Seminole Tribe of Florida v.

Florida 1996

Congress enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act in 1988. This Act
authorized Indian tribes to conduct gaming activities as long as they abided by terms
agreed upon by the tribe and the state the gaming activities occurred in. Under this act
the Seminole Tribe brought suit against Florida because it had failed to negotiate this
compact. Attorneys for Florida moved to have to case dismissed on the grounds that it
violated the state’s sovereign immunity from suits in federal court as well as the
Eleventh Amendment. The federal district court dismissed this motion. After the Court
of Appeals reversed this ruling, the Seminole Tribe appealed to the Supreme Court.
The question of law raised to the Supreme Court was whether the Eleventh
Amendment provided Florida with immunity from the suit filed by the Seminole Tribe.
The Supreme Court’s decision was 5-4 with Chief Justice Rehnquist delivering the
opinion of the Court. Justices Stevens and Souter filed dissenting opinions and Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer joined with Justice Souter.
In the opinion of the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist declared that the Eleventh
Amendment restricted the power of Congress to authorize suits against States. They
declared that Florida was the injured party because the Seminole Tribe had no standing.
Aside from distinguishing differences from many precedents, the ruling overturned
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. (1989) which held that Congress could abrogate States‘
Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Interstate Commerce Clause. The Court’s
opinion points out flaws in the reasoning in the Union Gas case stating that using the
fact that sometimes Congress may have power over the States implies that in situations
where Congress has less authority the States have more. The difference between the
Indian Commerce Clause and the Interstate Commerce Clause is that the Indian
Commerce Clause transfers more power from the State to the Federal Government than
does the other.
Other precedents that are mentioned include Blatchford v. Native Village of
Noatak (1991), Hans v. Louisiana (1890), Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer (1976), as well as the
doctrine of Ex parte Young (1908). Blatchford held that the Eleventh Amendment
restricted only certain jurisdiction of the federal court and Hans held that each State is a
sovereign entity in the federal system and that that sovereignty cannot be amended
without that beings consent. Fitzpatrick held that Congress can abrogate States’
immunity in pursuit of its powers under the Fourteenth Amendment. Due to this
however, there is not an established precedent here to be applied. The doctrine of Ex
parte Young does also not apply here because it relinquishes State sovereignty for a
state official and not the state itself.
Justice Souter dissents because he, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, feel
that the Court was mistaken in overturning Union Gas. They believe that the Seminole
Tribe of Florida was the injured party in this case. In Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, the
Constitution gives Congress to regulate commerce with the Indian Tribes. If the
Framers of the Eleventh Amendment had wanted to protect States from this type of suit
they would have worded it differently. Congress chose to enact its power with the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act.
I concur with Justice Souter’s dissent here. The meaning of the Eleventh
Amendment is clear and Congress was acting well within its power in enacting the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. Since under that Act the Seminole Tribe was allowed to
bring suit against Florida when it didn’t negotiate a compact under good faith, they were
the injured party. I would contend that there is no significant legal difference between
the Interstate Commerce Clause and the Indian Commerce Clause and creating such is
just a means to overturn Union Gas. As the dissent points out there is no point in the
majority opinion to deal with the issue of federal jurisdiction. They seemed to have
ignored this issue much as they did later in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow.
Instead of ruling on the issue at hand, the majority voted to deny the appellant standing.