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I- UTILITARIANISM

• Consequentialist normative theories determine the moral value of actions solely by a cost-benefit analysis. An
action is deemed morally right if the consequences are far more pleasurable than painful. For example, A
company owner who values outputs more than effort in determining if an action is valuable or not.
• Utilitarianism is concerned with the idea of promoting the greatest happiness for the greatest number of
people. Seeking of pleasure and aversion to pain is the basic ground of the principle of utility.

A. JEREMY BENTHAM

• Act utilitarians believe that whenever we are deciding what to do, we should perform the action that will
create the greatest net utility. In their view, the principle of utility—do whatever will produce the best overall
results—should be applied on a case by case basis. The right action in any situation is the one that yields more
utility (i.e. creates more well-being) than other available actions.

• The Principle of Utility


o Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure.
Pleasure then is equated to happiness and pain to evil.
o A principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency
which it appears to have to augment or diminish happiness.
o The greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people.

• The Felicific / Hedonic Calculus


o Given that any and each possible act that, placed on the felicific balance, would show the best
possible combination of maximum pleasure and minimum pain. This then is what would be a
morally good act.
o Assuming that pleasure is reducible to quantifiable units, Bentham proposes seven elements to be
considered in the calculus

a. Intensity – How strong is the pleasurable consequence?


b. Duration – How long will the pleasurable consequence last?
c. Certainty – How certain or sure that a pleasurable consequence would occur?
d. Propinquity – How near or close a pleasurable consequence would occur?
e. Fecundity – How likely will pleasurable consequences would multiply to even more pleasurable
consequences?
f. Purity – How an action would lead to purely pleasurable consequences rather than painful
ones?
g. Extent – How many people are bound to be affected by the act and its pleasurable
consequences?

1. JOHN STUART MILL (RULE UTILITARIANISM)

❖ Rule utilitarians adopt a two-part view that stresses the importance of moral rules. According to rule utilitarians,
a) a specific action is morally justified if it conforms to a justified moral rule; and b) a moral rule is justified if its
inclusion into our moral code would create more utility than other possible rules (or no rule at all). According to
this perspective, we should judge the morality of individual actions by reference to general moral rules, and we
should judge particular moral rules by seeing whether their acceptance into our moral code would produce more
well-being than other possible rules.

❖ In addition, Mill would say that HIGHER PLEASURES (intellectual pleasures, pleasures of beauty and art, etc.)
should be valued more instead of LOWER PLEASURES (physical pleasures, material pleasures, etc.)
❖ Subordinate Rules / “General Rules”
o Common sense morality. These are rules that tend to promote happiness.
o If breaking a subordinate rule would result in much more happiness, then break it.
o Sometimes it is necessary to do a direct utility calculation, when:
▪ You are in an unusual situation that the rules don’t cover;
▪ The subordinate rules conflict; and
▪ You are deciding which rules to adopt or teach.

❖ John Stuart Mill’s father, James Mill, was a fervent disciple of Jeremy Bentham. Accordingly, he indoctrinated his
son with Bentham’s utilitarianism.

❖ John Stuart Mill found Bentham’s view of human nature too narrow. He proposed that man’s end is not mere
pleasure and absence of pain, but rather some kind of a more generalized happiness, a state, however, which
man is not supposed to seek for itself, but which man attains in seeking some other goal or ideal as end, such as
spiritual perfection, knowledge, aesthetics experience, or creative imagination.

❖ Besides, for Mill there are higher and lower pleasures, qualitatively different kinds of pleasures and satisfactions,
contrary to Bentham’s mere quantitatively differentiated pleasures.

❖ Mill corrects misconceptions about the principle of utility. One misconception is that utilitarianism, by endorsing
the Epicurean view “that life has…no higher end than pleasure” is a “doctrine worthy only of swine.” Mill counters
that “the accusation supposes human beings to be capable of no pleasures except those of which swine are
capable.”

❖ He proffers a distinction (one not found in Bentham) between higher and lower pleasures, with higher pleasures
including mental, aesthetic, and moral pleasures. When we are evaluating whether or not an action is good by
evaluating the happiness that we can expect to be produced by it, he argues that higher pleasures should be
taken to be in kind (rather than by degree) preferable to lower pleasures.

It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be a Socrates dissatisfied rather than
a fool satisfied. The ultimate end of all human desires remains to be happiness.

❖ To do the right thing, in other words, we do not need to be constantly motivated by concern for the general
happiness. The large majority of actions intend the good of individuals (including ourselves) rather than the good
of the world. Yet the world’s good is made up of the good of the individuals that constitute it and unless we are
in the position of, say, a legislator, we act properly by looking to private rather than to public good. Our attention
to the public well-being usually needs to extend only so far as is required to know that we aren’t violating the
rights of others.

❖ Mill defends the possibility of a strong utilitarian conscience (i.e. a strong feeling of obligation to the general
happiness) by showing how such a feeling can develop out of the natural desire we have to be in unity with fellow
creatures—a desire that enables us to care what happens to them and to perceive our own interests as linked
with theirs. It is a sign of moral progress when the happiness of others, including the happiness of those we don’t
know, becomes important to us.

II- JOHN RAWLS AND TAXATION

• The veil of ignorance also makes it sure that the parties in the original position will not be concerned to the
status of the other participants. It does not favor anyone.

• The difference principle is applied to institutions and it regulates the distribution of wealth and income. This
includes regulating economic conventions and legal institutions, such as the market mechanism, the system
of property, contract, inheritance, securities, taxation, and so on.
• For Rawls, in a true democratic society, the liberty of the person ranks first. This is due to the fact that each
person has freedom which makes him/her a dignified being. This is different from the works of ancient
philosophers such as Aristotle, Plato, and Epicurus. For Aristotle, true happiness can be attained through
actions done guided by the principle of the Golden mean; whereas, for Epicurus, true happiness is rational
pleasure.

• In Rawls’ Second Principle of Justice, it is stated that social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so
that they are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of
opportunity. They are also to provide the greatest benefit for those who need the most under the name of
equality and equity.
• Taxation is the power of the state to collect money from every member of the society. For example, the
taxes collected will be used exclusively to fund the government’s project for the betterment of the society.

Sequence of Rawls’ Justice as Fairness:

A. First, Two Principles of Justice

Original Position and Veil of Ignorance

B. Second, a sketch of a society that operates on these principles, to show that they are realistic.

C. Third, that a just society—just by the lights of justice as fairness—would be stable in part because living in a just
society and having a sense of justice guided by his principles is good for those who live in the society.

Nature of the theory

- Rawls’s basic concern might be put this way:

a. What is the most reasonable conception of justice for a society of free and equal persons?

b. What principles should our society meet, if it is to be fair to persons conceived of as free and equal: both
conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal?

- The principles of justice are meant to secure and unite the liberty and equality of persons in the whole scheme of social
and political cooperation.

- Rawls acknowledges that we have the right to private property but in there are far more important goals than the
preservation of private property.

- This led him to his notion of distributive justice wherein a good society distributes its wealth in such a way that poverty
is minimized.1

- Rawls’s conception of social justice, “justice as fairness,” is a liberal conception in that it protects and gives priority to
certain equal basic liberties, which enable individuals to freely exercise their consciences, decide their values, and live
their chosen way of life.

- Liberal governments and societies respect individuals’ choices and tolerate many different lifestyles as well as religious,
philosophical, and moral doctrines.

- Rawls’s account is also liberal in that it endorses free markets in economic relations (vs. a planned economy), respects
individuals’ free choices of occupations and careers, and provides a social minimum for the least advantaged members
of society.

1
Christopher Ryan Maboloc, Philosophy of Man: The Existential Drama, Fundamental Topics and Thinkers, (Quezon City: Rex
Bookstore, 2013), 68.
- Rawls’s conception of justice is democratic in that it provides for equal political rights and seeks to establish equal
opportunities in educational and occupational choices.

- It is egalitarian in that it seeks to maintain the “fair value” of the political liberties, establishes “fair equality of
opportunity,” and determines the social minimum by aiming to maximally benefit the least advantaged members of
society.

- These rights, liberties, and opportunities are subsumed under Rawls’s two principles of justice.

• The basic liberties for all citizens:

– Political liberty (right to vote and be eligible for public office).

– Freedom of speech and assembly.

– Liberty of conscience and freedom of thought.

– Freedom regarding your own person.

– Right to hold personal property.

– Freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as these are understood under the rule of law.

I. THE ORIGINAL POSITION

- Rawls basically argues that the principles of justice would be chosen by rational representatives of free and equal
persons in an impartial initial situation; there the parties know general facts about human nature and social institutions
but have no knowledge of particular facts about themselves or their society and its history.

- In other words, it is a condition in which all parties who seek to bind themselves to the agreement choose the
principles of justice from behind a veil of ignorance.

II. THE VEIL OF IGNORANCE

- A device that deems that people do not know their status in society.
- The parties in the original position are “mutually disinterested.”
- They are indifferent to each other as contracting parties in the sense that they “take no interest in each others’
interests,” at least for purposes of this particular agreement.
- This means that the parties are motivated neither by affection nor by rancor for each other.
- The veil of ignorance ensures fairness in choosing the principles of justice.
- The initial status is meant to emphasize the equality of each human being.

II. Two Principles of Justice: [“Justice is the first virtue of the institution, as truth is of systems of thought.”] 2

A. First Principle: The Principle of Equal Basic Liberties

“First, each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties
compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others.”

1. This principle is also known as “the priority of liberty” principle.

2
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (MA: Harvard, 1999), 3.
2. The main idea of the first principle is that there are certain basic rights and freedoms of the person that are more
important than others, and that are needed to characterize the moral ideal of free and equal persons.3

3. Protections for the physical and psychological integrity and freedom of the person are the most obvious basic
rights and liberties, for they forbid unjustified violence, coercion, and enslavement of persons (among other things).
This means that no person is to be subordinated to the ends of other men. (This is Rawls’ acknowledgement of
Kant’s influence in his philosophizing.)

4. The first principle is part of Rawls’ liberal ideal of free self-governing persons who develop their human capacities,
and shape and pursue ways of life that are intrinsically rewarding. 4

5. Hence, we can say that human liberty is inviolable.

6. Rawls’ principle of liberty requires stringent protections for certain basic liberties:

a. Liberty of thought and conscience

b. Political liberties (rights of participation)

c. Liberty of association

d. Liberty and integrity of the person (including freedom of occupation and choice of careers and a right to
personal property)

e. Rights and liberties associated with the rule of law

7. The first principle refers to “basic liberty” and not just “liberty” because he accepts the idea that certain rights and
liberties are more important or “basic” than others.

Example: Most people believe it is more important that they be free to decide their religion, speak their minds,
choose their own careers, and marry and befriend only people that they choose, than that they have the freedom
to drive without safety belts and as fast as they please, use their property without regulation, or enter into just any
kind of financial dealing that is beneficial to them. Some freedoms of course deserve no protection at all – for
example, driving while intoxicated, or entering others’ houses without permission.

8. What is original in Rawls’s liberalism is his answer to the question:

a. How are we to decide which liberties are basic or fundamental, and which are not, and

b. how are we to decide conflicts between the basic liberties?

II. Second Principle: The Difference Principle5

“Second, that social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that,

a) offices and positions must be open to everyone under conditions of fair equality of opportunity (fair
opportunity principle) and
b) they are to be of the greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members of the society (difference
principle).”

- The second principle considers how social primary goods like income, opportunity, and the basis of self-respect can
be distributed from a just socio-political arrangement.6

3
Samuel Freeman, Rawls, (NY: Routledge, 2007), 45.
4
Ibid.
5
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 61.
6
Maboloc, Philosophy of Man: The Existential Drama, Fundamental Topics and Thinkers, 72.
A. FAIR EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY

1. Government instrumentalities (i.e. offices, elections) must be open to all under the fair terms of cooperation./

2. Every person must have the chance to enjoy the benefits or advantages that the institutions of government can
make available.

3. This includes the right to run for office.

- Positions are to be held open to everyone to compete for on grounds of qualifications relevant to performing
the tasks of that position, regardless of people’s racial, ethnic, or gender group, religious or philosophical views, or
social or economic position.

4. Equal opportunity developed out of the rejection of hereditary nobility, and the idea that people are to be
assigned social positions by birth.

5. There also must be an absence of social or conventional restrictions; otherwise private employers can discriminate
at will in hiring.

B. THE DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE

1. The second part of the principle states that the least-advantaged in the society must be favored primarily to make
the sharing of social primary goods fair.

2. By “least advantaged,” Rawls means the least advantaged working person, as measured by the income he/she
obtains for gainful employment. So the least advantaged are, in effect, people who earn the least and whose skills
are least in demand – in effect, the class of minimum-wage workers.7

The difference principle says that inequalities are permissible only if they maximally benefit the least
advantaged.

“An inequality is allowed only if there is reason to believe that the practice with the inequality will work
to the advantage of every party.”8

3. The difference principle is a principle for institutions, not for individuals.

4. This is not to say that the difference principle does not imply duties for individuals – it creates innumerable duties
for them.

5. It means rather that the difference principle applies in the first instance to regulate economic conventions and
legal institutions, such as the market mechanism, the system of property, contract, inheritance, securities,
taxation, and so on.9

6. It is a “rule for making the rules” individuals are to observe in daily life. It is then to be applied directly by
legislators and regulators as they make decisions about the rules that govern the many complicated institutions
within which economic production, trade, and consumption take place.

7. The difference principle as the primary principle to guide the deliberations of democratic citizens as they debate
the common good, and the decisions of legislators as they enact laws to realize the common good of democratic
citizens.

7
Freeman, Rawls, (NY: Routledge, 2007), 106
8
Rawls, “Justice as Fairness”, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 54, No. 22 (1957), 654.
9
Ibid., 99.
8. Application of the Difference Principle:

Three people are given the following amount of primary goods:

Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C


Bea P10,000 P7,000 P5,000
Alfred P8,000 P6,000 P4,000
Mark P1,000 P2,000 P4,000

- Rawls’ contention is that the least-advantaged should be allowed to maximize his chances of rising out of
poverty.
- In this case, it would be rational to choose C for it maximizes the chance of the least-advantaged to catch up to
those who are well-off and the risk is little if one gets the minimum.
- Situation A is a form of oligarchy since there are two sectors enriching themselves.
- Situation B does not far better since there is still a huge gap.
- Situation C shows some inequality but such can be compensated by the fact that the least-advantaged
possesses a chance to catch up. (Thus, validating the contention in item number 2).

The difference principle, then, works in tandem with fair opportunity; both are needed to establish a just distribution of
income and wealth. It is only in a society where there is a chance to compete for open positions is satisfied that
distribution designed to maximize the share of the least-advantaged will satisfy the requirements of distributive justice.

C. THE STATE AND ITS CITIZENS: RESPONSIBILITIES TO EACH OTHER: THE PRINCIPLES OF TAXATION AND INCLUSIVE
GROWTH

1. Rawls rejects the libertarian (and common-sense) view that a person has full rights and entitlements to possess all
market and other consensual transfers of property he or she receives. How otherwise could the taxation necessary
for maintaining institutions of justice, including the preservation of markets and the legal institution of property
themselves, be possible if people had complete rights to market distributions with no moral or legal duty to pay
taxes to maintain these institutions and other public goods?10

2. Accordingly, Rawls envisions a taxation system with a number of regulatory and distributive roles. The taxation
system is one of the primary institutions and procedures, along with markets, income supplements, fair equal
educational opportunities, and universal healthcare, that are necessary for pure procedural economic justice.

3. This requires that bequests (and other gifts) be taxed at the receiver’s, rather than the bequeather’s, end. (In legal
terminology, Rawls envisions a progressive “inheritance tax” rather than an “estate tax.”) Those who already are
wealthy would be taxed at a much higher rate than are inheritances by the less advantaged, which may involve little
or no tax at all.11

4. Rather than an income tax – which can discourage work due to income effects – a proportional expenditure tax is to
be used to tax consumption in a well-ordered property-owning democracy, with the tax applying only after a
minimum level of expenditures has been reached. (In this way a proportional expenditure tax differs from the
familiar sales tax, which applies to people regardless of their income and wealth.)

5. An expenditure tax means that people are not taxed on how much they contribute to social product through work
and investments, but rather on how much they take from the social product via consumption. The idea is not so
much to discourage people from consuming (after all, if they did not consume, there would not be demand for
further production); but it is rather to prevent the tax system from directly discouraging work and productive efforts
and contributions.

10
Freeman, Rawls, (NY: Routledge, 2007), 128.
11
Ibid., 227
6. Rawls seems to say that a proportional (consumption) tax is preferable to more familiar progressive taxes because
a proportional tax12:

(a) is more efficient, for it does not discourage incentives, and

(b) “treats everyone in a uniform way (assuming . . . income is fairly earned)”

7. The presumption must be that each person is obligated to pay his/her fair share in taxation, where “fair
share” is clearly not to be decided by some proportionate taxation rule, but by the difference principle and other
requirements of distributive justice.

OTHER IMPORTANT CONCEPTS TO REMEMBER


1. Social Contract Theory
2. Progressive Tax System
3. Tax Exemption

12
Freeman, Rawls, (NY: Routledge, 2007), 228.

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