G.R. No.

94951 April 22, 1991 WHEREFORE, Conformably With The Foregoing, judgment is
hereby rendered ordering the respondent, Apex Mining Company,
APEX MINING COMPANY, INC., petitioner, Inc., Masara, Davao del Norte, to pay the complainant, to wit:
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and SINCLITICA 1 Salary
CANDIDO, respondents.
Differential –– P16,289.20
Bernabe B. Alabastro for petitioner.
Angel Fernandez for private respondent. 2. Emergency Living

GANCAYCO, J.:
Is the househelper in the staff houses of an industrial company a
domestic helper or a regular employee of the said firm? This is the novel
issue raised in this petition.
Private respondent Sinclita Candida was employed by petitioner Apex
Mining Company, Inc. on May 18, 1973 to perform laundry services at its
staff house located at Masara, Maco, Davao del Norte. In the beginning,
she was paid on a piece rate basis. However, on January 17, 1982, she
was paid on a monthly basis at P250.00 a month which was ultimately
increased to P575.00 a month.
On December 18, 1987, while she was attending to her assigned task
and she was hanging her laundry, she accidentally slipped and hit her
back on a stone. She reported the accident to her immediate supervisor
Mila de la Rosa and to the personnel officer, Florendo D. Asirit. As a
result of the accident she was not able to continue with her work. She
was permitted to go on leave for medication. De la Rosa offered her the
amount of P 2,000.00 which was eventually increased to P5,000.00 to
persuade her to quit her job, but she refused the offer and preferred to
return to work. Petitioner did not allow her to return to work and
dismissed her on February 4, 1988.
On March 11, 1988, private respondent filed a request for assistance with
the Department of Labor and Employment. After the parties submitted
their position papers as required by the labor arbiter assigned to the case
on August 24, 1988 the latter rendered a decision, the dispositive part of
which reads as follows:
Allowance –– 12,430.00
3. 13th Month Pay
Differential –– 1,322.32
4. Separation Pay
(One-month for
every year of
service [1973-19881) –– 25,119.30
or in the total of FIFTY FIVE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SIXTY ONE PESOS AND 42/100 (P55,161.42).
SO ORDERED.1
Not satisfied therewith, petitioner appealed to the public respondent
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), wherein in due course a
decision was rendered by the Fifth Division thereof on July 20, 1989
dismissing the appeal for lack of merit and affirming the appealed
decision. A motion for reconsideration thereof was denied in a resolution
of the NLRC dated June 29, 1990.
Hence, the herein petition for review by certiorari, which appopriately
should be a special civil action for certiorari, and which in the interest of
justice, is hereby treated as such.2 The main thrust of the petition is that
private respondent should be treated as a mere househelper or domestic
servant and not as a regular employee of petitioner.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Under Rule XIII, Section l(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended, the
terms "househelper" or "domestic servant" are defined as follows:
The term "househelper" as used herein is synonymous to the
term "domestic servant" and shall refer to any person, whether
male or female, who renders services in and about the employer's
home and which services are usually necessary or desirable for
the maintenance and enjoyment thereof, and ministers
exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the
employer's family.3
The foregoing definition clearly contemplates such househelper or
domestic servant who is employed in the employer's home to minister
exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer's
family. Such definition covers family drivers, domestic servants, laundry
women, yayas, gardeners, houseboys and other similar househelps.
The definition cannot be interpreted to include househelp or
laundrywomen working in staffhouses of a company, like petitioner who
attends to the needs of the company's guest and other persons availing
of said facilities. By the same token, it cannot be considered to extend to
then driver, houseboy, or gardener exclusively working in the company,
the staffhouses and its premises. They may not be considered as within
the meaning of a "househelper" or "domestic servant" as above-defined
by law.
as employee. The Court finds no merit in making any such distinction.
The mere fact that the househelper or domestic servant is working within
the premises of the business of the employer and in relation to or in
connection with its business, as in its staffhouses for its guest or even for
its officers and employees, warrants the conclusion that such
househelper or domestic servant is and should be considered as a
regular employee of the employer and not as a mere family househelper
or domestic servant as contemplated in Rule XIII, Section l(b), Book 3 of
the Labor Code, as amended.
Petitioner denies having illegally dismissed private respondent and
maintains that respondent abandoned her work.1âwphi1This argument
notwithstanding, there is enough evidence to show that because of an
accident which took place while private respondent was performing her
laundry services, she was not able to work and was ultimately separated
from the service. She is, therefore, entitled to appropriate relief as a
regular employee of petitioner. Inasmuch as private respondent appears
not to be interested in returning to her work for valid reasons, the
payment of separation pay to her is in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the appealed decision
and resolution of public respondent NLRC are hereby AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

The criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of the
employer in the home of said employer. While it may be true that the
nature of the work of a househelper, domestic servant or laundrywoman
in a home or in a company staffhouse may be similar in nature, the
difference in their circumstances is that in the former instance they are
actually serving the family while in the latter case, whether it is a
corporation or a single proprietorship engaged in business or industry or
any other agricultural or similar pursuit, service is being rendered in the
staffhouses or within the premises of the business of the employer. In
such instance, they are employees of the company or employer in the
business concerned entitled to the privileges of a regular employee.

Petitioner contends that it is only when the househelper or domestic

servant is assigned to certain aspects of the business of the employer
that such househelper or domestic servant may be considered as such
G.R. Nos. 169295-96 November 20, 2006
REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
ERLINDA CASTANEDA, Respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Before this Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 filed by
Remington Industrial Sales Corporation to reverse and set aside the
Decision2 of the Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
Nos. 64577 and 68477, dated January 31, 2005, which dismissed
petitioner’s consolidated petitions for certiorari, and its subsequent
Resolution,3 dated August 11, 2005, which denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
The antecedent facts of the case, as narrated by the Court of Appeals,
are as follows:
The present controversy began when private respondent, Erlinda
Castaneda ("Erlinda") instituted on March 2, 1998 a complaint for illegal
dismissal, underpayment of wages, non-payment of overtime services,
non-payment of service incentive leave pay and non-payment of 13th
month pay against Remington before the NLRC, National Capital Region,
Quezon City. The complaint impleaded Mr. Antonio Tan in his capacity as
the Managing Director of Remington.
Erlinda alleged that she started working in August 1983 as company cook
with a salary of Php 4,000.00 for Remington, a corporation engaged in
the trading business; that she worked for six (6) days a week, starting as
early as 6:00 a.m. because she had to do the marketing and would end at
around 5:30 p.m., or even later, after most of the employees, if not all,
had left the company premises; that she continuously worked with
Remington until she was unceremoniously prevented from reporting for
work when Remington transferred to a new site in Edsa, Caloocan City.
She averred that she reported for work at the new site in Caloocan City
on January 15, 1998, only to be informed that Remington no longer
needed her services. Erlinda believed that her dismissal was illegal
because she was not given the notices required by law; hence, she filed
her complaint for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, salary
differentials, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay and 10%
attorney’s fees.
Remington denied that it dismissed Erlinda illegally. It posited that Erlinda
was a domestic helper, not a regular employee; Erlinda worked as a cook
and this job had nothing to do with Remington’s business of trading in
construction or hardware materials, steel plates and wire rope products. It
also contended that contrary to Erlinda’s allegations that the (sic) she
worked for eight (8) hours a day, Erlinda’s duty was merely to cook lunch
and "merienda", after which her time was hers to spend as she pleased.
Remington also maintained that it did not exercise any degree of control
and/or supervision over Erlinda’s work as her only concern was to ensure
that the employees’ lunch and "merienda" were available and served at
the designated time. Remington likewise belied Erlinda’s assertion that
her work extended beyond 5:00 p.m. as she could only leave after all the
employees had gone. The truth, according to Remington, is that Erlinda
did not have to punch any time card in the way that other employees of
Remington did; she was free to roam around the company premises,
read magazines, and to even nap when not doing her assigned chores.
Remington averred that the illegal dismissal complaint lacked factual and
legal bases. Allegedly, it was Erlinda who refused to report for work when
Remington moved to a new location in Caloocan City.
In a Decision4 dated January 19, 1999, the labor arbiter dismissed the
complaint and ruled that the respondent was a domestic helper under the
personal service of Antonio Tan, finding that her work as a cook was not
usually necessary and desirable in the ordinary course of trade and
business of the petitioner corporation, which operated as a trading
company, and that the latter did not exercise control over her functions.
On the issue of illegal dismissal, the labor arbiter found that it was the
respondent who refused to go with the family of Antonio Tan when the
corporation transferred office and that, therefore, respondent could not
have been illegally dismissed.
Upon appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) rendered
a Decision,5 dated November 23, 2000, reversing the labor arbiter, ruling,
viz:
We are not inclined to uphold the declaration below that complainant is a
domestic helper of the family of Antonio Tan. There was no allegation by
respondent that complainant had ever worked in the residence of Mr.
Tan. What is clear from the facts narrated by the parties is that
complainant continuously did her job as a cook in the office of respondent
serving the needed food for lunch and merienda of the employees. Thus,
her work as cook inured not for the benefit of the family members of Mr.
Tan but solely for the individual employees of respondent.
Complainant as an employee of respondent company is even bolstered
by no less than the certification dated May 23, 1997 issued by the
corporate secretary of the company certifying that complainant is their
bonafide employee. This is a solid evidence which the Labor Arbiter
simply brushed aside. But, such error would not be committed here as it
would be at the height of injustice if we are to declare that complainant is
a domestic helper.
Complainant’s work schedule and being paid a monthly salary of
₱4,000.00 are clear indication that she is a company employee who had
been employed to cater to the food needed by the employees which were
being provided by respondent to form part of the benefit granted them.
With regard to the issue of illegal dismissal, we believe that there is more
reason to believe that complainant was not dismissed because allegedly
she was the one who refused to work in the new office of respondent.
However, complainant’s refusal to join the workforce due to poor eyesight
could not be considered abandonment of work or voluntary resignation
from employment.
Under the Labor Code as amended, an employee who reaches the age
of sixty years old (60 years) has the option to retire or to separate from
the service with payment of separation pay/retirement benefit.
In this case, we notice that complainant was already 60 years old at the
time she filed the complaint praying for separation pay or retirement
benefit and some money claims.
Based on Article 287 of the Labor Code as amended, complainant is
entitled to be paid her separation pay/retirement benefit equivalent to
one-half (1/2) month for every year of service. The amount of separation
pay would be based on the prescribed minimum wage at the time of
dismissal since she was then underpaid. In as much as complainant is
underpaid of her wages, it behooves that she should be paid her salary
differential for the last three years prior to separation/retirement.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is hereby,
SET ASIDE, and a new one is hereby entered ordering respondents to
pay complainant the following:
1. Salary differential - ₱12,021.12 2. Service Incentive Leave Pay -
2,650.00 3. 13th Month Pay differential - 1,001.76 4. Separation
Pay/retirement benefit - 36,075.00
Total - ₱51,747.88
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved to reconsider this decision but the NLRC denied the
motion. This denial of its motion prompted petitioner to file a Petition for
Certiorari6 with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
64577, on May 4, 2001, imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC in (1) reversing in
toto the decision of the labor arbiter, and (2) awarding in favor of
respondent salary differential, service incentive leave pay, 13th month
pay differential and separation benefits in the total sum of ₱51,747.88.
While the petition was pending with the Court of Appeals, the NLRC
rendered another Decision7 in the same case on August 29, 2001. How
and why another decision was rendered is explained in that decision as
follows:
On May 17, 2001, complainant filed a Manifestation praying for a
resolution of her Motion for Reconsideration and, in support thereof,
alleges that, sometime December 18, 2000, she mailed her Manifestation
and Motion for Reconsideration registered as Registered Certificate No.
188844; and that the said mail was received by the NLRC, through a
certain Roland Hernandez, on December 26, 2000. Certifications to this
effect was issued by the Postmaster of the Sta. Mesa Post Office bearing
the date May 11, 2001 (Annexes A and B, Complainant’s Manifestation).
Evidence in support of complainant’s having actually filed a Motion for
Reconsideration within the reglementary period having been sufficiently
established, a determination of its merits is thus, in order.
On the merits, the NLRC found respondent’s motion for reconsideration
meritorious leading to the issuance of its second decision with the
following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated November 23,
2000, is MODIFIED by increasing the award of retirement pay due the
complainant in the total amount of SIXTY TWO THOUSAND FOUR
HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN and 50/100 (₱62,437.50). All other
monetary relief so adjudged therein are maintained and likewise made
payable to the complainant.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner challenged the second decision of the NLRC, including the
resolution denying its motion for reconsideration, through a second
Petition for Certiorari8 filed with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 68477 and dated January 8, 2002, this time imputing grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the NLRC in (1) issuing the second decision despite losing its
jurisdiction due to the pendency of the first petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals, and (2) assuming it still had jurisdiction to issue the
second decision notwithstanding the pendency of the first petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals, that its second decision has no basis
in law since respondent’s motion for reconsideration, which was made
the basis of the second decision, was not filed under oath in violation of
Section 14, Rule VII9 of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC and
that it contained no certification as to why respondent’s motion for
reconsideration was not decided on time as also required by Section 10,
Rule VI10 and Section 15, Rule VII11 of the aforementioned rules.
Upon petitioner’s motion, the Court of Appeals ordered the consolidation
of the two (2) petitions, on January 24, 2002, pursuant to Section 7, par.
b(3), Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of the Court of Appeals. It summarized
the principal issues raised in the consolidated petitions as follows:
1. Whether respondent is petitioner’s regular employee or a
domestic helper;
2. Whether respondent was illegally dismissed; and
3. Whether the second NLRC decision promulgated during the
pendency of the first petition for certiorari has basis in law.
On January 31, 2005, the Court of Appeals dismissed the consolidated
petitions for lack of merit, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the NLRC in issuing the assailed decisions.
On the first issue, it upheld the ruling of the NLRC that respondent was a
regular employee of the petitioner since the former worked at the
company premises and catered not only to the personal comfort and
enjoyment of Mr. Tan and his family, but also to that of the employees of
the latter. It agreed that petitioner enjoys the prerogative to control
respondent’s conduct in undertaking her assigned work, particularly the
nature and situs of her work in relation to the petitioner’s workforce,
thereby establishing the existence of an employer-employee relationship
between them.
On the issue of illegal dismissal, it ruled that respondent has attained the
status of a regular employee in her service with the company. It noted
that the NLRC found that no less than the company’s corporate secretary
certified that respondent is a bonafide company employee and that she
had a fixed schedule and routine of work and was paid a monthly salary
of ₱4,000.00; that she served with petitioner for 15 years starting in 1983,
buying and cooking food served to company employees at lunch
and merienda; and that this work was usually necessary and desirable in
the regular business of the petitioner. It held that as a regular employee,
she enjoys the constitutionally guaranteed right to security of tenure and
that petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proving that her dismissal
on January 15, 1998 was for a just or authorized cause and that the
manner of dismissal complied with the requirements under the law.
Finally, on petitioner’s other arguments relating to the alleged irregularity
of the second NLRC decision, i.e., the fact that respondent’s motion for
reconsideration was not under oath and had no certification explaining
why it was not resolved within the prescribed period, it held that such
violations relate to procedural and non-jurisdictional matters that cannot
assume primacy over the substantive merits of the case and that they do
not constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction that would nullify the second NLRC decision.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s contention that the NLRC lost its
jurisdiction to issue the second decision when it received the order
indicating the Court of Appeals’ initial action on the first petition for
certiorari that it filed. It ruled that the NLRC’s action of issuing a decision
in installments was not prohibited by its own rules and that the need for a
second decision was justified by the fact that respondent’s own motion for
reconsideration remained unresolved in the first decision. Furthermore, it
held that under Section 7, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court,12the
filing of a petition for certiorari does not interrupt the course of the
principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further
proceeding with the case.
From this decision, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on
February 22, 2005, which the Court of Appeals denied through a
resolution dated August 11, 2005.
Hence, the present petition for review.
The petitioner raises the following errors of law: (1) the Court of Appeals
erred in affirming the NLRC’s ruling that the respondent was petitioner’s
regular employee and not a domestic helper; (2) the Court of Appeals
erred in holding that petitioner was guilty of illegal dismissal; and (3) the
Court of Appeals erred when it held that the issuance of the second
NLRC decision is proper.
The petition must fail. We affirm that respondent was a regular employee
of the petitioner and that the latter was guilty of illegal dismissal.
Before going into the substantive merits of the present controversy, we
shall first resolve the propriety of the issuance of the second NLRC
decision.
The petitioner contends that the respondent’s motion for reconsideration,
upon which the second NLRC decision was based, was not under oath
and did not contain a certification as to why it was not decided on time as
required under the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC.13 Furthermore,
the former also raises for the first time the contention that respondent’s
motion was filed beyond the ten (10)-calendar day period required under
the same Rules,14 since the latter received a copy of the first NLRC
decision on December 6, 2000, and respondent filed her motion only on
December 18, 2000. Thus, according to petitioner, the respondent’s
motion for reconsideration was a mere scrap of paper and the second
NLRC decision has no basis in law.
We do not agree.
It is well-settled that the application of technical rules of procedure may
be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial justice, particularly in
labor cases.15 Labor cases must be decided according to justice and
equity and the substantial merits of the controversy.16 Rules of procedure
are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.17 Their
strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
avoided.18
This Court has consistently held that the requirement of verification is
formal, and not jurisdictional. Such requirement is merely a condition
affecting the form of the pleading, non-compliance with which does not
necessarily render it fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to
secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and
correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation,
and that the pleading is filed in good faith.19 The court may order the
correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or act on the pleading
although it is not verified, if the attending circumstances are such that
strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in order that the
ends of justice may thereby be served.20
Anent the argument that respondent’s motion for reconsideration, on
which the NLRC’s second decision was based, was filed out of time, such
issue was only brought up for the first time in the instant petition where no
new issues may be raised by a party in his pleadings without offending
the right to due process of the opposing party.
Nonetheless, the petitioner asserts that the respondent received a copy
of the NLRC’s first decision on December 6, 2000, and the motion for
reconsideration was filed only on December 18, 2000, or two (2) days
beyond the ten (10)-calendar day period requirement under the New
Rules of Procedure of the NLRC and should not be allowed.21
This contention must fail.
Under Article 22322 of the Labor Code, the decision of the NLRC shall be
final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from the receipt thereof
by the parties.
While it is an established rule that the perfection of an appeal in the
manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional, and failure to perfect an appeal has the effect of rendering
the judgment final and executory, it is equally settled that the NLRC may
disregard the procedural lapse where there is an acceptable reason to
excuse tardiness in the taking of the appeal.23 Among the acceptable
reasons recognized by this Court are (a) counsel's reliance on the
footnote of the notice of the decision of the Labor Arbiter that "the
aggrieved party may appeal. . . within ten (10) working days";24 (b)
fundamental consideration of substantial justice;25 (c) prevention of
miscarriage of justice or of unjust enrichment, as where the tardy appeal
is from a decision granting separation pay which was already granted in
an earlier final decision;26 and (d) special circumstances of the case
combined with its legal merits27 or the amount and the issue involved.28
We hold that the particular circumstances in the case at bar, in
accordance with substantial justice, call for a liberalization of the
application of this rule. Notably, respondent’s last day for filing her motion
for reconsideration fell on December 16, 2000, which was a Saturday. In
a number of cases,29 we have ruled that if the tenth day for perfecting an
appeal fell on a Saturday, the appeal shall be made on the next working
day. The reason for this ruling is that on Saturdays, the office of the
NLRC and certain post offices are closed. With all the more reason
should this doctrine apply to respondent’s filing of the motion for
reconsideration of her cause, which the NLRC itself found to be
impressed with merit. Indeed, technicality should not be permitted to
stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving the rights and
obligations of the parties for the ends of justice are reached not only
through the speedy disposal of cases but, more importantly, through a
meticulous and comprehensive evaluation of the merits of a case.
Finally, as to petitioner’s argument that the NLRC had already lost its
jurisdiction to decide the case when it filed its petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration,
suffice it to state that under Section 7 of Rule 6530 of the Revised Rules
of Court, the petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case
unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has
been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding with
the case. Thus, the mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari,
in connection with a pending case in a lower court, does not interrupt the
course of the latter if there is no writ of injunction.31 Clearly, there was no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in issuing its second
decision which modified the first, especially since it failed to consider the
respondent’s motion for reconsideration when it issued its first decision.
Having resolved the procedural matters, we shall now delve into the
merits of the petition to determine whether respondent is a domestic
helper or a regular employee of the petitioner, and whether the latter is
guilty of illegal dismissal.
Petitioner relies heavily on the affidavit of a certain Mr. Antonio Tan and
contends that respondent is the latter’s domestic helper and not a regular
employee of the company since Mr. Tan has a separate and distinct
personality from the petitioner. It maintains that it did not exercise control
and supervision over her functions; and that it operates as a trading
company and does not engage in the restaurant business, and therefore
respondent’s work as a cook, which was not usually necessary or
desirable to its usual line of business or trade, could not make her its
regular employee.
This contention fails to impress.
In Apex Mining Company, Inc. v. NLRC,32 this Court held that a
househelper in the staff houses of an industrial company was a regular
employee of the said firm. We ratiocinated that:
Under Rule XIII, Section 1(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended,
the terms "househelper" or "domestic servant" are defined as follows:
"The term ‘househelper’ as used herein is synonymous to the term
‘domestic servant’ and shall refer to any person, whether male or female,
who renders services in and about the employer’s home and which
services are usually necessary or desirable for the maintenance and
enjoyment thereof, and ministers exclusively to the personal comfort and
enjoyment of the employer’s family."
The foregoing definition clearly contemplates such househelper or
domestic servant who is employed in the employer’s home to minister
exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer’s
family. Such definition covers family drivers, domestic servants, laundry
women, yayas, gardeners, houseboys and similar househelps.
xxx xxx xxx
The criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of the
employer in the home of said employer. While it may be true that the
nature of the work of a househelper, domestic servant or laundrywoman
in a home or in a company staffhouse may be similar in nature, the
difference in their circumstances is that in the former instance they are
actually serving the family while in the latter case, whether it is a
corporation or a single proprietorship engaged in business or industry or
any other agricultural or similar pursuit, service is being rendered in the
staffhouses or within the premises of the business of the employer. In
such instance, they are employees of the company or employer in the
business concerned entitled to the privileges of a regular employee.
Petitioner contends that it is only when the househelper or domestic
servant is assigned to certain aspects of the business of the employer
that such househelper or domestic servant may be considered as such
an employee. The Court finds no merit in making any such distinction.
The mere fact that the househelper or domestic servant is working within
the premises of the business of the employer and in relation to or in
connection with its business, as in its staffhouses for its guest or even for
its officers and employees, warrants the conclusion that such
househelper or domestic servant is and should be considered as a
regular employee of the employer and not as a mere family househelper
or domestic servant as contemplated in Rule XIII, Section 1(b), Book 3 of
the Labor Code, as amended.
In the case at bar, the petitioner itself admits in its position paper33 that
respondent worked at the company premises and her duty was to cook
and prepare its employees’ lunch and merienda. Clearly, the situs, as
well as the nature of respondent’s work as a cook, who caters not only to
the needs of Mr. Tan and his family but also to that of the petitioner’s
employees, makes her fall squarely within the definition of a regular
employee under the doctrine enunciated in the Apex Mining case. That
she works within company premises, and that she does not cater
exclusively to the personal comfort of Mr. Tan and his family, is reflective
of the existence of the petitioner’s right of control over her functions,
which is the primary indicator of the existence of an employer-employee
relationship.
Moreover, it is wrong to say that if the work is not directly related to the
employer's business, then the person performing such work could not be
considered an employee of the latter. The determination of the existence
of an employer-employee relationship is defined by law according to the
facts of each case, regardless of the nature of the activities
involved.34 Indeed, it would be the height of injustice if we were to hold
that despite the fact that respondent was made to cook lunch
and merienda for the petitioner’s employees, which work ultimately
redounded to the benefit of the petitioner corporation, she was merely a
domestic worker of the family of Mr. Tan.
We note the findings of the NLRC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that
no less than the company’s corporate secretary has certified that
respondent is a bonafide company employee;35 she had a fixed schedule
and routine of work and was paid a monthly salary of ₱4,000.00;36 she
served with the company for 15 years starting in 1983, buying and
cooking food served to company employees at lunch and merienda, and
that this service was a regular feature of employment with the company.37
Indubitably, the Court of Appeals, as well as the NLRC, correctly held that
based on the given circumstances, the respondent is a regular employee
of the petitioner.1âwphi1
Having determined that the respondent is petitioner’s regular employee,
we now proceed to ascertain the legality of her dismissal from
employment.
Petitioner contends that there was abandonment on respondent’s part
when she refused to report for work when the corporation transferred to a
new location in Caloocan City, claiming that her poor eyesight would
make long distance travel a problem. Thus, it cannot be held guilty of
illegal dismissal.
On the other hand, the respondent claims that when the petitioner
relocated, she was no longer called for duty and that when she tried to
report for work, she was told that her services were no longer needed.
She contends that the petitioner dismissed her without a just or
authorized cause and that she was not given prior notice, hence
rendering the dismissal illegal.
We rule for the respondent.
As a regular employee, respondent enjoys the right to security of tenure
under Article 27938 of the Labor Code and may only be dismissed for a
just39 or authorized40 cause, otherwise the dismissal becomes illegal and
the employee becomes entitled to reinstatement and full backwages
computed from the time compensation was withheld up to the time of
actual reinstatement.
Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to
resume his employment.41 It is a form of neglect of duty; hence, a just
cause for termination of employment by the employer under Article 282 of
the Labor Code, which enumerates the just causes for termination by the
employer.42 For a valid finding of abandonment, these two factors should
be present: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever employer-employee
relationship, with the second as the more determinative factor which is
manifested by overt acts from which it may be deduced that the
employee has no more intention to work.43The intent to discontinue the
employment must be shown by clear proof that it was deliberate and
unjustified.44This, the petitioner failed to do in the case at bar.
Alongside the petitioner’s contention that it was the respondent who quit
her employment and refused to return to work, greater stock may be
taken of the respondent’s immediate filing of her complaint with the
NLRC. Indeed, an employee who loses no time in protesting her layoff
cannot by any reasoning be said to have abandoned her work, for it is
well-settled that the filing of an employee of a complaint for illegal
dismissal with a prayer for reinstatement is proof enough of her desire to
return to work, thus, negating the employer’s charge of abandonment.45
In termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to
show that the dismissal is for a just and valid cause; failure to do so
would necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal.46 The employer’s
case succeeds or fails on the strength of its evidence and not on the
weakness of the employee’s defense.47 If doubt exists between the
evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of
justice must be tilted in favor of the latter.48
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
assailed Decision dated January 31, 2005, and the Resolution dated
August 11, 2005, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 64577 and
68477 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
[ G.R. No. 222419, October 05, 2016 ]
RAMIL R. VALENZUELA, PETITIONER, VS. ALEXANDRA MINING
AND OIL VENTURES, INC. AND CESAR E. DETERA,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] filed under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the Decision[2] dated June 5, 2015 and
Resolution[3] dated January 13, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
GR. SP No. 136037.
Factual Antecedents
The instant case stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-
payment of backwages, overtime pay, separation pay, moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees filed by Ramil R. Valenzuela
(Valenzuela) against Alexandra Mining and Oil Ventures, Inc. (AMOVI)
and its owner and president, Cesar E. Detera (Cesar) (collectively, the
respondents).
In his Position Paper,[4] Valenzuela alleged that he was hired as a
company driver of AMOVI on January 12, 2008, with an eight-hour work
shift from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. and with a monthly salary of P12,000.00.
On June 15, 2013, after five years and five months of service, he was told
that he can no longer continue to work as there were no forthcoming
funds to pay for his salary.[5]
For their part, the respondents alleged that Valenzuela was actually hired
as a family driver of the Deteras. They alleged, however, that the
P12,000.00 monthly salary of Valenzuela was charged to AMOVFs
account for convenience. They averred that on June 15, 2013,
Valenzuela informed Cesar's wife, Annlynn, that he was going home to
his province to visit his parents. Annlynn granted him leave but when she
asked him whether he can return for work the following Monday,
Valenzuela told her that he would give her a call. Come Monday,
Valenzuela did not show up for work and did not also call to inform the
Deteras of the reason behind his absence. This caused them
inconvenience as their daughter's schooling has started and it was
Valenzuela's responsibility to bring her to and from school.[6] service, may be terminated at will by his employer pursuant to Article 150
of the Labor Code.[14]
A week later, Valenzuela showed up at the Deteras' residence and
informed them that he was resigning and asked for his separation pay. To Ruling of the NLRC
obviate further verbal altercation, Annlynn agreed but asked him to
submit a resignation letter. Ultimately, Annlynn told him to make up his
mind but Valenzuela just walked out and never returned.[7] On March 27, 2014, the NLRC Fourth Division (Formerly 7th Division)
rendered a Decision[15] affirming the ruling of the LA, the pertinent portion
In his Reply,[8] Valenzuela emphasized that he did not just suffer to work of which reads, thus:
for the company but also drove for the members of the Detera family. He
denied that he ever asked permission to visit his parents in Bicol, as the
Finally, resolving respondents' insistence that [Valenzuela] was hired as a
Deteras knew that his parents had long been dead. Moreover, the
Family Driver and not as Company Driver, we find the same untenable.
remains of his deceased parents were buried in Pateros. He alleged that
The records of this case show that respondents failed to present
he actually reported for work on June 17, 2013, but was prevented by
evidence to dispute [Valenzuela's] allegations. Such allegation is
Cesar who told him that his service is no longer needed as there were no
unsupported. On the other hand, the appellant [sic] was able to present in
funds forthcoming to pay for his salary.
[sic] identification card and payslips.
Ruling of the Labor Arbiter There being no showing of any error committed by the [LA] in the
assailed Decision, we opt not to disturb the same.

On November 16, 2013, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a WHEREFORE, the Appeal filed by respondents is
Decision[9] holding that Valenzuela had been illegally dismissed, the hereby DISMISSED. Assailed decision is AFFIRMED.
dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:
SO ORDERED.[16]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
finding [Valenzuela] to have been illegally dismissed. [The respondents]
are hereby found jointly and severally liable and ordered to pay The respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration[17] of the foregoing
[Valenzuela] the amount of One Hundred Thirty[-]Two Thousand Pesos decision, but the NLRC denied the same in its Resolution[18] dated April
(P132,000.00) representing his full backwages and separation pay plus 25, 2014.
ten percent (10%) thereof as attorney's fees.
Undeterred, the respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the CA
SO ORDERED.[10] imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC for holding
that there was an employer-employee relationship between AMOVI and
Valenzuela.
The LA dismissed Cesar's claim that Valenzuela was a family driver and
not an employee of AMOVI, as the evidence on record proved Ruling of the CA
otherwise.[11] She likewise pointed out that the respondents failed to
present any evidence to support their claim that Valenzuela abandoned
his employment.[12] On June 5, 2015, the CA rendered a Decision,[19] the dispositive portion
of which reads, as follows:
Unyielding, the respondents interposed an appeal to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC),[13] and reiterated their claim that
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated
Valenzuela was the family driver of the Deteras and not an employee of
March 27, 2014 and Resolution dated April 25, 2014 of the National
AMOVI. They added that Valenzuela, being a member of the household
Labor Relations Commission are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in reinstate the workers without any backwages was brought about by the
that the award of backwages is DELETED. finding that there was neither illegal dismissal nor abandonment of work.
Thus, to be fair with both parties, the Court ordered the reinstatement of
SO ORDERED.[20] the workers without unduly burdening the employer with the payment of
backwages since the fact of dismissal, much less illegal, was not
established.
The CA held that since there was no clear evidence that Valenzuela was
dismissed by the respondents and, on the other hand, there was an equal The instant case does not share the same factual milieu with Exodus. It is
lack of proof of abandonment of work on the part of Valenzuela. noteworthy to emphasize that in all the pleadings submitted by Cesar
Following the ruling of the Court in Exodus International Construction before the LA, NLRC and CA, he vigorously refuted the existence of an
Corporation, et al. v. Biscocho, et at.,[21] the remedy was to reinstate employer-employee relationship between AMOVI and Valenzuela, and at
Valenzuela without backwages.[22] the same time, presented himself as the real employer of the latter. His
argument was that Valenzuela was not a company driver but a family
On July 21, 2015, Valenzuela filed a Motion for Partial driver of the Deteras.
Reconsideration,[23] but the same was denied by the CA in its
Resolution[24] dated January 13, 2016. The question regarding who may be deemed the real employer of
Valenzuela had been unanimously resolved and agreed by the LA, NLRC
On March 10, 2016, Valenzuela filed the instant petition questioning the and the CA to be AMOVI. The labor tribunals and the CA were all in
Decision dated June 5, 2015 and Resolution dated January 13, 2016 of accord that Valenzuela was an employee of AMOVI as evidenced by the
the CA. He contends that the fact of his dismissal was clearly established identification card and payslips stating the company as his employer.
and this entitles him to the payment of both separation pay and full Moreover, the CA held that, utilizing the four-fold test of employer-
backwages. employee relationship, the result would show that Valenzuela was under
the control of AMOVI. It ruled thus:
Ruling of the Court
In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship,
jurisprudence spelled out the four-fold test, to wit: (1) the selection and
The Court holds that the instant case presents a clear case of illegal engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of
dismissal contrary to the ruling of the CA that there was none. dismissal; and (4) the employer's power to control the employee with
respect to the means and methods by which the work is to be
The ruling in Exodus is not accomplished, x x x.
applicable in the instant case
It was [AMOVI] which hired [Valenzuela] in January 2008, and which
In its decision, the CA ruled that while it was established that Valenzuela issued an identification card showing that [Valenzuela] was an employee.
was an employee of AMOVI, there was no proof that the company or its [Valenzuela] was likewise included in the payroll of [AMOVI], although it
president dismissed him from service. It likewise affirmed that Valenzuela was claimed that it was merely "for convenience." We do not see what
did not abandon his employment as the respondents failed to establish kind of convenience is afforded to [AMOVI].
acts showing his intention to leave employment. Thus, it applied the
ruling in Exodus, where it was held that when there is no evidence of the The power to discipline and to dismiss is also present, and it was
fact of dismissal on the part of the employer and, at the same time, no exercised by [Cesar] as President of [AMOVI] which incidentally is a
proof of abandonment on the part of the employee, the proper relief is family corporation.
reinstatement without backwages.[25]
Finally, the control test is likewise satisfied. [Valenzuela] had no choice
A cursory reading of Exodus, however, will show that it is inapplicable in as to who his passengers would be. He was a company driver who was
the instant case. It is well to remember that in Exodus, the resolution to required to render service to the President of the Corporation, including
his nuclear family. It was them who controlled and dictated the manner by
which he performed his job.[26] (Citation omitted)
The CA, however, erred in holding that there was no evidence of
dismissal as it is clear from Cesar's own admission that Valenzuela was
unceremoniously dismissed from service. In all his pleadings, while
claiming to be the real employer of Valenzuela, Cesar impliedly admitted
dismissing him from employment by repeatedly invoking Article 150 of the
Labor Code to justify his action. The provision reads as follows:
Art. 150. Service of termination notice. If the duration of the household
service is not determined either in stipulation or by nature of the service,
the employer or the househelper may give notice to put an end to the
relationship five (5) days before the intended termination of the service.
On the basis of the foregoing provision, Cesar asseverated that as a
family driver, Valenzuela's service may be terminated at will by his
employer.[27] Thus, there is implied admission that he indeed terminated
Valenzuela out of his own volition, without sufficient ground and notice.
Unfortunately for Cesar, the labor tribunals and the CA all agreed that
Valenzuela was a company employee and his admission on the fact of
the latter's dismissal only established that it was done without regard to
substantive and procedural due process.
The Court elucidated on the requisites of a valid dismissal in Skippers
United Pacific, Inc., et al. v. Doza, et al,[28]thus:
For a worker's dismissal to be considered valid, it must comply with both
procedural and substantive due process. The legality of the manner of
dismissal constitutes procedural due process, while the legality of the act
of dismissal constitutes substantive due process.
Procedural due process in dismissal cases consists of the twin
requirements of notice and hearing. The employer must furnish the
employee with two written notices before the termination of employment
can be effected: (1) the first notice apprises the employee of the
particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the
second notice informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss
him. Before the issuance of the second notice, the requirement of a
hearing must be complied with by giving the worker an opportunity to be
heard. It is not necessary that an actual hearing be conducted.
Substantive due process, on the other hand, requires that dismissal by
the employer be made under a just or authorized cause under Articles
282 to 284 of the Labor Code.[29] (Citations omitted)
Evidently, the respondents raised no valid ground to justify Valenzuela's
dismissal. As admitted by Cesar, Valenzuela was terminated at will. This
was corroborated by Valenzuela's claim that when he returned for work
on June 17, 2013, he was simply told that he can no longer continue to
work as there were no funds forthcoming to pay off his salary.
Further, the twin requirement of notice and hearing for a valid termination
was not observed by the respondents. Valenzuela was not at all informed
of the ground of his dismissal and was deprived the opportunity to explain
his side. He was rashly dismissed from service without a valid ground
and the required notices.
Valenzuela is entitled to separation
pay with full backwages.
Article 279[30] of the Labor Code, as amended, provides that an illegally
dismissed employee shall be entitled to reinstatement, full backwages,
inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from
him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
Lindsay,[31] the Court deliberated on the reliefs available to an illegally
In Macasero v. Southern Industrial Gases Philippines and/or
Lindsay,[31] the Court delibe dismissed employee. It held:
[A]n illegally dismissed employee is entitled to two reliefs: backwages and
reinstatement. The two reliefs provided are separate and distinct. In
instances where reinstatement is no longer feasible because of strained
relations between the employee and the employer, separation pay is
granted. In effect, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to either
reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay if reinstatement is no longer
viable, and backwages.
xxxx And in Velasco v. National Labor Relations Commission:
The accepted doctrine is that separation pay may avail in lieu of
reinstatement if reinstatement is no longer practical or in the best interest
of the parties. Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement may likewise be
awarded if the employee decides not to be reinstated.[32] (Citations
omitted, italics ours, and emphasis and underscoring deleted)
Consistent with the finding that Valenzuela had been illegally dismissed,
he is, therefore, entitled to reinstatement and full backwages. In view,
however, of the strained relations between the parties, the award of
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is a more feasible alternative.
In CRC Agricultural Trading, et al. v. NLRC, et al.,[33] the Court explained
the rationale behind the allowance for the award of separation pay in lieu
of reinstatement. It emphasized that under the doctrine of strained
relations, the payment of separation pay is considered an acceptable
alternative to reinstatement when the latter option is no longer desirable
or viable. On one hand, such payment liberates the employee from what
could be a highly oppressive work environment. On the other hand, it
releases the employer from the grossly unpalatable obligation of
maintaining in its employ a worker it could no longer trust.[34]
Considering the antagonistic stance of the parties with each other,
compelling Valenzuela's reinstatement might do more harm on their
already strained relationship. It is worth mentioning that Valenzuela acted
not only as a company driver, he was also being tasked to render
personal errands for the Deteras, like bringing the daughter of the
Deteras to and from school, which meant that the element of trust is
essential. The antagonism created by the institution of the instant case is
enough to conclude that the parties are no longer willing to work with
each other.
manifested by his persistent assertion that Valenzuela was merely a
family driver in order to justify his unceremonious dismissal. He
repeatedly insisted that as a family driver or member of the household
service, Valenzuela may be terminated at will, which was exactly what he
did. He unreasonably sent Valenzuela home when the latter reported for
work, the latter unaware of what he had done to merit such an abrupt
termination. Cesar's admission on the reckless manner of Valenzuela's
dismissal justifies holding him solidarity liable with AMOVI.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated June 5, 2015 and Resolution dated
January 13, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 136037
are AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) Alexandra
Mining and Oil Ventures, Inc. and Cesar Detera are hereby held liable for
illegal dismissal; and (2) the award of full backwages by the National
Labor Relations Commission (Fourth Division) in its Decision
promulgated on March 27, 2014 is hereby RESTORED. The respondents
are solidarity held liable for the payment of the monetary awards, subject
to a recomputation of separation pay which shall be one (1) month for
every year of service and full backwages from the time of illegal dismissal
up to the finality of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.

The Court takes note that there was an allegation that AMOVT had
ceased operation or that it was on the verge of collapse while the
proceedings in this dase are being conducted.[35] However, the fact of
actual closure of business was not clearly established in the records nor
was the Court informed by any of the parties that AMOVI had in fact
ceased operations. Therefore, this allegation will not be considered in the
period for the computation of the monetary awards due the dismissed
employee, as the company is still reasonably presumed to be in full
operation. The computation of the separation pay will still be one (1)
month salary for every year of service plus backwages from the time of
their illegal termination up to the finality of this Decision.[36]

Finally, the CA correctly ruled on the solidary liability of the respondents

to pay the monetary awards due the dismissed employee. As a rule, "[a]
corporate officer is not personally liable for the money claims of
discharged corporate employees unless he acted with evident malice and
bad faith in terminating their employment."[37] Here, Cesar's bad faith was