I.

PRELIMINARY PROVISION

AMONOY V GUTIERREZ CASE DIGEST

SERGIO AMONOY, petitioner, v. SPOUSES JOSE GUTIERREZ AND ANGELA

FORNILDA, respondents.
G.R. No. 140420. February 15, 2001

Facts:

Amonoy was the counsel of the successors of the deceased Julio Cantolos for the settlement of the
latter’s estate. On January 1965, the lots were adjudicated to Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda.
On January 20, 1965, Pasamba and Formilda executed a deed of real estate mortgage on the said two
lots adjudicated to them, in favor of Amonoy to secure the payment of his attorney’s fees. But on August
6, 1969, after the taxes had been paid, the claims settled and the properties adjudicated, the estate
was declared closed and terminated. When Pasamba and Formilda passed away, Formilda was
succeeded by the spouses Gutierrez. On January 21, 1970, Amonoy filed for the closure of the two lots
alleging the non-payment of attorney’s fees. The herein respondents denied the allegation, but
judgment was rendered in favor of Amonoy.

Still for failure to pay attorney’s fees, the lots were foreclosed. Amonoy was able to buy the lots by
auction where the house of the spouses Gutierrez was situated. On Amonoy’s motion of April 24, 1986,
orders were implemented for the demolition of structures in the said lot, including herein respondents’
house. On September 27, 1985, David Formilda petitioned to the Supreme Court for a TRO for the
suspension of the demolition, which was granted, but the houses have already been demolished. A
complaint for damages was filed by respondents, which was denied by RTC but grantedby CA, thus this
case.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Amonoy was liable for damages to respondents.

Ruling:

Petitioner invokes that it is well-settled that the maxim of damage resulting from the legitimate exercise
of a person’s rights is a loss without injury — damnum absque injuria — for which the law gives no
remedy, saying he is not liable for damages. The precept of Damnum Absque Injuria has no application
is this case. Petitioner did not heed the TRO suspending the demolition of structures. Although the acts
of petitioner may have been legally justified at the outset, their continuation after the issuance of the
TRO amounted to an insidious abuse of his right. Indubitably, his actions were tainted with bad faith.

Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain
standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of
one’s duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to
observe honesty and good faith. This must be observed. Clearly then, the demolition of respondents’
house by petitioner, despite his receipt of the TRO, was not only an abuse but also an unlawful exercise
of such right. The petition is denied. The decision of CA is affirmed.

FULL CASE
G.R. No. 140420 February 15, 2001

SERGIO AMONOY, petitioner,

vs.
Spouses JOSE GUTIERREZ and ANGELA FORNIDA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Damnum absque injuria. Under this principle, the legitimate exercise of a person's rights, even if it causes loss to
another, does not automatically result in an actionable injury. The law does not prescribe a remedy for the loss. This
principle does not, however, apply when there is an abuse of a person's right, or when the exercise of this right is
suspended or extinguished pursuant to a court order. Indeed, in the availment of one's rights, one must act with
justice, give their due, and observe honesty and good faith

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the April 21, 1999 Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 41451, which set aside the judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tanay, Rizal. The RTC had earlier dismissed the Complaint for damages filed by herein respondents against
petitioner. The dispositive portion of the challenged CA Decision reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is SET ASIDE, and in its stead judgment is rendered ordering the
defendant-appellee Sergio Amonoy to pay the plaintiffs-appellants bruno and Bernadina Gutierrez as actual
damages the sum of [t]wo [h]undred [f]ifty [t]housand [p]esos (P250,000.00)."3

Likewise assailed is the October 19, 1999 CA Resolution,4 which denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

The appellate court narrated the factual antecedents of this case as follows:

"This case had its roots in Special Proceedings No. 3103 of Branch I of the CFI of Pasig, Rizal, for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased Julio Cantolos, involving six(6) parcels of land situated in Tanay
Rizal. Amonoy was the counsel of therein Francisca Catolos, Agnes Catolos, Asuncion Pasamba and
Alfonso Formida. On 12 January 1965, the Project of Partition submitted was approved and xxx two (2) of
the said lots were adjudicated to Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda. The Attorney's fees charged by
Amonoy was P27,600.00 and on 20 January 1965 Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formida executed a
deed of real estate mortgage on the said two (2) lots adjudicated to them, in favor of Amonoy to secure the
payment of his attorney's fees. But it was only on 6 August 1969 after the taxes had been paid, the claims
settled and the properties adjudicated, that the estate was declared closed and terminated.

"Asuncion Pasamba died on 24 February 1969 while Alfonso Fornilda passsed away on 2 July 1969. Among
the heirs of the latter was his daughter, plaintiff-appellant Angela Gutierrez.

"Because his Attorney's fess thus secured by the two lots were not paid, on 21 January 1970 Amonoy filed
for their foreclosure in Civil Code4 No. 12726 entitled Sergio Amonoy vs. Heirs of Asuncion Pasamba and
Heirs of Alfonso Fornilda before the CFI of Pasig, Rizal, and this was assigned to Branch VIII. The heirs
opposed, contending that the attorney's fees charged [were] unconscionable and that the attorney's fees
charged [were] unconscionable and that the agreed sum was only P11,695.92. But on 28 September 1972
judgment was rendered in favor of Amonoy requiring the heirs to pay within 90 days the P27,600.00 secured
by the mortgage, P11,880.00 as value of the harvests, and P9,645.00 as another round of attorney's fees.
Failing in that, the two (2) lots would be sold at public auction.

"They failed to pay. On 6 February 1973, the said lots were foreclosed and on 23 March 1973 the auction
sale was held where Amonoy was the highest bidder at P23,760.00. On 2 May 1973 his bid was judicially
confirmed. A deficiency was claimed and to satisfy it another execution sale was conducted, and again the
highest bidder was Amonoy at P12,137.50.
 "Included in those sold was the lot on which the Gutierrez spouses had their house.

"More than a year after the Decision in Civil Code No. 12726 was rendered, the said decedent's heirs filed
on 19 December 1973 before the CFI of Pasig, Rixal[,] Civil case No. 18731 entitled Maria Penano, et al vs.
Sergio Amonoy, et al, a suit for the annulment thereof. The case was dismissed by the CFI on 7 November
1977, and this was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on 22 July 1981.

"Thereafter, the CFI on 25 July 1985 issued a Writ of Possession and pursuant to which a notice to vacate
was made on 26 August 1985. On Amonoy's motion of 24 April 1986, the Orders of 25 April 1986 and 6 May
1986 were issued for the demolition of structures in the said lots, including the house of the Gutierrez
spouses.

"On 27 September 1985 the petition entitled David Fornilda, et al vs Branch 164 RTC Ivth Pasig, Deputy
Sheriff Joaquin Antonil and Atty. Sergio Amonoy, G.R. No. L-72306, was filed before the Supreme Court.
Among the petitioners was the plaintiff-appellant Angela Gutierrez. On a twin musiyun (Mahigpit na Musiyon
Para Papanagutin Kaugnay ng Paglalapastangan) with full titles as fanciful and elongated as
their Petisyung (Petisyung Makapagsuri Taglay and Pagpigil ng Utos), a temporary restraining order was
granted on 2 June 1986 enjoining the demolition of the petitioners' houses.

"Then on 5 October 1988 a Decision was rendered in the said G.R. No. L-72306 disposing that:

"WHEREFORE, Certiorari is granted; the Order of respondent Trial Court, dated 25 July 1985,
granting a Writ of Possession, as well as its Orderd, dated 25 April 1986 and 16 May 1986, directing
and authorizing respondent Sheriff to demolish the houses of petitioners Angela and Leocadia
Fornilda are hereby ordered returned to petitioners unless some of them have been conveyed to
innocent third persons."5

But by the time the Supreme Court promulgated the abovementioned Decision, respondents' house had already
been destroyed, supposedly in accordance with a Writ of Demolition ordered by the lower court.

Thus, a Complaint for damages in connection with the destruction of their house was filed by respondents against
petitioner before the RTC on December 15, 1989.

In its January 27, 1993 Decision, the RTC dismissed respondents' suit. On appeal, the CA set aside the lower
court's ruling and ordered petitioner to pay respondents P250,000 as actual damages. Petitioner then filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, which was also denied.

The Issue

In his Memorandum,7 petitioner submits this lone issue for our consideration:

"Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct was correct in deciding that the petition [was] liable to the
respondents for damages."8

The Court's Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Main Issue:

Petitioner's Liability

Well-settled is the maxim that damage resulting from the legitimate exercise of a person's rights is a loss without
injury- damnum absque injuria - for which the law gives no remedy.9 In other words, one who merely exercises one's
rights does no actionable injury and cannot be held liable for damages.
Petitioner invokes this legal precept in arguing that he is not liable for the demolition of respondents' house. He
maintains that he was merely acting in accordance with the Writ of Demolition ordered by the RTC.

We reject this submission. Damnum absque injuria finds no application to this case.

True, petitioner commenced the demolition of respondents' house on May 30, 1986 under the authority of a Writ of
Demolition issued by the RTC. But the records show that a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), enjoining the
demolition of respondents' house, was issued by the Supreme Court on June 2, 1986. The CA also found, based on
the Certificate of Service of the Supreme Court process server, that a copy of the TRO was served on petitioner
himself on June 4, 1986.

Petitioner, howeverm, did not heed the TRO of this Court. We agree with the CA that he unlawfully pursued the
demolition of respondents' house well until the middle of 1987. This is clear from Respondent Angela Gutierrez's
testimony. The appellate court quoted the following pertinent portion thereof:10

"Q. On May 30, 1986, were they able to destroy your house?

"A. Not all, a certain portion only

xxx xxx xxx

"Q. Was your house completely demolished?

"A. No, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

"Q. Until when[,] Mrs. Witness?

"A. Until 1987.

"Q. About what month of 1987?

"A. Middle of the year.

"Q. Can you tell the Honorable Court who completed the demolition?

A. The men of Fiscal Amonoy."11

The foregoing disproves the claim of petitioner that the demolition, which allegedly commenced only on May 30,
1986, was completed the following day. It likewise belies his allegation that the demolitions had already ceased
when he received notice of the TRO.

Although the acts of petitioner may have been legally justified at the outsset, their continuation after the issuance of
the TRO amounted to an insidious abuse of his right. Indubitably, his actions were tainted with bad faith. Had he not
insisted on completing the demolition, respondents would not have suffered the loss that engendered the suit before
the RTC. Verily, his acts constituted not only an abuse of a right, but an invalid exercise of a right that had been
suspended when he received thae TRO from this Court on June 4, 1986. By then he was no longer entitled to
proceed with the demolition.

A commentator on this topic explains:

"The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is abused, especially to
the prejudice of others. The mask of a right without the spirit of justcie which gives it life, is repugnant to the
modern concept of social law. It cannot be said that a person exercises a right when he unnecessarily
prejudices another xxx. Over and above the specific precepts of postive law are the supreme norms of
 justice xxx; and he who violates them violates the law. For this reason it is not permissible to abuse our
rights to prejudice others."12

Likewise, in Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. CA,13 the Court discussed the concept of abuse of rights as follows:

"Artilce 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain
standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of
one's duties.These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; recognizes the
primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19
and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible xxx."

Clearly then, the demolition of respondents' house by petitioner, despite his receipt of the TRO, was not only an
abuse but also an unlawful exercise of such right. In insisting on his alleged right, he wantonly violated this Court's
Order and wittingly caused the destruction of respondents; house. 1âwphi1.nêt

Obviously, petitioner cannot invoke damnum absque injuria, a principle premised on the valid exercise of a
right.14Anything less or beyond such exercise will not give rise to the legal protection that the principle accords. And
when damage or prejudice to another is occasioned thereby, liability cannot be obscured, much less abated.

In the ultimate analysis, petitioner's liability is premised on the obligation to repair or to make whole the damage
caused to another by reason of one's act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or not
punishable by law.15

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the appealed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, Vitug, Gonzaga-Reyes, Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ: concur.

Albenson Enterprises v. Court of Appeals

CASE DIGEST
G.R. No. 88694, 11 January 1993

FACTS:

Petitioner Albenson Enterprises Corporation delivered to Guaranteed Industries, Inc. at Baltao Building mild steel
plates which the latter ordered and as part of the payment, a bouncing check was issued by one “Eugenio Baltao”.

Petitioner, in a sincere attempt to collect the sum of money due them, filed a criminal complaint against private
respondent Eugenio S. Baltao after the latter refused to make good the amount of the bouncing check despite
demand. However, there was a mistake of identity as there were two “Eugenio Baltaos” conducting business in the
same building – Eugenio S. Baltao and his son, Eugenio Baltao III.

It was found that the signature of the check was not of Eugenio S. Baltao and because of the alleged unjust filing of
a criminal case against him, respondent Baltao filed a complaint for damages anchored on Articles 19, 20, and 21 of
the Civil Code against petitioners.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the principle of abuse of rights (Article 19) has been violated, resulting in damages under Articles 20
and 21 or other applicable provision of law.

RULING:

No, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of rights. What prompted petitioners to file
the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against private respondent was their failure to collect the
amount of P2,575.00 due on a bounced check which they honestly believed was issued to them by private
respondent. Petitioners had conducted inquiries regarding the origin of the check. Private respondent, however, did
nothing to clarify the case of mistaken identity at first hand. Instead, private respondent waited in ambush and
thereafter pounced on the hapless petitioners at a time he thought was propitious by filing an action for damages.

The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is
exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20 speaks of the general
sanction for all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for their own sanction. Thus, anyone who,
whether willfully or negligently, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, causes damage to another, shall indemnify
his victim for injuries suffered thereby. Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following
elements: 1) There is an act which is legal; 2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public
policy; 3) and it is done with intent to injure.

There is no proof or showing that petitioners acted maliciously or in bad faith in the filing of the case against private
respondent. Consequently, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith committed by petitioners, they cannot be
held liable for damages.
G.R. No. 88694 January 11, 1993

ALBENSON ENTERPRISES CORP., JESSE YAP, AND BENJAMIN MENDIONA, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND EUGENIO S. BALTAO, respondents.

Puruganan, Chato, Chato & Tan for petitioners.

Lino M. Patajo, Francisco Ma. Chanco, Ananiano Desierto and Segundo Mangohig for private respondent.

BIDIN, J.:

This petition assails the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in

CA-GR CV No. 14948 entitled "Eugenio S. Baltao, plaintiff-appellee vs. Albenson Enterprises Corporation, et al,
defendants-appellants", which modified the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch XCVIII in
Civil Case No. Q-40920 and ordered petitioner to pay private respondent, among others, the sum of P500,000.00 as
moral damages and attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00. The facts are not disputed.

In September, October, and November 1980, petitioner Albenson Enterprises Corporation (Albenson for short)
delivered to Guaranteed Industries, Inc. (Guaranteed for short) located at 3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila,
the mild steel plates which the latter ordered. As part payment thereof, Albenson was given Pacific Banking
Corporation Check No. 136361 in the amount of P2,575.00 and drawn against the account of E.L. Woodworks
(Rollo, p. 148).

When presented for payment, the check was dishonored for the reason "Account Closed." Thereafter, petitioner
Albenson, through counsel, traced the origin of the dishonored check. From the records of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), Albenson discovered that the president of Guaranteed, the recipient of the unpaid
mild steel plates, was one "Eugenio S. Baltao." Upon further inquiry, Albenson was informed by the Ministry of
Trade and Industry that E.L. Woodworks, a single proprietorship business, was registered in the name of one
"Eugenio Baltao". In addition, upon verification with the drawee bank, Pacific Banking Corporation, Albenson was
advised that the signature appearing on the subject check belonged to one "Eugenio Baltao."

After obtaining the foregoing information, Albenson, through counsel, made an extrajudicial demand upon private
respondent Eugenio S. Baltao, president of Guaranteed, to replace and/or make good the dishonored check.

Respondent Baltao, through counsel, denied that he issued the check, or that the signature appearing thereon is
his. He further alleged that Guaranteed was a defunct entity and hence, could not have transacted business with
Albenson.

On February 14, 1983, Albenson filed with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a complaint against Eugenio S.
Baltao for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Submitted to support said charges was an affidavit of petitioner
Benjamin Mendiona, an employee of Albenson. In said affidavit, the above-mentioned circumstances were stated.

It appears, however, that private respondent has a namesake, his son Eugenio Baltao III, who manages a business
establishment, E.L. Woodworks, on the ground floor of the Baltao Building, 3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila,
the very same business address of Guaranteed.

On September 5, 1983, Assistant Fiscal Ricardo Sumaway filed an information against Eugenio S. Baltao for
Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. In filing said information, Fiscal Sumaway claimed that he had given
Eugenio S. Baltao opportunity to submit controverting evidence, but the latter failed to do so and therefore, was
deemed to have waived his right.

Respondent Baltao, claiming ignorance of the complaint against him, immediately filed with the Provincial Fiscal of
Rizal a motion for reinvestigation, alleging that it was not true that he had been given an opportunity to be heard in
the preliminary investigation conducted by Fiscal Sumaway, and that he never had any dealings with Albenson or
Benjamin Mendiona, consequently, the check for which he has been accused of having issued without funds was
not issued by him and the signature in said check was not his.
On January 30, 1984, Provincial Fiscal Mauro M. Castro of Rizal reversed the finding of Fiscal Sumaway and
exonerated respondent Baltao. He also instructed the Trial Fiscal to move for dismissal of the information filed
against Eugenio S. Baltao. Fiscal Castro found that the signature in PBC Check No. 136361 is not the signature of
Eugenio S. Baltao. He also found that there is no showing in the records of the preliminary investigation that
Eugenio S. Baltao actually received notice of the said investigation. Fiscal Castro then castigated Fiscal Sumaway
for failing to exercise care and prudence in the performance of his duties, thereby causing injustice to respondent
who was not properly notified of the complaint against him and of the requirement to submit his counter evidence.

Because of the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case against him for allegedly issuing a check which bounced in
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 for a measly amount of P2,575.00, respondent Baltao filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages against herein petitioners Albenson Enterprises, Jesse
Yap, its owner, and Benjamin Mendiona, its employee.

In its decision, the lower court observed that "the check is drawn against the account of "E.L. Woodworks," not of
Guaranteed Industries of which plaintiff used to be President. Guaranteed Industries had been inactive and had
ceased to exist as a corporation since 1975. . . . . The possibility is that it was with Gene Baltao or Eugenio Baltao
III, a son of plaintiff who had a business on the ground floor of Baltao Building located on V. Mapa Street, that the
defendants may have been dealing with . . . ." (Rollo, pp. 41-42).

The dispositive portion of the trial court 's decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendants ordering the
latter to pay plaintiff jointly and severally:

1. actual or compensatory damages of P133,350.00;

2. moral damages of P1,000,000.00 (1 million pesos);

3. exemplary damages of P200,000.00;

4. attorney's fees of P100,000.00;

5 costs.

Defendants' counterclaim against plaintiff and claim for damages against Mercantile Insurance Co.
on the bond for the issuance of the writ of attachment at the instance of plaintiff are hereby
dismissed for lack of merit. (Rollo, pp. 38-39).

On appeal, respondent court modified the trial court's decision as follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED by reducing the moral damages awarded
therein from P1,000,000.00 to P500,000.00 and the attorney's fees from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00,
said decision being hereby affirmed in all its other aspects. With costs against appellants. (Rollo, pp.
50-51)

Dissatisfied with the above ruling, petitioners Albenson Enterprises Corp., Jesse Yap, and Benjamin Mendiona filed
the instant Petition, alleging that the appellate court erred in:

1. Concluding that private respondent's cause of action is not one based on malicious prosecution
but one for abuse of rights under Article 21 of the Civil Code notwithstanding the fact that the basis
of a civil action for malicious prosecution is Article 2219 in relation to Article 21 or Article 2176 of the
Civil Code . . . .

2. Concluding that "hitting at and in effect maligning (private respondent) with an unjust criminal case
was, without more, a plain case of abuse of rights by misdirection" and "was therefore, actionable by
itself," and which "became inordinately blatant and grossly aggravated when . . . (private respondent)
 was deprived of his basic right to notice and a fair hearing in the so-called preliminary
investigation . . . . "

3. Concluding that petitioner's "actuations in this case were coldly deliberate and calculated", no
evidence having been adduced to support such a sweeping statement.

4. Holding the petitioner corporation, petitioner Yap and petitioner Mendiona jointly and severally
liable without sufficient basis in law and in fact.

5. Awarding respondents —

5.1. P133,350.00 as actual or compensatory damages, even in the absence of

sufficient evidence to show that such was actually suffered.

5.2. P500,000.00 as moral damages considering that the evidence in this connection
merely involved private respondent's alleged celebrated status as a businessman,
there being no showing that the act complained of adversely affected private
respondent's reputation or that it resulted to material loss.

5.3. P200,000.00 as exemplary damages despite the fact that petitioners were duly
advised by counsel of their legal recourse.

5.4. P50,000.00 as attorney's fees, no evidence having been adduced to justify such
an award (Rollo, pp. 4-6).

Petitioners contend that the civil case filed in the lower court was one for malicious prosecution. Citing the case
of Madera vs. Lopez (102 SCRA 700 [1981]), they assert that the absence of malice on their part absolves them
from any liability for malicious prosecution. Private respondent, on the other hand, anchored his complaint for
Damages on Articles 19, 20, and 21 ** of the Civil Code.

Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards
which may be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These
standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The
law, therefore, recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct
set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as
such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. Although the requirements of each provision is
different, these three (3) articles are all related to each other. As the eminent Civilist Senator Arturo Tolentino puts it:
"With this article (Article 21), combined with articles 19 and 20, the scope of our law on civil wrongs has been very
greatly broadened; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. It is now
difficult to conceive of any malevolent exercise of a right which could not be checked by the application of these
articles" (Tolentino, 1 Civil Code of the Philippines 72).

There is however, no hard and fast rule which can be applied to determine whether or not the principle of abuse of
rights may be invoked. The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated, resulting in
damages under Articles 20 and 21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case.
(Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 778 [1989]).

The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is
exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20 speaks of the general
sanction for all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for their own sanction (Tolentino, supra, p.
71). Thus, anyone who, whether willfully or negligently, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, causes damage to
another, shall indemnify his victim for injuries suffered thereby. Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and
has the following elements: 1) There is an act which is legal; 2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public
order, or public policy; 3) and it is done with intent to injure.
Thus, under any of these three (3) provisions of law, an act which causes injury to another may be made the basis
for an award of damages.

There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act must be intentional. However, Article 20
does not distinguish: the act may be done either "willfully", or "negligently". The trial court as well as the respondent
appellate court mistakenly lumped these three (3) articles together, and cited the same as the bases for the award
of damages in the civil complaint filed against petitioners, thus:

With the foregoing legal provisions (Articles 19, 20, and 21) in focus, there is not much difficulty in
ascertaining the means by which appellants' first assigned error should be resolved, given the
admitted fact that when there was an attempt to collect the amount of P2,575.00, the defendants
were explicitly warned that plaintiff Eugenio S. Baltao is not the Eugenio Baltao defendants had been
dealing with (supra, p. 5). When the defendants nevertheless insisted and persisted in filing a case
— a criminal case no less — against plaintiff, said defendants ran afoul of the legal provisions
(Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code) cited by the lower court and heretofore quoted (supra).

Defendants, not having been paid the amount of P2,575.00, certainly had the right to complain. But
that right is limited by certain constraints. Beyond that limit is the area of excess, of abuse of rights.
(Rollo, pp.
44-45).

Assuming, arguendo, that all the three (3) articles, together and not independently of each one, could be validly
made the bases for an award of damages based on the principle of "abuse of right", under the circumstances, We
see no cogent reason for such an award of damages to be made in favor of private respondent.

Certainly, petitioners could not be said to have violated the aforestated principle of abuse of right. What prompted
petitioners to file the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against private respondent was their failure to
collect the amount of P2,575.00 due on a bounced check which they honestly believed was issued to them by
private respondent. Petitioners had conducted inquiries regarding the origin of the check, and yielded the following
results: from the records of the Securities and Exchange Commission, it was discovered that the President of
Guaranteed (the recipient of the unpaid mild steel plates), was one "Eugenio S. Baltao"; an inquiry with the Ministry
of Trade and Industry revealed that E.L. Woodworks, against whose account the check was drawn, was registered
in the name of one "Eugenio Baltao"; verification with the drawee bank, the Pacific Banking Corporation, revealed
that the signature appearing on the check belonged to one "Eugenio Baltao".

In a letter dated December 16, 1983, counsel for petitioners wrote private respondent demanding that he make good
the amount of the check. Counsel for private respondent wrote back and denied, among others, that private
respondent ever transacted business with Albenson Enterprises Corporation; that he ever issued the check in
question. Private respondent's counsel even went further: he made a warning to defendants to check the veracity of
their claim. It is pivotal to note at this juncture that in this same letter, if indeed private respondent wanted to clear
himself from the baseless accusation made against his person, he should have made mention of the fact that there
are three (3) persons with the same name, i.e.: Eugenio Baltao, Sr., Eugenio S. Baltao, Jr. (private respondent), and
Eugenio Baltao III (private respondent's son, who as it turned out later, was the issuer of the check). He, however,
failed to do this. The last two Baltaos were doing business in the same building — Baltao Building — located at
3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila. The mild steel plates were ordered in the name of Guaranteed of which
respondent Eugenio S. Baltao is the president and delivered to Guaranteed at Baltao building. Thus, petitioners had
every reason to believe that the Eugenio Baltao who issued the bouncing check is respondent Eugenio S. Baltao
when their counsel wrote respondent to make good the amount of the check and upon refusal, filed the complaint for
violation of BP Blg. 22.

Private respondent, however, did nothing to clarify the case of mistaken identity at first hand. Instead, private
respondent waited in ambush and thereafter pounced on the hapless petitioners at a time he thought was propitious
by filing an action for damages. The Court will not countenance this devious scheme.

The criminal complaint filed against private respondent after the latter refused to make good the amount of the
bouncing check despite demand was a sincere attempt on the part of petitioners to find the best possible means by
which they could collect the sum of money due them. A person who has not been paid an obligation owed to him will
naturally seek ways to compel the debtor to pay him. It was normal for petitioners to find means to make the issuer
of the check pay the amount thereof. In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral
damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and
subject the actor to the payment of damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to
litigate (Rubio vs. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488 [1986]).

In the case at bar, private respondent does not deny that the mild steel plates were ordered by and delivered to
Guaranteed at Baltao building and as part payment thereof, the bouncing check was issued by one Eugenio Baltao.
Neither had private respondent conveyed to petitioner that there are two Eugenio Baltaos conducting business in
the same building — he and his son Eugenio Baltao III. Considering that Guaranteed, which received the goods in
payment of which the bouncing check was issued is owned by respondent, petitioner acted in good faith and
probable cause in filing the complaint before the provincial fiscal.

To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to
vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were
false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not
make one liable for malicious prosecution. (Manila Gas Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 602 [1980]).
Still, private respondent argues that liability under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code is so encompassing that
it likewise includes liability for damages for malicious prosecution under Article 2219 (8). True, a civil action for
damages for malicious prosecution is allowed under the New Civil Code, more specifically Articles 19, 20, 26, 29,
32, 33, 35, and 2219 (8) thereof. In order that such a case can prosper, however, the following three (3) elements
must be present, to wit: (1) The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the
prosecutor, and that the action was finally terminated with an acquittal; (2) That in bringing the action, the prosecutor
acted without probable cause; (3) The prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice (Lao vs. Court of
Appeals, 199 SCRA 58, [1991]).

Thus, a party injured by the filing of a court case against him, even if he is later on absolved, may file a case for
damages grounded either on the principle of abuse of rights, or on malicious prosecution. As earlier stated, a
complaint for damages based on malicious prosecution will prosper only if the three (3) elements aforecited are
shown to exist. In the case at bar, the second and third elements were not shown to exist. It is well-settled that one
cannot be held liable for maliciously instituting a prosecution where one has acted with probable cause. "Probable
cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on
the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted. In other words, a suit will lie only in cases where a legal prosecution has been carried on without
probable cause. The reason for this rule is that it would be a very great discouragement to public justice, if
prosecutors, who had tolerable ground of suspicion, were liable to be sued at law when their indictment miscarried"
(Que vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 169 SCRA 137 [1989]).

The presence of probable cause signifies, as a legal consequence, the absence of malice. In the instant case, it is
evident that petitioners were not motivated by malicious intent or by sinister design to unduly harass private
respondent, but only by a well-founded anxiety to protect their rights when they filed the criminal complaint against
private respondent.

To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a
sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant
knowing that his charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case
to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution. Proof and
motive that the institution of the action was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a
person must be clearly and preponderantly established to entitle the victims to damages (Ibid.).

In the case at bar, there is no proof of a sinister design on the part of petitioners to vex or humiliate private
respondent by instituting the criminal case against him. While petitioners may have been negligent to some extent in
determining the liability of private respondent for the dishonored check, the same is not so gross or reckless as to
amount to bad faith warranting an award of damages.

The root of the controversy in this case is founded on a case of mistaken identity. It is possible that with a more
assiduous investigation, petitioners would have eventually discovered that private respondent Eugenio S. Baltao is
not the "Eugenio Baltao" responsible for the dishonored check. However, the record shows that petitioners did exert
considerable effort in order to determine the liability of private respondent. Their investigation pointed to private
respondent as the "Eugenio Baltao" who issued and signed the dishonored check as the president of the debtor-
corporation Guaranteed Enterprises. Their error in proceeding against the wrong individual was obviously in the
nature of an innocent mistake, and cannot be characterized as having been committed in bad faith. This error could
have been discovered if respondent had submitted his counter-affidavit before investigating fiscal Sumaway and
was immediately rectified by Provincial Fiscal Mauro Castro upon discovery thereof, i.e., during the reinvestigation
resulting in the dismissal of the complaint.

Furthermore, the adverse result of an action does not per se make the act wrongful and subject the actor to the
payment of moral damages. The law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate, such right is
so precious that moral damages may not be charged on those who may even exercise it erroneously. And an
adverse decision does not ipso facto justify the award of attorney's fees to the winning party (Garcia vs. Gonzales,
183 SCRA 72 [1990]).

Thus, an award of damages and attorney's fees is unwarranted where the action was filed in good faith. If damage
results from a person's exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria (Ilocos Norte Electric Company vs.
Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 5 [1989]).

Coming now to the claim of private respondent for actual or compensatory damages, the records show that the
same was based solely on his allegations without proof to substantiate the same. He did not present proof of the
cost of the medical treatment which he claimed to have undergone as a result of the nervous breakdown he
suffered, nor did he present proof of the actual loss to his business caused by the unjust litigation against him. In
determining actual damages, the court cannot rely on speculation, conjectures or guesswork as to the amount.
Without the actual proof of loss, the award of actual damages becomes erroneous (Guilatco vs. City of Dagupan,
171 SCRA 382 [1989]).

Actual and compensatory damages are those recoverable because of pecuniary loss — in business, trade, property,
profession, job or occupation — and the same must be proved, otherwise, if the proof is flimsy and unsubstantiated,
no damages will be given (Rubio vs. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488 [1986]). For these reasons, it was gravely
erroneous for respondent court to have affirmed the award of actual damages in favor of private respondent in the
absence of proof thereof.

Where there is no evidence of the other party having acted in wanton, fraudulent or reckless, or oppressive manner,
neither may exemplary damages be awarded (Dee Hua Liong Electrical Equipment Corporation vs. Reyes, 145
SCRA 488 [1986]).

As to the award of attorney's fees, it is well-settled that the same is the exception rather than the general rule.
Needless to say, the award of attorney's fees must be disallowed where the award of exemplary damages is
eliminated (Article 2208, Civil Code; Agustin vs. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 375 [1990]). Moreover, in view of the
fact that there was no malicious prosecution against private respondent, attorney's fees cannot be awarded him on
that ground.

In the final analysis, there is no proof or showing that petitioners acted maliciously or in bad faith in the filing of the
case against private respondent. Consequently, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith committed by
petitioners, they cannot be held liable for damages (Escritor, Jr. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 577
[1987]). No damages can be awarded in the instant case, whether based on the principle of abuse of rights, or for
malicious prosecution. The questioned judgment in the instant case attests to the propensity of trial judges to award
damages without basis. Lower courts are hereby cautioned anew against awarding unconscionable sums as
damages without bases therefor.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 14948
dated May 13, 1989, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondent Baltao.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

GARCIANO V CA
G.R. No. 96126 August 10, 1992

ESTERIA F. GARCIANO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, EMERITO LABAJO, LUNISITA MARODA, LALIANA DIONES, CANONISA
PANINSORO, DIONISIO ROSAL, REMEDIOS GALUSO, FLORDELUNA PETALCORIN, MELCHIZEDECH
LOON, NORBERTA MARODA and JOSEPH WIERTZ, respondents.

Basilio E. Duaban for petitioner.

Julius Z. Neri for private respondent.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the complaint for damages filed by the
petitioner against the private respondents.

The petitioner was hired to teach during the 1981-82 school year in the Immaculate Concepcion Institute in the
Island of Camotes. On January 13, 1982, or before the school year ended, she applied for an indefinite leave of
absence because her daughter was taking her to Austria where her daughter was employed (Exh. B). The
application was recommended for approval by the school principal, Emerito O. Labajo, and approved by the
President of the school's Board of Directors (Exh. B-1).

On June 1, 1982, Emerito Labajo addressed a letter to the petitioner through her husband, Sotero Garciano (for she
was still abroad), informing her of the decision of Fr. Joseph Wiertz, the school's founder, concurred in by the
president of the Parent-Teachers Association and the school faculty, to terminate her services as a member of the
teaching staff because of: (1) the absence of any written contract of employment between her and the school due to
her refusal to sign one; and (2) the difficulty of getting a substitute for her on a temporary basis as no one would
accept the position without a written contract (Exhs. C and 1). Upon her return from Austria in the later part of June,
1982, she received the letter informing her that her services at the Immaculate Concepcion Institute had been
terminated. She made inquiries from the school about the matter and, on July 7, 1982, the members of the Board of
Directors of the school, with the exception of Fr. Joseph Wiertz, signed a letter notifying her that she was "reinstated
to report and do your usual duties as Classroom Teacher . . . effective July 5, 1982," and that "any letter or notice of
termination received by you before this date has no sanction or authority by the Board of Directors of this Institution,
therefore it is declared null and void . . ." (Exhs. D and 2).

On July 9, 1982, the president, vice president, secretary, and three members of the Board of Directors, out of a
membership of nine (9), resigned their positions from the Board "for the reason that the ICI Faculty, has reacted
acidly to the Board's deliberations for the reinstatement of Mrs. Esteria F. Garciano, thereby questioning the integrity
of the Board's decision" (Exh. E).

On September 3, 1982, petitioner filed a complaint for damages in the Regional Trial Court, Cebu, Branch XI,
against Fr. Wiertz, Emerito Labajo, and some members of the faculty of the school for discrimination and unjust and
illegal dismissal.

After trial, the lower court rendered a decision on August 30, 1985, ordering the defendants jointly and severally to
pay her P200,000 as moral damages, P50,000 exemplary damages, P32,400 as lost earnings for nine years, and
P10,000 as litigation expenses and attorney's fees.

The defendants (now private respondents) appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 10692), which on
August 30, 1990 reversed the trial court's decision thus:
 WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed, the complaint is dismissed, and defendants-
appellants are absolved from any liability to plaintiff-appellee. With costs against plaintiff-appellee.
(p. 13, Rollo.)

The plaintiff-appellee (now petitioner) filed a motion for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied on
October 26, 1990. Hence, this petition for review wherein the lone error assigned by petitioner reads:

Respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred in absolving the private respondents from liability by
faulting the petitioner for her failure to report back to her work. (p. 6, Rollo.)

After a careful perusal of the petition and the respondents' comments, the Court resolved to deny the petition for
lack of merit.

The board of directors of the Immaculate Concepcion Institute, which alone possesses the authority to hire and fire
teachers and other employees of the school, did not dismiss the petitioner. It in fact directed her to report for work.
While the private respondents sent her a letter of termination through her husband, they admittedly had no authority
to do so. As the Court of Appeals aptly observed:

We agree with defendants-appellants, however, that they should not have been held liable to
plaintiff-appellee for damages. Defendants-appellants had no authority to dismiss plaintiff-appellee
and the latter was aware of this. Hence, the letter of termination sent to her through her husband
(Exhs. C and 1) by defendants-appellants had no legal effect whatsoever. It did not effectively
prevent her from reporting for work. What is more, it was subsequently repudiated by the Board of
Directors which directed her to report for work. (Exhs. D and 2) There was, therefore, no reason why
she did not continue with her teaching in the school. No evidence had been presented to show that
defendants-appellants prevented her from reporting for work. The fact that defendants-appellants
had "acidly" received the action of the Board of Directors repudiating their decision to terminate
plaintiff-appellee is not proof that defendants-appellants had effectively and physically prevented
plaintiff-appellee from resuming her post. It was nothing more than a reaction to what defendants-
appellants perceived as an affront to their collective prestige. It would appear, therefore, that plaintiff-
appellee voluntarily desisted from her teaching job in the school and has no right to recover
damages from defendants-appellants. (p. 13, Rollo.)

Liability for damages under Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code arises only from unlawful, willful or negligent
acts that are contrary to law, or morals, good customs or public policy.

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.

Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

The Court of Appeals was correct in finding that petitioner's discontinuance from teaching was her own choice.
While the respondents admittedly wanted her service terminated, they actually did nothing to physically prevent her
from reassuming her post, as ordered by the school's Board of Directors. That the school principal and Fr. Wiertz
disagreed with the Board's decision to retain her, and some teachers allegedly threatened to resign en masse, even
if true, did not make them liable to her for damages. They were simply exercising their right of free speech or their
right to dissent from the Board's decision. Their acts were not contrary to law, morals, good customs or public policy.
They did not "illegally dismiss" her for the Board's decision to retain her prevailed. She was ordered to report for
work on July 5, 1982, but she did not comply with that order. Consequently, whatever loss she may have incurred in
the form of lost earnings was self-inflicted. Volenti non fit injuria.

With respect to petitioner's claim for moral damages, the right to recover them under Article 21 is based on equity,
and he who comes to court to demand equity, must come with clean hands. Article 21 should be construed as
granting the right to recover damages to injured persons who are not themselves at fault (Mabutas vs. Calapan
Electric Co. [CA] 50 OG 5828, cited in Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, Vol. 1, 1975 Ed., p. 87). Moral damages are
recoverable only if the case falls under Article 2219 in relation to Article 21 (Flordelis vs. Mar, 114 SCRA 41). In the
case at bar, petitioners is not without fault. Firstly, she went on an indefinite leave of absence and failed to report
back in time for the regular opening of classes. Secondly, for reasons known to herself alone, she refused to sign a
written contract of employment. Lastly, she ignored the Board of Directors' order for her to report for duty on July 5,
1982.

The trial court's award of exemplary damages to her was not justified for she is not entitled to moral, temperate or
compensatory damages. (Art. 2234, Civil Code).

In sum, the Court of Appeals correctly set aside the damages awarded by the trial court to the petitioner for they did
not have any legal or factual basis.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz , Medialdea and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

GLOBE MACKAY CABLE v. CA, GR No. 81262,
1989-08-25
Facts:
Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay Cable and Radio
Corporation (GLOBE MACKAY) in a dual capacity as a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to
the engineering operations manager.
In 1972, GLOBE MACKAY... discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it
lost several thousands of pesos.
According to private respondent it was he who actually discovered the anomalies and reported them on
November 10, 1972 to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to petitioner Herbert C. Hendry
who was then the Executive Vice-President and General Manager of GLOBE
MACKAY.
On November 11, 1972, one day after private respondent Tobias made the report, petitioner Hendry
confronted him by stating that he was the number one suspect, and ordered him to take a one week
forced leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open,... and to leave the office
keys.
On November 20, 1972, when private respondent Tobias returned to work after the forced leave,
petitioner Hendry went up to him and called him a "crook" and a "swindler." Tobias was then ordered to
take a lie detector test. He was also instructed to submit specimen of his... handwriting, signature, and
initials for examination by the police investigators to determine his complicity in the anomalies.
On December 6, 1972, the Manila police investigators submitted a laboratory crime report (Exh. "A")
clearing private respondent of participation in the anomalies.
Not satisfied with the police report, petitioners hired a private investigator, retired Col. Jose G. Fernandez,
who on December 10, 1972, submitted a report (Exh. "2") finding Tobias guilty. This report however
expressly stated that further investigation was still to be... conducted.
Nevertheless, on December 12, 1972, petitioner Hendry issued a memorandum suspending Tobias from
work preparatory to the filing of criminal charges against him.
In the meantime, on January 17, 1973, Tobias received a notice (Exh. "F") from petitioners that his
employment has been terminated effective December 13, 1972.
Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO). However,
petitioner Hendry, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was
dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty.
Private respondent Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious,
oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners.
Issues:
The main issue in this case is whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.
Ruling:
One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some basic principles
that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the
social order.
The framers of the Code, seeking to remedy the defect of the old Code which merely stated the effects of
the law, but failed to draw out its spirit, incorporated certain fundamental precepts which were "designed
to indicate certain norms that... spring from the fountain of good conscience" and which were also meant
to serve as "guides for human conduct [that] should run as golden threads through society, to the end that
law may approach its supreme ideal, which is the sway and dominance of justice"
Foremost among... these principles is that pronounced in Article 19 which provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of
human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed.
A right, though by itself legal because... recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become
the source of some illegality.
But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the
maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation.
Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article
21 would be proper.
Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
This article, adopted to remedy the "countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral
wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury" [Id.] should
"vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral... wrongs which it is impossible for
human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes"
In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked, there is no rigid test which
can be applied.
While the Court has not hesitated to apply Article 19 whether the legal and factual circumstances called
for its application... he question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated
resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 or other applicable... provision of law, depends on the
circumstances of each case.
And in the instant case, the Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant
circumstances, finds that petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to
private... respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified.
The trial court made a finding that notwithstanding the fact that it was private respondent Tobias who
reported the possible existence of anomalous transactions, petitioner Hendry "showed belligerence and
told plaintiff (private respondent herein) that he was the number one... suspect and to take a one week
vacation leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave his keys
to said defendant
But petitioners were not content with just dismissing Tobias. Several other tortious acts were committed
by petitioners against Tobias after the latter's termination from work.
The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the writing of a letter to RETELCO sometime in
October 1974, stating that Tobias had been dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty.
Finally, there is the matter of the filing by petitioners of six criminal complaints against Tobias.
Principles:
In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked, there is no rigid test which
can be applied. While the Court has not hesitated to apply Article 19 whether the legal and factual
circumstances called for its application [See for e.g., Velayo v.
Shell Co. of the Phil., Ltd., 100 Phil. 186 (1956); PNB v. CA, supra; Grand Union Supermarket, Inc. v.
Espino, Jr., G.R. No. L-48250, December 28, 1979, 94 SCRA 953; PAL v. CA, G.R. No. L-46558, July 31,
1981, 106 SCRA 391; United General Industries, Inc. v.
Paler, G.R. No. L-30205, March 15, 1982, 112 SCRA 404; Rubio v. CA, G.R. No. 50911, August 21,
1987, 153 SCRA 183] the question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated
resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 or other applicable... provision of law, depends on the
circumstances of each case. And in the instant case, the Court, after examining the record and
considering certain significant circumstances, finds that petitioners have indeed abused the right that they
invoke, causing damage to private... respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified.
G.R. No. 81262 August 25, 1989
GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C. HENDRY, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS, respondents.
Atencia & Arias Law Offices for petitioners.
Romulo C. Felizmena for private respondent.
CORTES, J.:

Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation
(GLOBE MACKAY) in a dual capacity as a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering operations
manager. In 1972, GLOBE MACKAY discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it lost
several thousands of pesos.

According to private respondent it was he who actually discovered the anomalies and reported them on November
10, 1972 to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to petitioner Herbert C. Hendry who was then the
Executive Vice-President and General Manager of GLOBE MACKAY.

On November 11, 1972, one day after private respondent Tobias made the report, petitioner Hendry confronted him
by stating that he was the number one suspect, and ordered him to take a one week forced leave, not to
communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave the office keys.

On November 20, 1972, when private respondent Tobias returned to work after the forced leave, petitioner Hendry
went up to him and called him a "crook" and a "swindler." Tobias was then ordered to take a lie detector test. He was
also instructed to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature, and initials for examination by the police
investigators to determine his complicity in the anomalies.

On December 6,1972, the Manila police investigators submitted a laboratory crime report (Exh. "A") clearing private
respondent of participation in the anomalies.

Not satisfied with the police report, petitioners hired a private investigator, retired Col. Jose G. Fernandez, who on
December 10, 1972, submitted a report (Exh. "2") finding Tobias guilty. This report however expressly stated that
further investigation was still to be conducted.

Nevertheless, on December 12, 1972, petitioner Hendry issued a memorandum suspending Tobias from work
preparatory to the filing of criminal charges against him.

On December 19,1972, Lt. Dioscoro V. Tagle, Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner, after investigating other
documents pertaining to the alleged anomalous transactions, submitted a second laboratory crime report (Exh. "B")
reiterating his previous finding that the handwritings, signatures, and initials appearing in the checks and other
documents involved in the fraudulent transactions were not those of Tobias. The lie detector tests conducted on
Tobias also yielded negative results.

Notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from the anomalies and the fact that the report of the
private investigator, was, by its own terms, not yet complete, petitioners filed with the City Fiscal of Manila a
complaint for estafa through falsification of commercial documents, later amended to just estafa. Subsequently five
other criminal complaints were filed against Tobias, four of which were for estafa through Falsification of commercial
document while the fifth was for of Article 290 of' the Revised Penal Code (Discovering Secrets Through Seizure of
Correspondence).lâwphî1.ñèt Two of these complaints were refiled with the Judge Advocate General's Office, which
however, remanded them to the fiscal's office. All of the six criminal complaints were dismissed by the fiscal.
Petitioners appealed four of the fiscal's resolutions dismissing the criminal complaints with the Secretary of Justice,
who, however, affirmed their dismissal.

In the meantime, on January 17, 1973, Tobias received a notice (Exh. "F") from petitioners that his employment has
been terminated effective December 13, 1972. Whereupon, Tobias filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The labor
arbiter dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the labor
arbiter's decision. However, the Secretary of Labor, acting on petitioners' appeal from the NLRC ruling, reinstated the
labor arbiter's decision. Tobias appealed the Secretary of Labor's order with the Office of the President. During the
pendency of the appeal with said office, petitioners and private respondent Tobias entered into a compromise
agreement regarding the latter's complaint for illegal dismissal.

Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO). However, petitioner
Hendry, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE
MACKAY due to dishonesty.

Private respondent Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and
abusive acts of petitioners. Petitioner Hendry, claiming illness, did not testify during the hearings. The Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch IX, through Judge Manuel T. Reyes rendered judgment in favor of private respondent by
ordering petitioners to pay him eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages, two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) as moral damages, twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00) as attorney's fees, and costs. Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. On the other
hand, Tobias appealed as to the amount of damages. However, the Court of Appeals, an a decision dated August 31,
1987 affirmed the RTC decision in toto. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied, the instant
petition for review on certiorari was filed.

The main issue in this case is whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.

Petitioners contend that they could not be made liable for damages in the lawful exercise of their right to dismiss
private respondent.

On the other hand, private respondent contends that because of petitioners' abusive manner in dismissing him as
well as for the inhuman treatment he got from them, the Petitioners must indemnify him for the damage that he had
suffered.

One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some basic principles that are to be
observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order." [REPORT ON
THE CODE COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers of the Code, seeking
to remedy the defect of the old Code which merely stated the effects of the law, but failed to draw out its spirit,
incorporated certain fundamental precepts which were "designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the
fountain of good conscience" and which were also meant to serve as "guides for human conduct [that] should run as
golden threads through society, to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal, which is the sway and
dominance of justice" (Id.) Foremost among these principles is that pronounced in Article 19 which provides:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards
which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These
standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The
law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set
forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may
nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform
with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for
which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government
of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally,
an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.

Article 20, which pertains to damage arising from a violation of law, provides that:

Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter
for the same.

However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not violate any provision of law since they were merely
exercising their legal right to dismiss private respondent. This does not, however, leave private respondent with no
relief because Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that:

Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

This article, adopted to remedy the "countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs
helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury" [Id.] should "vouchsafe adequate legal
remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically
in the statutes" [Id. it p. 40; See also PNB v. CA, G.R. No. L-27155, May 18,1978, 83 SCRA 237, 247].

In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked, there is no rigid test which can be
applied. While the Court has not hesitated to apply Article 19 whether the legal and factual circumstances called for
its application [See for e.g., Velayo v. Shell Co. of the Phil., Ltd., 100 Phil. 186 (1956); PNB v. CA, supra; Grand Union
Supermarket, Inc. v. Espino, Jr., G.R. No. L-48250, December 28, 1979, 94 SCRA 953; PAL v. CA, G.R. No. L-46558, July
31,1981,106 SCRA 391; United General Industries, Inc, v. Paler G.R. No. L-30205, March 15,1982,112 SCRA 404; Rubio
v. CA, G.R. No. 50911, August 21, 1987, 153 SCRA 183] the question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights
has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on
the circumstances of each case. And in the instant case, the Court, after examining the record and considering certain
significant circumstances, finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to
private respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified.

The trial court made a finding that notwithstanding the fact that it was private respondent Tobias who reported the
possible existence of anomalous transactions, petitioner Hendry "showed belligerence and told plaintiff (private
respondent herein) that he was the number one suspect and to take a one week vacation leave, not to communicate
with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave his keys to said defendant (petitioner Hendry)" [RTC
Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 232]. This, petitioners do not dispute. But regardless of whether or not it was private
respondent Tobias who reported the anomalies to petitioners, the latter's reaction towards the former upon
uncovering the anomalies was less than civil. An employer who harbors suspicions that an employee has committed
dishonesty might be justified in taking the appropriate action such as ordering an investigation and directing the
employee to go on a leave. Firmness and the resolve to uncover the truth would also be expected from such
employer. But the high-handed treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was certainly uncalled for. And this
reprehensible attitude of petitioners was to continue when private respondent returned to work on November 20,
1972 after his one week forced leave. Upon reporting for work, Tobias was confronted by Hendry who said. "Tobby,
you are the crook and swindler in this company." Considering that the first report made by the police investigators
was submitted only on December 10, 1972 [See Exh. A] the statement made by petitioner Hendry was baseless. The
imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the
standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has already ruled that the right of the
employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the
effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to the employee
[Quisaba v. Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer and Plywood Inc., G.R. No. L-38088, August 30, 1974, 58 SCRA 771; See also
Philippine Refining Co., Inc. v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-21871, September 27,1966, 18 SCRA 107] Under the circumstances of
the instant case, the petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving
the latter the right to recover damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.

But petitioners were not content with just dismissing Tobias. Several other tortious acts were committed by
petitioners against Tobias after the latter's termination from work. Towards the latter part of January, 1973, after the
filing of the first of six criminal complaints against Tobias, the latter talked to Hendry to protest the actions taken
against him. In response, Hendry cut short Tobias' protestations by telling him to just confess or else the company
would file a hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail. Hendry added that, "You Filipinos cannot be
trusted." The threat unmasked petitioner's bad faith in the various actions taken against Tobias. On the other hand,
the scornful remark about Filipinos as well as Hendry's earlier statements about Tobias being a "crook" and
"swindler" are clear violations of 'Tobias' personal dignity [See Article 26, Civil Code].

The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the writing of a letter to RETELCO sometime in October 1974,
stating that Tobias had been dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. Because of the letter, Tobias failed to
gain employment with RETELCO and as a result of which, Tobias remained unemployed for a longer period of time.
For this further damage suffered by Tobias, petitioners must likewise be held liable for damages consistent with
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Petitioners, however, contend that they have a "moral, if not legal, duty to forewarn
other employers of the kind of employee the plaintiff (private respondent herein) was." [Petition, p. 14; Rollo, p. 15].
Petitioners further claim that "it is the accepted moral and societal obligation of every man to advise or warn his
fellowmen of any threat or danger to the latter's life, honor or property. And this includes warning one's brethren of
the possible dangers involved in dealing with, or accepting into confidence, a man whose honesty and integrity is
suspect" [Id.]. These arguments, rather than justify petitioners' act, reveal a seeming obsession to prevent Tobias
from getting a job, even after almost two years from the time Tobias was dismissed.

Finally, there is the matter of the filing by petitioners of six criminal complaints against Tobias. Petitioners contend
that there is no case against them for malicious prosecution and that they cannot be "penalized for exercising their
right and prerogative of seeking justice by filing criminal complaints against an employee who was their principal
suspect in the commission of forgeries and in the perpetration of anomalous transactions which defrauded them of
substantial sums of money" [Petition, p. 10, Rollo, p. 11].

While sound principles of justice and public policy dictate that persons shall have free resort to the courts for redress
of wrongs and vindication of their rights [Buenaventura v. Sto. Domingo, 103 Phil. 239 (1958)], the right to institute
criminal prosecutions can not be exercised maliciously and in bad faith [Ventura v. Bernabe, G.R. No. L-26760, April
30, 1971, 38 SCRA 5871.] Hence, in Yutuk V. Manila Electric Co., G.R. No. L-13016, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 337, the Court
held that the right to file criminal complaints should not be used as a weapon to force an alleged debtor to pay an
indebtedness. To do so would be a clear perversion of the function of the criminal processes and of the courts of
justice. And in Hawpia CA, G.R. No. L-20047, June 30, 1967. 20 SCRA 536 the Court upheld the judgment against the
petitioner for actual and moral damages and attorney's fees after making a finding that petitioner, with persistence,
filed at least six criminal complaints against respondent, all of which were dismissed.

To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a design to vex and
humiliate a person and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that the charges were false and
groundless [Manila Gas Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. L-44190, October 30,1980, 100 SCRA 602]. Concededly, the filing
of a suit by itself, does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution [Inhelder Corporation v. CA, G.R. No.
52358, May 301983122 SCRA 576]. The mere dismissal by the fiscal of the criminal complaint is not a ground for an
award of damages for malicious prosecution if there is no competent evidence to show that the complainant had
acted in bad faith [Sison v. David, G.R. No. L-11268, January 28,1961, 1 SCRA 60].

In the instant case, however, the trial court made a finding that petitioners acted in bad faith in filing the criminal
complaints against Tobias, observing that:
x x x

Defendants (petitioners herein) filed with the Fiscal's Office of Manila a total of six (6) criminal cases, five (5) of which
were for estafa thru falsification of commercial document and one for violation of Art. 290 of the Revised Penal Code
"discovering secrets thru seizure of correspondence," and all were dismissed for insufficiency or lack of evidence."
The dismissal of four (4) of the cases was appealed to the Ministry of Justice, but said Ministry invariably sustained
the dismissal of the cases. As above adverted to, two of these cases were refiled with the Judge Advocate General's
Office of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to railroad plaintiffs arrest and detention in the military stockade, but
this was frustrated by a presidential decree transferring criminal cases involving civilians to the civil courts.

x x x

To be sure, when despite the two (2) police reports embodying the findings of Lt. Dioscoro Tagle, Chief Document
Examiner of the Manila Police Department, clearing plaintiff of participation or involvement in the fraudulent
transactions complained of, despite the negative results of the lie detector tests which defendants compelled plaintiff
to undergo, and although the police investigation was "still under follow-up and a supplementary report will be
submitted after all the evidence has been gathered," defendants hastily filed six (6) criminal cases with the city
Fiscal's Office of Manila, five (5) for estafa thru falsification of commercial document and one (1) for violation of Art.
290 of the Revised Penal Code, so much so that as was to be expected, all six (6) cases were dismissed, with one of the
investigating fiscals, Asst. Fiscal de Guia, commenting in one case that, "Indeed, the haphazard way this case was
investigated is evident. Evident likewise is the flurry and haste in the filing of this case against respondent Tobias,"
there can be no mistaking that defendants would not but be motivated by malicious and unlawful intent to harass,
oppress, and cause damage to plaintiff.

x x x

[RTC Decision, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 235-236].

In addition to the observations made by the trial court, the Court finds it significant that the criminal complaints were
filed during the pendency of the illegal dismissal case filed by Tobias against petitioners. This explains the haste in
which the complaints were filed, which the trial court earlier noted. But petitioners, to prove their good faith, point to
the fact that only six complaints were filed against Tobias when they could have allegedly filed one hundred cases,
considering the number of anomalous transactions committed against GLOBE MACKAY. However, petitioners' good
faith is belied by the threat made by Hendry after the filing of the first complaint that one hundred more cases would
be filed against Tobias. In effect, the possible filing of one hundred more cases was made to hang like the sword of
Damocles over the head of Tobias. In fine, considering the haste in which the criminal complaints were filed, the fact
that they were filed during the pendency of the illegal dismissal case against petitioners, the threat made by Hendry,
the fact that the cases were filed notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from involvement in the
anomalies committed against GLOBE MACKAY, coupled by the eventual dismissal of all the cases, the Court is led into
no other conclusion than that petitioners were motivated by malicious intent in filing the six criminal complaints
against Tobias.

Petitioners next contend that the award of damages was excessive. In the complaint filed against petitioners, Tobias
prayed for the following: one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) as actual damages; fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) as exemplary damages; eight hundred thousand pesos (P800,000.00) as moral damages; fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) as attorney's fees; and costs. The trial court, after making a computation of the damages incurred
by Tobias [See RTC Decision, pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 154-1551, awarded him the following: eighty thousand pesos
(P80,000.00) as actual damages; two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages; twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages; thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees; and, costs. It must
be underscored that petitioners have been guilty of committing several actionable tortious acts, i.e., the abusive
manner in which they dismissed Tobias from work including the baseless imputation of guilt and the harassment
during the investigations; the defamatory language heaped on Tobias as well as the scornful remark on Filipinos; the
poison letter sent to RETELCO which resulted in Tobias' loss of possible employment; and, the malicious filing of the
criminal complaints. Considering the extent of the damage wrought on Tobias, the Court finds that, contrary to
petitioners' contention, the amount of damages awarded to Tobias was reasonable under the circumstances.

Yet, petitioners still insist that the award of damages was improper, invoking the principle of damnum absque injuria.
It is argued that "[t]he only probable actual damage that plaintiff (private respondent herein) could have suffered was
a direct result of his having been dismissed from his employment, which was a valid and legal act of the defendants-
appellants (petitioners herein).lâwphî1.ñèt " [Petition, p. 17; Rollo, p. 18].

According to the principle of damnum absque injuria, damage or loss which does not constitute a violation of a legal
right or amount to a legal wrong is not actionable [Escano v. CA, G.R. No. L-47207, September 25, 1980, 100 SCRA 197;
See also Gilchrist v. Cuddy 29 Phil, 542 (1915); The Board of Liquidators v. Kalaw, G.R. No. L-18805, August 14, 1967,
20 SCRA 987]. This principle finds no application in this case. It bears repeating that even granting that petitioners
might have had the right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive manner in which that right was exercised
amounted to a legal wrong for which petitioners must now be held liable. Moreover, the damage incurred by Tobias
was not only in connection with the abusive manner in which he was dismissed but was also the result of several
other quasi-delictual acts committed by petitioners.

Petitioners next question the award of moral damages. However, the Court has already ruled in Wassmer v. Velez,
G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964, 12 SCRA 648, 653, that [p]er express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New
Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code." Hence, the Court of
Appeals committed no error in awarding moral damages to Tobias.

Lastly, the award of exemplary damages is impugned by petitioners. Although Article 2231 of the Civil Code provides
that "[i]n quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence," the Court,
in Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., G.R. No. L- 28589, January 8, 1973, 49 SCRA 1, ruled that if gross
negligence warrants the award of exemplary damages, with more reason is its imposition justified when the act
performed is deliberate, malicious and tainted with bad faith. As in the Zulueta case, the nature of the wrongful acts
shown to have been committed by petitioners against Tobias is sufficient basis for the award of exemplary damages
to the latter.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 09055 is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr. and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., took no part.

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI),
petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND LORETO DIONELA,
respondents
No. L-44748. August 29, 1986

Facts:

Loreto Dionela filed a complaint of damages against Radio Communiciations of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI)
due to the telegram sent through its Manila Office to the former, reading as follows:

176 AS JR 1215PM 9 PAID MANDALUYONG JUL 22-66 LORETO DIONELA CABANGAN LEGASPI CITY

WIRE ARRIVAL OF CHECK FER

LORETO DIONELA-CABANGAN-WIRE ARRIVAL OF CHECK-PER

115 PM

SA IYO WALANG PAKINABANG DUMATING KA DIYAN-WALA-KANG PADALA DITO KAHIT BULBUL MO

Loreto Dionela alleges that the defamatory words on the telegram sent to him wounded his feelings, caused
him undue embarrassment and affected adversely his business because other people have come to know
of said defamatory words. RCPI alleges that the additional words in Tagalog was a private joke between the
sending and receiving operators, that they were not addressed to or intended for plaintiff and therefore did
not form part of the telegram, and that the Tagalog words are not defamatory.

The RTC ruled that the additional words are libelous for any person reading the same would logically think
that they refer to Dionela, thus RCPI was ordered to pay moral damages in the amount of P40, 000.00. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision ruling that the company was negligent and failed to take
precautionary steps to avoid the occurrence of the humiliating incident, and the fact that a copy of the
telegram is filed among other telegrams and open to public is sufficient publication; however reducing the
amount awarded to P15, 000.00

Issue:

Whether or not the company should answer directly and primarily for the civil liability arising from the
criminal act of its employee.

Ruling:

Yes. The cause of action of the private respondent is based on Arts. 19 and 20 of the New Civil Code, as
well as on respondent’s breach of contract thru the negligence of its own employees. By adding extraneous
and libelous matters in the message sent to the private respondent, there is a clear breach of contract; for
upon payment of the fixed rate, the company undertakes to transmit the message accurately.

In contracts, the negligence of the employee (servant) is the negligence of the employer (master). This is
the master and servant rule. As a corporation, the petitioner can act only through its employees. Hence the
acts of its employees in receiving and transmitting messages are the acts of the petitioner. To hold that the
petitioner is not liable directly for the acts of its employees in the pursuit of petitioner’s business is to
deprive the general public availing of the services of the petitioner of an effective and adequate remedy.
In most cases, negligence must be proved in order that plaintiff may recover. However, since negligence
may be hard to substantiate in some cases, we may apply the doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITUR (the thing
speaks for itself), by considering the presence of facts or circumstances surrounding the injury.

The judgment of the CA is affirmed.

FULL CASE
G.R. No. L-44748 August 29, 1986

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILS., INC. (RCPI). petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LORETO DIONELA, respondents.
O. Pythogoras Oliver for respondents.

PARAS, J.:

Before Us, is a Petition for Review by certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals, modifying the decision of the
trial court in a civil case for recovery of damages against petitioner corporation by reducing the award to private
respondent Loreto Dionela of moral damages from P40,000 to Pl5,000, and attorney's fees from P3,000 to P2,000.

The basis of the complaint against the defendant corporation is a telegram sent through its Manila Office to the
offended party, Loreto Dionela, reading as follows:

176 AS JR 1215PM 9 PAID MANDALUYONG JUL 22-66 LORETO DIONELA CABANGAN

LEGASPI CITY

WIRE ARRIVAL OF CHECK FER

LORETO DIONELA-CABANGAN-WIRE ARRIVAL OF CHECK-PER

115 PM

SA IYO WALANG PAKINABANG DUMATING KA DIYAN-WALA-KANG PADALA DITO KAHIT

BULBUL MO

(p. 19, Annex "A")

Plaintiff-respondent Loreto Dionela alleges that the defamatory words on the telegram sent to him not only wounded
his feelings but also caused him undue embarrassment and affected adversely his business as well because other
people have come to know of said defamatory words. Defendant corporation as a defense, alleges that the
additional words in Tagalog was a private joke between the sending and receiving operators and that they were not
addressed to or intended for plaintiff and therefore did not form part of the telegram and that the Tagalog words are
not defamatory. The telegram sent through its facilities was received in its station at Legaspi City. Nobody other than
the operator manned the teletype machine which automatically receives telegrams being transmitted. The said
telegram was detached from the machine and placed inside a sealed envelope and delivered to plaintiff, obviously
as is. The additional words in Tagalog were never noticed and were included in the telegram when delivered.

The trial court in finding for the plaintiff ruled as follows:

 There is no question that the additional words in Tagalog are libelous. They clearly impute a vice or
defect of the plaintiff. Whether or not they were intended for the plaintiff, the effect on the plaintiff is
the same. Any person reading the additional words in Tagalog will naturally think that they refer to
the addressee, the plaintiff. There is no indication from the face of the telegram that the additional
words in Tagalog were sent as a private joke between the operators of the defendant.

The defendant is sued directly not as an employer. The business of the defendant is to transmit
telegrams. It will open the door to frauds and allow the defendant to act with impunity if it can escape
liability by the simple expedient of showing that its employees acted beyond the scope of their
assigned tasks.

The liability of the defendant is predicated not only on Article 33 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
but on the following articles of said Code:

ART. 19.- Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

ART. 20.-Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.

There is sufficient publication of the libelous Tagalog words. The office file of the defendant
containing copies of telegrams received are open and held together only by a metal fastener.
Moreover, they are open to view and inspection by third parties.

It follows that the plaintiff is entitled to damages and attorney's fees. The plaintiff is a businessman.
The libelous Tagalog words must have affected his business and social standing in the community.
The Court fixes the amount of P40,000.00 as the reasonable amount of moral damages and the
amount of P3,000.00 as attorney's fee which the defendant should pay the plaintiff. (pp. 15-16,
Record on Appeal)

The respondent appellate court in its assailed decision confirming the aforegoing findings of the lower court stated:

The proximate cause, therefore, resulting in injury to appellee, was the failure of the appellant to take
the necessary or precautionary steps to avoid the occurrence of the humiliating incident now
complained of. The company had not imposed any safeguard against such eventualities and this
void in its operating procedure does not speak well of its concern for their clientele's interests.
Negligence here is very patent. This negligence is imputable to appellant and not to its employees.

The claim that there was no publication of the libelous words in Tagalog is also without merit. The
fact that a carbon copy of the telegram was filed among other telegrams and left to hang for the
public to see, open for inspection by a third party is sufficient publication. It would have been
otherwise perhaps had the telegram been placed and kept in a secured place where no one may
have had a chance to read it without appellee's permission.

The additional Tagalog words at the bottom of the telegram are, as correctly found by the lower
court, libelous per se, and from which malice may be presumed in the absence of any showing of
good intention and justifiable motive on the part of the appellant. The law implies damages in this
instance (Quemel vs. Court of Appeals, L-22794, January 16, 1968; 22 SCRA 44). The award of
P40,000.00 as moral damages is hereby reduced to P15,000.00 and for attorney's fees the amount
of P2,000.00 is awarded. (pp. 22-23, record)

After a motion for reconsideration was denied by the appellate court, petitioner came to Us with the following:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

I
 The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that Petitioner-employer should answer directly and
primarily for the civil liability arising from the criminal act of its employee.

II

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that there was sufficient publication of the alleged
libelous telegram in question, as contemplated by law on libel.

III

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that the liability of petitioner-company-employer is
predicated on Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Articles on Human Relations.

IV

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in awarding Atty's. fees. (p. 4, Record)

Petitioner's contentions do not merit our consideration. The action for damages was filed in the lower court directly
against respondent corporation not as an employer subsidiarily liable under the provisions of Article 1161 of the New
Civil Code in relation to Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The cause of action of the private respondent is based
on Arts. 19 and 20 of the New Civil Code (supra). As well as on respondent's breach of contract thru the negligence
of its own employees. 1

Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of receiving and transmitting messages. Everytime a
person transmits a message through the facilities of the petitioner, a contract is entered into. Upon receipt of the rate
or fee fixed, the petitioner undertakes to transmit the message accurately. There is no question that in the case at
bar, libelous matters were included in the message transmitted, without the consent or knowledge of the sender.
There is a clear case of breach of contract by the petitioner in adding extraneous and libelous matters in the
message sent to the private respondent. As a corporation, the petitioner can act only through its employees. Hence
the acts of its employees in receiving and transmitting messages are the acts of the petitioner. To hold that the
petitioner is not liable directly for the acts of its employees in the pursuit of petitioner's business is to deprive the
general public availing of the services of the petitioner of an effective and adequate remedy. In most cases,
negligence must be proved in order that plaintiff may recover. However, since negligence may be hard to
substantiate in some cases, we may apply the doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITUR (the thing speaks for itself), by
considering the presence of facts or circumstances surrounding the injury.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of the appellate court is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Pe vs Pe
FACTS:

Alfonso Pe, the defendant, was a married man, agent of La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory in Gasan Marinduque
who was treated like a son by Cecilio Pe, one of the petitioners. Cecilio introduced Alfonso to his children and was
given access to visit their house. Alfonso got fond of Lolita, 24 year old single, daughter of Cecilio. The defendant
frequented the house of Lolita sometime in 1952 on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the
rosary. Eventually they fell in love with each other.

Plaintiff brought action before lower court of Manila and failed to prove Alfonso deliberately and in bad faith tried to
win Lolita’s affection. The case on moral damages was dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not defendant is liable to Lolita’s family on the ground of moral, good custom and public policy due
to their illicit affair.

HELD:

Alfonso committed an injury to Lolita’s family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy
contemplated in Article 20 of the civil code. The defendant took advantage of the trust of Cecilio and even used the
praying of rosary as a reason to get close with Lolita. The wrong caused by Alfonso is immeasurable considering the
fact that he is a married man.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the sum of
P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigations. Costs against appellee.
G.R. No. L-17396 May 30, 1962
CECILIO PE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ALFONSO PE, defendant-appellee.
Cecilio L. Pe for and in his own behalf as plaintiff-appellant.
Leodegario L. Mogol for defendant-appellee.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Plaintiffs brought this action before the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover moral, compensatory, exemplary
and corrective damages in the amount of P94,000.00 exclusive of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.

Defendant, after denying some allegations contained in the complaint, set up as a defense that the facts alleged
therein, even if true, do not constitute a valid cause of action.

After trial, the lower court, after finding that defendant had carried on a love affair with one Lolita Pe, an unmarried
woman, being a married man himself, declared that defendant cannot be held liable for moral damages it appearing
that plaintiffs failed to prove that defendant, being aware of his marital status, deliberately and in bad faith tried to
win Lolita's affection. So it rendered decision dismissing the complaint.1äw phï1.ñët

Plaintiffs brought this case on appeal before this Court on the ground that the issues involved are purely of law.

The facts as found by the trial court are: Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one Lolita Pe. At the time
of her disappearance on April 14, 1957, Lolita was 24 years old and unmarried. Defendant is a married man and
works as agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory. He used to stay in the town of Gasan, Marinduque, in
connection with his aforesaid occupation. Lolita was staying with her parents in the same town. Defendant was an
adopted son of a Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral relative of Lolita's father. Because of such fact and the
similarity in their family name, defendant became close to the plaintiffs who regarded him as a member of their
family. Sometime in 1952, defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him
how to pray the rosary. The two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine trysts not only in
the town of Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. They exchanged love notes with
each other the contents of which reveal not only their infatuation for each other but also the extent to which they had
carried their relationship. The rumors about their love affairs reached the ears of Lolita's parents sometime, in 1955,
and since then defendant was forbidden from going to their house and from further seeing Lolita. The plaintiffs even
filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national. The affair between defendant and Lolita
continued nonetheless.

Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was staying with her brothers and sisters at their residence at 54-B España
Extension, Quezon City. On April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared from said house. After she left, her brothers and
sisters checked up her thing and found that Lolita's clothes were gone. However, plaintiffs found a note on a
crumpled piece of paper inside Lolita's aparador. Said note, written on a small slip of paper approximately 4" by 3" in
size, was in a handwriting recognized to be that of defendant's. In English it reads:

Honey, suppose I leave here on Sunday night, and that's 13th of this month and we will have a date on the
14th, that's Monday morning at 10 a.m.

Reply

Love

The disappearance of Lolita was reported to the police authorities and the NBI but up to the present there is no
news or trace of her whereabouts.
The present action is based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code which provides:

Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner which is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

There is no doubt that the claim of plaintiffs for damages is based on the fact that defendant, being a married man,
carried on a love affair with Lolita Pe thereby causing plaintiffs injury in a manner contrary to morals, good customs
and public policy. But in spite of the fact that plaintiffs have clearly established that in illicit affair was carried on
between defendant and Lolita which caused great damage to the name and reputation of plaintiffs who are her
parents, brothers and sisters, the trial court considered their complaint not actionable for the reason that they failed
to prove that defendant deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection Thus, the trial court said: "In the
absence of proof on this point, the court may not presume that it was the defendant who deliberately induced such
relationship. We cannot be unmindful of the uncertainties and sometimes inexplicable mysteries of the human
emotions. It is a possibility that the defendant and Lolita simply fell in love with each other, not only without any
desire on their part, but also against their better judgment and in full consciousness of what it will bring to both of
them. This is specially so with respect to Lolita, being an unmarried woman, falling in love with defendant who is a
married man."

We disagree with this view. The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita's affection cannot lead, to
any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent
of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by the fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the
pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter's
family who was allowed free access because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her
family, the two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan but
also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit affairs reached the
knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden from going to their house and even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs
even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national. Nevertheless, defendant continued
his love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn
from this chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in
winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her
and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an
injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21
of the new Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the sum
of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigations. Costs against appellee.

Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Gasheem Shookat Baksh vs CA
FACTS:

Private respondent, Marilou Gonzales, filed a complaint dated October 27, 1987 for damages against the
petitioner for the alleged breach of their agreement to get married. She met the petitioner in Dagupan where
the latter was an Iranian medical exchange student who later courted her and proposed marriage. The
petitioner even went to Marilou’s house to secure approval of her parents. The petitioner then forced the
respondent to leave with him in his apartment. Marilou was a virgin before she lived with him. After a week,
she filed a complaint because the petitioner started maltreating and threatening her. He even tied the
respondent in the apartment while he was in school and drugged her. Marilou at one time became pregnant
but the petitioner administered a drug to abort the baby.

Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and told Marilou to not live with him since he is already
married to someone in Bacolod. He claimed that he never proposed marriage or agreed to be married
neither sought consent and approval of Marliou’s parents. He claimed that he asked Marilou to stay out of
his apartment since the latter deceived him by stealing money and his passport. The private respondent
prayed for damages and reimbursements of actual expenses.

ISSUE: Whether breach of promise to marry can give rise to cause for damages.

HELD:

The existing rule is that breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. The court held that
when a man uses his promise of marriage to deceive a woman to consent to his malicious desires, he
commits fraud and willfully injures the woman. In that instance, the court found that petitioner’s deceptive
promise to marry led Marilou to surrender her virtue and womanhood.

Moral damages can be claimed when such promise to marry was a deceptive ploy to have carnal knowledge
with the woman and actual damages should be paid for the wedding preparation expenses. Petitioner even
committed deplorable acts in disregard of the laws of the country.

Therefore, SC set aside the decision of CA awarding damages to the respondent.

G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.

Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review and set aside the Decision1 of
the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in toto the 16 October 1939 Decision of
Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16503. Presented is the
issue of whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.

The antecedents of this case are not complicated:

On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court a
complaint2 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges
in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and
reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano
Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern
Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his
love on the condition that they would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after the end of the school
semester, which was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in Bañaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced
her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him; a week before the
filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as
a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay
captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked
her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private
respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less than
P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her
such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.

In his Answer with Counterclaim,3 petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of the parties as averred in
the complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He
thus claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent; he neither
sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but
only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money
and passport; and finally, no confrontation took place with a representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his
Counterclaim, that the complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was unnecessarily
dragged into court and compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation,
he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.

After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order4 embodying the stipulated
facts which the parties had agreed upon, to wit:

1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, while the defendant
is single, Iranian citizen and resident (sic) of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since
September 1, 1987 up to the present;
 2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern, Dagupan City, College of
Medicine, second year medicine proper;

3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette , Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan
City since July, 1986 up to the present and a (sic) high school graduate;

4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of the Mabuhay Luncheonette,
Johhny Rabino introduced the defendant to the plaintiff on August 3, 1986.

After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16 October 1989 a
decision5 favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's
fees; the dispositive portion of the decision reads:

IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendant.

1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand (P20,000.00)
pesos as moral damages.

2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of three thousand (P3,000.00)
pesos as atty's fees and two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay the
costs.

3. All other claims are denied.6

The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private respondent were
lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual
advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, d)
because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that
deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents — in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions — made
some preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens,
inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and (g)
such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of
morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The trial court gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony
because, inter alia, she would not have had the temerity and courage to come to court and expose her honor and
reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false.7

The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the evidence for the private
respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by the respondent Court as follows:

According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that she never had a
boyfriend before, defendant started courting her just a few days after they first met. He later
proposed marriage to her several times and she accepted his love as well as his proposal of
marriage on August 20, 1987, on which same day he went with her to her hometown of Bañaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her parents and inform them of their relationship and
their intention to get married. The photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their submarkings) of defendant
with members of plaintiff's family or with plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on that occasion,
defendant told plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters that he intended to marry her during the
semestral break in October, 1987, and because plaintiff's parents thought he was good and trusted
him, they agreed to his proposal for him to marry their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to
stay in their house and sleep with plaintiff during the few days that they were in Bugallon. When
plaintiff and defendant later returned to Dagupan City, they continued to live together in defendant's
apartment. However, in the early days of October, 1987, defendant would tie plaintiff's hands and
feet while he went to school, and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made
her sleep the whole day and night until the following day. As a result of this live-in relationship,
plaintiff became pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to abort the fetus. Still plaintiff
continued to live with defendant and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her until he told her
that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City. That was the time
 plaintiff left defendant, went home to her parents, and thereafter consulted a lawyer who
accompanied her to the barangay captain in Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother, and
a barangay tanod sent by the barangay captain went to talk to defendant to still convince him to
marry plaintiff, but defendant insisted that he could not do so because he was already married to a
girl in Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial, is that defendant is
still single.

Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had informed them of his desire to
marry Marilou, he already looked for sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for the reception by
looking for pigs and chickens, and even already invited many relatives and friends to the forthcoming
wedding. 8

Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which docketed the case as CA-
G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief,9 he contended that the trial court erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of
factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.

On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision 10 affirming in toto the trial court's
ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining the trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court made the following
analysis:

First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who was already 29 years old at
the time, does not appear to be a girl of loose morals. It is uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior
to her unfortunate experience with defendant and never had boyfriend. She is, as described by the
lower court, a barrio lass "not used and accustomed to trend of modern urban life", and certainly
would (sic) not have allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive promise made by the
defendant to marry her." In fact, we agree with the lower court that plaintiff and defendant must have
been sweethearts or so the plaintiff must have thought because of the deception of defendant, for
otherwise, she would not have allowed herself to be photographed with defendant in public in so
(sic) loving and tender poses as those depicted in the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot believe,
therefore, defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to him except a waitress at the restaurant
where he usually ate. Defendant in fact admitted that he went to plaintiff's hometown of Bañaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May
18, 1988), at (sic) a beach party together with the manager and employees of the Mabuhay
Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April 1, 1987 when he allegedly talked to
plaintiff's mother who told him to marry her daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left
Dagupan City where he was involved in the serious study of medicine to go to plaintiff's hometown in
Bañaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some kind of special relationship between them? And this
special relationship must indeed have led to defendant's insincere proposal of marriage to plaintiff,
communicated not only to her but also to her parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of the
restaurant where plaintiff was working and where defendant first proposed marriage to her, also
knew of this love affair and defendant's proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she declared was the
reason why plaintiff resigned from her job at the restaurant after she had accepted defendant's
proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).

Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral character and must think
so low and have so little respect and regard for Filipino women that he openly admitted that when he
studied in Bacolod City for several years where he finished his B.S. Biology before he came to
Dagupan City to study medicine, he had a common-law wife in Bacolod City. In other words, he also
lived with another woman in Bacolod City but did not marry that woman, just like what he did to
plaintiff. It is not surprising, then, that he felt so little compunction or remorse in pretending to love
and promising to marry plaintiff, a young, innocent, trustful country girl, in order to satisfy his lust on
her. 11

and then concluded:

In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-appellant's fraudulent and
deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue
 and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these (sic) fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's
parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage. And as
these acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against morals, good customs, and public
policy, and are even gravely and deeply derogatory and insulting to our women, coming as they do
from a foreigner who has been enjoying the hospitality of our people and taking advantage of the
opportunity to study in one of our institutions of learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be
made, under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to compensate for the moral damages and
injury that he had caused plaintiff, as the lower court ordered him to do in its decision in this case. 12

Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March 1991; he raises therein the single
issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. 13

It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any moral wrong or injury
or violated any good custom or public policy; he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the private
respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs,
traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino
customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He
stresses that even if he had made a promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or
tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim
to take four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not posses
good moral character. Moreover, his controversial "common law life" is now his legal wife as their marriage had
been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation with the private
respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in relationship, the private
respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if
it was to be assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private respondent and had also promised to
marry her, such acts would not be actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case. The mere breach of
promise is not actionable. 14

On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the petition and the petitioner had filed
his Reply thereto, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
Memoranda, which they subsequently complied with.

As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in support of his thesis, it is clear
that questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule in this
jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter
court having heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely their deportment and manner of
testifying, unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which, if considered, might affect
the result of the case. 15

Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had overlooked any fact of
substance or values which could alter the result of the case.

Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence introduced by
the parties before the lower court. There are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina
vs.Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court took the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:

xxx xxx xxx

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures
(Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurb or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of
discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap.
30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of
the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellate and appellee (Evangelista v.
 Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia v. Court of
Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,);
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised
on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record (Salazar v.
Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).

Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the above quoted exceptions in this case.
Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts must be respected.

And now to the legal issue.

The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. 17 Congress deliberately
eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. The reason therefor is set
forth in the report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:

The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has
been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. 18 The history of breach of promise suits
in the United States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse
by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of
rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of the American states. . . . 19

This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of
torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs
which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. 20

As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:

But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by
positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many
victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury,
the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed
Civil Code the following rule:

Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.

An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year old
daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl
becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of
age. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the
grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and family have suffered incalculable
moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring action for damages. But under the proposed
article, she and her parents would have such a right of action.

Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would vouchsafe adequate legal
remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide
for specifically in the statutes. 21

Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
 is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known
in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or
common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence,
but international criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the
general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the
New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised
Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 22 In
between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been
beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20
of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much
more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. 23

In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's
promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to
fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress,
proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive
device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it
and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury
should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of
love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him
on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on
appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed
marriage." 24 In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single
Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its
example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under either
Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was above eighteen (18) years
of age at the time of the seduction.

Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to marry where the
woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,25 this Court denied recovery of
damages to the woman because:

. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he
is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant — who was around thirty-six (36)
years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent
are supposed to be — when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but,
also, because the court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner
because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him by having a fruit of their
engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.

In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if there had been moral
seduction, recovery was eventually denied because We were not convinced that such seduction existed. The
following enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made in the said case:

The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code Commission's
memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who had been seduced. The essential feature is
seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it
connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the
part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs.
Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).

It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —

To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or

inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement.
 If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire,
there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56) She must be induced to
depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and
wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that effect, and which result in her
person to ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer (27
Phil. 123).

And in American Jurisprudence we find:

On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or

deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient
to warrant a recovery.

Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire of
curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity
for the commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all
such cases would tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and would be a
reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be swift to profit. (47
Am. Jur. 662)

xxx xxx xxx

Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to
1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintain intimate sexual relations with appellant,
with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly
there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she
surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she
would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early
fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual relations upon
finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence,
we conclude that no case is made under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action
being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint. 27

In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently retired from this Court,
opined that in a breach of promise to marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral damages may be
recovered:

. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due to mutual lust.
(Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra vs. Marcos, 7
Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if
the CAUSE be the promise to marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance
that there was criminal or moral seduction, hence recovery of moral damages will prosper. If it be the
other way around, there can be no recovery of moral damages, because here mutual lust has
intervened). . . .

together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for the wedding presentations
(See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).

Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:

It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still subsists, notwithstanding the incorporation of
the present article31 in the Code. The example given by the Code Commission is correct, if there
was seduction, not necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar sense of deception. But when the
sexual act is accomplished without any deceit or qualifying circumstance of abuse of authority or
influence, but the woman, already of age, has knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot be said
that there is an injury which can be the basis for indemnity.
 But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic), the action lies. The court,
however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive the woman under the
circumstances, because an act which would deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not constitute
deceit as to an experienced woman thirty years of age. But so long as there is a wrongful act and a
resulting injury, there should be civil liability, even if the act is not punishable under the criminal law
and there should have been an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for that reason.

We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that granting, for argument's sake,
that he did promise to marry the private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both
parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra
vs. Marcos, 32 the private respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes as far as
stating that if the private respondent had "sustained any injury or damage in their relationship, it is primarily because
of her own doing, 33 for:

. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor sooner or later. Take
notice that she is a plain high school graduate and a mere employee . . . (Annex "C") or a waitress
(TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988) in a luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a man who can
give her economic security. Her family is in dire need of financial assistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53, May
18, 1988). And this predicament prompted her to accept a proposition that may have been offered by
the petitioner. 34

These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a condescending,
if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational
background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning,
he was not at all moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstances could not
have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly
intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and
would want her to be his life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who
honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of
ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional
respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in
blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his due
and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his obligations.

No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.

The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may not have been impelled
by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but because
of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as
she found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari
delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal
fault." 35At most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.

Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his transgression has been
brought about by the imposition of undue influence of the party on whom the burden of the original
wrong principally rests, or where his consent to the transaction was itself procured by
fraud. 36

In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:

Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no action by one against
the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule, however, has been interpreted as applicable only
where the fault on both sides is, more or less, equivalent. It does not apply where one party is
literate or intelligent and the other one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209).

We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said that this Court condones
the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the petitioner stay together in the same room in their house
after giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the honor of their daughters and
infuse upon them the higher values of morality and dignity.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is hereby DENIED, with
costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.

Bunag v. CA G.R. No. 101749

G.R. No. 101749 July 10, 1992
CONRADO BUNAG, JR., v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, First Division, and ZENAIDA B.
CIRILO,
REGALADO, J.:
FACTS:
On the afternoon of September 8, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. brought plaintiff-appellant to
a motel or hotel where they had sexual intercourse. Later that evening, said defendant-appellant
brought plaintiff-appellant to the house of his grandmother Juana de Leon in Pamplona, Las Piñas,
Metro Manila, where they lived together as husband and wife for 21 days, or until September 29,
1973. On September 10, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant filed their
respective applications for a marriage license with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Bacoor,
Cavite. On October 1, 1973, after leaving plaintiff-appellant, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. filed an
affidavit withdrawing his application for a marriage license.
Plaintiff-appellant contends that on the afternoon of September 8, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag,
Jr., together with an unidentified male companion, abducted her in the vicinity of the San Juan de
Dios Hospital in Pasay City and brought her to a motel where she was raped.
ISSUE:
Whether, since action involves a breach of promise to marry, the trial court erred in awarding
damages.
RULING:
It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an action for breach of
promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property
advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. 8 Generally, therefore, a breach of promise
to marry per se is not actionable, except where the plaintiff has actually incurred expenses for the
wedding and the necessary incidents thereof.
However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to those
provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively, under Article 21 of said Code, in relation
to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for moral damages. 9 Article 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes
which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even though they have actually suffered
material and moral injury, and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number
of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide for in the statutes. 10
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts of petitioner in forcibly abducting
private respondent and having carnal knowledge with her against her will, and thereafter promising to
marry her in order to escape criminal liability, only to thereafter renege on such promise after
cohabiting with her for twenty-one days, irremissibly constituteacts contrary to morals and good
customs. These are grossly insensate and reprehensible transgressions which indisputably warrant
and abundantly justify the award of moral and exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 21 in relation
to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and Article 2229 and 2234 of Civil Code.
Petitioner would, however, belabor the fact that said damages were awarded by the trial court on the
basis of a finding that he is guilty of forcible abduction with rape, despite the prior dismissal of the
complaint therefor filed by private respondent with the Pasay City Fiscal's Office.
Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that every
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. In other words, criminal liability will give rise to
civil liability ex delicto only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another
and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. 11 Hence, extinction of the penal action does not carry
with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. 12
In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction with rape was by mere
resolution of the fiscal at the preliminary investigation stage. There is no declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil case might arise did not exist. Consequently, the dismissal
did not in any way affect the right of herein private respondent to institute a civil action arising from
the offense because such preliminary dismissal of the penal action did not carry with it the extinction
of the civil action.
The reason most often given for this holding is that the two proceedings involved are not between the
same parties. Furthermore, it has long been emphasized, with continuing validity up to now, that there
are different rules as to the competency of witnesses and the quantum of evidence in criminal and
civil proceedings. In a criminal action, the State must prove its case by evidence which shows the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while in a civil action it is sufficient for the plaintiff to
sustain his cause by preponderance of evidence only. 13 Thus, in Rillon, et al. vs. Rillon, 14 we
stressed that it is not now necessary that a criminal prosecution for rape be first instituted and
prosecuted to final judgment before a civil action based on said offense in favor of the offended
woman can likewise be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment.
G.R. No. 101749 July 10, 1992
CONRADO BUNAG, JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, First Division, and ZENAIDA B.
CIRILO, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioner appeals for the reversal of the decision 1 of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on May 17, 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 07054, entitled "Zenaida B.
Cirilo vs. Conrado Bunag, Sr. and Conrado Bunag, Jr.," which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XI at Bacoor, Cavite, and, implicitly,
respondent court's resolution of September 3, 1991 2 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Respondent court having assiduously discussed the salient antecedents of this case, vis-a-vis the factual findings of the court below, the evidence of record and
the contentions of the parties, it is appropriate that its findings, which we approve and adopt, be extensively reproduced hereunder:

Based on the evidence on record, the following facts are considered indisputable: On the afternoon of September 8, 1973, defendant-
appellant Bunag, Jr. brought plaintiff-appellant to a motel or hotel where they had sexual intercourse. Later that evening, said defendant-
appellant brought plaintiff-appellant to the house of his grandmother Juana de Leon in Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, where they lived
together as husband and wife for 21 days, or until September 29, 1973. On September 10, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and
plaintiff-appellant filed their respective applications for a marriage license with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Bacoor, Cavite. On
October 1, 1973, after leaving plaintiff-appellant, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. filed an affidavit withdrawing his application for a marriage
license.

Plaintiff-appellant contends that on the afternoon of September 8, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., together with an unidentified male
companion, abducted her in the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios Hospital in Pasay City and brought her to a motel where she was raped. The
court a quo, which adopted her evidence, summarized the same which we paraphrased as follows:

Plaintiff was 26 years old on November 5, 1974 when she testified, single and had finished a college course in
Commerce (t.s.n., p. 4, Nov. 5, 1974). It appears that on September 8, 1973, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon,
while she was walking along Figueras Street, Pasay City on her way to the San Juan de Dios Canteen to take her
snack, defendant, Conrado Bunag, Jr., came riding in a car driven by a male companion. Plaintiff and defendant
Bunag, Jr. were sweethearts, but two weeks before September 8, 1973, they had a quarrel, and Bunag, Jr. wanted to
talk matters over with plaintiff, so that he invited her to take their merienda at the Aristocrat Restaurant in Manila
instead of at the San Juan de Dios Canteen, to which plaintiff obliged, as she believed in his sincerity (t.s.n., pp. 8-10,
Nov. 5, 1974).

Plaintiff rode in the car and took the front seat beside the driver while Bunag, Jr. seated himself by her right side. The
car travelled north on its way to the Aristocrat Restaurant but upon reaching San Juan Street in Pasay City, it turned
abruptly to the right, to which plaintiff protested, but which the duo ignored and instead threatened her not to make any
noise as they were ready to die and would bump the car against the post if she persisted. Frightened and silenced, the
car travelled its course thru F.B. Harrison Boulevard until they reached a motel. Plaintiff was then pulled and dragged
from the car against her will, and amidst her cries and pleas. In spite of her struggle she was no match to the joint
strength of the two male combatants because of her natural weakness being a woman and her small stature.
Eventually, she was brought inside the hotel where the defendant Bunag, Jr. deflowered her against her will and
consent. She could not fight back and repel the attack because after Bunag, Jr. had forced her to lie down and
embraced her, his companion held her two feet, removed her panty, after which he left. Bunag, Jr. threatened her that
he would ask his companion to come back and hold her feet if she did not surrender her womanhood to him, thus he
succeeded in feasting on her virginity. Plaintiff described the pains she felt and how blood came out of her private parts
after her vagina was penetrated by the penis of the defendant Bunag, Jr. (t.s.n. pp. 17-24, Nov. 5, 1974).

After that outrage on her virginity, plaintiff asked Bunag, Jr. once more to allow her to go home but the latter would not
consent and stated that he would only let her go after they were married as he intended to marry her, so much so that
she promised not to make any scandal and to marry him. Thereafter, they took a taxi together after the car that they
used had already gone, and proceeded to the house of Juana de Leon, Bunag, Jr.'s grandmother in Pamplona, Las
Piñas, Metro Manila where they arrived at 9:30 o'clock in the evening (t.s.n., p. 26, Nov. 5, 1974). At about ten (10)
o'clock that same evening, defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr., father of Bunag, Jr. arrived and assured plaintiff that the
following day which was a Monday, she and Bunag, Jr. would go to Bacoor, to apply for a marriage license, which they
did. They filed their applications for marriage license (Exhibits "A" and "C") and after that plaintiff and defendant Bunag,
Jr. returned to the house of Juana de Leon and lived there as husband and wife from September 8, 1973 to September
29, 1973.

On September 29, 1973 defendant Bunag, Jr. left and never returned, humiliating plaintiff and compelled her to go back
to her parents on October 3, 1973. Plaintiff was ashamed when she went home and could not sleep and eat because of
the deception done against her by defendants-appellants (t.s.n., p. 35, Nov. 5, 1974).
 The testimony of plaintiff was corroborated in toto by her uncle, Vivencio Bansagan who declared that on September 8,
1973 when plaintiff failed to arrive home at 9:00 o'clock in the evening, his sister who is the mother of plaintiff asked
him to look for her but his efforts proved futile, and he told his sister that plaintiff might have married (baka nag-asawa,
t.s.n., pp. 5-6, March 18, 1976). However, in the afternoon of the next day (Sunday), his sister told him that Francisco
Cabrera, accompanied by barrio captain Jacinto Manalili of Ligas, Bacoor, Cavite, informed her that plaintiff and Bunag,
Jr. were in Cabrera's house, so that her sister requested him to go and see the plaintiff, which he did, and at the house
of Mrs. Juana de Leon in Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro Manila he met defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr., who told him,
"Pare, the children are here already. Let us settle the matter and have them married."

He conferred with plaintiff who told him that as she had already lost her honor, she would bear her sufferings as Boy Bunag, Jr. and his
father promised they would be married.

Defendants-appellants, on the other hand, deny that defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr. abducted and raped plaintiff-appellant on
September 8, 1973. On the contrary, plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. eloped on that date because of the opposition of
the latter's father to their relationship.

Defendant-appellants claim that defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant had earlier made plans to elope and get married, and
this fact was known to their friends, among them, Architect Chito Rodriguez. The couple made good their plans to elope on the afternoon of
September 8, 1973, when defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., accompanied by his friend Guillermo Ramos, Jr., met plaintiff-appellant and her
officemate named Lydia in the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios Hospital. The foursome then proceeded to (the) aforesaid hospital's canteen
where they had some snacks. Later, Guillermo Ramos, Jr. took Lydia to Quirino Avenue where she could get a ride home, thereby leaving
the defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant alone. According to defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., after Guillermo Ramos, Jr. and
Lydia left, he and plaintiff-appellant took a taxi to the Golden Gate and Flamingo Hotels where they tried to get a room, but these were full.
They finally got a room at the Holiday Hotel, where defendant-appellant registered using his real name and residence certificate number.
Three hours later, the couple check out of the hotel and proceeded to the house of Juana de Leon at Pamplona, Las Piñas, where they
stayed until September 19, 1873. Defendant-appellant claims that bitter disagreements with the plaintiff-appellant over money and the threats
made to his life prompted him to break off their plan to get married.

During this period, defendant-appellant Bunag, Sr. denied having gone to the house of Juan de Leon and telling plaintiff-appellant that she
would be wed to defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. In fact, he phoned Atty. Conrado Adreneda, member of the board of directors of Mandala
Corporation, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr.'s employer, three times between the evening of September 8, 1973 and September 9, 1973
inquiring as to the whereabouts of his son. He came to know about his son's whereabouts when he was told of the couple's elopement late in
the afternoon of September 9, 1973 by his mother Candida Gawaran. He likewise denied having met relatives and emissaries of plaintiff-
appellant and agreeing to her marriage to his son. 3

A complaint for damages for alleged breach of promise to marry was filed by herein private respondent Zenaida B. Cirilo against petitioner Conrado Bunag, Jr. and
his father, Conrado Bunag, Sr., as Civil Case No. N-2028 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIX at Bacoor, Cavite. On August 20, 1983, on a finding, inter alia,
that petitioner had forcibly abducted and raped private respondent, the trial court rendered a decision 4 ordering petitioner Bunag, Jr. to pay private respondent
P80,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, P20,000.00 by way of temperate damages, and P10,000.00 for and as attorney's fees, as well
as the costs of suit. Defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr. was absolved from any and all liability.

Private respondent appealed that portion of the lower court's decision disculpating Conrado Bunag, Sr. from civil liability in this case. On the other hand, the
Bunags, as defendants-appellants, assigned in their appeal several errors allegedly committed by trial court, which were summarized by respondent court as
follows: (1) in finding that defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr. forcibly abducted and raped plaintiff-appellant; (2) in finding that defendants-appellants
promised plaintiff-appellant that she would be wed to defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr.; and (3) in awarding plaintiff-appellant damages for the breach of
defendants-appellants' promise of marriage. 5

As stated at the outset, on May 17, 1991 respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing both appeals and affirming in toto the decision of the trial
court. His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner Bunag, Jr. is before us on a petition for review, contending that (1) respondent court failed to
consider vital exhibits, testimonies and incidents for petitioner's defense, resulting in the misapprehensions of facts and violative of the law on preparation of
judgment; and (2) it erred in the application of the proper law and jurisprudence by holding that there was forcible abduction with rape, not just a simple elopement
and an agreement to marry, and in the award of excessive damages. 6

Petitioner Bunag, Jr. first contends that both the trial and appellate courts failed to take into consideration the alleged fact that he and private respondent had
agreed to marry, and that there was no case of forcible abduction with rape, but one of simple elopement and agreement to marry. It is averred that the agreement
to marry has been sufficiently proven by the testimonies of the witnesses for both parties and the exhibits presented in court.

This submission, therefore, clearly hinges on the credibility of the witnesses and evidence presented by the parties and the weight accorded thereto in the factual
findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. In effect, what petitioner would want this Court to do is to evaluate and analyze anew the evidence, both
testimonial and documentary, presented before and calibrated by the trial court, and as further meticulously reviewed and discussed by respondent court.

The issue raised primarily and ineluctably involves questions of fact. We are, therefore, once again constrained to stress the well-entrenched statutory and
jurisprudential mandate that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are, as a rule, conclusive upon this Court. Only questions of law, distinctly set forth, may be
raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, subject to clearly settled exceptions in case law.

Our jurisdiction in cases brought to us from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to the latter, its findings of fact being
conclusive. This Court has emphatically declared that it is not its function to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing
errors of law that might have been committed by the lower court. Barring, therefore, a showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the
record, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion, such findings must stand, for this Court is not expected or required to
examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties. 7 Neither does the instant case reveal any feature falling within, any of the
exceptions which under our decisional rules may warrant a review of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. On the foregoing considerations and our review
of the records, we sustain the holding of respondent court in favor of private respondent.

Petitioner likewise asserts that since action involves a breach of promise to marry, the trial court erred in awarding damages.
It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the
right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. 8 Generally, therefore, a breach of promise to marry per se is not
actionable, except where the plaintiff has actually incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents thereof.

However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively, under Article
21 of said Code, in relation to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for moral damages. 9 Article 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which leave
so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy
for that untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide for in the statutes. 10

Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts of petitioner in forcibly abducting private respondent and having carnal knowledge with her against
her will, and thereafter promising to marry her in order to escape criminal liability, only to thereafter renege on such promise after cohabiting with her for twenty-
one days, irremissibly constitute acts contrary to morals and good customs. These are grossly insensate and reprehensible transgressions which indisputably
warrant and abundantly justify the award of moral and exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 21 in relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and Article 2229
and 2234 of Civil Code.

Petitioner would, however, belabor the fact that said damages were awarded by the trial court on the basis of a finding that he is guilty of forcible abduction with
rape, despite the prior dismissal of the complaint therefor filed by private respondent with the Pasay City Fiscal's Office.

Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. In other
words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability ex delicto only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and
proximate cause thereof. 11 Hence, extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. 12

In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction with rape was by mere resolution of the fiscal at the preliminary investigation stage. There
is no declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil case might arise did not exist. Consequently, the dismissal did not in any way affect the right
of herein private respondent to institute a civil action arising from the offense because such preliminary dismissal of the penal action did not carry with it the
extinction of the civil action.

The reason most often given for this holding is that the two proceedings involved are not between the same parties. Furthermore, it has long been emphasized,
with continuing validity up to now, that there are different rules as to the competency of witnesses and the quantum of evidence in criminal and civil proceedings. In
a criminal action, the State must prove its case by evidence which shows the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while in a civil action it is sufficient for
the plaintiff to sustain his cause by preponderance of evidence only. 13 Thus, in Rillon, et al. vs. Rillon, 14 we stressed that it is not now necessary that a criminal
prosecution for rape be first instituted and prosecuted to final judgment before a civil action based on said offense in favor of the offended woman can likewise be
instituted and prosecuted to final judgment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, and the assailed judgment and resolution are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J. and Padilla, J., concur.

RODRIGO CONCEPCION, petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and
SPS. NESTOR NICOLAS and ALLEM NICOLAS, respondents.
G.R. No. 120706. January 31, 2000
Facts:

Sometime in 1985 the spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas resided at Pasig City, in an apartment
leased to them by the owner Florence “Bing” Concepcion, who also resided in the same compound
where the apartment was located. Nestor Nicolas was then engaged in the business of supplying
government agencies and private entities with office equipment, appliances and other fixtures.
Florence Concepcion joined this venture. Sometime in the second week of July 1985 Rodrigo
Concepcion, brother of the deceased husband of Florence, angrily accosted Nestor at the latter’s
apartment and accused him of conducting an adulterous relationship with Florence.

Rodrigo threatened Florence over the telephone that should something happen to his sick mother; in
case the latter learned about the affair, he would kill Florence. As a result of this incident, Nestor Nicolas
felt extreme embarrassment and shame to the extent that he could no longer face his neighbors.
Consequently, he was forced to write Rodrigo demanding public apology and payment of damages.
Rodrigo pointedly ignored the demand, for which reason the Nicolas spouses filed a civil suit against
him for damages. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Nestor Nicolas, hence this case.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in granting damages to Nestor Nicolas and his spouse.

Ruling:

According to petitioner, private respondents’ evidence is inconsistent as to time, place and persons who
heard the alleged defamatory statement. The Court finds this to be a gratuitous observation, for the
testimonies of all the witnesses for the respondents are unanimous that the defamatory incident
happened in the afternoon at the front door of the apartment of the Nicolas spouses in the presence of
some friends and neighbors, and later on, with the accusation being repeated in the presence of
Florence, at the terrace of her house. All told, these factual findings provide enough basis in law for the
award of damages by the Court of Appeals in favor of respondents.

The Court reject petitioner’s posture that no legal provision supports such award, the
incident complained of neither falling under Art. 22, 19, nor Art. 26 of the Civil Code. Damages
therefore are allowable for actions against a person’s dignity, such as profane, insulting, humiliating,
scandalous or abusive language. As stated in the Civil Code, moral damages which include physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury, although incapable of pecuniary computation, may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission. There is no
question that private respondent Nestor Nicolas suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings and social humiliation as a proximate result of petitioner’s abusive, scandalous and
insulting language. The decision of the Court of Appeals is therefore affirmed.
 G.R. No. 120706. January 31, 2000

RODRIGO CONCEPCION, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS.

NESTOR NICOLAS and ALLEM NICOLAS, Respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

Petitioner Rodrigo Concepcion assails in this petition for review

on certiorari the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 12 December 1994
which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City ordering
him to pay respondent spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas the sums
of P50,000.00 for moral damages, P25,000.00 for exemplary damages
and P10,000.00 for attorneys fees, plus the costs of suit.* Petitioner claims
absence of factual and legal basis for the award of damages.

The courts a quo found that sometime in 1985 the spouses Nestor Nicolas and
Allem Nicolas resided at No. 51 M. Concepcion St., San Joaquin, Pasig City, in
an apartment leased to them by the owner thereof, Florence "Bing"
Concepcion, who also resided in the same compound where the apartment was
located. Nestor Nicolas was then engaged in the business of supplying
government agencies and private entities with office equipment, appliances
and other fixtures on a cash purchase or credit basis. Florence Concepcion
joined this venture by contributing capital on condition that after her capital
investment was returned to her, any profit earned would be divided equally
between her and Nestor.

Sometime in the second week of July 1985 Rodrigo Concepcion, brother of the
deceased husband of Florence, angrily accosted Nestor at the latters
apartment and accused him of conducting an adulterous relationship with
Florence. He shouted, "Hoy Nestor, kabit ka ni Bing! x x x Binigyan ka pa pala
ni Bing Concepcion ng P100,000.00 para umakyat ng Baguio. Pagkaakyat mo
at ng asawa mo doon ay bababa ka uli para magkasarilinan kayo ni Bing."1 cräläwvirt ualib räry

To clarify matters, Nestor went with Rodrigo, upon the latters dare, to see
some relatives of the Concepcion family who allegedly knew about the
relationship. However, those whom they were able to see denied knowledge of
the alleged affair. The same accusation was hurled by Rodrigo against Nestor
when the two (2) confronted Florence at the terrace of her residence. Florence
denied the imputations and Rodrigo backtracked saying that he just heard the
rumor from a relative. Thereafter, however, Rodrigo called Florence over the
telephone reiterating his accusation and threatening her that should something
happen to his sick mother, in case the latter learned about the affair, he would
kill Florence.

As a result of this incident, Nestor Nicolas felt extreme embarrassment and

shame to the extent that he could no longer face his neighbors. Florence
Concepcion also ceased to do business with him by not contributing capital
anymore so much so that the business venture of the Nicolas spouses declined
as they could no longer cope with their commitments to their clients and
customers. To make matters worse, Allem Nicolas started to doubt Nestors
fidelity resulting in frequent bickerings and quarrels during which Allem even
expressed her desire to leave her husband. Consequently, Nestor was forced
to write Rodrigo demanding public apology and payment of damages. Rodrigo
pointedly ignored the demand, for which reason the Nicolas spouses filed a
civil suit against him for damages.

In his defense, Rodrigo denied that he maligned Nestor by accusing him

publicly of being Florence's lover. He reasoned out that he only desired to
protect the name and reputation of the Concepcion family which was why he
sought an appointment with Nestor through Florence's son Roncali to ventilate
his feelings about the matter. Initially, he discussed with Nestor certain
aspects of the joint venture in a friendly and amiable manner, and then only
casually asked the latter about his rumored affair with his sister-in-law.

In contesting the decision of the appellate court, petitioner Rodrigo Concepcion

raises the following issues: (a) whether there is basis in law for the award of
damages to private respondents, the Nicolas spouses; and, (b) whether there
is basis to review the facts which are of weight and influence but which were
overlooked and misapplied by the respondent appellate court.

Petitioner argues that in awarding damages to private respondents, the Court

of Appeals was without legal basis to justify its verdict. The alleged act
imputed to him by respondent spouses does not fall under Arts. 262 and
22193 of the Civil Code since it does not constitute libel, slander, or any other
form of defamation. Neither does it involve prying into the privacy of anothers
residence or meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relation of
another. Petitioner also insists that certain facts and circumstances of the case
were manifestly overlooked, misunderstood or glossed over by respondent
court which, if considered, would change the verdict. Impugning the credibility
of the witnesses for private respondents and the manner by which the
testimonial evidence was analyzed and evaluated by the trial court, petitioner
criticized the appellate court for not taking into account the fact that the trial
judge who penned the decision was in no position to observe first-hand the
demeanor of the witnesses of respondent spouses as he was not the original
judge who heard the case. Thus, his decision rendered was flawed.
The Court has ruled often enough that its jurisdiction in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited to
reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings complained
of are devoid of support by the evidence on record or the assailed judgment is
based on misapprehension of facts.4 The reason behind this is that the
Supreme Court respects the findings of the trial court on the issue of credibility
of witnesses, considering that it is in a better position to decide the question,
having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying during the trial.5 Thus it accords the highest respect, even
finality, to the evaluation made by the lower court of the testimonies of the
witnesses presented before it.

The Court is also aware of the long settled rule that when the issue is on the
credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will not generally disturb the findings
of the trial court; however, its factual findings may nonetheless be reversed if
by the evidence on record or lack of it, it appears that the trial court erred.6 In
this respect, the Court is not generally inclined to review the findings of fact of
the Court of Appeals unless its findings are erroneous, absurd, speculative,
conjectural, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse of discretion, or contrary to
the findings culled by the trial court of origin.7 This rule of course cannot be
unqualifiedly applied to a case where the judge who penned the decision was
not the one who heard the case, because not having heard the testimonies
himself, the judge would not be in a better position than the appellate courts
to make such determination.8 cräläwvirt uali brä ry

However, it is also axiomatic that the fact alone that the judge who heard the
evidence was not the one who rendered the judgment but merely relied on the
record of the case does not render his judgment erroneous or irregular. This is
so even if the judge did not have the fullest opportunity to weigh the
testimonies not having heard all the witnesses speak nor observed their
deportment and manner of testifying. Thus the Court generally will not find
any misapprehension of facts as it can be fairly assumed under the principle of
regularity of performance of duties of public officers that the transcripts of
stenographic notes were thoroughly scrutinized and evaluated by the judge
himself.

Has sufficient reason then been laid before us by petitioner to engender doubt
as to the factual findings of the court a quo? We find none. A painstaking
review of the evidence on record convinces us not to disturb the judgment
appealed from. The fact that the case was handled by different judges brooks
no consideration at all, for preponderant evidence consistent with their claim
for damages has been adduced by private respondents as to foreclose a
reversal. Otherwise, everytime a Judge who heard a case, wholly or partially,
dies or lives the service, the case cannot be decided and a new trial will have
to be conducted. That would be absurb; inconceivable.

According to petitioner, private respondents evidence is inconsistent as to

time, place and persons who heard the alleged defamatory statement. We find
this to be a gratuitous observation, for the testimonies of all the witnesses for
the respondents are unanimous that the defamatory incident happened in the
afternoon at the front door of the apartment of the Nicolas spouses in the
presence of some friends and neighbors, and later on, with the accusation
being repeated in the presence of Florence, at the terrace of her house. That
this finding appears to be in conflict with the allegation in the complaint as to
the time of the incident bears no momentous significance since an allegation in
a pleading is not evidence; it is a declaration that has to be proved by
evidence. If evidence contrary to the allegation is presented, such evidence
controls, not the allegation in the pleading itself, although admittedly it may
dent the credibility of the witnesses. But not in the instant case.

It is also argued by petitioner that private respondents failed to present as

witnesses the persons they named as eyewitnesses to the incident and that
they presented instead one Romeo Villaruel who was not named as a possible
witness during the pre-trial proceedings. Charging that Villaruels testimony is
not credible and should never have been accorded any weight at all, petitioner
capitalizes on the fact that a great distance separates Villaruels residence and
that of private respondents as reflected in their house numbers, the formers
number being No. 223 M. Concepcion St., while that of the Nicolas spouses,
No. 51 along the same street. This being so, petitioner concludes, Villaruel
could not have witnessed the ugly confrontation between Rodrigo and Nestor.
It appears however from Villaruels testimony that at the time of the incident
complained of, he was staying in an apartment inside the compound adjacent
to that of the Nicolas spouses. Whether his apartment was then numbered 223
is not stated. What is definite and clear is his statement that he and Nestor
Nicolas were neighbors on 14 July 1985.

There are other inconsistencies pointed out by petitioner in the testimonial

evidence of private respondents but these are not of such significance as to
alter the finding of facts of the lower court. Minor inconsistencies even
guarantee truthfulness and candor, for they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed
testimony.9Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses with on minor
details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of their
testimonies.10cräläwvirtua lib räry

All told, these factual findings provide enough basis in law for the award of
damages by the Court of Appeals in favor of respondents. We reject
petitioners posture that no legal provision supports such award, the incident
complained of neither falling under Art. 2219 nor Art. 26 of the Civil Code. It
does not need further elucidation that the incident charged of petitioner was
no less than an invasion on the right of respondent Nestor as a person. The
philosophy behind Art. 26 underscores the necessity for its inclusion in our civil
law. The Code Commission stressed in no uncertain terms that the human
personality must be exalted. The sacredness of human personality is a
concomitant consideration of every plan for human amelioration. The
touchstone of every system of law, of the culture and civilization of every
country, is how far it dignifies man. If the statutes insufficiently protect a
person from being unjustly humiliated, in short, if human personality is not
exalted - then the laws are indeed defective.11 Thus, under this article, the
rights of persons are amply protected, and damages are provided for violations
of a persons dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind.

It is petitioners position that the act imputed to him does not constitute any of
those enumerated in Arts 26 and 2219. In this respect, the law is clear. The
violations mentioned in the codal provisions are not exclusive but are merely
examples and do not preclude other similar or analogous acts. Damages
therefore are allowable for actions against a persons dignity, such as profane,
insulting, humiliating, scandalous or abusive language.12 Under Art. 2217 of
the Civil Code, moral damages which include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury, although incapable of
pecuniary computation, may be recovered if they are the proximate result of
the defendants wrongful act or omission.

There is no question that private respondent Nestor Nicolas suffered mental

anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation as a
proximate result of petitioners abusive, scandalous and insulting language.
Petitioner attempted to exculpate himself by claiming that he made an
appointment to see Nestor through a nephew, Roncali, the son of Florence, so
he could talk with Nestor to find out the truth about his rumored illicit
relationship with Florence. He said that he wanted to protect his nephews and
nieces and the name of his late brother (Florences husband).13 How he could
be convinced by some way other than a denial by Nestor, and how he would
protect his nephews and nieces and his familys name if the rumor were true,
he did not say. Petitioner admitted that he had already talked with Florence
herself over the telephone about the issue, with the latter vehemently denying
the alleged immoral relationship. Yet, he could not let the matter rest on the
strength of the denial of his sister-in-law. He had to go and confront Nestor,
even in public, to the latter's humiliation.

Testifying that until that very afternoon of his meeting with Nestor he never
knew respondent, had never seen him before, and was unaware of his
business partnership with Florence, his subsequent declarations on the witness
stand however belie this lack of knowledge about the business venture for in
that alleged encounter he asked Nestor how the business was going, what
were the collection problems, and how was the money being spent. He even
knew that the name of the business, Floral Enterprises, was coined by
combining the first syllables of the name Florence and Allem, the name of
Nestors wife. He said that he casually asked Nestor about the rumor between
him and Florence which Nestor denied. Not content with such denial, he dared
Nestor to go with him to speak to his relatives who were the source of his
information. Nestor went with him and those they were able to talk to denied
the rumor.

We cannot help noting this inordinate interest of petitioner to know the truth
about the rumor and why he was not satisfied with the separate denials made
by Florence and Nestor. He had to confront Nestor face to face, invade the
latters privacy and hurl defamatory words at him in the presence of his wife
and children, neighbors and friends, accusing him - a married man - of having
an adulterous relationship with Florence. This definitely caused private
respondent much shame and embarrassment that he could no longer show
himself in his neighborhood without feeling distraught and debased. This
brought dissension and distrust in his family where before there was none.
This is why a few days after the incident, he communicated with petitioner
demanding public apology and payment of damages, which petitioner ignored.

If indeed the confrontation as described by private respondents did not actually happen, then
there would have been no cause or motive at all for them to consult with their lawyer,
immediately demand an apology, and not obtaining a response from petitioner, file an action for
damages against the latter. That they decided to go to court to seek redress bespeaks of the
validity of their claim. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that while explaining at great
length why Florence Concepcion testified against him, petitioner never advanced any reason why
the Nicolas spouses, persons he never knew and with whom he had no dealings in the past,
would sue him for damages. It also has not escaped our attention that, faced with a lawsuit by
private respondents, petitioner sent his lawyer, a certain Atty. Causapin, to talk not to the
Nicolas spouses but to Florence, asking her not to be involved in the case, otherwise her name
would be messily dragged into it. Quite succinctly, Florence told the lawyer that it was not for
her to decide and that she could not do anything about it as she was not a party to the court
case.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Br. 167, holding Rodrigo
Concepcion liable to the spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas for P50,000.00 as moral
damages, P25,000.00 for exemplary damages, P10,000.00 for attorney's fees, plus costs of suit,
is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION v. JESICHRIS
MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, GR No. 195549, 2014-09-03
Facts:
[Respondent] Jesichris Manufacturing Company ([respondent] for short) filed this present complaint for
damages for unfair competition with prayer for permanent injunction to enjoin [petitioner] Willaware
Products Corporation ([petitioner] for short) from... manufacturing and distributing plastic-made automotive
parts similar to those of [respondent].
[Respondent] alleged that it is a duly registered partnership engaged in the manufacture and distribution
of plastic and metal products
[Respondent] further alleged that in view of the physical proximity of [petitioner's] office to [respondent's]
office, and in view of the fact that some of the [respondent's] employees had transferred to [petitioner],
[petitioner] had developed familiarity with [respondent's]... products, especially its plastic-made automotive
parts.
That sometime in November 2000, [respondent] discovered that [petitioner] had been manufacturing and
distributing the same automotive parts with exactly similar design, same material and colors but was
selling these products at a lower price as [respondent's] plastic-made... automotive parts and to the same
customers.
Issues:
In essence, the issue for our resolution is: whether or not petitioner committed acts amounting to unfair
competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code.
Ruling:
The concept of "unfair competition" under Article 28 is very much broader than that covered by intellectual
property laws. Under the present article, which follows the extended concept of "unfair competition" in
American jurisdictions, the term covers even cases of discovery of... trade secrets of a competitor, bribery
of his employees, misrepresentation of all kinds, interference with the fulfillment of a competitor's
contracts, or any malicious interference with the latter's business.
Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that "unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial
enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust,
oppressive or high-handed method shall give rise to a right of action... by the person who thereby suffers
damage."
In order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it must have two characteristics: (1) it must involve an injury
to a competitor or trade rival, and (2) it must involve acts which are characterized as "contrary to good
conscience," or "shocking to judicial sensibilities," or... otherwise unlawful; in the language of our law,
these include force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed
method. The public injury or interest is a minor factor; the essence of the matter appears to be a private
wrong perpetrated by... unconscionable means.
Here, both characteristics are present.
First, both parties are competitors or trade rivals, both being engaged in the manufacture of plastic-made
automotive parts.
Second, the acts of the petitioner were clearly "contrary to good conscience" as petitioner admitted having
employed respondent's former... employees, deliberately copied respondent's products and even went to
the extent of selling these products to respondent's customers.
As aptly observed by the court a quo, the testimony of petitioner's witnesses indicate that it acted in bad
faith in competing with the business of respondent, to wit:
In sum, petitioner is guilty of unfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code.
Principles:
In order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it must have two characteristics: (1) it must involve an injury
to a competitor or trade rival, and (2) it must involve acts which are characterized as "contrary to good
conscience," or "shocking to judicial sensibilities," or... otherwise unlawful; in the language of our law,
these include force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed
method. The public injury or interest is a minor factor; the essence of the matter appears to be a private
wrong perpetrated by... unconscionable means.

FULL CASE
G.R. No. 195549 September 3, 2014
WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
JESICHRIS MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the
Decision1 dated November 24, 2010 and Resolution2 dated February 10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 86744.

The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), are as follows:

[Respondent] Jesichris Manufacturing Company ([respondent] for short) filed this present complaint for damages for
unfair competition with prayer for permanent injunction to enjoin [petitioner] Willaware Products Corporation
([petitioner] for short) from manufacturing and distributing plastic-made automotive parts similar to those of
[respondent].

[Respondent] alleged that it is a duly registeredpartnership engaged in the manufacture and distribution of plastic
and metal products, with principal office at No. 100 Mithi Street, Sampalukan, Caloocan City. Since its registration in
1992, [respondent] has been manufacturing in its Caloocan plant and distributing throughout the Philippines plastic-
made automotive parts. [Petitioner], on the other hand, which is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of
kitchenware items made of plastic and metal has its office near that of [respondent]. [Respondent] further alleged
that in view of the physical proximity of [petitioner’s] office to [respondent’s] office, and in view of the fact that some
of the [respondent’s] employeeshad transferred to [petitioner], [petitioner] had developed familiarity with
[respondent’s] products, especially its plastic-made automotive parts.

That sometime in November 2000, [respondent] discovered that [petitioner] had been manufacturing and distributing
the same automotive parts with exactly similar design, same material and colors but was selling these products at a
lower price as [respondent’s] plastic-made automotive parts and to the same customers.

[Respondent] alleged that it had originated the use of plastic in place of rubber in the manufacture ofautomotive
underchassis parts such as spring eye bushing, stabilizer bushing, shock absorberbushing, center bearing cushions,
among others. [Petitioner’s] manufacture of the same automotive parts with plastic materialwas taken from
[respondent’s] idea of using plastic for automotive parts. Also, [petitioner] deliberately copied [respondent’s]
products all of which acts constitute unfair competition, is and are contrary to law, morals, good customs and public
policy and have caused [respondent] damages in terms oflost and unrealizedprofits in the amount of TWO MILLION
PESOS as of the date of [respondent’s] complaint.

Furthermore, [petitioner’s] tortuous conduct compelled [respondent] to institute this action and thereby to incur
expenses in the way of attorney’s fees and other litigation expenses in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (₱500,000.00).

In its Answer, [petitioner] denies all the allegations of the [respondent] except for the following facts: that it is
engaged in the manufacture and distribution of kitchenware items made of plastic and metal and that there’s
physical proximity of [petitioner’s] office to [respondent]’s office, and that someof [respondent’s] employees had
transferred to [petitioner] and that over the years [petitioner] had developed familiarity with [respondent’s] products,
especially its plastic made automotive parts.

As its Affirmative Defenses, [petitioner] claims that there can be no unfair competition as the plastic-made
automotive parts are mere reproductions of original parts and their construction and composition merely conforms to
the specificationsof the original parts of motor vehicles they intend to replace. Thus, [respondent] cannot claim that it
"originated" the use of plastic for these automotive parts. Even assuming for the sake of argument that [respondent]
indeed originated the use of these plastic automotive parts, it still has no exclusive right to use, manufacture and sell
these as it has no patent over these products. Furthermore, [respondent] is not the only exclusive manufacturer of
these plastic-made automotive parts as there are other establishments which were already openly selling them to
the public.3

After trial on the merits, the RTC ruled in favor of respondent. It ruled that petitioner clearly invaded the rights or
interest of respondent by deliberately copying and performing acts amounting to unfair competition. The RTC further
opined that under the circumstances, in order for respondent’s property rights to be preserved, petitioner’s acts of
manufacturing similar plastic-made automotive parts such as those of respondent’s and the selling of the
sameproducts to respondent’s customers, which it cultivated over the years, will have to be enjoined. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the defendant liable to plaintiff Two Million (₱2,000,000.00)
Pesos, as actual damages, One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos as attorney’s fees and One Hundred
Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos for exemplary damages. The court hereby permanently [enjoins] defendant from
manufacturing the plastic-made automotive parts as those manufactured by plaintiffs.

SO ORDERED.4

Thus, petitioner appealed to the CA.

On appeal, petitioner asserts that ifthere is no intellectual property protecting a good belonging to another,the
copying thereof for production and selling does not add up to unfair competition as competition is promoted by law
to benefit consumers. Petitioner further contends that it did not lure away respondent’s employees to get trade
secrets. It points out that the plastic spare parts sold by respondent are traded in the market and the copying of
these can be done by simplybuying a sample for a mold to be made.

Conversely, respondent averred that copyright and patent registrations are immaterial for an unfair competition case
to prosper under Article 28 of the Civil Code. It stresses that the characteristics of unfair competition are present in
the instant case as the parties are trade rivals and petitioner’s acts are contrary to good conscience for deliberately
copying its products and employing its former employees.

In a Decision dated November 24,2010, the CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC. Relevant portions
of said decision read:

Despite the evidence showing thatWillaware took dishonest steps in advancing its business interest against
Jesichris, however, the Court finds no basis for the award by the RTC of actual damages. One is entitled to actual
damages as one has duly proven. The testimony of Quejada, who was engaged by Jesichris in 2001 to audit its
business, only revealed that there was a discrepancy between the sales of Jesichris from 2001 to 2002. No amount
was mentioned. As for Exhibit "Q," which is a copy of the comparative income statement of Jesichris for 1999-2002,
it shows the decline of the sales in 2002 in comparison with those made in 2001 but it does not disclose if this
pertains to the subject automotive parts or to the other products of Jesichris like plates.

In any event, it was clearly shown that there was unfair competition on the part of Willaware that prejudiced
Jesichris. It is only proper that nominal damages be awarded in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱200,000.00) in order to recognize and vindicate Jesichris’ rights. The RTC’s award of attorney’s fees and
exemplary damages is also maintained.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated April 15, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City,
Branch 131, in Civil Case No. C-19771 is hereby MODIFIED. The award of Two Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00)
actual damages is deleted and in its place, Two Hundred Thousand Pesos nominal damages is awarded.

SO ORDERED.5

Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for reconsideration. However, the same was denied for lack of merit by the CA in a
Resolution dated February 10, 2011.

Hence, the present Petition for Review wherein petitioner raises the following issues for our resolution:

(1) Whether or not there is unfair competition under human relations when the parties are not competitors
and there is actually no damage on the part of Jesichris?

(2) Consequently, if there is no unfair competition, should there be moral damages and attorney’s fees?

(3) Whether or not the addition of nominal damages is proper although no rights have been established?

(4) If ever the right of Jesichris refersto its copyright on automotive parts, should it be considered in the light
of the said copyrights were considered to be void by no less than this Honorable Court in SC GR No.
161295?

(5) If the right involved is "goodwill" then the issue is: whether or not Jesichris has established "goodwill?"6

In essence, the issue for our resolution is: whether or not petitioner committed acts amounting to unfair competition
under Article 28 of the Civil Code.

Prefatorily, we would like to stress that the instant case falls under Article 28 of the Civil Code on humanrelations,
and not unfair competition under Republic Act No. 8293,7 as the present suit is a damage suit and the products are
not covered by patent registration. A fortiori, the existence of patent registration is immaterial in the present case.

The concept of "unfair competition"under Article 28 is very much broader than that covered by intellectual property
laws. Under the present article, which follows the extended concept of "unfair competition" in American jurisdictions,
the term coverseven cases of discovery of trade secrets of a competitor, bribery of his employees,
misrepresentation of all kinds, interference with the fulfillment of a competitor’s contracts, or any malicious
interference with the latter’s business.8

With that settled, we now come to the issue of whether or not petitioner committed acts amounting tounfair
competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code.

We find the petition bereft of merit.

Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that "unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in
labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed
method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage."
From the foregoing, it is clear thatwhat is being sought to be prevented is not competitionper sebut the use of unjust,
oppressive or high- handed methods which may deprive others of a fair chance to engage in business or to earn a
living. Plainly,what the law prohibits is unfair competition and not competition where the means usedare fair and
legitimate.

In order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it must have two characteristics: (1) it must involve an injury to a
competitor or trade rival, and (2) it must involve acts which are characterized as "contrary to good conscience," or
"shocking to judicial sensibilities," or otherwise unlawful; in the language of our law, these include force, intimidation,
deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method. The public injury or interest is a minor
factor; the essence of the matter appears to be a private wrong perpetrated by unconscionable means.9

Here, both characteristics are present.

First, both parties are competitors or trade rivals, both being engaged in the manufacture of plastic-made automotive
parts. Second, the acts of the petitioner were clearly "contrary to good conscience" as petitioner admitted having
employed respondent’s formeremployees, deliberately copied respondent’s products and even went to the extent of
selling these products to respondent’s customers.10

To bolster this point, the CA correctly pointed out that petitioner’s hiring of the former employees of respondent and
petitioner’s act of copying the subject plastic parts of respondent were tantamount to unfair competition, viz.:

The testimonies of the witnesses indicate that [petitioner] was in bad faith in competing with the business of
[respondent]. [Petitioner’s] acts can be characterized as executed with mischievous subtle calculation. To illustrate,
1âw phi 1

in addition to the findings of the RTC, the Court observes that [petitioner] is engaged in the production of plastic
kitchenware previous to its manufacturing of plasticautomotive spare parts, it engaged the services of the then mold
setter and maintenance operator of [respondent], De Guzman, while he was employed by the latter. De Guzman
was hired by [petitioner] in order to adjust its machinery since quality plastic automotive spare parts were not being
made. It baffles the Court why [petitioner] cannot rely onits own mold setter and maintenance operator to remedy its
problem. [Petitioner’s] engagement of De Guzman indicates that it is banking on his experience gained from working
for [respondent].

Another point we observe is that Yabut, who used to be a warehouse and delivery man of [respondent], was fired
because he was blamed of spying in favor of [petitioner]. Despite this accusation, he did not get angry. Later on, he
applied for and was hired by [petitioner] for the same position he occupied with [respondent]. These sequence of
events relating to his employment by [petitioner] is suspect too like the situation with De Guzman.11

Thus, it is evident that petitioner isengaged in unfair competition as shown by his act of suddenly shifting his
business from manufacturing kitchenware to plastic-made automotive parts; his luring the employees of the
respondent to transfer to his employ and trying to discover the trade secrets of the respondent.12

Moreover, when a person starts an opposing place of business, not for the sake of profit to himself, but regardless of
loss and for the sole purpose of driving his competitor out of business so that later on he can take advantage of the
effects of his malevolent purpose, he is guilty of wanton wrong.13 As aptly observed by the courta quo, the testimony
of petitioner’s witnesses indicate that it acted in bad faith in competing with the business of respondent, to wit:
[Petitioner], thru its General Manager, William Salinas, Jr., admitted that it was never engaged in the business of
plastic-made automotive parts until recently, year 2000:

Atty. Bautista: The business name of Willaware Product Corporation is kitchenware, it is (sic) not? Manufacturer of
kitchenware and distributor ofkitchenware, is it not? Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir. Atty. Bautista: And you said you have
known the [respondent] Jesichris Manufacturing Co., you have known it to be manufacturing plastic automotive
products, is it not? Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir. Atty. Bautista: In fact, you have been (sic) physically become familiar with
these products, plastic automotive products of Jesichris? Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir.

How [petitioner] was able to manufacture the same products, in terms of color, size, shape and composition as
those sold by Jesichris was due largely to the sudden transfer ofJesichris’ employees to Willaware.

Atty. Bautista: Since when have you been familiar with Jesichris Manufacturing Company?
Mr. Salinas: Since they transferred there (sic) our place.

Atty. Bautista: And that was in what year? Mr. Salinas: Maybe four (4) years. I don’t know the exact date.

Atty. Bautista: And some of the employees of Jesichris Manufacturing Co. have transferred to your company, is it
not?

Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir.

Atty. Bautista: How many, more or less?

Mr. Salinas: More or less, three (3).

Atty. Bautista: And when, in what year or month did they transfer to you?

Mr. Salinas: First, November 1.

Atty. Bautista: Year 2000?

Mr. Salinas: Yes sir. And then the other maybe February, this year. And the other one, just one month ago.

That [petitioner] was clearly outto take [respondent] out of business was buttressed by the testimony of [petitioner’s]
witness, Joel Torres:

Q: Are you familiar with the [petitioner], Willaware Product Corporation?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Will you kindly inform this court where is the office of this Willaware Product Corporation (sic)?

A: At Mithi Street, Caloocan City, sir.

Q: And Mr. Witness, sometime second Saturday of January 2001, will you kindly inform this court what unusual
even (sic) transpired between you and Mr. Salinas on said date?

A: There was, sir.

Q: What is that?

A: Sir, I was walking at that time together with my wife going to the market and then I passed by the place where
they were having a drinking spree, sir.

Q: You mentioned they, who were they who were drinking at that time?

A: I know one Jun Molina, sir.

Q: And who else was there?

A: William Salinas, sir.

Q: And will you kindly inform us what happened when you spotted upon them drinking?

A: Jun Molina called me, sir.

Q: And what happened after that?

A: At that time, he offered mea glass of wine and before I was able to drink the wine, Mr. Salinas uttered something,
sir.

Q: And what were those words uttered by Mr. Salinas to you?

A: "O, ano naapektuhan na kayo sa ginaya (sic) ko sa inyo?"

Q: And what did you do after that, after hearing those words?

A: And he added these words, sir. "sabihin mo sa amo mo, dalawang taon na lang pababagsakin ko na siya."

Q: Alright, hearing those words, will you kindly tell this court whom did you gather to be referred to as your "amo"?

A: Mr. Jessie Ching, sir.14

In sum, petitioner is guilty of unfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code.

However, since the award of Two Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00) in actual damages had been deleted and in its
place Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00) in nominal damages is awarded, the attorney's fees should
concomitantly be modified and lowered to Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00).

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 24, 2010 and Resolution dated
February 10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86744 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
that the award of attorney's fees be lowered to Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00).

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN* MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairerson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court's Division.
Hing vs. Choachuy
Case Digest: Hing vs. Choachuy

FACTS:

Sometime in April 2005, Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (owned by Choachuy’s) filed a
case for Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining
Order against the Hing’s. The latter claimed that the Hing’s constructed a fence without a valid
permit and that it would destroy the walls of their building. The court denied the application
for lack of evidence. So in order to get evidences for the case, on June 2005, Choachuy
illegally set-up two video surveillance cameras facing the Hing’s property. Their employees
even took pictures of the said construction of the fence. The Hing’s then filed a case against
the Choachuy’s for violating their right to privacy. On October 2005, the RTC issued a order
granting the application of the Hing’s for TRO and directed the Choachuy’s to remove the two
video surveillance cameras they installed. The Choachuy’s appealed the case to the Court of
Appeals and the RTC’s decision was annulled and set aside. The Hing’s then raised the case
to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the installation of two video surveillance cameras of Choachuy’s
violated the Hing’s right to privacy.

HELD:

Such act of the Choachuy’s violated the right of privacy of the Hing’s under Article 26(1)
prohibiting the “prying into the privacy of another’s residence.” Although it is a business
office and not a residence, the owner has the right to exclude the public or deny them access.
 G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013

SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING, Petitioners, v. ALEXANDER

CHOACHUY, SR. AND ALLAN CHOACHUY, Respondents.
DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

“The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for [one’s] personality as a unique
individual whose claim to privacy and [non]-interference demands respect.”1

This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the July 10, 2007 Decision3 and the
September 11, 2007 Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01473.

Factual Antecedents

On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Bill and Victoria Hing filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City a
Complaint5 for Injunction and Damages with prayer for issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction/Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO), docketed as Civil Case MAN-5223 and raffled to Branch 28, against respondents Alexander
Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy.

Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land (Lot 1900-B) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 42817 situated in Barangay Basak, City of Mandaue, Cebu;6 that respondents are the owners of Aldo Development
& Resources, Inc. (Aldo) located at Lots 1901 and 1900-C, adjacent to the property of petitioners;7 that respondents
constructed an auto-repair shop building (Aldo Goodyear Servitec) on Lot 1900-C; that in April 2005, Aldo filed a case
against petitioners for Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction/TRO, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-
5125;8 that in that case, Aldo claimed that petitioners were constructing a fence without a valid permit and that the said
construction would destroy the wall of its building, which is adjacent to petitioners’ property;9 that the court, in that case,
denied Aldo’s application for preliminary injunction for failure to substantiate its allegations;10 that, in order to get evidence
to support the said case, respondents on June 13, 2005 illegally set-up and installed on the building of Aldo Goodyear
Servitec two video surveillance cameras facing petitioners’ property;11 that respondents, through their employees and
without the consent of petitioners, also took pictures of petitioners’ on-going construction;12 and that the acts of respondents
violate petitioners’ right to privacy.13 Thus, petitioners prayed that respondents be ordered to remove the video surveillance
cameras and enjoined from conducting illegal surveillance.14

In their Answer with Counterclaim,15 respondents claimed that they did not install the video surveillance cameras,16 nor did
they order their employees to take pictures of petitioners’ construction.17 They also clarified that they are not the owners of
Aldo but are mere stockholders.18

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On October 18, 2005, the RTC issued an Order19 granting the application for a TRO. The dispositive portion of the said
Order reads: c ralavvonl inelawl ibra ry

WHEREFORE, the application for a [T]emporary [R]estraining [O]rder or a [W]rit of [P]reliminary [I]njunction is
granted. Upon the filing and approval of a bond by [petitioners], which the Court sets at P50,000.00, let a [W]rit of
[P]reliminary [I]njunction issue against the [respondents] Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy. They are hereby
directed to immediately remove the revolving camera that they installed at the left side of their building overlooking the side
of [petitioners’] lot and to transfer and operate it elsewhere at the back where [petitioners’] property can no longer be
viewed within a distance of about 2-3 meters from the left corner of Aldo Servitec, facing the road.

IT IS SO ORDERED.20

Respondents moved for a reconsideration21 but the RTC denied the same in its Order22 dated February 6, 2006.23 Thus: cralavvonline lawlib rary

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Issue a [W]rit of [P]reliminary [I]njunction
in consonance with the Order dated 18 October 2005.

IT IS SO ORDERED.24 nadcralavvo nline lawlib rary

Aggrieved, respondents filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari25 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with application for a
TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On July 10, 2007, the CA issued its Decision26 granting the Petition for Certiorari. The CA ruled that the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction was issued with grave abuse of discretion because petitioners failed to show a clear and unmistakable right to an
injunctive writ.27 The CA explained that the right to privacy of residence under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code was not
violated since the property subject of the controversy is not used as a residence.28 The CA also said that since respondents
are not the owners of the building, they could not have installed video surveillance cameras.29 They are mere stockholders of
Aldo, which has a separate juridical personality.30 Thus, they are not the proper parties.31 The falloreads: cra lavvonli nelawlib ra ry

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us GRANTING the petition filed in this
case. The assailed orders dated October 18, 2005 and February 6, 2006 issued by the respondent judge are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.32 nadcralavvonl inelawl ibra ry

Issues

Hence, this recourse by petitioners arguing that: cralavvon linelawl ibra ry

I.

THE X X X [CA] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE THE ORDERS OF THE [RTC] DATED
18 OCTOBER 2005 AND 6 FEBRUARY 2006 HOLDING THAT THEY WERE ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

II.

THE X X X [CA] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER SPOUSES HING ARE NOT ENTITLED
TO THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ON THE GROUND THAT THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL
AND CIVIL RIGHT TO PRIVACY DESPITE THE FACTUAL FINDINGS [OF] THE RTC, WHICH RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY FAILED
TO REFUTE, THAT THE ILLEGALLY INSTALLED SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS OF RESPONDENTS CHOACH[U]Y WOULD CAPTURE
THE PRIVATE ACTIVITIES OF PETITIONER SPOUSES HING, THEIR CHILDREN AND EMPLOYEES.

III.

THE X X X [CA] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT SINCE THE OWNER OF THE BUILDING IS ALDO
DEVELOPMENT AND RESOURCES, INC. THEN TO SUE RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY CONSTITUTE[S] A PURPORTEDLY
UNWARRANTED PIERCING OF THE CORPORATE VEIL.

IV.

THE X X X [CA] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT IGNORED THE SERIOUS FORMAL DEFICIENCIES OF BOTH THE
PETITION AND THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED 15 MARCH 2006 OF RESPONDENT[S] CHOACH[U]Y AND GAVE
X X X THEM DUE COURSE AND CONSIDERATION.33

Essentially, the issues boil down to (1) whether there is a violation of petitioners’ right to privacy, and (2) whether
respondents are the proper parties to this suit.

Petitioners’ Arguments

Petitioners insist that they are entitled to the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction because respondents’ installation of
a stationary camera directly facing petitioners’ property and a revolving camera covering a significant portion of the same
property constitutes a violation of petitioners’ right to privacy.34 Petitioners cite Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, which enjoins
persons from prying into the private lives of others.35 Although the said provision pertains to the privacy of another’s
residence, petitioners opine that it includes business offices, citing Professor Arturo M. Tolentino.36 Thus, even assuming
arguendo that petitioners’ property is used for business, it is still covered by the said provision.37

As to whether respondents are the proper parties to implead in this case, petitioners claim that respondents and Aldo are one
and the same, and that respondents only want to hide behind Aldo’s corporate fiction.38 They point out that if respondents
are not the real owners of the building, where the video surveillance cameras were installed, then they had no business
consenting to the ocular inspection conducted by the court.39

Respondents’ Arguments

Respondents, on the other hand, echo the ruling of the CA that petitioners cannot invoke their right to privacy since the
property involved is not used as a residence.40 Respondents maintain that they had nothing to do with the installation of the
video surveillance cameras as these were installed by Aldo, the registered owner of the building,41 as additional security for
its building. 42 Hence, they were wrongfully impleaded in this case.43

Our Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

The right to privacy is the right to be let alone.

The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution44 and in our laws. It is defined as “the right to be free from unwarranted
exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into one’s private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s
ordinary sensibilities.”45 It is the right of an individual “to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted
interference by the public in matters in which the public is not necessarily concerned.”46 Simply put, the right to privacy is
“the right to be let alone.”47

The Bill of Rights guarantees the people’s right to privacy and protects them against the State’s abuse of power. In this
regard, the State recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their houses. No one, not even the State, except “in case
of overriding social need and then only under the stringent procedural safeguards,” can disturb them in the privacy of their
homes.48

The right to privacy under Article 26(1)

of the Civil Code covers business offices
where the public are excluded therefrom
and only certain individuals are allowed
to enter.

Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an individual’s right to privacy and provides a legal remedy
against abuses that may be committed against him by other individuals. It states: cralavvonlinelaw libra ry

Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action
for damages, prevention and other relief: c ralavvonl inelawl ibra ry

(1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence; chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry

xxxx

This provision recognizes that a man’s house is his castle, where his right to privacy cannot be denied or even restricted by
others. It includes “any act of intrusion into, peeping or peering inquisitively into the residence of another without the
consent of the latter.”49 The phrase “prying into the privacy of another’s residence,” however, does not mean that only the
residence is entitled to privacy. As elucidated by Civil law expert Arturo M. Tolentino: cralavvo nline lawlib rary

Our Code specifically mentions “prying into the privacy of another’s residence.” This does not mean, however, that only the
residence is entitled to privacy, because the law covers also “similar acts.” A business office is entitled to the same
privacy when the public is excluded therefrom and only such individuals as are allowed to enter may come in. x
x x50 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, an individual’s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to his house or residence as
it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny them access. The phrase “prying into the
privacy of another’s residence,” therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations which an individual considers as
private. And as long as his right is recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy. The CA,
therefore, erred in limiting the application of Article 26(1) of the Civil Code only to residences.

The “reasonable expectation of privacy”

test is used to determine whether there
is a violation of the right to privacy.

In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the “reasonable expectation of privacy”
test. This test determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the expectation has been
violated.51 In Ople v. Torres,52 we enunciated that “the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy depends on a
two-part test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is
one that society recognizes as reasonable.” Customs, community norms, and practices may, therefore, limit or extend an
individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.”53 Hence, the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy must be
determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the case.54

In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere for the protection and safety of
everyone. The installation of these cameras, however, should not cover places where there is reasonable expectation of
privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained. Nor should these
cameras be used to pry into the privacy of another’s residence or business office as it would be no different from
eavesdropping, which is a crime under Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

In this case, the RTC, in granting the application for Preliminary Injunction, ruled that: cralavvonl inelawl ibra ry

After careful consideration, there is basis to grant the application for a temporary restraining order. The operation by
[respondents] of a revolving camera, even if it were mounted on their building, violated the right of privacy of [petitioners],
who are the owners of the adjacent lot. The camera does not only focus on [respondents’] property or the roof of the factory
at the back (Aldo Development and Resources, Inc.) but it actually spans through a good portion of [the] land of
[petitioners].

Based on the ocular inspection, the Court understands why [petitioner] Hing was so unyielding in asserting that the revolving
camera was set up deliberately to monitor the on[-]going construction in his property. The monitor showed only a portion of
the roof of the factory of [Aldo]. If the purpose of [respondents] in setting up a camera at the back is to secure the building
and factory premises, then the camera should revolve only towards their properties at the back. [Respondents’] camera
cannot be made to extend the view to [petitioners’] lot. To allow the [respondents] to do that over the objection of the
[petitioners] would violate the right of [petitioners] as property owners. “The owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in
such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person.”55

The RTC, thus, considered that petitioners have a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in their property, whether they use it
as a business office or as a residence and that the installation of video surveillance cameras directly facing petitioners’
property or covering a significant portion thereof, without their consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy. As we
see then, the issuance of a preliminary injunction was justified. We need not belabor that the issuance of a preliminary
injunction is discretionary on the part of the court taking cognizance of the case and should not be interfered with, unless
there is grave abuse of discretion committed by the court.56 Here, there is no indication of any grave abuse of
discretion. Hence, the CA erred in finding that petitioners are not entitled to an injunctive writ.

This brings us to the next question: whether respondents are the proper parties to this suit.

A real party defendant is one who has a

correlative legal obligation to redress
a wrong done to the plaintiff by reason
of the defendant's act or omission which
had violated the legal right of the former.

Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides: cralavvon line lawlib rary

SEC. 2. Parties-in-interest. — A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must
be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.

A real party defendant is “one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of the
defendant’s act or omission which had violated the legal right of the former.”57

In ruling that respondents are not the proper parties, the CA reasoned that since they do not own the building, they could
not have installed the video surveillance cameras.58 Such reasoning, however, is erroneous. The fact that respondents are
not the registered owners of the building does not automatically mean that they did not cause the installation of the video
surveillance cameras.

In their Complaint, petitioners claimed that respondents installed the video surveillance cameras in order to fish for evidence,
which could be used against petitioners in another case.59 During the hearing of the application for Preliminary Injunction,
petitioner Bill testified that when respondents installed the video surveillance cameras, he immediately broached his concerns
but they did not seem to care,60 and thus, he reported the matter to the barangay for mediation, and eventually, filed a
Complaint against respondents before the RTC.61 He also admitted that as early as 1998 there has already been a dispute
between his family and the Choachuy family concerning the boundaries of their respective properties.62 With these factual
circumstances in mind, we believe that respondents are the proper parties to be impleaded.

Moreover, although Aldo has a juridical personality separate and distinct from its stockholders, records show that it is a
family-owned corporation managed by the Choachuy family.63

Also quite telling is the fact that respondents, notwithstanding their claim that they are not owners of the building, allowed the court to enter the
compound of Aldo and conduct an ocular inspection. The counsel for respondents even toured Judge Marilyn Lagura-Yap inside the building and
answered all her questions regarding the set-up and installation of the video surveillance cameras.64 And when respondents moved for reconsideration
of the Order dated October 18, 2005 of the RTC, one of the arguments they raised is that Aldo would suffer damages if the video surveillance cameras
are removed and transferred.65 Noticeably, in these instances, the personalities of respondents and Aldo seem to merge.

All these taken together lead us to the inevitable conclusion that respondents are merely using the corporate fiction of Aldo as a shield to protect
themselves from this suit. In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents are the proper parties to this suit.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 10, 2007 and the Resolution dated September 11, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01473 are hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. The Orders dated October 18, 2005 and February 6, 200[6] of Branch
28 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City in Civil Case No. MAN-5223 are hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

Corpus v. Paje
Article 33
Facts:

—December 23, 1956 in Lubao, Pampanga, the passenger bus driven by Felardo Paje collided with the jeep driven
by Clemente Marcia resulting to Clemente’s death and physical injuries to two other persons. —A case was filed
against Paje in the CFI of Pampanga for homicide and double serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. —On November 7, 1960, Paje was found guilty but he appealed the judgment of conviction to the
Court of Appeals (CA). —On November 21, 1961, while Paje’s appeal was pending decision in the CA, Corpus
instituted in the CFI of Rizal a separate civil action (Civil Case No. 6880) for damages based upon the criminal act of
reckless imprudence against Paje & Victory Liner Transportation Co., Inc. —Corpus was claiming that the
defendants be ordered to pay jointly and separately the amounts of damages. —On November 9, 1962, CA
promulgated its decision in the appeal of Paje reversing the appealed judgement and acquitting him after finding that
the reckless imprudence charged against him did not exist, and that the collision was a case of pure accident. —On
December 29, 1962, Paje & Victory Liner filed in the civil action a motion to dismiss on the ground that the action
was barred by the acquittal by the CA but the motion was denied.

Issue:

Whether or not Corpus could claim the damages from Paje & Victory Liner as per the civil case she filed.

Held:

—No. Corpus could not claim for any damages filed on the civil case as the CFI of Rizal dismissed the complaint on
May 31, 1966 on the ground that Corpus’ action was based upon a quasi-delict.

—Quasi-delict is an act whereby a person, without malice, but by fault, negligence or imprudence not legally
excusable, causes injury to another.

—As per Article 1146 of the Civil Code, upon a quasi-delict , the action must be instituted within four years. Corpus
filed a civil case against Paje on November 21, 1961 which was already 4 years & 11 months since the incident
happened on December 23, 1956.

——Rules of Court (Rule 111, Sec.3) the extinction of the criminal action by acquittal of the defendant on the ground
that the criminal act charged against him did not exist, necessarily extinguished also the civil action for damages
based upon the same act.
G.R. No. L-26737 July 31, 1969

LAURA CORPUS, and the minors RICARDO, TERESITA and

CORAZON, all surnamed MARCIA and represented by their mother
LAURA CORPUS, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FELARDO PAJE and THE VICTORY LINER TRANSPORTATION CO.,
INC., defendants-appellees.
Crispin D. Baizas and Associates for plaintiffs-appellants.
Flores, Macapagal, Ocampo and Balbastro for defendants-appellees.

CAPISTRANO, J.:

This is a direct appeal on questions of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing the
complaint in Civil Case No. 6880 of that court.

On December 23, 1956, a passenger bus of the Victory Liner Transportation Co., Inc., driven by Felardo Paje,
collided within the municipality of Lubao, Pampanga, with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter's
death and in physical injuries to two other persons.

An information for homicide and double serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence was filed against
Felardo Paje in the Court First Instance of Pampanga. The heirs of Clemente Marcia reserved their right to institute
a separate civil action for damages. On November 7, 1960, the accused, Felardo Paje, was found guilty and
convicted of the crime charged in the information. Said defendant appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court
of Appeals. On November 21, 1961, while defendant's appeal was pending decision in the Court of Appeals,
Clemente Marcia's heirs, namely, his widow, Laura Corpus, and their minor children, instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal a separate civil action (Civil Case No. 6880) for damages based upon the criminal act of reckless
imprudence against Felardo Paje and the Victory Liner Transportation Co., Inc., defendants, praying that said
defendants be ordered to pay jointly and severally the amounts of damages claimed by the plaintiffs. On November
9, 1962, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision in the appeal of Felardo Paje reversing the appealed
judgment and acquitting the appellant after finding that the reckless imprudence charged against him did not exist,
and that the collision was a case of pure accident.

On December 29, 1962, the defendants filed in the civil action a motion to dismiss on the ground that the action was
barred by the acquittal by the Court of Appeals of the defendant Felardo Paje in the criminal action. The motion was
denied.

At the pre-trial of the civil case, the defendants asked the court to rule on their special defense that plaintiffs' cause
of action based upon a quasi-delict had prescribed considering that the complaint was brought four years and
eleven months after the collision and that according to Article 1144 of the Civil Code an action based upon a quasi-
delict must be instituted within four years. The lower court, in its order of May 31, 1966, dismissed the complaint on
the ground that plaintiffs' action was based upon a quasi-delict and that it had prescribed. The plaintiffs appealed
direct to this Court on questions of law from the order dismissing the complaint.

Plaintiffs-appellants contend that the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint. The contention is unmeritorious
in view of the following considerations.

(1) The acquittal of the defendant Felardo Paje by the Court of Appeals in the criminal action on the ground that the
reckless imprudence or criminal negligence charged against him did not exist and that the collision was a case of
pure accident, was a bar to the civil action for damages for the death of Clemente Marcia, which action was based
upon the same criminal negligence of which the defendant Felardo Paje was acquitted in the criminal action. In the
celebrated case of Chantangco vs. Abaroa, which was an appeal from the Philippine Supreme Court to the United
States Supreme Court, 218 U.S. 476; 54 L. Ed. 1116; 40 Phil. 1056, Mr. Justice Lurton, speaking for the Supreme
Court of the United States, said:

It is true that one of the plaintiffs in the present case reserved whatever right he may have had to bring a civil
action. This was obviously of no avail, inasmuch as there resulted a judgment for the defendant, and the
plain inference from the foregoing is that a verdict of acquittal must carry with it exemption from civil
responsibility.

Criminal negligence, that is, reckless imprudence, is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil
Code which authorizes the institution of an independent civil action, that is, of an entirely separate and distinct civil
action for damages, which shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and shall be proved only by a
preponderance of evidence. Said article mentions only the crimes of defamation, fraud (estafa) and physical injuries.
Although in the case of Dyogi, et al. vs. Yatco, et al., G.R. No. L-9623, January 22, 1957, this Court held that the
term "physical injuries" used in article 33 of the Civil Code includes homicide, 1 it is to be borne in mind that the
charge against Felardo Paje was for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, and not for homicide and physical
injuries. In the case of People vs. Buan, G.R. No. L-25366, March 29, 1968, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, speaking for
the Supreme Court, said that the "offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in
the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law
penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into
account to determine the penalty; it does not qualify the substance of the offense." It is, therefore, clear that the
charge against Felardo Paje was not for homicide but for reckless imprudence, that is, criminal negligence resulting
in homicide (death of Clemente Marcia) and double physical injuries suffered by two other persons. As reckless
imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code, there is
no independent civil action for damages that may be instituted in connection with said offense. Hence, homicide
through reckless imprudence or criminal negligence comes under the general rule that the acquittal of the defendant
in the criminal action is a bar to his civil liability based upon the same criminal act notwithstanding that the injured
party reserved 2 his right to institute a separate civil action (Chantangco vs. Abaroa, supra). In the language of the
Rules of Court (Rule 111, Sec. 3) the extinction of the criminal action by acquittal of the defendant on the ground
that the criminal act charged against him did not exist, necessarily extinguished also the civil action for damages
based upon the same act.

(2) Assuming, arguendo, that the civil action for damages for the death of Clemente Marcia was based upon a
quasi-delict, 3 the trial court's finding that on that basis the action had prescribed is correct. An action upon a quasi-
delict must be instituted within four (4) years (Article 1146, Civil Code). The four-year prescriptive period began to
run from the day the quasi-delict was committed, or from December 23, 1956, and the running of the said period
was not interrupted by the institution of the criminal action for reckless imprudence. (Paulan vs. Sarabia, G.R. No. L-
10542, July 31, 1958.)

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the order appealed from is affirmed, with special pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Castro, Fernando and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez and Teehankee, JJ., concur in the result.
1äw phï1.ñët

Reyes, J.B.L., and Zaldivar, JJ., took no part.

 HEIRS OF THE LATE TEODORO GUARING JR., plaintiff
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant
G.R. No. 108395. March 7, 1997
FACTS:

On November 7, 1987, the car driven by Teodoro Guaring Jr. collided with the Philippine Rabbit Bus
driven by Angelo Cuevas and wth a Toyota Cressida Car driven by Eligio Enriquez, along the North
Luzon Expressway in San Rafael, Mexico Pampanga.. As a consequence, Guaring died.

The trial court ruled in favor of herein petitioners, but lost in the Court of Appeals where the accused
was acquitted based on reasonable doubt. This was because it was found out that the deceased was the
one who acted negligently. The accused the claimed appealed in the court that the civil case filed against
him be extinguished since the extinguishment of his criminal liability necessarily follows the
extinguishment of his civil liability, since his civil liability aroused from his criminal liability. The
petitioners disagreed on this ground, claiming that the civil case should pursue. This was then appealed
to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the civil case must be terminated as a consequence of the termination of the criminal
case based on reasonable doubt.

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that the acquittal of the bus driver was based on reasonable doubt, which
means that the civil case for damages was not barred since the cause of action of the heirs was based
on quasi delict. Even if damages are sought on the basis of crime and not quasi delict, the acquittal of
the bus driver will not bar recovery of damages because the acquittal was based not on a finding that
he was not guilty but only on reasonable doubt. Thus, it has been held:

The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a
declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not
extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of
evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is
not criminal but only civil in nature as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious
mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability; and, where the civil
liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted.

Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled that the proceedings for the civil case of the said incident must
continue for the recovery of damages of the victim’s heirs. The case was remanded to the trial court to
determine the civil liability of the accused.
[G.R. No. 108395. March 7, 1997.]

HEIRS OF THE LATE TEODORO GUARING, JR., Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS,

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., and ANGELES CUEVAS, Respondents.
Rene A.V . Saguisag, for Petitioner.
Escudero Marasigan Sison and E. H. Villareal for Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines.
SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; CRIMINAL LIABILITY; DOES NOT CARRY WITH IT EXTINCTION OF CIVIL LIABILITY BASED ON
QUASI- DELICT. — Acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil liability based on quasi-delict. Thus. in Tayag, v. Alcantara, it was held: the extinction of civil
liability referred to in Par. (c), Section 3, Rule 111 [now Rule 111, S2(b)], refers exclusively to civil liability founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and
not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not
happened or has not been committed by the accused.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — It is noteworthy that the accident in that case also involved a Philippine Rabbit
Bus and that, as in this case, the acquittal of the bus driver was based on reasonable doubt. We held that the civil case
for damages was not barred since the cause of action of the heirs was based on quasi-delict.

3. ID.; ID.; ACQUITTAL EXTINGUISHES LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES ONLY WHEN IT INCLUDES A DECLARATION THAT
THE FACTS FROM WHICH THE CIVIL MIGHT ARISE DID NOT EXISTS. — Even if damages are sought on the basis of crime
and not quasi-delict the acquittal of the bus driver will not bar recovery of damages because the acquittal was based
not on a finding that he was not guilty but only on reasonable doubt. Thus, it has been held: The judgment of
acquittal distinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the facts from
which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt. (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases,
where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature (De Guzman
v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558; People v. Pantig, supra) as for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief
committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability (See Art. 332, Revised Penal Code); and, where the
civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted (Castro v.
Collector of Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623).

4. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT, NOT A TRIER OF FACTS; CASE REMANDED TO THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR
RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE; CASE AT BAR. — In the present case, the dispositive portion of the decision of the RTC in
the criminal case reads: WHEREFORE, the Court, entertaining reasonable doubts as to his guilt, the accused is hereby
acquitted of the offense of reckless imprudence resulting to double homicide and damage to property as charged in
the Information, without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. It was thus error for the appellate court to skip
the review of the evidence in this case and instead base its decision on the findings of the trial court in the criminal
case. The appellate court did not even have before it the evidence in the criminal case. What it did was simply to cite
findings contained in the decision of the criminal court. Worse, what the criminal court considered was reasonable
doubt concerning the liability of the bus driver the appellate court regarded as a categorical finding that the driver
was not negligent and, on that basis declared in this case that "the proximate cause of the accident was the act of
deceased Guaring in overtaking another vehicle ahead of him." The notion that an action for quasi-delict is separate
and distinct from the criminal action was thus set aside. This case must be decided on the basis of the evidence in the
civil case. This is important because the criminal court appears to have based its decision, acquitting the bus driver on
the ground of reasonable doubt, solely on what it perceived to be relative capacity for observation of the prosecution
and defense witnesses. Because the Court of Appeals did not consider the evidence in the civil case, this case should
be remanded to it so that it may render another decision in accordance with the law and evidence. The issues raised
by petitioners are essentially factual and require the evaluation of evidence, which is the function of the Court of
Appeals in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction. They cannot be decided in this Court. Wherefore, the
decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and this case is remanded to the Court of Appeals with instruction to
render judgment with reasonable dispatch in accordance with law and the evidence presented in Civil Case No. 88-
43860.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 20, which ordered respondent Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver, Angeles Cuevas, to
pay various amounts in damages to petitioners, the heirs of the late Teodoro Guaring, Jr.

This case arose from an unfortunate vehicular accident which happened on November 7, 1987, along the North
Expressway in San Rafael, Mexico, Pampanga. Involved in the accident were a Mitsubishi Lancer car driven by
Teodoro Guaring, Jr., who died as a result of the mishap, Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 415, driven by Angeles Cuevas, and
a Toyota Cressida car, driven by Eligio Enriquez. The Mitsubishi Lancer was heading north, at the speed of 80 to 90
kilometers per hour. Following it was the Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 415, with Plate No. CVD-584. On the other hand,
the Toyota Cressida was cruising on the opposite lane, bound for Manila.

Petitioners, heirs of Teodoro Guaring, Jr., brought this action for damages, based on quasi delict, in the Regional Trial
Court of Manila. Their evidence tended to show that the Rabbit bus tried to overtake Guaring’s car by passing on the
right shoulder of the road and that in so doing it hit the right rear portion of Guaring’s Mitsubishi Lancer. The impact
caused the Lancer to swerve to the south-bound lane, as a result of which it collided with the Toyota Cressida car
coming from the opposite direction.

With Teodoro Guaring Jr. in the Lancer, seated beside him in front, was Bonifacio Clemente. Riding in the Toyota
Cressida driven by Sgt. Eligio Enriquez was his mother, Dolores Enriquez, who was seated beside him. Seated at the
back were his daughter Katherine (who was directly behind him), his wife Lilian, and his nephew Felix Candelaria.

Killed in the collision were Teodoro Guaring, Jr., who was driving the Lancer, and Dolores Enriquez, who was riding in
the Cressida, while injured were Bonifacio Clemente and the occupants of the Toyota Cressida.

Private respondents, on the other hand, presented evidence tending to show that the accident was due to the
negligence of the deceased Guaring. They claimed that it was Guaring who tried to overtake the vehicle ahead of him
on the highway and that in doing so he encroached on the south-bound lane and collided with the oncoming Cressida
of U.S. Air Force Sgt. Enriquez. Private respondents claim that as a result of the collision the Lancer was thrown back
to its lane where it crashed into the Rabbit bus.

On May 16, 1990, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment finding Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver,
Angeles Cuevas, at fault, and holding them solidarily liable for damages to petitioners. The dispositive portion of its
decision reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, ordering the latter to
pay the former, jointly and severally, the sum of:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. P500,000.00 for loss of earning capacity of the deceased Teodoro Guaring, Jr.;

2. P1,000,000.00 as moral damages;

3. P50,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees; and

4. Costs of suit.

From this judgment, private respondent Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. appealed, contending:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library

1. The lower court erred in not finding that the proximate cause of the collision was Guaring’s negligence in
attempting to overtake the car in front of him.

2. The lower court erred in not holding that PRBL exercised due diligence in the supervision of its employees.

3. The lower court erred in awarding the amount of P500,000.00 in favor of plaintiffs-appellees representing
Guaring’s loss of earning capacity.

4. The lower court erred in awarding moral damages in favor of Plaintiffs-Appellees.

5. The lower court erred in awarding attorney’s fees in favor of Plaintiffs-Appellees.

On December 16, 1992, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, setting aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila in the civil action for damages and dismissing the complaint against private respondents Philippine Rabbit
Bus Lines, Inc. and Cuevas on the strength of a decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court at San Fernando,
Pampanga, in the criminal case, acquitting the bus driver Angeles Cuevas of reckless imprudence resulting in damage
to property and double homicide. The appellate court held that since the basis of petitioners’ action was the alleged
negligence of the bus driver, the latter’s acquittal in the criminal case rendered the civil case based on quasi delict
untenable.

Hence, this petition. Petitioners contend that

[1] EVIDENCE IN ONE CASE IS INADMISSIBLE IN ANOTHER CASE AGAINST A PERSON NOT A PARTY IN THE FIRST
CASE AND TO HOLD OTHERWISE IS VIOLATIVE OF PROCEDURAL DUE. PROCESS.

[2] THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS WITHOUT FACTUAL FINDINGS AND DID NOT RESOLVE
SQUARELY THE ASSIGNED ERRORS AND IS THEREFORE A VOID JUDGMENT.

[3] ACQUITTAL OF THE ACCUSED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE, WHETHER ON REASONABLE DOUBT OR NOT, IS NO BAR
TO THE PROSECUTION FOR DAMAGES BASED ON QUASI-DELICT.

The question is whether the judgment in the criminal case extinguished the liability of private respondent Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver, Angeles Cuevas, for damages for the death of Teodoro Guaring, Jr. In absolving
private respondents from liability, the Court of Appeals reasoned: 1

Since the appellee’s civil action is predicated upon the negligence of the accused which does not exist as found by the
trial court in the said criminal case, it necessarily follows that the acquittal of the accused in the criminal case carries
with it the extinction of the civil responsibility arising therefrom. Otherwise stated, the fact from which the civil
action might arise, that is, the negligence of the accused, did not exist.

The finding in the criminal case that accused Cuevas was not negligent and the proximate cause of the accident was
the act of deceased Guaring in overtaking another vehicle ahead of him likewise exonerates PRB from any civil
liability.
Although it did not say so expressly, the appellate court appears to have based its ruling on Rule 111, §2(b) of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from
a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.

This provision contemplates, however, a civil action arising from crime, whereas the present action was instituted
pursuant to Art. 2176 of the Civil Code, which provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red

It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict. Thus, in Tayag v. Alcantara, 2 it was held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

. . . a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and
found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to
recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (c),
Section 3, Rule 111 [now Rule 111, §2(b)], refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not
been committed by the accused . . .

It is noteworthy that the accident in that case also involved a Philippine Rabbit bus and that, as in this case, the
acquittal of the bus driver was based on reasonable doubt. We held that the civil case for damages was not barred
since the cause of action of the heirs was based on quasi delict.

Again, in Gula v. Dianala it was held: 3

Since the cause of action of plaintiffs-appellants is based on culpa aquiliana and not culpa criminal, thus precluding
the application of the exception in Sec. 3(c) of Rule 111 [now Rule 111, §2(b)], and the fact that it can be inferred from
the criminal case that defendant-accused, Pedro Dianala, was acquitted on reasonable doubt because of dearth of
evidence and lack of veracity of the two principal witnesses, the doctrine in Mendoza v. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113, will not
find application. In that case, the acquittal was not based on reasonable doubt and the cause of action was based on
culpa criminal, for which reason we held the suit for damages barred.

Even if damages are sought on the basis of crime and not quasi delict, the acquittal of the bus driver will not bar
recovery of damages because the acquittal was based not on a finding that he was not guilty but only on reasonable
doubt. Thus, it has been held: 4

The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration
that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal
where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of evidence is
required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil
in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558; People v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft,
and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability (See Art. 332, Revised
Penal Code); and, where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the
accused was acquitted (Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623).
In the present case, the dispositive portion of the decision of the RTC in the criminal case reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court, entertaining reasonable doubt as to his guilt, the accused is hereby acquitted, of the offense
of reckless imprudence resulting to double homicide and damage to property as charged in the Information. without
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. 5

It was thus error for the appellate court to skip the review of the evidence in this case and instead base its decision on
the findings of the trial court in the criminal case. In so doing, the appellate court disregarded the fact that this case
had been instituted independently of the criminal case and that petitioners herein took no part in the criminal
prosecution. In fact this action was filed below before the prosecution presented evidence in the criminal action. The
attention of the Court of Appeals was called to the decision in the criminal case, which was decided on September 7,
1990, only when the decision of the trial court in this case was already pending review before it (the Court of
Appeals).

The appellate court did not even have before it the evidence in the criminal case. What it did was simply to cite
findings contained in the decision of the criminal court. Worse, what the criminal court considered was reasonable
doubt concerning the liability of the bus driver the appellate court regarded as a categorical finding that the driver
was not negligent and, on that basis, declared in this case that "the proximate cause of the accident was the act of
deceased Guaring in overtaking another vehicle ahead of him." The notion that an action for quasi delict is separate
and distinct from the criminal action was thus set aside.

This case must be decided on the basis of the evidence in the civil case. This is important because the criminal court
appears to have based its decision, acquitting the bus driver on the ground of reasonable doubt, solely on what it
perceived to be the relative capacity for observation of the prosecution and defense witnesses. 6 The prosecution did
not call Bonifacio Clemente to testify despite the fact that shortly after the accident he gave a statement to the police,
pinning the blame for the accident on the Philippine Rabbit bus driver. Indeed, the civil case involved a different set of
witnesses. Petitioners presented Eligio Enriquez, who was driving the Cressida, and Bonifacio Clemente, who was a
passenger in Guaring’s car. Thus, both had full view of the accident.

It is unfair to bind petitioners to the result of the criminal action when the fact is that they did not take part therein.
That the witnesses presented on behalf of the petitioners are different from those presented by the prosecution
should have brought home to the appellate court the fundamental unfairness of considering the decision in the
criminal case conclusive of the civil case.

Because the Court of Appeals did not consider the evidence in the civil case, this case should be remanded to it so
that it may render another decision in accordance with the law and the evidence. The issues raised by petitioners are
essentially factual and require the evaluation of evidence, which is the function of the Court of Appeals in the exercise
of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction. They cannot be decided in this Court.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and this case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals
with instruction to render judgment with reasonable dispatch in accordance with law and the evidence presented in
Civil Case No. 88-43860.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Romero, Puno and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco
Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco (2007) / Ynares-Santiago

Facts

Champion, Hope, and More were considered local brands subject to ad valorem [accdg to value] tax [20-45%]. Two days prior (1 Jul ’93)
to RA 7654’s effectivity, VC [Comm., BIR] issued the RMC reclassifying the brands as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign
brand subject to 55% AV tax (brands were subjected to RA 7654, Sec. 142 (c)(1) before it took effect). On 2 Jul, BIR Deputy Comm sent
a copy of RMC to Fortune via fax. It was only on 15 Jul when Fortune received a certified photocopy of the RMC.

Fortune filed an MfR on 20 Jul, requesting the RMC’s recall but it was denied on 30 Jul, and payment of the AV tax deficiency (9M~)
was demanded within 10 days. Fortune filed a petition for review with the CTaxApp (CTA) which issued an injunction enjoining RMC’s
implementation (defective, invalid, unenforceable). This was affirmed by the CA, and SC in Comm, BIR v. CA, since the RMC fell short
of the requirements for a valid admin issuance.

Fortune filed a complaint for damages against VC in her private capacity in the RTC, saying that she should be held liable for
damages under NCC 32 (RMC issuance violated right against property deprivation without due process + equal protection of the laws).
VC filed a motion to dismiss since she issued RMC in the performance of her fxn, within authority, and said that being an agent of RP,
the latter is the one responsible for her acts, and that the complaint did have a cause of axn because there was no allegation of malice/bad
faith.

RTC denied VC’s motion to dismiss. CA dismissed the case as well, saying that under NCC 32, liability may arise even if defendant
did not act with malice/bad faith. CA also said that Admin Code is the general law on puboff’s civil liab while NCC 32 is the special law
governing this case, and that malice/bad faith need not be alleged in the complaint for damages. VC filed this complaint, saying that what
shld be applied is the Admin Code [liab attaches only when there is a clear showing of bad faith / malice / gross negligence] and said that
Admin Code is the special law, and that NCC is the general law.

Issues and Holding

1. WON a puboff be sued in his private capacity for acts done in connection with the discharge of ofc fxns. YES, when [#3]
A. GEN RULE: PubOff not liab for damages which another suffers from just performance of official duties, within scope of tasks +
RP not amenable to judgment for monetary claims without its consent
i. HOWEVER, puboff not immune from damages in personal capacity for acts done in bad faith (not protected by mantle
of immunity) [See cited Admin Code provision + Sec 39 of the same]
ii. Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA – puboff who in/directly violates another’s consti rights may be sued for damages under NCC 32
even though there is no malice / bad faith
iii. SO: puboff may be sued […]
a. when there is malice, bad faith, negligence
b. when he violated a consti right of plaintiff
2. NCC 32 or Admin Code Sec. 38, Book I? NCC 32
A. LegMeth knowledge – gen, special law shld be harmonized if possible; special law prevails; the circ that special law is passed
before or after gen law does not change principle
B. Discussion of Code Comm (Dean Bocobo)
i. There was a proposal re NCC 32 that puboff be held liable for consti right violation only if there is malice / bad faith but
he said that Code Comm opposes this
a. Nature of NCC 32 – wrong may be civil or criminal
b. To make such a requisite would defeat main purpose (effective protection of individual rights)
c. Object is to put an end to abuse by plea of good faith; in US the remedy is in the nature of tort
C. NCC 32 patterned after Am law tort – WRONG, TORTIOUS ACT DEFINED AS THE COMMISSION/OMISSION OF ACT BY
ONE, WITHOUT RIGHT, WHEREBY ANOTHER RECEIVES SOME INJURY IN PERSON, PROPERTY, OR REPUTATION
i. Liab in tort not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent
D. Aberca v. Ver – With NCC 32, principle of puboff acctability under Consti acquires added meaning, assumes larger dimension
E. Admin Code – bad faith, malice, negligence vital elements to make puboff liable for damages; subject is general (“acts” done
in performance of duties, without specifying action/omission that may give rise to civil suit)
i. IN CONTRAST TO NCC 32 which specifies clearly the acts that may give rise to axn for damages (tort for impairment
of rights, liberties)
3. WON VC may be held liable for damages. YES (no explicit / direct answer on this though)
A. Complaint brought under NCC 32 which does not require bad faith and malice, so the failure to allege it will not amount to
failure to state cause of action
G.R. No. 141309 June 19, 2007
LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION, respondent.
DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Petitioner assails the May 7, 1999 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47167, which affirmed the
September 29, 1997 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina, Branch 272, in Civil Case No. 97-341-MK,
denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss. The complaint filed by respondent sought to recover damages for the alleged
violation of its constitutional rights arising from petitioner’s issuance of Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93
(RMC 37-93), which the Court declared invalid in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals.3

Petitioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato was then the Commissioner of Internal Revenue while respondent Fortune
Tobacco Corporation is an entity engaged in the manufacture of different brands of cigarettes, among which are
"Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes.

On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted Republic Act No. 7654 (RA 7654), which took effect on July 3, 1993. Prior to
its effectivity, cigarette brands ‘Champion," "Hope," and "More" were considered local brands subjected to an ad
valorem tax at the rate of 20-45%. However, on July 1, 1993, or two days before RA 7654 took effect, petitioner issued
RMC 37-93 reclassifying "Champion," "Hope," and "More" as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand
subject to the 55% ad valorem tax.4 RMC 37-93 in effect subjected "Hope," "More," and "Champion" cigarettes to the
provisions of RA 7654, specifically, to Sec. 142,5 (c)(1) on locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently
classified and taxed at 55%, and which imposes an ad valorem tax of "55% provided that the minimum tax shall not
be less than Five Pesos (P5.00) per pack."6

On July 2, 1993, at about 5:50 p.m., BIR Deputy Commissioner Victor A. Deoferio, Jr. sent via telefax a copy of RMC 37-
93 to Fortune Tobacco but it was addressed to no one in particular. On July 15, 1993, Fortune Tobacco received, by
ordinary mail, a certified xerox copy of RMC 37-93. On July 20, 1993, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration
requesting the recall of RMC 37-93, but was denied in a letter dated July 30, 1993.7 The same letter assessed
respondent for ad valorem tax deficiency amounting to P9,598,334.00 (computed on the basis of RMC 37-93) and
demanded payment within 10 days from receipt thereof.8 On August 3, 1993, respondent filed a petition for review
with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), which on September 30, 1993, issued an injunction enjoining the implementation
of RMC 37-93.9 In its decision dated August 10, 1994, the CTA ruled that RMC 37-93 is defective, invalid, and
unenforceable and further enjoined petitioner from collecting the deficiency tax assessment issued pursuant to RMC
No. 37-93. This ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and finally by this Court in Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Court of Appeals.10 It was held, among others, that RMC 37-93, has fallen short of the requirements for a
valid administrative issuance.

On April 10, 1997, respondent filed before the RTC a complaint11 for damages against petitioner in her private
capacity. Respondent contended that the latter should be held liable for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code
considering that the issuance of RMC 37-93 violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without
due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss12 contending that: (1) respondent has no cause of action against her because she
issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority. She claimed that
she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts; (2) the
complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith; and (3) the certification against forum
shopping was signed by respondent’s counsel in violation of the rule that it is the plaintiff or the principal party who
should sign the same.

On September 29, 1997, the RTC denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss holding that to rule on the allegations of
petitioner would be to prematurely decide the merits of the case without allowing the parties to present evidence. It
further held that the defect in the certification against forum shopping was cured by respondent’s submission of the
corporate secretary’s certificate authorizing its counsel to execute the certification against forum shopping. The
dispositive portion thereof, states:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant Liwayway Vinzons-Chato
and the motion to strike out and expunge from the record the said motion to dismiss filed by plaintiff Fortune
Tobacco Corporation are both denied on the grounds aforecited. The defendant is ordered to file her answer to the
complaint within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order.

SO ORDERED.13

The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. However, same was
dismissed on the ground that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act
with malice or bad faith. The appellate court ratiocinated that Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code is the
general law on the civil liability of public officers while Article 32 of the Civil Code is the special law that governs the
instant case. Consequently, malice or bad faith need not be alleged in the complaint for damages. It also sustained
the ruling of the RTC that the defect of the certification against forum shopping was cured by the submission of the
corporate secretary’s certificate giving authority to its counsel to execute the same.

Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant recourse contending that the suit is grounded on her acts done in the
performance of her functions as a public officer, hence, it is Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code which
should be applied. Under this provision, liability will attach only when there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice, or
gross negligence. She further averred that the Civil Code, specifically, Article 32 which allows recovery of damages for
violation of constitutional rights, is a general law on the liability of public officers; while Section 38, Book I of the
Administrative Code is a special law on the superior public officers’ liability, such that, if the complaint, as in the
instant case, does not allege bad faith, malice, or gross negligence, the same is dismissible for failure to state a cause
of action. As to the defect of the certification against forum shopping, she urged the Court to strictly construe the
rules and to dismiss the complaint.

Conversely, respondent argued that Section 38 which treats in general the public officers’ "acts" from which civil
liability may arise, is a general law; while Article 32 which deals specifically with the public officers’ violation of
constitutional rights, is a special provision which should determine whether the complaint states a cause of action or
not. Citing the case of Lim v. Ponce de Leon,14 respondent alleged that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, it is enough
that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiff and it is not required that said public officer
should have acted with malice or in bad faith. Hence, it concluded that even granting that the complaint failed to
allege bad faith or malice, the motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action should be denied inasmuch as
bad faith or malice are not necessary to hold petitioner liable.

The issues for resolution are as follows:

(1) May a public officer be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in connection with the discharge of
the functions of his/her office?
(2) Which as between Article 32 of the Civil Code and Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code should govern in
determining whether the instant complaint states a cause of action?

(3) Should the complaint be dismissed for failure to comply with the rule on certification against forum shopping?

(4) May petitioner be held liable for damages?

On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person may suffer arising
from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks.15 An officer who acts
within his authority to administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have
been caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for
monetary claims without its consent.16 However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her
personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by
the mantle of immunity for official actions.17

Specifically, under Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where there is bad faith,
malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under Section 39 of the same Book, civil
liability may arise where the subordinate public officer’s act is characterized by willfulness or negligence. Thus –

Sec. 38. Liability of Superior Officers. – (1) A public officer shall not be civilly liable for acts done in the performance of
his official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence.

xxxx

Section 39. Liability of Subordinate Officers. – No subordinate officer or employee shall be civilly liable for acts done
by him in good faith in the performance of his duties. However, he shall be liable for willful or negligent acts done by
him which are contrary to law, morals, public policy and good customs even if he acts under orders or instructions of
his superior.

In addition, the Court held in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,18 that a public officer who directly or indirectly
violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if
his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.

Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in
the course of the performance of the functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith,
or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.

Anent the second issue, we hold that the complaint filed by respondent stated a cause of action and that the decisive
provision thereon is Article 32 of the Civil Code.

A general statute is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit any subject or place naturally
belonging to such class. A special statute, as the term is generally understood, is one which relates to particular
persons or things of a class or to a particular portion or section of the state only.19

A general law and a special law on the same subject are statutes in pari materia and should, accordingly, be read
together and harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving effect to both. The rule is that where there are two acts,
one of which is special and particular and the other general which, if standing alone, would include the same matter
and thus conflict with the special act, the special law must prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly
than that of a general statute and must not be taken as intended to affect the more particular and specific provisions
of the earlier act, unless it is absolutely necessary so to construe it in order to give its words any meaning at all.20

The circumstance that the special law is passed before or after the general act does not change the principle. Where
the special law is later, it will be regarded as an exception to, or a qualification of, the prior general act; and where
the general act is later, the special statute will be construed as remaining an exception to its terms, unless repealed
expressly or by necessary implication.21

Thus, in City of Manila v. Teotico,22 the Court held that Article 2189 of the Civil Code which holds provinces, cities,
and municipalities civilly liable for death or injuries by reason of defective conditions of roads and other public works,
is a special provision and should prevail over Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409, the Charter of Manila, in determining
the liability for defective street conditions. Under said Charter, the city shall not be held for damages or injuries
arising from the failure of the local officials to enforce the provision of the charter, law, or ordinance, or from
negligence while enforcing or attempting to enforce the same. As explained by the Court:

Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter, because Republic Act 409 is a special law,
intended exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general law, applicable to the entire
Philippines.

The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and, we think, correctly. It is true that, insofar as its territorial
application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code a general legislation; but, as regards
the subject matter of the provisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating
the liability of the City of Manila for "damages or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of" city officers
"to enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence" of the city "Mayor,
Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions." Upon the other hand,
Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces, cities and municipalities . . .
liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by, any person by reason" — specifically — "of the defective
condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision." In
other words, said section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof,
whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective streets," in particular. Since the present action is based upon
the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.23

In the case of Bagatsing v. Ramirez,24 the issue was which law should govern the publication of a tax ordinance, the
City Charter of Manila, a special act which treats ordinances in general and which requires their publication before
enactment and after approval, or the Tax Code, a general law, which deals in particular with "ordinances levying or
imposing taxes, fees or other charges," and which demands publication only after approval. In holding that it is the
Tax Code which should prevail, the Court elucidated that:

There is no question that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is a special act since it relates only to the City of
Manila, whereas the Local Tax Code is a general law because it applies universally to all local governments. Blackstone
defines general law as a universal rule affecting the entire community and special law as one relating to particular
persons or things of a class. And the rule commonly said is that a prior special law is not ordinarily repealed by a
subsequent general law. The fact that one is special and the other general creates a presumption that the special is to
be considered as remaining an exception of the general, one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a
particular case. However, the rule readily yields to a situation where the special statute refers to a subject in general,
which the general statute treats in particular. Th[is] exactly is the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. Section 17
of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila speaks of "ordinance" in general, i.e., irrespective of the nature and scope
thereof, whereas, Section 43 of the Local Tax Code relates to "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other
charges" in particular. In regard, therefore, to ordinances in general, the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is
doubtless dominant, but, that dominant force loses its continuity when it approaches the realm of "ordinances
levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges" in particular. There, the Local Tax Code controls. Here, as always, a
general provision must give way to a particular provision. Special provision governs.

Let us examine the provisions involved in the case at bar. Article 32 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates, or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be
liable to the latter for damages:

xxxx

(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;

xxxx

(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;

xxxx

The rationale for its enactment was explained by Dean Bocobo of the Code Commission, as follows:

"DEAN BOCOBO. Article 32, regarding individual rights, Attorney Cirilo Paredes proposes that Article 32 be so
amended as to make a public official liable for violation of another person’s constitutional rights only if the public
official acted maliciously or in bad faith. The Code Commission opposes this suggestion for these reasons:

"The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not necessary therefore that there should
be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective
protection of individual rights. Public officials in the past have abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable
motives or good faith in the performance of their duties. Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an end to official
abuse by the plea of good faith. In the United States this remedy is in the nature of a tort.

"Mr. Chairman, this article is firmly one of the fundamental articles introduced in the New Civil Code to implement
democracy. There is no real democracy if a public official is abusing and we made the article so strong and so
comprehensive that it concludes an abuse of individual rights even if done in good faith, that official is liable. As a
matter of fact, we know that there are very few public officials who openly and definitely abuse the individual rights
of the citizens. In most cases, the abuse is justified on a plea of desire to enforce the law to comply with one’s duty.
And so, if we should limit the scope of this article, that would practically nullify the object of the article. Precisely, the
opening object of the article is to put an end to abuses which are justified by a plea of good faith, which is in most
cases the plea of officials abusing individual rights."25

The Code Commission deemed it necessary to hold not only public officers but also private individuals civilly liable for
violation of the rights enumerated in Article 32 of the Civil Code. It is not necessary that the defendant under this
Article should have acted with malice or bad faith, otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose, which is the effective
protection of individual rights. It suffices that there is a violation of the constitutional right of the plaintiff.26

Article 32 was patterned after the "tort" in American law.27 A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which has been defined
as the commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or
indirectly, in person, property, or reputation.28 There are cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is
determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which
the motive of the defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that
otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine whether the act was
wrongful.29 Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act which is
otherwise an invasion of another’s legal right; that is, liability in tort is not precluded by the fact that defendant acted
without evil intent.30

The clear intention therefore of the legislature was to create a distinct cause of action in the nature of tort for
violation of constitutional rights, irrespective of the motive or intent of the defendant.31 This is a fundamental
innovation in the Civil Code, and in enacting the Administrative Code pursuant to the exercise of legislative powers,
then President Corazon C. Aquino, could not have intended to obliterate this constitutional protection on civil
liberties.

In Aberca v. Ver,32 it was held that with the enactment of Article 32, the principle of accountability of public officials
under the Constitution acquires added meaning and assumes a larger dimension. No longer may a superior official
relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to
answer for the transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the
citizen. Part of the factors that propelled people power in February 1986 was the widely held perception that the
government was callous or indifferent to, if not actually responsible for, the rampant violations of human rights.
While it would certainly be too naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the
prospect of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil
Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression, joint tortfeasors.

On the other hand, Sections 38 and 39, Book I of the Administrative Code, laid down the rule on the civil liability of
superior and subordinate public officers for acts done in the performance of their duties. For both superior and
subordinate public officers, the presence of bad faith, malice, and negligence are vital elements that will make them
liable for damages. Note that while said provisions deal in particular with the liability of government officials, the
subject thereof is general, i.e., "acts" done in the performance of official duties, without specifying the action or
omission that may give rise to a civil suit against the official concerned.

Contrarily, Article 32 of the Civil Code specifies in clear and unequivocal terms a particular specie of an "act" that may
give rise to an action for damages against a public officer, and that is, a tort for impairment of rights and liberties.
Indeed, Article 32 is the special provision that deals specifically with violation of constitutional rights by public
officers. All other actionable acts of public officers are governed by Sections 38 and 39 of the Administrative Code.
While the Civil Code, specifically, the Chapter on Human Relations is a general law, Article 32 of the same Chapter is a
special and specific provision that holds a public officer liable for and allows redress from a particular class of
wrongful acts that may be committed by public officers. Compared thus with Section 38 of the Administrative Code,
which broadly deals with civil liability arising from errors in the performance of duties, Article 32 of the Civil Code is
the specific provision which must be applied in the instant case precisely filed to seek damages for violation of
constitutional rights.

The complaint in the instant case was brought under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Considering that bad faith and malice
are not necessary in an action based on Article 32 of the Civil Code, the failure to specifically allege the same will not
amount to failure to state a cause of action. The courts below therefore correctly denied the motion to dismiss on the
ground of failure to state a cause of action, since it is enough that the complaint avers a violation of a constitutional
right of the plaintiff.

Anent the issue on non-compliance with the rule against forum shopping, the subsequent submission of the
secretary’s certificate authorizing the counsel to sign and execute the certification against forum shopping cured the
defect of respondent’s complaint. Besides, the merits of the instant case justify the liberal application of the rules.33

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 7, 1999
which affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Marikina, Branch 272, denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss,
is AFFIRMED. The Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Marikina, Branch 272, is hereby DIRECTED to continue with
the proceedings in Civil Case No. 97-341-MK with dispatch.

With costs.

SO ORDERED.

Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, JJ., concur.

CHU VS Court of Appeals Case Digest G.R. No. 49588. December 21,
1990
>Topic: Criminal Procedure Rule 111, Rules of Court
FACTS: Private respondents Jaime Navoa and Milagros de Leos filed a criminal case against before petitioners Diong Bi
Chu alias “Patrick Chang” and Chang Ka Hi alias “Chang Ka Hee” with estafa. Commission No. 3 rendered judgment
acquitting petitioner Diong Bi Chu alias “Patrick Chang”, holding that the transaction between the parties was a joint
venture, requiring each party to contribute to a common fund. As an offshoot of the criminal case, private respondents
filed a civil action 4 against Diong Bi Chu, Chang Ka Hee and Lu Liong Corporation for recovery of damages arising from
guaranty and fraud, before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the civil action for
damages filed against them, on the ground that the same is barred by the prior judgment of Military Commission No. 3
and by private respondents’ failure to reserve their right to file a separate civil action.

the appellate cour held that the civil action for damages under Art. 33 of the Civil Code is independent of the criminal case
and that the dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner Chang Ka Hee and the acquittal of petitioner Diong Bi Chu do
not constitute a bar to the prosecution of the civil action for damages against them. Petitioners moved for reconsideration
of said resolution, but the same was denied.

ISSUE/HELD: WON a civil action for damages based on fraud under Art. 33 of the Civil Code is barred by a prior
judgment of acquittal in a criminal case. NEGATIVE

RATIO DICIDENDI:

Art. 33 of the Civil Code provides that “(I)n cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.”

To hold a person liable for damages under the foregoing provision, only a preponderance of evidence is required. An
acquittal in a criminal case is not a bar to the filing of an action for civil damages, for one may not be criminally liable and
still be civilly liable. Thus, the outcome or result of the criminal case, whether an acquittal or conviction, is really
inconsequential and will be of no moment in the civil action.

The civil action under Art. 33 need not be reserved because the law itself already makes the reservation. 10 In the case of
Bonite v. Zosa, 11 it was held that:

“Besides, the requirement in Section 2 of Rule 111 of the former Rules on Criminal Procedure that there be a reservation
in the criminal case of the right to institute an independent civil action, has been declared as not in accordance with law. It
is regarded as an unauthorized amendment to the substantive law, i.e. the Civil Code, which does not require such a
reservation. In fact, the reservation of the right to file an independent civil action has been deleted from Section 2, Rule
111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, in consonance with the decisions of this Court declaring such requirement
of a reservation as ineffective.”
 [G.R. No. 49588. December 21, 1990.]

DIONG BI CHU, alias PATRICK CHANG, CHANG KA HEE and LU

LIONG CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. GREGORIO G. PINEDA, as Presiding Judge, Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXI; JAIME NAVOA and MILAGROS DE
LEOS, Respondents.
Neri, De Leon & Caldito, for Petitioners.

Recto Law Offices for Private Respondents.

DECISION

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the 16 October 1978 resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
08363-SP. The antecedent facts are as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

In a complaint filed by private respondents Jaime Navoa and Milagros de Leos before Military Commission No. 3,
docketed as Criminal Case No. MC-3-57, petitioners Diong Bi Chu alias "Patrick Chang" and Chang Ka Hi alias "Chang
Ka Hee", were charged with estafa for violation of Art. 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. It was alleged in the
complaint that thru false pretenses and fraudulent acts, petitioners Diong Bi Chu and Chang Ka Hee succeeded in
inducing private respondents to mortgage a parcel of land belonging to and registered in the name of Jaime Navoa, and
that they (petitioners) misappropriated the proceeds therefrom, causing damages to private respondents in the amount of
P670,000.00.

After the prosecution had presented its evidence and rested its case, a demurrer to evidence was filed by Chang Ka Hee.
The charge against him was dismissed on the ground that he had nothing to do with the transaction. 2

On 3 August 1977, Military Commission No. 3 rendered judgment acquitting petitioner Diong Bi Chu alias "Patrick Chang",
holding that the transaction between the parties was a joint venture, requiring each party to contribute to a common fund
and that —

"There was no fraus (sic) nor deceit on the part of the accused Diong Bi Chu since it was admitted that Industria Phils.
Inc., did have a contract with the PVTA for the exportation of foreign leaf tobacco for blending purpose. Unfortunately,
after the initial shipment, and for the subsequent shipments, the President prohibited the importation of Virgina leaf
tobacco, and for the loss suffered, no one is to blame. This is one of the attendant risks in a joint venture which could not
be foreseen. chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

"WHEREFORE, it is the sentence of this Commission that the transaction being a joint venture, with the accused Diong Bi
Chu alias Patrick Chang, acting in good faith and without fault nor negligence, for which he can not in any way be held
liable, should and is hereby acquitted of the charge." 3

As an offshoot of the criminal case, on 31 March 1978, private respondents filed a civil action 4 against Diong Bi Chu,
Chang Ka Hee and Lu Liong Corporation for recovery of damages arising from guaranty and fraud, before the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch 21, docketed as Civil Case No. 29077. Petitioners Diong Bi Chu and Chang Ka Hee were
the majority stockholders of Lu Liong Corporation.

Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the civil action for damages filed against them, on the ground that the same is
barred by the prior judgment of Military Commission No. 3 and by private respondents’ failure to reserve their right to file a
separate civil action. 5 On 30 May 1978, the court denied said motion to dismiss. 6 Petitioners’ first and second motions
for reconsideration were likewise denied on 10 July and 31 August 1978, respectively. 7
A petition for certiorari was then filed by herein petitioners before the Court of Appeals, assailing the aforesaid orders of
the court a quo. In a resolution dated 16 October 1978, the appellate court dismissed said petition, holding that the civil
action for damages under Art. 33 of the Civil Code is independent of the criminal case and that the dismissal of the
criminal case against petitioner Chang Ka Hee and the acquittal of petitioner Diong Bi Chu do not constitute a bar to the
prosecution of the civil action for damages against them. Petitioners moved for reconsideration of said resolution, but the
same was denied in a resolution dated 29 December 1978. 8

Not satisfied with the foregoing rulings of the Court of Appeals, petitioners filed the petition at bar, raising the sole issue of
whether or not a civil action for damages based on fraud under Art. 33 of the Civil Code is barred by a prior judgment of
acquittal in a criminal case.

Art. 33 of the Civil Code provides that" (I)n cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence." cralaw virtua1aw library

To hold a person liable for damages under the foregoing provision, only a preponderance of evidence is required. An
acquittal in a criminal case is not a bar to the filing of an action for civil damages, for one may not be criminally liable and
still be civilly liable. Thus, the outcome or result of the criminal case, whether an acquittal or conviction, is really
inconsequential and will be of no moment in the civil action. chanrobles law library : red

To subordinate the civil action contemplated in Arts. 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code to the result of the criminal prosecution
would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action when, on the contrary, the law provides that such
civil action "may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding and regardless of the result of the latter." Art. 33 of the
Civil Code contemplates a civil action for recovery of damages that is entirely unrelated to the purely criminal aspect of the
case. This is the reason why only a preponderance of evidence and not proof beyond reasonable doubt is deemed
sufficient in such civil action. 9

The civil action under Art. 33 need not be reserved because the law itself already makes the reservation. 10 In the case of
Bonite v. Zosa, 11 it was held that: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Besides, the requirement in Section 2 of Rule 111 of the former Rules on Criminal Procedure that there be a reservation
in the criminal case of the right to institute an independent civil action, has been declared as not in accordance with law. It
is regarded as an unauthorized amendment to the substantive law, i.e. the Civil Code, which does not require such a
reservation. In fact, the reservation of the right to file an independent civil action has been deleted from Section 2, Rule
111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, in consonance with the decisions of this Court declaring such requirement
of a reservation as ineffective."cralaw virtua1aw library

Thus, dismissal of the criminal case against Chang Ka Hee and acquittal of Diong Bi Chu before Military Commission No.
3 for the charge of estafa is not a bar to the civil action for damages against them, based on fraud.

While a military commission or tribunal was declared to have no jurisdiction to try, even during the period of martial law,
civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them, as long as the civil courts are open and functioning, 12 however, such
ruling applies only to future cases or cases still on-going or not yet final —

"In the interest of justice and consistency, we hold that Olaguer should, in principle, be applied prospectively only to future
cases and cases still ongoing or not yet final when that decision was promulgated. Hence, there should be no retroactive
nullification of final judgments, whether of conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts against civilians before the
promulgation of the Olaguer decision. Such final sentences should not be disturbed by the State. Only in particular cases
where the convicted person or the State shows that there was serious denial of the Constitutional rights of the accused
should the nullity of the sentence be declared and a retrial be ordered based on the violation of the constitutional rights of
the accused, and not on the Olaguer doctrine. If a retrial is no longer possible, the accused should be released since the
judgment against him is null on account of the violation of his constitutional rights and denial of due process." 13

Applying the foregoing principles, despite the validity of the acquittal of Diong Bi Chu and the dismissal of the criminal
case against Chang Ka Hee by Military Commission No. 3, such fact does not deprive private respondents of their right to
recover civil damages against said persons based on fraud under Art. 33 of the Civil Code. chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit, and the case is hereby remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.
Paras, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera J., took no part.

G.R. No. L-51183 December 21, 1983

CARMEN L. MADEJA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. FELIX T. CARO and EVA ARELLANO-JAPZON, respondents.

Ernesto P. Miel for petitioner.

Gorgonio T. Alvarez for respondents.

ABAD SANTOS, J.: ñé+.£ª wph!1

In Criminal Case No. 75-88 of the defunct Court of First Instance of Eastern Samar, DR. EVA A. JAPZON is
accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy. The
complaining witness is the widow of the deceased, Carmen L. Madeja. The information states that: "The offended
party Carmen L. Madeja reserving her right to file a separate civil action for damages." (Rollo, p. 36.)

The criminal case still pending, Carmen L. Madeja sued Dr. Eva A. Japzon for damages in Civil Case No. 141 of the
same court. She alleged that her husband died because of the gross negligence of Dr. Japzon. The respondent
judge granted the defendant's motion to dismiss which motion invoked Section 3(a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court which reads: têñ.£îhqwâ£

Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. — In all cases not included in the preceding section
the following rules shall be observed:

(a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after
the criminal action has been commenced the civil action can not be instituted until final judgment has
been rendered in the criminal action. ...

According to the respondent judge, "under the foregoing Sec. 3 (a), Rule 111, New Rules of Court, the instant civil
action may be instituted only after final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action." (Rollo, p. 33.)

The instant petition which seeks to set aside the order of the respondent judge granting the defendant's motion to
dismiss Civil Case No. 141 is highly impressed with merit.

Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the Civil Code is the applicable provision. The
two enactments are quoted hereinbelow: têñ.£îhqw â£

Sec. 2. Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in Articles 31,32, 33, 34 and 2177 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case,
provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence."
(Rule 111, Rules of Court.)

Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action
 shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. (Civil Code,)

There are at least two things about Art. 33 of the Civil Code which are worth noting, namely:

1. The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex-delicto. This is manifest from the provision which
uses the expressions "criminal action" and "criminal prosecution." This conclusion is supported by the comment of
the Code Commission, thus: têñ.£îhqw â£

The underlying purpose of the principle under consideration is to allow the citizen to enforce his
rights in a private action brought by him, regardless of the action of the State attorney. It is not
conducive to civic spirit and to individual self-reliance and initiative to habituate the citizens to
depend upon the government for the vindication of their own private rights. It is true that in many of
the cases referred to in the provision cited, a criminal prosecution is proper, but it should be
remembered that while the State is the complainant in the criminal case, the injured individual is the
one most concerned because it is he who has suffered directly. He should be permitted to demand
reparation for the wrong which peculiarly affects him. (Report, p. 46.)

And Tolentino says: têñ.£îhqwâ£

The general rule is that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended
party reserves his right to institute it separately; and after a criminal action has been commenced, no
civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted. The present articles creates an
exception to this rule when the offense is defamation, fraud, or physical injuries, In these cases, a
civil action may be filed independently of the criminal action, even if there has been no reservation
made by the injured party; the law itself in this article makes such reservation; but the claimant is not
given the right to determine whether the civil action should be scheduled or suspended until the
criminal action has been terminated. The result of the civil action is thus independent of the result of
the civil action." (I Civil Code, p. 144 [1974.])

2. The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the
Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide. têñ.£îhqw â£

The Article in question uses the words 'defamation', 'fraud' and 'physical injuries.' Defamation and
fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal
Code using these terms as means of offenses defined therein, so that these two terms defamation
and fraud must have been used not to impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the
Philippines, but in their generic sense. With this apparent circumstance in mind, it is evident that the
terms 'physical injuries' could not have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in the
Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code Commission would have used terms in
the same article-some in their general and another in its technical sense. In other words, the term
'physical injuries' should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries,
bacause the terms used with the latter are general terms. In any case the Code Commission
recommended that the civil action for physical injuries be similar to the civil action for assault and
battery in American Law, and this recommendation must hove been accepted by the Legislature
when it approved the article intact as recommended. If the intent has been to establish a civil action
for the bodily harm received by the complainant similar to the civil action for assault and battery, as
the Code Commission states, the civil action should lie whether the offense committed is that of
physical injuries, or frustrated homicide, or attempted homicide, or even death," (Carandang vs.
Santiago, 97 Phil. 94, 96-97 [1955].)

Corpus vs. Paje, L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, which states that reckless imprudence or criminal
negligence is not included in Article 33 of the Civil Code is not authoritative. Of eleven justices only nine took part in
the decision and four of them merely concurred in the result.

In the light of the foregoing, it is apparent that the civil action against Dr. Japzon may proceed independently of the
criminal action against her.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted; the order dismissing Civil Case No. 141 is hereby set aside; no
special pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. 1äw phï1.ñët

Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, De Castro and Escolin, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., concurring:

I concur. Death due to a negligent act may be a delict or quasi-delict. It may create a civil action based on article
100 of the Penal Code or an action based on culpa aquiliana under article 2176 of the Civil Code. These alternatives
are assumed in article 2177 of the Civil Code "but the plaintiff cannot recover twice for the same act or omission of
the defendant" (Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607 and Sudario vs. Acro Taxi and Yuson, 86 Phil. 1. See Formento vs.
CA, L-26442, August 29,1969,29 SCRA 437).

The term "physical injuries" in article 33 of the Civil Code includes death and may give rise to an independent civil
action (Dyogi vs. Yatco, 100 Phil. 1095).

The rule in Corpus vs. Paje, L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, that reckless imprudence is not included in
article 33 of the Civil Code, is not authoritative doctrine because it was concurred in by only five Justices. Four
Justices concurred in the result.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., concurring:

I concur. Death due to a negligent act may be a delict or quasi-delict. It may create a civil action based on article
100 of the Penal Code or an action based on culpa aquiliana under article 2176 of the Civil Code. These alternatives
are assumed in article 2177 of the Civil Code "but the plaintiff cannot recover twice for the same act or omission of
the defendant" (Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607 and Sudario vs. Acro Taxi and Yuson, 86 Phil. 1. See Formento vs.
CA, L-26442, August 29,1969,29 SCRA 437).

The term "physical injuries" in article 33 of the Civil Code includes death and may give rise to an independent civil
action (Dyogi vs. Yatco, 100 Phil. 1095).

The rule in Corpus vs. Paje, L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, that reckless imprudence is not included in
article 33 of the Civil Code, is not authoritative doctrine because it was concurred in by only five Justices. Four
Justices concurred in the result.
MAXIMO MARCIA, AMALIA MOJICA, TIRSO YAP,
DAMIANA MARCIA, EDGAR MARCIA, and RENATO YAP,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPREALS, FELARDO PAJE
and VICTORY LINER, INC., respondents.
Facts:

On December 23, 1956, in the municipality of Lubao Pampanga, a bus operated by Victory Liner, Inc. and driven by
Felardo Paje, collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter’s death and in physical injuries to
petitioner Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. Thereupon, an information for homicide and serious physical injuries thru
reckless imprudence was filed against Paje in RTC Pampanga.

On January 23, 1957 an action for damages was filed in the RTC of Rizal by the petitioner against Victory and Paje,
alleging that the mishap due to the reckless imprudence and negligence of the latter in driving.

While the civil case was in progress in Rizal, RTC Pampanga rendered its decision and convicted the respondent.
However, in their appeal to the Ca they were acquitted.

As conducted by the CA, criminal negligence is wanting in the case, and that Paje was not even guilty of Civil
Negligence because it was a case of mere accident.

Respondent Paje in the Civil Case in Rizal moved for dismissal of the complaint invoking the decision of the CA for
his acquittal. However, the Rizal RTC dismissed the motion and thereafter continued the trial. The RTC Rizal
dismissed the complaint against Victory and Paje based on the decision of the CA.

The petitioner appealed to the CA invoking Article 33 of the New Civil Code and Sec. 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court and not Sec. 3.

The CA held that private respondent cannot be held civilly liable after it had ruled in the criminal action that
negligence was wanting and that the collision was pure accident.

Issue:

Whether the civil case filed separately be dismissed.

Ruling:

It was held by the court that Article 33 speaks only of defamation, fraud and physical injuries. The injuries suffered
by the petitioners were alleged to be the result of criminal negligence; they were not inflicted with malice. Hence, no
independent civil action for damages maybe instituted in connection therewith. Furthermore, Section 3 (c), Rule 111
of the Rules of Court states that “extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from which the civil might arise did not exist.” Otherwise stated, unless the act from which the
civil liability arises is declared to be non-existent in the final judgment, the extinction of the criminal liability will not
carry with it the extinction of the civil liability.
G.R. No. L-34529 January 27, 1983

MAXIMO MARCIA, AMALIA MOJICA, TIRSO YAP, DAMIANA MARCIA,

EDGAR MARCIA, and RENATO YAP, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, FELARDO PAJE, and VICTORY LINER,
INC., respondents.
Ricardo J. Francisco, for petitioners.

Flors, Macapagal, Ocampo & Dizon for private respondents.

RELOVA, J.:

Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, which dismissed the complaint filed by tile petitioners against private respondents in the concept of an
independent civil action for damages for physical injuries resulting from reckless imprudence.

On December 23, 1956, in the municipality of Lubao, Pampanga, a passenger bus operated by private respondent
Victory Liner, Inc. and driven by its employee. private respondent Felardo Paje, collided with a jeep driven by
Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter's death and in physical injuries to herein petitioners, Edgar Marcia and
Renato Yap. Thereupon, an information for homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was
filed against Felardo Paje in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (Criminal Case No. 2745).

On January 23, 1957, an action for damages (Civil Case No. 4425) was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap, together with their respective parents. against the Victory Liner, Inc. and Felardo
Paje, alleging that, the mishap was due to the reckless imprudence and negligence of the latter in driving the
passenger bus.

While said Civil Case No. 4425 was in progress in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the criminal action proceeded
in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (Criminal Case No. 2745). The accused Felardo Paje was convicted of
the offense charged. However, on appeal to the Court of Appeals, he was acquitted in a decision promulgated on
November 3, 1982, based on the findings, to wit:

1 That the Victory Liner bus left its post, kilometer post no. 156, in San Marcelino, Zambales, at
about 2:00 AM

2 That on the highway at Lubao, Pampanga, between Posts Nos. 83 and 84, the appellant driver
thereof, saw a cargo truck parked in the middle of the right lane of the road to Manila, without

3 That appellant slackened the speed of his truck from 60 km. p.h. to 35 or 40 km. p. h. in order to
pass said truck;

4 That the appellant did not see the oncoming jeep until it swerved to the left.

5 That the jeep was still far so appellant attempted to pass the truck but before he could do so, the
jeep came very fast at the center of the road and out of its lane.

6 That the passengers of the bus shouted at the appellant to bring the bus to the side so as to avoid
a frontal collision with he jeep, and appellant brought his bus to the right shoulder of the road going
to Bataan;
 7 That the jeep driven by the deceased Clemente Marcia was running at a fast pace for which
reason the driver lost control and veered sharply to the right shoulder of the road and crashed into
the bus, parked thereat a few seconds before.

8 That appellant was not speeding, was diligent, and hence, not liable for the collision which at the
least, was a fortuitous event for which no one was responsible.

and the conclusion that "CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE is WANTING in this case, and that appellant was NOT even
guilty of CIVIL NEGLIGENCE, Insofar as appellant was concerned, it was a case of PURE ACCIDENT."

As a consequence, herein private respondents, defendants in Civil Case No. 4425 of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, moved for the dismissal of the complaint invoking the decision of the Court of Appeals acquitting Felardo Paje
and citing Section I (d), Rule 107 of the Rules of Court now Section 3 (c), Rule I I I of the New Rules of Court), which
reads:

SECTION 1. Rules governing civil actions arising from offenses. — Except as otherwise provided by
law, the following rules shall be observed:

xxx xxx xxx

(d) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not
exist. In the other cases, the persons entitled to the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and
in the manner provided by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and
reparation or indemnity for the damages suffered.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and, thereafter, continued to hear defendants' (herein private
respondents) evidence. The following were presented as defendants' evidence in chief:

(a) the whole record of Criminal Case No. 2745 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in which
defendant Felardo Paje was by reason of the occurrence prosecuted criminally and convicted of
homicide with serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence;

(b) the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 01691 Cr, acquitting the accused; and

(c) copy of the brief of the said defendant as accused-appellant in the said Court of Appeals case.

On August 10, 1966, the Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered a decision dismissing plaintiffs' complaint against
the defendants Victory Liner, Inc. and Felardo Paje, without pronouncement as to costs.

Petitioners appealed the case to the (Court of Appeals CA-G.R. No. 38964-R) alleging that the acquittal of Paje in
the criminal action for homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence "is not a ground for
dismissing the complaint in the instant civil action; that the instant civil action is entirely separate and distinct from
the criminal action and shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, so that whatever may have been the
result of the criminal action is irrelevant to this civil action; that Section 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court and not
Section 3, paragraph (c) of the said rule applies; that the statement in the decision of the Court of Appeals in the
criminal action that defendant Paje as accused therein was not guilty of civil negligence is without the jurisdiction of
the said Court to make and is to be completely disregarded as an extraneous, officious and void statement which
cannot affect in any way the instant civil action; that the records of the criminal action against defendant Paje are
inadmissible evidence; that it has been established in the case at bar, not only by preponderance of evidence but by
uncontradicted, conclusive evidence that petitioners suffered damages as a proximate result of the negligence of
respondent Paje and that it has been established, not only by preponderance of evidence but by uncontradicted,
conclusive evidence, that the damages suffered by petitioners as a result of the negligence of private respondents is
in the amount of P250,817.96, and that the latter should be sentenced, jointly and severally, to pay the same to
petitioner.
In the meantime, the heirs of Clemente Marcia who, as aforesaid, died as a result of the collision, instituted a
separate civil action in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No. 6880) for damages based on the alleged
reckless imprudence of bus driver Felardo Paje, praying that the driver and the Victory Liner, Inc. be ordered to pay
jointly and severally the amount of damages claimed. The complaint of the heirs of Clemente Marcia was dismissed
by the trial court. Appeal on questions of law was taken to this Court (Laura Corpus et al vs. Felardo Paje at al, 28
SCRA 1062) which, however, affirmed the order for the reason, among others, that "(1) The acquittal of the
defendant Felardo Paje by the Court of Appeals in the criminal action on the ground that the reckless imprudence or
criminal negligence charged against him did not exist and that the collision was a case of pure accident, was a bar
to the civil action for damages for the death of Clemente Marcia, which action was based upon the same criminal
negligence of which the defendant Felardo Paje was acquitted in the criminal action."

Following the ruling of this Court in the Corpus vs. Paje decision, respondent Court of Appeals held that the private
respondents Cannot be held civilly liable after it had ruled in the criminal action that negligence was wanting and
that the collision was a case of pure accident.

Dissatisfied with the decision, petitioners have come to US alleging that the Court of Appeals erred:

I.

IN NOT HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS INSTANT CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES AGAINST
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FOR PHYSICAL INJURIES RESULTING FROM NEGLIGENCE IS AN
INDEPENDENT ONE, ENTIRELY SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM THE CRIMINAL ACTION,
UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLES 33, 2176 AND 2177 OF THE NEW (CIVIL CODE AND
SECTION 2 OF RULE 111 OF THE RULES OF COURT. AND IN INSTEAD HOLDING THAT THE
INSTANT ACTION IS NOT AMONG THE INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS AUTHORIZED BY THE
SAID PROVISIONS.

II.

IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ACQUITTAL OF RESPONDENT FELARDO PAJE, DRIVER OF

RESPONDENT VICTORY LINER, INC., IN THE CRIMINAL ACTION BASED ON THE SAID
PHYSICAL INJURIES AND NEGLIGENCE IS ENTIRELY IRRELEVANT TO THE INSTANT CIVIL
ACTION FOR DAMAGES BY VIRTUE OF THE AFORECITED PROVISIONS OF THE NEW CIVIL
CODE AND THE RULES OF COURT, AND IN INSTEAD HOLDING THAT THE SAID ACQUITTAL
IS A BAR TO THE INSTANT CIVIL ACTION UNDER SECTION 3 (c) OF RULE I I I AND SECTION
49 (c) OF RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT.

III.

IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THE

INSTANT CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES, CONSISTING OF THE RECORDS OF THE CRIMINAL
ACTION IN THE TRIAL COURT, THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ACQUITTING
RESPONDENT PAJE AND THE COPY OF THE BRIEF OF THE SAID RESPONDENT AS
ACCUSED-APPELLANT, ARE INADMISSIBLE IN THE INSTANT CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES.

IV.

IN NOT HOLDING THAT IT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE CASE AT BAR, NOT ONLY BY
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE BUT BY UNCONTRADICTED, CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE,
THAT PETITIONERS SUFFERED DAMAGES AS A PROXIMATE RESULT OF THE NEGLIGENCE
OF RESPONDENT PAJE.

V.

IN NOT HOLDING THAT IT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED, NOT ONLY BY PREPONDERANCE OF

EVIDENCE BUT BY UNCONTRADICTED, CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE, THAT THE DAMAGES
SUFFERED BY PETITIONERS AS A RESULT OF THE NEGLIGENCE OF DEFENDANTS IS IN
 THE AMOUNT OF P250,817.96, AND IN NOT SENTENCING PRIVATE RESPONDENTS JOINTLY
AND SEVERALLY TO PAY THE SAME TO PETITIONERS.

It is the stand of herein petitioners that Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, not Section 3 (c) thereof, should
apply in the case at bar.

Sec. 2. Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case,
provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

We do not agree, Section 2 of Rule 111 merely refers to the institution of an independent civil action without waiting
for the filing or termination of the criminal action and requires only preponderance of evidence to prosper and not
proof beyond reasonable doubt as required for conviction in criminal cases. However, an acquittal based on the
finding that the facts upon which civil liability did not exist, bars the filing of an independent civil action if it is based
on the crime. As early as 1952, We have held in the case of Tan vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Company 91 Phil. 672,
that "the acquittal of the accused from the criminal charge will not necessarily extinguish the civil liability unless the
court declares in the judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Where the court
states 'that the evidence throws no light on the cause of fire and that it was an unfortunate accident for which the
accused cannot be held responsible,' this declaration fits well into the exception of the rule which exempts the
accused, from civil liability. " Likewise, in Albornoz vs. Albornoz, 98 Phil. 785, it was the ruling that "where the
judgment in a criminal action contains an express declaration that the basis of claimant's action did not exist, the
latter's action for civil liability is barred under section 1 (d) Rule 107 of the Rules of Court." And, in De Mesa vs.
Priela 24 SCRA 582, this Court, speaking through then Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, ruled that extinction of
the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a
final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the
civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who may be liable
for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered (Sec. 3 [c], Rule 111, Rules of
Court.)"

As held in Corpus vs. Paje, supra, reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the three crimes
mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.

The above article speaks only of defamation, fraud and physical injuries. The injuries suffered by herein petitioners
were alleged to be the result of criminal negligence; they were not inflicted with malice. Hence, no independent civil
action for damages may be instituted in connection therewith. Further, Section 3 (c), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
states that "(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist." Otherwise
stated, unless the act from which the civil liability arises is declared to be nonexistent in the final judgment, the
extinction of the criminal liability will not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability. Thus, if a person is charged
with homicide and successfully pleaded self-defense, his acquittal by reason thereof will extinguish his civil liability.
He has not incurred any criminal liability. On the other hand, if his acquittal is, for instance, due to the fact that he
was not sufficiently Identified to be the assailant, a civil action for damages may be maintained. His acquittal is not
due to non-existence of the crime from which civil liability might arise, but because he was not, in the eyes of the
court, sufficiently Identified as the perpetrator of the crime.

In People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, said that "the essence of
the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an
imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes the
negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to
determine the penalty; it does not qualify the substance of the offense.
The charge against Felardo Paje was not for homicide and physical injuries but for reckless imprudence or criminal
negligence resulting in homicide (death of Clemente Marcia) and physical injuries suffered by Edgar Marcia and
Renato Yap. They are not one of the three (3) crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code and, therefore, no
civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution.

The case of Laura Corpus vs. Felardo Paje (supra) is the same as the case at bar, the only difference being the
party-plaintiffs or petitioners. Clemente Marcia died, while Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap suffered physical injuries in
the same accident. The heirs of Clemente Marcia filed Civil Case No. 6880 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
against herein respondents. The case was dismissed and appealed directly to this Court. The order appealed from
1äw phï1.ñët

was affirmed, as recorded in Laura Corpus vs. Felardo Paje, 28 SCRA 1062.

The case at bar (Civil Case No. 4425) was filed by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap against the same defendants in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal. After trial, the case was dismissed and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It is
now before Us on appeal by certiorari from the said decision.

Relative to the admissibility of the documents, to wit; (a) the records of the criminal case against Paje, (b) the
decision of the Court of Appeals acquitting the latter; and (c) copy of the brief of the respondent Paje as accused-
appellant, suffice it to say that since petitioners' cause of action is based on the alleged recklessness and
imprudence of respondent Paje it necessarily follows that his acquittal by the Court of Appeals and its declaration
that the mishap was "pure accident" are relevant and material evidence. In fact, the lower court may even take
judicial notice of the decision of the Court of Appeals in said criminal case.

Finally, with respect to the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, well settled is the rule that the same are final and
cannot be disturbed by Us, particularly where they are based, as they are in the case at bar, upon substantial
evidence.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. With costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
II. PERSONS
ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.
No. L-16439. July 20, 1961

Facts:

Nita Villanueva came to know Geluz when she was pregnant by her husband before their marriage. Geluz performed
an abortion on Nita Villanueva. After the latter’s marriage, she again became pregnant and since she was employed in
the Commission on Elections, the pregnancy was inconvenient and she had herself aborted again by Geluz. In less
than two years, she again became pregnant and had her two-month old fetus aborted by Geluz for a sum of fifty
pesos. Nita’s husband was then campaigning for his election and was aware and did not give consent to the abortion.
He filed for an action for the award of damages. The trial court and Court of Appeals predicated the award of
damages in the sum of three thousand pesos for moral damages.

Issue:

Whether or not the spouses Lazo could recover damages from the physician who caused the same.

Held:

The petition is meritorious.

The minimum award for the death of a person does not cover the case of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with
personality and incapable of having rights and obligations. Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of
personal injury or death pertains primarily to the injured, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to the
parents or heirs of an unborn child. The damages which the parents of an unborn child can recover are limited to the
moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the fetus, on account of distress and anguish
attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations. In this case, however, the appellee was
indifferent to the previous abortions of his wife, clearly indicative that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his
parental hopes and expectations.

The decision is reversed and the complaint ordered is dismissed.

G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961
ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO,
respondents.
Mariano H. de Joya for petitioner.

A.P. Salvador for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured
her abortion, could recover damages from physician who caused the same.

The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondent Oscar Lazo, the of Nita
Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician. Convinced of the merits of the complaint upon the evidence
adduced, the trial court rendered judgment favor of plaintiff Lazo and against defendant Geluz, ordering the latter to
pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. On appeal, Court of Appeals, in a special
division of five, sustained the award by a majority vote of three justices as against two, who rendered a separate
dissenting opinion.

The facts are set forth in the majority opinion as follows:

Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948 — through her aunt Paula
Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal
her pregnancy from her parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by the defendant. After
her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the Commission on
Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the defendant in October
1953. Less than two years later, she again became pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister
Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez
streets in Manila, where the three met the defendant and his wife. Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old
foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency. The plaintiff was at this time in the province of
Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the
abortion.

It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of damages. Upon
application of the defendant Geluz we granted certiorari.

The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages in the sum of P3,000.06 upon the
provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. This we believe to be error, for
the said article, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover the case of an
unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality. Under the system of our Civil Code, "la criatura abortiva no
alcanza la categoria de persona natural y en consscuencia es un ser no nacido a la vida del Derecho" (Casso-Cervera,
"Diccionario de Derecho Privado", Vol. 1, p. 49), being incapable of having rights and obligations.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it
is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the
injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of
action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no
transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished
from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato
habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by
imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition
specified in the following article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated
from its mother's womb.

The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is generally held that recovery can not had for the
death of an unborn child (Stafford vs. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555; Dietrich vs. Northampton, 52 Am. Rep.
242; and numerous cases collated in the editorial note, 10 ALR, (2d) 639).

This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages must be those
inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his right to life
and physical integrity. Because the parents can not expect either help, support or services from an unborn child, they
would normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis that
was the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental
expectations (Civ. Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art.
2230). But in the case before us, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis for an award
of moral damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by
the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and
affections. The lower court expressly found, and the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not contradict it,
that the appellee was aware of the second abortion; and the probabilities are that he was likewise aware of the first.
Yet despite the suspicious repetition of the event, he appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the
causes thereof, and secure the punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion,
the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant. His
only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money payment, since he sued for
P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances of record,
was clearly exaggerated.

The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that:

It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband who righteously feels outraged by the abortion which his wife
has deliberately sought at the hands of a physician would be highminded rather than mercenary; and that his primary
concern would be to see to it that the medical profession was purged of an unworthy member rather than turn his
wife's indiscretion to personal profit, and with that idea in mind to press either the administrative or the criminal
cases he had filed, or both, instead of abandoning them in favor of a civil action for damages of which not only he, but
also his wife, would be the beneficiaries.

It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of appellee's wife, without medical necessity to
warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible act, that can not be too severely condemned; and the consent of
the woman or that of her husband does not excuse it. But the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an
award of damage that, under the circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.

The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed. Without costs.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Department of Justice and the Board of Medical Examiners for their
information and such investigation and action against the appellee Antonio Geluz as the facts may warrant.
Quimiguing v Icao G.R. No. 26795 July
31, 1970
J. J.B.L. Reyes

Facts:
Icao, a married man, impregnated Quimiging, a minor. As a result, she had to pay for hospitalization and stopped
studying. The latter claimed damages Php 120 a month. Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack
of cause of action since the complaint did not allege that the child had been born. The trial judge sustained defendant's
motion and dismissed the complaint.
Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, she had later given birth to a baby
girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable, since the original
complaint averred no cause of action. The plaintiff appealed directly to this Court.

Issue: Is a conceived child entitled to support?

Held: Yes. Petition granted.

Ratio:
A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable
to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to
support from its progenitors.
It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that support is an obligation of
parents and illegitimate children "does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn," violates Article 40 aforesaid,
besides imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the text of Article 291. It is true that Article 40 prescribing that
"the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it" adds further "provided it be born
later with the conditions specified in the following article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely
delivered from the mother's womb).

Auxiliary reason: A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to force a woman
not his wife to yield to his lust constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim
compensation for the damage caused. Says Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:
ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts

Hence, the girl has a cause of action.

G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970
CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO
QUIMIGUING and JACOBA CABILIN, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee.
Torcuato L. Galon for plaintiffs-appellants.

Godardo Jacinto for defendant-appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal on points of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte (Judge Onofre Sison
Abalos, presiding), in its Civil Case No. 1590, dismissing a complaint for support and damages, and another order
denying amendment of the same pleading.

The events in the court of origin can be summarized as follows:

Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in the court below. In her complaint it was
averred that the parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and confidential relations; that defendant Icao,
although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation, and
without her consent; that as a result she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and
plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's fees.

Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege that
the child had been born; and after hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained defendant's motion and dismissed the
complaint.

Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later
given birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable,
since the original complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly to this Court.

We find the appealed orders of the court below to be untenable. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given
by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly of
the defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the
said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as
prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in
preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after
the death of the testator Article 854, Civil Code).

ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn children may be accepted by those persons who would legally
represent them if they were already born.
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at
the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the
devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to
the right of 'representation.

It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that support is an obligation of
parents and illegitimate children "does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn," violates Article 40
aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the text of Article 291. It is true that Article 40
prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it" adds further
"provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the
time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent to the
right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would become entirely useless and ineffective.
Manresa, in his Commentaries (5th Ed.) to the corresponding Article 29 of the Spanish Civil Code, clearly points this
out:

Los derechos atribuidos al nasciturus no son simples expectativas, ni aun en el sentido tecnico que la moderna
doctrina da a esta figura juridica sino que constituyen un caso de los propiamente Ilamados 'derechos en estado de
pendenci'; el nacimiento del sujeto en las condiciones previstas por el art. 30, no determina el nacimiento de aquellos
derechos (que ya existian de antemano), sino que se trata de un hecho que tiene efectos declarativos. (1 Manresa,
Op. cit., page 271)

A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to force a woman not his wife to
yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint in this case) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim
that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused. Says Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:

ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts:

xxx xxx xxx

(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28 ....

Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she was carrying, plaintiff herself had a cause of action for
damages under the terms of the complaint; and the order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action was
doubly in error.

WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.
CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION v.
ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S.
MONTAÑO, GR No. 182836, 2009-10-13
Facts:

granting bereavement leave and other death benefits to Rolando P. Hortillano (Hortillano), grounded on... the death
of his unborn child.

Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) and a member
of respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines
for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed on 9

January 2006, a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent,
pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental and the Union... bereavement
leave with pay to any employee in case of death of the employee's legitimate dependent (parents, spouse, children,
brothers and sisters)... claim was based on the death of Hortillano's unborn child. Hortillano's wife, Marife V.
Hortillano, had a premature delivery on 5 January 2006 while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy.[5] According to
the Certificate of Fetal

Death dated 7 January 2006, the female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental
insufficiency.

Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano's claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement
leave and other death benefits

Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel of Hortillano's claims for bereavement and other death
benefits, the Union resorted to the grievance machinery provided in the CBA.

The parties mutually chose Atty. Montaño, an Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, to resolve said issue

When the preliminary conferences again proved futile in amicably settling the dispute, the parties proceeded to
submit their respective Position Papers, [12] Replies,[13] and Rejoinders[14] to Atty. Montaño.

The Union maintained that Article X, Section 2 and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA did not specifically state that
the dependent should have first been... born alive or must have acquired juridical personality so that his/her
subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death benefits. The Union cited cases wherein employees of MKK
Steel Corporation (MKK Steel) and Mayer Steel Pipe Corporation (Mayer Steel), sister companies of

Continental Steel, in similar situations as Hortillano were able to receive death benefits under similar provisions of
their CBAs.

Steve L. Dugan (Dugan), an employee of Mayer Steel, whose wife also prematurely delivered a fetus, which had
already died prior to the delivery. Dugan was able to receive paternity leave, bereavement leave, and voluntary
contribution... under the CBA between his union and Mayer Steel.[15] Dugan's child was only 24 weeks in the womb
and died before labor, as opposed to Hortillano's child who was already 37-38 weeks in the womb and only died
during labor.

MKK Steel and Mayer Steel are located in the same compound as Continental Steel

Continental Steel posited that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a
fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement to the benefits, namely:
(1) death and (2)... status as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillano's case.
Continental Steel, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42[16] of the Civil Code, contended that only one with civil
personality could die. Hence, the unborn child never died... because it never acquired juridical personality.

Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases involving the employees of its sister companies, MKK Steel and
Mayer Steel, referred to by the Union, were irrelevant and incompetent evidence, given the separate and distinct
personalities of the companies.

On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montaño, the appointed Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, issued a Resolution[17] ruling
that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave with pay and death benefits.

bereavement leave

(1) there is "death"; (2) such death must... be of employee's "dependent"; and (3) such dependent must be
"legitimate".

benefit for death and accident insurance... a) there is "death"; (b) such death must be of employee's

"dependent"; (c) such dependent must be "legitimate"; and (d) proper legal document to be presented.[

The fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to
rely on another for support; he/she could not have... existed or sustained himself/herself without the power or aid of
someone else, specifically, his/her mother. Therefore, the fetus was already a dependent, although he/she died
during the labor or delivery. There was also no question that Hortillano and his wife were lawfully... married, making
their dependent, unborn child, legitimate.

Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review on Certiorari

Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montaño erred in granting Hortillano's claims for bereavement leave with pay
and other death benefits because no death of an employee's dependent had occurred. The death of a fetus, at
whatever stage of pregnancy, was excluded... from the coverage of the CBA since what was contemplated by the CBA
was the death of a legal person, and not that of a fetus, which did not acquire any juridical personality.

It asserted that the status of a child could only be determined upon said child's birth, otherwise, no such appellation
can be had. Hence, the conditions sine qua non for Hortillano's entitlement to bereavement... leave and other death
benefits under the CBA were lacking.

Issues:

Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montaño erred in granting Hortillano's claims for bereavement leave with pay
and other death benefits because no death of an employee's dependent had occurred. The death of a fetus, at
whatever stage of pregnancy, was excluded... from the coverage of the CBA since what was contemplated by the CBA
was the death of a legal person, and not that of a fetus, which did not acquire any juridical personality.

It asserted that the status of a child could only be determined upon said child's birth, otherwise, no such appellation
can be had. Hence, the conditions sine qua non for Hortillano's entitlement to bereavement... leave and other death
benefits under the CBA were lacking.

It asserted that the status of a child could only be determined upon said child's birth, otherwise, no such appellation
can be had. Hence, the conditions sine qua non for Hortillano's entitlement to bereavement... leave and other death
benefits under the CBA were lacking.

Ruling:

Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 February 2008, affirmed Atty. Montaño's Resolution dated 20 November
2007.
petitioner Continental Steel's] exposition on the legal sense in which the term "death" is used in the CBA fails to
impress the Court, and the same is irrelevant for ascertaining the purpose, which the grant of bereavement leave and
death benefits thereunder,... is intended to serve. While there is no arguing with [Continental Steel] that the
acquisition of civil personality of a child or fetus is conditioned on being born alive upon delivery, it does not follow
that such event of premature delivery of a fetus could never be... contemplated as a "death" as to be covered by the
CBA provision, undoubtedly an event causing loss and grief to the affected employee, with whom the dead fetus
stands in a legitimate relation... proposed a narrow and technical significance to the term

"death of a legitimate dependent" as condition for granting bereavement leave and death benefits under the CBA.

A dead fetus simply cannot be... equated with anything less than "loss of human life", especially for the expectant
parents.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolution
dated November 20, 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño is hereby AFFIRMED and
UPHELD.

With costs against [herein petitioner Continental Steel]

9 May 2008, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration[23] of Continental Steel.

If the provisions of the CBA are indeed clear and unambiguous, then there is no need to resort to the interpretation or
construction of the same. Moreover, Continental Steel itself admitted that neither... management nor the Union
sought to define the pertinent terms for bereavement leave and other death benefits during the negotiation of the
CBA.

And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life.[24] Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need
not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than...
the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception,[25] that the State must protect equally with the
life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered,
qualifies as... death.
Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and other death benefits under the CBA, Hortillano's claims for the same should have been granted
by Continental Steel.

We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee
and his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents' grief and sense of loss... arising from the death of their unborn child, who,
in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently.

Petition is DENIED.

granted to Rolando P. Hortillano bereavement leave pay and other death benefits in the amounts of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00)
and Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00), respectively, grounded on the death of his unborn child,... are AFFIRMED. Costs against Continental
Steel Manufacturing Corporation

Principles:

20 November 2007

The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child
acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born.

Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death.

First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code on natural persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37 of the
same Code, the very first of the general provisions on civil personality

Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality
may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired... juridical personality could die.
G.R. No. 182836 October 13, 2009
CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAÑO and
NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY
OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (NMCSC-
SUPER), Respondents.
DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision1 dated 27
February 2008 and the Resolution2 dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the
Resolution3 dated 20 November 2007 of respondent Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño
(Montaño) granting bereavement leave and other death benefits to Rolando P. Hortillano (Hortillano), grounded on
the death of his unborn child.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) and a member
of respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines
for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed on 9 January 2006, a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and
Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded
between Continental and the Union, which reads:

ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE

xxxx

Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVE—The Company agrees to grant a bereavement leave with pay to any employee in
case of death of the employee’s legitimate dependent (parents, spouse, children, brothers and sisters) based on the
following:

2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao, Bulacan - 7 days

2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila - 11 days

xxxx

ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS

xxxx

Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE—The Company shall grant death and accidental insurance to the
employee or his family in the following manner:

xxxx
4.3 DEPENDENTS—Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (Php11,550.00) in case of death of the employees
legitimate dependents (parents, spouse, and children). In case the employee is single, this benefit covers the
legitimate parents, brothers and sisters only with proper legal document to be presented (e.g. death certificate).

The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child. Hortillano’s wife, Marife V. Hortillano, had a
premature delivery on 5 January 2006 while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy.5 According to the Certificate of
Fetal Death dated 7 January 2006, the female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental
insufficiency.6

Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement
leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance.7

Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel of Hortillano’s claims for bereavement and other death
benefits, the Union resorted to the grievance machinery provided in the CBA. Despite the series of conferences held,
the parties still failed to settle their dispute,8 prompting the Union to file a Notice to Arbitrate before the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), National Capital
Region (NCR).9 In a Submission Agreement dated 9 October 2006, the Union and Continental Steel submitted for
voluntary arbitration the sole issue of whether Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits
pursuant to Article X, Section 2

and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA.10 The parties mutually chose Atty. Montaño, an Accredited Voluntary
Arbitrator, to resolve said issue.11

When the preliminary conferences again proved futile in amicably settling the dispute, the parties proceeded to
submit their respective Position Papers, 12 Replies,13 and Rejoinders14 to Atty. Montaño.

The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to the CBA.
The Union maintained that Article X, Section 2 and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA did not specifically state that
the dependent should have first been born alive or must have acquired juridical personality so that his/her
subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death benefits. The Union cited cases wherein employees of MKK
Steel Corporation (MKK Steel) and Mayer Steel Pipe Corporation (Mayer Steel), sister companies of Continental Steel,
in similar situations as Hortillano were able to receive death benefits under similar provisions of their CBAs.

The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve L. Dugan (Dugan), an employee of Mayer Steel, whose wife also
prematurely delivered a fetus, which had already died prior to the delivery. Dugan was able to receive paternity
leave, bereavement leave, and voluntary contribution under the CBA between his union and Mayer Steel.15 Dugan’s
child was only 24 weeks in the womb and died before labor, as opposed to Hortillano’s child who was already 37-38
weeks in the womb and only died during labor.

The Union called attention to the fact that MKK Steel and Mayer Steel are located in the same compound as
Continental Steel; and the representatives of MKK Steel and Mayer Steel who signed the CBA with their respective
employees’ unions were the same as the representatives of Continental Steel who signed the existing CBA with the
Union.

Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which provides that all doubts in labor legislations and labor
contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety of and decent living for the laborer.

On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of
an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement to the
benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillano’s case.
Continental Steel, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 4216 of the Civil Code, contended that only one with civil personality
could die. Hence, the unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding from the
same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a
person at all. Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality. A
fetus that was delivered dead could not be considered a dependent, since it never needed any support, nor did it ever
acquire the right to be supported.

Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was clear and unambiguous. Since neither of the parties
qualified the terms used in the CBA, the legally accepted definitions thereof were deemed automatically accepted by
both parties. The failure of the Union to have unborn child included in the definition of dependent, as used in the CBA
– the death of whom would have qualified the parent-employee for bereavement leave and other death benefits –
bound the Union to the legally accepted definition of the latter term.

Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases involving the employees of its sister companies, MKK Steel and
Mayer Steel, referred to by the Union, were irrelevant and incompetent evidence, given the separate and distinct
personalities of the companies. Neither could the Union sustain its claim that the grant of bereavement leave and
other death benefits to the parent-employee for the loss of an unborn child constituted "company practice."

On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montaño, the appointed Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, issued a Resolution17 ruling
that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave with pay and death benefits.

Atty. Montaño identified the elements for entitlement to said benefits, thus:

This Office declares that for the entitlement of the benefit of bereavement leave with pay by the covered employees
as provided under Article X, Section 2 of the parties’ CBA, three (3) indispensable elements must be present: (1) there
is "death"; (2) such death must be of employee’s "dependent"; and (3) such dependent must be "legitimate".

On the otherhand, for the entitlement to benefit for death and accident insurance as provided under Article XVIII,
Section 4, paragraph (4.3) of the parties’ CBA, four (4) indispensable elements must be present: (a) there is "death";
(b) such death must be of employee’s "dependent"; (c) such dependent must be "legitimate"; and (d) proper legal
document to be presented.18

Atty. Montaño found that there was no dispute that the death of an employee’s legitimate dependent occurred. The
fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely
on another for support; he/she could not have existed or sustained himself/herself without the power or aid of
someone else, specifically, his/her mother. Therefore, the fetus was already a dependent, although he/she died
during the labor or delivery. There was also no question that Hortillano and his wife were lawfully married, making
their dependent, unborn child, legitimate.

In the end, Atty. Montaño decreed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, a resolution is hereby rendered ORDERING [herein petitioner Continental Steel] to
pay Rolando P. Hortillano the amount of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (₱4,939.00), representing his
bereavement leave pay and the amount of Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (₱11,550.00) representing
death benefits, or a total amount of ₱16,489.00

The complaint against Manuel Sy, however, is ORDERED DISMISSED for lack of merit.

All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Further, parties are hereby ORDERED to faithfully abide with the herein dispositions.

Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review on Certiorari,19 under Section 1,
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101697.

Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montaño erred in granting Hortillano’s claims for bereavement leave with pay
and other death benefits because no death of an employee’s dependent had occurred. The death of a fetus, at
whatever stage of pregnancy, was excluded from the coverage of the CBA since what was contemplated by the CBA
was the death of a legal person, and not that of a fetus, which did not acquire any juridical personality. Continental
Steel pointed out that its contention was bolstered by the fact that the term death was qualified by the phrase
legitimate dependent. It asserted that the status of a child could only be determined upon said child’s birth,
otherwise, no such appellation can be had. Hence, the conditions sine qua non for Hortillano’s entitlement to
bereavement leave and other death benefits under the CBA were lacking.

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 February 2008, affirmed Atty. Montaño’s Resolution dated 20
November 2007. The appellate court interpreted death to mean as follows:

[Herein petitioner Continental Steel’s] exposition on the legal sense in which the term "death" is used in the CBA fails
to impress the Court, and the same is irrelevant for ascertaining the purpose, which the grant of bereavement leave
and death benefits thereunder, is intended to serve. While there is no arguing with [Continental Steel] that the
acquisition of civil personality of a child or fetus is conditioned on being born alive upon delivery, it does not follow
that such event of premature delivery of a fetus could never be contemplated as a "death" as to be covered by the
CBA provision, undoubtedly an event causing loss and grief to the affected employee, with whom the dead fetus
stands in a legitimate relation. [Continental Steel] has proposed a narrow and technical significance to the term
"death of a legitimate dependent" as condition for granting bereavement leave and death benefits under the CBA.
Following [Continental Steel’s] theory, there can be no experience of "death" to speak of. The Court, however, does
not share this view. A dead fetus simply cannot be equated with anything less than "loss of human life", especially for
the expectant parents. In this light, bereavement leave and death benefits are meant to assuage the employee and
the latter’s immediate family, extend to them solace and support, rather than an act conferring legal status or
personality upon the unborn child. [Continental Steel’s] insistence that the certificate of fetal death is for statistical
purposes only sadly misses this crucial point.20

Accordingly, the fallo of the 27 February 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolution
dated November 20, 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño is hereby AFFIRMED and
UPHELD.

With costs against [herein petitioner Continental Steel].21

In a Resolution22 dated 9 May 2008, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration23 of Continental
Steel.

Hence, this Petition, in which Continental Steel persistently argues that the CBA is clear and unambiguous, so that the
literal and legal meaning of death should be applied. Only one with juridical personality can die and a dead fetus
never acquired a juridical personality.

We are not persuaded.

As Atty. Montaño identified, the elements for bereavement leave under Article X, Section 2 of the CBA are: (1) death;
(2) the death must be of a dependent, i.e., parent, spouse, child, brother, or sister, of an employee; and (3) legitimate
relations of the dependent to the employee. The requisites for death and accident insurance under Article XVIII,
Section 4(3) of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, who could be a parent, spouse, or child
of a married employee; or a parent, brother, or sister of a single employee; and (4) presentation of the proper legal
document to prove such death, e.g., death certificate.

It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion of Continental Steel that the provisions of the CBA are clear
and unambiguous, its fundamental argument for denying Hortillano’s claim for bereavement leave and other death
benefits rests on the purportedly proper interpretation of the terms "death" and "dependent" as used in the CBA. If
the provisions of the CBA are indeed clear and unambiguous, then there is no need to resort to the interpretation or
construction of the same. Moreover, Continental Steel itself admitted that neither management nor the Union sought
to define the pertinent terms for bereavement leave and other death benefits during the negotiation of the CBA.
The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of death is
misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines
when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death.

First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code on natural persons,
must be applied in relation to Article 37 of the same Code, the very first of the general provisions on civil personality,
which reads:

Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person
and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be
lost.

We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her juridical capacity and capacity to act as
a person are not in issue. It is not a question before us whether the unborn child acquired any rights or incurred any
obligations prior to his/her death that were passed on to or assumed by the child’s parents. The rights to
bereavement leave and other death benefits in the instant case pertain directly to the parents of the unborn child
upon the latter’s death.

Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil
Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only
those who have acquired juridical personality could die.

And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life.24 Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need
not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than
the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception,25 that the State must protect equally with the life
of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered,
qualifies as death.

Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As Continental Steel itself defines, a
dependent is "one who relies on another for support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself without the power or
aid of someone else." Under said general definition,26 even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillano’s
child could not have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillano’s wife,
for sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA provisions in question that the dependent may be the parent,
spouse, or child of a married employee; or the parent, brother, or sister of a single employee. The CBA did not provide
a qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or must have acquired civil
personality, as Continental Steel avers. Without such qualification, then child shall be understood in its more general
sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mother’s womb.

The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent child’s status in relation to his/her parents. In Angeles v.
Maglaya,27 we have expounded on who is a legitimate child, viz:

A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the element of lawful
union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be
more emphatic on the matter: "Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate."
(Emphasis ours.)

Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel,28 we identified an illegitimate child to be as follows:

The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated in the Family Code. Now,
there are only two classes of children -- legitimate (and those who, like the legally adopted, have the rights of
legitimate children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless
the law itself gives them legitimate status. (Emphasis ours.)
It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited jurisprudence, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
child attaches upon his/her conception. In the present case, it was not disputed that Hortillano and his wife were
validly married and that their child was conceived during said marriage, hence, making said child legitimate upon her
conception.

Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to comply with the fourth element entitling him to death and
accident insurance under the CBA, i.e., presentation of the death certificate of his unborn child.

Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and other death benefits under the CBA, Hortillano’s
claims for the same should have been granted by Continental Steel.

We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give aid to, and if
possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said
that the parents’ grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a
gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but
died subsequently.

Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave and other death benefits should be
interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions thereof. Time and again, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating
that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor
of labor.29 In the same way, the CBA and CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor of labor. In Marcopper Mining
v. National Labor Relations Commission,30 we pronounced:

Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the Labor Arbiter in the assailed decision that "when the pendulum
of judgment swings to and fro and the forces are equal on both sides, the same must be stilled in favor of labor."
While petitioner acknowledges that all doubts in the interpretation of the Labor Code shall be resolved in favor of
labor, it insists that what is involved-here is the amended CBA which is essentially a contract between private
persons. What petitioner has lost sight of is the avowed policy of the State, enshrined in our Constitution, to accord
utmost protection and justice to labor, a policy, we are, likewise, sworn to uphold.

In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v. NLRC [183 SCRA 451 (1990)], we categorically stated that:

When conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be weighed on the scales of social justice, the heavier influence
of the latter should be counter-balanced by sympathy and compassion the law must accord the underprivileged
worker.

Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265 (1991)], we declared:

Any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor pursuant to the social justice policy.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 27 February 2008 and Resolution dated 9 May 2008 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution dated 20 November 2007 of Accredited
Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño, which granted to Rolando P. Hortillano bereavement leave pay and
other death benefits in the amounts of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (₱4,939.00) and Eleven
Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (₱11,550.00), respectively, grounded on the death of his unborn child, are
AFFIRMED. Costs against Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation.

SO ORDERED.
Martinez v Martinez March 31, 1902 G.R. No.
445
J. Cooper
Facts:

This is an action brought by Pedro Martinez Ilustre, the son and the compulsory legal heir, against Francisco Martinez
Garcia for a declaration of prodigality against the father.
The son claimed that the father is dissipating and squandering his estate by making donations to his second wife and
to her parents of properties amounting to over $200,000; that he has given over the administration of this estate to
the management of his wife; that the defendant has a propensity for litigation and has instituted groundless actions
against the plaintiff in order to take possession of the property held in common with the plaintiff to give it to his wife
and her relatives.
The defendant alleged that he has executed in favor of the plaintiff a general power of attorney under which the plaintiff
has administered the community estate for several years; that the plaintiff has caused the ships Germana, Don
Francisco, and Balayan, belonging to the estate, to be registered in his own name without the consent of the father
and is otherwise mismanaging and misappropriating the property of the estate, which caused the defendant to revoke
the power of attorney given to plaintiff, and that the suit brought by the defendant against the plaintiff was due to the
attitude of the son, who, notwithstanding the fact that the power of attorney had been revoked, refused to render an
account of his administration.

The Court of First Instance rendered judgment against the plaintiff and adjudged the costs against him. The plaintiff
has appealed to this court.
Issue: Is the father suffering from prodigality thereby injuring the estate of his son?

Held: No. Petition dismissed

Ratio:
The acts which constitute prodigality are not defined in the Civil Code owing to the difficulty of applying general rules
to the varying circumstances of the case and the different situations of persons.
Under our law it may inferred that the acts of prodigality must show a morbid state of mind and a disposition to spend,
waste, and lessen the estate to such an extent as is likely to expose the family to want of support, or to deprive the
forced heirs of their undisposable part of the estate.
Donations are considered as acts of liberality dictated by generosity and affection. All persons who can contract and
dispose of property may make donations. (Art. 624 of the Civil Code.)
Public policy requires that limitations of the character mentioned should be imposed upon the owner, but a law which
would impose restrictions further than such as are required by public policy may well be regarded unjust and tending
in a contrary direction, as destroying the incentive to acquire property, and as subduing the generous impulse of the
heart.
While some of the witnesses state that the possessions of the wife have greatly increased since her marriage, there
is no evidence whatever to show that there has been any perceptible diminution of the defendant’s property. This can
be accounted for only on the grounds that the father, so far from being a prodigal, is still in the full exercise of his
faculties and still possesses the industry, thrift, and ability that resulted in the accumulation of a splendid estate after
the date of his marriage with the mother of the plaintiff, to one-half of which estate the plaintiff has succeeded as heir
of the mother.
A careful consideration of the evidence is sufficient to induce the belief that the plaintiff himself possesses that
propensity for instituting lawsuits which he unjustly attributes to his father.
G.R. No. 445 March 31, 1902
PEDRO MARTINEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
FRANCISCO MARTINEZ, defendant-appellee.
Carlos Ledesma, for appellant.
Felipe Calderon, for appellee.

COOPER, J.:

This is an action brought by Pedro Martinez Ilustre, the son and the compulsory legal heir, against Francisco
Martinez Garcia for a declaration of prodigality against the father.

The allegations in the complaint are substantially: That Don Francisco Martinez, owing to his advanced age, is
dissipating and squandering his estate by making donations to his second wife, Doña Anastacia Ilustre, and to her
parents of properties amounting to over $200,000; that he has given over the administration of this estate to the
management of his wife; that the defendant has a propensity for litigation and has instituted groundless actions
against the plaintiff in order to take possession of the property held in common with the plaintiff to give it to his wife
and her relatives.

In a supplementary prayer plaintiff asked the court to direct that the complaint be entered in the property register of
the province, which was done by order of the court.

The defendant in his answer denies the allegations in the complaint and sets forth a state of facts quite inconsistent
with those alleged in the complaint.

Among other things, it is stated that he has executed in favor of the plaintiff a general power of attorney under which
the plaintiff has administered the community estate for several years; that the plaintiff has caused the
ships Germana, Don Francisco, and Balayan, belonging to the estate, to be registered in his own name without the
consent of the father and is otherwise mismanaging and misappropriating the property of the estate, which caused
the defendant to revoke the power of attorney given to plaintiff, and that the suit brought by the defendant against
the plaintiff was due to the attitude of the son, who, notwithstanding the fact that the power of attorney had been
revoked, refused to render an account of his administration.

The Court of First Instance rendered judgment against the plaintiff and adjudged the costs against him. The plaintiff
has appealed to this court.

The acts which constitute prodigality are not defined in the Civil Code owing to the difficulty of applying general rules
to the varying circumstances of the case and the different situations of persons.

The declaration of prodigality must be made in an ordinary action (en juicio contradictorio). (Art. 221 of the Civil
Code.)

The proceedings must be instituted by the consort or the forced heirs. (Art. 222 of the Civil Code.)

Under our law it may inferred that the acts of prodigality must show a morbid state of mind and a disposition to
spend, waste, and lessen the estate to such an extent as is likely to expose the family to want of support, or to
deprive the forced heirs of their undisposable part of the estate.

Donations are considered as acts of liberality dictated by generosity and affection. All persons who can contract and
dispose of property may make donations. (Art. 624 of the Civil Code.)
Donations may comprise all the actual property of the donor, except such as is required for the support of the donor
in a condition corresponding to his circumstances. (Art. 634 of the Civil Code.)

And with further limitation that no person can give by a donation more than what he can give by testament.

A donation is considered inofficious in all that exceeds such limits. (Art. 636 of the Civil Code.)

Public policy requires that limitations of the character mentioned should be imposed upon the owner, but a law
which would impose restrictions further than such as are required by public policy may well be regarded unjust and
tending in a contrary direction, as destroying the incentive to acquire property, and as subduing the generous
impulse of the heart.

Beyond these limitations the law does not attempt to adjust claims to generosity.

There were a number of witnesses introduced both by the plaintiff and by the defendant whose testimony it is
unnecessary to recount.

The testimony on the part of the plaintiff was wholly insufficient to support the allegations of his complaint. It was
vague, indefinite, and of an inconclusive nature.

The father's estate consisted of city property in Manila; of farms and of certain vessels, two of which are steamships.
There is no evidence offered to show any transfers by sale or mortgage of these properties. This could have been
easily done if such existed. Donations of real property must be made in a public deed (art. 633 of the Civil Code),
and the acquisition of vessels must also be included in a written instrument, and produces no effect with regard to
third person if not recorded in the Commercial Registry. (Art. 573 of the Code of Commerce.)

There is no proof that there was any money belonging to the estate, or other personal property, the transfer of which
could not be easily traced.

The son has been in possession of a greater part of the estate since November, 1897, collecting the revenue from
the ships and rents from the city property.

The farms have been non-productive on account of the disturbed conditions of the country, and the revenue from
even these has been in part collected by the son.

While some of the witnesses state that the possessions of the wife have greatly increased since her marriage, there
is no evidence whatever to show that there has been any perceptible diminution of the defendant's property. This
can be accounted for only on the grounds that the father, so far from being a prodigal, is still in the full exercise of
his faculties and still possesses the industry, thrift, and ability that resulted in the accumulation of a splendid estate
after the date of his marriage with the mother of the plaintiff, to one-half of which estate the plaintiff has succeeded
as heir of the mother.

A careful consideration of the evidence is sufficient to induce the belief that the plaintiff himself possesses that
propensity for instituting lawsuits which he unjustly attributes to his father.

The judgment of the Court of First Instance is affirmed and costs of suits in both courts is adjudged against the
plaintiff.
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964
BENGZON, J.P., J.:

Facts:

Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love decided to get married on September 4,
1954. Wassmer made the necessary preparations for the wedding including making and sending wedding invitations,
buying of wedding dress and other apparels, and other wedding necessities.

On Sept. 2, 1954, Velez left this note for his bride-to-be advising her that he will not be able to attend the wedding
because his mom was opposed to said wedding.

And one day before the wedding, he sent another message to Wassmer advising her that nothing has changed and that
he will be returning soon. Therefore, Velez did not appear and was not heard from again.

Wassmer sued Velez for damages and he failed to answer and was declared in default. On April 29, 1955, judgment was
rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages; P2,500.00 as attorney’s fees; and the costs.

On appeal, Velez argued that his failure to attend the scheduled wedding was because of fortuitous events. He further
argued that he cannot be held civilly liable for breaching his promise to marry Wassmer because there is no law upon
which such an action may be grounded. He also contested the award of exemplary and moral damages against him.

Issue:

Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong in this case.

Held:

This is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable
wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the
matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for
which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 which provides in part “any person
who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.”

And under the law, any violation of Article 21 entitles the injured party to receive an award for moral damages as
properly awarded by the lower court in this case. Further, the award of exemplary damages is also proper. Here, the
circumstances of this case show that Velez, in breaching his promise to Wassmer, acted in wanton, reckless, and
oppressive manner – this warrants the imposition of exemplary damages against him.
G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jamir for defendant-appellant.

Samson S. Alcantara for plaintiff-appellee.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed by appropriate planning and serious
endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is worse, complete public humiliation.

Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get married and set
September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his bride-to-be:

Dear Bet —

Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair today.

Please do not ask too many people about the reason why — That would only create a scandal.

Paquing

But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:

NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE .

PAKING

Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.

Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. Plaintiff adduced evidence before the
clerk of court as commissioner, and on April 29, 1955, judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff
P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the
costs.

On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings and motion for new
trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it cut. But the court, on August 2, 1955, ordered the parties and
their attorneys to appear before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage of the proceedings the possibility of
arriving at an amicable settlement." It added that should any of them fail to appear "the petition for relief and the
opposition thereto will be deemed submitted for resolution."

On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court. Instead, on the following day his counsel filed a motion
to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendants petition for relief. The counsel stated that he would confer with
defendant in Cagayan de Oro City — the latter's residence — on the possibility of an amicable element. The court
granted two weeks counted from August 25, 1955.
Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the court had expired on September 8, 1955 but
that defendant and his counsel had failed to appear.

Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order of July 6, 1956 calling the parties and their
attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956. This time. however, defendant's counsel informed the court that chances of
settling the case amicably were nil.

On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's aforesaid petition. Defendant has appealed to this
Court. In his petition of June 21, 1955 in the court a quo defendant alleged excusable negligence as ground to set
aside the judgment by default. Specifically, it was stated that defendant filed no answer in the belief that an amicable
settlement was being negotiated.

A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, must be duly
supported by an affidavit of merits stating facts constituting a valid defense. (Sec. 3, Rule 38, Rules of Court.)
Defendant's affidavit of merits attached to his petition of June 21, 1955 stated: "That he has a good and valid defense
against plaintiff's cause of action, his failure to marry the plaintiff as scheduled having been due to fortuitous event
and/or circumstances beyond his control." An affidavit of merits like this stating mere conclusions or opinions instead
of facts is not valid. (Cortes vs. Co Bun Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani vs. P. Tarrachand Bros., L-15800, December
29, 1960.)

Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in fact unnecessary, or a mere surplusage,
because the judgment sought to be set aside was null and void, it having been based on evidence adduced before the
clerk of court. In Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519, October 30, 1962, this Court pointed out that the
procedure of designating the clerk of court as commissioner to receive evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule
33) of the Rules of Court. Now as to defendant's consent to said procedure, the same did not have to be obtained for
he was declared in default and thus had no standing in court (Velez vs. Ramas, 40 Phil. 787; Alano vs. Court of First
Instance, L-14557, October 30, 1959).

In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts that the judgment is contrary to law.
The reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action for breach of promise to marry.
Indeed, our ruling in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa vs. Biansay (L-
14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere breach of a promise to marry" is not an actionable wrong. We pointed out that
Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code the provisions that would have it so.

It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with
impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage."

The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage, which
was subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and
distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-to-be's trousseau, party drsrses and
other apparel for the important occasion were purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl
were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received (Tsn.,
6; Exh. E). And then, with but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old,: simply left a note
for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home city in
Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning
soon." But he never returned and was never heard from again.

Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an
actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity,
only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with
Article 21 aforesaid.

Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages awarded were excessive. No question is raised as to the
award of actual damages. What defendant would really assert hereunder is that the award of moral and exemplary
damages, in the amount of P25,000.00, should be totally eliminated.

Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases
mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages, defendant contends that the same could not be
adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." The argument is devoid of
merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton ... , reckless [and]
oppressive manner." This Court's opinion, however, is that considering the particular circumstances of this case,
P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the lower court's judgment is hereby affirmed, with
costs.
APOLONIO TANJANCO VS. COURT OF APPEALS & ARACELI
FACTS:
Apolonio Tanjanco courted the plaintiff Araceli Santos BOTH BEING OF ADULT
AGE: that the defendant expressed and professed his undying love and affection
for plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated the tender feelings: that in
consideration of the defendant’s PROMISE OF MARRIAGE plaintiff consented and
acceded to defendant’s pleas for carnal knowledge(sexual intercourse) which later
Araceli Santos conceived a child. Apolonio REFUSED TO MARRY Araceli as
promised and refrained from seeing the plaintiff which led to her suffering from
mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feeling, moral shock and social
humiliation. The plaintiff asked that the defendant recognize the child she was
bearing; to pay her not less than P430 a month for her support plus P100,000 in
moral and exemplary damages plus 10,000 attorney’s fees.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a breach of promise of marriage can bring any action for damages
in court. Whether or not seduction has been an element in the relationship
between Apolonio and Arceli

RULING: NO case can be made since the plaintiff Araceli was a woman of adult age,
maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant with repeated acts of
intercourse. Such is not compatible to the idea of seduction. Plainly, there is
voluntariness and mutual passion: for had the appellant been deceived she would
not have again yielded to his embraces much less for one year without exacting
fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage and she would have cut all
relationship upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. One
cannot be held liable for a breach of promise to marry.
G.R. No. L-18630 December 17, 1966
APOLONIO TANJANCO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARACELI SANTOS,
respondents.

P. Carreon and G. O. Veneracion, Jr. for petitioner.

Antonio V. Bonoan for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals (in its Case No. 27210-R) revoking an order of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (in Civil Case No. Q-4797) dismissing appellant's action for support and damages.

The essential allegations of the complaint are to the effect that, from December, 1957, the defendant (appellee
herein), Apolonio Tanjanco, courted the plaintiff, Araceli Santos, both being of adult age; that "defendant expressed
and professed his undying love and affection for plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated the tender feelings"; that
in consideration of defendant's promise of marriage plaintiff consented and acceded to defendant's pleas for carnal
knowledge; that regularly until December 1959, through his protestations of love and promises of marriage,
defendant succeeded in having carnal access to plaintiff, as a result of which the latter conceived a child; that due to
her pregnant condition, to avoid embarrassment and social humiliation, plaintiff had to resign her job as secretary in
IBM Philippines, Inc., where she was receiving P230.00 a month; that thereby plaintiff became unable to support
herself and her baby; that due to defendant's refusal to marry plaintiff, as promised, the latter suffered mental
anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation. The prayer was for a decree
compelling the defendant to recognize the unborn child that plaintiff was bearing; to pay her not less than P430.00 a
month for her support and that of her baby, plus P100,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages, plus P10,000.00
attorney's fees.

Upon defendant's motion to dismiss, the court of first instance dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of
action.

Plaintiff Santos duly appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the latter ultimately decided the case, holding with the
lower court that no cause of action was shown to compel recognition of a child as yet unborn, nor for its support, but
decreed that the complaint did state a cause of action for damages, premised on Article 21 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, prescribing as follows:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

The Court of Appeals, therefore, entered judgment setting aside the dismissal and directing the court of origin to
proceed with the case.

Defendant, in turn, appealed to this Court, pleading that actions for breach of a promise to marry are not permissible
in this jurisdiction, and invoking the rulings of this Court in Estopa vs. Piansay, L-14733, September 30, 1960;
Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, L-14628, January 29, 1962; and De Jesus vs. SyQuia, 58 Phil. 886.

We find this appeal meritorious.

In holding that the complaint stated a cause of action for damages, under Article 21 above mentioned, the Court of
Appeals relied upon and quoted from the memorandum submitted by the Code Commission to the Legislature in 1949
to support the original draft of the Civil Code. Referring to Article 23 of the draft (now Article 21 of the Code), the
Commission stated:

But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive law. Fully
sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even
though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the
interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule:

"ART. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."

An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A
promise of marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present
laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above eighteen years of age. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of
marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and her
family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring any action for damages. But under
the proposed article, she and her parents would have such a right of action.

The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code Commission's memorandum
refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere
sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement,
superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs.
Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).

It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —

To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield
because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from
mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56). She must be induced to depart from the
path of virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and do have
that effect, and which result in her ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil.
123).

And in American Jurisprudence we find:

On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury;
and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recover.

Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire or curiosity of the female, and the
defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to
allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and would be a reward for
unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be swift to profit." (47 Am. Jur. 662)

Bearing these principles in mind, let us examine the complaint. The material allegations there are as follows:

I. That the plaintiff is of legal age, single, and residing at 56 South E. Diliman, Quezon City, while defendant is also of
legal age, single and residing at 525 Padre Faura, Manila, where he may be served with summons;

II. That the plaintiff and the defendant became acquainted with each other sometime in December, 1957 and soon
thereafter, the defendant started visiting and courting the plaintiff;

III. That the defendant's visits were regular and frequent and in due time the defendant expressed and professed his
undying love and affection for the plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated the tender feelings;

IV. That in the course of their engagement, the plaintiff and the defendant as are wont of young people in love had
frequent outings and dates, became very close and intimate to each other and sometime in July, 1958, in
consideration of the defendant's promises of marriage, the plaintiff consented and acceded to the former's earnest
and repeated pleas to have carnal knowledge with him;

V. That subsequent thereto and regularly until about July, 1959 except for a short period in December, 1958 when the
defendant was out of the country, the defendant through his protestations of love and promises of marriage
succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the plaintiff;

VI. That as a result of their intimate relationship, the plaintiff started conceiving which was confirmed by a doctor
sometime in July, 1959;

VII. That upon being certain of her pregnant condition, the plaintiff informed the defendant and pleaded with him to
make good his promises of marriage, but instead of honoring his promises and righting his wrong, the defendant
stopped and refrained from seeing the plaintiff since about July, 1959 has not visited the plaintiff and to all intents
and purposes has broken their engagement and his promises.

Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-
appellee, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of
intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual
passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful
persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year,
without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut chart all sexual relations
upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. Hence, we conclude that no case is made under
Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First
Instance in dismissing the complaint.

Of course, the dismissal must be understood as without prejudice to whatever actions may correspond to the child of
the plaintiff against the defendant-appellant, if any. On that point, this Court makes no pronouncement, since the
child's own rights are not here involved.

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of the Court of First
Instance is affirmed. No costs.