© 2001 F.

Alvarado

Slides to be available from http://www.pserc.wisc.edu

Interdependencies In Networks

Fernando Alvarado*
Electrical and Computer Engineering
University of Wisconsin-Madison

(*) Member, IEEE-USA Energy Policy Committee

Member, Power Outage Study Team (POST)
Past Advisor, Critical Infrastructure Protection Office

IEEE/PES Winter Meeting

Columbus, Ohio, 1 February 2001
1 February 2001 Interdependencies in Networks PSERC
“When I was younger, I used to think that
government was the enemy of industry.
I used to think that clean air regulations
would kill the automobile and the power
industry. Having grown older and wiser,
I now recognize the enormous value to
society of past clean air policies. I now
believe that what is good for society is
actually good for corporations” (Mike
Gent paraphrased, IEEE EPC, July 2000)

“The role of policymakers is to

lineup the interests of society
with individual greed and then
take a step back and watch”
(yours truly, November 2000)

1 February 2001 Interdependencies in Networks © 2001 F. Alvarado

 Themes of this talk

Complexity and complexity reduction

Challenges and questions
Some specifics

Markets naturally operate in a decentralized

manner provided the rules are set right
(the objective is not centralized optimization)

1 February 2001 Interdependencies in Networks © 2001 F. Alvarado

 Structure of interdependencies

Interdependencies in large scale infra-

structures often have a network structure
The structure may reflect physical interconnections
The structure may reflect implicit interconnections
The graphs describing interdependencies
offer powerful tools for exploring
vulnerabilities and modes of failure due to
interdependencies

1 February 2001 Interdependencies in Networks © 2001 F. Alvarado

 Complexity is a source of
uncertainty
The transmission system was designed on
an area by area basis. Inter-area
interconnections evolved in order to
Perform economy exchanges
Enable mutual assistance during emergencies
Design and operation of a system presumes
cooperation among grid participants
Deregulation of the electric market is
leading to a greater utilization of the
transmission grid

1 February 2001 Interdependencies in Networks © 2001 F. Alvarado

 Why is complexity increasing?

New patterns of power grid utilization

result in new patterns of flow,
combinations of active units and
unanticipated congestion patterns
Overlaying communication networks,
computer networks and power
networks introduces inter-network
dependencies

1 February 2001 Interdependencies in Networks © 2001 F. Alvarado

 Coordination and
understanding
Reduction in centralized planning and
control can result in failures from lack of
coordination or unwillingness to consider
system-wide effects
Human understanding of complexity is
important in terms of managing
emergencies and partial failure conditions
A complex system operating under emergency
conditions can be quite unintuitive
Emergency actions may not be optimal under time
and complexity pressures

1 February 2001 Interdependencies in Networks © 2001 F. Alvarado

 Consequences of complexity

Markets normally align self-serving

interests with society's interests, even
when these interests reduce profits of
competitors
In power systems, self-serving behavior can
lead to incentives for the elimination of
competition even in situations where
market power is not present
There is a magnification effect that the grid provides
An action by one party that provides a small additional
self profit and that requires only modest changes in
one's operation, can greatly increase the cost of
another party

1 February 2001 Interdependencies in Networks © 2001 F. Alvarado

 Some issues of interest

• Understanding stability when markets

control significant aspects of the system
– The combination of economies of scale in supply
and changing congestion patterns can lead to the
regions of erratic and unstable system behavior
• Interactions among the controls of power
and voltage control devices
– Flow control devices, when operated in connection
with interchange and generation control, can affect
flows in remote regions of a system
• Further understanding of voltage collapse
• Countermeasures to malicious control

1 February 2001 Interdependencies in Networks © 2001 F. Alvarado

 Complexity reduction as a tool

• Study complexity-reduction technologies

– Breakup the power grid by use of DC and/or FACTS
technologies
– Use dispersed technologies to mitigate the effect of
failures
• Methodologies for rapid understanding of
a system under crisis conditions
– The extremely large size of the grid has led to large
computational challenges
• Uncertainty and risk management tools
for security management in the presence
of large-scale system threats

1 February 2001 Interdependencies in Networks © 2001 F. Alvarado

 Goals and challenges

Develop an understanding of all

threats and failure modes that can
occur as a result of system
complexity
Develop tools necessary to mitigate
the effects of complexity
Mitigate the impact of complexity by
ab-initio design

1 February 2001 Interdependencies in Networks © 2001 F. Alvarado

 Research on structural and
policy implications on security
Self interests differs greatly from the
common good,
Aligning the two by appropriate means can
be difficult as a result of the numerous
interdependencies, complexities and
vested interests within the system.
A particular concern is market power
Market power in power systems has some unique
characteristics
Beneficial actions to one party can affect
another party adversely

1 February 2001 Interdependencies in Networks © 2001 F. Alvarado

 Additional questions

• Understanding of specific rules for

markets, rules for the ISO, and rules that
an end user must abide by
• Means for measuring security taking into
consideration the uncertainties introduced
by separate ownership of system assets
• Self-interest within the context of a grid
can lead to conditions that the only way
for one supplier to make a profit is by
operating in such a way that competition
is hampered

1 February 2001 Interdependencies in Networks © 2001 F. Alvarado

 Interdependencies

Dependency of the telecommunication and

Web infrastructure on electric power
Impact that energy conservation efforts can
have on vulnerability
Increased penetration of power electronic devices,
which make many industrial processes more
efficient, could have a highly undesirable effect on
network security as a result of a removal of the
"natural" voltage and frequency dependencies of
most loads on these two quantities.

1 February 2001 Interdependencies in Networks © 2001 F. Alvarado

 More on interdependencies

Impact of decreases in power quality

on communications and computing
Transportation
Impact of electric vehicles
Impact of transportation disruptions on
electricity provision

1 February 2001 Interdependencies in Networks © 2001 F. Alvarado

 Some specific activities

Dynamic interaction between market and

power system can induce instabilities
Extended eigenanalysis including discrete effects
We may have the first evidence of this in practice

Interdependency of markets, policymaking

and reliability can lead to system failure
New definition of unreliability: when the supply and
demand curves do not intersect
Load as a resource
Using water pumping to help the power system

1 February 2001 Interdependencies in Networks © 2001 F. Alvarado

 Deterministic Demand and Supply, low demand case

Price

Demand (inelastic)
Maximum
available
power

Available supply

Quantity (power)
Clearing
price
1 February 2001 Interdependencies in Networks © 2001 F. Alvarado
Deterministic Demand and Supply, high demand case
Clearing
price
Price

Demand (inelastic)
Maximum
available
power

Available supply

Quantity (power)

1 February 2001 Interdependencies in Networks © 2001 F. Alvarado

 Probabilistic Demand, high demand case

Probability of low prices

Outage
probability
1 February 2001 Interdependencies in Networks © 2001 F. Alvarado
 The piece-wise nature of the supply curve

Generator 6
Generator 5
Generator 1

Generator 2

Generator 3

Generator 4

1 February 2001 Interdependencies in Networks © 2001 F. Alvarado

 The effect of a generator outage

Old
Outaged supply
generator limit
New
supply
limit

1 February 2001 Interdependencies in Networks © 2001 F. Alvarado

Effect of demand uncertainty
Probability
and generator outage
p2

Probability p1

n-1 secure

insecure

Outage probability is p1*p2

1 February 2001 Interdependencies in Networks © 2001 F. Alvarado