 32 , 2 67
Ed d i ng ton , Si r Ar thur S .
, 84 , 9 5 H ei d g g e Mar i
e r , tn , 5 , 1 8 , 5 3— 5 5 ,
97 , 2 84 65 2 8 8—2 89
,
Eins tein Albert 2 80 , , H i e senberg , W erner , 1 18, 1 4 1,

E mp i ri ci s m s en se 7 1 , , , 1 5 8— 1 5 9 , 2 80—2 8 1
222 v on H i ld eb r a nd D i etri ch , 2 18
,
Ep i s temology 2 2 5 , 2 88
d ef .
, 12 Hi rst R J 9 3— 94 . .
, ,
method 1 9—2 3 ,
H i s tori ci ty 197—2 0 6 ,
E rror H och en P eter 138— 1 3 9

, ,
no t i n s en s es 1 04—10 5 ,
H um e D a vid 1 4 1— 147 2 0 9—2 13
, , ,
p a r a d ox O f 24 —2 6
,
H us serl E d mund 49 66 12 3
, , , , ,
sources Of 2 7 1 05— 10 6 , ,
2 2 8—2 3 1
E ss ence
a nd exi stence 1 30—13 1 , Id eali sm ep i stemological 35
, ,
k now led ge of 17 1 1 7 8 ,
-
, 179 Id ea s
1 87 a s Ob j ects Of k now mg 7 2—7 5 ,
ntologic a l D esca rtes clea r a nd d i s tinct

’
o a nd g nos eolog i ca l, ,
1 83 3 7— 3 8
E idv ence , 20 , 147- 14 8, 2 2 6—2 3 1 Id e ntity , p ri ncip le O f, 1 3 1— 132
3 04 Ind ex
Mora l exp eri ence 2 85 — 2 89 ,

t
P la o , 3 , 4 , 6, 4 2 , 1 5 8 , 1 60, 1 6 1 ,
My stery v s p roblem 2 3 6—24 1

.
, 1 63 , 1 64 , 2 4 6
P ola ny i , Mi ch a el , 2 05
Natura l vi ew , 66 P ra gma tis m 1 87— 1 97 ,
Newma n John , He nry r na l

Ca d i , P ri nc ip les firs t 13 1— 140 , ,
150 P r ota g or a s 1 1 ,
Nomi nali sm 1 5 7— 1 60 , P rou s t Ma rcel 1 2 5 , ,
Noumena K a nt on 1 1 6— 1 17
, ,
P sy ch olog y d i sti nct from , ep i ste
mology , 2 2 , 1 67- 1 68
Ob j ectivi ty , Py rrho ,
11
a mbi guity in mea ni ng O f, 1 19
1 27 Q u a li ti es s en s e 6 9—7 0
, ,
a nd rela tivity Of knowled ge , p rim a ry a nd sec ond a ry ,

7 3—7 5 ,
—20 3 1 0 8— 1 10 , 1 23 , 1 2 5 , 19 5 , 2 7 8
Ob j e cts , Of science , 1 1 8— 1 19 , terti a ry 85—86 1 95 , ,
2 79— 2 85 Questi on as fund a menta l ,

cogni
O rteg a y G a s s et ,
Jos é ,
1 8, 5 5 5 6, -
ti on 63s s , .
64
Os tens ive s ignific a ti on 97— 1 00 , Rea li sm 9— 1 0 3 5 , ,
O ther mind s 2 5 1 2 60 ,
— immed i a te 1 10 ,
a rg ument b y an a logy for 2 5 3 , mod era te 1 63 ,
255 na ive 68—70 10 3 , ,
virtu a l 108— 1 1 9 ,
Pa ra d igm a rgument 95—97 , Reg is L M 17 22, . .

, ,
P a sc a l Bla i s e 2 3 1 24 6
, , , Rei d L oui s A rn a uld 285
, ,
P erc ep ti on C h a p ter s 5 a nd 6
, Rela tivi s m 1 1 200 , ,
Ob j ectivi ty O f 1 13— 1 1 5 , Rela ti vi ty Of k nowled g e 1 97—203 , .
a n d sci ence 8 3 8 7 1 12 1 1 8 ,
—
, ,
See a ls o Sen s a ti ons C o ncep ts , .
1 19 Rep r es en t a ti on a li s m 7 5 8 6 87 , ,
—
P h a nta sm 1 7 4 , v a n Ri et G eorg es 22 1 8 3 , , ,
P hen om en a K a nt , on , 1 1 6— 1 1 7 , R ou s selot P i erre 1 7 1 1 7 7 183 , , , , ,
1 4 3— 1 44 23 1
P henomena li m 9 1 95 107 s ,
—
, Roy ce Jos i a h 2 66—2 67
, ,
P hen omen ology 22 8 23 1 See ,

— . Rus s ell B ertra nd 1 6 22 , , , , 3 6, 88
a ls o H us s erl H eid egg er Mer , , 89
lea u P onty Ma rcel von H il
-
, , Ry le, G ilb e rt , 40 , 10 1— 10 2 , 2 84
d eb ra nd .
r Jos ef
P i ep e , , 18 1 Sa rtre Je a n P a ul
,
-
,
1 4 , 2 63— 2 65
P la nc k Ma x , , 2 82 Sc ep tici s m 9— 1 2 ,
3 05
Sy mp a thy , 2 62— 2 63
Ta utology , necess a ry t ruth a s,
2 1 3—2 1 5
T eilhar d d e C h a rd i n ,
Pie rre ,
2 05
mony 1 5 0 1 5 1
T esti ,
—
T heory a nd f a ct 2 83— 2 84
, ,
“ ”
Thi ng n oti on o f
, 144 , , 2 03
2 04 , 2 94
St T homa s A q i a s , 22 , 4 8—49 ,
. un
1 67 , 1 7 1— 1 7 2, 1 74 , 18 1 , 222
Ti me 13— 14
,
T oulmin Step hen 2 8 3 2 84, ,

-
Tr a ns cend enc e 2 4 2—2 4 6 2 7 5 , ,
T ra ns cend en ta l eg o 22 9—2 3 1 ,
Truth
d ef .
, 19
criteri on o f 24 24 6 , ,
r
p ga m a ti s m a n d 1 9 1— 1 93
,
Of the tr a ns p hen omena l -

, 24 3
24 8
tra ns temp ora l cha ra cter
-
Of,
2 0 1—20 2 , 2 19- 2 2 1
Univers a li ty
as criteri on for truth , 2 87- 2 88,
2 94—29 5
n ot ui va lent to imp ers ona l
eq
valid ity 244—245 ,
Univers a ls 15 2— 1 5 7 1 64—1 66
, ,
Ver ifia bili ty p ri ncip le , of, 2 15
W hitehea d Alfred North 7 5 , ,
W ilhelms en Fred eri ck 22 , ,
W i s d om John 2 5 6— 2 5 7
, ,
W i ttgens tei n Lud wi g 100—1 02 , ,
W ond er 3—7 ,
W orld b eing i h a 5 1—5 8

,
- -

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FORE WORD

In preparing this volume the following intentions have been

princip ally in mind : to provide a text which covers the standard

The a im then i s both i nformati onal and p hiloso phical and a

central philosophi cal point conveyed b oth directly a nd obliquely

is that reﬂection in the philosophy of knowledge is still goi ng on .

Therefore an attempt has been made to gi ve a more Op en and

unﬁnished air to the discussions than is customary with a text

the a im of convi ncing the student of the current and continuingly

ti onal i ntention of acquain ti ng him with the l i terature ; they are

meant as an integral pedagogical part of the course .

liza ble by those who do no t share this standpoint A s i nd i cated

all standard topi cs i n the customary epistemologi cal course are

an instructor who prefers to conﬁne himself to these topics with ,

o ut bothering abo ut less fam iliar matters will be able to d o so ,

in a cour se of normal length .

My primary debt of gratitude in connection with this book is to

in a lly in spired it and whose en couragement and generously co op

go to Dr Bernard B Gilligan of Fordham University for many

illuminating and extremely help ful conversations on the philosophy

classe s my preoc cupation with epi stemological problems w as long

room teacher s ui generis .

Grateful acknowledgment is made to Fordh a m University Press

Interna ti ona l Phi los op hi ca l Q ua rter ly for p e rm i ssion to us e the ,

paragraph on Proust in Chapter V which ﬁrst appeared in an

The Ques ti o n a s Irr ed uc i ble B eg i nni ng

4 . T H E P ROB LE M OF P E RCE P TIO N: I

b) S ens e-D a tum Ap p roa ch: A Wa y O ut?

c ) L i ng uis tic A na lys is

2 ) Os te nsi ve Sig niﬁca ti o n

P ROBLE M OF P E RCEP TIO N: II

Scho la s ti c So luti ons : P r eli mi na ry

SE ARCH FO R TH E U NCO NDITIONAL

7 . CONCE P TUAL KNOW LED G E

C o ncep tua lis m

8 . TH OU GH T AND EXP E RIENCE : I

Vo n H i ld ebra nd a nd Philos op hica l Ins ig ht

O n the Na ture of E vi d ence

INTE RSUBJEC I IVE K NOWLE DGE

D irect K no w led g e o f the O ther

physi cs wi th this thought and he s eems to b elieve that this urge

But two generations earli er Socrates had built hi s ow n p hilo

that no man had knowledge H i s interpretation of the Delphi c

thought they knew while Socrates alone knew that he d id not

us as a rather meager one .

At ﬁr st s i ght we would seem to have here two rather sharply

a seem i ng aﬁi rma tion of universal ignorance a s the natur al pre

help to reconcile these two approaches .

Philosophy says Plato begi ns in w ond er It is primar ily wonder

( to tha uma zein ) and no man w ho lacks this capacity ca n ever

attain to philosophical insi ght Si nce this sentiment is derived from

1 Pla to , Ap o logy, 2 1—2 3 .

The wonder which i s spoken of here should not be thought

IBM 705 or the clockwork of a carbon molecule Philosophical .

wonder i s not primarily before the complicated and abstruse but ,

whi ch is most unfathomable and it is i n the region of the near at

What is change being motion time space mind matter? O f

such questions has the career of p hilosop hy been made A mong .

a perfect coincidence of the obvious and the mysterious : the

nearest at hand and yet most distant

And with this we m eet a t once the ambiguous compenetration

endeavor to retain the immediacy of the ques tioned d atum while

c ould s eem odder than to question a thing which i s already present