IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE On the first issue, the Court held that it may integrate the

rst issue, the Court held that it may integrate the Bar in the exercise of its
power “to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
and the admission to the practice of law.” Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
part of the Court’s constitutional authority over the Bar.

49 SCRA 22
The second issue hinges on the following constitutional rights: freedom of association
and of speech, as well as the nature of the dues exacted from the lawyer, i.e., whether
FACTS: or not the Court thus levies a tax. The Court held:

Republic Act. No. 6397 entitled “An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine
Bar and Appropriating Funds Therefore” was passed in September 1971, ordaining
“Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of
court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar.” The Supreme Court formed a
Commission on Bar Integration and in December 1972, the Commission earnestly
recommended the integration of the bar. The Court accepted all comments on the
proposed integration.
ISSUES:
1. Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine bar?
2. Would the integration of the bar be constitutional?
3. Should the Court ordain the integration of the bar at this time?
RULING:
1. Integration is not violative of freedom of association because it does not compel
a lawyer to become a member of any group of which he is not already a
member. All that it does is “to provide an official national organization for the
well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is
already a member.” The lawyer too is not compelled to attend meetings,
participate of activities, etc. The only compulsion is the payment of annual
dues. Assuming, however, that it does compel a lawyer to be a member of an
integrated bar, the court held that “such compulsion is justified as an exercise
of the police power of the state”
2. Integration is also not violative of the freedom of speech just because dues paid
b the lawyer may be used for projects or programs, which the lawyer opposes.
To rule otherwise would make every government exaction a “free speech
issue.” Furthermore, the lawyer is free to voice out his objections to positions
taken by the integrated bar.
3. The dues exacted from lawyers is not in the nature of a levy but is purely for
purposes of regulation.

As to the third issue, the Court believes in the timeliness of the integration. Survey
In ruling on the issues raised, the Court first adopted the definition given by the showed an overwhelming majority of lawyers who favored integration.
Commission to “integration” in this wise: “Integration of the Philippine Bar means the
official unification of the entire lawyer population of the Philippines. This requires
membership and financial support (in reasonable amount) of every attorney as
conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll
of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.” The term “Bar” refers to the collectivity of all
persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or unified
Bar) perforce must include all lawyers.

Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do

so; the State. Bar integration therefore, signifies the setting up by government
authority of a national organization of the legal profession based on the recognition of
the lawyer as an officer of the court.

Designed to improve the positions of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the
rule of law, integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their
own organized action and participation, the promotion of the objectives of the legal
profession, pursuant to the principle of maximum Bar autonomy with minimum
supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court.
 government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of
VITRIOLO v. DASIG A.C. No. social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice.

4984, April 1, 2003 For her violation of the Attorney’s Oath as well as of Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.03 of Canon
120 and Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly
for acts of dishonesty as well as gross misconduct as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, we
Facts: This is an administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty. Felina S. Dasig, find that respondent deserves not just the penalty of three years’ suspension from
an official of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED). The charge involves gross membership in the Bar as well as the practice of law, as recommended by the IBP
misconduct of respondent in violation of the Attorney’s Oath for having used her Board of Governors, but outright disbarment. Her name shall be stricken off the list of
public office to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of attorneys upon finality of this decision.
the CHED. Almost all complainants in the instant case are high-ranking officers of the
CHED. In their sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with this Court on December 4, 1998,
ANGELITA C. ORCINO vs. ATTY.
complainants allege that respondent, while she was OIC of Legal Affairs Service,
CHED, committed acts that are grounds for disbarment under Section 27,2 Rule 138 of GASPAR A.C. No. 3773 , September 24,
the Rules of Court, to wit:
1997
She demanded from Betty C. Mangohon, a teacher of Our Lady of Mariazel
Monday, February 23, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Educational Center in Novaliches, Quezon City, the amount of P5,000.00 for the Labels: Case Digests, Legal Ethics
facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal
Affairs Service, CHED. she demanded from Rosalie B. Dela Torre, a student, the
amount of P18,000.00 to P20,000.00 for facilitation of her application for correction
of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED. She demanded from
Rocella G. Eje, a student, the amount of P5,000.00 for facilitation of her application Facts: Orcino engaged the services of Atty. Gaspar to prosecute
for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED. She acriminal case she intended to file against several suspects in the
demanded from Jacqueline N. Ng, a student, a considerable amount which was
subsequently confirmed to be P15,000.00 and initial fee of P5,000.00 more or less for slaying of her husband. Complainant paid respondent his fees as
facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal stipulated. Forthwith, respondent entered into his duties and
Affairs Service, CHED.
performed them religiously from the preliminary investigation with
the office of the prosecutor until the case was thereafter filed with
Issue: Whether the Respondent violated her Oath as well as the Code of Professional the RTC of Baloc, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija.
Responsibility.
Held: Yes, respondent Arty. Felina S. Dasig is found liable for gross misconduct and
dishonesty in violation of the Attorney’s Oath as well as the Code of Professional Respondent however failed to attend the bail hearing scheduled in
Responsibility, and is hereby ordered DISBARRED. Respondent’s attempts to extort
money from persons with applications or requests pending before her office are
August 1991. It was at this nearing that the court, over
violative of Rule 1.0118 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits complainant's objections, granted bail to all the accused. After the
members of the Bar from engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or
deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.0219 of the Code
hearing, complainant immediately went to respondent's residence
which bars lawyers in government service from promoting their private interests. and confronted him with his absence. Respondent explained that he
Promotion of private interests includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in did not receive formal notice of the hearing. Complainant became
any transaction requiring the approval of his office or which may be affected by the
functions of his office. Respondent’s conduct in office falls short of the integrity and belligerent and started accusing him of jeopardizing the case by his
good moral character required from all lawyers, specially from one occupying a high absence. Respondent said that her suspicions were based on
public office. For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act
or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in rumors and intrigues fed to her by her relatives. Complainant,
government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and however, continued accusing him belligerently. She asked for the
observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in
records of the case saying that she could refer them to another
lawyer. Stung by her words, respondent gave her the records.
Subsequently, respondent filed before the trial court a "Motion to
Withdraw as Counsel" but it did not bear the consent of
complainant. The court issued an order directing respondent to
secure complainant'sconsent to the motion "and his appearance as
private prosecutor shall continue until he has secured this consent."
Complainant refused to sign her conformity to respondent's
withdrawal. Meanwhile, the hearings in thecriminal case continued.
Respondent did not appear at the hearings nor did he contact
complainant. Complainant was thus compelled to engage the
services of another lawyer. Hence, this complaint.
Issue: Whether or not a lawyer is excused from his duty to
represent his client if said client refuses to give his consent to the
lawyer’s motion to withdraw his appearance.
No. Rule 22.01 of Canon 22 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides: ”A lawyer may withdraw his services from
his client only in the following instances: (a) when a client insists
upon an unjust or immoralconduct of his case; (b) when the client
insists that the lawyer pursueconduct violative of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; (c) when the client has two or more
retained lawyers and the lawyers could not get along to the
detriment of the case; (d) when the mental or physical condition of
the lawyer makes him incapable of handling the case effectively; (e)
when the client deliberately fails to pay the attorney's fees agreed
upon; (f) when the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; (g)
other similar cases”.
Respondent's withdrawal was made on the ground that "there no
longer exist[ed] the . . . confidence" between them and that there
had been "serious differences between them relating to the manner
of private prosecution." This circumstance is neither one of the
foregoing instances nor can it be said that it is analogous thereof.

Held: No. A lawyer may retire at any time from any action or special
proceeding with the written consent of his client filed in court and
copy thereof served upon the adverse party. Should the client refuse
to give hisconsent, the lawyer must file an application with the
court. The court, on notice to the client and adverse party, shall
determine whether he ought to be allowed to retire. The application
for withdrawal must be based on a good cause. In the instant case,
respondent did not file an application with the court for it to
determine whether he should be allowed to withdraw.

Corollary Issue: Granting that the Motion to withdraw appearance

filed by respondent is sufficient as to form, is it based upon a good
cause?
 THIRD DIVISION
[ A.C. No. 10576, January 14, 2015 ]
ARCATOMY S. GUARIN, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. CHRISTINE A.C. LIMPIN,
RESPONDENT.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a complaint[1] for disbarment filed by Arcatomy S. Guarin against Atty.
Christine Antenor-Cruz Limpin for allegedly filing a false General Information Sheet
(GIS) with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) thus violating Canon
1[2] and Rule 1.01[3] of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The facts are culled from the pleadings.
In 2004, Guarin was hired by Mr. Celso G. de los Angeles as Chief Operating Officer
and thereafter as President of OneCard Company, Inc., a member of the Legacy Group
of Companies. He resigned from his post effective August 11, 2008 and transferred to
St. Luke's Medical Center as the Vice President for Finance.
On November 27, 2008, Atty. Limpin, the Corporate Secretary of Legacy Card, Inc.
(LCI), another corporation under the Legacy Group, filed with the SEC a GIS for LCI
for "updating purposes". The GIS[4] identified Guarin as Chairman of the Board of
Directors (BOD) and President.
Mired with allegations of anomalous business transactions and practices, on
December 18, 2008, LCI applied for voluntary dissolution with the SEC.
On July 22, 2009, Guarin filed this complaint with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) claiming that Atty. Limpin
violated Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR by knowingly listing him as a stockholder,
Chairman of the Board and President of LCI when she knew that he had already
resigned and had never held any share nor was he elected as chairperson of the BOD
or been President of LCI. He also never received any notice of meeting or agenda
where his appointment as Chairman would be taken up. He has never accepted any
appointment as Chairman and President of LCI.
Atty. Limpin admits that she filed the GIS with the SEC listing Guarin as a
stockholder, the Chairman of the BOD and President of LCI. She argued that the GIS
was provisional to comply with SEC requirements. It would have been corrected in the
future but unfortunately LCI filed for voluntary dissolution shortly thereafter. She
averred that the GIS was made and submitted in good faith and that her certification
served to attest to the information from the last BOD meeting held on March 3,
2008.[5]
She asserted that Guarin knew that he was a stockholder. Atty. Limpin said that on
October 13, 2008, she sent Guarin a text message and asked him to meet with her so
he may sign a Deed of Assignment concerning shareholdings. Guarin responded in the
affirmative and said that he would meet with her on Friday, October 17, 2008. Guarin,
however, neglected to show up at the arranged time and place for reasons unknown to
Atty. Limpin. On the strength of Guarin's positive reply, Atty. Limpin filed the GIS on
November 27, 2008.
To belie the claim that LCI never held any board meeting, Atty. Limpin presented
Secretary's Certificates dated May 16, 2006[6], May 22, 2006[7], and June 13,
2007[8] bearing Guarin's signature.
Moreover, Atty. Limpin stated that there were pending criminal complaints against
the directors and officers of LCI, where she and Guarin are co-respondents: Senator
Roxas, et al. v. Celso de los Angeles, et al.[9] and SEC v. Legacy Card, Inc.[10] In those
proceedings, Guarin raised as a defense that the November 27, 2008 GIS was spurious
and/or perjured. She averred that this Court held that "when the criminal prosecution
based on the same act charged is still pending in court, any administrative disciplinary
proceedings for the same act must await the outcome of the criminal case to avoid
contradictory findings."[11] During the mandatory preliminary conference, however,
both parties stipulated that the complaint filed by Senator Roxas was dismissed as to
Guarin.[12]
Lastly, Atty. Limpin contends that Guarin failed to present sufficient evidence to
warrant disbarment. She stated that merely presenting the GIS does not constitute as
proof of any unethical conduct, harassment and malpractice.
In its Report,[13] the IBP CBD found that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and
1.02[14] of the CPR and thus recommended that she be suspended from the practice of
law for three months. It noted that based on the submissions of the parties, Guarin
was never a stockholder of LCI consequently making him ineligible to be a member of
the BOD. Neither was there proof that Guarin acted as the President of LCI but was a
mere signatory of LCI's bank accounts. This made the verified statement of Atty.
Limpin untrue.[15]
Moreover, it was noted that only Mr. Celso de los Angeles had the authority to appoint
or designate directors or officers of Legacy. Atty. Limpin was aware that this
procedure was not legally permissible. Despite knowing this to be irregular, she
allowed herself to be dictated upon and falsely certified that Guarin was a stockholder,
chairman and president of the company. The Secretary's Certificates with Guarin's
signature Atty. Limpin presented were of no moment since in these Guarin merely
acceded to become a signatory of bank accounts and these do not show that Guarin
was a stockholder.
The IBP Board of Governors in its April 15, 2013 Resolution[16] adopted in toto the
CBD Report. Atty. Limpin moved for reconsideration[17] but was denied in the March
21, 2014 Resolution[18] of the IBP Board of Governors.
We adopt the report and recommendation of the IBP. Atty. Limpin has violated Canon
1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the CPR.
Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the rules of
procedure, rather than seek exceptions as loopholes.[19] A lawyer who assists a client in
a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies
disciplinary action against the lawyer.[20]
Disbarment proceedings are sui generis and can proceed independently of civil and
criminal cases. As Justice Malcolm stated "[t]he serious consequences of disbarment
or suspension should follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence
against the respondent. The presumption is that the attorney is innocent of the
charges pr[o]ferred and has performed his duty as an officer of the court in accordance
with his oath."[21]
However, considering the seriousness of Atty. Limpin's action in submitting a false
document we see it fit to increase the recommended penalty to six months suspension
from the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Christine A.C. Limpin GUILTY of violation
of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Christine A.C. Limpin
from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision,
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt
with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended
to respondent's personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

Grounds for such administrative action against a lawyer may be found in Section
27,[22] Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Among these are (1) the use of any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office and (2) any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before the admission to practice.

After going through the submissions and stipulations of the parties, we agree with the
IBP that there is no indication that Guarin held any share to the corporation and that
he is therefore ineligible to hold a seat in the BOD and be the president of the
company.[23] It is undisputed that Atty. Limpin filed and certified that Guarin was a
stockholder of LCI in the GIS. While she posits that she had made the same in good
faith, her certification also contained a stipulation that she made a due verification of
the statements contained therein. That Atty. Limpin believed that Guarin would sign a
Deed of Assignment is inconsequential: he never signed the instrument. We also note
that there was no submission which would support the allegation that Guarin was in
fact a stockholder. We thus find that in filing a GIS that contained false information,
Atty. Limpin committed an infraction which did not conform to her oath as a lawyer in
accord with Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR.

We also agree with the IBP that in allowing herself to be swayed by the business
practice of having Mr. de los Angeles appoint the members of the BOD and officers of
the corporation despite the rules enunciated in the Corporation Code with respect to
the election of such officers, Atty. Limpin has transgressed Rule 1.02 of the CPR.
 EN BANC
[ A.C. No. 10679, March 10, 2015 ]
PO1 JOSE B. CASPE, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. AQUILINO A. MEJICA,
RESPONDENT.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a complaint[1] for disbarment filed by PO1 Jose B. Caspe against Atty.
Aquilino A. Mejica[2] for alleged violation of Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)
specifically Rules 1.03,[3] 1.04,[4] and 10.01[5]. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Board of Governors (IBP BOG) recommended that Atty. Mejica be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of three years.[6]
Caspe alleged the controversy started when Atty. Mejica disregarded conflict of
interest rules. Caspe said that when he filed a complaint for attempted murder against
Antonio Rodriguez, Jr., Atty. Mejica served as Caspe's counsel. When Rodriguez, Jr.
filed his counter-affidavit, it was Atty. Mejica who counseled and represented him.[7]
Caspe brought separate suits for damages and disbarment: one for conflict of
interest[8] and the present complaint. Atty. Mejica tried to negotiate a settlement but
Caspe refused. Atty. Mejica allegedly then threatened Caspe that "he will help file cases
after cases against the complainant until he kneels before [him]. He will 'put down'
complainant so much so that he will be removed from the service."[9] From then on,
Caspe alleged, Atty. Mejica maliciously encouraged the filing of suits against him.
In the present complaint, Caspe narrated that on December 21, 2007, Romulo
Gaduena,[10] a barangay tanod, harassed Jan Mark Busa and Marcelino Jataas with a
gun. Caspe, who was on duty, together with PO1 Onofre Lopeña responded. They
recovered a caliber 0.357 revolver which was turned over to the Can-avid Police
station. The incident was recorded in the police blotter. Gaduena evaded arrest with
the help of barangay captain Prudencio Agda and other barangay tanods[11] who
allegedly clobbered Caspe and took his gun. In the interest of peace and harmony, the
Chief of Police[12] called and requested that Caspe desist from filing charges against the
barangay captain and tanods, specifically Gaduena. Caspe acceded.
However, Gaduena, with Atty. Mejica as counsel, filed a complaint[13] for serious
slander by deed against Caspe, which was supported by a joint affidavit[14] of two
barangay tanods. It was alleged that Caspe kicked, collared and slapped Gaduena's
face. This prompted Caspe to disregard the agreement with the Chief of Police and he
filed cases against the tanods. Suspecting that Atty. Mejica encouraged Gaduena to
file the case against him, Caspe filed the cases for damages[15] and
disbarment[16] against Atty. Mejica before the IBP.
In its July 4, 2008 Order,[17] the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) ordered
Atty. Mejica to submit his answer.
A Notice of Mandatory Conference was issued on September 22, 2008 for a hearing
scheduled on October 21, 2008.[18] Atty. Mejica, however, failed to appear. The
hearing was rescheduled on November 18, 2008.
On November 13, 2008, Atty. Mejica filed a manifestation that he never received a
copy of the complaints against him. He asked that the hearing be postponed and
rescheduled and that copies of the complaint be furnished to him.[19] The hearing was
thus rescheduled to January 13, 2009[20] and a copy of the complaint was sent to him
via a private courier, LBC. It appeared however that he did not claim the mail.[21]
On December 9, 2008, Atty. Mejica once more manifested that he did not receive any
notice from LBC of any mail to be claimed. He also expressed misgivings on the shift
from registered mail to the use of a private courier to send copies of the complaint. He
requested that a copy of the complaint be sent to him via registered mail.[22]
Atty. Mejica failed to appear in the January 13, 2009 hearing. The IBP CBD issued an
order warning him that his failure to appear in the next rescheduled hearing would
render him in default and the case would be submitted for decision.[23]
Atty. Mejica failed to appear for the February 3, 2009 hearing. The IBP CBD ordered
the case submitted for decision.[24]
In its Report and Recommendation,[25] the IBP CBD found respondent guilty of
violating Rules 1.03, 1.04 and 10.01 of the CPR. It stated that Atty. Mejica was
corruptly motivated in encouraging the filing of suits against Caspe making good his
threat to file case upon case against the latter until he kneels before him. Notice was
taken that this was Atty. Mejica's second infraction for a similar offense. In Baldado v.
Mejica,[26] he was suspended from the practice of law for a period of three
months.[27] The IBP CBD thus recommended that Atty. Mejica be suspended from the
practice of law for one year.[28]
In its April 15, 2013 Resolution, the IBP BOG adopted the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP CBD.[29] Atty. Mejica moved for reconsideration.[30]
In its May 3, 2014 Resolution, the IBP BOG denied the motion for reconsideration and
modified the penalty by increasing the period of suspension to three years.[31] The
resolution noted that Atty. Opinion, member of the BOG and counsel of Caspe for this
case, stepped out of the room when the case came for discussion and did not
participate in the voting.[32]

Atty. Mejica maintains that he was not afforded due process. He stated that he
received a Notice of Preliminary Conference for October 21, 2008 but did not appear
since he did not receive a copy of the complaint and was not ordered to answer. For
the scheduled February 3, 2009 Conference, Atty. Mejica reasoned that it was
impossible for him to attend the meeting since he received the Notice in the afternoon
of February 3, 2009.[33] Furthermore, he was not given the opportunity to
answer. Atty. Mejica also maintained that he never threatened Caspe because he was
not present during the preliminary conference where he allegedly uttered the
threatening words.[34]
We adopt the findings of the IBP but modify the penalty imposed.
The only question the Court takes up in disbarment proceedings is whether the
member of the bar is fit to be allowed the privileges as such or not.[35] This Court has
stated that a lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in
his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in good moral
character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor as to render him unworthy to
continue as an officer of the Court.[36]
In disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar, only clear preponderance of
evidence is required to establish liability. As long as the evidence presented by
complainant or that taken judicial notice of by the Court is more convincing and
worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto, the imposition of
disciplinary sanction is justified.[37] The Court has required that a complainant has the
onus of proving the charges against respondent by clear, convincing and satisfactory
evidence.[38]
Based on the Report and Recommendation, the Court is convinced that there is
sufficient evidence to sanction Atty. Mejica. The following observation by the IBP CBD
is well taken:
x x x First, when the cases were initiated and filed against PO1 Caspe through the help
of [Atty. Mejica], he was already facing disbarment and civil cases which the former
filed against him. Second, these cases [were] filed after [Atty. Mejica] made [the]
threat [to] file cases against PO1 Caspe by reason of [the] refusal to withdraw the
disbarment and civil cases. Third, a gap of more than five months elapsed between the
incident of December 21, 2007 and the filing of the grave slander by deed and that
during this period, the chief of Police who [was] presumed to have regularly performed
his job did not prosecute the criminal cases against [Gaduena] and
companions. Fourth, during [the] said period, PO1 Caspe who [was] presumed to have
taken ordinary care of his cause did not file the criminal cases against [Gaduena] and
companions. Fifth, the existence of a settlement agreement between PO1 Caspe and
Brgy. Captain Agda, Kagawad Sobresida and the other tanods is therefore factual, but
despite such settlement, the case for grave slander by deed was still filed with [Atty.
Mejica] as counsel. Sixth, PO1 Caspe filed this disbarment case only after the grave
slander by deed and the multiple attempted murders were filed against him with the
help of [Atty. Mejica]. Seventh, and most importantly, despite ethical proscription,
[Atty. Mejica] served as counsel for the criminal complainants against PO1 Caspe.[39]
The IBP CBD concluded that there could be no other reason for Atty. Mejica to file the
cases against PO1 Caspe other than to get back at him. We agree that the confluence of
circumstances points to Atty. Mejica's corrupt motive in helping Gaduena in filing
cases against Caspe, in violation of Rules 1.03, 1.04 and 10.01 of the CPR.
With respect to Atty. Mejica's claim that he was not afforded due process, i.e., he was
not able to receive a copy of a complaint which in turn was the reason for him not to
have attended the mandatory conference, we find this untenable.
Section 5, Rule V of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline
Integrated Bar of the Philippines provides that:
SEC. 5. Non-appearance of Parties, and Non-verification of Pleadings. a)
Non-appearance at the mandatory conference or at the clarificatory questioning date
shall be deemed a waiver of right to participate in the proceeding. Ex parte conference
or hearings shall then be conducted. Pleadings submitted or filed which are not
verified shall not be given weight by the Investigating Commissioner.
Atty. Mejica during the course of these proceedings has missed all four scheduled
hearings supposedly since he was not furnished any copy of the complaint. Records
suggest however that a copy of the complaint was sent to him on August 25, 2008, a
mail which he did not claim. He submitted two manifestations in response to notices
he received. He was thus placed on notice that there was an action against him.
It is the Court's opinion that Atty. Mejica's attitude toward the proceedings before the
IBP indicates a lack of respect for the IBP's rules and procedures. In Cabauatan v.
Venida,[40] we stated that in not heeding the IBP's directives:
x x x Respondent's refusal to obey the orders of the IBP "is not only irresponsible, but
also constitutes utter disrespect for the judiciary and his fellow lawyers. His conduct is
unbecoming of a lawyer, for lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court orders
and processes and are expected to stand foremost in complying with court directives
being themselves officers of the court." Respondent should be reminded that -
As an officer of the court, [he] is expected to know that a resolution of this Court is not
a mere request but an order which should be complied with promptly and
completely. This is also true of the orders of the IBP as the investigating arm of the
Court in administrative cases against lawyers.
Respondent should strive harder to live up to his duties of observing and maintaining
the respect due to the courts, respect for law and for legal processes, and of upholding
the integrity and dignity of the legal profession in order to perform his responsibilities
as a lawyer effectively.[41]
In Heenan v. Espejo,[42] a lawyer's unjustified refusal to heed the directives of the IBP
and to appear at the scheduled mandatory conference constituted a blatant disrespect
for the IBP amounting to conduct unbecoming a lawyer. We looked back on our ruling
in Almendarez, Jr. v. Atty. Langit,[43] where we stated that:
The misconduct of respondent is aggravated by his unjustified refusal to heed the
orders of the IBP requiring him to file an answer to the complaint-affidavit and,
afterwards, to appear at the mandatory conference x x x he is justly charged with
conduct unbecoming a lawyer, for a lawyer is expected to uphold the law and promote
respect for legal processes. Further, a lawyer must observe and maintain respect not
only to the courts, but also to judicial officers and other duly constituted authorities,
including the IBP. Under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the Court has empowered
the IBP to co
EN BANC
[ A.C. No. 8208, January 10, 2018 ]
RET. JUDGE VIRGILIO ALPAJORA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. RONALDO
ANTONIO V. CALAYAN, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
GESMUNDO, J.:
Before the Court is a Counter-Complaint[1] filed by complainant (Ret.) Judge Virgilio
Alpajora (Complainant) against respondent Atty. Ronaldo Antonio V. Calayan
(Respondent), which originated from an administrative complaint filed by the latter
against the former before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for ignorance of
the law and/or issuance of undue order. The administrative complaint against Judge
Alpajora was dismissed by the Court in a Resolution,[2] dated March 2, 2009, on the
ground that the matters raised therein were judicial in nature.
In his Comment/Opposition with Counter-Complaint to Discipline
Complainant,[3] complainant charged respondent with (a) filing a malicious and
harassment administrative case, (b) propensity for dishonesty in the allegations in his
pleadings, (c) misquoting provisions of law, and (d) misrepresentation of facts.
Complainant prayed for respondent's disbarment and cancellation of his license as a
lawyer.
The Antecedents
Prior to this case, an intra-corporate case docketed as Civil Case No. 2007-10 and
entitled "Calayan Educational Foundation Inc. (CEFI), Dr. Arminda Calayan, Dr.
Bernardita Calayan-Brion and Dr. Manuel Calayan vs. Atty. Ronalda A.V. Calayan,
Susan S. Calayan and Deanna Rachelle S. Calayan," was filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City designated as commercial court and presided by
Judge Adolfo Encomienda. Respondent was President and Chairman of the Board of
Trustees of CEFI. He signed and filed pleadings as "Special Counsel pro se" for
himself. Court proceedings ensued despite several inhibitions by judges to whom the
case was re-raffled until it was finally re-raffled to complainant. Thereafter,
complainant issued an Omnibus Order,[4] dated July 11, 2008 for the creation of a
management committee and the appointment of its members. That Order prompted
the filing of the administrative case against the Judge Alpajora.
The administrative case against complainant was dismissed. The Court, however,
referred the comment/opposition with counter-complaint filed by complainant in the
administrative case against him to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for
appropriate action.
The OBC deemed it proper to re-docket the counter-complaint as a regular
administrative case against respondent. Thus, in a Resolution,[5] dated June 3, 2009,
upon recommendation of the OBC, the Court resolved to require respondent to submit
his comment on the counter-complaint.
In its Resolution,[6] dated September 9, 2009, the Court noted respondent's comment
and referred the administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
After a mandatory conference before the IBP, both parties were directed to submit
their respective verified position papers.
Position of complainant
Complainant alleged that he partially tried and heard Civil Case No. 2007-10, an intra-
corporate case filed against respondent, when he later voluntarily inhibited himself
from it on account of the latter's filing of the administrative case against him.
The intra-corporate case was previously tried by Presiding Judge Adolfo Encomienda
(Presiding Judge Encomienda) until he voluntarily inhibited after respondent filed an
Urgent Motion to Recuse and a Supplement to Defendant's Urgent Motion to Recuse
on the grounds of undue delay in disposing pending incidents, gross ignorance of the
law and gross inefficiency.[7] The motions came after Presiding Judge Encomienda
issued an order appointing one Atty. Antonio Acyatan (Atty. Acyatan) as receiver, who
was directed to immediately take over the subject corporation.
After Presiding Judge Encomienda inhibited himself, the case was reraffled to the sala
of Executive Judge Norma Chionglo-Sia, who also inhibited herself because she was
about to retire. The case was referred to Executive Judge Eloida R. de Leon-Diaz for
proper disposition and reraffle.[8] The case was finally raffled to complainant.[9]
Complainant averred that the administrative case against him by respondent was
brought about by his issuance of the omnibus order, dated July 11, 2008, where he
ordered the creation of a management committee and appointment of its members.
Meanwhile, the RTC resolved that Atty. Acyatan continue to discharge his duties and
responsibilities with such powers and authority as the court-appointed receiver. The
trial court also authorized the foundation to pay Atty. Acyatan reimbursement
expenses and professional charges. Complainant claimed that his order was not
acceptable to respondent because he knew the import and effect of the said order that
he, together with his wife and daughter, would lose their positions as Chairman,
Treasurer and Secretary, respectively, and as members of the Board ofTrustees of the
CEFI.[10]
Complainant further claimed that before the records of Civil Case 2007-10 was
transmitted to his sala and after he had inhibited from said case, respondent filed
thirteen (13) civil and special actions before the RTC of Lucena City.[11] Atty. Calayan
also filed two (2) related intra-corporate controversy cases - violating the rule on
splitting causes of actions - involving the management and operation of the
foundation. According to complainant, these showed the propensity and penchant of
respondent in filing cases, whether or not they are baseless, frivolous or unfounded,
with no other intention but to harass, malign and molest his opposing parties,
including the lawyers and the handling judges. Complainant also revealed that
respondent filed two (2) other administrative cases against a judge and an assisting
judge in the RTC of Lucena City, which were dismissed because the issues raised were
judicial in nature.[12]
Complainant also disclosed that before his sala, respondent filed eighteen (18)
repetitious and prohibited pleadings.[13] Respondent continuously filed pleadings after
pleadings as if to impress upon the court to finish the main intra-corporate case with
such speed. To complainant's mind, the ultimate and ulterior objective of respondent
in filing the numerous pleadings, motions, manifestation and explanations was to
prevent the takeover of the management of CEFI and to finally dismiss the case at the
pre-trial stage.
Complainant further revealed that due to the series of motions for recusation or
inhibition of judges, there is no presiding judge in Lucena City available to try and
hear the Calayan cases. Moreover, respondent filed nine (9) criminal charges against
opposing lawyers and their respective clients before the City Prosecutor of Lucena
City. In addition, there were four (4) administrative cases filed against opposing
counsels pending before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline.[14]
Based on the foregoing, complainant asserted that respondent committed the
following: (1) serious and gross misconduct in his duties as counsel for himself; (2)
violated his oath as lawyer for [a] his failure to observe and maintain respect to the
courts (Section 20(b), Rule 138, Rules of Court); [b] by his abuse of judicial process
thru maintaining actions or proceedings inconsistent with truth and honor and his
acts to mislead the judge by false statements (Section 20(d), Rule 138); (3) repeatedly
violated the rules of procedures governing intra-corporate cases and maliciously
misused the same to defeat the ends of justice; and (4) knowingly violated the rule
against the filing of multiple actions arising from the same cause of action.
Position of respondent
In his Position Paper,[15] respondent countered that the subject case is barred by the
doctrine of res judicata.
According to him, the counter-complaint was integrated with the
Comment/Opposition of complainant in the administrative case docketed as A.M.
OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2968-RTJ filed by respondent against the latter. He stressed that
because no disciplinary measures were levelled on him by the OCA as an outcome of
his complaint, charges for malpractice, malice or bad faith were entirely ruled out;
moreso, his disbarment was decidedly eliminated.[16] Respondent argued that the
doctrine of res judicata was embedded in the OCA's finding that his complaint was
judicial in nature.[17] He likewise averred that the conversion of the administrative
complaint against a judge into a disbarment complaint against him, the complaining
witness, was hideously adopted to deflect the charges away from complainant.
Respondent insisted that the counter-complaint was not sanctioned by the Rules of
Court on disbarment and the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar
Discipline.[18]
Respondent also claimed that the counter-complaint was unverified and thus, without
complainant's own personal knowledge; instead, it is incontrovertible proof of his lack
of courtesy and obedience toward proper authorities and fairness to a fellow lawyer.[19]
Further, respondent maintained that complainant committed the following: 1) grossly
unethical and immoral conduct by his impleading a non-party;[20] (2) betrayal of his
lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR);[21] (3) malicious and
intentional delay in not terminating the pre-trial,[22] in violation of the Interim Rules
because he ignored the special summary nature of the case;[23] and (4) misquoted
provisions of law and misrepresented the facts.[24]
Lastly, it was respondent's submission that the counter-complaint failed to adduce the
requisite quantum of evidence to disbar him, even less, to cite him in contempt of
court assuming ex gratia the regularity of the referral of the case.[25]
Report and Recommendation of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
In its Report and Recommendation,[26] the Investigating Commissioner noted that,
instead of refuting the allegations and evidence against him, respondent merely
reiterated his charges against complainant. Instead of asserting his defense against
complainant's charges, the position paper for the respondent appeared more to be a
motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated March 2, 2009 rendered bf the
Supreme Court, dismissing the administrative case against complainant.[27]
In any case, based on the parties' position papers, the Investigating Commissioner
concluded that respondent violated Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court,[28] Rules 8.01, 10.01 to 10.03, 11.03, 11.04, 12.02 and 12.04 of the CPR[29] and,
thus, recommended his suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years,[30] for
the following reasons:
First, respondent did not deny having filed four (4) cases against the counsel involved
in the intra-corporate case from which the subject administrative cases stemmed, and
nine (9) criminal cases against the opposing parties, their lawyers, and the receiver
before the Office of the Prosecutor of Lucena City all of which were subject of judicial
notice. The Investigating Commissioner opined that such act manifested respondent's
malice in paralyzing these lawyers from exerting their utmost effort in protecting their
client's interest.[31]
Second, respondent committed misrepresentation when he cited a quote from former
Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as a thesis when, in fact, it was a dissenting opinion.
The Investigating Commissioner further opined that describing the supposed
discussions by the judge with respondent's adverse counsels as contemplated crimes
and frauds is not only grave but also unfounded and irrelevant to the present case.[32]
Third, respondent grossly abused his right of recourse to the courts by the filing of
multiple actions concerning the same subject matter or seeking substantially identical
relief.[33] He admitted filing pleadings indiscriminately, but argued that it was within
his right to do so and it was merely for the purpose of saving CEFI from imminent
downfall.[34] The Investigating Commissioner opined that the filing of multiple actions
not only was contemptuous, but also a blatant violation of the lawyer's oath.[35]
Fourth, respondent violated Canon 11 of the CPR by attributing to complainant ill-
motives that were not supported by the record or had no materiality to the case.[36] He
charged complainant with coaching adverse counsel on account of their alleged close
ties, inefficiency in dealing with his pleadings, acting with dispatch on the adverse
party's motions, partiality to the plaintiffs because he was a townmate of Presiding
Judge Encomienda, and arriving at an order without predicating the same on legal
bases under the principle of stare decisis.[37] According to the Investigating
Commissioner, these charges are manifestly without any basis and also established
respondent's disrespect for the complainant.[38]
Based on the findings, the Investigating Commissioner ultimately concluded:
As a party directly involved in the subject intra-corporate controversy, it is duly noted
that Respondent was emotionally affected by the ongoing case. His direct interest in
the proceedings apparently clouded his judgment, on account of which he failed to act
with circumspect in his choice of words and legal remedies. Such facts and
circumstances mitigate Respondent's liability. Hence, it is hereby recommended that
Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.[39]
Consequently, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution[40] adopting and
approving the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. It
recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for two (2) years.
Aggrieved, respondent moved for reconsideration.
In a Resolution,[41] dated May 4, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors denied
respondent's motion for reconsideration as there was no cogent reason to reverse the
findings of the Commission and the motion was a mere reiteration of the matters
which had already been threshed out.
Hence, pursuant to Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court,[42] the Resolution
of the IBP Board of Governors, together with the whole record of the case, was
transmitted to the Court for final action.
Ruling of the Court

The Court adopts the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and the
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.
It is bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in law, but also known to
possess good moral character. Lawyers should act and comport themselves with
honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the public's
faith in the legal profession.[43]
When lawyers, in the performance of their duties, act in a manner that prejudices not
only the rights of their client, but also of their colleagues and offends due
administration of justice, appropriate disciplinary measures and proceedings are
available such as reprimand, suspension or even disbarment to rectify their wrongful
acts.
The Court, however, emphasizes that a case for disbarment or suspension is not meant
to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case, but is intended to cleanse the ranks of
the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the public and the
courts.[44] Proceedings to discipline erring members of the bar are not instituted to
protect and promote the public good only, but also to maintain the dignity of the
profession by the weeding out of those who have proven themselves unworthy
thereof.[45]
In this case, perusal of the records reveals that Atty. Calayan has displayed conduct
unbecoming of a worthy lawyer.
Harassing tactics against opposing counsel
As noted by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, respondent did not deny filing
several cases, both civil and criminal, against opposing parties and their counsels. In
his motion for reconsideration of the IBP Board of Governors' Resolution, he again
admitted such acts but expressed that it was not ill-willed. He explained that the
placing of CEFI under receivership and directing the creation of a management
committee and the continuation of the receiver's duties and responsibilities by virtue
of the Omnibus Order spurred his filing of various pleadings and/or motions.[46] It was
in his desperation and earnest desire to save CEFI from further damage that he
implored the aid of the courts.[47]
The Court is mindful of the lawyer's duty to defend his client's cause with utmost zeal.
However, professional rules impose limits on a lawyer's zeal and hedge it with
necessary restrictions and qualifications.[48] The filing of cases by respondent against
the adverse parties and their counsels, as correctly observed by the Investigating
Commissioner, manifests his malice in paralyzing the lawyers from exerting their
utmost effort in protecting their client's interest.[49] Even assuming arguendo that
such acts were done without malice, it showed respondent's gross indiscretion as a
colleague in the legal profession.
Unsupported ill-motives attributed to a judge
As officers of the court, lawyers are duty-bound to observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts and judicial officers. They are to abstain from offensive or menacing
language or behavior before the court and must refrain from attributing to a judge
motives that are not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.[50]
Here, respondent has consistently attributed unsupported imputations against the
complainant in his pleadings. He insisted that complainant antedated the order, dated
August 15, 2008, because the envelopes where the order came from were rubber
stamped as having been mailed only on August 26, 2008.[51] He also accused the
complainant judge of being in cahoots and of having deplorable close ties with the
adverse counsels;[52] and that complainant irrefutably coached said adverse
counsels.[53] However, these bare allegations are absolutely unsupported by any piece
of evidence. Respondent did not present any proof to establish complainant's alleged
partiality or the antedating. The date of mailing indicated on the envelope is not the
date of issue of the said order.
Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the CPR state that:
Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the Courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
xxx
Rule 11.04 A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record
or have no materiality to the case.
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds respondent guilty of attributing unsupported
ill-motives to complainant. It must be remembered that all lawyers are bound to
uphold the dignity and authority of the courts, and to promote confidence in the fair
administration of justice. It is the respect for the courts that guarantees the stability of
the judicial institution; elsewise, the institution would be resting on a very shaky
foundation.[54]
Hence, no matter how passionate a lawyer is towards defending his client's cause, he
must not forget to display the appropriate decorum expected of him, being a member
of the legal profession, and to continue to afford proper and utmost respect due to the
courts.
Failure to observe candor, fairness and good faith before the court; failure to assist
in the speedy and efficient administration of justice
It cannot be gainsaid that candidness, especially towards the courts, is essential for the
expeditious administration of justice. Courts are entitled to expect only complete
candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer,
on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. Otherwise, the
administration of justice would gravely suffer if indeed it could proceed at all.[55]
In his Motion for Reconsideration[56] of the Resolution dated February 10, 2014 of the
IBP Board of Governors, respondent wrote:
Anent, the Respondent's alleged commission of falsehood in his pleadings, suffice it to
state that if certain pleadings prepared by the Respondent contained some allegations
that turned out to be inaccurate, the same were nevertheless unintentional and only
arose out of the Respondent's honest misappreciation of certain facts;[57]
The records, however, showed that respondent's allegations were not brought about by
mere inaccuracy. For one of his arguments against the complainant, respondent relied
on Rule 9 of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies which
provides:
SECTION 1. Creation of a Management Committee. - As an incident to any of the
cases filed under these Rules or the Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation, A
PARTY MAY APPLY for the appointment of a management committee for the
corporation, partnership or association, when there is imminent danger of: x x x
[Emphasis supplied]
He stressed that the courts cannot motu proprio legally direct the appointment of a
management committee when the Interim Rules predicate such
appointment exclusively upon the application of a party in the complaint a quo.[58]
By employing the term "exclusively" to describe the class of persons who can apply for
the appointment of a management committee,[59] respondent tried to mislead the
Court. Lawyers are well aware of the tenor of a provision of law when "may" is used.
"May" is construed as permissive and operating to confer discretion.[60] Thus, when
the Interim Rules stated that "a party may apply x x x," it did not connote
exclusivity to a certain class. It simply meant that should a party opt for the
appointment of such, it may do so. It does not, however, exclude the courts from
ordering the appointment of a management committee should the surrounding
circumstances of the case warrant such.
Further, as regards his alleged misquotation, respondent argues that he should have
been cited in contempt. He found justification in Cortes vs. Bangalan,[61] to wit:
x x x. The alleged offensive and contemptuous language contained in the letter-
complaint was not directed to the respondent court. As observed by the Court
Administrator, "what respondent should have done in this particular case is that he
should have given the Court (Supreme Court) the opportunity to rule on the complaint
and not simply acted precipitately in citing complainant in contempt of court in a
manner which obviously smacks of retaliation rather than the upholding of a court's
honor."
A judge may not hold a party in contempt of court for expressing concern on his
impartiality even if the judge may have been insulted therein. While the power to
punish in contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial
proceedings and to uphold the due administration of justice, judges, however, should
exercise their contempt powers judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and
with the end in view of utilizing their contempt powers for correction and preservation
not for retaliation or vindication.[62]
As correctly pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, the jurisprudence quoted
precisely cautions a judge against citing a party in contempt, which is totally
contradictory to the position of respondent. He misrepresented the text of a decision,
in violation of the CPR.
Moreover, in defense of the multiple pleadings he filed, respondent avers that there is
no law or rule that limits the number of motions, pleadings and even cases as long as
they are sufficient in form and substance and not violative of the prohibition against
forum shopping.[63] He maintains that his pleadings were filed in utmost good faith
and for noble causes, and that he was merely exercising his constitutionally protected
rights to due process and speedy disposition of cases.[64]
Ironically, Atty. Calayan's indiscriminate filing of pleadings, motions, civil and
criminal cases, and even administrative cases against different trial court judges
relating to controversies involving CEFI, in fact, runs counter to the speedy disposition
of cases. It frustrates the administration of justice. It degrades the dignity and integrity
of the courts.
A lawyer does not have an unbridled right to file pleadings, motions and cases as he
pleases. Limitations can be inferred from the following rules:
1. Rules of Court
a. Rule 71, Section 3. Indirect Contempt to be Punished After Charge and
Hearing. - After charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given
to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed
by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of
the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
xxx
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or
proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of
this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
xxx
2. Code of Professional Responsibility
a. Canon 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for law and for legal processes.
b. Canon 10, Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and
shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
c. Canon 12 - A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist
in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
d. Canon 12, Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the
execution of a Judgment or misuse Court processes.
Respondent justifies his filing of administrative cases against certain judges, including
complainant, by relying on In Re: Almacen (Almacen).[65] He claims that the mandate
of the ruling laid down in Almacen was to encourage lawyers' criticism of erring
magistrates.[66]
In Almacen, however, it did not mandate but merely recognized the right of a lawyer,
both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful
terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.[67] In addition,
the Court therein emphasized that these criticisms are subject to a condition, to wit:
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and
shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists
between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the
judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of
the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to
disciplinary action.[68] [Emphasis supplied.]
Indubitably, the acts of respondent were in violation of his duty to observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers and his duty to
never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer.[69]
In his last ditch attempt to escape liability, respondent apologized for not being more
circumspect with his remedies and choice of words. He admitted losing objectivity and
becoming emotional while pursuing the cases involving him and the CEFI. The Court,
however, reiterates that a lawyer's duty, is not to his client but primarily to the
administration of justice. To that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate. His
conduct ought to, and must always, be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics.
Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in
the pursuit of his devotion to his client's cause, is condemnable and unethical.[70]
For having violated the CPR and the Lawyer's Oath, respondent's conduct should be
meted with a commensurate penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS and APPROVES the Resolution of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines - Board of Governors dated September 28, 2013.
Accordingly, Atty. Ronaldo Antonio V. Calayan is found GUILTY of violating The
Lawyer's Oath and The Code of Professional Responsibility and he is hereby
ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will warrant the
imposition of a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the: (a) Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their information and guidance;
(b) the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and (c) the Office of the Bar Confidant. Let a
copy of this decision be attached to the personal records of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.