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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cayetano vs. Monsod
G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991.*
RENATO L. CAYETANO, petitioner, vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Qualifications of COMELEC Chairman; “Practice of law” defined.—Practice of law

means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. “To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service,
which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.” (111 ALR 23)
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term “practice of law”, particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construc-tion intended by the framers
of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a
lawyerentrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the
rich and the poor—verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement—that he has been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Same; Same; Judicial review of judgments rendered by the Commission on Appointments.—The

Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the public hearings on Monsod’s confirmation,
implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment
rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial
interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly
shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission’s judgment. In the instant case, there is no
occasion for the exercise of the Court’s corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of
discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the
writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
________________
* EN BANC.
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VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 3, 1991

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PADILLA, J., Dissenting:
Constitutional Law; Qualifications of COMELEC Chairman; Definition of “Practice of Law".—What

constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, “practice” refers to the actual performance or
application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes an active,
habitual, repeated or customary action. To “practice” law, or any profession for that matter, means, to
exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing
aide, cannot be said to be in the “practice of medicine.” A certified public accountant who works as a
clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is
employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal
Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., Dissenting:
Constitutional Law; Qualifications of COMELEC Chairman; Definition of “Practice of Law".—The

Constitution uses the phrase “engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.” The deliberate
choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional,
accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be “engaged” in an activity for ten
years requires committed participation in something which is the result of one’s decisive choice. It
means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with
intent and attention during the ten-year period.
PETITION to review the decision of the Commission on Appointments.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.
PARAS, J.:
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are
involved, the Court’s
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decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national
existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
“There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of
age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the
immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.”
(Italics supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section 1(1), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which
similarly provides:
‘There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight

Commissioners who shall be naturalborn citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be mem-bers of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.” (Italics supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a

legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines “practice of law” as:
“The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique
to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and
assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all
kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken
for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining
an office where he is held out to be an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney,
counseling clients in legal matters. negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing
and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate.” (Black’s Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
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The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v.
Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when
he:
“x x x for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or
corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in
proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee,
or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative
capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients
under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of
advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in
court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law.” (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v,
C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, (105 Phil. 173, 176–177) stated:
“The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management
of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the
law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before
a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions.” (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied)
“Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any
court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of
legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments
covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions
may
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have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and
affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions
of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the
courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between
that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves
advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these
manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of
sound moral character; and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests
upon all attorneys.” (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.], p. 665–666, citing In re
Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service
Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139, 144). (Italics ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974–
1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and
public service.
“One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he
does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of
their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing
attorney at law within the meaning of the statute.” (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. “To engage in the practice of law is to perfom those
acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any
kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.” (111
ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term “practice of law.”
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“MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do during our
review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief statement?
, -. . ..
“THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
“MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit Among
others, the qualifications provided for by Section 1 is that ‘They must be Members of the Philippine
Bar—I am quoting from the provision—'who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years/”
“To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now
employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this provision
on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of
law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in
the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they
are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the
Commission on Audit.
“This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem
it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this
provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law
for at least ten years is taken up.
“MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
“MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
“MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of
a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?
‘MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will necessarily
involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now
would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the provision on qualifications under our
provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore. the answer is yes,
“MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of law.
“MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
“MR. OPLE. Thank you.”
x x (Italics supplied)
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Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two
Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not
less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. (italics supplied)
Corollary to this is the term “private practitioner'' and which is in many ways synonymous with the word
“lawyer.” Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the
majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career
Horizons: Illinois), 1986], p. 15]).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means
“an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services.” (Ibid.). Lawyers who
practice alone are often called “sole practitioners.” Groups of lawyers are called “firms.” The firm is
usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners, Some firms may be organized as
professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm
are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried
attorneys called “associates.” (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram,
Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as
“the performance of any acts . .. . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law.
(State Bar Ass’n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting
Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost
every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be
too global to be workable. (Wolfram, op. cit).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for
lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend
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little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case.
(Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer’s role colors
much of both the public image and the selfperception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.).
Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the
importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: “Even today, there are still uninformed
laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The members
of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed
societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms.
General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases
they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely describe[d] as business counseling:
than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the
trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be
avoided where internal medicine can be effective.” (Business Star, “Corporate Finance Law/' Jan.
11,1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner will engage in a number of legal tasks,
each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other
interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice will usually perform at
least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice,
a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such
as representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare
types—a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will
require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling,
advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of
evaluation and mediation are both
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effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).

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Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very
important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial
litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers’ work the
constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized
into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice
and government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, hereinbelow quoted are emerging trends in
corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law
practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members participating in various
legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends in
corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding of

the nature and implications of the corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating rate
of information accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal policy
formulation, particularly “modelmaking” and “contingency planning,” has impressed upon us the
inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of
significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the
consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of
acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory, operational
analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an improved
decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein a
“model”, of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative
courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the trends
of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and
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formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-
disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.
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Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law can
be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional contexts and the various
approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master’s or doctorate degree
in business administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making now
have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which are
currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an
astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary step
in securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, “Corporate Finance Law,” Jan.
11,1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the “abogado de

campanilla.” He is the “big-time” lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the
tycoons and magnates of business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that a
corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary
with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their
legal problems to private law firms, Many others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other
corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a
corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax
laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and
other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission). and in other capacities
which require an ability to deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business
of the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining policy and becoming
involved in management. (Italics supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not
understanding how one’s work actually fits into the work of the organization. This can be frustrating to
someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short,
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a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the
business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer’s services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation

(MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter
the international law field. After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of
companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, this
is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced
attorneys while the younger attorneys do their “international practice” in law libraries. (Business Star,
“Corporate Law Practice,” May 25, 1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of
Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: “A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a
good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them.”
(Business Star, “Corporate Finance Law,” Jan. 11,1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a “shot in the arm,” so to speak. No longer are
we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code
and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of
insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an
introduction to usable disciplinary skills applicable to a corporate counsel’s management
responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them.
Otherwise known as “intersecting managerial jurisprudence,” it forms a unifying theme for the
corporate counsel’s total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel’s role. For that matter, the
corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning that
the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a corporation’s
strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with
global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms
increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each other—often with those who are
competitors in other arenas.
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Also, the nature of the lawyer’s participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly
changing. The modern corporate lawyer has gained anew role as a stakeholder—in some cases
participating in the organization and operations of governance through participation on boards and
other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions and
laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as corporations organize for global
operations. (Italics supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is with governmental policies toward the promotion and management of
technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness
more generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more adversarial relationships
and traditional forms of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned
from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between
governmental and business Japan’s MITI is world famous. (Italics supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct
group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and
temporary groups within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the
group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the environment,
coordinating work with outsiders. promoting team achievements within the organization. In general,
such external activities are better predictors of team performance than internal group processes,
“In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial
mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective
managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance
considerations, (Italics supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics, The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new
managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the
role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of
systematic problems—physical, economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New programming
techniques now make the systems dynamics principles more accessible to managers—including
corporate counsels. (Italics supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and
uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of
litigation,
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aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases,
(Italics supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management Computer-based models can be used directly by parties
and mediators in all kinds of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective
negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an
international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three pointed areas
of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of the
general counsel’s responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is
concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at
that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of the firm
to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation’s evolving economic
and organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment.
The practice and theory of “law” is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to
make a global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel’s Office. The general counsel has emerged in the
last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear
responsibility for key aspects of the firm’s strategic issues, including structuring its global operations,
managing improved relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees, managing
expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping
internally with more complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a
good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate
activities. And even if the corporate lawyer’s aim is not the understand all of the law’s effects on
corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge of the management issues
if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal “constitution” or makeup of the modern corporation.
“Business Star, “The Corporate Counsel,” April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of
financial law affecting each
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aspect of their work, Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory.
What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk
opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, “Corporate Finance law,”
Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on
April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the
required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1901,' the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman
of the COMELEC. On June 18,1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as
Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s

nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960
with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
since its inception in 1972–73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more
than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the
law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963–1970), Monsod worked as an
operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted
with the laws of member-countries, negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project
work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served
as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since
1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and
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Page 15 of 57
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Cayetano vs. Monsod
economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National
Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod’s work involved being knowledgeable In election law. He
appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy,
Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen’s Conference
for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban
poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and
lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the
Davide Commission, a quasijudicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member
of the Constitutional Commission (1986–1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma
for “innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public
accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative.” (pp. 128–129 Rollo) (Italics
supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member,
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately
constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the
Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an
operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members
of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, “Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers,”
Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Italics supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country’s Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the
loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into
five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower’s representation; (3) conditions of closing;
(4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13),
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside from
performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national development
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Cayetano vs. Monsod

Page 16 of 57
policies as key factors in maintaining their countries’ sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper,
entitled “Wanted; Development Lawyers for Developing Nations,” submitted by L. Michael Hager,
regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for International Development, during the Session on
Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the
World Peace Through Law Center on August 26–31 , 1973). 1973). (Italics supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation policies, demand
expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily,
a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist or an economist in the
formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture
of technical language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent
counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See International
Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of
Law, 1987, p. 321). (Italics supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and conditions
which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements of the
contract. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state
the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt
restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for
foreign loan agreements—an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of whose
kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: “They carry no banners, they beat
no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and
serene mastery.’ (See Ricardo J. Romulo, “The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments,” Integrated Bar
of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term “practice of law”, particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers
of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a
lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a Iawyer-legislator of both the
rich and the poor—verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement—that he
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Cayetano vs. Monsod
has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:
Page 17 of 57
“Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is
vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that
there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving
considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide."(emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744)
where it stated:
“It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in
accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on
the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority to
direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the
discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary
power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law.” (Italics supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1)
nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the
Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the
President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc.
. . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14,1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the
Constitution which provides:
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Cayetano vs. Monsod
“The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last
Members for three years, without reappointment, Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.”
Page 18 of 57
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla’s separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of
law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of
the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of
the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla’s definition would require generally a habitual law
practice, perhaps practised two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice
a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I
made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that law
practice " ... is what people ordinar-ily mean by the practice of law.” True I cited the definition but only
by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by “traditional areas
of law practice is essentially tautologous” or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being
defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals,
in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that
sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the
Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons
practising law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines,
say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing,
how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is
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Cayetano vs. Monsod
indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the public hearings on Monsod’s
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law.
The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond
judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion
is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission’s judgment. In the instant case, there is
no occasion for the exercise of the Court’s corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of
Page 19 of 57
discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the
writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following;
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court
reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the
negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed? The
answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirm a
Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S.
Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
“We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life/'
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who
was Samson’s beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that—
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Cayetano vs. Monsod
“No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.”
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning
white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson’s eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing
of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous
fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: “Did any blade
touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?” The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not
the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Page 20 of 57
Fernan (C.J.), Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, J., See brief concurrence.
Melencio-Herrera, J., In the result, 011 the same basis as Justice Narvasa.
Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz and Padilla, JJ., see dissents.
Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.)
Bidin, J., I join in the dissent of Justice Gutierrez.
Sarmiento, J., On leave.
Regalado, J., No part due to intended personal association with respondent Monsod.
Davide, Jr., J., No part, I was among those who issued a testimonial in favor of Christian Monsod
which was submitted by him to CA.
Page 21 of 57
VOL. 441, OCTOBER 25, 2004
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Cruz vs. Cabrera
Adm. Case No. 5737. October 25, 2004.*
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, complainant, vs. ATTY. STANLEY CABRERA, respondent.
Administrative Law; Attorneys; Lawyers should not be held to too strict an account for words said in the
heat of the moment, because of chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way is for the court to condone
even contemptuous language.—We hold that respondent’s outburst of “appear ka ng appear, pumasa
ka muna” does not amount to a violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Based
on the facts of this case, such outburst came about when respondent pointed out to the trial court that
complainant is not a lawyer to correct the judge’s impression of complainant’s appearance, inasmuch as
the judge, in her Order of January 14, 2002, noted that complainant is a lawyer. Such single outburst,
though uncalled for, is not of such magnitude as to warrant respondent’s suspension or reproof. It is but
a product of impulsiveness or the heat of the moment in the course of an argument between them. It
has been said that lawyers should not be held to too strict an account for words said in the heat of the
moment, because of chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way is for the court to condone even
contemptuous language.
Same; Same; A party’s right to conduct litigation personally is recognized by Section 34 of Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court.— Nonetheless, we remind respondent that complainant is not precluded from
litigating personally his cases. A party’s right to conduct litigation personally is recognized by Section 34
of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
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Cruz vs. Cabrera
Same; Same; Mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, lawyers must conduct
themselves honorably and fairly; The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place
in the dignity of judicial forum.—All lawyers should take heed that lawyers are licensed officers of the
Page 22 of 57
courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties,
responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. Membership in the bar imposes
upon them certain obligations. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, they must
conduct themselves honorably and fairly. Though a lawyer’s language may be forceful and emphatic, it
should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of
intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Misconduct.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
In an administrative complaint dated July 7, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz charges Atty. Stanley Cabrera with
misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Complainant alleges that he is a fourth year law student; since the latter part of 2001, he instituted
several actions against his neighbors; he appeared for and in his behalf in his own cases; he met
respondent who acted as the counsel of his neighbors; during a hearing on January 14, 2002, in one case
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay City, presided by Judge Caridad Cuerdo, the following
exchange transpired:
xxx x x x So, may we know your honor, if he is a lawyer or not?
The Court having been inhibited by the respondent from hearing the case, replied:
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You are asking for my inhibition and yet you want me to rule on his appearance x x x x x x.
Page 23 of 57
Thereafter, the respondent said:
Because your honor, he (pertaining to the complainant) is misrepresenting himself to be a lawyer!
To this the complainant remarked:
“Your Honor, I’m not x x x x x x.”
Respondent, this time engulfed with anger in a raising voice said:
Appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna; x x x.
Respondent’s imputations were uncalled for and the latter’s act of compelling the court to ask
complainant whether he is a lawyer or not was intended to malign him before the public, inasmuch as
respondent knew that complainant is not a lawyer, having appeared for and in his behalf as a party
litigant in prior cases; respondent’s imputations of complainant’s misrepresentation as a lawyer was
patently with malice to discredit his honor, with the intention to threaten him not to appear anymore in
cases respondent was handling; the manner, substance, tone of voice and how the words “appear ka ng
appear, pumasa ka muna!” were uttered were totally with the intention to annoy, vex and humiliate,
malign, ridicule, incriminate and discredit complainant before the public.
Complainant claims that respondent’s display of improper attitude, arrogance, misbehavior, misconduct
in the performance of his duties both as a lawyer and officer of the court, before the public and the
court, was a patent transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to uphold in their dealings
with society and corresponding appropriate penalty or sanctions for the said administrative violations
should be imposed on the respondent.
In his Comment, respondent contends that the complaint filed against him is a vicious scheme to
dissuade him from appearing as counsel for the Mina family against whom complainant had filed several
civil and criminal cases including
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Cruz vs. Cabrera
him to further complainant’s illegal practice of law; complainant’s complaint occurred during a judicial
proceeding wherein complainant was able to represent himself considering that he was appearing in
barong tagalog thus the presiding judge was misled when she issued an order stating “[i]n today’s
hearing both lawyers appeared;” because of which, respondent stated: “Your honor I would like to
manifest that this counsel (referring to complainant) who represents the plaintiff in this case is not a
lawyer,” to which complainant replied: “The counsel very well know that I am not yet a lawyer”; the
reason he informed the court that complainant is not a lawyer was because the presiding judge did not
know that complainant is not a lawyer and complainant did not inform the presiding judge that he is not
a lawyer when he stated: “for the plaintiff your honor”; he stated “pumasa ka muna” out of indignation
because of complainant’s temerity in misrepresenting himself as lawyer; it is surprising that the City
Prosecutor of Pasay City filed a complaint for oral defamation against him considering that in a
precedent case the Supreme Court stated: “It is a settled principle in this jurisdiction that statements
made in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged (Navarrete vs. Court of Appeals, 325
SCRA 540)”; in another malicious prosecution being perpetuated by the complainant against the Mina
family pending before Judge Priscilla Mijares of RTC Branch 108, Pasay City, they were able to prohibit
the appearance of complainant as counsel for himself as authenticated by an Order of Judge Priscilla
Mijares which allegedly stated among other; to wit:
In connection with Ferdinand A. Cruz’s motion to appear as counsel, the motion is likewise denied,
movant not having satisfied the requirements and conditions under Rule 138-A, Sections 1 and 2.
Respondent alleges that when complainant filed an administrative case against Judge Priscilla Mijares
when said Judge stated in Tagalog in open court “Hay naku masama yung marunong pa sa Huwes! OK?”
the same was dismissed by the Honorable Court’s Third Division which stated among
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Cruz vs. Cabrera
others: “That the questioned remarks of respondent were uttered more out of frustration and in
reaction to complainant’s actuations and taking into account that complainant is not yet a lawyer but
was already lecturing the court on a matter which is not even a point of discussion was sheer arrogance
Page 25 of 57
on the part of the complainant.” Respondent prays that the complaint against him be dismissed for lack
of merit.
The administrative case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.
In a report, dated March 4, 2004, IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro recommended respondent’s
suspension from the practice of law for a period of three months for violating Rule 8.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides:
A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.
In her report, Commissioner Navarro stated:
After going over the evidence submitted by the parties, the undersigned noted that respondent’s
averment that the utterances he made in open court is (sic) privileged communication does not hold
water for the same was (sic) not relevant to the issue of the case in question under trial before the said
court.
Respondent did not refute the fact that the same utterances he made in open court against the
complainant had been the basis for his indictment of Oral Defamation and later Unjust Vexation under
Criminal Cases Nos. 02-1031 and No. 02-2136 respectively, pending trial before MTC Branch 45, Pasay
City.
Likewise respondent did not refute complainant’s allegation that in 1979 he was held in contempt and
was not allowed to practice law for seven years by the Supreme Court in the administrative case filed
against him by Emilia E. Andres on December 14, 1979 docketed as A.M. L-585 for his fondness in using
contumacious language in his dealing with others.
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Cruz vs. Cabrera
From the facts obtaining, it is apparent that the utterance hurled by the respondent in the manner,
substance and tone of his voice which was not refuted by him “that appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka
muna” in whatever manner it was uttered are in itself not only abusive but insulting specially on the part
of law students who have not yet taken nor passed the bar examination required of them.
Page 26 of 57
Respondent should have been more discreet and cautious in informing the court if it was his purpose
relative to complainant’s appearance in court; although the latter appeared only in his behalf but not for
others if he had complied with the requirements of Rule 138 (Sections 1 and 3) of the Rules of Court.
Respondent should have been more temperate in making utterances in his professional dealings so as
not to offend the sensitivities of the other party as in this case.
On April 16, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution to annul and set aside the
recommendation of the investigating commissioner and to approve the dismissal of the case for lack of
merit.
Prefatorily, we note that the IBP Board of Governors failed to observe the procedural requirements of
Sec. 12 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on review and decision by the Board of Governors which
states:
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors.—(a) Every case heard by an investigator shall
be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence transmitted to it by the
Investigator with his report. The decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall
clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based. It shall be promulgated within
a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the submittal of
the Investigator’s report. (Emphasis supplied)
In Teodosio vs. Nava,1 the Court stressed the important function of the requirement that the decision of
the Board of Governors state the facts and the reasons on which it is
_______________
1 357 SCRA 406 (2001).
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Cruz vs. Cabrera
based, which is akin to what is required of the decisions of courts of record, thus:
For aside from informing the parties the reason for the decision to enable them to point out to the
appellate court the findings with which they are not in agreement, in case any of them decides to appeal
the decision, it is also an assurance that the judge, or the Board of Governors in this case, reached his
judgment through the process of legal reasoning.2
Page 27 of 57
In this case, the Board of Governors’ resolution absolving respondent of any misconduct does not
contain any findings of facts or law upon which it based its ruling. Ordinarily, noncompliance with the
rule would result in the remand of the case. Nonetheless, where the controversy has been pending
resolution for quite sometime and the issues involved could be resolved on the basis of the records on
appeal, the Court has opted to resolve the case in the interest of justice and speedy disposition of
cases.3 This case falls within the exception.
We hold that respondent’s outburst of “appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna” does not amount to a
violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Based on the facts of this case, such outburst came about when respondent pointed out to the trial
court that complainant is not a lawyer to correct the judge’s impression of complainant’s appearance,
inasmuch as the judge, in her Order of January 14, 2002, noted that complainant is a lawyer.4 Such
single outburst, though uncalled for, is not of such magnitude as to warrant respondent’s suspension or
reproof. It is but a product of impulsiveness or the heat of the moment in the course of an argument
between them. It has been said that lawyers should not be held to too strict an account for words said in
the heat of the moment, because of chagrin at losing
_______________
2 Id., p. 412.
3 Id., pp. 412-413.
4 Rollo, p. 9.
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Cruz vs. Cabrera
cases, and that the big way is for the court to condone even contemptuous language.5
Nonetheless, we remind respondent that complainant is not precluded from litigating personally his
cases. A party’s right to conduct litigation personally is recognized by Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court:
SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted.—In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid
Page 28 of 57
of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney,
and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
In Maderada vs. Mediodea,6 this Court expounded on the foregoing provision, thus:
This provision means that in a litigation, parties may personally do everything during its progress—from
its commencement to its termination. When they, however, act as their own attorneys, they are
restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice law; otherwise,
ignorance would be unjustifiably rewarded. Individuals have long been permitted to manage, prosecute
and defend their own actions; and when they do so, they are not considered to be in the practice of law.
“One does not practice law by acting for himself any more than he practices medicine by rendering first
aid to himself.”
The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves the exercise of a profession or
vocation usually for gain, mainly as attorney by acting in a representative capacity and as counsel by
rendering legal advise to others. Private practice has been defined by this Court as follows:
x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall
within the prohibition of statute [refer-
_______________
5 In re: Gomez, 43 Phil. 376, 377 (1922).
6 413 SCRA 313 (2003).
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Cruz vs. Cabrera
ring to the prohibition for judges and other officials or employees of the superior courts or of the Office
of the Solicitor General from engaging in private practice] has been interpreted as customarily or
habitually holding one’s self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. x x
x.
Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or habitually holding herself out to
the public as a lawyer. Neither was she demanding payment for such services. Hence, she cannot be said
to be in the practice of law.7
Page 29 of 57
On the other hand, all lawyers should take heed that lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are
empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and
liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain
obligations. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, they must conduct themselves
honorably and fairly.8 Though a lawyer’s language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be
dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language
and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum.9
WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondent Atty. Stanley Cabrera for misconduct in violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility is DISMISSED for lack of merit. He is, however, admonished to be
more circumspect in the performance of his duties as an officer of the court.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (Chairman), Callejo, Sr., Tinga and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Complaint dismissed, but respondent admonished.
_______________
7 Id., pp. 324-325.
8 Reyes vs. Chiong, Jr., 405 SCRA 212, 217 (2003).
9 De la Rosa vs. Sabio, Jr., 407 SCRA 213, 220 (2003).
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Ramos vs. Pallugna
Note.—A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the
court. (MaglucotAw vs. Maglucot, 329 SCRA 78 [2000])
——o0o—— Cruz vs. Cabrera, 441 SCRA 211, Adm. Case No. 5737 October 25, 2004
Page 30 of 57
A.C. No. 6705. March 31, 2006.*
RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, complainant, vs. ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, respondent.
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Practice of Law; Conflict of Interests; Canon 6 provides that the Code “shall
apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official duties.” A government lawyer is
thus bound by the prohibition “not [to] represent conflicting interests.” Not only that, he is likewise
prohibited from engaging in “unlawful conduct” which includes violation of the statutory prohibition on
a government employee to “engage in the private practice of [his] profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law.”—
_______________
* EN BANC.
11
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
11
Lim-Santiago vs. Sagucio
Canon 6 provides that the Code “shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their
official duties.” A government lawyer is thus bound by the prohibition “not [to] represent conflicting
interests.” However, this rule is subject to certain limitations. The prohibition to represent conflicting
interests does not apply when no conflict of interest exists, when a written consent of all concerned is
given after a full disclosure of the facts or when no true attorney-client relationship exists. Moreover,
considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, clear
preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty. Respondent
is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in “unlawful x x x conduct.” Unlawful
conduct includes violation of the statutory prohibition on a government employee to “engage in the
private practice of [his] profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with [his] official functions.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; In Quiambao vs. Bamba, 468 SCRA 1 (2005), the Supreme Court enumerated
various tests to determine conflict of interests.—In Quiambao v. Bamba, the Court enumerated various
tests to determine conflict of interests. One test of inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer will
be asked to use against his former client any confidential information acquired through their connection
or previous employment. In essence, what a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the
client’s confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in
which he previously represented him.
Page 31 of 57
Same; Same; Same; Same; A lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that
occurred beyond the lawyer’s employment with the client.—The fact alone that respondent was the
former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat and the case he resolved as government
prosecutor was labor-related is not a sufficient basis to charge respondent for representing conflicting
interests. A lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred
beyond the lawyer’s employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the
duty to protect the client’s interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former client
and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.
12
12
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Private practice of law” contemplates a succession of acts of
the same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer.—The Court has
defined the practice of law broadly as—x x x any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. “To engage in the practice of
law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to
give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill.” “Private practice of law” contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature
habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer.
Same; Same; Same; For as long as respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by lawyers with
the use of their legal knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the term “practice of law.”—
Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently and he was not a
retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument is without merit because the
law does not distinguish between consultancy services and retainer agreement. For as long as
respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge,
the same falls within the ambit of the term “practice of law.”
Same; Same; Same; Violations of RA 6713 are not subject to disciplinary action under the Code of
Professional Responsibility unless the violations also constitute infractions of specific provisions of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.—Violations of RA 6713 are not subject to disciplinary action under
the Code of Professional Responsibility unless the violations also constitute infractions of specific
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Certainly, the IBP has no jurisdiction to investigate
violations of RA 6713—the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees—
unless the acts involved also transgress provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Here,
respondent’s violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which mandates
Page 32 of 57
that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” Respondent’s
admission that he received from Taggat fees for legal services while serving as a government prosecutor
is an unlawful conduct, which constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01.
13
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
13
Same; Same; Same; Civil Service; Penalties; Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for
government employees engaging in unauthorized private practice of profession is suspension for six
months and one day to one year.—The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise
of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts. Under Civil Service Law and rules, the
penalty for government employees engaging in unauthorized private practice of profession is
suspension for six months and one day to one year. We find this penalty appropriate for respondent’s
violation in this case of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Suarez & Narvasa Law Firm for complainant.
Elpidio R. Viernes for respondent.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while working
as government prosecutor.
The Facts
Ruthie Lim-Santiago (“complainant”) is the daughter of Alfonso Lim and Special Administratrix of his
estate.1 Alfonso Lim is a stockholder and the former President of Taggat Industries, Inc.2
Page 33 of 57
Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio (“respondent”) was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of
Taggat Industries,
_______________
1 Rollo, p. 153.
2 Id., at pp. 128-129.
14
14
Inc.3 until his appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao, Cagayan in 1992.4
Taggat Industries, Inc. (“Taggat”) is a domestic corporation engaged in the operation of timber
concessions from the government. The Presidential Commission on Good Government sequestered it
sometime in 1986,5 and its operations ceased in 1997.6
Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat (“Taggat employees”) filed a criminal complaint entitled
“Jesus Tagorda, Jr., et al. v. Ruthie Lim-Santiago,” docketed as I.S. No. 97-240 (“criminal complaint”).7
Taggat employees alleged that complainant, who took over the management and control of Taggat after
the death of her father, withheld payment of their salaries and wages without valid cause from 1 April
1996 to 15 July 1997.8
Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the preliminary investigation.9
He resolved the criminal complaint by recommending the filing of 651 Informations10 for violation of
Article 28811 in relation to Arti-
_______________
3 Id., at p. 10.
4 Id., at pp. 1, 240.
5 Id., at p. 240.
6 Id.
Page 34 of 57
7 Id., at p. 21.
8 Id., at p. 22.
9 Id., at p. 75.
10 21 Taggat employees filed their Affidavits alleging that complainant failed to pay them 31 quincenas
of their salaries and wages, thus 651 Informations were recommended for filing.
11 Article 288 of the Labor Code of the Philippines provides: “Penalties.—Except as otherwise provided
in this Code, or unless the acts complained of hinges on a question of interpretation or implementation
of ambiguous provisions of an existing collective bargaining agreement, any violation of the provisions
of this Code declared to be unlawful or penal in nature shall be punished with a fine of not less than One
Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) nor more than Ten Thou
15
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
15
cle 11612 of the Labor Code of the Philippines.13 Complainant now charges respondent with the
following violations:
1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Respondent, being
the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew the operations of Taggat very
well. Respondent should have inhibited himself from hearing, investigating and deciding the case filed
by Taggat employees.14 Furthermore, complainant claims that respondent instigated the filing of the
cases and even harassed and threatened Taggat employees to accede and sign an affidavit to support
the complaint.15
2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor
Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice of law while
working as a government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to prove that respondent
received P10,000 as retainer’s fee for the months of January and February 1995,16 another P10,000 for
_______________
Page 35 of 57
sand Pesos (P10,000.00), or imprisonment of not less than three months nor more than three years, or
both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court. x x x.”
12 Article 116 of the Labor Code of the Philippines provides: “Withholding of wages and kickbacks
prohibited.—It shall be unlawful for any person directly or indirectly, to withhold any amount from the
wages of a worker or induce him to give up any part of his wages by force, stealth, intimidation, threat
or by any other means whatsoever without the worker’s consent.”
13 Rollo, p. 82.
14 Id., at p. 2.
15 Id., at p. 3.
16 Id., at pp. 110-111.
16
16
the months of April and May 1995,17 and P5,000 for the month of April 1996.18
Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while working as
government prosecutor.
Respondent refutes complainant’s allegations and counters that complainant was merely aggrieved by
the resolution of the criminal complaint which was adverse and contrary to her expectation.19
Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed, respondent had resigned from Taggat for
more than five years.20 Respondent asserts that he no longer owed his undivided loyalty to Taggat.21
Respondent argues that it was his sworn duty to conduct the necessary preliminary investigation.22
Respondent contends that complainant failed to establish lack of impartiality when he performed his
duty.23 Respondent points out that complainant did not file a motion to inhibit respondent from
hearing the criminal complaint24 but instead complainant voluntarily executed and filed her counter-
affidavit without mental reservation.25
Respondent states that complainant’s reason in not filing a motion to inhibit was her impression that
respondent would exonerate her from the charges filed as gleaned from complainant’s statement during
the hearing conducted on 12 February 1999:
Page 36 of 57
_______________
17 Id., at pp. 112-113.
18 Id., at p. 114.
19 Id., at p. 243.
20 Id., at p. 242.
21 Id., at p. 244.
22 Id.
23 Id., at p. 243.
24 Id., at p. 245.
25 Id., at p. 244.
17
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
17
xxx
Q.
(Atty. Dabu).What do you mean you didn’t think he would do it, Madam Witness?
A.
Because he is supposed to be my father’s friend and he was working with my Dad and he was supposed
to be trusted by my father. And he came to me and told me he gonna help me. x x x.26
Respondent also asserts that no conflicting interests exist because he was not representing Taggat
employees or complainant. Respondent claims he was merely performing his official duty as Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor.27 Respondent argues that complainant failed to establish that respondent’s act
was tainted with personal interest, malice and bad faith.28
Page 37 of 57
Respondent denies complainant’s allegations that he instigated the filing of the cases, threatened and
harassed Taggat employees. Respondent claims that this accusation is bereft of proof because
complainant failed to mention the names of the employees or present them for cross-examination.29
Respondent does not dispute his receipt, after his appointment as government prosecutor, of retainer
fees from complainant but claims that it was only on a case-to-case basis and it ceased in 1996.30
Respondent contends that the fees were paid for his consultancy services and not for representation.
Respondent submits that consultation is not the same as representation and that rendering consultancy
services is not prohibited.31 Respondent, in his Reply-Memorandum, states: “x x x [I]f ever Taggat paid
him certain amounts, these were paid voluntarily by Taggat without the respondent’s asking, in-
_______________
26 Id., at pp. 246, 483.
27 Id., at p. 247.
28 Id.
29 Id., at p. 249.
30 Id., at pp. 247-248.
31 Id., at p. 350.
18
18
tended as token consultancy fees on a case-to-case basis and not as or for retainer fees. These payments
do not at all show or translate as a specie of ‘conflict of interest.’ Moreover, these consultations had no
relation to, or connection with, the above-mentioned labor complaints filed by former Taggat
employees.”32
Respondent insists that complainant’s evidence failed to prove that when the criminal complaint was
filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cagayan, respondent was still the retained counsel
or legal consultant.33
Page 38 of 57
While this disbarment case was pending, the Resolution and Order issued by respondent to file 651
Informations against complainant was reversed and set aside by Regional State Prosecutor of Cagayan
Rodolfo B. Cadelina last 4 January 1999.34 Hence, the criminal complaint was dismissed.35
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ Investigating Commissioner Ma. Carmina M. Alejandro-Abbas
(“IBP Commissioner Abbas”) heard the case36 and allowed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.37 Due to IBP Commissioner Abbas’ resignation, the case was reassigned to Commissioner
Dennis A.B. Funa (“IBP Commissioner Funa”).38
After the parties filed their memoranda and motion to resolve the case, the IBP Board of Governors
issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-479 (“IBP Resolution”) dated 4 November 2004
_______________
32 Id.
33 Id., at p. 248.
34 Id., at pp. 155-157.
35 Id.
36 Id., at pp. 84-89, 99-103, 232, 237-239, 268, 273, 276-279, 282-284, 294-296, 299-300.
37 Id., at pp. 330-331.
38 Id., at p. 362.
19
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
19
adopting with modification39 IBP Commissioner Funa’s Report and Recommendation (“Report”) finding
respondent guilty of conflict of interests, failure to safeguard a former client’s interest, and violating the
prohibition against the private practice of law while being a government prosecutor. The IBP Board of
Governors recommended the imposition of a penalty of three years suspension from the practice of law.
The Report reads:
Page 39 of 57
“Now the issue here is whether being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with his role as Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor in deciding I.S. No. 97-240. A determination of this issue will require the test of
whether the matter in I.S. No. 97-240 will conflict with his former position of Personnel Manager and
Legal Counsel of Taggat.
I.S. No. 97-240 was filed for “Violation of Labor Code” (see Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutors
Office, Annex “B” of Complaint). Herein Complainant, Ruthie Lim-Santiago, was being accused as having
the “management and control” of Taggat (p. 2, Resolution of the Prov. Pros. Office, supra).
Clearly, as a former Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat, herein Respondent undoubtedly
handled the personnel and labor concerns of Taggat. Respondent, undoubtedly dealt with and related
with the employees of Taggat. Therefore, Respondent undoubtedly dealt with and related with
complainants in I.S. No. 97-240. The issues, therefore, in I.S. No. 97-240, are very much familiar with
Respondent. While the issues of unpaid salaries pertain to the periods 1996-1997, the mechanics and
personalities in that case are very much familiar with Respondent.
A lawyer owes something to a former client. Herein Respondent owes to Taggat, a former client, the
duty to “maintain inviolate the client’s confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will
injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him” (Natam v. Capule, 91 Phil.
640; p. 231, Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 4th ed.).
Respondent argues that as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, he does not represent any client or any
interest except justice. It should
_______________
39 The IBP Commissioner imposed a penalty of three months suspension from the practice of law.
20
20
not be forgotten, however, that a lawyer has an immutable duty to a former client with respect to
matters that he previously handled for that former client. In this case, matters relating to personnel,
labor policies, and labor relations that he previously handled as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of
Taggat. I.S. No. 97-240 was for “Violation of the Labor Code.” Here lies the conflict. Perhaps it would
have been different had I.S. No. 97-240 not been labor-related, or if Respondent had not been a
Page 40 of 57
Personnel Manager concurrently as Legal Counsel. But as it is, I.S. No. 97-240 is labor-related and
Respondent was a former Personnel Manager of Taggat.
xxxx
While Respondent ceased his relations with Taggat in 1992 and the unpaid salaries being sought in I.S.
No. 97-240 were of the years 1996 and 1997, the employees and management involved are the very
personalities he dealt with as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. Respondent dealt with
these persons in his fiduciary relations with Taggat. Moreover, he was an employee of the corporation
and part of its management.
xxxx
As to the propriety of receiving “Retainer Fees” or “consultancy fees” from herein Complainant while
being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, and for rendering legal consultancy work while being an
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, this matter had long been settled. Government prosecutors are
prohibited to engage in the private practice of law (see Legal and Judicial Ethics, Ernesto Pineda, 1994
ed., p. 20; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109; Aquino v. Blanco, 70 Phil. 647). The act of being a legal
consultant is a practice of law. To engage in the practice of law is to do any of those acts that are
characteristic of the legal profession (In re: David, 93 Phil. 461). It covers any activity, in or out of court,
which required the application of law, legal principles, practice or procedures and calls for legal
knowledge, training and experience (PLA v. Agrava, 105 Phil. 173; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 111;
Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210).
Respondent clearly violated this prohibition.
As for the secondary accusations of harassing certain employees of Taggat and instigating the filing of
criminal complaints, we find the evidence insufficient.
21
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
21
Accordingly, Respondent should be found guilty of conflict of interest, failure to safeguard a former
client’s interest, and violating the prohibition against the private practice of law while being a
government prosecutor.”40
The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule
139-B41 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court

Page 41 of 57
The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (“Code”). However, the Court finds respondent liable for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility against unlawful conduct.42 Respondent committed unlawful
conduct when he violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees or Republic Act No. 6713 (“RA 6713”).
Canon 6 provides that the Code “shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their
official duties.”43
_______________
40 Rollo, pp. 549-554.
41 Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors.—
xxxx
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent
should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its
findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be
transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.
42 Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01.—A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
43 Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 6.
22
22
A government lawyer is thus bound by the prohibition “not [to] represent conflicting interests.”44
However, this rule is subject to certain limitations. The prohibition to represent conflicting interests
does not apply when no conflict of interest exists, when a written consent of all concerned is given after
a full disclosure of the facts or when no true attorney-client relationship exists.45 Moreover, considering
the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, clear preponderant
evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.46
Page 42 of 57
Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in “unlawful x x x conduct.”
Unlawful conduct includes violation of the statutory prohibition on a government employee to “engage
in the private practice of [his] profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that
such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with [his] official functions.”47
Complainant’s evidence failed to substantiate the claim that respondent represented conflicting
interests
In Quiambao v. Bamba,48 the Court enumerated various tests to determine conflict of interests. One
test of inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer will be asked to use against his former client any
confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment.49 In essence,
what a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the client’s confidence or to refrain from
doing any-
_______________
44 Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule 15.03.
45 R. Agpalo, COMMENTS ON THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT 165 (2001 ed.).
46 Berbano v. Barcelona, A.C. No. 6084, 3 September 2003, 410 SCRA 258.
47 RA 6713, Section 7(b)(2).
48 A.C. No. 6708, 25 August 2005, 468 SCRA 1.
49 Id., at pp. 10-11.
23
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
23
thing which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him.50
In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when respondent handled the preliminary
investigation of the criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997. The issue in the criminal
complaint pertains to non-payment of wages that occurred from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. Clearly,
respondent was no longer connected with Taggat during that period since he resigned sometime in
1992.
Page 43 of 57
In order to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests, evidence must be presented to
prove that respondent used against Taggat, his former client, any confidential information acquired
through his previous employment. The only established participation respondent had with respect to
the criminal complaint is that he was the one who conducted the preliminary investigation. On that
basis alone, it does not necessarily follow that respondent used any confidential information from his
previous employment with complainant or Taggat in resolving the criminal complaint.
The fact alone that respondent was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat and
the case he resolved as government prosecutor was labor-related is not a sufficient basis to charge
respondent for representing conflicting interests. A lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client does not
cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer’s employment with the client. The intent of the law
is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the client’s interests only on matters that he previously
handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has
terminated.
Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of evidence to prove her allegations. Thus,
respondent is not guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code.
_______________
50 Pormento, Sr. v. Pontevedra, A.C. No. 5128, 31 March 2005, 454 SCRA 167, 178.
24
24
Respondent engaged in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor
The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as—
“x x x any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. ‘To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service,
which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.’ ”51
“Private practice of law” contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily
holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer.52
Page 44 of 57
Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently and he was not a
retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument is without merit because the
law does not distinguish between consultancy services and retainer agreement. For as long as
respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge,
the same falls within the ambit of the term “practice of law.”
Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his legal services to complainant while working as a
government prosecutor. Even the receipts he signed stated that the payments by Taggat were for
“Retainer’s fee.”53 Thus, as correctly pointed out by complainant, respondent clearly violated the
prohibition in RA 6713.
However, violations of RA 6713 are not subject to disciplinary action under the Code of Professional
Responsibility unless the violations also constitute infractions of specific
_______________
51 Cayetano v. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113, 3 September 1991, 201 SCRA 210, 214.
52 Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap, Inc., 447 Phil. 750, 759; 399 SCRA 601, 610 (2003).
53 Exhs. “B,” “B-2,” “B-3,” Rollo, pp. 110-114.
25
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
25
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Certainly, the IBP has no jurisdiction to investigate
violations of RA 6713—the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees—
unless the acts involved also transgress provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Here, respondent’s violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which
mandates that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.”
Respondent’s admission that he received from Taggat fees for legal services while serving as a
government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct, which constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01.
Respondent admitted that complainant also charged him with unlawful conduct when respondent
stated in his Demurrer to Evidence:
Page 45 of 57
“In this instant case, the complainant prays that the respondent be permanently and indefinitely
suspended or disbarred from the practice of the law profession and his name removed from the Roll of
Attorneys on the following grounds:
xxxx
d) that respondent manifested gross misconduct and gross violation of his oath of office and in his
dealings with the public.”54
On the Appropriate Penalty on Respondent
The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based
on the surrounding facts.55
Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for government employees engaging in unauthorized
private practice of profession is suspension for six months and one day to one
_______________
54 Id., at pp. 241-242.
55 Endaya v. Oca, A.C. No. 3967, 3 September 2003, 410 SCRA 244, 255.
26
26
year.56 We find this penalty appropriate for respondent’s violation in this case of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio GUILTY of violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio from
the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision. Let copies of this Decision be
furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent’s personal record as an
attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country
for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Page 46 of 57
Panganiban (C.J.), Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona,

Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio suspended from practice of law for six (6) months for violation of Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of Code of Professional Responsibility.
Notes.—The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege
or franchise—it is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained
and certified. (People vs. Santocildes, Jr., 321 SCRA 310 [1999])
A lawyer may not without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose
interest conflicts
_______________
56 Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service
Laws as mandated by Section 12 of RA 6713.
27
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
27
Re: Dropping from the Rolls of Ms. Carolyn C. Arcangel
with that of his former client. (Cruz vs. Jacinto, 328 SCRA 636 [2000])
——o0o—— Lim-Santiago vs. Sagucio, 486 SCRA 10, A.C. No. 6705 March 31, 2006
Page 47 of 57
VOL. 11 AUGUST 31, 1964
755
Cui vs. Cui
No. L-18727. August 31, 1964.
JESUS MA. CUI, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO MA. CUI, defendant-appellant, ROMULO CUI, Intervenor-
appellant.
Attorneys; "Titulo de Abogado" means membership in the bar.—The term "titulo de abogado" means
not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the bar after due
admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law.
Same; Possession of law degree not indispensable to qualify as lawyer.—Possession of the law degree
itself is not ndispensable; completion of the prescribed courses may be shown n some other way.
756
756
Cui vs. Cui .
Same; Reinstatement to the roll wipes out disabilities.—Reinstatement to the roll of attorneys wipes out
the restrictions and disabilities resulting from a previous disbarment.
Quo warranto; Limitations; One year after right of plaintiff to hold office arose.—Under Section 16 of
Rule 66 (f formerly Sec, 16 Rule 68, taken from Section 215 of Act 190), and action of quo warranto must
be filed within one (1) year after the right of the plaintiff to hold the office arose.
Same; Same: Same; Period not to be counted from date defendant began to discharge duties of office.—
The basis of a quo warranto action being the plaintiff's own right to office, it is from the time such right
arose that the one-year limitation must be counted and not from the date the incumbent defendant
began to discharge the duties of said office.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Canonoy, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court
Jose W. Diokno for plaintiff-appellee.

Page 48 of 57
Jaime R. Nuevas and Hector L. Hofileña for defendant-appellant.
Romulo Cui in his own behalf as intervenor-appellants
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This is a proceeding in quo warranto originally filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The office in
contention is that of Administrator of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili. Judgment was rendered on 27
April 1961 in favor of the plaintiff, Jesus Ma. Cui, and appealed to us by the defendant, Antonio Ma. Cui,
and by the intervenor, Romulo Cui.
The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña Benigna Cui,
now deceased, "for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and
helpless persons." It acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239 of the Philippine
Legislature passed 27 November 1926) and endowed with extensive properties by the said spouses
through a series of donations, principally the deed of donation executed on 2 January 1926.
757
VOL. 11, AUGUST 31, 1964
757
Cui vs. Cui
Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, in case of their
incapacity or death, to "such persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to
them." Section 2 of the deed of donation provides as follows:
"Que en caso de nuestro fallecimiento o incapacidad para administrar, nos sustituyan nuestro legitimo
sobrino Mariano Cui, si al tiempo de nuestra muerte o incapacidad se hallare residiendo en la ciudad de
Cebu, y nuestro sobrino politico Dionisio Jakosalem. Si nuestro dicho sobrino Mariano Cui no estuviese
residiendo entonces en la ciudad de Cebu, designamos en su lugar a nuestro otro sobrino legitimo
Mauricio Cui. Ambos sobrinos administraran conjuntamente el HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI. A la
muerte o incapacidad de estos dos administradores, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE
BARILI pasara a una sola persona que sera el varon, mayor de edad, que descienda legitimamente de
cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui y Victor Cui, y que
posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos, el que
pague al Estado mayor impuesto o contribucion. En igualdad de circunstancias, sera preferida el varon
de mas edad descendiente de quien tenia ultimamente la administracion. Cuando absolutamente faltare
persona de estas cualificaciones, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara al señor
Page 49 of 57
Obispo de Cebu o quien sea el mayor dignatario de la Iglesia Catolica, apostolica, Romana, que tuviere
asiento en la cabecera de esta Provincia de Cebu, y en su defecto, al Gobierno Provincial de Cebu."
Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued to administer the Hospicio until her death in 1929.
Thereupon the administration passed to Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem. The first died on 8 May
1931 and the second, on 1 July 1931. On 2 July 1931 Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son of Mauricio Cui, became
the administrator. Thereafter, beginning in 1932, a series of controversies and court litigations ensued
concerning the position of administrator, to which, in so far as they are pertinent to the present case,
reference will be made later in this decision.
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui, one
of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña Benigna Cui, On 27 February 1960 the then
incumbent
758
758
Cui vs. Cui
administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio" entered
into between them and embodied in a notarial document. The next day, 28 February, Antonio Ma. Cui
took his oath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice of either the "convenio" or of his
brother's assumption of the position.
Dr. Teodoro Cui died on 27 August 1960; on 5 September 1960 the plaintiff wrote a letter to the
defendant demanding that the office be turned over to him; and on 13 September 1960, the demand
not having been complied with, the plaintiff filed the complaint in this case. Romulo Cui later on
intervened, claiming a right to the same office, being a grandson of Vicente Cui, another one of the
nephews mentioned by the founders of the Hospicio in their deed of donation.
As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective qualifications to the position
of administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and therefore under equal circumstances would be
preferred, pursuant to section 2 of the deed of donation. However, before the test of age may be
applied the deed gives preference to the one, among the legitimate descendants of the nephews therein
named, "que posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos
titulos, el que pague al estado mayor impuesto o contribucion,"
The specific point in dispute is the meaning of the term "titulo de abogado." Jesus Ma. Cui holds the
degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of Santo Tomas (Class 1926) but is not a member of the
Bar, not having passed the examinations to qualif y him as one. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a
Page 50 of 57
member of the Bar, and although disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 (administrative case No.
141), was reinstated by resolution promulgated on 10 February 1960, about two weeks before he
assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio de Barili.
759
VOL. 11, AUGUST 31, 1964
759
Cui vs. Cui
The Court a quo, in deciding this point in favor of the plaintiff, said that the phrase "titulo de abogado/'
taken alone, means that of a full-fledged lawyer, but that "as used in the deed of donation and
considering the function or purpose of the administrator, it should not be given a strict interpretation
but a liberal one," and therefore means a law degree or diploma of Bachelor of Laws. This ruling is
assailed as erroneous both by the defendant and by the intervenor.
We are of the opinion that whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de abogado" means not
mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due
admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. In Spanish the word "titulo" is defined as
"testimonio o instrumento dado para ejercer un empleo, dignidad o profesion" (Diccionario de la Lengua
Española, Real Academia Española, 1947 ed., p. 1224) and the word "abogado," as follows: "Perito en el
derecho positivo que se dedica a defender en juicio, por escrito o de palabra, los derechos o intereses
de los litigantes, y tambien a dar dictmen sobre las cuestiones o puntos legales que se le consultan." (Id.,
p. 5) A Bachelor's degree alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of certain academic
requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. The English equivalent of
"abogado" is lawyer or attor ney-at-law. This term has a fixed and general signification, and has
reference to that class of persons who are by license off icers of the courts, empowered to appear,
prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by
law as a consequence.
In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority of the Supreme
Court. According to Rule 138 such admission requires passing the Bar examinations, taking the lawyer's
oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court, this certificate being his license to practice the
profession. The academic degree of Bachelor of Laws in itself has little to do with admission to the Bar,
except as evidence
760
760
Page 51 of 57
Cui vs. Cui
of compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the examinations has "successfully completed
all the prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved by the Secretary of
Education." For this purpose, however, possession of the degree itself is not indispensable: completion
of the prescribed courses may be shown in some other way. Indeed there are instances, particularly
under the former Code of Civil Procedure, where persons who had not gone through any formal legal
education in college were allowed to take the Bar examinations and to qualify as lawyers. (Section 14 of
that code required possession of "the necessary qualifications of learning ability.") Yet certainly it would
be incorrect to say that such persons do not possess the "titulo de abogado" because they lack the
academic degree of Bachelor of Laws from some law school or university.
The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established the foregoing test advisely, and
provided in the deed of donation that if not a lawyer, the administrator should be a doctor or a civil
engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these, should be the one who pays the highest taxes
among those otherwise qualified. A lawyer, first of al!, because under Act No. 3239 the managers or
trustees of the Hospicio shall "make regulations for the government of said institution (Sec. 3, b); shall
"prescribe the conditions subject to which invalids and incapacitated and destitute persons may be
admitted to the institute" (Sec. 3, d); shall see to it that the rules and conditions promulgated for
admission are not in conflict with the provisions of the Act; and shall administer properties of
considerable value—for all of which work, it is to be presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a
license to practice the profession would be a distinct asset.
Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the defendant, to the
office of administrator. But it is argued that although the latter is a member of the Bar he is nevertheless
disqualified by virtue of paragraph 3 of the deed of donation, which
761
VOL. 11, AUGUST 81, 1964
761
Cui vs. Cui
provides that the administrator may be removed on the ground, among others, of ineptitude in the
discharge of his office or lack of evident sound moral character. Reference is made to the fact that the
defendant was disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 for immorality and unprofessional conduct. It
is also a fact, however, that he was reinstated on 10 February 1960, before he assumed the office of
administrator. His reinstatement is a recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that
required for his admission to the Bar in the first place.
Page 52 of 57
"Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great extent in the sound discretion of the
court. The court action will depend, generally speaking, on whether or not it decides that the public
interest in the orderly and impartial administration of justice will be conserved by the applicant's
participation therein in the capacity of an attorney and counselor at law. The applicant must, like a
candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the court that he is a person of good moral character—a fit
and proper person to practice law. The court will take into consideration the applicant's character and
standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge for which he was disbarred, his
conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the disbarment and the
application for reinstatement. (5 Am. Jur., Sec. 301, p. 443)
"Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to reinstatement, notwithstanding the

attorney has received a pardon following his conviction, and the requirements for reinstatement have
been held to be the same as for original admission to the bar, except that the court may require a
greater degree of proof than in an original admission." (7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 815.)
"The decisive questions on an application for reinstatement are whether applicant is 'of good moral
character' in the sense in which that phrase is used when applied to attorneys-at-law and is a fit and
proper person to be entrusted with the privileges of the office of an attorney, and whether his mental
quallifications are such as to enable him to discharge efficiently his duty to the public, and the moral
attributes are to be regarded as a separate and distinct from his mental qualifications." (7 C.J.S.,
Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 816)."
As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required of one seeking reinstatement to the office
of
762
762
Cui vs. Cui
attorney cannot be less exacting than that implied in paragraph 3 of the deed of donation as a requisite
for the office which is disputed in this case. When the defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the
restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out.
This action must fail on one other ground: it is already barred by lapse of time amounting the
prescription or laches. Under Section 16 of Rule 68 (formerly sec. 16, Rule 68, taken from section 216 of
Act 190), this kind of action must be filed within one (1) year after the right of plaintiff to hold the office
arose.
Page 53 of 57
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui believed himself entitled to the office in question as long ago as 1932. On January
26 of that year he filed a complaint in quo warranto against Dr. Teodoro Cui, who assumed the
administration of the Hospicio on 2 July 1931. Mariano Cui, the plaintiff's father, and Antonio Ma. Cui
came in as intervenors, The case was dismissed by the Court of First Instance upon a demurrer by the
defendant there to the complaint and complaint in intervention. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court
from the order of dismissal, the case was remanded for further proceedings (Cui v. Cui, 60 Phil. 37, 48).
The plaintiff, however, did not prosecute the case as indicated in the decision of this Court, but acceded
to an arrangement whereby Teodoro Cui continued as administrator, Mariano Cui was named "legal
adviser" and plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui accepted a position as assistant administrator.
Subsequently the plaintiff tried to get the position by a series of extra-judicial maneuvers. First he
informed the Social Welfare Commissioner, by letter dated 1 February 1950, that as of the previous 1
January he had "made clear" his intention of occupying the office of administrator of the Hospicio." He
followed that up with another letter dated 4 February, announcing that he had taken over the
administration as of 1 January 1950. Actually, however, he took his oath of office before a notary public
only on 4 March 1950, after receiving a re-
763
VOL. 11, AUGUST 31, 1964
763
Cui vs. Cui
ply of acknowledgment, dated 2 March, from the Social Welfare Commissioner, who thought that he
had already assumed the position as stated in his communication of 4 February 1950. The rather
muddled situation was referred by the Commissioner to the Secretary of Justice, who, in an opinion
dated 3 April 1950 (op. No. 45, S. 1950), correcting another opinion previously given, in effect ruled that
the plaintiff, not being a lawyer, was not entitled to the administration of the Hospicio,
Meanwhile, the question again became the subject of a court controversy. On 4 March 1950, the
Hospicio commenced an action against the Philippine National Bank in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu (Civ. No. R-1216) because the Bank had frozen the Hospicio's deposits therein, The Bank then filed
a third-party complaint against herein plaintiff-appellee, Jesus Ma. Cui, who had, as stated above, taken
oath as administrator. On 19 October 1950, having been deprived of recognition by the opinion of the
Secretary of Justice he moved to dismiss the third-party complaint on the ground that he was
relinquishing "temporarily" his claim to the administration of the Hospicio. The motion was denied in an
order dated 2 October 1953. On 6 February 1954 he was able to take another oath of office as
administrator before President Magsaysay, and soon afterward filed a second motion to dismiss in Civil
case No. R-1216. President Magsaysay, be it said, upon learning that a case was pending in Court, stated
in a telegram to his Executive Secretary that "as far as (he) was concerned the court may disregard the
Page 54 of 57
oath" thus taken, The motion to dismiss was granted nevertheless and the other parties in the case filed
their notice of appeal from the order of of dismissal. The plaintiff then filed an ex-parte motion to be
excluded as party in the appeal and the trial Court again granted the motion. This was on 24 November
1954. Appellants thereupon instituted a mandamus proceeding in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-8540),
which was decided on 28 May 1956, to the effect that Jesus Ma. Cui should be included in the appeal.
That appeal, however, after it reached this Court was dismissed upon motion
764
764
Cui vs. Cui
of' the parties, who agreed that "the office of administrator and trustee of the Hospicio x x x should be
ventilated in quo warranto proceedings to be initiated against the incumbent by whomsoever is not
occupying the office but believes he has a right to it" (G.R. No. L-9103). The resolution of dismissal was'
issued 31 July 1956. At that time the incumbent administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, but no action in quo
warranto was filed against him by plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui as indicated in the aforesaid mo tion for
dismissal.
On 10 February 1960, defendant Antonio Ma. Cui was reinstated by this Court as member of the Bar,
and on the following 27 February Dr. Teodoro Cui resigned as administrator in his favor, pursuant to the
"convenio" between them executed on the same date. The next day Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of
office.
The failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his claim judicially after this Court decided the first case of Cui v.
Cui in 1934 (60 Phil. 3769), remanding it to the trial court for further proceedings; his acceptance
instead of the position of assistant administrator, allowing Dr. Teodoro Cui to continue as administrator
and his failure to file an action in quo warranto against said Dr. Cui after 31 July 1956, when the appeal
in Civil Case No. R-1216 of the Cebu Court was dismissed upon motion of the parties precisely so that
the conflicting claims of the parties could be ventilated in such an action—all these circumstances
militate against the plaintiffs present claim in view of the rule that an action in quo warranto must be
filed within one year after the right of the plaintiff to hold the office arose. The excuse that the plaintiff
did not file an action against Dr. Teodoro Cui after 31 July 1956 because of the latter's illness did not
interrupt the running of the statutory period. And the fact that this action was filed within one year of
the defendant's assumption of office in September 1960 does not make the plaintiff's position any
better, for the basis of the action is his own right to the office and it is from the time such right arose
that the one-year limitation must
765
Page 55 of 57
VOL. 11, AUGUST 81, 1964
765
Cui vs. Cui
be counted, not from the date the incumbent began to discharge the duties of said office. Bautista v.
Fajardo, 38 Phil. 624; Lim vs. Yulo, 62 Phil. 161.
Now for the claim of intervenor and appellant Romulo Cui. This party is also a lawyer, grandson of
Vicente Cui, one of the nephews of the founders of the Hospicio mentioned by them in the deed of
donation. He is further, in the line of succession, than defendant Antonio Ma. Cui, who is a son of
Mariano Cui, another one of the said nephews. The deed of donation provides: "a la muerte o
incapacidad de estos administradores (those appointed in the deed itself) pasara a una sola persona que
sera el varon, mayor de edad, que descienda legitimamente de cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos
legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui, Victor Cui, y que posea titulo de abogado x x x En
igualdad de circumstancias, sera preferido el varon de mas edad descendiente de quien tenia
ultimamente la administracion." Besides being a nearer descendant than Romulo Cui, Antonio Ma. Cui is
older than he and therefore is preferred when the circumstances are otherwise equal. The intervenor
contends that the intention of the founders was to confer the administration by line and successively to
the descendants of the nephews named in the deed, in the order they are named, Thus, he argues, since
the last administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, who belonged to the Mauricio Cui line, the next
administrator must come from the line of Vicente Cui, to whom the intervenor belongs. This
interpretation, however, is not justified by the terms of the deed of donation.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside,
and the complaint as well as the complaint in intervention are dismissed, with costs equally against
plaintiff-appellee and intervenor-appellant.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes and Regala, JJ., concur.
Judgment reversed and set aside; complaint as well as complaint in intervention dismissed.
766
766
National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority vs. NWSA Consolidated Unions
Notes.—Regarding the disputed meaning of "titulo de abogado" and "admission to the Philippine Bar", it
was recently held that the "Treaty on the Validity of Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions
Page 56 of 57
between the Philippine Republic and Spain" merely extended to diplomas issued or degrees conferred
by educational institutions of Spain the same recognition and treatment that we accord to similar
diplomas or degrees from local institution of learning; and, therefore, holders of said Spanish diplomas
or degrees must take the examination prescribed by our laws for holders of similar diplomas or degrees
from educational institutions in the Philippines (Philippine Medical Association v. Board of Medical
Examiners, et al, L-25135, Sept. 21, 1968). This reiterates the earlier ruling in In re Garcia, Resolution
dated 15 August 1961, 2 SCRA 984.
Practice of Law to fall within the prohibition of Section 32 of Rule 32 of the Rules of Court has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding
payment for such services (People v. Villanueva, L-19450, May 27, 1965).
Passing the bar examination is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law, taking the
prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential (Martinez v. Diao, Adm. Case
No. 244, March 31, 1963).
——oOo—— Cui vs. Cui, 11 SCRA 755, No. L-18727 August 31, 1964
Page 57 of 57

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Page 1 of 57

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cayetano vs. Monsod

G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991.*

Constitutional Law; Qualifications of COMELEC Chairman; “Practice of law” defined.—Practice of law

Same; Same; Judicial review of judgments rendered by the Commission on Appointments.—The

VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 3, 1991

Cayetano vs. Monsod

PADILLA, J., Dissenting:

Constitutional Law; Qualifications of COMELEC Chairman; Definition of “Practice of Law".—What

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., Dissenting:

Constitutional Law; Qualifications of COMELEC Chairman; Definition of “Practice of Law".—The

PETITION to review the decision of the Commission on Appointments.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cayetano vs. Monsod

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

‘There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a

Black defines “practice of law” as:

VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 3, 1991

Cayetano vs. Monsod

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cayetano vs. Monsod

VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 3, 1991

Cayetano vs. Monsod

“THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

“MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

“MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

“MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

“MR. OPLE. Thank you.”

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cayetano vs. Monsod

VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 3, 1991

Cayetano vs. Monsod

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cayetano vs. Monsod

effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding of

VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 3, 1991

Cayetano vs. Monsod

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the “abogado de

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cayetano vs. Monsod

Moreover, a corporate lawyer’s services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation

VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 3, 1991

Cayetano vs. Monsod

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cayetano vs. Monsod

VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 3, 1991

Cayetano vs. Monsod

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cayetano vs. Monsod

VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 3, 1991

Cayetano vs. Monsod

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cayetano vs. Monsod

VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 3, 1991

Cayetano vs. Monsod