De Facto Officers prevails.

De facto doctrine: A person, who, by proper authority,  When de jure officer is also the de facto officer,
is admitted and sworn into office, is deemed to be lawful title and possession are united and there
rightfully is such office, until, by judicial declaration in a cannot be another de facto officer.
proper proceeding, he is ousted therefrom, or his
admission thereto is declared void. Elements of de facto officership:
See Tuanda v. Sandiganbayan , infra
Basis: to prevent chaos resulting from multiple suits
against the actions of every official whose claim to office Effect of office created under unconstitutional
may be open to question; to ensure orderly government statute
function despite technical defects in title to office. First view: Occupant is not even a de facto officer
because the 1st element is not satisfied (no legal office
Situations to speak of). Occupant is a usurper.
1. Officer by reputation/acquiescence (when Second view: Occupant is a de facto officer, at least
people, without inquiry, submit to/invoke his before the declaration of unconstitutionality, where strict
action, supposing him to be an officer) adherence to the effect of unconstitutionality will lead to
2. Officer by appointment/election who has failed to uncertainty, confusion, and inconvenience, for the sake
conform to some precedent or condition of public policy and protecting private rights.
3. Officer by defective appointment, because of
ineligibility, want of appointing authority, or Legal effects of de facto officers’ acts
defect in exercise of appointing authority, which  As to the officers themselves – acts are VOID.
is UNKNOWN to the public De facto officer cannot justify his acts as valid
4. Officer appointed/elected pursuant to an and binding in any suit to which he is a party. He
unconstitutional law, before declaration of such is estopped from taking advantage of his own
fact. (doctrine of operative fact) lack of title.
 As regards the public and 3rd persons – acts are
De jure officer: One who has lawful right to an office in VALID UNTIL the de facto officer’s title is
all respects, but has either been ousted from it or never adjudged insufficient. Authority of de facto officer
actually taken possession of it. cannot subject to collateral attack & cannot be
assailed by 3rd persons, who have the right to
DE JURE OFFICER DE FACTO OFFICER assume that the de facto officer is legally
rests on right rests on reputation qualified.
has lawful right or title to has possession and
office performs duties under Assailing de facto officership
color of authority without  cannot be done collaterally; must be done
being technically qualified directly by quo warranto
in all points of law to act  suit must be filed by claimant/de jure officer or
the State thru OSG/prosecutor
cannot be removed in a can be removed in a  de facto officer is entitled to due process
direct proceeding direct
proceeding Right to compensation
USURPER DE FACTO OFFICER General rule: De facto officer cannot maintain action to
no color of has color of authority/ title recover salary because his acts are void as to himself.
authority/lawful simply assumes office Exception: Compensation may be recovered for services
title required by the office, rendered by de facto officer acting
even if public knows him public does not know/not without bad faith (e.g., Malaluan case).
to be a usurper ought to know lack of title Exception to exception: When de facto officer was
merely designated and not appointed.
acts are null and void acts are valid insofar as
rights of the public and 3rd  De jure officer cannot compel payment of salary
persons are concerned for period when de facto officer discharged the
may become de facto Double occupancy of a position in good faith while still in possession of
officer if assumption of single office is not the office (see Monroy case).
office is acquiesced in allowed when  If the tenure of the de facto officer was found
the law provides for only wrongful (i.e., he is in bad faith), de jure officer
one incumbent. may recover from him.
 Usurper is liable to de jure officer for salaries
 A de facto officer and a de jure officer cannot received by the former.
hold office at the same time.  Disbursing officers have a right to rely on the
 There cannot be two de facto officers in apparent title of the de facto officer.
possession of an office for which one incumbent
is provided for by law. Officer with the better title
DIMAANDAL V. COA | Martinez, 1998
FACTS
 Nov. 28, 1992, Zosimo Dimaandal, then holding the
position of Supply Officer III was designated as Acting
Assistant Provincial Treasurer by then Gov. Vicente
Mayo of Batangas.
 Dimaandal filed a claim for the difference in salary
and Representation and Transpo Allowance (RATA)
of AsstsProv’l treas. And Supply Ofcr, III
(P61,308.00).
 Provincial Auditor allowed only P8,400.00 which
corresponds to the difference in the allowance
attached to the designation and the position occupied
since the designation is temporary in nature and does
not amount to an appointment as would entitle
Dimaandal to receive the salary of the position.
 Dimaandal appealed to COA, which sustained the
stand of the Prov’l Auditor since he was merely
designated as Asst. Prov’l Treas. in addition to his
regular duties. COA further opined that he is not
entitled to receive the difference (P8,400) since the
party designating him to the position is not the duly
competent authority.
 Dimaandal cites Menzon v. Petilla: “de facto officers
are entitled to salary for services actually rendered”.
ISSUE
WON Dimaandal is a de facto officer entitled to salary for
services.
HELD/RATIO
NO. The governor did not have the authority to appoint
nor designate one temporarily in cases of temporary
absence or disability or a vacancy in a provincial office.
That power resides in the President (Sec.2077, Rev.
Admin. Code) or the secretary of Finance (Sec. 471, Loc.
Gov. Code).
 Dimaandal’s designation by Gov. Mayo is defective
and confers no right to claim the differences in salary.
Moreover, Dimaandal’s designation and the gov’s
absence of authority to authorize payment of addt’l
salary and RATA does not make him a de facto
officer.
 Further, the case of Menzon is not applicable in this
case since in that case, what was extended was an
appointment to the vacant position of vice-gov. Here,
what was extended was a mere designation.
 Appointment= selection by the proper authority of an
individual who is to exercise the powers and functions
of a given office
 Designation= merely connotes an imposition of
additional duties, does not entail payment of
additional benefits nor the right to claim the salary
attached to the position.
 De Facto Officer= one who derives his appointment
from one having colourable authority to appoint and
whose appointment is valid on its face; one who is in
possession of an office and is discharging its duties
under color of authority, by which is meant authority
derived from an appointment, however irregular or
informal; one who is in possession of an office in the
open exercise of its functions under color of an
election or an appointment, even though such
election or appointment may be irregular.
MENZON V. PETILLA | Guttierez, 1991
FACTS
 On February 16, 1988, by virtue of the fact that no
Governor had been proclaimed in the province of
Leyte, the Secretary of Local Government Luis
Santos designated the Vice-Governor, Leopoldo E.
Petilla as Acting Governor of Leyte
 On March 25, 1988 the petitioner Aurelio D. Menzon,
a senior member of the SangguniangPanlalawigan
was also designated by Secretary Luis Santos to act
as the Vice-Governor for the province of Leyte.
 On May 29, 1989, the Provincial Administrator, Tente
U. Quintero inquired from the Undersecretary of the
Department of Local Government, Jacinto T. Rubillar,
Jr., as to the legality of the appointment of the
petitioner to act as the Vice-Governor of Leyte.
 Undersecretary Jacinto T. Rubillar, Jr. stated that
since B.P. 337 has no provision relating to succession
in the Office of the Vice-Governor in case of a
temporary vacancy, the appointment of the petitioner
as the temporary Vice-Governor is not necessary
since the Vice-Governor who is temporarily
performing the functions of the Governor, could
concurrently assume the functions of both offices.
 SangguniangPanlalawigan, in a special session held
on July 7, 1989, issued Resolution No. 505 where it
held invalid the appointment of the petitioner as acting
Vice-Governor of Leyte.
 there is no permanent (sic) nor a vacancy in said
office.
 petitioner, on July 10, 1989, through the acting LDP
Regional Counsel, Atty. ZosimoAlegre, sought
clarification from Undersecretary Jacinto T. Rubillar,
Jr.
 that "there is no succession provided for in case of
temporary vacancy in the office of the vice-governor
and that the designation of a temporary vice-governor
is not necessary.
 In view of the clarificatory letter of Undersecretary
Rubillar, the Regional Director of the Department of
Local Government, Region 8,
ResurreccionSalvatierra, on July 17, 1989, wrote a
letter addressed to the Acting-Governor of Leyte,
Leopoldo E Petilla, requesting the latter that
Resolution No. 505 of the SangguniangPanlalawigan
be modified accordingly
 Despite these several letters of request, the Acting
Governor and the SangguniangPanlalawigan,
refused to correct Resolution No. 505 and
correspondingly to pay the petitioner the emoluments
attached to the Office of Vice-Governor.
 Thus, on November 12, 1989, the petitioner a petition
for certiorari and mandamus. The petition sought the
nullification of Resolution No. 505 and for the
payment of his salary for his services as the acting
Vice-Governor of Leyte. -During the pendency of the
 petition, more particularly on May 16, 1990, the
provincial treasurer of Leyte, Florencio Luna allowed
the payment to the petitioner of his salary as acting
Vice-Governor of Leyte in the amount of P17,710.00,
for the actual services rendered by the petitioner as
acting Vice-Governor.
 On August 28, 1990, this Court dismissed the petition
filed by Aurelio D. Menzon.
 On September 6, 1990, respondent LeopoldoPetilla,
by virtue of the above resolution requested Governor
Larrazabal to direct the petitioner to pay back to the
province of Leyte all the emoluments and
compensation which he received while acting as the
Vice-Governor of Leyte.
 On September 21, 1990, the petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration of our resolution. The motion
prayed that this Court uphold the petitioner's right to
receive the salary and emoluments attached to the
office of the Vice-Governor while he was acting as
such.
ISSUE
(1) WON there was a vacancy.
(2) WON the Secretary of Local Government has the
authority to make temporary appointments--YES
HELD/RATIO
(1) YES. The law on Public Officers is clear on the matter.
There is no vacancy whenever the office is occupied by a
legally qualified incumbent. A sensucontrario, there is a
vacancy when there is no person lawfully authorized to
assume and exercise at present the duties of the office. It
can be readily seen that the office of the Vice-Governor
was left vacant when the duly elected Vice-Governor
LeopoldoPetilla was appointed Acting Governor. In the
eyes of the law, the office to which he was elected was
left barren of a legally qualified person to exercise the
duties of the office of the Vice-Governor.
 There is no satisfactory showing that LeopoldoPetilla,
notwithstanding his succession to the Office of the
Governor, continued to simultaneously exercise the
duties of the Vice-Governor. The nature of the duties
of a Provincial Governor call for a full-time occupant
to discharge them. More so when the vacancy is for
an extended period. Precisely, it was Petilla's
automatic assumption to the acting Governorship that
resulted in the vacancy in the office of the Vice-
Governor.
(2) YES. Under the circumstances of this case and
considering the silence of the Local Government Code,
the Court rules that, in order to obviate the dilemma
resulting from an interregnum created by the vacancy, the
President, acting through her alter ego, the Secretary of
Local Government, may remedy the situation. The
temporary appointment extended to the petitioner to act
as the Vice-Governor is valid. The exigencies of public
service demanded nothing less than the immediate
appointment of an acting Vice-Governor.
 under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, the President is
empowered to make temporary appointments in
certain public offices, in case of any vacancy that may
occur. In the absence of any contrary provision in the
Local Government Code and in the best interest of
public service, we see no cogent reason why the
procedure thus outlined by the two laws may not be
similarly applied in the present case.
 It was best for Leyte to have a full- time Governor and
an acting Vice-Governor. Service to the public is the
primary concern of those in the government. It is a
continuous duty unbridled by any political
considerations.
 In view of the foregoing, the petitioner's right to be
paid the salary attached to the Office of the Vice
Governor is indubitable. The compensation, however,
to be remunerated to the petitioner, following the
example in Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the
Revised Administrative Code, and pursuant to the
proscription against double compensation must only
be such additional compensation as, with his existing
salary, shall not exceed the salary authorized by law
for the Office of the Vice-Governor.
 And even granting that the President, acting through
the Secretary of Local Government, possesses no
power to appoint the petitioner, at the very least, the
petitioner is a de facto officer entitled to
compensation.
 There is no denying that the petitioner assumed the
Office of the Vice-Governor under color of a known
appointment. As revealed by the records, the
petitioner was appointed by no less than the alter ego
of the President, the Secretary of Local Government,
after which he took his oath of office before Senator
Alberto Romulo in the Office of Department of Local
Government Regional Director Res Salvatierra. The
appointment has the color of validity.
 The petitioner, for a long period of time, exercised the
duties attached to the Office of the Vice-Governor. He
was acclaimed as such by the people of Leyte. Upon
the principle of public policy on which the de facto
doctrine is based and basic considerations of justice,
it would be highly iniquitous to now deny him the
salary due him for the services he actually rendered
as the acting Vice-Governor of the province of Leyte
-The additional compensation which the petitioner has
received, in the amount exceeding the salary authorized
by law for the position of Senior Board Member, shall be
considered as payment for the actual services rendered
as acting Vice-Governor and may be retained by him.
MALALUAN V. COMELEC | Hermosisima, 1996
FACTS
 Luis Malaluan and Jose Evangelista were both
mayoralty candidates on the municipality of
Kidapawan, North Cotabato.
 Evangelista was proclaimed by the Municipal Board
off Canvassers as duly elected mayor. Malaluan filed
an election protest with the RTC. RTC declared
Malaluan as the duly elected mayor. Evangelista
appealed the decision to the COMELEC. Malaluan
filed a motion for execution pending appeal which was
grabned by the RTC. Thus, Malaluan assumed the
office of municipal mayor.
 1st Division COMELEC ordered Malaluan to vacate
the office having found that Evangelista was the duly
elected mayor. COMELEC en banc affirmed.
 Malaluan filed this petition.
 note: term expired June 30,1995. Petition has
become moot. However, question as to damages is
ripe for adjudication.
 Claimed as part of the damages to which Evangelista
is allegedly entitled to is the salary that would have
accrued to him had there been no execution of the
RTC’s decision pending appeal.
ISSUE
WON Malaluan is a usurper and should pay the damages
and salaries to Evangelista.
HELD/RATIO
NO. Malaluan is not a usurper because a usurper is one
who undertakes to act officially w/o and color of right,
while Malaluan exercised the duties of an elective office
under color of election thereto.
 Malaluan is a de facto officer who in good faith has
had possession of the office and had discharged the
duties pertaining thereto and is therefore legally
entitled to the emoluments of the office.
 The long-standing rule is that notwithstanding
subsequent ouster as a result of an election protest,
an elective official who has been proclaimed by the
COMELEC as winner and who assumed office and
entered into the performance of the duties of that
office is entitled to the compensation legally provided
for the position. This is in keeping with the ordinary
course of events. The emolument must go to the
person who rendered the service unless the contrary
is proved.
 criterion for a justifiable award of election protest
expenses ans salaries remains to be the existence of
a pertinent breach of obligations arising from k, quasi-
k, tortious acts, crimes, or a specific legal provision
authorizing the money claim.
 the 1st Division COMELEC reasoned that Evangelista
was the one elected, he was ousted not by final
judgment but by an order of execution pending appeal
which was groundless; that Malaluan occupied the
position in an illegal manner as a usurper and that he
had no right to the salaries of the office. However,
there is no pertinent breach of obligations arising from
k, quasi-k, tortious acts, crimes that can be attributed
to Malaluan nor did Evangelista point out a specific
legal provision authorizing the money claim.
 that Malaluan was proclaimed winner by the RTC and
not by COMELEC is of no moment since it is a well-
settled rule that “as much recognition should be given
to the value of the decision of a judicial body as a
basis for the right to assume office as that given by
law to the proclamation made by the Board of
Canvassers.”
 the damage may be said to be
damnumabsqueinjuria= damage inflicted without
injustice or without violation of a legal right for which
the law provides no remedy.
FLORES V. DRILON | Bellosillo, 1993
FACTS
 Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of RA 7227:
Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992
under which Mayor Richard Gordon of Olongapo City
was appointed as Chairman and Chief Executive of
SBMA.
 sec. 13 par. (d) contains a proviso saying that for the
1st year of its effectivity, the mayor of Olongapo shall
be appointed as chair and chief exec of SBMA.
Petitioners claim this to be violative of a) sec. 7 Art.
IX-B Consti (no elective official shall be eligible for
appointment or designation in any capacity to any
public office or position during his tenure) since mayor
of Olongapo is an elective office, b) sec 16 Art VII
Consti (that the Pres shall appoint all other ofcrs of
govt whose appointments are not provided by law)
since Congress through the proviso appointed
Gordon.
ISSUE
WON the appointment is unconstitutional.
HELD/RATIO
YES. The proviso directs the president to appoint an
elective e official as chair of SBMA which is exactly what
the consti proscription seeks to prevent
 sec.94 LGC permits the appointment of an elective
official to another post if so allowed by law or by
primary functions of his office. However, no legislative
act can prevail over the fundamental law of the land.
 it is argued that the SBMA posts are ex officio to the
position of the mayor of Olongapo and is thus an
exception to the proscription. The argument is based
on a wrong premise since Congress did not
contemplate the SBMA posts as ex officio or
automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor of
Olongapo w/o need of appointment. The phrase “shall
be appointed” shows the intent to make the SBMA
posts appointive.
 the proviso is a legislative encroachment on the
power of the president to appoint as it already
specified the person who is to occupy the position and
the president has no choice under the law but to
appoint the mayor of olongapo.
 being an elective official, Gordon is not eligible for
appointment to the position of SBMA chair. His
appointment pursuant to a le3gislation contravening
the consti cannot be sustained. However, he remains
to be the mayor of Olongapo and his acts as SBMA
Chair are not necessarily void since he may be
deemed as a de facto officer= one whose acts, though
not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon principles
of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they
involve the interest of the public and 3rd persons,
where the duties of the office were exercised under
color of a known election or appointment , void
because the officer was not eligible, or because there
was a want of power in the appointing body, or by
reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise, or
under color of an election or appointment by or
 pursuant to a public unconstitutional law before the
same is adjudged to be such.
 in accordance w/ the ruling in CLU emoluments
received by Gordon pursuant to his appointment may
be retained by him.
TORRES V. RIBO | Tuason, 1948
FACTS
 Torres, Ribo andBalderian were candidates for
provincial governor of Leyte.
 Ribonad 2 mems of the prov’l board were candidates
and disqualified to form parts of the prov’l board of
canvassers.
 COMELEC appointed the division superintendent of
schools, district engr and the district health ofcr to
replace the disqualified members.
 division superintendent of schools & district engr were
out of town so in the meantime, Tizon, asst. Civil engr
and Pascual, chief clerk in the division superintendent
of schools substituted.
 they canvassed the votes and proclaimed Ribo as
gov-elect.
 prov’l board of canvassers had a 2nd meeting this
time w/ the division superintendent of schools &
district engr. They made a new canvass of votes and
proclaimed Ribo as governor.
ISSUE
WON Tizon and Pascual were lawful members of the
provincial board of canvassers.
HELD/RATIO
NO. Sec.158 of the Rev. Election Code designates teh
officers who are to comprise the provincial board of
canvassers and sec.159 enumerates the officers to be
appointed substitute members. The express enumeration
excludes all other officers. Moreover, an officer to whom
a discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to another.
 moreover, Tizon and Pascual were not de facto
officers as maintained by Ribo. An officer de facto is
one who has the reputation of being the officer he
assumes to be, and yet is not a good officer in point
of law. He must have acted as an officer for such a
length of time, under color of title and under such
circumstances of reputation or acquiescence by the
public and public authorities, as to afford a
presumption of appointment or election, and induce
people, w/o inquiry, amd relying on the supposition
that he is the officer he assumes to be.
 Tizon and Pascual did not posses any of these
conditions. They acted w/o appointment, sommission,
or any color of title to the office. There was no
acquiescence public or private.
 thus, there were only 3 lawful members sitting on the
board of canvassers. Under sec.159 of rev. Election
code, the provincial board of canvassers must be
composed of 6 members. 3 members is not enough
compliance with the law. There must at least be a
quorum = 4. The meeting of the provincial board of
canvassers and the proclamation in that meeting
were illegal and of no effect.
TUANDA V. SANDIGANBAYAN | Kapunan, 1995
FACTS
 On 9 February 1989, private respondents Delia
Estrellanes and BartolomeBinaohan were designated
as industrial labor sectoral representative and
agricultural labor sectoral representative respectively,
for the Sangguniang Bayan of Jimalalud, Province of
Negros Oriental by then Secretary Luis T. Santos of
the Department of Local Government. They took their
oath of office.
 On 4 May 1990, private respondents filed a petition
for mandamus to recognize them as members on the
Sangguniang Bayan. It was dismissed
 Thereafter, petitioners filed action with the Regional
Trial Court to declare null and void the designations
of private respondents as sectoral representatives,
 An information was filed before the Sandiganbayan,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 16936 charging
petitioners
 by refusing to pay despite demand the amount of
P95,350.00
 and P 108,900.00 representing respectively their per
diems, salaries and other privileges and benefits, and
such undue injury continuing to the present to the
prejudice and damage of BartolomeBinaohan and
Delia Estrellanes.
 petitioners filed a motion with the Sandiganbayan for
suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Case
 on the ground that a prejudicial question exists in Civil
Case
 pending before the Regional Trial Court.
 Regional Trial Court rendered a decision declaring,
null and void ab initio the designations issued by the
Department of Local Government to the private
respondents as sectoral representatives for having
been done in violation of Section 146 (2) of B.P. Blg.
337. otherwise known as the Local Government
Code.: there must be a determination to be made by
the Sangguniang itself that the said sectors are of
sufficient number in the city or municipality to warrant
representation... in cases where the Sanggunian
concerned has not yet determined that the Industrial
and Agricultural Labor Sectors in their particular city
or municipality are of sufficient number to warrant
representation, there will absolutely be no basis for
the designation/appointments.
 Since in the present case, there was total absence of
the required prior determination by the Sangguniang
Bayan of Jimalalud, the designations of private
defendants as sectoral representatives null and void.
 Private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals
 Meanwhile, Sandiganbayan issued a resolution
denying the motion for suspension of proceedings
filed by petitioners.”It appears, nevertheless, that the
private complainants have been rendering services
on the basis of their respective appointments as
sectoral members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the
Municipality of Jimalalud, Negros Oriental, and that
their said appointments enjoy the presumption of
 regularity. Having rendered such services, the private
complainants are entitled to the salaries attached to
their office. Even assuming that the said Regional
Trial Court shall later decide that the said
appointments of the private complainants are null and
void, still the private complainants are entitled to their
salaries and compensation for service they have
actually rendered, for the reason that before such
judicial declaration of nullity, the private complainants
are considered at least de facto public officers acting
as such on the basis of apparently valid appointments
issued by competent authorities”.
 Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which
was denied. Hence, this special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUE
WON private respondents are entitled to compensation
for actual services rendered.
HELD/RATIO:
NO. Private respondents insist that even if their
designations are nullified, they are entitled to
compensation for actual services rendered. However, as
found by the trial court and as borne out by the records,
from the start, private respondents designations as
sectoral representatives have been challenged by
petitioners. The private respondents' claim that they have
actually rendered services as sectoral representatives
has not been established.
 Sandiganbayan 's thesis that even in the event that
private respondents' designations are finally declared
invalid, they may still be considered de facto public
officers entitled to compensation for services actually
rendered is unmeritorious.
 The conditions and elements of de facto officership
are the following:
1) There must be a de jure office;
2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence
by the public; and
3) There must be actual physical possession of the office
in good faith.
 One can qualify as a de facto officer only if all the
aforestated elements are present. There can be no de
facto officer where there is no de jure office although
there may be a de facto officer in a de jure office.
MONROY V. CA | Bengzon, 1967
FACTS
 Petitioner Roberto Monroy was the incumbent Mayor
of Navotas, Rizal, he filed his certificate of candidacy
as representative of the first district of Rizal in the
forthcoming elections with the COMELEC. Three
days later petitioner filed a letter withdrawing said
certificate of candidacy. COMELEC approved the
withdrawal
 respondent Felipe del Rosario, then the vice-mayor of
Navotas, took his oath of office as municipal mayor
on the theory that petitioner had forfeited the said
office upon his filing of the certificate of candidacy
 in a suit for injunction instituted by petitioner against
respondents Court of First Instance held that (a) the
former had ceased to be mayor of Navotas, Rizal,
after his certificate of candidacy was filed on
September 15, 1961; (b) respondent del Rosario
became municipal mayor upon his having assumed
office as such on September 21, 1961; (c) petitioner
must reimburse, as actual damages, the salaries to
which respondent was entitled as Mayor from
September 21, 1961 up to the time he can reassume
said office.
 on appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, CA
affirmed
 Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE
WON Monroy was a de facto officer entitled to mayoralty
salaries from the time he withdrew his candidacy.
HELD/RATIO
NO. Sec. 27 of the Rev. Election Code providing that —
“Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official running
for an office, other than the one which he is actually
holding, shall be considered resigned from his office from
the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.”
 The forfeiture is automatic and permanently effective
upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for
another office. Only the moment and act of filing are
considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is
forfeited forever and nothing save a new election or
appointment can restore the ousted official.
 The withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy does not
necessarily render the certificate void ab initio. Once
filed, the permanent legal effects produced thereby
remain even if the certificate itself be subsequently
withdrawn.
 Petitioner maintains that respondent Court of Appeals
erred in affirming a lower court judgment requiring
petitioner to pay respondent Del Rosario by way of
actual damages the salaries he was allegedly entitled
to receive from September 21, 1961, to the date of
petitioner's vacation of his office as mayor. In support
of this he relies solely upon Rodriguez v. Tan
 holding that a senator who had been proclaimed and
had assumed office but was later on ousted in an
election protest, is a de facto officer during the time
he held the office of senator, and can retain the
emoluments received even as against the successful
protestant
 Petitioner's factual premise is the appellate court's
finding that he was a de facto officer when he
continued occupying the office of mayor after
September 15, 1961.
 Rodriguez case is not applicable here for absence of
factual and legal similarities. The Rodriguez case
involved a senator who had been proclaimed as duly
elected, assumed the office and was subsequently
ousted as a result of an election contest
 But the case at bar does not involve a proclaimed
elective official who will be ousted because of an
election contest. The present case for injunction and
quo warranto involves the forfeiture of the office of
 municipal mayor by the incumbent occupant thereof
and the claim to that office by the vice mayor because
of the operation of Sec. 27 of the Rev. Election Code.
 It is the general rule then, i.e., "that the rightful
incumbent of a public office may recover from an
officer de facto the salary received by the latter during
the time of his wrongful tenure, even though he
entered into the office in good faith and under color of
title" that applies in the present case.
 the de facto doctrine has been formulated, not for the
protection of the de facto officer principally, but rather
for the protection of the public and individuals who get
involved in the official acts of persons discharging the
duties of an office without being lawful officers.
 A de facto officer, not having good title, takes the
salaries at his risk and must therefore account to the
de jure officer for whatever amount of salary he
received during the period of his wrongful retention of
the public office
GEN. MANAGER, PPA V. MONSERATE | Salvador-
Guttierez, 2002
FACTS
 PPA underwent reorganization. Monserate applied
for a permanent position of Manager II of Resource
Management Division and she was appointed such
among 6 other contestants. However, upon the
protest of the 2nd placer (Anino), Julia’s appointment
was rendered ineffective without any explanation.
She was not even notified of any hearing for the said
replacement. She was reappointed to a lower position
(Administrative Officer) with lower salary grade (SG
15) than what she was already receiving.
 Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but the
same was denied by the CSC
 respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for review
 the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision[16]
nullifying the twin Resolutions of the CSC.
 It concluded that her reassignment from the position
of Manager II, Resource Management Division (SG-
19), to the position of Administrative Officer (SG-15)
was a demotion violative of her constitutional right to
security of tenure and due process.
 Ramon Anino and the PPA General Manager filed on
August 14, 1997 the present petition
ISSUE
(1) WON there was due process when respondent was
replaced by petitioner Anino from her position as Manager
II, Resource Management Division, and demoted as
Administrative Officer
(2) WON respondent is entitled to backpay differentials.
HELD/RATIO
(1) NO. The grounds for respondent’s demotion are
incomprehensible for lack of discussion or explanation by
the Board to enable respondent to know the reason for
her demotion. The PPA Appeals Board Resolution was
void for lack of evidence and proper notice to respondent.
 Her demotion, tantamount to a revocation of her
appointment as Manager II, is a patent violation of her
constitutional rights to security of tenure and due
process. Once an appointment is issued and the
moment the appointee assumes a position in the civil
service under a completed appointment, he acquires
a legal, not merely equitable, right to the position
which is protected not only by statute, but also by the
constitution, and cannot be taken away from him
either by revocation of the appointment, or by
removal, except for cause, and with previous notice
and hearing.
 when the Court of Appeals reinstated respondent to
her legitimate post as Manager II in the Resource
Management Division, it merely restored her
appointment to the said position to which her right to
security of tenure had already attached. To be sure,
her position as Manager II never became vacant
since her demotion was void. In this jurisdiction, "an
appointment to a non-vacant position in the civil
service is null and void ab initio.
(2) YES. Backwages are in favor of respondent. While
petitioner Anino’s appointment to the contested position is
void, as earlier discussed, he is nonetheless considered
a de facto officer during the period of his incumbency. A
de facto officer is one who is in possession of an office
and who openly exercises its functions under color of an
appointment or election, even though such appointment
or election may be irregular.
 In Monroy vs. Court of Appeals, Court ruled that a
rightful incumbent of a public office may recover from
a de facto officer the salary received by the latter
during the time of his wrongful tenure, even though he
(the de facto officer) occupied the office in good faith
and under color of title. A de facto officer, not having
a good title, takes the salaries at his risk and must,
therefore, account to the de jure officer for whatever
salary he received during the period of his wrongful
tenure. In the later case of Civil Liberties Union vs.
Executive Secretary Court allowed a de facto officer
to receive emoluments for actual services rendered
but only when there is no de jure officer.
 In fine, the rule is that where there is a de jure officer,
a de facto officer, during his wrongful incumbency, is
not entitled to the emoluments attached to the office,
even if he occupied the office in good faith.
 This rule, however, cannot be applied squarely on the
present case in view of its peculiar circumstances.
While her assumption to said lower position and her
acceptance of the corresponding emoluments cannot
be considered as an abandonment of her claim to her
rightful office (Division Manager), she cannot recover
full backwages for the period when she was
unlawfully deprived thereof. She is entitled only to
backpay differentials for the period starting from her
assumption as Administrative Officer up to the time of
her actual reinstatement to her rightful position as
Division Manager. Such backpay differentials pertain
to the difference between the salary rates for the
positions of Manager II and Administrative Officer.
The same must be paid by petitioner Anino
corresponding from the time he wrongfully assumed
 the contested position up to the time of his retirement
on November 30, 1997.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (CLU) V. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY | Fernan, 1991
FACTS
 Petitioner challenged EO 284 issued by Pres. Aquino,
which in effect allowed Cabinet members, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries and other
appointive officials of the Executive Dept. to hold
other positions (not more than two apart from their
primary positions) in the government albeit subject to
limitations imposed therein.
 The respondents in refuting the petitioners’ argument
that the measure was violative of Article VIII Section
13 of the Constitution, invoked Article IX-B Section
7,allowing the holding of multiple positions by the
appointive official“if allowed by law or by pressing
functions of his position”.
ISSUE
WON EO 284 is unconstitutional.
HELD/RATIO
YES. EO 284 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. It allows
cabinetmembers, undersecretaries or assistant
secretaries to holdmultiple offices in direct contravention
of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the
Constitution. Court is alerted by the respondents to the
impractical consequence that strictconstruction of said
provision will bring considering that Cabinet members
would be stripped of their offices held in an ex-officio
capacity but SC clarifies that ex-officio posts or those
required by the primary functions of the executive official
do not fall within the definition of “any other office”
indicated in the constitutional prohibition.
Article VIII, Section 12. The Members of the Supreme
Court and of other courts established by law shall not be
designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions.
 Exceptions to prohibition on executive officers from
holding the additional positions
a. VP as member of the Cabinet
Article VII, Section 3. There shall be a Vice-Presidentwho
shall have the same qualifications and term ofoffice and
be elected with, and in the same manner, asthe President.
He may be removed from office in thesame manner as the
President.The Vice-President may be appointed as
aMember of the Cabinet. Such appointment requires
noconfirmation.
Note: It is submitted, however, that although the VP may
beappointed to the Cabinet, he may not receive
additionalcompensation in second capacity because of
the absoluteprohibition in Section 6, Article VII.
b. Secretary of Justice as member, Judicial Bar
andCouncil (JBC)
Article VIII, Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council
ishereby created under the supervision of the
SupremeCourt composed of the Chief Justice as ex
officioChairman, the Secretary of Justice, and
arepresentative of the Congress as ex officio Members,
arepresentative of the Integrated Bar, a professor oflaw,
a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and
arepresentative of the private sector.
c. Ex-officio positions
 Prohibition under Sec. 13, Art. VII does not cover
positions held without additional compensation in ex-
officio capacities as
 provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of the
 concened official’s office.
 Definition of ex-officio: from office or by virtue of
office. Denotes an act done in an official character, or
as a consequence of office and without any other
appointment or authority than that conferred by the
office.
 Example: Secretary of Transportation and
Communications is theex-officio Chairman of the
Board of the Philippine Ports Authority, and the Light
Rail Transit Authority (LRTA)
 - Finding Executive Order No. 284 to be
constitutionally infirm, the court hereby orders
respondents Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources FulgencioFactoran, Jr., Secretary of Local
Government 45 Luis Santos, Secretary of National
Defense Fidel V. Ramos, Secretary of Health Alfredo
R.A. Bengzon and Secretary of the Budget Guillermo
Carague to immediately relinquish their other offices
or employment, as herein defined, in the government,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries. With respect to
the other named respondents, the petitions have
become moot and academic as they are no longer
occupying the positions complained of.
 During their tenure in the questioned positions,
respondents may be considered de facto officers and
as such entitled to emoluments for actual services
rendered. It has been held that "in cases where there
is no de jure, officer, a de facto officer, who, in good
faith has had possession of the office and has
discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally
entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in
an appropriate action recover the salary, fees and
other compensations attached to the office. This
doctrine is, undoubtedly, supported on equitable
grounds since it seems unjust that the public should
benefit by the services of an officer de facto and then
be freed from all liability to pay any one for such
services. Any per diem, allowances or other
emoluments received by the respondents by virtue of
actual services rendered in the questioned positions
may therefore be retained by them.