Jurisdiction Fullcases ECA SANDIGAN Cta RTC

December 3, 2014. G.R. No. 180364.
TZE SUN WONG, petitioner, vs. Kenny Wong, respondent.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
clearly states that decisions of any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions (except to judgments or final orders issued under the Labor Code of the
Philippines) shall be appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) under this rule.—Section 1, Rule
43 of the Rules of Court clearly states that decisions of any quasi-judicial agency in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions (except to judgments or final orders issued
under the Labor Code of the Philippines) shall be appealed to the CA under this rule.
Same; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; The extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be
deemed proper “when it is necessary to prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party,
where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient, and in case of urgency.”—Case
law explains that “[a] remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the
petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court
or agency.” In this relation, it has been recognized that the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari may be deemed proper “when it is necessary to prevent irreparable damages
and injury to a party, x x x where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient,
x x x and x x x in case of urgency.” In this case, petitioner instituted an administrative
appeal before the Secretary of Justice and thereafter sought direct recourse to the
CA via certiorari, thereby leap-frogging other available remedies, the first being a
subsequent administrative appeal to the OP and, eventually, an appeal of the OP decision
to the CA via Rule 43. While these remedies remained available to him, the Court deems
that they would not afford him speedy and adequate relief in view of the plain imminence of
his deportation, by virtue of the issuance of a warrant of deportation. The urgency of such
circumstance therefore justified his direct resort to certiorari.
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* FIRST DIVISION.
568
568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tze Sun Wong vs. Wong
Same; Same; Same; In a special civil action for certiorari brought against a court with
jurisdiction over a case, the petitioner carries the burden to prove that the respondent
tribunal committed not merely a reversible error but a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the impugned order.—“In a special civil action
for certiorari brought against a court with jurisdiction over a case, the petitioner carries the
burden to prove that the respondent tribunal committed not merely a reversible error but a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
impugned order. Showing mere abuse of discretion is not enough, for the abuse must be
shown to be grave. Grave abuse of discretion means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial
power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually
refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such
judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or
whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.”
Administrative Agencies; Bureau of Immigration; In this jurisdiction, courts will not
interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies
entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and
training of such agencies.—Petitioner’s certiorari petition before the CA basically revolves
on his denial of the acts of misrepresentation imputed against him, claiming that the same
do not warrant his deportation. However, the commission of said acts involves factual
matters that have already been established during the proceedings before the BOI Board of
Commissioners. In this regard, it is crucial to point out that “[t]he Bureau is the agency
that can best determine whether petitioner violated certain provisions of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. In this jurisdiction, courts will
not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under
the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies. By reason of the
special knowledge and expertise of administrative departments over matters falling within
their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon and their findings
of fact in that regard are generally accorded respect, if not finality, by
569
VOL. 743, DECEMBER 3, 2014 569
the courts.” As petitioner has not sufficiently demonstrated any cogent reason to
deviate from the BOI Board of Commissioners’ findings, courts are wont to defer to its
judgment.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Burden of Proof; The rule is well-settled that he who alleges a
fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.—Petitioner’s
argument is correct in theory since deliberation by all members of the collegial body is
evidently what the rule contemplates, with the votes of only two (2) members being
sufficient for a decision to prevail. Unfortunately, however, petitioner has not shown any
proof that deliberations were not conducted by all commissioners before the questioned
Judgment was made. The rule is well-settled that he who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence. Thus, once more, his self-serving assertion
cannot be given credence. This is especially so in light of the presumption of regularity,
which herein ought to prevail due to the absence of any clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary. Bustillo v. People, 620 SCRA 483 (2010), states: The presumption of regularity of
official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a
duty. The presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes
conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and in
case of doubt as to an officer’s act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor
of its lawfulness.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of

the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Cayetano, Sebastian, Ata, Dado & Cruz for petitioner.
N.A. Aranzaso & Associates for respondent.
570
PERLAS-BERNABE,J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the

Decision2 dated May 15, 2007 and the Resolution3 dated October
23, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 92607,
affirming the deportation of petitioner Tze Sun Wong (petitioner).
The Facts
Petitioner is a Chinese citizen who immigrated to the

Philippines in 1975 and subsequently acquired a permanent
resident status in 1982. As the records would show, he studied,
married, and continued to reside in the country, and even owned a
company called Happy Sun Travel and Tours.4
On September 12, 2000, respondent Kenny Wong (respondent),
owner and proprietor of San Andres Construction Supply, filed a
Complaint-Affidavit5 against petitioner before the Bureau of
Immigration (BOI), alleging that the latter had misrepresented, in
his driver’s license application, that he was a Filipino citizen.
Respondent also averred that petitioner and his business partner,
Tina Yu, issued postdated checks in the amount of P886,922.00
which, however, bounced to his damage and prejudice. Thus,
taking cue from the foregoing acts, respondent prayed that
petitioner be investigated by the BOI for violation of immigration
laws.6
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 22-51.

2 Id., at pp. 10-17. Penned by Associate Justice Lucenito N. Tagle, with Associate Justices Amelita G.
Tolentino and Mariflor Punzalan-Castillo, concurring.
3 Id., at p. 19.
4 Id., at p. 11.
5 Id., at pp. 127-128.
6 Id., at pp. 69 and 170.
571
VOL. 743, DECEMBER 3, 2014 571
In his Counter-Affidavit7 dated September 28, 2000, petitioner
denied respondent’s claim of misrepresentation, stating that when
he applied for a driver’s license, it was another person who filled
up the application form for him. However, said person entered the
wrong information, particularly, on his name, birth year, and
nationality.8
Finding probable cause, the Special Prosecutor filed with the
BOI the applicable deportation charges9 against petitioner,
docketed as BSI-D.C. No. ADD-02-280.10Thereafter, the BOI
Commissioner issued a Mission Order11 to verify petitioner’s
immigration status. The Mission Order was later recalled12 and the
Law and Investigation Division endorsed the records to the Board
of Special Inquiry which directed the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.13
The BOI’s Ruling
In a Judgment 14 dated October 2, 2002, the BOI Board of

Commissioners ordered the deportation of petitioner on the
grounds of: (a) illegal use of alias, i.e., Joseph Wong, which was the
name appearing in his driver’s license application; and (b)
misrepresenting himself as a Filipino citizen in the same
application, in violation of Section 37(a)(7) and (9)15 of
_______________
7 Id., at pp. 152-153.

8 Id., at p. 11.
9 See Charge Sheet dated February 14, 2002, docketed as D.C. No. ADD-02-983
issued by Acting Special Prosecutor Antonio M. Carolino; id., at pp. 163-164.
10 Id., at p. 170.
11 Pertaining to Mission Order No. ADD-02-157 dated April 17, 2002 (not
attached to the records of this case).
12 See Order dated July 16, 2002. (See Rollo, p. 165.)
13 Id., at p. 171.
14 Id., at pp. 170-173. Signed by Commissioner Andrea D. Domingo and
Associate Commissioner Daniel C. Cueto.
15 DEPORTATION OF ALIENS
37. Sec.
572
Commonwealth Act No. 613,16 otherwise known as “The
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940” (Immigration Act), in relation
to Sections 1, 2, and 317 of Republic Act No. (RA) 6085.18
_______________
The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any
other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for
deportation as charged against the alien: (a)
xxxx
Any alien who remains in the Philippines in violation of any limitation or condition under which he
was admitted as a nonimmigrant; 7.
xxxx
Any alien who commits any of the acts described in Sections forty-five and forty-six of this Act,
independent of criminal action which may be brought against him: 9. Provided, That in the case of an
alien who, for any reason, is convicted and sentenced to suffer both imprisonment and deportation, said
alien shall first serve the entire period of his imprisonment before he is actually deported: Provided,
however, That the imprisonment may be waived by the Commissioner of Immigration with the consent of
the Department Head, and upon payment by the alien concerned of such amount as the Commissioner
may fix and approved by the Department Head;
xxxx
16 Entitled “An Act to Control and Regulate the Immigration of Aliens into the Philippines” (August
26, 1940).
17 Section one of Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred forty-two is hereby amended to read as
follows: 1. Section
Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other entertainment purposes
and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use
any name different from the one with which he was registered at birth in the office of the local civil
registry, or with which he was baptized for the first time, or, in case of an alien, with which he was
registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized
by a competent court: 1. “Sec. Provided, That persons, whose births have not been registered in any
local civil registry and who have not been baptized, have one
573
VOL. 743, DECEMBER 3, 2014 573
Aside from pointing out the misrepresentations made by
petitioner, the BOI took judicial notice of the fact that driver’s
license applications require the personal appearance of the
applicant in order to prevent fraud. Thus, by allowing someone to
apply for him, he actively involved himself in the preparation and
issuance of a fraudulent driver’s license. By
_______________
year from the approval of this act within which to register their names in the civil registry of their
residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames.”
Section Two of Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred forty-two is hereby amended to read as
follows: 2. Section
Any person desiring to use an 2. “Sec. alias shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like
those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name, and no person shall be allowed to
secure such judicial authority for more than one alias. The petition for an alias shall set forth the person’s
baptismal and family name and the name recorded in the civil registry, if different, his immigrant’s name,
if an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such names other than his original or real name, specifying the
reason or reasons for the use of the desired alias. The judicial authority for the use of alias the Christian
name and the alien immigrant’s name shall be recorded in the proper local civil registry, and no person
shall use any name or names other, than his original or real name unless the same is or are duly recorded
in the proper local civil registry.”
Section three of Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred forty-two, is hereby amended to read as
Follows: 3. Section
No person having been baptized with a name different from that with which he was registered at birth
in the local civil registry, or in case of an alien, registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry, or any
person who obtained judicial authority to use an alias, or who uses a pseudonym, shall represent himself
in any public or private transaction or shall sign or execute any public or private document without
stating or affixing his real or original name and all names or 3. “Sec. aliases or pseudonym he is or may
have been authorized to use.”
18 Entitled “An Act Amending Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred Forty-Two Regulating
the Use of Aliases” (August 4, 1969).
574
the same account, he cannot then aver that he was without any
participation in the entry of his supposed Philippine citizenship in
his driver’s license.19
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration20 which was
eventually denied by the BOI in a Resolution21 dated December 4,
2002. As such, petitioner filed an appeal before the Secretary of
Justice.
The Secretary of Justice’s Ruling
In a Resolution22 dated March 22, 2004, Acting Secretary of

Justice Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez affirmed the ruling of the
BOI, holding that since it undisputedly appears on the face of
petitioner’s driver’s license that he is a Filipino citizen under the
name of Joseph Wong, he cannot then raise the defense that it was
not his doing but that of a stranger who merely helped him. 23 It
was further pointed out that petitioner’s use of the alias “Joseph
Wong” was illegal since said name is not registered in the BOI and
does not fall under the recognized exceptions where use
of alias may be allowed.24
Petitioner moved for reconsideration25 and raised the argument
that the Judgment of the BOI was null and void since only two
commissioners26 participated in the decision-making process.
Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzalez rendered a
_______________
19 Rollo, p. 172.
20 Dated October 17, 2002. (Id., at pp. 174-177.)
21 Id., at pp. 189-190. Signed by Commissioner Andrea D. Domingo and Associate Commissioners
Arthel B. Caronoñgan, Daniel C. Cueto, and Orlando V. Dizon.
22 Id., at pp. 92-94.
23 Id., at p. 93.
24 Id., at p. 94.
25 See Motion for Reconsideration dated May 13, 2005; id., at pp. 199-213.
26 Referring to Commissioner Andrea D. Domingo and Associate Commissioner Daniel C. Cueto.
575
VOL. 743, DECEMBER 3, 2014 575
Resolution27 dated September 9, 2005, rejecting petitioner’s
argument on the basis of Section 8 of the Immigration Act which
simply requires that “[i]n any case coming before the [BOI] Board
of Commissioners, the decision of any two members shall prevail[,]”
as in this case. It was added that when petitioner sought to
reconsider said Judgment, all four (4) commissioners28decided in
favor of his deportation.29
The CA’s Ruling
In a Decision31 dated May 15, 2007, the CA

denied32 the certiorari petition. Preliminarily, it found that
petitioner chose the wrong remedy considering that the decisions of
the BOI Board of Commissioners are directly appealable to the CA
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.33 The CA also observed that
even on the assumption that the Secretary of Justice was given the
authority to countermand the BOI Judgment under the
Administrative Code, no countermand was made, and hence, the
same should have already attained finality.34 On the substantive
aspects, the CA affirmed the ruling of the Secretary of Justice that
petitioner should be deported for violating the above mentioned
rules.35
_______________
27 Rollo, pp. 97-98.

28 Referring to Commissioner Andrea D. Domingo and Associate Commissioners Arthel B.
Caronoñgan, Daniel C. Cueto and Orlando V. Dizon.
29 Rollo, p. 98.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari30 before the CA.
30 Dated January 5, 2005. (Id., at pp. 65-91.)
31 Id., at pp. 10-17.
32 Id., at p. 17.
33 Id., at p. 13.
34 Id., at p. 14.
35 Id., at pp. 15-16.
576
Petitioner sought reconsideration36 but was denied in a
Resolution37 dated October 23, 2007, hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA
correctly denied petitioner’s petition for certiorari.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is without merit.

The Court first discusses the propriety of petitioner’s recourse
before the CA.
Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court clearly states that
decisions of any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its
quasi-judicial functions (except to judgments or final orders
issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines) shall be appealed
to the CA under this rule.
43 RULE
Appeals From the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies to the Court of
Appeals
1. SectionScope.—This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of

the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or
authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of
Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the President, Land
Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of
Patents,
_______________
36 See Motion for Reconsideration dated June 4, 2007; id., at pp. 299-316.
37 Id., at p. 19.
577
VOL. 743, DECEMBER 3, 2014 577
Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy

Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian
Reform under Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees’
Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission,
Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments, Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law. (Emphasis supplied)
The statutory basis of the CA’s appellate jurisdiction over

decisions rendered by quasi-judicial agencies (except those falling
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the
Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442) in the above
mentioned respect is Section 9(3) of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 129,38 as amended:39
9. SectionJurisdiction.—The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
xxxx
Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions resolutions, orders or
awards of Regional Trial Courts and (3) quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities,
boards or commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social
Security Commission, the Employees’ Compensation Commission and the Civil Service
Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential
Decree No.
_______________
38 Entitled “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor,

and for Other Purposes” (August 14, 1981).
39 Amended by RA 7902 entitled “An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals, Amending for the Purpose Section Nine of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as Amended, Known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980” (March 18,
1995).
578
442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third
paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act
of 1948.
xxxx
Notably, in Cayao-Lasam v. Spouses Ramolete,40 it was clarified

that the enumeration of the quasi-judicial agencies under Section
1, Rule 43 is not exclusive:
The Rule expressly provides that it should be applied to appeals from awards,
judgments, final orders or resolutions of any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its
quasi-judicial functions. The phrase “among these agencies” confirms that the enumeration
made in the Rule is not exclusive to the agencies therein listed.41
Thus, although unmentioned in the enumeration, the Court, in

the case of Dwikarna v. Hon. Domingo42(Dwikarna), held that the
decisions rendered by the BOI Board of Commissioners may be
appealable to the CA viaRule 43 in the event that a motion for
reconsideration therefrom is denied:
If petitioner is dissatisfied with the decision of the Board of Commissioners of the
Bureau of Immigration, he can move for its reconsideration. If his motion is denied, then
he can elevate his case by way of a petition for review before the Court of
Appeals, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.43 (Emphasis supplied)
It bears elucidation that the availability of a Rule 43 appeal to
the CA from the BOI Board of Commissioners as ruled
_______________
40 595 Phil. 56; 574 SCRA 439 (2008).

41 Id., at p. 71; p. 453.
42 477 Phil. 891; 433 SCRA 748 (2004).
43 Id., at p. 901; p. 755.
579
VOL. 743, DECEMBER 3, 2014 579
in Dwikarna presupposes the presence of any of the exceptions to
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,44 considering
that the Secretary of Justice may still review the decisions of the
aforesaid body. In Caoile v. Vivo45 (Caoile), it was held:
[S]ince the Commissioners of Immigration are under the Department of Justice 46 and, in
this case, they followed the Secretary’s Order setting aside the individual actions of the
former Commissioners, the aggrieved parties should have exhausted their administrative
remedies by appealing to the Secretary before seeking judicial intervention.47
_______________
44 The doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies are subject to
certain exceptions, to wit:
“(a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged
administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable
delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved
is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is
purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention
is urgent; (g) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the
controverted acts violate due process; (i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has
been rendered moot; (j) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) where strong
public interest is involved; and (l) in quo warranto proceedings.” (Vigilar v. Aquino, G.R. No. 180388,
January 18, 2011, 639 SCRA 772, 777, citing Republic v. Lacap, 546 Phil. 87, 97-98; 517 SCRA 255, 265-
266 [2007]).
45 210 Phil. 67; 125 SCRA 85 (1983).
46 See Chapter 10, Title III, Book IV, Executive Order No. (EO) 292.
47 Caoile v. Vivo, supra at p. 82; pp. 99-100, citing Board of Commissioners v. Domingo, 118 Phil. 680,
684; 8 SCRA 661, 663 (1963).
580
Citing Caoile, the Court, in the more recent case of Kiani v. The
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation,48expounded on the
procedure:
Under Section 8, Chapter 3, Title I, Book III of Executive Order No. 292, the power to
deport aliens is vested on the President of the Philippines, subject to the requirements of
due process. The Immigration Commissioner is vested with authority to deport aliens under
Section 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended.49 Thus, a party aggrieved
by a Deportation Order issued by the [Board of Commissioner (BOC)] is proscribed from
assailing said Order in the RTC even via a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Conformably
with [the] ruling of the Court in [Commissioner] Domingo v. Scheer (see 466 Phil. 235, 264-
284 [2004]), such party may file a motion for the reconsideration thereof before the BOC.
The Court ruled therein that “there is no law or rule which provides that a Summary
Deportation Order issued by the BOC in the exercise of its authority becomes final after one
year from its issuance, or that the aggrieved party is barred from filing a motion for a
reconsideration of any order or decision of the BOC.” The Court, likewise, declared that in
deportation proceedings, the Rules of Court may be applied in a suppletory manner and
that the aggrieved party may file a motion for reconsideration of a decision or final order
under Rule 37 of said Rules.
In case such motion for reconsideration is denied by the BOC, the aggrieved
party may appeal to the Secretary of Justice and, if the latter
_______________
48 518 Phil. 501; 483 SCRA 341 (2006).

49 See also Section 10, Chapter 3, Title I, Book III, EO 292, which provides:
10. SectionPower to Countermand Decisions of the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of
Immigration.—The decision of the Board of Commissioners which has jurisdiction over all deportation
cases shall become final and executory after thirty (30) days from promulgation, unless within such period
the President shall order the contrary.
581
VOL. 743, DECEMBER 3, 2014 581
denies the appeal, to the Office of the President of the Philippines [(OP)]. The
party may also choose to file a petition for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, on the ground that the Secretary of Justice acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in dismissing the
appeal, the remedy of appeal not being adequate and speedy remedy. In case the
Secretary of Justice dismisses the appeal, the aggrieved party may resort to filing
a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, as amended.50
Thus, to recap, from the denial of the BOI Board of

Commissioners’ motion for reconsideration, the aggrieved party
has three (3) options: (a) he may file an appeal directly to the
CA via Rule 43 provided that he shows that any of the exceptions
to the exhaustion doctrine attend; (b) absent any of the exceptions,
he may exhaust the available administrative remedies within the
executive machinery, namely, an appeal to the Secretary of Justice
and then to the OP, and thereafter, appeal the OP’s
decisions via Rule 43;51 or (c) he may directly resort
to certiorari before the CA strictly on jurisdictional grounds,
provided that he explains why any of the aforementioned remedies
cannot be taken as “adequate and speedy.” Anent the last of these
options, the Court, in Rigor v. CA,52 had this to say:
For a writ of certiorari to issue, a petitioner must not only prove that the tribunal, board
or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction. He must also show that he has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the
_______________
50 Kiani v. Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, supra note 48 at pp. 515-516; pp. 357-358.
51 The OP is one of the quasi-judicial agencies specifically mentioned in Section 1, Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court.
52 526 Phil 852; 494 SCRA 375 (2006).
582
ordinary course of law against what he perceives to be a legitimate grievance.
A recourse affording prompt relief from the injurious effects of the judgment or acts of a
lower court or tribunal is considered “plain, speedy and adequate” remedy.53
Case law explains that “[a] remedy is plain, speedy and adequate
if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of
the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency.”54 In
this relation, it has been recognized that the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari may be deemed proper “when it is necessary to prevent
irreparable damages and injury to a party, x x x where an appeal
would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient, x x x and x x x in case
of urgency.”55
In this case, petitioner instituted an administrative appeal
before the Secretary of Justice and thereafter sought direct
recourse to the CA via certiorari, thereby leap-frogging other
available remedies, the first being a subsequent administrative
appeal to the OP and, eventually, an appeal of the OP decision to
the CA via Rule 43. While these remedies remained available to
him, the Court deems that they would not afford him speedy and
adequate relief in view of the plain imminence of his deportation,
by virtue of the issuance of a warrant of deportation.56 The urgency
of such circumstance therefore justified his direct resort
to certiorari.
This notwithstanding, the Court nonetheless denies the petition
on substantive grounds.
_______________
53 Id., at p. 855; p. 379.

54 Bordomeo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161596, February 20, 2013, 691 SCRA 269, 286.
55 Francisco Motors Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 535 Phil. 736, 748; 505 SCRA 8, 20 (2006).
56 See dispositive portion of the October 2, 2002 Judgment of BOI Board of Commissioners; Rollo, pp.
172-173.
583
VOL. 743, DECEMBER 3, 2014 583
It must be highlighted that the case under consideration
essentially calls for the Court to determine whether the CA’s
dismissal of petitioner’s certiorari petition before it was correct.
“In a special civil action for certiorari brought against a court
with jurisdiction over a case, the petitioner carries the burden to
prove that the respondent tribunal committed not merely a
reversible error but a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the impugned order. Showing
mere abuse of discretion is not enough, for the abuse must be
shown to be grave. Grave abuse of discretion means either that the
judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that
the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or
virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or
whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.”57
Petitioner’s certiorari petition before the CA basically revolves
on his denial of the acts of misrepresentation imputed against him,
claiming that the same do not warrant his deportation. However,
the commission of said acts involves factual matters that have
already been established during the proceedings before the BOI
Board of Commissioners. In this regard, it is crucial to point out
that “[t]he Bureau is the agency that can best determine
whether petitioner violated certain provisions of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. In this
jurisdiction, courts will not interfere in matters which are
addressed to the sound discretion of government agen-
_______________
57 Supra note 54 at p. 289, citing Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, G.R. No.
153852, October 24, 2012, 684 SCRA 410, 422-423.
584
cies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming
under the special technical knowledge and training of such
agencies. By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of
administrative departments over matters falling within their
jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon
and their findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded
respect, if not finality, by the courts.”58 As petitioner has not
sufficiently demonstrated any cogent reason to deviate from the
BOI Board of Commissioners’ findings, courts are wont to defer to
its judgment.
Besides, petitioner’s defenses anent what had actually
transpired during the relevant incidents surrounding his driver’s
license application apparently constitute mere self-serving
allegations barren of any independent proof. While he blamed the
unnamed fixer filling up the erroneous details in his application,
his version of the story remained uncorroborated. The lack of
testimony on the part of the fixer leaves much to be desired from
petitioner’s theory.
Moreover, the Court’s review of the present case is via a petition
for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which generally
bars any question pertaining to the factual issues raised. The well-
settled rule is that questions of fact are not reviewable in petitions
for review under Rule 45, subject only to certain exceptions, among
them, the lack of sufficient support in evidence of the trial court’s
judgment or the appellate court’s misapprehension of the adduced
facts.59 None of these exceptions was, however, convincingly shown
to attend in this case.
Now, on the matter of the alleged nullity of the BOI Board of
Commissioners’ Judgment due to the fact that it had been signed
only by two (2) commissioners, suffice it to state that
_______________
58 Dwikarna v. Domingo, supra note 42 at p. 901; pp. 754-755; emphasis and underscoring supplied.
59 Guevarra v. People, G.R. No. 170462, February 5, 2014, 715 SCRA 384.
585
VOL. 743, DECEMBER 3, 2014 585
Section 8 of the Immigration Act simply requires that in any
case coming before the BOI Board of Commissioners, the decision
of any two (2) members shall prevail:
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
8. Sec.Decision of the Board.—The board of Commissioners, hereinafter referred to in

this Act, shall be composed of the Commissioner of Immigration and the two Deputy
Commissioners. In the absence of a member of the Board, the Department Head shall
designate an officer or employee in the Bureau of Immigration to serve as a member
thereof. In any case coming before the Board of Commissioners, the decision of any two
members shall prevail.
Petitioner argues that the foregoing rule only refers to the

number of votes necessary to constitute the decision of the Board,
insisting that deliberation should still be made by all
commissioners as a collegial body.60
Petitioner’s argument is correct in theory since deliberation by
all members of the collegial body is evidently what the rule
contemplates, with the votes of only two (2) members being
sufficient for a decision to prevail. Unfortunately, however,
petitioner has not shown any proof that deliberations were not
conducted by all commissioners before the questioned Judgment
was made. The rule is well-settled that he who alleges a fact has
the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not
evidence.61 Thus, once more, his self-serving assertion cannot be
given credence. This is especially so in light of the presumption of
regularity, which herein ought to prevail due to the absence of any
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Bustillo v.
People62 states:
_______________
60 Rollo, pp. 43-44.

61 Alcazar v. Arante, G.R. No. 177042, December 10, 2012, 687 SCRA 507, 517.
62 G.R. No. 160718, May 12, 2010, 620 SCRA 483.
586
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption, however, prevails until it is
overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the
presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made
in support of the presumption and in case of doubt as to an officer’s act being lawful or
unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness.63
In particular, the presumption that the Judgment had been

deliberated by the BOI Board of Commissioners as a collegial body
stands. In any event, the lack of any concurrence or dissension
from the two (2) other commissioners missing on the face of the
October 2, 2002 Judgment has already been placated by their
eventual signing of full concurrence in the subsequent Resolution
dated December 4, 2002 denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
May 15, 2007 and the Resolution dated October 23, 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 92607 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro,
Bersamin and Perez, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Notes.—He who alleges a fact has the burden of proof and mere
allegation is not evidence. (Pedrano vs. Heirs of Benedicto Pedrano,
539 SCRA 401 [2007])
_______________
63 Id., at p. 492.
587
VOL. 743, DECEMBER 3, 2014 587
Situations when the extraordinary remedy of certiorarimay be
deemed proper. (Bordomeo vs. Court of Appeals, 691 SCRA 269
[2013])
——o0o——
August 11, 2015. G.R. No. 209447.*
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT

(PCGG), petitioner, vs. HON. WINLOVE M. DUMAYAS, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Makati City and UNITED
COCONUT PLANTERS BANK (UCPB), respondents.
August 11, 2015. G.R. No. 210901.*
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT

(PCGG), petitioner, vs. HON. WINLOVE M. DUMAYAS, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Makati City and UNITED
COCONUT PLANTERS LIFE ASSURANCE CORPORATION
(COCOLIFE), respondents.
Pleadings and Practice; Certification of Non-forum Shopping; Verification; Under Rule
46, Section 3, paragraph 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, petitions for
certiorari must be verified and accompanied by a sworn certification of non-forum
shopping.—Under Rule 46, Section 3, paragraph 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, petitions for certiorari must be verified and accompanied by a sworn certification
of non-forum shopping. A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the
pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or
based on authentic records. The party need not sign the verification. A party’s
representative, lawyer or any person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in
the pleading may sign the verification.
Same; Same; A certification of non-forum shopping is a certification under oath by the
plaintiff or principal party in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for
relief or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith.—
A certification of non-forum shopping is a certification under oath by the plaintiff or
principal party in the complaint or other initiatory
_______________
* EN BANC.
525
VOL. 765, AUGUST 11, 2015 525
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) vs. Dumayas
pleading asserting a claim for relief or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith, (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or
filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency
and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if
there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status
thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has
been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court
wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Same; Same; Verification; It is obligatory that the one signing the verification and
certification against forum shopping on behalf of the principal party or the other petitioners
has the authority to do the same.—It is obligatory that the one signing the verification and
certification against forum shopping on behalf of the principal party or the other petitioners
has the authority to do the same. We hold that the signature of only one Commissioner of
petitioner PCGG in the verification and certification against forum shopping is not a fatal
defect.
Remedial Law; Verification; The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an
assurance that the allegations in the petition are true and correct, not merely speculative.—It
has been consistently held that the verification of a pleading is only a formal, not a
jurisdictional, requirement. The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an
assurance that the allegations in the petition are true and correct, not merely speculative.
This requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleadings, and noncompliance
therewith does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective.
Same; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; Words and Phrases; Jurisdiction is defined as the
power and authority of a court to hear, try, and decide a case.—Jurisdiction is defined as the
power and authority of a court to hear, try, and decide a case. Jurisdiction over the subject
matter is conferred by the Constitution or by law and is determined by the allegations of
the complaint and the relief prayed for, regardless of whether the plaintiff is entitled to
recovery upon all or some of the claims prayed for therein. Jurisdiction is not acquired
526
by agreement or consent of the parties, and neither does it depend upon the defenses
raised in the answer or in a motion to dismiss.
Same; Same; Same; Sandiganbayan; Under Section 4(C) of Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7975 and RA No. 8249, the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan included suits for recovery of ill-gotten wealth and related cases.—
Under Section 4(C) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249, the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan included suits for recovery of ill-gotten wealth and
related cases: (C) Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. x x x x The Sandiganbayan shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of
mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs
and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature,
including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over
these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
Same; Same; Res Judicata; The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment
on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of
the parties and their privies and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving
the same claim, demand, or cause of action.—The doctrine of res judicata provides that a
final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as
to the rights of the parties and their privies and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent
actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. The following requisites must
obtain for the application of the doctrine: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2)
it must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration
of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case; (3) it must
have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject
matter and of cause of action. This requisite is satisfied if the two actions are substantially
between the same parties.
527
VOL. 765, AUGUST 11, 2015 527
Same; Same; Same; The doctrine of res judicata has two (2) aspects. The first, known as
“bar by prior judgment,” or “estoppel by verdict,” is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the
prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. The second,
known as “conclusiveness of judgment,” otherwise known as the rule of auter action pendent,
ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in
any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action.—The doctrine
of res judicata has two aspects. The first, known as “bar by prior judgment,” or “estoppel by
verdict,” is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the
same claim, demand or cause of action. The second, known as “conclusiveness of judgment,”
otherwise known as the rule of auter action pendent, ordains that issues actually and
directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the
same parties involving a different cause of action.
PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the orders of the Regional

Trial Court of Makati City, Br. 59.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Divina Law Office for respondents United Coconut Planters
Bank (UCPB) and United Coconut Planters Life Assurance
Corporation (COCOLIFE).
VILLARAMA, JR.,J.:
It is an important fundamental principle in our judicial system

that every litigation must come to an end. Litigation must end and
terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an
effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a
judgment has become final, the winning party be, not through a
mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict.1 Adherence to
the principle impacts upon the lives of
_______________
1 Navarro v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company, 612 Phil. 462, 471; 594 SCRA 149, 159 (2009).
528
about three million poor farmers who have long waited to benefit
from the outcome of the 27-year battle for the judicial recovery of
assets acquired through illegal conversion of the coconut levies
collected during the Marcos regime into private funds.
The Case
Before us are the consolidated petitions seeking the reversal of
the following Orders2 issued by respondent Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 59: (a) Order
dated April 29, 2013 denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss the
complaint in Civil Case No. 12-1251; (b) Order dated June 28, 2013
denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner; (c)
Omnibus Order dated May 15, 2013 denying petitioner’s motion to
dismiss the complaint in Civil Case No. 12-1252; and (d) Order
dated December 4, 2013 denying the motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner.
The Antecedents
The factual background of this case is gathered from the records

and the decisions of this Court involving the coconut levy funds.
We reproduce the pertinent portions of the January 24, 2012
Decision in COCOFED v. Republic:3
In 1971, Republic Act No. (R.A.) 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut Investment
Company (CIC) to administer the Coconut Investment Fund (CIF), which, under Section
8 thereof, was to be sourced from a Php0.55 levy on the sale of every 100 kg. of copra. Of the
Php0.55 levy of which the copra seller was, or ought to
_______________
2 Rollo (G.R. No. 209447), pp. 52-56; Rollo (G.R. No. 210901), pp. 52-61. The
Omnibus Order dated May 15, 2013 was issued by Presiding Judge Josefino A.
Subia of the RTC, Branch 138, Makati City.
3 679 Phil. 508; 663 SCRA 514 (2012).
529
VOL. 765, AUGUST 11, 2015 529
be, issued COCOFUND receipts, Php0.02 was placed at the disposition of COCOFED, the
national association of coconut producers declared by the Philippine Coconut
Administration (PHILCOA, now PCA) as having the largest membership.
The declaration of martial law in September 1972 saw the issuance of several
presidential decrees (“PDs”) purportedly designed to improve the coconut industry through
the collection and use of the coconut levy fund. While coming generally from impositions on
the first sale of copra, the coconut levy fund came under various names x x x. Charged with
the duty of collecting and administering the Fund was PCA. Like COCOFED with which it
had a legal linkage, the PCA, by statutory provisions scattered in different coco levy
decrees, had its share of the coco levy.
The following were some of the issuances on the coco levy, its collection and utilization,
how the proceeds of the levy will be managed and by whom, and the purpose it was
supposed to serve:
1.P.D. No. 276 established the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF) and
declared the proceeds of the CCSF levy as trust fund, to be utilized to subsidize the sale of
coconut-based products, thus stabilizing the price of edible oil.
2.P.D. No. 582 created the Coconut Industry Development Fund (CIDF) to finance
the operation of a hybrid coconut seed farm.
Then came 3. P.D. No. 755 providing under its Section 1 the following:
It is hereby declared that the policy of the State is to provide readily available credit
facilities to the coconut farmers at a preferential rates; that this policy can be expeditiously
and efficiently realized by the implementation of the “Agreement for the Acquisition of a
Commercial Bank for the benefit of Coconut Farmers” executed by the [PCA] x x x; and that
the [PCA] is hereby authorized
530
to distribute, for free, the shares of stock of the bank it acquired to the coconut farmers
x x x.
Towards achieving the policy thus declared, P.D. No. 755, under its Section 2,
authorized PCA to utilize the CCSF and the CIDF collections to acquire a commercial bank
and deposit the CCSF levy collections in said bank, interest free, the deposit
withdrawable only when the bank has attained a certain level of sufficiency in its equity
capital. The same section also decreed that all levies PCA is authorized to collect shall not
be considered as special and/or fiduciary funds or form part of the general funds of the
government within the contemplation of P.D. No. 711.
4.P.D. No. 961 codified the various laws relating to the development of coconut/palm
oil industries.
The relevant provisions of P.D. No. 961, as later amended by 5. P.D. No. 1468 (Revised
Coconut Industry Code), read:
ARTICLE III
Levies
1. SectionCoconut Consumers Stabilization Fund Levy.—The [PCA] is hereby
empowered to impose and collect x x x the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund Levy
x x x.
xxxx
5. SectionExemption.—The [CCSF] and the [CIDF] as well as all disbursements as
herein authorized, shall not be construed x x x as special and/or fiduciary funds, or
as part of the general funds of the national government within the contemplation of PD
711; x x x the intention being that said Fund and the disbursements thereof as
herein authorized for the benefit of the coconut farmers shall be owned by them
531
VOL. 765, AUGUST 11, 2015 531
in their private capacities: x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
6.Letter of Instructions No. (LOI) 926, Series of 1979, made reference to the
creation, out of other coco levy funds, of the Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF) in
P.D. No. 1468 and entrusted a portion of the CIIF levy to UCPB for investment, on
behalf of coconut farmers, in oil mills and other private corporations, with the
following equity ownership structure:
2. SectionOrganization of the Cooperative Endeavor.—The [UCPB], in its capacity as
the investment arm of the coconut farmers thru the [CIIF] x x x is hereby directed to invest,
on behalf of the coconut farmers, such portion of the CIIF x x x in private corporations x x x
under the following guidelines:
The coconut farmers shall own or control at least x x x a) (50%) of the outstanding
voting capital stock of the private corporation [acquired] thru the CIIF and/or
corporation owned or controlled by the farmers thru the CIIF x x x. (Words in bracket
added)
Through the years, a part of the coconut levy funds went directly or indirectly to
[finance] various projects and/or was converted into different assets or investments. Of
particular relevance to this case was their use to acquire the First United Bank (FUB),
later renamed UCPB, and the acquisition by UCPB, through the CIIF companies, of a large
block of SMC shares.
xxxx
Shortly after the execution of the PCA-Cojuangco, Jr. Agreement, President Marcos
issued, on July 29, 1975, P.D. No. 755 directing, as earlier narrated, PCA to use the CCSF
and CIDF to acquire a commercial bank to provide coco farmers with “readily available
credit facili-
532
ties at preferential rate,” and PCA “to distribute, for free,” the bank shares to coconut
farmers.
Then came the 1986 EDSA event. One of the priorities of then President Corazon C.
Aquino’s revolutionary government was the recovery of ill-gotten wealth reportedly
amassed by the Marcos family and close relatives, their nominees and associates. Apropos
thereto, she issued Executive Order Nos. (EOs) 1, 2 and 14, as amended by E.O. 14-A, all
Series of 1986. E.O. 1 created the PCGG and provided it with the tools and processes it may
avail of in the recovery efforts; E.O. No. 2 asserted that the ill-gotten assets and properties
come in the form of shares of stocks, etc.; while E.O. No. 14 conferred on
the Sandiganbayan exclusive and original jurisdiction over ill-gotten wealth cases, with
the provisothat “technical rules of procedure and evidence shall not be applied strictly” to
the civil cases filed under the E.O. Pursuant to these issuances, the PCGG issued
numerous orders of sequestration, among which were those handed out, as earlier
mentioned, against shares of stock in UCPB purportedly owned by or registered
in the names of (a) more than a million coconut farmers and (b) the CIIF companies,
including the SMC shares held by the CIIF companies. On July 31, 1987, the PCGG
instituted before the Sandiganbayan a recovery suit docketed thereat as CC No. 0033.
After the filing and subsequent amendments of the complaint in CC 0033, Lobregat,
COCOFED, et al., and Ballares, et al., purportedly representing over a million coconut
farmers, sought and were allowed to intervene. Meanwhile, the following incidents/events
transpired:
On the postulate, 1. inter alia, that its coco-farmer members own at least 51% of the
outstanding capital stock of UCPB, the CIIF companies, etc., COCOFED, et al., on
November 29, 1989, filed Class Action Omnibus Motion praying for the lifting of the orders
of sequestration referred to above and for a chance to present evidence to prove the coconut
farmers’ ownership of the UCPB and CIIF
533
VOL. 765, AUGUST 11, 2015 533
shares. The plea to present evidence was denied;
Later, the Republic moved for and secured approval of a motion for separate trial which
paved the way for the subdivision of the causes of action in CC 0033, each detailing how the
assets subject thereof were acquired and the key roles the principal played; 2.
Civil Case 0033, pursuant to an order of the 3. Sandiganbayan would be subdivided
into eight complaints, docketed as CC 0033-A to CC 0033-H.
xxxx
On February 23, 2001, Lobregat, COCOFED, Ballares, 4. et al., filed a Class Action
Omnibus Motion to enjoin the PCGG from voting the sequestered UCPB shares and the
SMC shares registered in the names of the CIIF companies. The Sandiganbayan, by Order
of February 28, 2001, granted the motion, sending the Republic to come to this Court
on certiorari, docketed as G.R. Nos. 147062-64, to annul said order; and
By Decision of 5. December 14, 2001, in G.R. Nos. 147062-64 (Republic v.
COCOFED), the Court declared the coco levy funds as prima facie public funds.
And purchased as the sequestered UCPB shares were by such funds, beneficial
ownership thereon and the corollary voting rights prima facie pertain, according
to the Court, to the government.4(Additional emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
_______________
4 Id., at pp. 528-536; pp. 527-535.
534
As mentioned in the above cited case, the amended complaint in
Civil Case No. 0033 revolved around the provisional takeover by
the PCGG of COCOFED, Cocomark, and Coconut Investment
Company and their assets and the sequestration of shares of stock
in UCPB CIIF corporations (CIIF oil mills and the 14 CIIF holding
companies), or CIIF companies, so-called for having been either
organized, acquired and/or funded as UCPB subsidiaries with the
use of the CIIF levy. The basic complaint also contained allegations
about the alleged misuse of the coconut levy funds to buy out the
majority of the outstanding shares of stock of San Miguel
Corporation (SMC).5
The proceedings relevant to this case pertain to Civil Case No.
0033-A entitled, Republic of the Philippines, plaintiff, v. Eduardo
M. Cojuangco, Jr., et al., defendants, COCOFED, et al.,
BALLARES, et al., Class Action Movants(Re: Anomalous Purchase
and Use of [FUB] now [UCPB]), and Civil Case No. 0033-F
entitled, Republic of the Philippines, plaintiff, v. Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr., et al., defendants (Re: Acquisition of San Miguel
Corporation Shares of Stock).
The Sandiganbayan rendered partial summary judgments in
Civil Case No. 0033-A and 0033-F on July 11, 2003 and May 7,
2004, respectively. In our Decision dated January 24, 2012
in COCOFED v. Republic,6 we affirmed with modification the said
partial summary judgments and also upheld the Sandiganbayan’s
ruling that the coconut levy funds are special public funds of the
Government. Citing Republic v. COCOFED7 which resolved the
issue of whether the PCGG has the right to vote the sequestered
shares, we declared that the coconut levy funds are not only
affected with public interest but are, in fact, prima facie public
funds. We also upheld the Sandiganbayan’s ruling that Sections 1
and 2 of P.D. 755,
_______________
5 Id., at pp. 525-526; p. 525.

6 Supra note 3.
7 423 Phil. 735; 372 SCRA 462 (2001).
535
VOL. 765, AUGUST 11, 2015 535
Section 3, Article III of P.D. 961, and the implementing regulations
of the PCA, are unconstitutional “for allowing the use and/or the
distribution of properties acquired through the coconut levy funds
to private individuals for their own direct benefit and absolute
ownership.” As to the ownership of the six CIIF companies, the 14
holding companies, and the CIIF block of SMC shares of stock, we
held these to be owned by the Government, having likewise been
acquired using the coconut levy funds. Accordingly, “the properties
subject of the January 24, 2012 Decision were declared owned by
and ordered reconveyed to the Government, to be used only for the
benefit of all coconut farmers and for the development of the
coconut industry.”8
Under the Resolution dated September 4, 2012, we denied with
finality the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners in
G.R. Nos. 177857-58.
The dispositive portion of the September 4, 2012 Resolution
in Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) v.
Republic of the Philippines9 thus reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves
to DENY with FINALITY the instant Motion for Reconsideration
dated February 14, 2012 for lack of merit.
The Court further resolves to CLARIFY that the 753,848,312
SMC Series 1 preferred shares of the CIIF companies converted
from the CIIF block of SMC shares, with all the dividend earnings
as well as all increments arising from, but not limited to, the
exercise of preemptive rights subject of the September 17, 2009
Resolution, shall now be the subject matter of the January 24,
2012 Decision and shall be declared owned by the Government and
be used only for the benefit of all coconut farmers and for the
development of the coconut industry.
_______________
8 As summarized in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Republic, G.R. No. 180705, November 27, 2012, 686 SCRA 472,
477-482.
9 G.R. Nos. 177857-58 & 178193, September 4, 2012, 679 SCRA 604.
536
As modified, the fallo of the January 24, 2012 Decision shall read, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 177857-58 and 178793 are hereby DENIED.
The Partial Summary Judgment dated July 11, 2003 in Civil Case No. 0033-A as reiterated
with modification in Resolution dated June 5, 2007, as well as the Partial Summary
Judgment dated May 7, 2004 in Civil Case No. 0033-F, which was effectively amended in
Resolution dated May 11, 2007, are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, only with
respect to those issues subject of the petitions in G.R. Nos. 177857-58 and 178193.
However, the issues raised in G.R. No. 180705 in relation to Partial Summary Judgment
dated July 11, 2003 and Resolution dated June 5, 2007 in Civil Case No. 0033-A, shall be
decided by this Court in a separate decision.
The Partial Summary Judgment in Civil Case No. 0033-A dated July 11, 2003, is
hereby MODIFIED, and shall read as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, We rule as follows:
SUMMARY OF THE COURT’S RULING
A. Re: CLASS ACTION MOTION FOR A SEPARATE SUMMARY JUDGMENT dated
April 11, 2001 filed by Defendant Maria Clara L. Lobregat, COCOFED, et al., and
Ballares, et al.
The Class Action Motion for Separate Summary Judgment dated April 11, 2001 filed by
defendant Maria Clara L. Lobregat, COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al., is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.
537
VOL. 765, AUGUST 11, 2015 537
B. Re: MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (RE: COCOFED, ET AL. AND
BALLARES, ET AL.) dated April 22, 2002 filed by Plaintiff.
The portion of Section 1 of P.D. No. 755, which reads: 1. a.
x x x and that the Philippine Coconut Authority is hereby authorized to distribute, for
free, the shares of stock of the bank it acquired to the coconut farmers under such rules and
regulations it may promulgate.
taken in relation to Section 2 of the same P.D., is unconstitutional: (i) for having allowed
the use of the CCSF to benefit directly private interest by the outright and unconditional
grant of absolute ownership of the FUB/UCPB shares paid for by PCA entirely with the
CCSF to the undefined “coconut farmers,” which negated or circumvented the national
policy or public purpose declared by P.D. No. 755 to accelerate the growth and development
of the coconut industry and achieve its vertical integration; and (ii) for having unduly
delegated legislative power to the PCA.
b. The implementing regulations issued by PCA, namely, Administrative Order No. 1,
Series of 1975 and Resolution No. 074-78 are likewise invalid for their failure to see to it
that the distribution of shares serve exclusively or at least primarily or directly the
aforementioned public purpose or national policy declared by P.D. No. 755.
2. Section 2 of P.D. No. 755 which mandated that the coconut levy funds shall not be
considered special and/or fiduci-
538
ary funds nor part of the general funds of the national government and similar provisions of
Sec. 5, Art. III, P.D. No. 961 and Sec. 5, Art. III, P.D. No. 1468 contravene the provisions of
the Constitution, particularly, Art. IX(D), Sec. 2; and Article VI, Sec. 29(3).
3. Lobregat, COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al. have not legally and validly obtained
title of ownership over the subject UCPB shares by virtue of P.D. No. 755, the Agreement
dated May 25, 1975 between the PCA and defendant Cojuangco, and PCA implementing
rules, namely, Adm. Order No. 1, S. 1975 and Resolution No. 074-78.
4. The so-called “Farmers’ UCPB shares” covered by 64.98% of the UCPB shares of
stock, which formed part of the 72.2% of the shares of stock of the former FUB and now of
the UCPB, the entire consideration of which was charged by PCA to the CCSF, are hereby
declared conclusively owned by, the Plaintiff Republic of the Philippines.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.
The Partial Summary Judgment in Civil Case No. 0033-F dated May 7, 2004, is
hereby MODIFIED, and shall read as follows:
WHEREFORE, the MOTION FOR EXECUTION OF PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT (RE: CIIF BLOCK OF SMC SHARES OF STOCK) dated August 8, 2005
of the plaintiff is hereby denied for lack of merit. However, this Court orders the severance
of this particular claim of Plaintiff. The Partial Summary Judgment dated May 7, 2004 is
now considered a separate final and
539
VOL. 765, AUGUST 11, 2015 539
appealable judgment with respect to the said CIIF Block of SMC shares of stock.
The Partial Summary Judgment rendered on May 7, 2004 is modified by deleting the
last paragraph of the dispositive portion, which will now read, as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we hold that:
The Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Re: Defendants CIIF Companies, 14
Holding Companies and Cocofed, et al.) filed by Plaintiff is hereby GRANTED.
ACCORDINGLY, THE CIIF COMPANIES, NAMELY:
1. Southern Luzon Coconut Oil Mills (SOLCOM);
2. Cagayan de Oro Oil Co., Inc. (CAGOIL);
3. Iligan Coconut Industries, Inc. (ILICOCO);
4. San Pablo Manufacturing Corp. (SPMC);
5. Granexport Manufacturing Corp. (GRANEX); and
6. Legaspi Oil Co., Inc. (LEGOIL),
AS WELL AS THE 14 HOLDING COMPANIES, NAMELY:
1. Soriano Shares, Inc.;
2. ACS Investors, Inc.;
3. Roxas Shares, Inc.;
4. Arc Investors, Inc.;
5. Toda Holdings, Inc.;
6. AP Holdings, Inc.;
7. Fernandez Holdings, Inc.;
8. SMC Officers Corps, Inc.;
9. Te Deum Resources, Inc.;
10. Anglo Ventures, Inc.;
11. Randy Allied Ventures, Inc.;
12. Rock Steel Resources, Inc.;
540
13. Valhalla Properties Ltd., Inc.; and
14. First Meridian Development, Inc.\
AND THE CONVERTED SMC SERIES 1 PREFERRED SHARES

TOTALING 753,848,312 SHARES SUBJECT OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE
COURT DATED SEPTEMBER 17, 2009 TOGETHER WITH ALL DIVIDENDS
DECLARED, PAID OR ISSUED THEREON AFTER THAT DATE, AS WELL AS
ANY INCREMENTS THERETO ARISING FROM, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
EXERCISE OF PREEMPTIVE RIGHTS ARE DECLARED OWNED BY THE
GOVERNMENT TO BE USED ONLY FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL COCONUT
FARMERS AND FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COCONUT INDUSTRY, AND
ORDERED RECONVEYED TO THE GOVERNMENT.
THE COURT AFFIRMS THE RESOLUTIONS ISSUED BY
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ON JUNE 5, 2007 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 0033-A AND ON
MAY 11, 2007 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 0033-F, THAT THERE IS NO MORE NECESSITY
OF FURTHER TRIAL WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP OF (1)
THE SEQUESTERED UCPB SHARES, (2) THE CIIF FLOCK OF SMC SHARES,
AND (3) THE CIIF COMPANIES, AS THEY HAVE FINALLY BEEN ADJUDICATED
IN THE AFOREMENTIONED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTS DATED JULY
11, 2003 AND MAY 7, 2004.
SO ORDERED.
Costs against petitioners COCOFED, et al. in G.R. Nos. 177857-58 and Danilo S. Ursua
in G.R. No. 178193.
No further pleadings shall be entertained. Let Entry of Judgment be made in due
course.
541
VOL. 765, AUGUST 11, 2015 541
SO ORDERED.10 (Boldface in the original; additional underscoring supplied)
On December 28, 2012, a petition for declaratory relief 11was filed

by respondent UCPB in the RTC of Makati City (Civil Case No. 12-
1251) against the six CIIF oil mills and 14 holding companies (CIIF
companies), PCGG and other corporations “similarly situated.” A
similar petition12 was also filed by respondent United Coconut
Planters Life Assurance Corporation (COCOLIFE) against the
same defendants (Civil Case No. 12-1252).
Civil Case No. 12-1251
UCPB alleged that the capital or equity used in establishing the

CIIF companies was not exclusively sourced from the coconut levy
funds. It claimed that while P633 Million was invested by it as
Administrator of the CIIF, as universal bank it also invested
around P112 million in the six oil mill companies or oil mills group
(CIIF OMG). As to the 14 holding companies, UCPB claimed that
while it had the funds in mid-1983 to purchase the 33,133,266
shares in SMC then being sold by the Soriano Group for the price
of P1.656 Billion to Mr. Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., it could not,
under banking laws, directly engage in the business of brewery. To
make the equity investment, the 14 holding companies were
established by the CIIF OMG to serve as corporate vehicles for the
investment in SMC shares (CIIF SMC Block of Shares).
With the foregoing supposed equity in the CIIF companies and
contributions to the acquisition of the SMC shares, UCPB
claims 11.03% indirect ownership valued at P7.84 Billion, based on
the P71.04 Billion present value of the said sequestered shares
(P56.5 Billion redemption price of the redeemed
_______________
10 Id., at pp. 609-613.

11 Rollo (G.R. No. 209447), pp. 172-195.
12 Rollo (G.R. No. 210901), pp. 86-105.
542
shares plus P14.54 Billion dividends and accrued interests for the
account of the 14 holding companies). UCPB thus prayed for a
judgment:
declaring the rights and duties of [UCPB] affirming and confirming [UCPB’s]
proportionate right, title and interest in the Oil Mills Group Companies, its indirect equity
of the 14 Coconut Industry Investment Funds (“CIIF”) Holding Companies and the San
Miguel Corporation (“SMC”) Shares, the dividends thereon and the proceeds of the
redemption thereof and that any disbursement or disposition thereof should x x x respect
and take into account [UCPB’s] right, title and interest thereto.13
PCGG filed a motion to dismiss citing the following grounds: (1)

lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case; (2) the
January 24, 2012 Decision of the Supreme Court cannot be the
proper subject of a petition for declaratory relief; (3) a petition for
declaratory relief is unavailing since the alleged right or interest of
UCPB over the CIIF companies and the CIIF Block of SMC Shares
had long been breached or violated upon the issuance of the writ of
sequestration against the said companies and shares of stock by
the PCGG, which thereafter assumed their administration and
voted the shares of stock; (4) UCPB is now estopped from asserting
its alleged right over the subject companies and shares of stock,
having failed to enforce it for a long time (25 years) from the date
of filing by PCGG of the complaint in the Sandiganbayan in 1987
until the Supreme Court decided with finality the issue of
ownership of the subject sequestered companies and shares of
stock on September 4, 2012; and (5) the petition is defective, as it
failed to implead an indispensable party, the Republic of the
Philippines.13-a
_______________
13 Rollo (G.R. No. 209447), p. 193.

13-a Records, pp. 92-122.
543
VOL. 765, AUGUST 11, 2015 543
UCPB opposed the motion contending that the subject of its
petition is not the Supreme Court Decision dated January 24, 2012
but the proper documents establishing UCPB’s ownership over the
subject companies and shares of stock. It further asserted that
there is no actual breach of right or estoppel that would bar
UCPB’s claim considering that it was not even a party to any
previous legal suit involving the subject properties.13-b
On April 29, 2013, respondent Judge issued the first assailed
Order denying the motion to dismiss and directing the PCGG to
file its Answer. PCGG’s motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied under the Order dated June 28, 2013.
Civil Case No. 12-1252
COCOLIFE raised similar claims of ownership in the subject

companies and shares of stock by virtue of its being a stockholder,
owning 146,610,567 UCPB shares independently of its right as
direct shareholder of the CIIF OMG and the 14 holding companies,
as well as the CIIF SMC Block of Shares. It alleged that on
December 18, 1985, it purchased from UCPB shares of stock in
four CIIF oil companies. Using funds coming from COCOLIFE and
UCPB, the CIIF OMG was able to raise the money for the purchase
of the 33,133,266 common shares in SMC. Consequently,
COCOLIFE’s percentage ownership in the CIIF SMC Block of
Shares being held by the 14 holding companies is 11.01%.
According to COCOLIFE, its investment in the CIIF OMG is
evidenced by certificates of stock issued by San Pablo
Manufacturing Corp., Southern Luzon Coconut Oil Mills,
Granexport Manufacturing Corp. and Legaspi Oil Co., Inc.
Like UCPB, COCOLIFE asserted that the CIIF OMG and 14
CIIF holding companies are not wholly owned by the Government.
Since it was not impleaded in the complaint filed by
_______________
13-b Id., at pp. 233-247.
544
the PCGG for the recovery of allegedly ill-gotten properties (CIIF
companies and CIIF SMC Block of Shares), COCOLIFE argued
that it should not be deprived of its proportionate interest (11.01%)
in the said properties sequestered by PCGG. It thus prayed that
judgment be rendered by the RTC declaring the rights and duties
of COCOLIFE affirming and confirming COCOLIFE’s
proportionate interest in the four CIIF oil companies, its indirect
equity in the 14 CIIF holding companies and the CIIF SMC Block
of Shares including the proceeds or their equivalent, and that any
disbursement or disposition thereof should preserve, respect and
take into account COCOLIFE’s right and interest.
Civil Case No. 12-1252 was consolidated with Civil Case No. 12-
1251. PCGG likewise moved to dismiss the petition in Civil Case
No. 12-1252 on the same grounds it raised in Civil Case No. 12-
1251.
The Omnibus Order dated May 15, 2013 denied the motion to
dismiss and further required PCGG to file its Answer. PCGG’s
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by respondent
Judge on December 4, 2013.
Petitioner’s Arguments
PCGG contends that respondent judge gravely abused his

discretion in not dismissing the petitions for declaratory relief,
which merely aim to re-litigate the issue of ownership already
passed upon by the Sandiganbayanunder the Partial Summary
Judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 0033-F and the January 24,
2012 Decision of this Court in COCOFED v. Republic.14 It argues
that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the acts performed by PCGG
pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions, particularly those relating
to the issuance of writs of sequestration, and that all cases
involving ill-gotten wealth
_______________
14 COCOFED v. Republic, supra note 3.
545
VOL. 765, AUGUST 11, 2015 545
assets are under the unquestionable jurisdiction of the Sandigan-
bayan.
Contrary to the asseveration of respondents UCPB and
COCOLIFE, PCGG maintains that their petitions for declaratory
relief actually seek to modify or alter the Decision of this Court
in COCOFED v. Republic, which has become final and executory.
PCGG also contends that documents like stock certificates cannot
be a proper subject of a petition for declaratory relief considering
that the phrase “other written instruments” contemplated by the
Rules of Court pertains to a written document constituting a
contract upon which rights and obligations are created, which
terms could be interpreted by the courts so as to avoid any
conflicting interests between the parties. Further, the alleged
ownership or title of UCPB and COCOLIFE have already been
breached or violated by the issuance of writs of sequestration over
the subject properties.
On account of their inaction for more than 25 years that the
issue of ownership over the sequestered CIIF companies and CIIF
SMC Block of Shares were being litigated, PCGG argues that
UCPB and COCOLIFE are now estopped from asserting any such
right in the said properties. And as to their nonparticipation in the
cases before the Sandiganbayan, PCGG asserts it has no legal
obligation to implead UCPB and COCOLIFE, as held in Universal
Broadcasting Corporation v. Sandiganbayan (5thDiv.).15
Respondents’ Arguments
Respondents question the authority of Commissioner Vicente L.

Gengos, Jr. in filing the present petitions before the Court and
signing the Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping.
They point out that the PCGG is a collegial body created by virtue
of EO 1, and it may function
_______________
15 556 Phil. 615; 529 SCRA 782 (2007).
546
only as such “Commission.” Consequently, the present action
should have been properly authorized by all members of the
Commission.
On the issue of jurisdiction, UCPB and COCOLIFE argue that
since they have properly alleged a case for declaratory relief,
jurisdiction over the subject matter lies in the regular courts such
as the RTC of Makati City. Having filed a motion to dismiss, PCGG
is deemed to have admitted the material allegations of the
complaint, specifically that UCPB and COCOLIFE had jointly
acquired the six CIIF oil mills by investing direct equity of P112
Million (UCPB) and P112 Million (COCOLIFE) for the four CIIF
oil mills. Citing San Miguel Corporation v. Kahn16 where this Court
held that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction if the subject
matter of the case does not involve or has no relation to the
recovery of ill-gotten wealth, UCPB and COCOLIFE insist that the
subject matter of their petitions is the declaration of their rights
under corporate documents, which in turn relate to UCPB and
COCOLIFE’s investments not sourced from the coconut levy funds.
It is thus the allegations in the complaint that determine the cause
of action and what court has jurisdiction over such cause of action,
and not the defenses raised in the motion to dismiss and/or answer.
In the same vein, UCPB and COCOLIFE posit that, contrary to
PCGG’s position, proceeding to hear the cases below will not pave
the way for reexamining the findings of this Court in its Decision
in COCOFED v. Republic. This is because the subject matter of the
petitions for declaratory relief is not the coconut levy funds but
their own investments in the CIIF OMG and consequent indirect
ownership of the CIIF SMC Block of Shares. Neither do their
petitions seek to lift the sequestration orders as these pertain only
to those shares in CIIF OMG which were acquired by UCPB as
Administrator, using coconut levy funds. While respondents adhere
to
_______________
16 257 Phil. 459; 176 SCRA 447 (1989).
547
VOL. 765, AUGUST 11, 2015 547
the wisdom of the Decision in COCOFED v. Republic, it is their
position that the ruling therein does not affect their respective
claims to 11% proportional equity stake in the CIIF OMG
companies. Moreover, since they were not impleaded
in Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0033-F and in G.R. Nos. 177857-
58 and 178193, respondents maintain that they are not bound by
any adjudication of ownership rendered therein.
Respondents further contend that the writ of sequestration
issued by the Sandiganbayan cannot be considered a breach which
gives rise to a cause of action in favor of any of the parties. There
was no “injury” on the part of UCPB and COCOLIFE despite the
sequestration proceedings because they were not impleaded as a
party in the sequestration case. They point out that their title and
interest in the subject properties remained unaffected by the
sequestration by PCGG considering that the CIIF companies had
not done anything to disown or deny UCPB and COCOLIFE’s
stockholdings, as in fact, in their Answer to the petition for
declaratory relief, these companies expressly admitted the
existence of respondents’ stockholdings in each respective
company. Also, the CIIF OMG were all in agreement that there is a
need for declaratory relief judgment on respondents’ claims in the
sequestered properties notwithstanding the final decision of this
Court which resolved the issue of ownership in favor of the
Government.
On February 26, 2014 in G.R. No. 210901, we issued a temporary
restraining order (TRO) immediately enjoining the respondent
judge, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 59, their representatives,
agents or other persons acting on their behalf, from proceeding
with the hearing of the petitions for declaratory relief in Civil Case
Nos. 12-1251 and 12-1252.17 Likewise, a TRO was issued in G.R.
No. 209447 enjoining the
_______________
17 Rollo (G.R. No. 210901), pp. 197-200.
548
respondent judge from further hearing the said petitions for
declaratory relief.18
Issues
The issues generated by this controversy are the following:

1) Noncompliance with the rule on Verification and Certification
of Non-Forum Shopping which was signed by only one PCGG
Commissioner;
2) Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil Case Nos.
12-1251 and 12-1252;
3) Noncompliance with the requisites of a petition for declaratory
relief complied with; and
4) Application of res judicata and/or laches as bar to the suits for
declaratory relief filed by UCPB and COCOLIFE.
Our Ruling
The petitions are meritorious.
Alleged Lack of Authority of PCGG

Commissioner Vicente L. Gengos,
Jr. to file the present petition
Under Rule 46, Section 3, paragraph 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure, as amended, petitions for certiorarimust be verified and
accompanied by a sworn certification of non-forum shopping.19 A
pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the
pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of
his personal knowledge or
_______________
18 Rollo (G.R. No. 209447), pp. 344-345 and back page.

19 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, Rule 65, Section 1.
549
VOL. 765, AUGUST 11, 2015 549
based on authentic records.20 The party need not sign the
verification. A party’s representative, lawyer or any person who
personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading may
sign the verification.21
On the other hand, a certification of non-forum shopping is
a certification under oath by the plaintiff or principal party in the
complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief or
in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed
therewith, (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or
filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or
quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such
other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other
pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status
thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or
similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report
that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his
aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.22
It is obligatory that the one signing the verification and
certification against forum shopping on behalf of the principal
party or the other petitioners has the authority to do the
same.23 We hold that the signature of only one Commissioner of
petitioner PCGG in the verification and certification against forum
shopping is not a fatal defect.
It has been consistently held that the verification of a pleading is
only a formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement. The purpose of
requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that the
allegations in the petition are true and correct,
_______________
20 Id., Rule 7, Section 4.

21 Mediserv, Inc. v. Court of Appeals (Special Former 13th Division), 631 Phil. 282, 290; 617 SCRA
284, 291 (2010), citing Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146364, June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 492, 509.
22 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, Rule 7, Section 5.
23 Fuentebella v. Castro, 526 Phil. 668, 674; 494 SCRA 183, 189 (2006).
550
not merely speculative. This requirement is simply a condition
affecting the form of pleadings, and noncompliance therewith does
not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective.24
As to the certification of non-forum shopping, a rigid application
of the rules should not defeat the PCGG’s mandate under EO 1, EO
2, EO 14 and EO 14-A to prosecute cases for the recovery of ill-
gotten wealth, and to conserve sequestered assets and
corporations, which are in custodia legis, under its administration.
Indeed, relaxation of the rules is warranted in this case involving
coconut levy funds previously declared by this Court as “affected
with public interest” and judicially determined as public funds.
Relevantly, after the promulgation of the decision of this Court
in COCOFED v. Republic, EO 180 was issued on March 18, 2015
reiterating the Government’s policy to ensure that all coco levy
funds and coco levy assets be utilized “solely and exclusively for the
benefit of all the coconut farmers and for the development of the
coconut industry.” In line with such policy, Section 3 thereof
provides:
Section 3. Actions to Preserve, Protect and Recover Coco Levy Assets.—The
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), and any other concerned government agency shall, under the general supervision
of the Secretary of Justice, file the proper pleadings or institute and maintain the necessary
legal actions to preserve, protect, or recover the Government’s rights and interests
in the Coco Levy Assets and to prevent any dissipation or reduction in their
value. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
_______________
24 Torres-Gomez v. Codilla, Jr., 684 Phil. 632, 644; 668 SCRA 600, 611 (2012), citing Alde v. Bernal,
630 Phil. 54, 61; 616 SCRA 60, 67 (2010).
551
VOL. 765, AUGUST 11, 2015 551
Apropos PCGG v. Cojuangco, Jr.,25 involving the issue of who has
the right to vote the sequestered SMC shares, we gave due course
to the petition for certiorari and mandamus despite the lack of
signature of the Solicitor General; but it was signed by two special
counsels and the verification was signed by Commissioner
Herminio Mendoza. We noted the extraordinary circumstances in
the filing of the petition by the said government officials that
justified a liberal interpretation of the rules.
The RTC has no jurisdiction

over suits involving the se-
questered coco levy assets and
coco levy funds.
Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to

hear, try, and decide a case.26 Jurisdiction over the subject matter
is conferred by the Constitution or by law and is determined by the
allegations of the complaint and the relief prayed for, regardless of
whether the plaintiff is entitled to recovery upon all or some of the
claims prayed for therein. Jurisdiction is not acquired by
agreement or consent of the parties, and neither does it depend
upon the defenses raised in the answer or in a motion to dismiss.27
Under Section 4(C) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No.
7975 and R.A. No. 8249, the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan included suits for recovery of ill-gotten wealth
and related cases:
_______________
25 361 Phil. 892; 302 SCRA 217 (1999).

26 Zamora v. Court of Appeals, 262 Phil. 298, 304; 183 SCRA 279, 283 (1990).
27 Veneracion v. Mancilla, 528 Phil. 309, 326; 495 SCRA 712, 727 (2006), citing Tolentino v. Leviste,
485 Phil. 661, 673; 443 SCRA 274, 284 (2004) and Arnado v. Buban, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1543, May 31, 2004,
430 SCRA 382, 386.
552
(C) Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
xxxx
The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the
issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and
other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of
similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which
may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That
the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court. (Italics in
the original; emphasis supplied)
In PCGG v. Peña,28 we made the following clarification on the

extent of the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction:
x x x Under Section 2 of the President’s Executive Order No. 14 issued on May 7, 1986,
all cases of the Commission regarding “the Funds, Moneys, Assets, and Properties Illegally
Acquired or Misappropriated by Former President Ferdinand Marcos, Mrs. Imelda
Romualdez Marcos, their Close Relatives, Subordinates, Business Associates, Dummies,
Agents, or Nominees” whether civil or criminal, are lodged within the “exclusive and
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan” and all incidents arising from, incidental
to, or related to, such cases necessarily fall likewise under the Sandiganbayan’s
exclusive and original jurisdiction, subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the
Supreme Court.29 (Emphasis supplied)
Soriano III v. Yuzon30 reiterated the above ruling, thus:

_______________
28 243 Phil. 93; 159 SCRA 556 (1988).

29 Id., at p. 102; pp. 561-562.
30 247 Phil. 191, 208; 164 SCRA 226, 242 (1988).
553
VOL. 765, AUGUST 11, 2015 553
Now, that exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the Sandiganbayan would evidently
extend not only to the principal causes of action, i.e., the recovery of alleged ill-
gotten wealth, but also to “all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to,
such cases,” such as the dispute over the sale of the shares, the propriety of the issuance of
ancillary writs or provisional remedies relative thereto, the sequestration thereof, which
may not be made the subject of separate actions or proceedings in another forum. As
explained by the Court in Peña:
“The rationale of the exclusivity of such jurisdiction is readily understood. Given the
magnitude of the past regime’s ‘organized pillage’ and the ingenuity of the plunderers and
pillagers with the assistance of the experts and best legal minds available in the market, it
is a matter of sheer necessity to restrict access to the lower courts, which would
have tied into knots and made impossible the commission’s gigantic task of
recovering the plundered wealth of the nation, whom the past regime in the process
had saddled and laid prostrate with a huge $27 billion foreign debt that has since ballooned
to $28.5 billion.” (italics and emphasis supplied) (Additional emphasis supplied)
Respondents’ petitions for declaratory relief filed in the RTC

asserted their claim of ownership over the sequestered CIIF
companies and indirectly the CIIF SMC Block of Shares, in the
following percentages: 11.03% (UCPB) and 11.01% (COCOLIFE).
Undeniably, these are related to the ill-gotten wealth cases (Civil
Case Nos. 0033-A and 0033-F) involving the issue of ownership of
the aforesaid sequestered companies and shares of stock, which
have been tried and decided by the Sandiganbayan, and the
decision had been appealed to and
554
finally disposed of by this Court in G.R. Nos. 177857-
5831(COCOFED and Lobregat, et al.’s ownership claim over the
CIIF companies and CIIF SMC Block of Shares) and G.R. No.
18070532 (Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr.’s claim over UCPB shares
under an Agreement with PCA).
Contrary to respondents’ contention, the subject matter of their
petitions for declaratory relief, i.e., their purported contribution to
the acquisition of four CIIF OMG companies and the 14 holding
companies, as well as indirect ownership of a portion of the CIIF
SMC Block of Shares, is inextricably intertwined with the issue of
ownership judicially settled in the aforementioned appeals from
the Partial Summary Judgments rendered in Civil Case Nos. 0033-
A and 0033-F.
The allegation that no coconut levy funds were actually used to
purchase stockholdings in the CIIF companies is of no moment.
Since the CIIF companies and CIIF SMC Block of Shares have long
been sequestered and placed under the administration of the
PCGG, the latter’s functions may not be interfered with by a
coequal court. In Republic v. Investa Corporation33 involving the
propriety of dilution of the Government’s percentage in the
stockholdings of a sequestered corporation (DOMSAT), we held
that it is the Sandiganbayan and not the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) which has jurisdiction over the petition filed by
the Republic and DOMSAT. As conservator of sequestered shares,
PCGG has the duty to ensure that the sequestered properties are
not dissipated under its watch.
Previously, this Court affirmed the jurisdiction of the RTC in a
suit also involving a claim of ownership in the sequestered
corporation, and ruled in this wise:34
_______________
31 COCOFED v. Republic, supra note 3.

32 Supra note 8.
33 576 Phil. 741; 554 SCRA 29 (2008).
34 Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 341
Phil. 432; 275 SCRA 433 (1997).
555
VOL. 765, AUGUST 11, 2015 555
We disagree with the RTC and the CA on the issue of jurisdiction. While there can be no
dispute that PCOC was sequestered, the fact of sequestration alone did not
automatically oust the RTC of jurisdiction to decide upon the question of
ownership of the subject gaming and office equipment. The PCGG must be a party
to the suit in order that the Sandiganbayan’s exclusive jurisdiction may be
correctly invoked. This is deducible from no less than E.O. No. 14, the “Peña” and
“Nepomuceno” cases relied upon by both subordinates courts. Note that in Section 2 of E.O.
No. 14 which provides:
The Presidential Commission on Good Government shall file all such cases, whether
civil or criminal, with the 2. “Section Sandiganbayan, which shall have exclusive and
original jurisdiction thereof.”
it speaks of the PCGG as party-plaintiff. On the other hand, the PCGG was impleaded
as codefendant in both the “Peña” and “Nepomuceno” cases. But here, the PCGG does not
appear in either capacity, as the complaint is solely between PAGCOR and respondents
PCOC and Marcelo. The “Peña” and “Nepomuceno” cases which recognize the independence
of the PCGG and the Sandiganbayan in sequestration cases, therefore, cannot be invoked
in the instant case so as to divest the RTC of its jurisdiction, under Section 19 of B.P. 129,
over PAGCOR’s action for recovery of personal property.35 (Emphasis supplied)
In Cuenca v. PCGG,36 we upheld the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan over all incidents affecting the shares of a
sequestered corporation considering that the action before the RTC
is inexorably entwined with the Government’s case for recovery of
ill-gotten wealth pending with the Sandiganbayan. Thus:
_______________
35 Id., at pp. 438-439; pp. 438-439.

36 561 Phil. 235; 535 SCRA 102 (2007).
556
Petitioners contend that even if UHC was indeed sequestered, jurisdiction over the
subject matter of petitioners’ Complaint for enforcement or rescission of contract between
petitioners and respondents belonged to the RTC and not the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners
cited Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Court of Appeals, x x x, this Court
held that the fact of sequestration alone did not automatically oust the RTC of jurisdiction
to decide upon the question of ownership of the disputed gaming and office equipment as
PCGG must be a party to the suit in order that the Sandiganbayan’s exclusive jurisdiction
may be correctly invoked, and as Section 2 of EO 14 was duly applied in PCGG v.
Peña and PCGG v. Nepomuceno, which ineluctably spoke of respondent PCGG as a party-
litigant.
xxxx
Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over the instant case
A rigorous examination of the antecedent facts and existing records at hand shows
that Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over the instant case.
Thus, the petition must fail for the following reasons:
First, it is a fact that the shares of stock of UHC and CDCP, the subject matter of Civil
Case No. 91-2721 before the Makati City RTC, were also the subject matter of an ill-gotten
wealth case, specifically Civil Case No. 0016 before the Sandiganbayan. In Civil Case No.
91-2721 of the Makati City RTC, petitioners prayed for a judgment either transferring the
UHC shares or restoring and reconveying the PNCC shares to them. In the event a final
judgment is rendered in said Makati City RTC case in favor of petitioners, then such
adjudication tends to render moot and academic the judgment to be rendered
in SandiganbayanCivil Case No. 0016 considering that the legal ownership of either the
UHC or PNCC shares would now be transferred to petitioners Rodolfo Cuenca and CIC.
Such adverse judgment would
557
VOL. 765, AUGUST 11, 2015 557
run counter to the rights of ownership of the government over the UHC and PNCC shares
in question. x x x
Moreover, inasmuch as UHC was impleaded in Civil Case No. 0016 as a defendant
and was listed among the corporations beneficially owned or controlled by
petitioner Cuenca, the issue of the latter’s right to acquire ownership of UHC
shares is inexorably intertwined with the right of the Republic of the Philippines,
through PCGG, to retain ownership of said UHC shares.
It must be borne in mind that the Sandiganbayan was created in 1978 pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1606. Said law has been amended during the interim period
after the Edsa Revolution of 1986 and before the 1987 Constitution was drafted, passed,
and ratified. Thus, the executive issuances during such period before the ratification of the
1987 Constitution had the force and effect of laws. Specifically, then President Corazon C.
Aquino issued the following Executive Orders which amended PD 1606 insofar as the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over civil and criminal cases instituted and prosecuted
by the PCGG is concerned, viz.:
xxxx
Bearing on the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over cases of ill-gotten wealth, EO 14,
Secs. 1 and 2 provide:
Any provision of the law to the contrary notwithstanding, the 1.
SECTION Presidential Commission on Good Government with the assistance of the
Office of the Solicitor General and other government agencies, is hereby empowered to
file and prosecute all cases investigated by it under Executive Order No. 1, dated
February 28, 1986 and Executive Order No. 2, dated March 12, 1986, as may be
warranted by its findings.
558
The 2. SECTION Presidential Commission on Good Government shall file all
such cases, whether civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan, which shall
have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
Notably, these amendments had been duly recognized and reflected in subsequent
amendments to PD 1606, specifically Republic Act Nos. 7975 and 8249.
In the light of the foregoing provisions, it is clear that it is the Sandiganbayan
and not the Makati City RTC that has jurisdiction over the disputed UHC and
PNCC shares, being the alleged “ill-gotten wealth” of former President Ferdinand
E. Marcos and petitioner Cuenca. The fact that the Makati City RTC civil case involved
the performance of contractual obligations relative to the UHC shares is of no
importance. The benchmark is whether said UHC shares are alleged to be ill-gotten
wealth of the Marcoses and their perceived cronies. More importantly, the interests
of orderly administration of justice dictate that all incidents affecting the UHC
shares and PCGG’s right of supervision or control over the UHC must be addressed
to and resolved by the Sandiganbayan. Indeed, the law and courts frown upon split
jurisdiction and the resultant multiplicity of suits, which result in much lost time, wasted
effort, more expenses, and irreparable injury to the public interest.
Second, the UHC shares in dispute were sequestered by respondent PCGG.
Sequestration is a provisional remedy or freeze order issued by the PCGG designed to
prevent the disposal and dissipation of ill-gotten wealth. The power to sequester property
means to
place or cause to be placed under [PCGG’s] possession or control said property, or any
building or office wherein any such property or any records pertaining thereto may be
found, including business enterprises and entities, for the purpose of preventing the de-
559
VOL. 765, AUGUST 11, 2015 559
struction of, and otherwise conserving and preserving the same, until it can be
determined, through appropriate judicial proceedings, whether the property was in truth
ill-gotten. (Silverio v. PCGG, 155 SCRA 60 [1987])
Considering that the UHC shares were already sequestered, enabling the PCGG
to exercise the power of supervision, possession, and control over said shares, then
such power would collide with the legal custody of the Makati City RTC over the
UHC shares subject of Civil Case No. 91-2721. Whatever the outcome of Civil Case No.
91-2721, whether from enforcement or rescission of the contract, would directly militate on
PCGG’s control and management of IRC and UHC, and consequently hamper or interfere
with its mandate to recover ill-gotten wealth. As aptly pointed out by
respondents, petitioners’ action is inexorably entwined with the Government’s
action for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth — the subject of the pending case before
the Sandiganbayan. Verily, the transfer of shares of stock of UHC to petitioners or the
return of the shares of stock of CDCP (now PNCC) will wreak havoc on the sequestration
case as both UHC and CDCP are subject of sequestration by PCGG.
Third, Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation and Holiday Inn (Phils.),
Inc. are not analogous to the case at bar. The first dealt with ownership of gaming and
office equipment, which is distinct from and will not impact on the sequestration issue of
PCOC. The second dealt with an ordinary civil case for performance of a contractual
obligation which did not in any way affect the sequestration proceeding of NRHDCI; thus,
the complaint-in-intervention of Holiday Inn (Phils.), Inc. was properly denied for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
In both cases cited by petitioners, there was a substantial distinction between
the sequestration proceedings and the subject matter of the actions. This does
not prevail in the instant case, as the ownership of the shares of stock of the
sequestered
560
companies, UHC and CDCP, is the subject matter of a pending case and thus
addressed to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Sec. 2 of EO 14 pertinently provides: “The Presidential Commission on Good
Government shall file all such cases, whether civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan,
which shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof.”
The above proviso has been squarely applied in Peña, where this Court held that the
exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the Sandiganbayan would evidently extend not only to
the principal causes of action, that is, recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, but also to all
incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to such cases, including a dispute over the
sale of the shares, the propriety of the issuance of ancillary writs of relative provisional
remedies, and the sequestration of the shares, which may not be made the subject of
separate actions or proceedings in another forum. Indeed, the issue of the ownership of
the sequestered companies, UHC and PNCC, as well as IRC’s ownership of them, is
undeniably related to the recovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth and can be
squarely addressed via the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Fourth, while it is clear that the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan only
encompasses cases where PCGG is impleaded, such requirement is satisfied in the instant
case. The appellate court clearly granted PCGG’s petition for certiorari in C.A.-G.R. S.P.
No. 49686, assailing the trial court’s denial of its Motion for Leave to Intervene with Motion
to Dismiss. Thus, the trial court’s April 20, 1998 Order was reversed and set aside by the
appellate court through its assailed Decision. Consequently, PCGG was granted the
right to intervene and thus became properly impleaded in the instant case. Without
doubt, the trial court has no jurisdiction to
561
VOL. 765, AUGUST 11, 2015 561
hear and decide Civil Case No. 91-2721.37 (Additional emphasis
supplied)
In the light of the foregoing, it is clear that
the Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over the subject
matter of Civil Case Nos. 12-1251 and 12-1252.
First, the subject matters of respondents’ petitions in Civil Case
Nos. 0033-A and 0033-F filed by the PCGG against Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, et al. are the same, i.e., the ownership of CIIF
companies and CIIF SMC Block of Shares, which were claimed by
the Government as acquired by the defendants using public funds
(coco levy funds). In the interest of orderly administration of justice
and the policy against multiplicity of suits, it is but proper
that all incidents affecting the coconut levy funds and assets be
addressed and resolved by the Sandiganbayan. Claims of
ownership of a portion of the subject CIIF companies and SMC
shares by private entities such as UCPB and COCOLIFE are
inextricably related to the aforementioned ill-gotten wealth cases
filed in the Sandiganbayan.
Second, UCPB, along with the CIIF companies and CIIF SMC
Block of Shares, were duly sequestered by the PCGG and had been
under the latter’s administration for more than 25 years. With the
final determination made by this Court in COCOFED v.
Republic that these properties unquestionably belong to the
Government as they were acquired using the coconut levy funds,
the PCGG can now exercise full acts of ownership as evident from
the latest executive issuance, EO 180, by President Benigno
Simeon C. Aquino III.
Third, aside from their sequestration by PCGG, the ownership of
the aforesaid assets is the subject matter in both Civil Case Nos.
12-1251 and 12-1252 filed in the RTC and Civil Case Nos. 0033-A
and 0033-F in the Sandiganbayan. Respondents’ assertion that the
subject matter of their petitions for
_______________
37 Id., at pp. 246-252; pp. 114-121.
562
declaratory relief is different due to private funds used in buying
shares in UCPB and CIIF oil mills is but a feeble attempt to create
an exception to the Sandiganbayan’s exclusive jurisdiction. As
underscored in Cuenca v. PCGG,38 the benchmark is whether such
shares of UCPB and CIIF oil mills are alleged to be ill-gotten
wealth of the Marcoses and their perceived cronies, which is
sufficient to bring the case within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan pursuant to existing laws and decrees.
Fourth, the requirement in Peña and Nepomuceno that the
PCGG must be a party to the suit in order to invoke
the Sandiganbayan’s exclusive jurisdiction was satisfied in this
case. PCGG was impleaded as codefendant in Civil Case Nos. 12-
1251 and 12-1252. It even filed a motion to dismiss in both cases
and appealed from the denial of said motions by respondent judge.
Thus, while the Republic itself was not impleaded in the petitions
for declaratory relief, PCGG was formally made a party thereto.
Applicability of Res Judicata
The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the

merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive
as to the rights of the parties and their privies and constitutes an
absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim,
demand, or cause of action.39 The following requisites must obtain
for the application of the doctrine: (1) the former judgment or order
must be final; (2) it must be a judgment or order on the merits,
that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the evidence or
stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case; (3) it
must have been ren-
_______________
38 Id., at p. 250; p. 118.

39 PCGG v. Sandiganbayan, 556 Phil. 664, 674; 530 SCRA 13, 21 (2007), citing Lanuza v. Court of
Appeals, 494 Phil. 51, 58; 454 SCRA 54, 61 (2005), further citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, 381 Phil.
558, 564; 324 SCRA 560, 565 (2000).
563
VOL. 765, AUGUST 11, 2015 563
dered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and second
actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action.
This requisite is satisfied if the two actions are substantially
between the same parties.40
There is no question regarding compliance with the first, second
and third requisites. However, respondents maintain that while
they adhere to the Decision in COCOFED v. Republic, said decision
did not affect their right or title to the subject properties since the
subject matter in their petitions for declaratory relief is not the
coconut levy funds but their own private funds used by them in
purchasing shares from UCPB and CIIF companies, that in turn
resulted in their indirect ownership of the CIIF SMC Block of
Shares in their respective proportions: 11.03% (UCPB) and 11.01%
(COCOLIFE).
Respondents further assert that they are not bound by the
adjudication of ownership in COCOFED v. Republicconsidering
that they were not impleaded as defendants in Civil Case Nos.
0033-A and 0033-F.
We disagree.
In Universal Broadcasting Corporation v. Sandiganbayan
(5th Div.),41 we reiterated that it is not necessary to implead
companies which are the res of suits for recovery of ill-gotten
wealth. We held that —
Petitioner submits that the Sandiganbayan never acquired jurisdiction over it as it was
not impleaded as a party-defendant in Civil Case No. 0035.
The submission has no merit.
The Price Mansion property is an asset alleged to be ill-gotten. Like UBC, it is listed as
among the proper-
_______________
40 Id., at pp. 674-675; p. 21, citing Escareal v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., 495 Phil. 107, 118; 455 SCRA
119, 130 (2005).
41 Universal Broadcasting Corporation v. Sandiganbayan (5th Div.), supra note 15.
564
ties of Benjamin Romualdez. For sure, UBC is among the corporations listed as alleged
repositories of shares of stock controlled by Romualdez.
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, the Court held that there is no need to implead firms
which are merely the res of the actions in ill-gotten wealth cases and that judgment
may simply be directed against the assets, thus:
C.Impleading Unnecessary Re Firms which are the Res of the Actions
And as to corporations organized with ill-gotten wealth, but are not themselves guilty of
misappropriation, fraud or other illicit conduct — in other words, the companies themselves
are the object or thing involved in the action, the res thereof — there is no need to
implead them either. Indeed, their impleading is not proper on the strength alone of their
having been formed with ill-gotten funds, absent any other particular wrongdoing on their
part. The judgment may simply be directed against the shares of stock shown to
have been issued in consideration of ill-gotten wealth. x x x
x x x In this light, they are simply the res in the actions for the recovery of illegally
acquired wealth, and there is, in principle, no cause of action against them and no ground to
implead them as defendants in said actions. x x x42 (Additional emphasis supplied)
The doctrine of res judicata has two aspects. The first, known as
“bar by prior judgment,” or “estoppel by verdict,” is the effect of a
judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the
same claim, demand or cause of action. The
_______________
42 Id., at pp. 620-621; pp. 787-788.
565
VOL. 765, AUGUST 11, 2015 565
second, known as “conclusiveness of judgment,” otherwise known
as the rule of auter action pendent, ordains that issues actually and
directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any
future case between the same parties involving a different cause of
action.43
[C]onclusiveness of judgment — states that a fact or question which was in issue in a
former suit and there was judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that
action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any
future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of
concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the judgment
remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in
one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the same
parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a particular point
or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the
determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the
same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same
point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit. Identity of cause of
action is not required but merely identity of issues.44 (Emphasis and italics supplied)
We have applied the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment in a
previous case involving ownership of shares of stock in a
sequestered corporation, as follows:
_______________
43 PCGG v. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division), 590 Phil. 383, 396; 569 SCRA 360, 372 (2008),
citing Rasdas v. Estenor, 513 Phil. 664, 675; 477 SCRA 538, 548 (2005).
44 Id., at pp. 396-397; pp. 372-373.
566
In cases wherein the doctrine of “conclusiveness of judgment” applies, there is, as in
Civil Case No. 0034 and Civil Case No. 0188 identity of issues not necessarily identity of
causes of action. The prior adjudication of the Sandiganbayan affirmed by this
Court in G.R. No. 140615, as to the ownership of the 1/7 Piedras shares of
Arambulo, is conclusive in the second case, as it has been judicially resolved.
The filing of Civil Case No. 0188, although it has a different cause of action from Civil
Case No. 0034, will not enable the PCGG to escape the operation of the principle of res
judicata. A case litigated once shall not be relitigated in another action as it would violate
the interest of the State to put an end to litigation — republicae ut sit litium and the policy
that no man shall be vexed twice for the same cause — nemo debet bis vexari et eadem
causa. Once a litigant’s rights had been adjudicated in a valid final judgment by a
competent court, he should not be granted an unbridled license to come back for another
try.45 (Additional italics and emphasis supplied)
We hold that res judicata under the second aspect

(conclusiveness of judgment) is applicable in this case. The issue of
ownership of the sequestered CIIF companies and CIIF SMC Block
of Shares was directly and actually resolved by
the Sandiganbayan and affirmed by this Court in COCOFED v.
Republic. More important, in the said decision, we categorically
affirmed the resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan in Civil
Case Nos. 0033-A and 0033-F “THAT THERE IS NO MORE
NECESSITY OF FURTHER TRIAL WITH RESPECT TO THE
ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP OF (1) THE SEQUESTERED UCPB
SHARES, (2) THE CIIF BLOCK OF SMC SHARES, AND (3) THE
CIIF COMPANIES, AS THEY HAVE FINALLY BEEN
ADJUDICATED IN THE AFOREMENTIONED PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENTS DATED JULY 11, 2003 AND MAY 7,
2004.” Among the admitted facts
_______________
45 Id., at p. 397; pp. 373-374.
567
VOL. 765, AUGUST 11, 2015 567
set forth in the Order dated February 23, 2004 is the acquisition by
UCPB of the “controlling interests” in the six CIIF oil mills. The
Partial Summary Judgment further quoted from the Answer to
Third Amended Complaint (Subdivided) with Compulsory
Counterclaims dated January 7, 2000 filed by the CIIF oil mills
and 14 holding companies, in which they also alleged that
pursuant to the authority granted to it by P.D. 961 and P.D. 1568,
“UCPB acquired controlling interests” in the six CIIF oil mills.46
In the same decision we specifically upheld the Sandiganbayan’s
findings and conclusion on the issue of ownership of the CIIF
OMG, the 14 holding companies and the CIIF SMC Block of
Shares, viz.:
The CIIF Companies and the CIIF Block
of SMC shares are public funds/assets
From the foregoing discussions, it is fairly established that the coconut levy funds are
special public funds. Consequently, any property purchased by means of the coconut
levy funds should likewise be treated as public funds or public property, subject to
burdens and restrictions attached by law to such property.
In this case, the 6 CIIF Oil Mills were acquired by the UCPB using coconut levy
funds. On the other hand, the 14 CIIF holding companies are wholly owned
subsidiaries of the CIIF Oil Mills. Conversely, these companies were acquired using or
whose capitalization comes from the coconut levy funds. However, as in the case of UCPB,
UCPB itself distributed a part of its investments in the CIIF oil mills to coconut farmers,
and retained a part thereof as administrator. The portion distributed to the supposed
coconut farmers followed the procedure outlined in PCA Resolution No. 033-78. And as the
administrator of the CIIF
_______________
46 Rollo (G.R. No. 210901), pp. 167 and 177.

568
holding companies, the UCPB authorized the acquisition of the SMC shares. In fact, these
companies were formed or organized solely for the purpose of holding the SMC shares. As
found by the Sandiganbayan, the 14 CIIF holding companies used borrowed funds from the
UCPB to acquire the SMC shares in the aggregate amount of P1.656 Billion.
Since the CIIF companies and the CIIF block of SMC shares were acquired using
coconut levy funds — funds, which have been established to be public in character — it goes
without saying that these acquired corporations and assets ought to be regarded and
treated as government assets. Being government properties, they are accordingly owned by
the Government, for the coconut industry pursuant to currently existing laws.
It may be conceded hypothetically, as COCOFED, et al. urge that the 14 CIIF holding
companies acquired the SMC shares in question using advances from the CIIF companies
and from UCPB loans. But there can be no gainsaying that the same advances and UCPB
loans are public in character, constituting as they do assets of the 14 holding companies,
which in turn are wholly-owned subsidiaries of the 6 CIIF Oil Mills. And these oil mills
were organized, capitalized and/or financed using coconut levy funds. In net effect,
the CIIF block of SMC shares are simply the fruits of the coconut levy funds acquired at the
expense of the coconut industry. In Republic v. COCOFED, the En Banc Court, speaking
through Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio Panganiban, stated: “Because the subject
UCPB shares were acquired with government funds, the government becomes their prima
facie beneficial and true owner.” By parity of reasoning, the adverted block of SMC shares,
acquired as they were with government funds, belong to the government as, at the very
least, their beneficial and true owner.
We thus affirm the decision of the Sandiganbayan on this point. But as We have earlier
discussed, reiterating our holding in Republic v. COCOFED, the State’s avowed policy or
purpose in creating the coconut levy
569
VOL. 765, AUGUST 11, 2015 569
fund is for the development of the entire coconut industry, which is one of the major
industries that promotes sustained economic stability, and not merely the livelihood of a
significant segment of the population. Accordingly, We sustain the ruling of
the Sandiganbayan in CC No. 0033-F that the CIIF companies and the CIIF block
of SMC shares are public funds necessarily owned by the Government. We,
however, modify the same in the following wise: These shares shall belong to
the Government, which shall be used only for the benefit of the coconut farmers
and for the development of the coconut industry.47 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
In G.R. No. 180705, separately decided by this Court on
November 27, 2012, we also affirmed the Sandiganbayan’s decision
nullifying the shares of stock transfer to Eduardo M. Cojuangco,
Jr. We held that as the coconut levy funds partake of the nature of
taxes and can only be used for public purpose, and importantly, for
the purpose for which it was exacted, i.e., the development,
rehabilitation and stabilization of the coconut industry, they
cannot be used to benefit — whether directly or indirectly —
private individuals, be it by way of a commission, or as the PCA-
Cojuangco Agreement words it, compensation. Accordingly, the
UCPB shares of stock representing the 7.22% fully paid shares
subject of the petition, with all dividends declared, paid or issued
thereon, as well as any increments thereto arising from, but not
limited to, the exercise of preemptive rights, were ordered
reconveyed to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines,
which shall “be used only for the benefit of all coconut farmers and
for the development of the coconut industry.”48
Having resolved that subject matter jurisdiction pertains to
the Sandiganbayan and not the RTC, and that the petitions for
declaratory relief are barred by our January 24, 2012
_______________
47 COCOFED v. Republic, supra note 3 at pp. 620-622; pp. 622-624.
48 Supra note 8 at p. 536.
570
Decision which settled with finality the issue of ownership of the
CIIF oil mills, the 14 holding companies and CIIF SMC Block of
Shares, we deem it unnecessary to address the other issues
presented.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The Orders dated
April 29, 2013 and June 28, 2013 in Civil Case No. 12-1251; and
Omnibus Order dated May 15, 2013 (Branch 138) and Order dated
December 4, 2013 in Civil Case Nos. 12-1251 and 12-1252
(consolidated petitions) of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 59, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The
petitions in Civil Case Nos. 12-1251 and 12-1252 filed by UCPB
and COCOLIFE, respectively, are DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ.), Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Brion, Bersamin, Del
Castillo, Perez, Mendoza, Perlas-Bernabe and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta and Jardeleza, JJ., No part.
Reyes, J., On Leave.
Petitions granted, orders annulled and set aside.
Note.—The provision found in Section 15, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution that “the right of the State to recover properties
unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or
from their nominees or transferees shall not be barred by
prescription, laches or estoppels” applies only to civil actions for
recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and not to criminal cases.
(Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans vs.
Desierto, 648 SCRA 586 [2011])
——o0o——
G.R. No. 207843 July 15, 2015
COMMISSION OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF TAX APPEALS (SECOND DIVISION) and PETRON
CORPORATION,* Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari1 are the Resolutions dated February 13,
20132 and May 8, 20133 of the Court of Tax Appeals, Second Division (CTA) in
CTA Case No. 8544 reversing and setting aside the earlier dismissal of the
petition for review filed by private respondent Petron Corporation (Petron) in the
said case on the bases of prematurity and lack of jurisdiction.
The Facts
Petron, which is engaged in the manufacture and marketing of petroleum

products, imports alkylate as a raw material or blending component for the
manufacture of ethanol-blended motor gasoline.4 For the period January 2009 to
August 2011, as well as for the month of April 2012, Petron transacted an
aggregate of 22 separate importations for which petitioner the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue (CIR) issued Authorities to Release Imported Goods (ATRIGs),
categorically stating that Petron's importation of alkylate is exempt from the
payment of the excise tax because it was not among those articles enumerated
as subject to excise tax under Title VI of Republic Act No. (RA) 8424,5 as
amended, or the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). With respect,
however, to Petron's alkylate importations covering the period September 2011
to June 2012 (excluding April 2012), the CIR inserted, without prior notice, a
reservation for all ATRIGs issued,6 stating that:
This is without prejudice to the collection of the corresponding excise taxes,

penalties and interest depending on the final resolution of the Office of the
Commissioner on the issue of whether this item is subject to the excise taxes
under the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as amended.7
In June 2012, Petron imported 12,802,660 liters of alkylate and paid value-added
tax (VAT) in the total amount of ?41,657,533.00 as evidenced by Import Entry
and Internal Revenue Declaration (IEIRD) No. SN 122406532. Based on the
Final Computation, said importation was subjected by the Collector of Customs
of Port Limay, Bataan, upon instructions of the Commissioner of Customs (COC),
to excise taxes of ₱4.35 per liter, or in the aggregate amount of ₱55,691,571.00,
and consequently, to an additional VAT of 12% on the imposed excise tax in the
amount of ₱6,682,989.00.8 The imposition of the excise tax was supposedly
premised on Customs Memorandum Circular (CMC) No. 164-2012 dated July 18,
2012, implementing the Letter dated June 29, 2012 issued by the CIR, which
states that:
[A]lkylate which is a product of distillation similar to that of naphta, is subject to

excise tax under Section 148( e) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC)
of 1997. 9
In view of the CIR's assessment, Petron filed before the CTA a petition for
review,10 docketed as CTA Case No. 8544, raising the issue of whether its
importation of alkylate as a blending component is subject to excise tax as
contemplated under Section 148 (e) of the NIRC.
On October 5, 2012, the CIR filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction and prematurity.11
Initially, in a Resolution12 dated November 15, 2012, the CTA granted the CIR's
motion and dismissed the case. However, on Petron's motion for
reconsideration,13 it reversed its earlier disposition in a Resolution14 dated
February 13, 2013, and eventually denied the CIR's motion for
reconsideration15 therefrom in a Resolution16 dated May 8, 2013. In effect, the
CTA gave due course to Petron's petition, finding that: (a) the controversy was
not essentially for the determination of the constitutionality, legality or validity of a
law, rule or regulation but a question on the propriety or soundness of the CIR's
interpretation of Section 148 (e) of the NIRC which falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the CTA under Section 4 thereof, particularly under the phrase
"other matters arising under [the NIRC]";17 and (b) there are attending
circumstances that exempt the case from the rule on non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies, such as the great irreparable damage that may be
suffered by Petron from the CIR's final assessment of excise tax on its
importation.18
Aggrieved, the CIR sought immediate recourse to the Court, through the instant
petition, alleging that the CTA committed grave abuse of discretion when it
assumed authority to take cognizance of the case despite its lack of jurisdiction
to do so.19
The core issue to be resolved is whether or not the CTA properly assumed
jurisdiction over the petition assailing the imposition of excise tax on Petron's
importation of alkylate based on Section 148 (e) of the NIRC.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The CIR asserts that the interpretation of the subject tax provision, i.e., Section
148 (e) of the NIRC, embodied in CMC No. 164-2012, is an exercise of her
quasi-legislative function which is reviewable by the Secretary of Finance, whose
decision, in turn, is appealable to the Office of
the President and, ultimately, to the regular courts, and that only her quasi-
judicial functions or the authority to decide disputed assessments, refunds,
penalties and the like are subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the
CTA.20 She likewise contends that the petition suffers from prematurity due to
Petron 's failure to exhaust all available remedies within the administrative level
in accordance with the Tariff and Customs Code (TCC).21
The CIR's position is well-grounded.
Section 4 of the NIRC confers upon the CIR both: (a) the power to interpret tax
laws in the exercise of her quasi-legislative function; and (b) the power to decide
tax cases in the exercise of her quasi-judicial function. It also delineates the
jurisdictional authority to review the validity of the CIR's exercise of the said
powers, thus:
SEC. 4. Power of the Commissioner to Interpret Tax Laws and to Decide Tax
Cases. - The power to interpret the provisions of this Code and other tax laws
shall be under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Commissioner, subject
to review by the Secretary of Finance.
The power to decide disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes,

fees or other charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters
arising under this Code or other laws or portions thereof administered by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue is vested in the Commissioner, subject to the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
The CTA is a court of special jurisdiction, with power to review by appeal

decisions involving tax disputes rendered by either the CIR or the
COC. Conversely, it has no jurisdiction to determine the validity of a ruling
1âw phi 1
issued by the CIR or the COC in the exercise of their quasi-legislative powers to
interpret tax laws. These observations may be deduced from a reading of Section
7 of RA 1125,22 as amended by RA 9282,23 entitled "An Act Creating the Court of
Tax Appeals," enumerating the cases over which the CT A may exercise its
jurisdiction:
Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. -The CTA shall exercise:
a. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:
1. Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases

involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes,
fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters
arising under the National Internal Revenue or other laws
administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;
2. Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases

involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes,
fees or other charges, penalties in relations thereto, or other matters
arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other laws
administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, where the National
Internal Revenue Code provides a specific period of action, in which
case the inaction shall be deemed a denial;
3. Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Comis in

local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise
of their original or appellate jurisdiction;
4. Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving

liability for customs duties, fees or other money charges, seizure,
detention or release of property affected, fines, forfeitures or other
penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the
Customs Law or other laws administered by the Bureau of Customs;
5. Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the

exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the
assessment and taxation of real property originally decided by the
provincial or city board of assessment appeals;
6. Decisions of the Secretary of Finance on customs cases elevated

to him automatically for review from decisions of the Commissioner
of Customs which are adverse to the Government under Section
2315 of the Tariff and Customs Code;
7. Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry, in the case of

nonagricultural product, commodity or article, and the Secretary of
Agriculture in the case of agricultural product, commodity or article,
involving dumping and countervailing duties under Section 301 and
302, respectively, of the Tariff and Customs Code, and safeguard
measures under Republic Act No. 8800, where either party may
appeal the decision to impose or not to impose said duties.
b. Jurisdiction over cases involving criminal offenses as herein provided:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all criminal offenses arising

from violations of the National Internal Revenue Code or Tariff and
Customs Code and other laws administered by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue or the Bureau of Customs: Provided, however,
That offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the
principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and
penalties, claimed is less than One million pesos (₱1,000,000.00) or
where there is no specified amount claimed shall be tried by the
regular Courts and the jurisdiction of the CTA shall be appellate. Any
provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary
notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil
action for the recovery of civil liability for taxes and penalties shall at
all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in
the same proceeding by the CT A, the filing of the criminal action
being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action,
and no right to reserve the filling of such civil action separately from
the criminal action will be recognized.
2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal offenses:
a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of

the Regional Trial Courts in tax cases originally decided by
them, in their respective territorial jurisdiction.
b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or

orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their
appellate jurisdiction over tax cases originally decided by the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in their respective jurisdiction.
c. Jurisdiction over tax collection cases as herein provided:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction in tax collection cases involving final and

executory assessments for taxes, fees, charges and penalties: Provided,
however, That collection cases where the principal amount of taxes and
fees, exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is less than One million
pesos (₱1,000,000.00) shall be tried by the proper Municipal Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial Court.
2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in tax collection cases:
a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the

Regional Trial Courts in tax collection cases originally decided by
them, in their respective territorial jurisdiction.
b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of
the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction
over tax collection cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in
their respective jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, Petron's tax liability was premised on the COC's issuance of CMC
No. 164-2012, which gave effect to the CIR's June 29, 2012 Letter interpreting
Section 148 (e) of the NIRC as to include alkyl ate among the articles subject to
customs duties, hence, Petron's petition before the CTA ultimately challenging
the legality and constitutionality of the CIR's aforesaid interpretation of a tax
provision. In line with the foregoing discussion, however, the CIR correctly
argues that the CT A had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition as its
resolution would necessarily involve a declaration of the validity or
constitutionality of the CIR's interpretation of Section 148 (e) of the NIRC, which
is subject to the exclusive review by the Secretary of Finance and ultimately by
the regular courts. In British American Tobacco v. Camacho,24 the Court ruled
that the CTA's jurisdiction to resolve tax disputes excludes the power to rule on
the constitutionality or validity of a law, rule or regulation, to wit:
While the above statute confers on the CTA jurisdiction to resolve tax disputes in
general, this does not include cases where the constitutionality of a law or rule is
challenged. Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a law, or a
rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its
quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the
same. x x x.25
In asserting its jurisdiction over the present case, the CTA explained that Petron's
petition filed before it "simply puts in question" the propriety or soundness of the
CIR's interpretation and application of Section 148 (e) of the NIRC (as embodied
in CMC No. 164-2012) "in relation to" the imposition of excise tax on Petron's
importation of alkylate; thus, the CTA posits that the case should be regarded as
"other matters arising under [the NIRC]" under the second paragraph of Section
4 of the NIRC, therefore falling within the CTA's jurisdiction:26
SEC. 4. Power of the Commissioner to Interpret Tax Laws and to Decide Tax
Cases. - The power to interpret the provisions of this Code and other tax laws
shall be under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Commissioner, subject
to review by the Secretary of Finance.
The power to decide disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes,

fees or other charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters
arising under this Code or other laws or portions thereof administered by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue is vested in the commissioner, subject to the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
The Court disagrees.
As the CIR aptly pointed out, the phrase "other matters arising under this Code,"
as stated in the second paragraph of Section 4 of the NIRC, should be
understood as pertaining to those matters directly related to the preceding
phrase "disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other
charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto" and must therefore not be taken
in isolation to invoke the jurisdiction of the CTA.27 In other words, the subject
phrase should be used only in reference to cases that are, to begin with, subject
to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CTA, i.e., those controversies over
which the CIR had exercised her quasi-judicial functions or her power to decide
disputed assessments, refunds or internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges,
penalties imposed in relation thereto, not to those that involved the CIR's
exercise of quasi-legislative powers.
In Enrile v. Court of Appeals,28 the Court, applying the statutory construction

principle of ejusdem generis,29explained the import of using the general clause
"other matters arising under the Customs Law or other law or part of law
administered by the Bureau of Customs" in the enumeration of cases subject to
the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CTA, saying that: [T]he 'other matters'
that may come under the general clause should be of the same nature as those
that have preceded them applying the rule of construction known as ejusdem
generis.30(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Hence, as the CIR's interpretation of a tax provision involves an exercise of her

quasi-legislative functions, the proper recourse against the subject tax ruling
expressed in CMC No. 164-2012 is a review by the Secretary of Finance and
ultimately the regular courts. In Commissioner of Customs v. Hypermix Feeds
Corporation,31 the Court has held that:
The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an

administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the
jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of
judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive
agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the
courts, including the regional trial courts. This is within the scope of judicial
power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate
action the validity of the acts of the political departments. x x x.32
Besides, Petron prematurely invoked the jurisdiction of the CT A. Under Section
7 of RA 1125, as amended by RA 9282, what is appealable to the CT A is the
decision of the COC over a customs collector's adverse ruling on a taxpayer's
protest:
SEC. 7. Jurisdiction. -The CTA shall exercise:
a. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:
1. Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving

disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges,
penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal
Revenue or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;
xxxx
4. Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for

customs duties, fees or other money charges, seizure, detention or release of
property affected, fines, forfeitures or other penalties in relation thereto, or other
matters arising under the Customs Law or other laws administered by the Bureau
of Customs;
xxxx
Section 11 of the same law is no less categorical in stating that what may be the
subject of an appeal to the CT A is a decision, ruling or inaction of the CIR or the
COC, among others:
SEC. 11. Who May Appeal; Mode of Appeal; Effect of Appeal. – Any party
adversely affected by a decision, ruling or inaction of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, the Commissioner of Customs, the Secretary of Finance, the
Secretary of Trade and Industry or the Secretary of Agriculture or the Central
Board of Assessment Appeals or the Regional Trial Courts may file an appeal
with the CTA within thirty (30) days after the receipt of such decision or ruling or
after the expiration of the period fixed by law for action as referred to in Section
7(a)(2) herein.
xxxx
In this case, there was even no tax assessment to speak of. While customs
collector Federico Bulanhagui himself admitted during the CTA's November 8,
2012 hearing that the computation he had written at the back page of the IEIRD
served as the final assessment imposing excise tax on Petron's importation of
alkylate,33 the Court concurs with the CIR's stance that the subject IEIRD was not
yet the customs collector's final assessment that could be the proper subject of
review. And even if it were, the same should have been brought first for review
before the COC and not directly to the CTA. It should be stressed that the CTA
has no jurisdiction to review by appeal, decisions of the customs collector.34 The
TCC prescribes that a party adversely affected by a ruling or decision of the
customs collector may protest such ruling or decision upon payment of the
amount due35 and, if aggrieved by the action of the customs collector on the
matter under protest, may have the same reviewed by the COC.36 It is only after
the COC shall have made an adverse ruling on the matter may the aggrieved
party file an
appeal to the CT A.37
Notably, Petron admitted to not having filed a protest of the assessment before
the customs collector and elevating a possible adverse ruling therein to the COC,
reasoning that such a procedure would be costly and impractical, and would
unjustly delay the resolution of the issues which, being purely legal in nature
anyway, were also beyond the authority of the customs collector to resolve with
finality.38 This admission is at once decisive of the issue of the CTA's jurisdiction
over the petition. There being no protest ruling by the customs collector that was
appealed to the COC, the filing of the petition before the CTA was premature as
there was nothing yet to review.39
Verily, the fact that there is no decision by the COC to appeal from highlights
Petron's failure to exhaust administrative remedies prescribed by law. Before a
party is allowed to seek the intervention of the courts, it is a pre-condition that he
avail of all administrative processes afforded him, such that if a remedy within the
administrative machinery can be resorted to by giving the administrative officer
every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then
such remedy must be exhausted first before the court's power of judicial review
can be sought, otherwise, the premature resort to the court is fatal to one's cause
of action.40 While there are exceptions to the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, it has not been sufficiently shown that the present case
falls under any of the exceptions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated February 13,

2013 and May 8, 2013 of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), Second Division in
CTA Case No. 8544 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for
review filed by private respondent Petron Corporation before the CTA is
DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity.
SO ORDERED.
CE CASECNAN WATER and ENERGY COMPANY, INC.,
petitioner, vs. THE PROVINCE OF NUEVA ECIJA, THE OFFICE
OF THE PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF NUEVA ECIJA, and THE
OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL TREASURER OF NUEVA
ECIJA, as represented by HON. AURELIO UMALI, HON.
FLORANTE FAJARDO and HON. EDILBERTO PANCHO,
respectively, or their lawful successors, respondents.
NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION and DEPART-
MENT OF FINANCE, as necessary parties.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction over the
subject matter is required for a court to act on any controversy.—
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is required for a court to act on any
controversy. It is conferred by law and not by the consent or waiver upon a
court. As such, if a court lacks jurisdiction over an action, it cannot decide
the case on the merits and must dismiss it.
Same; Same; Same; Court of Tax Appeals; This expanded jurisdiction
of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) includes its exclusive appellate
jurisdiction to review by appeal the decisions, orders or resolutions of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in local tax cases originally decided or resolved
by the RTC in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction.—With
respect to the CTA, its jurisdiction was expanded and its rank elevated to
that of a collegiate court with special jurisdiction by virtue of Republic Act
No. 9282. This expanded jurisdiction of the CTA includes its exclusive
appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal the decisions, orders or
resolutions of the RTC in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by
the RTC in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In the recent case of City of Manila v.
Grecia-Cuerdo, 715 SCRA 182 (2014), the Supreme Court (SC)
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
181
VOL. 759, JUNE 17, 2015 181
CE Casecnan Water and Energy Company, Inc. vs. Province of Nueva Ecija
ruled that the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) likewise has the jurisdiction
to issue writs of certiorari or to determine whether there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in issuing an interlocutory order in cases
falling within the CTA’s exclusive appellate jurisdiction.—In the recent
case of City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo, 715 SCRA 182 (2014), the Court
ruled that the CTA likewise has the jurisdiction to issue writs
of certiorari or to determine whether there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the CTA’s
exclusive appellate jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is settled that it is the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA) which has exclusive jurisdiction over a special civil action
for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in a local tax case.—It is settled that it is the CTA which has
exclusive jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an
interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case.
Interlocutory Orders; Certiorari; Local Taxation; Court of Tax Appeals;
Jurisdiction; A certiorari petition questioning an interlocutory order issued
in a local tax case falls under the jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals
(CTA).—No doubt, the injunction case before the RTC is a local tax case.
And as earlier discussed, a certiorari petition questioning an interlocutory
order issued in a local tax case falls under the jurisdiction of the CTA.
Thus, the CA correctly dismissed the Petition for Certiorari before it for
lack of jurisdiction.

Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez & Gatmaitan for petitioner.
Victorino O. Borja for respondents.
Office of the Government Corporate Counsel for National
Irrigation Administration.
182
DEL CASTILLO,J.:
The Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) has exclusive jurisdiction over a

special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order
issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in a local tax case.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the November 2,
2010 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
108441 which dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the Petition
for Certiorari of petitioner CE Casecnan Water and Energy
Company, Inc. (petitioner) against the Province of Nueva Ecija, the
Office of the Provincial Assessor of Nueva Ecija (Office of the
Provincial Assessor) and the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of
Nueva Ecija (Office of the Provincial Treasurer) (respondents). Also
assailed is the March 24, 2011 Resolution3 of the CA denying
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.4
Factual Antecedents
On June 26, 1995, petitioner and the National Irrigation

Administration (NIA) entered into a build-operate-transfer (BOT)
contract known as the “Amended and Restated Casecnan Project
Agreement”5 (Casecnan Contract) relative to the construction and
development of the Casecnan Multi-Purpose Irrigation and Power
Project (Casecnan Project) in Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija and
Alfonso Castaneda, Nueva Vizcaya. The Casecnan Project is a
combined irrigation and hydroelectric
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 64-97.

2 CA Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 1304-1320; penned by Associate Justice Juan Q.
Enriquez, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Noel G. Tijam and Ramon M.
Bato, Jr.; Associate Justices Florito S. Macalino and Samuel H. Gaerlan, dissented.
3 Id., at pp. 1467-1468.
4 Id., at pp. 1347-1376.
5 Id., Vol. I, pp. 102-175.
183
VOL. 759, JUNE 17, 2015 183
power generation facility using the Pantabangan Dam in Nueva
Ecija.
On September 29, 2003, petitioner and NIA executed a
Supplemental Agreement6 amending Article II of the Casecnan
Contract which pertains to payment of taxes. Article 2.2 thereof
states that NIA must reimburse petitioner for real property taxes
(RPT) provided the same was paid upon NIA’s directive and with
the concurrence of the Department of Finance.
On September 6, 2005, petitioner received from the Office of the
Provincial Assessor a Notice of Assessment of Real Property dated
August 2, 2005, which indicates that for the years 2002 to 2005, its
RPT due was P248,676,349.60. Petitioner assailed the assessment
with the Nueva Ecija Local Board of Assessment Appeals (Nueva
Ecija LBAA) which dismissed it on January 26, 2006. Undeterred,
petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal with the Nueva Ecija Central
Board of Assessment Appeals (Nueva Ecija CBAA). During the
pendency thereof, respondents collected from petitioner the RPT
due under the said assessment as well as those pertaining to the
years 2006 up to the second quarter of 2008, totalling
P363,703,606.88. Petitioner paid the assessed RPT under protest;
it also initiated proceedings questioning the validity of the
collection with respect to the years 2006 up to the second quarter of
2008. Thereafter, petitioner received a letter7 dated July 9, 2008
from the Office of the Provincial Treasurer stating that it has RPT
in arrears for the years 2002 up to the second quarter of 2008
amounting to P1,277,474,342.10. Petitioner received another
letter8dated August 29, 2008 from the same office clarifying that its
arrearages in RPT actually amounted to P1,279,997,722.70 (2008
RPT Reassessment). Again, petitioner questioned this assessment
through an ap-
_______________
6 Id., at pp. 176-194.

7 Id., at p. 452.
8 Id., at p. 471.
184
peal before the Nueva Ecija LBAA. While the same was pending,
petitioner received from respondents a letter dated September 10,
2008 demanding payment for its alleged RPT arrearages.
Hence, on September 23, 2008, petitioner filed with the RTC of
San Jose City, Nueva Ecija a Complaint9 for injunction and
damages with application for temporary restraining order (TRO)
and preliminary injunction10praying to restrain the collection of the
2008 RPT Reassessment. Petitioner emphasized, among others,
that it was not the one which should pay the taxes but NIA.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On September 24, 2008, the RTC denied petitioner’s application

for a 72-hour TRO.11
Meanwhile, petitioner received from the Office of the Provincial
Treasurer a letter dated September 22, 2008 further demanding
payment for RPT covering the third quarter of 2008 (2008-3Q
Assessment). Thus, petitioner filed on September 29, 2008 an
Amended Complaint12asking the RTC to likewise enjoin
respondents from collecting RPT based on the 2008-3Q Assessment
in the amount of P53,346,755.18.
On October 2, 2008, the RTC issued a 20-day TRO13 enjoining
respondents from collecting from petitioner the RPT covered by the
2008 RPT Reassessment amounting to P1,279,997,722.70,
including surcharges and penalties.
Subsequently, however, the RTC denied petitioner’s application
for writ of preliminary injunction in its Order14of Octo-
_______________
9 Rollo, pp. 155-203.

10 Raffled to Branch 39 and docketed as Civil Case No. (08)-189-P.
11 Rollo, pp. 204-206.
12 Id., at pp. 207-267.
13 Id., at pp. 268-276.
14 Id., at pp. 277-282; penned by Judge Cynthia Martinez Florendo.
185
VOL. 759, JUNE 17, 2015 185
ber 24, 2008. It also denied petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration thereof in an Order15 dated January 30, 2009.
On April 24, 2009, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition
for Certiorari16 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to
annul and set aside the aforementioned October 24, 2008 and
January 30, 2009 RTC Orders.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its November 2, 2010 Decision,17 the CA observed that the

Petition for Certiorari before it was actually an offshoot of the 2008
RPT Reassessment. And since in resolving the issue of whether the
RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s
application for a writ of preliminary injunction, the issue of the
validity of the assessment and the collection of the RPT against
petitioner must also be resolved, thus jurisdiction over the case lies
within the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). Hence, the CA ruled:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorariis hereby
DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly, DISMISSED for lack of
jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.18
Petitioner sought reconsideration; however, it was denied in a

Resolution19 dated March 24, 2011.
Undaunted, petitioner filed this Petition imputing upon the CA
grave error in:
_______________
15 Id., at pp. 321-322.

16 CA Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 2-93.
17 Id., Vol. II, pp. 1304-1320.
18 Id., at p. 1319.
19 Id., at pp. 1467-1468.
186
x x x ruling that it is the Court of Tax Appeals (and not the Court of
Appeals) which has jurisdiction over the CA Injunction Case.20
In its Petition21 and Reply,22 petitioner argues that it is the CA,

not the CTA, which has jurisdiction over the subject matter of its
Petition for Certiorari. Petitioner maintains that its petition
relates to an ordinary civil action for injunction and not to a local
tax case. It insists that in both the RTC injunction case and the
Petition for Certiorari before the CA, petitioner was not protesting
respondents’ assessment of RPT against it; what it was seeking
was respondents’ enjoinment from committing or continuing to
commit acts that would probably violate its right. In particular,
petitioner points out that the RTC injunction case was intended to
enjoin respondents from collecting payment during the pendency of
the case with the LBAA challenging the validity of the 2008 RPT
Reassessment. Petitioner explains that the said injunction case
was filed with the RTC because the LBAA has no injunctive power.
Respondents’ Arguments
In their Comment,23 respondents argue that in resolving the

issue on the propriety of issuing a writ of injunction, the CA will
have to inevitably pass upon the propriety of the assessment of
RPT on the Casecnan Project, a local tax matter which is within
the jurisdiction of the CTA. Respondents also echo the CA
pronouncement that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative
remedies with respect to the assessment and collection of RPT.
_______________
20 Rollo, p. 70.
21 Id., at pp. 64-97.
22 Id., at pp. 795-805.
23 Id., at pp. 769-774.
187
VOL. 759, JUNE 17, 2015 187
Our Ruling
There is no merit in the Petition.
It is the CTA which has the power to rule on a Petition

for Certiorari assailing an interlocutory order of the RTC
relating to a local tax case.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is required for a court to act

on any controversy. It is conferred by law and not by the consent or
waiver upon a court. As such, if a court lacks jurisdiction over an
action, it cannot decide the case on the merits and must dismiss
it.24
With respect to the CTA, its jurisdiction was expanded and its
rank elevated to that of a collegiate court with special jurisdiction
by virtue of Republic Act No. 9282.25This expanded jurisdiction of
the CTA includes its exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by
appeal the decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTC in local tax
cases originally decided or resolved by the RTC in the exercise of
its original or appellate jurisdiction.26
In the recent case of City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo,27the Court
ruled that the CTA likewise has the jurisdiction to issue writs
of certiorari or to determine whether there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
_______________
24 Nippon Express (Philippines) Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal

Revenue, G.R. No. 185666, February 4, 2015, 749 SCRA 570.
25 An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA),
Elevating its Rank to the Level of a Collegiate Court with Special Jurisdiction and
Enlarging its Membership, Amending for the Purpose Certain Sections of Republic
Act No. 1125, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Law Creating the Court of Tax
Appeals, and for Other Purposes.
26 Republic Act No. 9282, Sec. 7(3).
27 G.R. No. 175723, February 4, 2014, 715 SCRA 182.
188
jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory
order in cases falling within the CTA’s exclusive appellate
jurisdiction, thus:
The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant of such
power, with respect to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial power shall be vested in
one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law
and that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly
interpreted that the power of the CTA includes that of determining
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC
in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that
the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari in these cases.28 (Citations omitted and emphasis
supplied)
Further, the Court in City of Manila, citing J. M. Tuason & Co.,

Inc. v. Jaramillo,29 De Jesus v. Court of Appeals,30 as well as the
more recent cases of Galang, Jr. v. Hon. Judge
Geronimo31 and Bulilis v. Nuez,32 held that:
_______________
28 Id., at p. 202.
29 118 Phil. 1022; 9 SCRA 189 (1963).
30 G.R. No. 101630, August 24, 1992, 212 SCRA 823.
31 659 Phil. 65; 643 SCRA 631 (2011).
32 670 Phil. 665; 655 SCRA 241 (2011).
189
VOL. 759, JUNE 17, 2015 189
Consistent with the above pronouncement, this Court has held as early
as the case of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al.that ‘if a case may
be appealed to a particular court or judicial tribunal or body, then said
court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the
extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.’ This
principle was affirmed in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals, where the Court
stated that ‘a court may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of
error, the final orders or decisions of the lower court.’ The rulings in J.M.
Tuason and De Jesus were reiterated in the more recent cases of Galang,
Jr. v. Geronimo and Bulilis v. Nuez.
Furthermore, Section 6, Rule 135 of the present Rules of Court provides
that when by law, jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all
auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect
may be employed by such court or officer.33 (Citations omitted)
Anent petitioner’s contention that it is the CA which has

jurisdiction over a certiorari petition assailing an interlocutory
order issued by the RTC in a local tax case, the Court had this to
say:
If this Court were to sustain petitioners’ contention that jurisdiction
over their certiorari petition lies with the CA, this Court would be
confirming the exercise by two judicial bodies, the CA and the CTA, of
jurisdiction over basically the same subject matter — precisely the split-
jurisdiction situation which is anathema to the orderly administration of
justice. The Court cannot accept that such was the legislative
motive, especially considering that the law expressly confers on
the CTA, the tribunal with the specialized competence over tax
and tariff matters, the role of ju-
_______________
33 City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo, supra note 27 at pp. 202-203.
190
dicial review over local tax cases without mention of any other
court that may exercise such power. Thus, the Court agrees with the
ruling of the CA that since appellate jurisdiction over private respondents’
complaint for tax refund is vested in the CTA, it follows that a petition
for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the
said case should, likewise, be filed with the same court. To rule otherwise
would lead to an absurd situation where one court decides an appeal in the
main case while another court rules on an incident in the very same case.
xxxx
A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the
power necessary to exercise it effectively, to make all orders that will
preserve the subject of the action, and to give effect to the final
determination of the appeal. It carries with it the power to protect that
jurisdiction and to make the decisions of the court thereunder effective.
The court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has authority to control all
auxiliary and incidental matters necessary to the efficient and proper
exercise of that jurisdiction. For this purpose, it may, when necessary,
prohibit or restrain the performance of any act which might interfere with
the proper exercise of its rightful jurisdiction in cases pending before
it.34 (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)
Given these, it is settled that it is the CTA which has exclusive

jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an
interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case.
The RTC injunction case is a local tax case.
In maintaining that it is the CA that has jurisdiction over

petitioner’s certiorari petition, the latter argues that the in-
_______________
34 Id., at pp. 203-205.
191
VOL. 759, JUNE 17, 2015 191
junction case it filed with the RTC is not a local tax case but an
ordinary civil action. It insists that it is not protesting the
assessment of RPT against it but only prays that respondents be
enjoined from collecting the same.
The Court finds, however, that in praying to restrain the
collection of RPT, petitioner also implicitly questions the propriety
of the assessment of such RPT. This is because in ruling as to
whether to restrain the collection, the RTC must first necessarily
rule on the propriety of the assessment. In other words, in filing an
action for injunction to restrain collection, petitioner was in effect
also challenging the validity of the RPT assessment. As aptly
discussed by the CA:
x x x [T]he original action filed with the RTC is one for Injunction, with
an application for Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction to enjoin the province of Nueva Ecija from further collecting the
alleged real property tax liability assessed against it. Simply because the
action is an application for injunctive relief does not necessarily mean that
it may no longer be considered as a local tax case. The subject matter and
the issues, not the name or designation of the remedy, should control.
While an ancillary action for injunction may not be a main case, the court
[still has] to determine, even in a preliminary matter, the applicable tax
laws, rules and jurisprudence. x x x35
Moreover, in National Power Corporation v. Municipal

Government of Navotas,36 as well as in City of Lapu-Lapu v.
Philippine Economic Zone Authority,37 this Court already held that
local tax cases include RPT.
No doubt, the injunction case before the RTC is a local tax case.
And as earlier discussed, a certiorari petition questioning an
interlocutory order issued in a local tax case falls un-
_______________
35 CA Rollo, Vol. II, p. 1315.

36 G.R. No. 192300, November 24, 2014, 741 SCRA 505.
37 G.R. Nos. 184203 and 187583, November 26, 2014, 742 SCRA 524.
192
der the jurisdiction of the CTA. Thus, the CA correctly dismissed
the Petition for Certiorari before it for lack of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The November 2, 2010
Decision and March 24, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 108441 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Mendoza and Reyes,**JJ., concur.
Notes.—The Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), sitting as Division,
has jurisdiction to review by appeal the decisions, rulings and
resolutions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) over local tax cases,
which includes real property taxes. (National Power Corporation
vs. Municipal Government of Navotas, 741 SCRA 505 [2014])
The Supreme Court (SC) has ruled that the Court of Tax Appeals
(CTA), not the Court of Appeals (CA), has the exclusive original
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorariassailing interlocutory
orders issued by Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) in a local tax case.
(City of Lapu-Lapu vs. Philippine Economic Zone Authority, 742
SCRA 524 [2014])
——o0o——
_______________
* * Designated acting member per Special Order No. 2056-A dated June 10, 2015.
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved
April 19, 2010. G.R. No. 166829.*
TFS, INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.
Civil Procedure; Appeals; Court of Tax Appeals; Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction to review
decisions or resolutions issued by the Division of the Court of Tax Appeals is no longer with
the Court of Appeals but with the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc.—Jurisdiction to review
decisions or resolutions issued by the Divisions of the CTA is no longer with the CA but
with the CTA En Banc. 18. This rule is embodied in Section 11 of RA 9282, which provides
that: “SECTION 11. Section 18 of the same Act is hereby amended as follows: SEC. Appeal
to the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc.—No civil proceeding involving matters arising under
the National Internal Revenue Code, the Tariff and Customs Code or the Local Government
Code shall be maintained, except as herein provided, until and unless an appeal has been
previously filed with the CTA and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this
Act. A party adversely affected by a resolution of a Division of the CTA on a
motion for reconsideration or new trial, may file a petition for review with the
CTA en banc.
Same; Same; Same; Same; An appeal must be perfected within the reglementary period
provided by law—Supreme Court excused the late filing of the notices of appeal because at
the time the said notices of appeal were filed, the new rules applicable therein had just been
recently issued.—It is settled that an appeal must be perfected within the reglementary
period provided by law; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory. However, as in
all cases, there are exceptions to the strict application of the rules for perfecting an appeal.
We are aware of our rulings in Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Mangubat,
312 SCRA 463 (1999), and in Alfonso v. Sps. Andres, 390 SCRA 465 (2002), wherein we
excused the late filing of the notices of appeal because at the time the said notices of appeal
were filed, the new rules applicable therein had just been recently issued. We noted that
judges and lawyers need time to familiarize themselves with recent rules.
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
347
VOL. 618, APRIL 19, 2010 347

TFS, Incorporated vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Attorneys; Although a client is bound by the acts of his counsel, including the latter’s
mistakes and negligence, a departure from this rule is warranted where such mistake or
neglect would result in serious injustice to the client.—Although a client is bound by the acts
of his counsel, including the latter’s mistakes and negligence, a departure from this rule is
warranted where such mistake or neglect would result in serious injustice to the client.
Procedural rules may thus be relaxed for persuasive reasons to relieve a litigant of an
injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure. Such
is the situation in this case.
Civil Procedure; Appeals; Although strict compliance with the rules for perfecting an
appeal is indispensable for the prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and
expeditious dispatch of judicial business, strong compelling reasons such as serving the ends
of justice and preventing a grave miscarriage may nevertheless warrant the suspension of the
rules.—In fine, although strict compliance with the rules for perfecting an appeal is
indispensable for the prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and expeditious
dispatch of judicial business, strong compelling reasons such as serving the ends of justice
and preventing a grave miscarriage may nevertheless warrant the suspension of the rules.
In the instant case, we are constrained to disregard procedural rules because we cannot in
conscience allow the government to collect deficiency VAT from petitioner considering that
the government has no right at all to collect or to receive the same. Besides, dismissing this
case on a mere technicality would lead to the unjust enrichment of the government at the
expense of petitioner, which we cannot permit. Technicalities should never be used as a
shield to perpetrate or commit an injustice.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolutions of the Court

of Tax Appeals.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
348
DEL CASTILLO,J.:
Only in highly meritorious cases, as in the instant case, may the
rules for perfecting an appeal be brushed aside.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court seeks to set aside the November 18, 20041 Resolution of
the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc in C.T.A. EB No. 29
which dismissed petitioner’s Petition for Review for having been
filed out of time. Also assailed is the January 24, 20052 Resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration.
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner TFS, Incorporated is a duly organized domestic
corporation engaged in the pawnshop business. On January 15,
2002, petitioner received a Preliminary Assessment Notice
(PAN)3 for deficiency value added tax (VAT), expanded withholding
tax (EWT), and compromise penalty in the amounts of
P11,764,108.74, P183,898.02 and P25,000.00, respectively, for the
taxable year 1998. Insisting that there was no basis for the
issuance of PAN, petitioner through a letter4 dated January 28,
2002 requested the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) to withdraw
and set aside the assessments.
In a letter-reply5 dated February 7, 2002, respondent
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) informed petitioner that
a Final Assessment Notice (FAN)6 was issued on January 25, 2002,
and that petitioner had until February 22, 2002 within which to
file a protest letter.
_______________
1 Rollo, p. 50.
2 Id., at pp. 51-54.
3 Id., at pp. pp. 82-83.
4 Id., at pp. 84-87.
5 Id., at p. 88.
6 Id., at pp. 89-94.
349
VOL. 618, APRIL 19, 2010 349
On February 20, 2002, petitioner protested the FAN in a
letter7 dated February 19, 2002.There being no action taken by the
CIR, petitioner filed a Petition for Review8with the CTA on
September 11, 2002, docketed as CTA Case No. 6535.
During trial, petitioner offered to compromise and to settle the
assessment for deficiency EWT with the BIR. Hence, on September
24, 2003, it filed a Manifestation and Motion withdrawing its
appeal on the deficiency EWT, leaving only the issue of VAT on
pawnshops to be threshed out. Since no opposition was made by
the CIR to the Motion, the same was granted by the CTA on
November 4, 2003.
Ruling of the Court of the Tax Appeals
On April 29, 2004, the CTA rendered a Decision9upholding the
assessment issued against petitioner in the amount of
P11,905,696.32, representing deficiency VAT for the year 1998,
inclusive of 25% surcharge and 20% deficiency interest, plus 20%
delinquency interest from February 25, 2002 until full payment,
pursuant to Sections 248 and 249(B) of the National Internal
Revenue Code of 1997 (NIRC). The CTA ruled that pawnshops are
subject to VAT under Section 108(A) of the NIRC as they are
engaged in the sale of services for a fee, remuneration or
consideration.10
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration11 but the motion
was denied by the CTA in its Resolution dated July 20,
2004,12 which was received by petitioner on July 30, 2004.
_______________
7 Id., at pp. 95-98.

8 Id., at pp. 72-81.
9 Id., at pp. 100-111.
10 Id., at p. 107.
11 Id., at pp. 112-125.
12 Id., at p. 126.
350
On August 16, 2004, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals
(CA) a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for
Review.13 On August 24, 2004, it filed a Petition for Review14 but it
was dismissed by the CA in its Resolution15 dated August 31, 2004,
for lack of jurisdiction in view of the enactment of Republic Act No.
9282 (RA 9282).16
Ruling of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc
Realizing its error, petitioner filed a Petition for Review17 with
the CTA En Banc on September 16, 2004. The petition, however,
was dismissed for having been filed out of time per Resolution
dated November 18, 2004. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution dated January
24, 2005.
Hence, this petition.
Issues
In its Memorandum,18 petitioner interposes the following issues:

WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF TAX APPEALS EN BANC SHOULD HAVE
GIVEN DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION
_______________
13 Id., at pp. 128-132.

14 Id., at pp. 134-160.
15 Id., at p. 161.
16 AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS (CTA), ELEVATING ITS RANK TO THE
LEVEL OF A COLLEGIATE COURT WITH SPECIAL JURISDICTION AND ENLARGING ITS MEMBERSHIP, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE CERTAIN SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1125, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LAW CREATING THE COURT OF
TAX APPEALS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
17 Rollo, pp. 162-189.
18 Id., at pp. 268-326.
351
VOL. 618, APRIL 19, 2010 351

FOR REVIEW AND NOT STRICTLY APPLIED THE TECHNICAL RULES OF
PROCEDURE TO THE DETRIMENT OF JUSTICE.
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS SUBJECT TO THE 10% VAT.19
Petitioner admits that it failed to timely file its Petition for
Review with the proper court (CTA). However, it attributes the
procedural lapse to the inadvertence or honest oversight of its
counsel, who believed that at the time the petition was filed on
August 24, 2004, the CA still had jurisdiction since the rules and
regulations to implement the newly enacted RA 9282 had not yet
been issued and the membership of the CTA En Banc was not
complete. In view of these circumstances, petitioner implores us to
reverse the dismissal of its petition and consider the timely filing of
its petition with the CA, which previously exercised jurisdiction
over appeals from decisions/resolutions of the CTA, as substantial
compliance with the then recently enacted RA 9282.
Petitioner also insists that the substantive merit of its case
outweighs the procedural infirmity it committed. It claims that the
deficiency VAT assessment issued by the BIR has no legal basis
because pawnshops are not subject to VAT as they are not included
in the enumeration of services under Section 108(A) of the NIRC.
Respondent’s Arguments
The CIR, on the other hand, maintains that since the petition
was filed with the CTA beyond the reglementary period, the
Decision had already attained finality and can no longer be opened
for review. As to the issue of VAT on pawnshops, he opines that
petitioner’s liability is a matter of law; and in
_______________
19 Id., at p. 274.
352
the absence of any provision providing for a tax exemption,
petitioner’s pawnshop business is subject to VAT.
Our Ruling
The petition is meritorious.

Jurisdiction to review decisions or resolutions issued by the
Divisions of the CTA is no longer with the CA but with the CTA En
Banc. This rule is embodied in Section 11 of RA 9282, which
provides that:
Section 18 of the same Act is hereby amended as follows: 11. “SECTION
18. SEC.Appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc.—No civil proceeding involving
matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code, the Tariff and Customs Code or
the Local Government Code shall be maintained, except as herein provided, until and
unless an appeal has been previously filed with the CTA and disposed of in accordance with
the provisions of this Act.
A party adversely affected by a resolution of a Division of the CTA on a motion
for reconsideration or new trial, may file a petition for review with the CTA en
banc.”(Emphasis supplied)
Procedural rules may be relaxed in

the interest of substantial justice
It is settled that an appeal must be perfected within the
reglementary period provided by law; otherwise, the decision
becomes final and executory.20 However, as in all cases, there are
exceptions to the strict application of the rules for perfecting an
appeal.21
_______________
20 Nationwide Security and Allied Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 155844, July 14, 2008,
558 SCRA 148, 155-156.
21 Monreal v. Court of Appeals, 204 Phil. 395, 401; 119 SCRA 8, 13 (1982).
353
VOL. 618, APRIL 19, 2010 353
We are aware of our rulings in Mactan Cebu International
Airport Authority v. Mangubat22 and in Alfonso v. Sps.
Andres,23 wherein we excused the late filing of the notices of appeal
because at the time the said notices of appeal were filed, the new
rules24 applicable therein had just been recently issued. We noted
that judges and lawyers need time to familiarize themselves with
recent rules.
However, in Cuevas v. Bais Steel Corporation25 we found that the
relaxation of rules was unwarranted because the delay incurred
therein was inexcusable. The subject SC Circular 39-98 therein
took effect on September 1, 1998, but the petitioners therein filed
their petition for certiorarifive months after the circular took effect.
In the instant case, RA 9282 took effect on April 23, 2004, while
petitioner filed its Petition for Review on Certiorari with the CA on
August 24, 2004, or four months after the effectivity of the law. By
then, petitioner’s counsel should have been aware of and familiar
with the changes introduced by RA 9282. Thus, we find petitioner’s
argument on the newness of RA 9282 a bit of a stretch.
Petitioner likewise cannot validly claim that its erroneous filing
of the petition with the CA was justified by the absence of the CTA
rules and regulations and the incomplete membership of the
CTA En Banc as these did not defer the effectivity26 and
implementation of RA 9282. In fact, under Section 2 of RA
9282,27 the presence of four justices already constitutes
_______________
22 371 Phil. 393, 398-399; 312 SCRA 463, 466 (1999).

23 439 Phil. 298, 306-307; 390 SCRA 465, 471 (2002).
24 On the alternative modes of service of pleading and the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,
respectively.
25 439 Phil. 793, 805-806; 391 SCRA 192, 203 (2002).
26 19. SECTIONEffectivity Clause.—This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its
publication in at least two newspapers of general circulation.
27 Now Amended by RA 9503, “AN ACT ENLARGING THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE COURT OF
TAX APPEALS, AMENDING FOR
354
a quorum for En Banc sessions and the affirmative votes of four
members of the CTA En Banc are sufficient to render
judgment.28 Thus, to us, the petitioner’s excuse of “inadvertence or
honest oversight of counsel” deserves scant consideration.
However, we will overlook this procedural lapse in the interest of
substantial justice. Although a client is bound by the acts of his
counsel, including the latter’s mistakes and negligence, a
departure from this rule is warranted where such mistake or
neglect would result in serious injustice to the client.29 Procedural
rules may thus be relaxed for persuasive reasons to relieve a
litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply
with the prescribed procedure.30 Such is the situation in this case.
_______________
THE PURPOSE CERTAIN SECTIONS OF THE LAW CREATING THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES,” Approved June 12, 2008.
28 Section 2 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

2. “SEC.Sitting En Banc or Division; Quorum; Proceedings.—The CTA may sit en banc or in two (2)
Divisions, each Division consisting of three (3) Justices.
Four (4) Justices shall constitute a quorum for sessions en banc and two (2) Justices for sessions of a
Division: Provided, That when the required quorum cannot be constituted due to any vacancy,
disqualification, inhibition, disability, or any other lawful cause, the Presiding Justice shall designate any
Justice of other Divisions of the Court to sit temporarily therein.
The affirmative votes of four (4) members of the Court en banc or two (2) members of a Division, as the
case may be, shall be necessary for the rendition of a decision or resolution.”
29 Meneses v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 156304, October 23, 2006, 505 SCRA 90, 97-98.
30 Spouses Ello v. Court of Appeals, 499 Phil. 398, 411; 460 SCRA 406, 417 (2005), citing Sebastian v.
Morales, 445 Phil. 595, 605; 397 SCRA 549, 558-559 (2003).
355
VOL. 618, APRIL 19, 2010 355
Imposition of VAT on pawnshops for
the tax years 1996 to 2002 was deferred
Petitioner disputes the assessment made by the BIR for VAT
deficiency in the amount of P11,905,696.32 for taxable year 1998
on the ground that pawnshops are not included in the coverage of
VAT.
We agree.
In First Planters Pawnshop, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue,31 we ruled that:
“x x x Since petitioner is a non-bank financial intermediary, it is subject to 10% VAT for
the tax years 1996 to 2002; however, with the levy, assessment and collection of VAT
from non-bank financial intermediaries being specifically deferred by law, then
petitioner is not liable for VAT during these tax years. But with the full
implementation of the VAT system on non-bank financial intermediaries starting January
1, 2003, petitioner is liable for 10% VAT for said tax year. And beginning 2004 up to the
present, by virtue of R.A. No. 9238, petitioner is no longer liable for VAT but it is subject to
percentage tax on gross receipts from 0% to 5%, as the case may be.” (Emphasis in the
original text)
Guided by the foregoing, petitioner is not liable for VAT for the
year 1998. Consequently, the VAT deficiency assessment issued by
the BIR against petitioner has no legal basis and must therefore be
cancelled. In the same vein, the imposition of surcharge and
interest must be deleted.32
In fine, although strict compliance with the rules for perfecting
an appeal is indispensable for the prevention of needless delays
and for the orderly and expeditious dispatch of judicial business,
strong compelling reasons such as serving the ends of justice and
preventing a grave miscarriage may
_______________
31 G.R. No. 174134, July 30, 2008, 560 SCRA 606, 621.
32 See Tambunting Pawnshop, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 179085, January
21, 2010, 610 SCRA 514.
356
nevertheless warrant the suspension of the rules.33 In the instant
case, we are constrained to disregard procedural rules because we
cannot in conscience allow the government to collect deficiency
VAT from petitioner considering that the government has no right
at all to collect or to receive the same. Besides, dismissing this case
on a mere technicality would lead to the unjust enrichment of the
government at the expense of petitioner, which we cannot permit.
Technicalities should never be used as a shield to perpetrate or
commit an injustice.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed
November 18, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals En
Banc in C.T.A. EB No. 29 which dismissed petitioner’s Petition for
Review for having been filed out of time, and the January 24, 2005
Resolution which denied the motion for reconsideration, are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The assessment for deficiency Value
Added Tax for the taxable year 1998, including surcharges,
deficiency interest and delinquency interest, are hereby
CANCELLED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Nachura,** Abad and Perez,
June 21, 2016. G.R. No. 199422.*
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

petitioner, vs. KEPCO ILIJAN CORPORATION, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Annulment of Judgments; Annulment of judgment is a
recourse that presupposes the filing of a separate and original action for the purpose of
annulling or avoiding a decision in another case; It is an extraordinary remedy that is
equitable in character and is permitted only in exceptional cases.—Annulment of judgment,
as provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, is based only on the grounds of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction. It is a recourse that presupposes the filing of a separate and
original action for the purpose of annulling or avoiding a decision in another case.
Annulment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the judgment sought to be
annulled is rendered. It is unlike a motion for reconsideration, appeal or even a petition for
relief from judgment, because annulment is not a continuation or progression of the same
case, as in fact the case it seeks to annul is already final and executory. Rather, it is an
extraordinary remedy that is equitable in character and is permitted only in exceptional
cases.
Same; Same; Same; Annulment of judgment implies power by a superior court over a
subordinate one, as provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, wherein the appellate court
may annul a decision
_______________
* EN BANC.
194
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Kepco Ilijan Corporation
of the regional trial court (RTC), or the latter court may annul a decision of the
municipal or metropolitan trial court.—Annulment of judgment involves the exercise of
original jurisdiction, as expressly conferred on the Court of Appeals by Batas Pambansa
Bilang (BP Blg.) 129, Section 9(2). It also implies power by a superior court over a
subordinate one, as provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, wherein the appellate
court may annul a decision of the regional trial court, or the latter court may annul a
decision of the municipal or metropolitan trial court.
Same; Same; Same; Court of Tax Appeals; The law and the rules are silent when it
comes to a situation in which a court, in this case the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), is called
upon to annul its own judgment.—But the law and the rules are silent when it comes to a
situation similar to the case at bar, in which a court, in this case the Court of Tax Appeals,
is called upon to annul its own judgment. More specifically, in the case at bar, the CTA
sitting En Banc is being asked to annul a decision of one of its divisions. However, the laws
creating the CTA and expanding its jurisdiction (RA Nos. 1125 and 9282) and the court’s
own rules of procedure (the Revised Rules of the CTA) do not provide for such a scenario. It
is the same situation among other collegial courts. To illustrate, the Supreme Court or the
Court of Appeals may sit and adjudicate cases in divisions consisting of only a number of
members, and such adjudication is already regarded as the decision of the Court itself. It is
provided for in the Constitution, Article VIII, Section 4(1) and BP Blg. 129, Section 4,
respectively. The divisions are not considered separate and distinct courts but are divisions
of one and the same court; there is no hierarchy of courts within the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals, for they each remain as one court notwithstanding that they also work in
divisions. The Supreme Court sitting En Banc is not an appellate court vis-à-vis its
divisions, and it exercises no appellate jurisdiction over the latter. As for the Court of
Appeals En Banc, it sits as such only for the purpose of exercising administrative,
ceremonial, or other non-adjudicator/functions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) and
even the Rules of Court which apply suppletorily thereto provide for no instance in which
the En Banc may reverse, annul or void a final decision of a division.—The Revised Rules of
the CTA and even the Rules of Court which apply supple-
195
VOL. 794, JUNE 21, 2016 195
torily thereto provide for no instance in which the En Bancmay reverse, annul or void
a final decision of a division. Verily, the Revised Rules of the CTA provide for no instance of
an annulment of judgment at all. On the other hand, the Rules of Court, through Rule 47,
provides, with certain conditions, for annulment of judgment done by a superior court, like
the Court of Appeals, against the final judgment, decision or ruling of an inferior court,
which is the Regional Trial Court, based on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. The Regional Trial Court, in turn, also is empowered to, upon a similar action,
annul a judgment or ruling of the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts within its
territorial jurisdiction. But, again, the said Rules are silent as to whether a collegial court
sitting En Bancmay annul a final judgment of its own division.
Same; Same; Same; Republic Act (RA) No. 9282, Section 1 puts the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA) on the same level as the Court of Appeals (CA), so that if the latter’s final
judgments may not be annulled before the Supreme Court (SC), then the CTA’s own
decisions similarly may not be so annulled.—A direct petition for annulment of a judgment
of the CTA to the Supreme Court, meanwhile, is likewise unavailing, for the same reason
that there is no identical remedy with the High Court to annul a final and executory
judgment of the Court of Appeals. RA No. 9282, Section 1 puts the CTA on the same level
as the Court of Appeals, so that if the latter’s final judgments may not be annulled before
the Supreme Court, then the CTA’s own decisions similarly may not be so annulled. And
more importantly, it has been previously discussed that annulment of judgment is an
original action, yet, it is not among the cases enumerated in the Constitution’s Article VIII,
Section 5 over which the Supreme Court exercises original jurisdiction. Annulment of
judgment also often requires an adjudication of facts, a task that the Court loathes to
perform, as it is not a trier of facts.
Same; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Certiorari is available when there is no appeal
or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.—As earlier
discussed, the petition designated as one for annulment of judgment (following Rule 47)
was legally and procedurally infirm and, thus, was soundly dismissed by the CTA En
Banc on such ground. Also, the CTA could not have treated the petition as an appeal or a
continuation of the case before the CTA First Division because the latter’s decision had
196
become final and executory and, thus, no longer subject to an appeal. Instead, what
remained as a remedy for the petitioner was to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
which could have been filed as an original action before this Court and not before the
CTA En Banc. Certiorari is available when there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, such as in the case at bar. Since the
petition below invoked the gross and palpable negligence of petitioner’s counsel which is
allegedly tantamount to its being deprived of due process and its day in court as party-
litigant and as it also invokes lack of jurisdiction of the CTA First Division to entertain the
petition filed by private respondent since the same allegedly fails to comply with the
reglementary periods for judicial remedies involving administrative claims for refund of
excess unutilized input VAT under the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), which
periods it claims to be jurisdictional, then the proper remedy that petitioner should have
availed of was indeed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, an original or independent
action premised on the public respondent having acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. However, since
a certiorari petition is not a continuation of the appellate process borne out of the original
case but is a separate action focused on actions that are in excess or wanting of jurisdiction,
then it cannot be filed in the same tribunal whose actions are being assailed but is instead
cognizable by a higher tribunal which, in the case of the CTA, is this Court. In the case
involving petitioner, the petition could have been filed directly with this Court, even
without any need to file a motion for reconsideration with the CTA division or En Banc, as
the case appears to fall under one of the recognized exceptions to the rule requiring such a
motion as a prerequisite to filing such petition.
Same; Same; Same; The writ of certiorari is an “extraordinary remedy” that is justified
in the “absence of an appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.”—The writ of certiorari is an “extraordinary remedy” that is justified in the
“absence of an appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.” It may be given due course as long as petitioners allege that they had no appeal or
any other efficacious remedy against the appellate court’s decision.
197
VOL. 794, JUNE 21, 2016 197
Same; Same; Same; When the appellate court’s decision is void for lack of due process,
the filing of a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court (SC) without a motion for
reconsideration is justified.—Direct resort to this Court via a certiorari petition on the same
grounds as in this case has jurisprudential precedents. In one, We held that when the
appellate court’s decision is void for lack of due process, the filing of a petition
for certiorari with this court without a motion for reconsideration is justified. This Court
also has held that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is available
when the proceedings in question amount to depriving the petitioner his day in court. It is
true that certiorari is not a substitute for appeal, but exempt from this rule is a case when
the trial court’s decision or resolution was issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. When a fraudulent scheme prevents a party from having his day in court
or from presenting his case, the fraud is one that affects and goes into the
jurisdiction of the court. A question as to lack of jurisdiction of the respondent tribunal
or agency is properly the office of a petition for certiorari.
Procedural Rules and Technicalities; In select cases, the Supreme Court (SC) has
asseverated that “it is always within its power to suspend its own rules or to except a
particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require it.”—Although in
select cases, this Court has asseverated that “it is always within its power to suspend its
own rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice
require it” and that the Rules of Court were conceived and promulgated to set forth
guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses
it, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial
discretion. We have also equally stressed that strict compliance with the rules of procedure
is essential to the administration of justice.
Same; It is harder to justify a relaxation of the rules when the litigant itself suffers from
inexcusable neglect. It is an oft-repeated pronouncement that clients should take the
initiative of periodically checking the progress of their cases, so that they could take timely
steps to protect their interest.—In this case, even if there was allegedly a deliberate effort
from petitioner’s counsel to refuse to participate, despite notice, in the conduct of the case
after the filing of the
198
Answer right up to the issuance of the Writ of Execution against petitioner, equally
apparent is the failure of petitioner and/or petitioner’s responsible subordinates to
supervise the said counsel as well as the conduct and progress of the case. Not only was
there an apparent negligence of counsel, which binds the client, there likewise appears to
have been lapses on the part of the client — the petitioner and the petitioner’s responsible
subordinates — themselves. Equally oft-repeated is the rule that service made upon the
present counsel of record at his given address is service to the client. Thus, it is harder to
justify a relaxation of the rules when the litigant itself suffers from inexcusable neglect. It
is an oft-repeated pronouncement that clients should take the initiative of periodically
checking the progress of their cases, so that they could take timely steps to protect their
interest. Failing such, clients are left with more recourse against the consequence of their
and their counsel’s omissions.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolutions of the Court

of Tax Appeals En Banc.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Zambrano & Gruba Law Offices for respondent.
PERALTA,J.:
This is a petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Resolutions1 dated July
27, 20112 and November 15, 20113of the Court of Tax Appeals
(CTA) En Banc.
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Juanito C. Castañeda, Jr., with Presiding Justice

Ernesto D. Acosta, Associate Justices Lovell R. Bautista, Erlinda P. Uy, Caesar A.
Casanova, Olga Palanca-Enriquez, Esperanza R. Fabon-Victorino, Cielito N.
Mindaro-Grulla, Amelia R. Cotangco-Manalastas, concurring.
2 Rollo, pp. 9-20.
3 Id., at pp. 29-32.
199
VOL. 794, JUNE 21, 2016 199
The facts follow.
For the first4 and second5 quarters of the calendar year 2000,
respondent filed its Quarterly value-added tax (VAT) returns with
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). It also filed the Application
for Zero-Rated Sales for calendar year 2000 which was duly
approved by the BIR.6
Thereafter, respondent filed with the BIR its claim for refund in
the amount of P449,569,448.73 representing input tax incurred for
the first and second quarters of the calendar year 2000 from its
importation and domestic purchases of capital goods and services
preparatory to its production and sales of electricity to the
National Power Corporation.7
Petitioner did not act upon respondent’s claim for refund or
issuance of tax credit certificate for the first and second quarters of
the calendar year 2000. Consequently, respondent filed a Petition
for Review8 on March 21, 2002, and an Amended Petition for
Review9 on September 12, 2003.
In her Answer,10 petitioner alleged the following Special and
Affirmative Defenses: (1) respondent is not entitled to the refund of
the amounts prayed for; (2) the petition was prematurely filed for
respondent’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies; (3)
respondent failed to show that the taxes paid were erroneously or
illegally collected; and (4) respondent has no cause of action.
After the issues were joined, trial on the merits ensued.
Respondent, thereafter, filed its Memorandum on September 1,
2008. For failure of petitioner to file the required
_______________
4 CTA Records, p. 14.

5 Id., at p. 16.
6 Id., at p. 18.
7 Id., at pp. 19-35. See also Rollo, p. 141.
8 Id., at pp. 1-9.
9 Id., at pp. 427-435.
10 Id., at pp. 44-45.
200
Memorandum despite notice, the CTA First Division issued a
Resolution11 dated September 12, 2008 submitting the case for
decision.
On September 11, 2009, the CTA First Division rendered a

Decision,12 the dispositive portion13 of which reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, THIS Court finds petitioner
entitled to a refund in the amount of P443,447,184.50,
representing unutilized input VAT paid on its domestic purchases
and importation of capital goods for the first and second quarters of
2000, as computed below:
There being no motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner,

the above mentioned decision became final and executory and a
corresponding Entry of Judgment was issued on October 10, 2009.
Thus, on February 16, 2010, the Court is-
_______________
11 Id., at p. 1067.
12 Rollo, pp. 134-148. Penned by Associate Justice Caesar A. Casanova, with Associate Justice Lovell
R. Bautista, concurring, and Presiding Justice Ernesto D. Acosta, dissenting.
13 Id., at p. 147.
201
VOL. 794, JUNE 21, 2016 201
sued a Writ of Execution,14 the pertinent portion of which reads
as follows:
You are hereby ORDERED to REFUND in favor of the

petitioner KEPCO ILIJAN CORPORATION, the amount of
P443,447,184.50 representing unutilized input VAT paid on
its domestic purchases and importation of capital goods for
the first and second quarters of 2000, pursuant to the
Decision of this Court, promulgated on September 11, 2009,
which has become final and executory on October 10, 2009, by
virtue of the Entry of Judgment issued on said date.
The Sheriff of this Court is hereby directed to see to it that
this Writ is carried out by the Respondent and/or his agents,
and shall make the corresponding return/report thereon
within thirty (30) days after receipt of the Writ.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner alleges that she learned only of the Decision and the
subsequent issuance of the writ of March 7, 2011 when the Office
of the Deputy Commissioner for Legal and Inspection Group
received a Memorandum from the Appellate Division of the
National Office recommending the issuance of a Tax Credit
Certificate in favor of the respondent in the amount of
P443,447,184.50.
Accordingly, on April 11, 2011 petitioner filed a petition for
annulment of judgment with the CTA En Banc, praying for the
following reliefs: (1) that the Decision dated September 11, 2009 of
the CTA First Division in CTA Case No. 6412 be annulled and set
aside; (2) that the Entry of Judgment on October 10, 2009 and Writ
of Execution on February 16, 2010 be nullified; and (3) that the
CTA First Division be directed to reopen CTA Case No. 6412 to
allow petitioner to submit her memoranda setting forth her
substantial legal defenses.
_______________
14 Id., at p. 151.
202
In opposition, respondent filed its Motion to Deny Due Course
(To The Petition for Annulment of Judgment), arguing, among
others, that petitioner is not lawfully entitled to the annulment of
judgment on the ground that the CTA En Banc is bereft of
jurisdiction to entertain annulment of judgments on the premise
that the Rules of Court, Republic Act (RA) No. 9282,15 and the
Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals do not expressly provide
a remedy on annulment of judgments.
On July 27, 2011, the CTA En Banc issued a
Resolution16 dismissing the petition. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the same was denied in a Resolution17 dated
November 15, 2011.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner raises the following arguments to support her
petition:
I
THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS (EN BANC) HAS
JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE
PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT.
II
THE NEGLIGENCE COMMITTED BY PETITIONER’S
COUNSEL IS GROSS, PALPABLE AND CONSTITUTES
TOTAL ABANDONMENT OF PETITIONER’S CAUSE
WHICH IS TANTAMOUNT TO EXTRINSIC FRAUD.
_______________
15 An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), Elevating its Rank to the
Level of a Collegiate Court with Special Jurisdiction and Enlarging its Membership, Amending for the
Purpose Certain Sections of Republic Act No. 1125, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Law Creating
the Court of Tax Appeals, and Other Purposes.
16 Rollo, pp. 9-20.
17 Id., at pp. 29-32.
203
VOL. 794, JUNE 21, 2016 203
III
THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS (FIRST DIVISION) HAS
NO JURISDICTION OVER THE ORIGINAL PETITION
FILED BY RESPONDENT.
IV
PETITIONER IS NOT BARRED BY LACHES FROM
ASSAILING THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF TAX
APPEALS (FIRST DIVISION) OVER THE PETITION
FILED BY RESPONDENT.18
Prefatorily, we first pass upon the issue of whether the CTA En

Banc has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for
annulment of judgment filed by petitioner.
Annulment of judgment, as provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Court, is based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. It is a recourse that presupposes the filing of a
separate and original action for the purpose of annulling or
avoiding a decision in another case. Annulment is a remedy in law
independent of the case where the judgment sought to be annulled
is rendered.19 It is unlike a motion for reconsideration, appeal or
even a petition for relief from judgment, because annulment is not
a continuation or progression of the same case, as in fact the case it
seeks to annul is already final and executory. Rather, it is an
extraordinary remedy that is equitable in character and is
permitted only in exceptional cases.20
Annulment of judgment involves the exercise of original
jurisdiction, as expressly conferred on the Court of Appeals
by Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP Blg.) 129, Section 9(2). It also
implies power by a superior court over a subordinate one, as
_______________
18 Id., at p. 44.
19 Macalalag v. Ombudsman, 468 Phil. 918, 923; 424 SCRA 741, 745 (2004).
20 Nudo v. Caguioa, 612 Phil. 517, 522; 595 SCRA 208, 212 (2009).
204
provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, wherein the
appellate court may annul a decision of the regional trial court, or
the latter court may annul a decision of the municipal or
metropolitan trial court.
But the law and the rules are silent when it comes to a situation
similar to the case at bar, in which a court, in this case the Court of
Tax Appeals, is called upon to annul its own judgment. More
specifically, in the case at bar, the CTA sitting En Banc is being
asked to annul a decision of one of its divisions. However, the laws
creating the CTA and expanding its jurisdiction (RA Nos. 1125 and
9282) and the court’s own rules of procedure (the Revised Rules of
the CTA) do not provide for such a scenario.
It is the same situation among other collegial courts. To
illustrate, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals may sit and
adjudicate cases in divisions consisting of only a number of
members, and such adjudication is already regarded as the
decision of the Court itself.21 It is provided for in the Constitution,
Article VIII, Section 4(1) and BP Blg. 129, Section 4, respectively.
The divisions are not considered separate and distinct courts but
are divisions of one and the same court; there is no hierarchy of
courts within the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, for
they each remain as one court notwithstanding that they also work
in divisions.22 The Supreme Court sitting En Banc is not an
appellate court vis-à-vis its divisions, and it exercises no appellate
jurisdiction over the latter.23 As for the Court of Appeals En Banc,
it sits as such
_______________
21 See Land Bank of the Philippines v. Suntay, 678 Phil. 879, 912; 662 SCRA 614, 645-646 (2011).
22 Id.
23 The command in Firestone Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, Dissenting Opinion of then Associate
Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, 389 Phil. 810, 822; 334 SCRA 465, 478 (2000) that “no doctrine or
principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered En Banc or in division may be modified or
reversed except by the court sitting En Banc” (Constitution, Art. VIII, Section 4[3]) does
205
VOL. 794, JUNE 21, 2016 205
only for the purpose of exercising administrative, ceremonial, or
other non-adjudicator/functions.24
Thus, it appears contrary to these features that a collegial court,
sitting En Banc, may be called upon to annul a decision of one of
its divisions which had become final and executory, for it is
tantamount to allowing a court to annul its own judgment and
acknowledging that a hierarchy exists within such court. In the
process, it also betrays the principle that judgments must, at some
point, attain finality. A court that can revisit its own final
judgments leaves the door open to possible endless reversals or
modifications which is anathema to a stable legal system.
Thus, the Revised Rules of the CTA and even the Rules of Court
which apply suppletorily thereto provide for no instance in which
the En Banc may reverse, annul or void a final decision of a
division. Verily, the Revised Rules of the CTA provide for no
instance of an annulment of judgment at all. On the other hand,
the Rules of Court, through Rule 47, provides, with certain
conditions, for annulment of judgment done by a superior court,
like the Court of Appeals, against the final judgment, decision or
ruling of an inferior court, which is the Regional Trial Court, based
on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. The
Regional Trial Court, in turn, also is empowered to, upon a similar
action, annul a judgment or ruling of the Metropolitan or
Municipal Trial Courts within its territorial jurisdiction. But,
again, the said Rules are silent as to whether a collegial court
sitting En Banc may annul a final judgment of its own division.
_______________
not refer to the modification or reversal of a ruling in a specific case, but to a doctrine or legal principle
which reversal, in any case, applies only prospectively or to future cases. As stated in Benzonan v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. Nos. 97973 & 97998, January 27, 1992, 205 SCRA 515; Heirs of Wilson P. Gamboa v. Teves,
696 Phil. 276; 682 SCRA 397 (2012); Velasco, Jr., J., dissenting.
24 B.P. Blg. 129, Sec. 4.
206
As earlier explained, the silence of the Rules may be attributed
to the need to preserve the principles that there can be no
hierarchy within a collegial court between its divisions and the En
Banc, and that a court’s judgment, once final, is immutable.
A direct petition for annulment of a judgment of the CTA to the
Supreme Court, meanwhile, is likewise unavailing, for the same
reason that there is no identical remedy with the High Court to
annul a final and executory judgment of the Court of Appeals. RA
No. 9282, Section 1 puts the CTA on the same level as the Court of
Appeals, so that if the latter’s final judgments may not be annulled
before the Supreme Court, then the CTA’s own decisions similarly
may not be so annulled. And more importantly, it has been
previously discussed that annulment of judgment is an original
action, yet, it is not among the cases enumerated in the
Constitution’s Article VIII, Section 5 over which the Supreme
Court exercises original jurisdiction. Annulment of judgment also
often requires an adjudication of facts, a task that the Court
loathes to perform, as it is not a trier of facts.25
Nevertheless, there will be extraordinary cases, when the
interest of justice highly demands it, where final judgments of the
Court of Appeals, the CTA or any other inferior court may still be
vacated or subjected to the Supreme Court’s modification, reversal,
annulment or declaration as void. But it will be accomplished not
through the same species of original action or petition for
annulment as that found in Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, but
through any of the actions over which the Supreme Court has
original jurisdiction as specified in the Constitution, like 65 of the
Rules of Court.
Hence, the next query is: Did the CTA En Banc correctly deny
the petition for annulment of judgment filed by petitioner?
_______________
25 INC Shipmanagement, Inc. v. Moradas, 724 Phil. 374; 713 SCRA 475 (2014).
207
VOL. 794, JUNE 21, 2016 207
As earlier discussed, the petition designated as one for
annulment of judgment (following Rule 47) was legally and
procedurally infirm and, thus, was soundly dismissed by the
CTA En Banc on such ground. Also, the CTA could not have
treated the petition as an appeal or a continuation of the case
before the CTA First Division because the latter’s decision had
become final and executory and, thus, no longer subject to an
appeal.
Instead, what remained as a remedy for the petitioner was to file
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, which could have been filed
as an original action before this Court and not before the CTA En
Banc. Certiorari is available when there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
such as in the case at bar. Since the petition below invoked the
gross and palpable negligence of petitioner’s counsel which is
allegedly tantamount to its being deprived of due process and its
day in court as party-litigant26 and as it also invokes lack of
jurisdiction of the CTA First Division to entertain the petition filed
by private respondent since the same allegedly fails to comply with
the reglementary periods for judicial remedies involving
administrative claims for refund of excess unutilized input VAT
under the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC),27 which periods
it claims to be jurisdictional, then the proper remedy that
petitioner should have availed of was indeed a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65, an original or independent action
premised on the public respondent having acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. However, since a certiorari petition
is not a continuation of the appellate process borne out of the
original case but is a separate action focused on actions that are in
excess or wanting of jurisdic-
_______________
26 Rollo, pp. 55-71.

27 Id., at pp. 71-76.
208
tion,28 then it cannot be filed in the same tribunal whose actions
are being assailed but is instead cognizable by a higher tribunal
which, in the case of the CTA, is this Court.29 In the case involving
petitioner, the petition could have been filed directly with this
Court, even without any need to file a motion for reconsideration
with the CTA division or En Banc, as the case appears to fall under
one of the recognized exceptions to the rule requiring such a
motion as a prerequisite to filing such petition.30
_______________
28 City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo, G.R. No. 175723, February 4, 2014, 715

SCRA 182.
29 RA No. 1125, as amended by RA No. 9282, Sec. 19.
30 The exceptions to the rule of filing such a motion prior to a resort to a petition
for certiorari are:
a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction;
b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised
and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed
upon in the lower court;
c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question
and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or
of the petitioner or the subject matter of the petition is perishable;
d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be
useless;
e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme
urgency for relief;
f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the
granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due
process;
h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and
i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.
(Rapid Manpower Consultants, Inc. v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 187418, September 28,
2015, 771 SCRA 475)
209
VOL. 794, JUNE 21, 2016 209
The office of a certiorari petition is detailed in the Rules of Court,
thus:
1. SectionPetition for certiorari.—When any tribunal,

board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting
such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy
of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of
all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto,
and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided
in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46. (1a)
The writ of certiorari is an “extraordinary remedy” that is

justified in the “absence of an appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.”31 It may be given
due course as long as petitioners allege that they had no appeal or
any other efficacious remedy against the appellate court’s
decision.32
Direct resort to this Court via a certiorari petition on the same
grounds as in this case has jurisprudential precedents. In one, We
held that when the appellate court’s decision is void for lack of due
process, the filing of a petition for certiorari with this court without
a motion for reconsideration is justified.33 This Court also has held
that a petition for certio-
_______________
31 Davao Merchant Marine Academy v. Court of Appeals (Fifth Division), 521 Phil. 524, 530; 487
SCRA 396, 402 (2006).
32 Id.
33 People v. Duca, 618 Phil. 154, 169; 603 SCRA 159, 172 (2009).
210
rari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is available when the
proceedings in question amount to depriving the petitioner his day
in court.34 It is true that certiorari is not a substitute for appeal,
but exempt from this rule is a case when the trial court’s decision
or resolution was issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion.35When a fraudulent scheme prevents a party from
having his day in court or from presenting his case, the
fraud is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the
court.36 A question as to lack of jurisdiction of the respondent
tribunal or agency is properly the office of a petition for certiorari.
In any event, petitioner’s failure to avail of this remedy and
mistaken filing of the wrong action are fatal to its case and renders
and leaves the CTA First Division’s decision as indeed final and
executory. By the time the instant petition for review was filed by
petitioner with this Court on December 9, 2011, more than sixty
(60) days have passed since petitioner’s alleged discovery (on
March 7, 2011) of its loss in the case as brought about by the
alleged negligence or fraud of its counsel.
Thus, the current discussion serves no further purpose other
than as merely a future guide to the bench and the bar when
confronted with a similar situation.
Although in select cases, this Court has asseverated that “it is
always within its power to suspend its own rules or to except a
particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice
require it” and that the Rules of Court were conceived and
promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice
but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise,
courts will be mere slaves to
_______________
34 See Rural Bank of Calinog (Iloilo), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 501 Phil. 387, 396; 463 SCRA 79, 89
(2005).
35 Id.
36 See Encinares v. Achero, 613 Phil. 391, 404; 597 SCRA 34, 45 (2009), quoting Republic v. Guerrero,
520 Phil. 296, 309; 485 SCRA 424, 437 (2006).
211
VOL. 794, JUNE 21, 2016 211
or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. 37We have
also equally stressed that strict compliance with the rules of
procedure is essential to the administration of justice.38
In this case, even if there was allegedly a deliberate effort from
petitioner’s counsel to refuse to participate, despite notice, in the
conduct of the case after the filing of the Answer right up to the
issuance of the Writ of Execution against petitioner,39 equally
apparent is the failure of petitioner and/or petitioner’s responsible
subordinates to supervise the said counsel as well as the conduct
and progress of the case. Not only was there an apparent
negligence of counsel,40 which binds the client, there likewise
appears to have been lapses on the part of the client — the
petitioner and the petitioner’s responsible subordinates —
themselves. Equally oft-repeated is the rule that service made
upon the present counsel of record at his given address is service to
the client.41 Thus, it is harder to justify a relaxation of the rules
when the litigant itself suffers from inexcusable neglect. It is an
oft-repeated pronouncement that clients should take the initiative
of periodically checking the progress of their cases, so that they
could take timely steps to protect their interest.42Failing such,
clients are left with more recourse against the consequence of their
and their counsel’s omissions.
To prevent similar disadvantageous incidents against the
government in the future, the BIR
is DIRECTED to ADOPT mechanisms, procedures, or measures
that can effectively
_______________
37 Ginete v. Court of Appeals, 357 Phil. 36, 52; 296 SCRA 38, 52 (1998), citing C. Viuda de Ordoveza v.
Raymundo, 63 Phil. 275 (1936).
38 Tan v. Planters Products, Inc., 573 Phil. 416, 428; 550 SCRA 287, 300 (2008).
39 Rollo, pp. 40-42.
40 Macondray & Co., Inc. v. Provident Insurance Corporation, 487 Phil. 158, 168; 445 SCRA 644, 654
(2004).
41 Id.
42 Id.
212
monitor the progress of cases being handled by its counsels.
Likewise, the Ombudsman is DIRECTED to CONDUCT an in-
depth investigation to determine who were responsible for the
apparent mishandling of the present case that resulted in the loss
of almost half-a-billion pesos, which the government could have
used to finance its much needed infrastructure, livelihood projects,
and other equally important projects.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is
hereby DENIED. The assailed Resolutions dated July 27, 2011
and November 15, 2011 of the Court of Tax Appeals En
Banc are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ.), Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion,
Bersamin, Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe,
Leonen and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Del Castillo, J., On Official Leave.
Jardeleza, J., No part.
Petition denied, resolutions affirmed.
Notes.—The remedy of petition for annulment of judgment,
although seen as “a last remedy,” is not an alternative to the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal and petition for relief.
(Pinausukan Seafood House, Roxas Boulevard, Inc. vs. Far East
Bank & Trust Company, now Bank of the Philippine Islands, 714
SCRA 226 [2014])
On March 30, 2004, the Legislature passed into law Republic Act
No. 9282 amending RA 1125 by expanding the jurisdiction of the
Court of Tax Appeals, enlarging its membership and elevating its
rank to the level of a collegiate court with special jurisdiction. (City
of Manila vs. Grecia-Cuerdo, 715 SCRA 182 [2014])
——o0o——
August 28, 2013. G.R. No. 172293.*
ARACELI J. CABRERA and ARNEL CABRERA and in behalf of
the heirs of SEVERINO CABRERA, petitioners, vs. ANGELA G.
FRANCISCO, FELIPE C. GELLA, VICTOR C. GELLA, ELENA
LEILANI G. REYES, MA. RIZALINA G. ILIGAN and DIANA
ROSE GELLA, respondents.
Remedial Law; Courts; It is the Court’s bounden duty to assess independently the merits
of a motion.―It cannot be gainsaid that “[i]t is the [C]ourt’s bounden duty to assess
independently the merits of a motion x x x.” In this case, the RTC complied with this duty
by making its own independent assessment of the merits of respondents’ Motion to Dismiss.
A reading of the RTC’s Order will show that in resolving said motion, it judiciously
examined the Complaint and the documents attached thereto as well as the other pleadings
filed in connection with the said motion. Based on these, it made an extensive discussion of
its observations and conclusions.
Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the nature of the
action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the Complaint.―To ascertain the
correctness of petitioner’s contention, the averments in the Complaint and the character of
the relief sought in the said Complaint must be consulted. This is because the jurisdiction
of the court is determined by the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the
allegations in the Complaint.
Same; Same; Same; In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which
is not capable of pecuniary estimation the Supreme Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought.―The Court in Ungria v.
Court of Appeals, 654 SCRA 314 (2011), restated the criterion laid down in Singson v.
Isabela Sawmill, 88 SCRA 623 (1979), to ascertain if an action is capable or not of
pecuniary estimation, viz.: In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of
which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
104

04
Cabrera vs. Francisco
criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it
is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the [C]ourts of [F]irst
[I]nstance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is
something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered
such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of
money, and are cognizable exclusively by [C]ourts of [F]irst [I]nstance (now Regional Trial
Courts).
Same; Civil Procedure; Actions; Real Actions; Under Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of
Court, a real action is an action affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest
therein. These include partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real
property.―Clearly, the allegations in their Complaint failed to sufficiently show that they
have interest of whatever kind over the properties of respondents. Given these, petitioners’
claim that their action involves interest over a real property is unavailing. Thus, the Court
quotes with approval the CA’s ratiocination with respect to the same: As to their weak
claim of interest over the property, it is apparent that their only interest is to be
compensated for their long-term administration of the properties. They do not claim an
interest in the properties themselves but merely payment for their services, such payment
they compute to be equivalent to five (5%) percent of the value of the properties. Under
Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is an action affecting title to or
possession of real property, or interest therein. These include partition or condemnation of,
or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property. Plaintiffs-appellants’ interest is obviously not
the one contemplated under the rules on jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Courts; Regional Trial Courts; Jurisdiction; This jurisdictional amount of
exceeding P100,000.00 for Regional Trial Courts (RTC’s) outside of Metro Manila was
adjusted to P200,000.00 effective March 20, 1999 in pursuance to Section 5 of RA 7691.―To
determine whether the RTC in this case has jurisdiction over petitioners’ Complaint,
respondents correctly argued that the same be considered vis-à-vis Section 19(8) of BP 129,
which provides: SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases.—Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction: x x x x (8) In all other cases in which
105
VOL. 704, AUGUST 28, 2013 105

the demand, exclusive of interests, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees,
litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property exceeds One hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of
the abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00). This
jurisdictional amount of exceeding P100,000.00 for RTC’s outside of Metro Manila was
adjusted to P200,000.00 effective March 20, 1999 in pursuance to Section 5 of RA 7691
which further provides: SEC. 5. After five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the
jurisdictional amounts mentioned in Sec. 19(3), (4), and (8); and Sec. 33(1) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129as amended by this Act, shall be adjusted to Two hundred thousand
pesos (P200,000.00). Five (5) years thereafter, such jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted
further to Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00): Provided, however, That in the
case of Metro Manila, the abovementioned jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted after
five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00).
Hence, when petitioners filed their Complaint on September 3, 2001, the said increased
jurisdictional amount was already effective. The demand in their Complaint must therefore
exceed P200,000.00 in order for it to fall under the jurisdiction of the RTC.

Mariano R. Pefianco for petitioners.
Balane Tamase Alampay Law Office for respondents.
DEL CASTILLO,J.:
“The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has
jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations
contained in the [C]omplaint of the plaintiff[s] x x x. The
averments in the [C]omplaint and the character of the relief sought
are the ones to be consulted. x x x”1
_______________
1 Padlan v. Dinglasan, G.R. No. 180321, March 20, 2013, 694 SCRA 91.
106
This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 assails the July 6, 2005
Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 75126
which dismissed the appeal filed by petitioners Araceli J. Cabrera
(Araceli) and Arnel Cabrera (Arnel), in their own behalf and in
behalf of the heirs of Severino Cabrera (petitioners), and affirmed
the Order4dated May 2, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 12, San Jose, Antique in Civil Case No. 2001-9-3267. The
said RTC Order granted the Motion to Dismiss5of respondents
Angela G. Francisco, Felipe C. Gella, Victor C. Gella, Elena Leilani
G. Reyes, Ma. Rizalina G. Iligan and Diana Rose Gella
(respondents) and dismissed petitioners’ Complaint6 denominated
as Collection of Agents’ Compensation, Commission and Damages.
Likewise assailed is the CA Resolution7 dated April 5, 2006 which
denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.8
Factual Antecedents
On October 25, 1976, respondents’ father, Atty. Lorenzo C. Gella
(Atty. Gella), executed a private document confirming that he has
appointed Severino Cabrera (Severino), husband of Araceli and
father of Arnel as administrator of all his real properties located in
San Jose, Antique9 consisting of about 24
_______________
2 Rollo, pp. 8-20.
3 CA Rollo, pp. 102-109; penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican and concurred in by Associate
Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Enrico A. Lanzanas.
4 Records, pp. 42-47; penned by Judge Rudy P. Castrojas.
5 Id., at pp. 14-21.
6 Id., at pp. 1-5.
7 CA Rollo, pp. 124-125; penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican and concurred in by Associate
Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Enrico A. Lanzanas.
8 Id., at pp. 112-114.
9 Records, p. 6.
107
VOL. 704, AUGUST 28, 2013 107
hectares of land described as Lot No. 1782-B and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-16987.10
When Severino died in 1991, Araceli and Arnel, with the consent
of respondents, took over the administration of the properties.
Respondents likewise instructed them to look for buyers of the
properties, allegedly promising them “a commission of five percent
of the total purchase price of the said properties as compensation
for their long and continued administration”11 thereof.
Accordingly, petitioners introduced real estate broker and
President of ESV Marketing and Development Corporation,
Erlinda Veñegas (Erlinda), to the respondents who agreed to have
the said properties developed by Erlinda’s company. However, a
conflict arose when respondents appointed Erlinda as the new
administratrix of the properties and terminated Araceli’s and
Arnel’s services.
Petitioners, through counsel, wrote respondents and demanded
for their five percent commission and compensation to no avail.
Hence, on September 3, 2001, they filed a Complaint for Collection
of Agent’s Compensation, Commission and Damages12 against
respondents before the RTC. Attached to their Complaint is a copy
of the tax declaration for Lot No. 1782-B.13
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
Petitioners prayed that they be paid (1) commission and
compensation in the form of real property equivalent to five
percent of the 24-hectare Lot No. 1782-B, (2) moral damages of
P100,000.00, and (3) attorney’s fees and litigation expenses of
P100,000.00.
_______________
10 Id., at p. 7.
11 Id., at p. 3.
12 Id., at pp. 1-5.
13 Id., at p. 8.
108
Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss14 based on the following
grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction, (2) failure to state a cause of
action, and (3) lack of legal capacity of Araceli and Arnel to sue in
behalf of the other heirs of Severino.
Respondents argued that for RTCs outside of Metro Manila to
take cognizance of a civil suit, the jurisdictional amount must
exceed P200,000.00 pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act (RA) No.
7691 which amended Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129.
And since the total market value of Lot No. 1782-B is
P3,550,072,15 five percent thereof is only P177,506.60 or less than
the said jurisdictional amount, then the RTC has no jurisdiction
over petitioners’ Complaint. Respondents also posited that the
Complaint states no cause of action since petitioners’ supposed
right to any commission remained inchoate as Lot No. 1782-B has
not yet been sold; in fact, the Complaint merely alleged that
petitioners introduced a real estate broker to respondents. Lastly,
respondents averred that petitioners have no legal capacity to sue
on behalf of Severino’s other heirs and that the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping attached to the Complaint only
mentioned Araceli and Arnel as plaintiffs.
Finding respondents’ arguments to be well-taken, the RTC, in an
Order16 dated May 2, 2002 ruled:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the [respondents’] Motion to Dismiss is
granted. Consequently, this case is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against the
[petitioners].
SO ORDERED.17
Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal,18 hence, the elevation of the

records of the case to the CA.
_______________
14 Id., at pp. 14-21.
15 Id., at p. 5.
16 Id., at pp. 42-47.
17 Id., at p. 47.
109
VOL. 704, AUGUST 28, 2013 109
Petitioners averred that their claim is one which is incapable of
pecuniary estimation or one involving interest in real property the
assessed value of which exceeds P200,000.00. Hence, it falls under
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC. Moreover, they
asserted that they are not only claiming for commission but also
for compensation for the services rendered by Severino as well as
by Araceli and Arnel for the administration of respondents’
properties. Citing Section 3, Rule 319 of the Rules of Court,
petitioners justified the inclusion of Severino’s other heirs as
plaintiffs in the Complaint.
In the Decision20 dated July 6, 2005, the CA concluded that the
Complaint is mainly for collection of sum of money and not one
which is incapable of pecuniary estimation since petitioners are
claiming five percent of the total purchase price of Lot No. 1782-B.
Neither does it involve an interest over a property since petitioners
are merely claiming payment for their services. The appellate court
also ruled that the Complaint did not state a cause of action since
it failed to show the existence of petitioners’ right that was
allegedly violated by respondents. Moreover, it found no evidence
of Araceli’s and Arnel’s authority to file the Complaint for and in
behalf of Severino’s other heirs. In sum, the CA found no error on
the
_______________
18 Id., at p. 48.
19 3. SEC.Representatives as parties.—Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by
a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of
the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an
express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An
agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without
joining the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal.
20 CA Rollo, pp. 102-109.
110
part of the RTC in granting respondents’ Motion to Dismiss. Thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered
by us DISMISSING the appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the [Order]
rendered by [the] lower court in Civil Case No. 2001-9-3267 with double costs
against [petitioners].
SO ORDERED.21
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration22questioning solely

the CA’s affirmance of the RTC’s finding on lack of jurisdiction.
This was, however, also denied in a Resolution23 dated April 5,
2006.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Issues
Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s findings that it has
no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case; that the
Complaint states no cause of action; and that petitioners Araceli
and Arnel have no legal capacity to sue in behalf of the other heirs
of Severino.
The Parties’ Arguments
At the outset, petitioners claim that the RTC did not make its
own independent assessment of the merits of respondents’ Motion
to Dismiss but only blindly adopted the arguments raised therein.
This, to them, violates the Court’s pronouncement in Atty. Osumo
v. Judge Serrano24enjoining judges to be faithful to the law and to
maintain professional competence.
_______________
21 Id., at p. 109.
22 Id., at pp. 112-114.
23 Id., at pp. 124-125.
24 429 Phil. 626, 633; 380 SCRA 110, 114 (2002).
111
VOL. 704, AUGUST 28, 2013 111
As to the substantial issues, petitioners reiterate the arguments
they raised before the CA. They insist that their Complaint is one
which is incapable of pecuniary estimation or involves interest in
real property the assessed value of which exceeds P200,000.00 and
falls within the RTC’s jurisdiction. At any rate, they emphasize
that they likewise seek to recover damages, the amount of which
should have been considered by the RTC in determining
jurisdiction. Moreover, they have a cause of action against the
respondents because an agency under the Civil Code is presumed
to be for a compensation.25 And what they are claiming in their
Complaint is such compensation for the services rendered not only
by Severino but also by Araceli and Arnel as administrators/agents
of respondents’ properties. Lastly, they allege that pursuant to
Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the joining of Severino’s
other heirs as plaintiffs in the Complaint, is proper.
On the other hand, respondents assert that petitioners’
Complaint, as correctly found by the CA, is for a specific sum of
money seeking to recover the amount of P177,503.60,26 which is
below the jurisdictional amount for RTCs outside of Metro Manila.
As to petitioners’ claim for damages, the same is only incidental to
the principal claim for agent’s compensation and therefore should
not be included in computing the total amount of the claim for
purposes of determining jurisdiction. Respondents likewise point
out that the CA’s affirmance of the RTC’s findings that the
Complaint states no cause of action and that Araceli and Arnel
have no capacity to sue in behalf of the other heirs can no longer be
questioned before this Court as they are already final and
executory since petitioners failed to assail them in their Motion for
Reconsideration with the CA. Be that as it may, no error can be im-
_______________
25 Article 1875 of the Civil Code provides: “Agency is presumed to be for a compensation, unless there
is proof to the contrary.”
26 Rollo, p. 62.
112
puted to the CA for affirming the said findings as they are in
accordance with law.
Our Ruling
The Petition lacks merit.
Contrary to petitioners’ claim, the RTC
made an independent assessment of
the merits of respondents’ Motion to
Dismiss.
It cannot be gainsaid that “[i]t is the [C]ourt’s bounden duty to
assess independently the merits of a motion x x x.”27 In this case,
the RTC complied with this duty by making its own independent
assessment of the merits of respondents’ Motion to Dismiss. A
reading of the RTC’s Order will show that in resolving said motion,
it judiciously examined the Complaint and the documents attached
thereto as well as the other pleadings filed in connection with the
said motion.28 Based on these, it made an extensive discussion of its
observations and conclusions. This is apparent from the following
portions of the said Order, to wit:
x x x In the instant case, the plaintiffs’ complaint does not even mention specifically
the amount of their demand outside of their claim for damages and attorney’s fees.
They are only demanding the payment of their alleged commission/compensation
and that of the late Severino Cabrera which they fixed at 5% of Lot No. 1782-B
allegedly with an area of 24 hectares. They did not also state
_______________
27 Cerezo v. People, G.R. No. 185230, June 1, 2011, 650 SCRA 222, 229.
28 Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, records, pp. 23-24; Reply (To Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion to Dismiss
dated 02 January 2002), id., at pp. 27-29; Rejoinder, id., at pp. 32-33; Sur-Rejoinder (Re: Motion to Dismiss
dated 11 December 2001), id., at pp. 34-36.
113
VOL. 704, AUGUST 28, 2013 113

the total monetary value of Lot 1782-B neither did they mention the monetary
equivalent of 5% of Lot No. 1782-B. In short, the complaint fails to establish that
this Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim.
As the tax declaration covering Lot No. 1782-B has been attached to the
complaint as Annex “C” and made an integral part thereof, the court, in its desire to
determine whether it has jurisdiction over the subject matter of plaintiff’s claim
computed the total market value of Lot No. 1782-B, including the value of the trees
and the plants standing thereon, as appearing in said Annex “C”. The computation
shows the amount of P3,508,370.00. Five percent thereof is P175,418.50. It is way
below the jurisdictional amount for the Regional Trial Court outside Metro Manila
which is pegged at more than P200,000. Clearly, therefore, this [C]ourt has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the plaintiff’s complaint as correctly
contended by the defendants.29
xxxx
A careful scrutiny of the complaint in this case reveals that it is bereft of any
allegation that Lot No. 1782-B or any portion thereof has already been sold thru the
plaintiffs’ efforts prior to the alleged dismissal as agents or brokers of the
defendants. As they failed to sell Lot No. 1782-B or any portion thereof, then they
are not entitled to any commission, assuming in gratia argumenti that they were
promised 5% commission by defendants should they be able to sell Lot No. 1782-B or
any part or parcel of the said lot.
Besides, the court notices that the appointment of the plaintiffs’ father (Annex
“A”-Complaint) does not state in any manner that he is entitled to a compensation
or commission when it is supposed to be the repository of what had been agreed
upon between him and Atty. Lorenzo C. Gella, relative [to] his designation as
administrator of Atty. Gella. As such, the plaintiffs cannot
_______________
29 Id., at p. 45.
114

claim now that Severino Cabrera is entitled to any compensation or commission as
Annex “A” does not so provide.30
xxxx
An examination of the records of this case reveals that there is nothing in
plaintiffs’ complaint showing that they were empowered by the other heirs of the
late Severino Cabrera to take this action on their behalf. x x x31
Clearly, petitioners’ claim that the RTC merely adopted the

arguments of respondents in their Motion to Dismiss when it
resolved the same is belied by the above-quoted disquisition of the
RTC on the matter and therefore deserves no credence.
Petitioners’ Complaint is neither one
which is incapable of pecuniary
estimation nor involves interest in a
real property.
Section 19(1) and (2) of BP 12932 as amended by RA 769133 read:
19. SEC. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases.—Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable
of pecuniary estimation;
_______________
30 Id., at p. 46.
31 Id.
32 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980.
33 AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS,
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, AMENDING FOR
THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 129.
115
VOL. 704, AUGUST 28, 2013 115

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the
property involved exceeds twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for
civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over
which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
xxxx
Insisting that the RTC has jurisdiction over their Complaint,

petitioners contend that the same is one which is incapable of
pecuniary estimation or involves interest in a real property the
assessed value of which exceeds P200,000.00.
The Court does not agree. To ascertain the correctness of
petitioner’s contention, the averments in the Complaint and the
character of the relief sought in the said Complaint must be
consulted.34 This is because the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from
the allegations in the Complaint.35 Hence, the pertinent portions of
petitioners’ Complaint are hereunder reproduced:
xxxx
That on October 25, 1976 the defendants’ father the late Atty. Lorenzo
Gella, x x x designated x x x Severino Cabrera as agent or [administrator of
all his real properties located in San Jose, Antique] x x x. 2.
That said Severino Cabrera immediately assumed his duties and
responsibilities faithfully as agent or administrator until his death in 1991 of
the properties of Lorenzo Gella in San Jose, Antique consisting of about 3.
_______________
34 Padlan v. Dinglasan, supra note 1.
35 Id.
116

24 hectares x x x [which later] became Lot No. 1782-B in the name
of the defendants, covered by T.C.T. No. T-16987, Register of Deeds
of Antique x x x.
That after the death of said Severino Cabrera in 1991, with the consent of
the defendants, his wife took over his duties and responsibilities as agent or
administratrix of the above-named properties of the defendants in San Jose,
Antique with the help of her son, Arnel Cabrera as ‘encargado’ and the
plaintiffs were also instructed by the defendants to look for buyers of their
properties and plaintiffs were promised by defendants 4. a commission of
five percent of the total purchase price of the said properties as
compensation for their long and continued administration of all the
said properties.
That sometime in 1994 plaintiffs approached the real estate broker
Erlinda Veñegas to sell the above-described Lot No. 1782-B and the plaintiffs
gave her the addresses of the defendants who at all times live in Metro
Manila[. T]hereafter defendants agreed to have the said property developed
by ESV Marketing 5. & Development Corporation represented by its
President, said Erlinda Veñegas and defendants also designated said Erlinda
Veñegas as administratrix of said property and at the same time defendants
dismissed plaintiffs as agents or administrators thereof;
That on August 1, 2001 plaintiffs, through counsel wrote defendants
6. demanding payment of their five percent of twenty four hectares
properties under their administration for twenty five years in [the] form [of]
real estate in [the] subdivision of Lot 1782-B as their compensation or
commission, but defendants refused and failed to pay plaintiffs in cash or
in kind of what is due them;
That in view of the aforesaid failure and refusal of defendants to pay their
compensation or commission and instead they were dismissed and replaced
by the said Erlinda Veñegas they themselves recommended to defendants,
the plaintiffs have suffered public humiliation, mental anguish, and serious
anxiety for which plaintiffs 7.
117
VOL. 704, AUGUST 28, 2013 117

should be adjudged and entitled to moral damages in the sum of
not less than Php100,000.00 each.
That defendants’ ingratitude and unjustified refusal to pay plaintiffs x x x
their compensation or commission for twenty five years service as
administrators and had successfully found [a] developer of defendants’
property but only to be dismissed, plaintiffs were compelled to institute this
action and incur expenses as well as attorney’s fees in the sum of
Php100,000.00. 8.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after due hearing, judgment
be rendered against defendants jointly and severally in favor of the plaintiffs,
as follows:
a. To pay plaintiffs their compensation or commissionin [the] form
of real estate from Lot No. 1782-B subdivision equivalent to five percent of
twenty four hectares properties under their administration;
To pay plaintiffs moral damages in the amount of not less than
Php100,000.00 each; b.
Attorney’s fee and litigation expenses in the amount of not less than
Php100,000.00 each and pay the costs of suit c.
x x x x36 (Italics and Emphases supplied)
The Court in Ungria v. Court of Appeals37 restated the criterion

laid down in Singson v. Isabela Sawmill38 to ascertain if an action
is capable or not of pecuniary estimation, viz.:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not
capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it
_______________
36 Records, pp. 2-4.
37 G.R. No. 165777, July 25, 2011, 654 SCRA 314, 324-325.
38 177 Phil. 575, 588-589; 88 SCRA 623, 637-638 (1979).
118

is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the
[C]ourts of [F]irst [I]nstance would depend on the amount of the claim. However,
where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money,
where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal
relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of
the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable
exclusively by [C]ourts of [F]irst [I]nstance (now Regional Trial Courts).
It can be readily seen from the allegations in the Complaint that

petitioners’ main purpose in filing the same is to collect the
commission allegedly promised them by respondents should they
be able to sell Lot No. 1782-B, as well as the compensation for the
services rendered by Severino, Araceli and Arnel for the
administration of respondents’ properties. Captioned as a
Complaint for Collection of Agent’s Compensation, Commission
and Damages, it is principally for the collection of a sum of money
representing such compensation and commission. Indeed, the
payment of such money claim is the principal relief sought and not
merely incidental to, or a consequence of another action where the
subject of litigation may not be estimated in terms of money. In
fact, petitioners in this case estimated their claim to be equivalent
to five percent of the purchase price of Lot No. 1782-B. Therefore,
the CA did not err when it ruled that petitioners’ Complaint is not
incapable of pecuniary estimation.
The Court cannot also give credence to petitioners’ contention
that their action involves interest in a real property. The October
25, 1976 letter39 of Atty. Gella confirming Severino’s appointment
as administrator of his properties does not provide that the latter’s
services would be compensated in the form of real estate or, at the
very least, that it was for a com-
_______________
39 Records, p. 6.
119
VOL. 704, AUGUST 28, 2013 119
pensation. Neither was it alleged in the Complaint that the five
percent commission promised to Araceli and Arnel would be
equivalent to such portion of Lot No. 1782-B. What is clear from
paragraph 4 thereof is that respondents instructed petitioners to
look for buyers of their properties and “were promised by
[respondents] a commission of five percent of the total purchase
price of the said properties as compensation for their long and
continued administration of all the said properties.” Also,
petitioners’ allegation in paragraph 6 that respondents failed to
pay them “in cash or in kind” of what is due them negates any
agreement between the parties that they should be paid in the
form of real estate. Clearly, the allegations in their Complaint
failed to sufficiently show that they have interest of whatever kind
over the properties of respondents. Given these, petitioners’ claim
that their action involves interest over a real property is
unavailing. Thus, the Court quotes with approval the CA’s
ratiocination with respect to the same:
As to their weak claim of interest over the property, it is apparent that their only
interest is to be compensated for their long-term administration of the properties.
They do not claim an interest in the properties themselves but merely payment for
their services, such payment they compute to be equivalent to five (5%) percent of
the value of the properties. Under Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real
action is an action affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest
therein. These include partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on,
real property. Plaintiffs-appellants’ interest is obviously not the one contemplated
under the rules on jurisdiction.40
Petitioners’ demand is below the
jurisdictional amount required for RTCs
outside of Metro Manila, hence, the RTC
_______________
40 CA Rollo, p. 106.
120
concerned in this case has no jurisdiction

over petitioners’ Complaint.
To determine whether the RTC in this case has jurisdiction over
petitioners’ Complaint, respondents correctly argued that the same
be considered vis-à-vis Section 19(8) of BP 129, which provides:
19. SEC.Jurisdiction in Civil Cases.—Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:
xxxx
In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interests, damages of
whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the
property exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases
in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds
Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00). (8)
This jurisdictional amount of exceeding P100,000.00 for RTC’s

outside of Metro Manila was adjusted to P200,000.00 effective
March 20, 1999 in pursuance to Section 5 of RA 7691 41 which
further provides:
After five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the jurisdictional amounts
mentioned in Sec. 19(3), (4), and (8); and Sec. 33(1) of 5. SEC. Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129 as amended by this Act, shall be adjusted to Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00). Five (5) years thereafter, such jurisdictional amounts shall be
adjusted further to Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00): Provided,
however, That in the case of Metro Manila, the abovementioned jurisdictional
amounts shall be adjusted after five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act to Four
hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00).
_______________
41 See Supreme Court Circular No. 21-99 dated April 15, 1999.
121
VOL. 704, AUGUST 28, 2013 121
Hence, when petitioners filed their Complaint on September 3,
2001, the said increased jurisdictional amount was already
effective. The demand in their Complaint must therefore exceed
P200,000.00 in order for it to fall under the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Petitioners prayed that they be paid five percent of the total
purchase price of Lot No. 1782-B. However, since the Complaint
did not allege that the said property has already been sold, as in
fact it has not yet been sold as respondents contend, there is no
purchase price which can be used as basis for computing the five
percent that petitioners are claiming. Nevertheless and as
mentioned, petitioners were able to attach to their Complaint a
copy of the tax declaration for Lot No. 1782-B showing a total
market value of P3,550,072.00.42 And since “[t]he fair market value
is the price at which a property may be sold by a seller, who is not
compelled to sell, and bought by a buyer, who is not compelled to
buy,”43 the RTC correctly computed the amount of petitioners’ claim
based on the property’s market value. And since five percent of
P3,550,072.00 is only P177,503.60 or below the jurisdictional
amount of exceeding P200,000.00 set for RTCs outside of Metro
Manila, the RTC in this case has no jurisdiction over petitioners’
claim.
There is no merit to petitioners’ averment that their demand for
moral damages should be included in the computation of their total
claims. Paragraph 8, Section 19 of BP 129 expressly speaks of
demand which is exclusive of damages of whatever kind. This
exclusion was later explained by the Court in Administrative
Circular No. 09-94 dated June 14, 1994 as follows:
The exclusion of the term “damages of whatever kind” in determining the
jurisdictional amount un- 2.
_______________
42 Records, p. 8; not P3,508,370.00 as computed by the RTC.
43 Hilario v. Salvador, 497 Phil. 327, 336; 457 SCRA 815, 826 (2005).
122

der Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691,
applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the
main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main
cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be
considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.
Here, the moral damages being claimed by petitioners are

merely the consequence of respondents’ alleged non-payment of
commission and compensation the collection of which is petitioners’
main cause of action. Thus, the said claim for moral damages
cannot be included in determining the jurisdictional amount.
In view of the foregoing, the CA did not err in affirming the
RTC’s conclusion that it has no jurisdiction over petitioners’ claim.
The CA’s affirmance of the RTC’s
findings that the Complaint states no
cause of action and that Araceli and
Arnel have no authority to sue in behalf
of Severino’s other heirs cannot be
raised in this Petition.
As pointed out by respondents, petitioners failed to question in
their Motion for Reconsideration before the CA its affirmance of
the RTC’s findings that the Complaint states no cause of action
and that Araceli and Arnel have no authority to sue in behalf of the
other heirs of Severino. Suffice it to say that “[p]rior to raising
[these arguments] before this Court, [they] should have raised the
matter in [their Motion for Reconsideration] in order to give the
appellate court an opportunity to correct its ruling. For [them] to
raise [these issues]
123
VOL. 704, AUGUST 28, 2013 123
before [this Court] now would be improper, since [they] failed to do
so before the CA.”44
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review
on Certiorari is DENIED and the assailed Decision dated July 6,
2005 and the Resolution dated April 5, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75126 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Peralta,** Perez and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ.,
concur.
Notes.―A real action is an action affecting title to or recovery of
possession of real property. (Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty
Development Corporation vs. Formaran III, 578 SCRA 283 [2009])
An action for cancellation of title, a real action, is not
extinguished upon the death of a party. (Regalado vs. Regalado,
650 SCRA 712 [2011])
――o0o――
_______________
44 Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Abad, 492 Phil. 657, 667-668; 452 SCRA 579, 591
(2005).
** Per Special Order No. 1525 dated August 22, 2013
June 25, 2013. G.R. No. 179267.*

JESUS C. GARCIA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN
T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 41,
Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in
behalf of minor children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD,
JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Family Courts; Family Courts Act of 1997
(R.A. No. 8369); It must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level
as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the “Family Courts Act of
1997,” family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic
violence against women and children.—At the outset, it must be stressed that Family
Courts are special courts, of the same level as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369,
otherwise known as the “Family Courts Act of 1997,” family courts have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence against women and children. In
accordance with said law, the Supreme Court designated from among the branches of the
Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each of several key cities identified. To
achieve harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides that
Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law.
Same; Same; Same; Regional Trial Courts; It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have
jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, “this authority being embraced in the
general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by
the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law.”—Inspite of its designation as a
family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of authority as a court of general
original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal, special
proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency. It is
settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to re-
_______________
* EN BANC.
353
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 353

Garcia vs. Drilon
solve the constitutionality of a statute, “this authority being embraced in the general
definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the
criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law.” The Constitution vests the power of
judicial review or the power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty,
international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation not only in this Court, but in all RTCs. We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v.
CA, 3 SCRA 696 (1961), that, “[p]lainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior
courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for
it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such
constitutionality happens to be in issue.”
Same; Violence Against Women and Children; Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the
Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children, lays down a new kind of procedure
requiring the respondent to file an opposition to the petition and not an answer.—Section 20
of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children, lays
down a new kind of procedure requiring the respondent to file an opposition to the petition
and not an answer. Thus: SEC. 20. Opposition to petition.—(a) The respondent may file an
opposition to the petition which he himself shall verify. It must be accompanied by the
affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection
order should not be issued; (b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint, but any cause of action which
could be the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.
Same; Civil Procedure; Cause of Action; The unconstitutionality of a statute is not a
cause of action that could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party
complaint.—We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a
counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party complaint are to be excluded from the opposition,
the issue of constitutionality cannot likewise be raised therein. A counterclaim is defined
as any claim for money or other relief which a defending party may have against an
opposing party. A crossclaim, on the other hand, is any claim by one party against a co-
party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the
original action or of a counterclaim
354

54
Garcia vs. Drilon
therein. Finally, a third-party complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with
leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action for contribution, indemnity,
subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent’s claim. As pointed out by Justice
Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action
that could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint.
Therefore, it is not prohibited from being raised in the opposition in view of the familiar
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Same; Evidence; Constitutional Law; The question relative to the constitutionality of a
statute is one of law which does not need to be supported by evidence.—That the proceedings
in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should not have deterred petitioner from
raising the same in his Opposition. The question relative to the constitutionality of a
statute is one of law which does not need to be supported by evidence.
Same; Temporary Protection Order (TPO); If a temporary protection order issued is due
to expire, the trial court may extend or renew the said order for a period of thirty (30) days
each time until final judgment is rendered.—To obviate potential dangers that may arise
concomitant to the conduct of a hearing when necessary, Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-10-
11-SC provides that if a temporary protection order issued is due to expire, the trial court
may extend or renew the said order for a period of thirty (30) days each time until final
judgment is rendered. It may likewise modify the extended or renewed temporary
protection order as may be necessary to meet the needs of the parties. With the private
respondent given ample protection, petitioner could proceed to litigate the constitutional
issues, without necessarily running afoul of the very purpose for the adoption of the rules
on summary procedure.
Same; Provisional Remedies; Injunction; Temporary Protection Order (TPO); It bears
stressing that protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect women and their
children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such orders will defeat the very
purpose of the law against Violence Against Women and Children.—As the rules stand, a
review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is prohibited. Moreover, if the
appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection shall not stay its enforcement, with
more
355
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 355

Garcia vs. Drilon
reason that a TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a time, should not be
enjoined. The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not
of itself entitle a litigant to have the same enjoined. In Younger v. Harris, Jr., 27 L.Ed.2d
669 (1971), the Supreme Court of the United States declared, thus: Federal injunctions
against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with respect to their separate and
distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of course, even if such statutes are
unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the community is immune from prosecution, in
good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a prosecution even though
alleged to be unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief in equity
which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who
seeks its aid. (Citations omitted) The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status
quo until the trial court hears fully the merits of the case. It bears stressing, however, that
protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect women and their children from acts of
violence. To issue an injunction against such orders will defeat the very purpose of the law
against VAWC.
Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Courts are not concerned with the wisdom,
justice, policy, or expediency of a statute; By the principle of separation of powers, it is the
legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law.—It is
settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a
statute. Hence, we dare not venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the members
of Congress in limiting the protection against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women
and children only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be entertained in this
proceeding. Congress has made its choice and it is not our prerogative to supplant this
judgment. The choice may be perceived as erroneous but even then, the remedy against it is
to seek its amendment or repeal by the legislative. By the principle of separation of powers,
it is the legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any
law. We only step in when there is a violation of the Constitution. However, none was
sufficiently shown in this case.
Same; Equal Protection of the Laws; Equal protection simply requires that all persons
or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities im-
356

56
Garcia vs. Drilon
posed.—Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-
repeated disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, 59
SCRA 54 (1974), is instructive: The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a
guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not,
therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality,
that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of
operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such,
but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality,
not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in
fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not
forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to
operate. The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping
of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain
particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification
is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no
manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid
classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based
on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to
the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the
standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation
or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
Same; Same; The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that
women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias
and prejudice against women all make for real differences justifying the classification under
the law.—The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women
are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and
prejudice against women
357
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Garcia vs. Drilon
all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law. As Justice
McIntyre succinctly states, “the accommodation of differences ... is the essence of true
equality.”
Same; Same; Gender-Based Violence; According to the Philippine Commission on
Women (the National Machinery for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment), violence
against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with the unequal power relationship
between women and men otherwise known as “gender-based violence.”—According to the
Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for Gender Equality and
Women’s Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely linked
with the unequal power relationship between women and men otherwise known as
“gender-based violence.” Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think men are the
leaders, pursuers, providers, and take on dominant roles in society while women are
nurturers, men’s companions and supporters, and take on subordinate roles in society. This
perception leads to men gaining more power over women. With power comes the need to
control to retain that power. And VAW is a form of men’s expression of controlling women
to retain power.
Same; Same; The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought
about by biases and prejudices against women.—The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to
address the discrimination brought about by biases and prejudices against women. As
emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women, addressing or correcting discrimination through specific measures focused on
women does not discriminate against men. Petitioner’s contention, therefore, that R.A.
9262 is discriminatory and that it is an “anti-male,” “husband-bashing,” and “hate-men”
law deserves scant consideration. As a State Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound
itself to take all appropriate measures “to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct
of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary
and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of
either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.” Justice Puno correctly
pointed out that “(t)he paradigm shift changing the character of domestic violence from a
private affair to a public offense will require the development
358

58
Garcia vs. Drilon
of a distinct mindset on the part of the police, the prosecution and the judges.”
Same; Same; The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A.
9262, which is to address violence committed against women and children, spelled out in its
Declaration of Policy.—The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose
of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed against women and children, spelled
out in its Declaration of Policy, as follows: SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.—It is hereby
declared that the State values the dignity of women and children and guarantees full
respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its
members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal
safety and security. Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence
committed against women and children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms
guaranteed under the Constitution and the provisions of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international human rights
instruments of which the Philippines is a party.
Same; Same; The application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when
it was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of
women and their children are threatened by violence and abuse.—The application of R.A.
9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to future
conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women and their children are
threatened by violence and abuse. R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children
who suffer violence and abuse.
Statutes; An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit
in its wordings or detailed in its provisions.—There is nothing in the definition of VAWC
that is vague and ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense. The acts
enumerated above are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the
innocent and the prohibited acts. They are worded with sufficient definiteness that persons
of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited, and need not guess at
its meaning nor differ in its application. Yet, petitioner insists that
359
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Garcia vs. Drilon
phrases like “depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal
right,” “solely controlling the conjugal or common money or properties,” “marital infidelity,”
and “causing mental or emotional anguish” are so vague that they make every quarrel a
case of spousal abuse. However, we have stressed that the “vagueness” doctrine merely
requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld — not absolute
precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather
than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute
are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been
more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions.
Criminal Law; Violence Against Women and Children; Conspiracy; While the law
provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former
marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the
principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC).—VAWC may likewise be
committed “against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship.” Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word “person” who has or had a sexual
or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships. Moreover,
while the law provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage,
former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of
the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-
Tan v. Spouses Tan, 567 SCRA 231 (2008), the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan,
the victim, were held to be proper respondents in the case filed by the latter upon the
allegation that they and their son (Go-Tan’s husband) had community of design and
purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and
pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally,
emotionally, mentally and physically.
Remedial Law; Temporary Protection Order; Words and Phrases; A protection order is
an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their children, their
family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs; The rules require that
petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the petitioner thereby
undertaking full responsibility, criminal or
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civil, for every allegation therein.—A protection order is an order issued to prevent
further acts of violence against women and their children, their family or household
members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended
parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the
opportunity and ability to regain control of their life. “The scope of reliefs in protection
orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies
necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the
victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or
household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from
committing acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables
the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from
violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial
support.” The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and
verified by the petitioner thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every
allegation therein. Since “time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be
prevented,” the court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and
hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable
ground to believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and
imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is about to recur.
Same; Same; Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice
and hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the
defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of Violence
Against Women and Children may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the
hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before
such acts could be prevented.—The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged
as violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is
issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could be
enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the
victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her
tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts
could be pre-
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vented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of
procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests,
among which is protection of women and children from violence and threats to their
personal safety and security. It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte,
the court shall likewise order that notice be immediately given to the respondent directing
him to file an opposition within five (5) days from service. Moreover, the court shall order
that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be served immediately on the respondent by the
court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days from service on the
respondent. Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the
immediate issuance and service of the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an
opposition to the petition within five (5) days from service. The date of the preliminary
conference and hearing on the merits shall likewise be indicated on the notice.
Same; Same; The respondent of a petition for protection order should be apprised of the
charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side; “To be heard” does
not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings.—It is
clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order should
be apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side.
Thus, the fear of petitioner of being “stripped of family, property, guns, money, children,
job, future employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of
what happened” is a mere product of an overactive imagination. The essence of due process
is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may
have in support of one’s defense. “To be heard” does not only mean verbal arguments in
court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either
through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due
process.
Same; Same; Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private
respondent’s residence, regardless of ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of
protecting the latter. Such removal and exclusion may be permanent only where no property
rights are violated.—Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the
respondent in the VAWC case from the residence of the
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victim, regardless of ownership of the residence, is virtually a “blank check” issued to
the wife to claim any property as her conjugal home. The wording of the pertinent rule,
however, does not by any stretch of the imagination suggest that this is so. It states: SEC.
11. Reliefs available to the offended party.—The protection order shall include any, some or
all of the following reliefs: x x x x (c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the
residence of the offended party, regardless of ownership of the residence, either temporarily
for the purpose of protecting the offended party, or permanently where no property rights
are violated. If the respondent must remove personal effects from the residence, the court
shall direct a law enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to the residence, remain
there until the respondent has gathered his things and escort him from the residence;
x x x x Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private respondent’s
residence, regardless of ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of protecting the latter.
Such removal and exclusion may be permanent only where no property rights are violated.
How then can the private respondent just claim any property and appropriate it for herself,
as petitioner seems to suggest?
Same; Same; Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the
Violence Against Women and Children case or any issue thereof to a mediator.—Under
Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the case or any issue thereof
to a mediator. The reason behind this provision is well-explained by the Commentary on
Section 311 of the Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence as follows: This section
prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to mediation in a proceeding for an
order for protection. Mediation is a process by which parties in equivalent bargaining
positions voluntarily reach consensual agreement about the issue at hand. Violence,
however, is not a subject for compromise. A process which involves parties mediating
the issue of violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of
issues in a proceeding for an order of protection is problematic because the petitioner is
frequently unable to participate equally with the person against whom the protection order
has been sought.
Same; Same; Barangay Protection Order (BPO); The Barangay Protection Order issued
by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavail-
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ability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist
from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the
woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely
executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to “enforce
all laws and ordinances,” and to “maintain public order in the barangay.”—Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government. On the other hand, executive power “is
generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of
carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.” As clearly
delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his
unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist
from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the
woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangayis, thus, purely
executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to “enforce
all laws and ordinances,” and to “maintain public order in the barangay.” We have held that
“(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the existence of certain
facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall be
and the fact that these acts may affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of
judicial powers.”
Statutes; Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal
breach or a clear conflict with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one,
must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court.—
Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal breach or a
clear conflict with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be
demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. In other
words, the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt. In the instant case,
however, no concrete evidence and convincing arguments were presented by petitioner to
warrant a declaration of the unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is an act of Congress
and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal
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executive department. As we said in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 369 SCRA 394 (2001),
courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its
plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of
promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J., Concurring Opinion:
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Regional Trial Courts; View that the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), designated as a Family Court, is vested with jurisdiction to decide issues
of constitutionality of a law, and that the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 can be
resolved in a summary proceeding, in accordance with the rule that the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, otherwise it may not be
considered on appeal.—I agree with Justice Bernabe that the RTC, designated as a Family
Court, is vested with jurisdiction to decide issues of constitutionality of a law, and that the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 can be resolved in a summary proceeding, in
accordance with the rule that the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity, otherwise it may not be considered on appeal. Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-
SC, the Rule on Republic Act No. 9262 provides: Sec. 20. Opposition to Petition.—(a) The
respondent may file an opposition to the petition which he himself shall verify. It must be
accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or
permanent protection order should not be issued. (b) Respondent shall not include in the
opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint, but any cause of
action which could be the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil
action.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Temporary Protection Order; View that the alleged
unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 is a matter that would have prevented the trial
court from granting the petition for protection order against the petitioner.—The alleged
unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 is a matter that would have prevented the
trial court from granting the petition for protection order against the petitioner. Thus,
petitioner should have raised it in his Opposition as a defense against the issuance of a
protection order against him.365
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Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that an action questioning the constitutionality
of the law cannot be filed separately even with another branch of the RTC. This is not
technically feasible because there will be no justiciable controversy or an independent cause
of action that can be the subject of such separate action if it were not for the issuance of the
Temporary Protection Order against the petitioner.—For all intents and purposes, the
Petition for Prohibition filed before the Court of Appeals was precipitated by and was
ultimately directed against the issuance of the TPO, an interlocutory order, which under
Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC is a prohibited pleading. An action questioning the
constitutionality of the law also cannot be filed separately even with another branch of the
RTC. This is not technically feasible because there will be no justiciable controversy or an
independent cause of action that can be the subject of such separate action if it were not for
the issuance of the TPO against the petitioner. Thus, the controversy, subject of a separate
action, whether before the Court of Appeals or the RTC, would still have to be the issuance
of the TPO, which is the subject of another case in the RTC.
Statutes; View that the challenge to the constitutionality of the law must be raised at the
earliest opportunity.—The challenge to the constitutionality of the law must be raised at the
earliest opportunity. In Dasmariñas Water District v. Monterey Foods Corporation, 565
SCRA 624 (2008), we said: A law is deemed valid unless declared null and void by a
competent court; more so when the issue has not been duly pleaded in the trial court. The
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity. x x x. The settled
rule is that courts will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the
necessity of deciding it. (Citation omitted.) This Court held that such opportunity is in the
pleadings before a competent court that can resolve it, such that “if it is not raised in the
pleadings, it cannot be considered at the trial, and, if not considered at the trial, it cannot
be considered on appeal.” The decision upon the constitutional question is necessary to
determine whether the TPO should be issued against petitioner. Such question should have
been raised at the earliest opportunity as an affirmative defense in the Opposition filed
with the RTC handling the protection order proceedings, which was the competent court to
pass upon the constitutional issue.366

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Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Multiplicity of Suits; View that the filing of a separate
action before the Court of Appeals or the RTC for the declaration of unconstitutionality of
Republic Act No. 9262 would result to multiplicity of suits. It is clear that the issues of
constitutionality and propriety of issuing a protection order raised by petitioner are
inextricably intertwined.—The filing of a separate action before the Court of Appeals or the
RTC for the declaration of unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 would result to
multiplicity of suits. It is clear that the issues of constitutionality and propriety of issuing a
protection order raised by petitioner are inextricably intertwined. Another court, whether it
is an appellate court or a trial court, cannot resolve the constitutionality question in the
separate action without affecting the petition for the issuance of a TPO. Bringing a separate
action for the resolution of the issue of constitutionality will result in an unresolved
prejudicial question to the validity of issuing a protection order. If the proceedings for the
protection order is not suspended, it does create the danger of having inconsistent and
conflicting judgments between the two separate courts, whether of the same or different
levels in the judicial hierarchy. These two judgments would eventually be the subject of
separate motions for reconsideration, separate appeals, and separate petitions for review
before this Court – the exact scenario the policy against multiplicity of suits is avoiding. As
we previously held, “the law and the courts frown upon split jurisdiction and the resultant
multiplicity of actions.”
Procedural Rules and Technicalities; View that when public interest requires the
resolution of the constitutional issue raised, and in keeping with the Supreme Court’s duty of
determining whether other agencies or even co-equal branches of government have remained
within the limits of the Constitution and have not abused the discretion given them, the
Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure and resolve the constitutional issue.—
Notwithstanding my position that the Court of Appeals properly dismissed the Petition for
Prohibition because of petitioner’s failure to raise the issue of constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 9262 at the earliest opportunity, I concur that the Court, in the exercise of its sound
discretion, should still pass upon the said issue in the present Petition. Notable is the fact
that not only the petitioner, but the private respondent as well, pray that the Court resolve
the constitutional issue considering its novelty and paramount importance. Indeed, when
public interest
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requires the resolution of the constitutional issue raised, and in keeping with this
Court’s duty of determining whether other agencies or even co-equal branches of
government have remained within the limits of the Constitution and have not abused the
discretion given them, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure and resolve
the constitutional issue.
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Law; View that recent Philippine
jurisprudence has recognized the need to apply different standards of scrutiny in testing the
constitutionality of classifications.—Recent Philippine jurisprudence has recognized the
need to apply different standards of scrutiny in testing the constitutionality of
classifications. In British American Tobacco v. Camacho, 585 SCRA 36 (2009), this Court
held that since the case therein neither involved a suspect classification nor impinged on a
fundamental right, then “the rational basis test was properly applied to gauge the
constitutionality of the assailed law in the face of an equal protection challenge.”
Same; Same; View that in the context of the constitutional policy to “ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men” the level of scrutiny applicable, to
test whether or not the classification in Republic Act No. 9262 violates the equal protection
clause, is the middle-tier scrutiny or the intermediate standard of judicial review.—Since
statutory remedies accorded to women are not made available to men, when the reality is
that there are men, regardless of their number, who are also suffering from domestic
violence, the rational basis test may be too wide and liberal to justify the statutory
classification which in effect allows different treatment of men who are similarly situated.
In the context of the constitutional policy to “ensure the fundamental equality before the
law of women and men” the level of scrutiny applicable, to test whether or not the
classification in Republic Act No. 9262 violates the equal protection clause, is the middle-
tier scrutiny or the intermediate standard of judicial review. To survive
intermediate review, the classification in the challenged law must (1) serve important
governmental objectives, and (2) be substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives.
Same; Same; View that by constitutional mandate, the Philippines is committed to
ensure that human rights and fundamental
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freedoms are fully enjoyed by everyone.—By constitutional mandate, the Philippines is
committed to ensure that human rights and fundamental freedoms are fully enjoyed by
everyone. It was one of the countries that voted in favor of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR), which was a mere two years after it gained independence from the
United States of America. In addition, the Philippines is a signatory to many United
Nations human rights treaties such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention Against
Torture, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, among others.
Same; Same; View that the Declaration of Policy in Republic Act No. 9262 enunciates
the purpose of the said law, which is to fulfill the government’s obligation to safeguard the
dignity and human rights of women and children by providing effective remedies against
domestic violence or physical, psychological, and other forms of abuse perpetuated by the
husband, partner, or father of the victim.—The Declaration of Policy in Republic Act No.
9262 enunciates the purpose of the said law, which is to fulfill the government’s obligation
to safeguard the dignity and human rights of women and children by providing effective
remedies against domestic violence or physical, psychological, and other forms of abuse
perpetuated by the husband, partner, or father of the victim. The said law is also viewed
within the context of the constitutional mandate to ensure gender equality, which is quoted
as follows: Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nationbuilding, and shall
ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW); Republic Act No. 9262; View that Republic Act No. 9262 can be viewed therefore
as the Philippines’ compliance with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which is committed to condemn discrimination
against women and directs its members to undertake, without delay, all appropriate means
to eliminate discrimination against women in all forms both in law and in practice.—It has
been acknowledged that “gender-based violence is a form of discrimination that seriously
inhibits women’s ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with men.”
Republic
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Act No. 9262 can be viewed therefore as the Philippines’ compliance with the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW),
which is committed to condemn discrimination against women and directs its members to
undertake, without delay, all appropriate means to eliminate discrimination against women
in all forms both in law and in practice. Known as the International Bill of Rights of
Women, the CEDAW is the central and most comprehensive document for the advancement
of the welfare of women. It brings the women into the focus of human rights concerns, and
its spirit is rooted in the goals of the UN: to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in
the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women. The
CEDAW, in its preamble, explicitly acknowledges the existence of extensive
discrimination against women, and emphasized that such is a violation of the
principles of equality of rights and respect for human dignity.
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Law; Gender-Based Violence; As one of the
country’s pervasive social problems, violence against women is deemed to be closely linked
with the unequal power relationship between women and men and is otherwise known as
“gender-based violence.”—As one of the country’s pervasive social problems, violence against
women is deemed to be closely linked with the unequal power relationship between women
and men and is otherwise known as “gender-based violence.” Violent acts towards women
has been the subject of an examination on a historic world-wide perspective. The exhaustive
study of a foreign history professor noted that “[f]rom the earliest civilizations on, the
subjugation of women, in the form of violence, were facts of life,” as three great bodies of
thought, namely: Judeo-Christian religious ideas; Greek philosophy; and the Common Law
Legal Code, which have influenced western society’s views and treatment of women, all
“assumed patriarchy as natural; that is, male domination stemming from the view of male
superiority.” It cited 18th century legal expert William Blackstone, who explained that the
common law doctrine of coverture reflected the theological assumption that husband and
wife were ‘one body’ before God; thus “they were ‘one person’ under the law, and that one
person was the husband,” a concept that evidently found its way in some of our Civil Code
provisions prior to the enactment of the Family Code.370

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Criminal Law; Violence Against Women and Children (R.A. No. 9262); View that
although there exists other laws on violence against women in the Philippines, Republic Act
No. 9262 deals with the problem of violence within the family and intimate relationships,
which deserves special attention because it occurs in situations or places where women and
children should feel most safe and secure but are actually not.—Preventing violence against
women and children through their availment of special legal remedies, serves the
governmental objectives of protecting the dignity and human rights of every person,
preserving the sanctity of family life, and promoting gender equality and empowering
women. Although there exists other laws on violence against women in the Philippines,
Republic Act No. 9262 deals with the problem of violence within the family and intimate
relationships, which deserves special attention because it occurs in situations or places
where women and children should feel most safe and secure but are actually not. The law
provides the widest range of reliefs for women and children who are victims of violence,
which are often reported to have been committed not by strangers, but by a father or a
husband or a person with whom the victim has or had a sexual or dating relationship. Aside
from filing a criminal case in court, the law provides potent legal remedies to the victims
that theretofore were not available. The law recognizes, with valid factual support based on
statistics that women and children are the most vulnerable victims of violence, and
therefore need legal intervention. On the other hand, there is a dearth of empirical basis to
anchor a conclusion that men need legal protection from violence perpetuated by women.
Temporary Protection Order (TPO); View that the law permits the issuance of protection
orders and the granting of certain reliefs to women victims, even without a hearing; Despite
the ex parte issuance of these protection orders, the temporary nature of these remedies allow
them to be availed of by the victim without violating the offender’s right to due process as it
is only when a full-blown hearing has been done that a permanent protection order may be
issued.—The law takes into account the pervasive vulnerability of women and children, and
the seriousness and urgency of the situation, which, in the language of the law result in or
is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse
including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty. Hence, the law permits the issuance of
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protection orders and the granting of certain reliefs to women victims, even without a
hearing. The law has granted authority for barangay officials to issue a protection order
against the offender, based on the victim’s application. The RTC may likewise grant an
application for a temporary protection order (TPO) and provide other reliefs, also on the
mere basis of the application. Despite the ex parte issuance of these protection orders, the
temporary nature of these remedies allow them to be availed of by the victim without
violating the offender’s right to due process as it is only when a full-blown hearing has been
done that a permanent protection order may be issued. Thus, these remedies are suitable,
reasonable, and justified. More importantly, they serve the objectives of the law by
providing the victims necessary immediate protection from the violence they perceive as
threats to their personal safety and security. This translates to the fulfillment of other
governmental objectives as well. By assuring the victims instant relief from their situation,
they are consequently empowered and restored to a place of dignity and equality. Such is
embodied in the purpose to be served by a protection order.
Criminal Law; Violence Against Women and Children (R.A. No. 9262); View that in
furtherance of the governmental objectives, especially that of protecting human rights,
violence against women and children under this Act has been classified as a public offense,
making its prosecution independent of the victim’s initial participation.—In furtherance of
the governmental objectives, especially that of protecting human rights, violence against
women and children under this Act has been classified as a public offense, making its
prosecution independent of the victim’s initial participation. Verily, the classification
made in Republic Act No. 9262 is substantially related to the important
governmental objectives of valuing every person’s dignity, respecting human
rights, safeguarding family life, protecting children, promoting gender equality,
and empowering women.
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Law; View that the equal protection clause
in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition against classification.—The
equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition
against classification. The non-identical treatment of women and men under Republic Act
No. 9262 is justified to put them on
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equal footing and to give substance to the policy and aim of the state to ensure the
equality of women and men in light of the biological, historical, social, and culturally
endowed differences between men and women. Republic Act No. 9262, by affording special
and exclusive protection to women and children, who are vulnerable victims of domestic
violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental objectives of protecting human
rights, insuring gender equality, and empowering women. The gender-based classification
and the special remedies prescribed by said law in favor of women and children are
substantially related, in fact essentially necessary, to achieve such objectives. Hence, said
Act survives the intermediate review or middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The gender-
based classification therein is therefore not violative of the equal protection clause
embodied in the 1987 Constitution.
Violence Against Women and Children; Temporary Protection Order; View that a
protection order is issued under Republic Act No. 9262 for the purpose of preventing further
acts of violence against a woman or her child.—A protection order is issued under Republic
Act No. 9262 for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence against a woman or her
child. The circumstances surrounding the availment thereof are often attended by urgency;
thus, women and child victims must have immediate and uncomplicated access to the same.
Same; Same; Police Power; View that Republic Act No. 9262 and its implementing
regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power
of the State to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public (in
this case, a particular sector thereof), as well as the protection of human life, commonly
designated as the police power.—The ex parte issuance of the TPO does not make it
unconstitutional. Procedural due process refers to the method or manner by which the law
is enforced. It consists of the two basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the
guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal. However, it is a
constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield
to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those involved herein. Republic Act
No. 9262 and its implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of
that pervasive, sovereign power of the State to protect the safety, health, and general
welfare and comfort
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of the public (in this case, a particular sector thereof), as well as the protection of
human life, commonly designated as the police power.
Barangay Protection Order (BPO); Words and Phrases; View that a Barangay
Protection Order (BPO) refers to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay, or in
his absence the Barangay Kagawad, ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts
of violence against the family or household members particularly women and their
children.—A Barangay Protection Order (BPO) refers to the protection order issued by
the Punong Barangay, or in his absence the Barangay Kagawad, ordering the perpetrator
to desist from committing acts of violence against the family or household members
particularly women and their children. The authority of barangay officials to issue a BPO is
conferred under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9262: SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders
(BPOs); Who May Issue and How.—Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the
protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from
committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong Barangay who receives
applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant on the date of filing
after ex parte determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is
unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any
available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad the order must
be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong
Barangay was unavailable at the time for the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective
for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong
Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the same on the
respondent, or direct any barangayofficial to effect is personal service. The parties may be
accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the Punong Barangay.
Same; View that in the case of a Barangay Protection Order, it is a mere provisional
remedy under Republic Act No. 9262, meant to address the pressing need of the victims for
instant protection; Under the Implementing Rules of Republic Act No. 9262, the issuance of a
Barangay Protection Order or the pendency of an application for a Barangay Protection
Order shall not preclude the victim from applying for, or the court from granting, a
Temporary Protection Order or Permanent Protection Order.—While judicial power rests
exclusively
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in the judiciary, it may be conceded that the legislature may confer on administrative
boards or bodies, or even particular government officials, quasi-judicial power involving the
exercise of judgment and discretion, as incident to the performance of administrative
functions. But in so doing, the legislature must state its intention in express terms that
would leave no doubt, as even such quasi-judicial prerogatives must be limited, if they are
to be valid, only to those incidental to or in connection with the performance of
administrative duties, which do not amount to conferment of jurisdiction over a matter
exclusively vested in the courts. In the case of a BPO, it is a mere provisional remedy under
Republic Act No. 9262, meant to address the pressing need of the victims for instant
protection. However, it does not take the place of appropriate judicial proceedings and
remedies that provide a more effective and comprehensive protection to the victim. In fact,
under the Implementing Rules of Republic Act No. 9262, the issuance of a BPO or the
pendency of an application for a BPO shall not preclude the victim from applying for, or the
court from granting, a TPO or PPO. Where a TPO has already been granted by any court,
the barangay official may no longer issue a BPO. The same Implementing Rules also
require that within twenty-four (24) hours after the issuance of a BPO,
the barangay official shall assist the victim in filing an application for a TPO or PPO with
the nearest court in the victim’s place of residence. If there is no Family Court or RTC, the
application may be filed in the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court or
the Metropolitan Trial Court.
BRION, J., Concurring Opinion:
Criminal Law; Violence Against Women and Children; View that Congress found that
domestic and other forms of violence against women and children contribute to the failure to
unify and strengthen family ties, thereby impeding the State’s mandate to actively promote
the family’s total development.—From the terms of the law, I find it plain that Congress
enacted R.A. No. 9262 as a measure intended to strengthen the family. Congress found that
domestic and other forms of violence against women and children contribute to the failure
to unify and strengthen family ties, thereby impeding the State’s mandate to actively
promote the family’s total development. Congress also found, as a reality, that women and
children are more susceptible to domestic and other forms of violence due to, among
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others, the pervasive bias and prejudice against women and the stereotyping of roles
within the family environment that traditionally exist in Philippine society. On this basis,
Congress found it necessary to recognize the substantial distinction within the family
between men, on the one hand, and women and children, on the other hand. This
recognition, incidentally, is not the first to be made in the laws as our law on
persons and family under the Civil Code also recognize, in various ways, the
distinctions between men and women in the context of the family.
Constitutional Law; Reasonableness Test; View that the reasonableness test has been
consistently applied to allow the courts to uphold State action as long as the action is found
to be germane to the purpose of the law, in this case to support the unity and development of
the family.—My serious reservation on the use of an expanded equal protection clause and
in applying a strict scrutiny standard is, among others, based on lack of necessity; we do
not need these measures when we can fully examine R.A. No. 9262’s constitutionality using
the reasonableness test. The family is a unit, in fact a very basic one, and it cannot operate
on an uneven standard where measures beyond what is necessary are extended to women
and children as against the man—the head of the family and the family provider. The use
of an expanded equal protection clause only stresses the concept of an uneven equality that
cannot long stand in a unit living at close quarters in a situation of mutual dependency on
one another. The reasonableness test, on the other hand, has been consistently applied to
allow the courts to uphold State action as long as the action is found to be germane to the
purpose of the law, in this case to support the unity and development of the family. If we
are to deviate from or to modify this established standard of scrutiny, we must do
so carefully and for strong justifiable reasons.
Same; Equal Protection of the Law; Suspect Classification; Words and Phrases; View
that a suspect classification is one where distinctions are made based on the most invidious
bases for classification that violate the most basic human rights, i.e., on the basis of race,
national origin, alien status, religious affiliation and, to a certain extent, sex and sexual
orientation.—When the court uses a strict standard for review to evaluate the
constitutionality of a law, it proceeds from the premise that the law established a “suspect
classi-
376

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Garcia vs. Drilon
fication.” A suspect classification is one where distinctions are made based on the most
invidious bases for classification that violate the most basic human rights, i.e., on the
basis of race, national origin, alien status, religious affiliation and, to a certain extent, sex
and sexual orientation. With a suspect classification, the most stringent scrutiny of the
classification is applied: the ordinary presumption of constitutionality is reversed and the
government carries the burden of proving the statute’s constitutionality. This approach is
unlike the lowest level of scrutiny (reasonableness test) that the Court has applied in the
past where the classification is scrutinized and constitutionally upheld if found to be
germane to the purpose of the law. Under a reasonableness test, there is a presumption of
constitutionality and that the laws enacted by Congress are presumed to fall within its
constitutional powers.
Same; Same; View that there is no indication that Congress actually intended to
classify women and children as a group against men, under the terms of R.A. No. 9262.
Rather than a clear intent at classification, the overriding intent of the law is indisputably to
harmonize family relations and protect the family as a basic social institution.—I do not
really see any indication that Congress actually intended to classify women and children as
a group against men, under the terms of R.A. No. 9262. Rather than a clear intent at
classification, the overriding intent of the law is indisputably to harmonize family
relations and protect the family as a basic social institution. After sifting through
the comprehensive information gathered, Congress found that domestic and other forms of
violence against women and children impedes the harmony of the family and the personal
growth and development of family members. In the process, Congress found that these
types of violence must pointedly be addressed as they are more commonly experienced by
women and children due to the unequal power relations of men and women in our society;
Congress had removed these types of violence as they are impediments that block the
harmonious development that it envisions for the family, of which men are important
component members.
Same; Same; Suspect Classification; View that a suspect classification and the
accompanying strict scrutiny should depend on the circumstances of the case, on the impact
of the illegal differential treatment on the group involved, on the needed protection and the
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Garcia vs. Drilon
impact of recognizing a suspect classification on future classification.—In my view, a
suspect classification and the accompanying strict scrutiny should depend on the
circumstances of the case, on the impact of the illegal differential treatment on the group
involved, on the needed protection and the impact of recognizing a suspect classification on
future classification. A suspect classification label cannot solely and automatically be
triggered by the circumstance that women and children are accorded special protection by
the Constitution. In fact, there is no place for a strict level of scrutiny when the
Constitution itself has recognized the need for special protection; where such recognition
has been made, congressional action should carry the presumption of validity.
Same; Same; View that the classification in the law was not immediately brought on by
considerations of gender or sex; it was simply a reality as unavoidable as the reality that in
Philippine society, a marriage is composed of a man, a woman and their children.—A
suspect classification and the accompanying strict scrutiny standard cannot be solely based
on the circumstance that the law has the effect of being “gender-specific.” I believe that the
classification in the law was not immediately brought on by considerations of
gender or sex; it was simply a reality as unavoidable as the reality that in
Philippine society, a marriage is composed of a man, a woman and their children.
An obvious reason, of course, why the classification did not solely depend on gender is
because the law also covers children, without regard to their sex or their sexual orientation.
Same; Same; View that R.A. No. 9262 does not deny, restrict or curtail civil and human
rights of other persons falling outside the classification, particularly of the men members of
the family who can avail of remedies provided by other laws to ensure the protection of their
own rights and interests.—With the objective of promoting solidarity and the development
of the family, R.A. No. 9262 provides the legal redress for domestic violence that
particularly affects women and their children. Significantly, the law does not deny,
restrict or curtail civil and human rights of other persons falling outside the
classification, particularly of the men members of the family who can avail of
remedies provided by other laws to ensure the protection of their own rights and
interests. Consequently, the resulting classification under R.A. No.
378
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Garcia vs. Drilon
9262 is not wholly intended and does not work an injustice by removing remedies that
are available to men in violence committed against them. The law furthermore does not
target men against women and children and is there simply to achieve a legitimate
constitutional objective, and it does not achieve this by a particularly harmful classification
that can be labeled “suspect” in the sense already established by jurisprudence. Under the
circumstances, the use and application of strict scrutiny review, or even the use of an
expanded equal protection perspective, strike me as both unnecessary and disproportionate.
ABAD, J., Separate Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Law; View that men and women are
supposed to be equal yet this particular law provides immediate relief to complaining women
and harsh consequences to their men even before the matter reaches the courtroom, a relief
not available to the latter.—This separate concurring opinion will address the issue of equal
protection since it presents the more serious challenge to the constitutionality of the law.
Men and women are supposed to be equal yet this particular law provides immediate relief
to complaining women and harsh consequences to their men even before the matter reaches
the courtroom, a relief not available to the latter. The law, Garcia says, violates his right to
equal protection because it is gender-specific, favoring only women when men could also be
victims of domestic violence.
Same; Same; View that the equal protection clause can no longer be interpreted as only
a guarantee of formal equality but of substantive equality.—Chief Justice Puno’s thesis is
that the right to equal protection casts another shadow when the issue raised under it
involves persons protected by the social justice provision of the Constitution, specifically,
Section 1, Article XIII. The equal protection clause can no longer be interpreted as only a
guarantee of formal equality but of substantive equality. “It ought to be construed,” said the
Chief Justice, “in consonance with social justice as ‘the heart’ particularly of the 1987
Constitution — a transformative covenant in which the Filipino people agreed to enshrine
asymmetrical equality to uplift disadvantaged groups and build a genuinely egalitarian
democracy.” This means that the weak, including women
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in relation to men, can be treated with a measure of bias that they may cease to be
weak.
Same; Same; Expanded Equal Protection Clause; View that the expanded equal
protection clause should be understood as meant to “reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political
power for the common good.”—Chief Justice Puno goes on: “The Expanded Equal Protection
Clause, anchored on the human rights rationale, is designed as a weapon against the
indignity of discrimination so that in the patently unequal Philippine society, each person
may be restored to his or her rightful position as a person with equal moral status.”
Specifically, the expanded equal protection clause should be understood as meant to “reduce
social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably
diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.” Borrowing the language of Law
v. Canada, 1 S.C.R. 497 (1999), case and adding his own thoughts, the Chief Justice said:
The purpose of the Expanded Equal Protection Clause is to protect and enhance the right to
dignity by: 1) preventing the imposition, perpetuation and aggravation “of disadvantage,
stereotyping, or political [,economic, cultural,] or social prejudice”; and 2) promo[ting a
Philippine] society in which all persons enjoy equal recognition at law as human beings.
Violence Against Women and Children; Equal Protection of the Law; View that
Republic Act No. 9262 is gender-specific as only they may file the prescribed actions against
offenders, whether men or women, with whom the victims are or were in lesbian
relationships.—What remedies does R.A. 9262 especially provide women and children? The
law is gender-specific as only they may file the prescribed actions against offenders,
whether men or women, with whom the victims are or were in lesbian relationships. The
definition includes past or present marital, live-in, sexual or dating relationships. This law
also provides for the remedy of a protection order in a civil action or in a criminal action,
aside from the criminal action for its violation. It makes the process of securing a
restraining order against perpetrators easier and more immediate by providing for the legal
remedy of protection orders from both the courts and barangay officials.380

80
Garcia vs. Drilon
Same; Same; Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW); View that in the context of women’s rights, substantive equality has been
defined by the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW) as equality which requires that women be given an equal start and that they be
empowered by an enabling environment to achieve equality of results.—In the context of
women’s rights, substantive equality has been defined by the Convention on the
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) as equality which
requires that women be given an equal start and that they be empowered by an enabling
environment to achieve equality of results. It is not enough to guarantee women treatment
that is identical to that of men. Rather, biological as well as socially and culturally
constructed differences between women and men must be taken into account. Under certain
circumstances, non-identical treatment of women and men will be required in order to
address such differences.
Same; View that R.A. No. 9262 is based on the experiences of women who have been
victims of domestic violence.—Clearly, the substantive equality model inspired R.A. 9262.
For one thing, Congress enacted it because of compelling interest in preventing and
addressing the serious problem of violence against women in the context of intimate
relationships — recognized all over the world as one of the most insidious forms of gender
discrimination. For another, R.A. 9262 is based on the experiences of women who have been
victims of domestic violence. The list of acts regarded as forms of violence come from true-
to-life stories of women who have suffered abuses from their male partners. Finally, R.A.
9262 seeks women’s full participation in society. Hence, the law grants them needed relief
to ensure equality, protection, and personal safety, enabling them to enjoy their civil,
political, social, and economic rights. The provision on protection orders, for instance,
precisely aims to safeguard “the victim from further harm, minimizing any disruption in
the victim’s daily life, and facilitating the opportunity and ability of the victim to
independently regain control over her life.”
LEONEN, J., Concurring Opinion:
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Locus Standi; Words and Phrases; View that Locus
standi is defined as “a right of appearance
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Garcia vs. Drilon
in a court of justice on a given question.”—Legal standing in cases that raise
constitutional issues is essential. Locus standi is defined as “a right of appearance in a
court of justice on a given question.” The fundamental question is “whether a party alleges
such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
Violence Against Women and Children; View that it may be said that violence in the
context of intimate relationships should not be seen and encrusted as a gender issue; rather,
it is a power issue.—In this light, it may be said that violence in the context of intimate
relationships should not be seen and encrusted as a gender issue; rather, it is a power issue.
Thus, when laws are not gender-neutral, male victims of domestic violence may also suffer
from double victimization first by their abusers and second by the judicial system.
Incidentally, focusing on women as the victims entrenches some level of heteronormativity.
It is blind to the possibility that, whatever moral positions are taken by those who are
dominant, in reality intimate relationships can also happen between men.
Statutes; View that an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes
no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is x x x as inoperative as though it
had never been passed.—We have declared that “[a]n unconstitutional act is not a law; it
confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is x x x
as inoperative as though it had never been passed.” However, the seemingly all-inclusive
statement of absolute retroactive invalidity may not always be justified. One established
exception is the doctrine of operative fact. The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to
the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an
unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination
of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always
be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is
applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those
who have relied on the invalid Law.
382
Garcia vs. Drilon
Roland G. Ravina for petitioner.
Ma. Rowena Amelia V. Guanzon for private respondents.
Mae Niña Reyes-Gallos for private respondents.
Claire Angeline P. Luczon co-counsel for private respondents.
PERLAS-BERNABE,J.:
Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the Philippines
boasts of 86.8 million Filipinos — or 93 percent of a total
population of 93.3 million adhering to the teachings of Jesus
Christ.1 Yet, the admonition for husbands to love their wives as
their own bodies just as Christ loved the church and gave himself
up for her2 failed to prevent, or even to curb, the pervasiveness of
violence against Filipino women. The National Commission on the
Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW) reported that, for the years
2000-2003, “female violence comprised more than 90% of all forms
of abuse and violence and more than 90% of these reported cases
were committed by the women’s intimate partners such as their
husbands and live-in partners.”3
Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited advocacy
by women’s groups, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against
_______________
1 “Philippines still top Christian country in Asia, 5th in world,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, December
21, 2011.
2 Ephesians 5:25-28.
3 RATIONALE OF THE PROPOSED RULE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN, citing
statistics furnished by the National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women.
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Garcia vs. Drilon
Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for
Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.”
It took effect on March 27, 2004.4
R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes
acts of violence against women and their children (VAWC)
perpetrated by women’s intimate partners, i.e., husband; former
husband; or any person who has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom the woman has a common child.5 The
law provides for protection orders from the barangay and the
courts to prevent the commission of further acts of VAWC; and
outlines the duties and responsibilities of barangay officials, law
enforcers, prosecutors and court personnel, social workers, health
care providers, and other local government officials in responding
to complaints of VAWC or requests for assistance.
A husband is now before the Court assailing the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being violative of the equal
protection and due process clauses, and an undue delegation of
judicial power to barangay officials.
The Factual Antecedents
On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent)
filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor children, a verified
petition6 (Civil Case No. 06-797) before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection
Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner),
pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical
abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result
of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of
deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support.7
_______________
4 Id.
5 Section 3(a), R.A. 9262.
6 Rollo, pp. 63-83.
7 Id., at pp. 66-67.
384
Garcia vs. Drilon
Private respondent’s claims
Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34
years old and the former was eleven years her senior. They have
three (3) children, namely: Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17 years old, who is
the natural child of petitioner but whom private respondent
adopted; Jessie Anthone J. Garcia, 6 years old; and Joseph Eduard
J. Garcia, 3 years old.8
Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful
wife, whose life revolved around her husband. On the other hand,
petitioner, who is of Filipino-Chinese descent, is dominant,
controlling, and demands absolute obedience from his wife and
children. He forbade private respondent to pray, and deliberately
isolated her from her friends. When she took up law, and even
when she was already working part time at a law office, petitioner
trivialized her ambitions and prevailed upon her to just stay at
home. He was often jealous of the fact that his attractive wife still
catches the eye of some men, at one point threatening that he
would have any man eyeing her killed.9
Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair
with a bank manager of Robinson’s Bank, Bacolod City, who is the
godmother of one of their sons. Petitioner admitted to the affair
when private respondent confronted him about it in 2004. He even
boasted to the household help about his sexual relations with said
bank manager. Petitioner told private respondent, though, that he
was just using the woman because of their accounts with the
bank.10
Petitioner’s infidelity spawned a series of fights that left private
respondent physically and emotionally wounded. In one of their
quarrels, petitioner grabbed private respondent on both arms and
shook her with such force that caused
_______________
8 Id., at p. 64.
9 Id., at pp. 67-68.
10 Id., at pp. 68-70.
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Garcia vs. Drilon
bruises and hematoma. At another time, petitioner hit private
respondent forcefully on the lips that caused some bleeding.
Petitioner sometimes turned his ire on their daughter, Jo-Ann, who
had seen the text messages he sent to his paramour and whom he
blamed for squealing on him. He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and
slapped her many times. When private respondent decided to leave
petitioner, Jo-Ann begged her mother to stay for fear that if the
latter leaves, petitioner would beat her up. Even the small boys are
aware of private respondent’s sufferings. Their 6-year-old son said
that when he grows up, he would beat up his father because of his
cruelty to private respondent.11
All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private
respondent to the brink of despair. On December 17, 2005, while at
home, she attempted suicide by cutting her wrist. She was found
by her son bleeding on the floor. Petitioner simply fled the house
instead of taking her to the hospital. Private respondent was
hospitalized for about seven (7) days in which time petitioner never
bothered to visit, nor apologized or showed pity on her. Since then,
private respondent has been undergoing therapy almost every
week and is taking anti-depressant medications.12
When private respondent informed the management of
Robinson’s Bank that she intends to file charges against the bank
manager, petitioner got angry with her for jeopardizing the
manager’s job. He then packed his things and told private
respondent that he was leaving her for good. He even told private
respondent’s mother, who lives with them in the family home, that
private respondent should just accept his extramarital affair since
he is not cohabiting with his paramour and has not sired a child
with her.13
_______________
11 Id., at pp. 70-71.
12 Id., at p. 72.
13 Id., at p. 73.
386
Garcia vs. Drilon
Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but
she is afraid that he would take her children from her and deprive
her of financial support. Petitioner had previously warned her that
if she goes on a legal battle with him, she would not get a single
centavo.14
Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the
construction of deep wells. He is the President of three
corporations — 326 Realty Holdings, Inc., Negros Rotadrill
Corporation, and J-Bros Trading Corporation — of which he and
private respondent are both stockholders. In contrast to the
absolute control of petitioner over said corporations, private
respondent merely draws a monthly salary of P20,000.00 from one
corporation only, the Negros Rotadrill Corporation. Household
expenses amounting to not less than P200,000.00 a month are paid
for by private respondent through the use of credit cards, which, in
turn, are paid by the same corporation together with the bills for
utilities.15
On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of
P60,000.00 from Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and enjoys
unlimited cash advances and other benefits in hundreds of
thousands of pesos from the corporations.16After private respondent
confronted him about the affair, petitioner forbade her to hold
office at JBTC Building, Mandalagan, where all the businesses of
the corporations are conducted, thereby depriving her of access to
full information about said businesses. Until the filing of the
petition a quo, petitioner has not given private respondent an
accounting of the businesses the value of which she had helped
raise to millions of pesos.17
_______________
14 Id., at p. 74.
15 Id., at pp. 65-66.
16 Id., at p. 66.
17 Id., at p. 70.
387
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Garcia vs. Drilon
Action of the RTC of Bacolod City
Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger
of violence against the private respondent and her children exists
or is about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO18on March 24, 2006
effective for thirty (30) days, which is quoted hereunder:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
Ordered to remove all his personal belongings from the conjugal dwelling or family
home within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Restraining Order and if he
refuses, ordering that he be removed by police officers from the conjugal dwelling;
this order is enforceable notwithstanding that the house is under the name of 236
Realty Holdings Inc. (Republic Act No. 9262 states “regardless of ownership”), this is
to allow the Petitioner (private respondent herein) to enter the conjugal dwelling
without any danger from the Respondent. a)
After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the conjugal dwelling, or anytime
the Petitioner decides to return to the conjugal dwelling to remove things, the
Petitioner shall be assisted by police officers when re-entering the family home.
The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner police assistance on Sunday, 26
March 2006 because of the danger that the Respondent will attempt to take her
children from her when he arrives from Manila and finds out about this suit.
To stay away from the petitioner and her children, mother and all her household
help and driver from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter the gate of the
subdivision where the Petitioner may be temporarily residing. b)
Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or otherwise communicate with the
Petitioner, directly or indirectly, or c)
_______________
18 Id., at pp. 84-87.
388

Garcia vs. Drilon
through other persons, or contact directly or indirectly her children, mother and
household help, nor send gifts, cards, flowers, letters and the like. Visitation rights
to the children may be subject of a modified TPO in the future.
To surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK
and ordering the Philippine National Police Firearms and Explosives Unit and the
Provincial Director of the PNP to cancel all the Respondent’s firearm licenses. He
should also be ordered to surrender any unlicensed firearms in his possession or
control. d)
To pay full financial support for the Petitioner and the children, including rental of
a house for them, and educational and medical expenses. e)
Not to dissipate the conjugal business. f)
To render an accounting of all advances, benefits, bonuses and other cash he
received from all the corporations from 1 January 2006 up to 31 March 2006, which
himself and as President of the corporations and his Comptroller, must submit to
the Court not later than 2 April 2006. Thereafter, an accounting of all these funds
shall be reported to the court by the Comptroller, copy furnished to the Petitioner,
every 15 days of the month, under pain of Indirect Contempt of Court. g)
To ensure compliance especially with the order granting support pendente lite, and
considering the financial resources of the Respondent and his threat that if the
Petitioner sues she will not get a single centavo, the Respondent is ordered to put up
a BOND TO KEEP THE PEACE in the amount of FIVE MILLION PESOS, in two
sufficient sureties. h)
On April 24, 2006, upon motion19 of private respondent, the trial

court issued an amended TPO,20 effective for thirty (30) days, which
included the following additional provisions:
_______________
19 Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of Temporary Protection Order (TPO) or Issuance of Modified
TPO. Id., at pp. 90-93.
20 Id., at pp. 94-97.
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Garcia vs. Drilon
The petitioners (private respondents herein) are given the continued use of the
Nissan Patrol and the Starex Van which they are using in Negros Occidental. i)
The petitioners are given the continued use and occupation of the house in
Parañaque, the continued use of the Starex van in Metro Manila, whenever they go
to Manila. j)
Respondent is ordered to immediately post a bond to keep the peace, in two
sufficient sureties. k)
To give monthly support to the petitioner provisionally fixed in the sum of One
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 150,000.00) per month plus rental expenses of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00) per month until the matter of support could
be finally resolved. l)
Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an

Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the
TPO21 seeking the denial of the renewal of the TPO on the grounds
that it did not (1) comply with the three-day notice rule, and (2)
contain a notice of hearing. He further asked that the TPO be
modified by (1) removing one vehicle used by private respondent
and returning the same to its rightful owner, the J-Bros Trading
Corporation, and (2) cancelling or reducing the amount of the bond
from P5,000,000.00 to a more manageable level at
P100,000.00.Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved22 for
the modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to his
children.
On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet again,
but subject only to the following modifications prayed for by
private respondent:
That respondent (petitioner herein) return the clothes and other personal
belongings of Rosalie and her a)
_______________
21 Id., at pp. 98-103.
22 Id., at pp. 138-140.
390

Garcia vs. Drilon
children to Judge Jesus Ramos, co-counsel for Petitioner, within 24 hours from
receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in
Indirect Contempt of Court;
Respondent shall make an accounting or list of furniture and equipment in the
conjugal house in Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City within 24
hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel; b)
Ordering the Chief of the Women’s Desk of the Bacolod City Police Headquarters to
remove Respondent from the conjugal dwelling within eight (8) hours from receipt of
the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, and that he cannot return until 48
hours after the petitioners have left, so that the petitioner Rosalie and her
representatives can remove things from the conjugal home and make an inventory
of the household furniture, equipment and other things in the conjugal home, which
shall be submitted to the Court. c)
Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00 and Php50,000.00 for rental and
Php25,000.00 for clothes of the three petitioners (sic) children within 24 hours from
receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in
indirect contempt of Court; d)
That respondent surrender his two firearms and all unlicensed firearms to the Clerk
of Court within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his
counsel; e)
That respondent shall pay petitioner educational expenses of the children upon
presentation of proof of payment of such expenses. f)23
Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial

support; failed to faithfully comply with the TPO; and committed
new acts of harassment against her and their
_______________
23 Order dated May 24, 2006. Id., at pp. 148-149.
391
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Garcia vs. Drilon
children, private respondent filed another application24 for the
issuance of a TPO ex parte. She alleged inter alia that petitioner
contrived a replevin suit against himself by J-Bros Trading, Inc., of
which the latter was purportedly no longer president, with the end
in view of recovering the Nissan Patrol and Starex Van used by
private respondent and the children. A writ of replevin was served
upon private respondent by a group of six or seven policemen with
long firearms that scared the two small boys, Jessie Anthone and
Joseph Eduard.25
While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to school,
two men allegedly attempted to kidnap him, which incident
traumatized the boy resulting in his refusal to go back to school.
On another occasion, petitioner allegedly grabbed their daughter,
Jo-Ann, by the arm and threatened her.26 The incident was
reported to the police, and Jo-Ann subsequently filed a criminal
complaint against her father for violation of R.A. 7610, also known
as the “Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act.”
Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner’s lawyers initiated the
filing by the housemaids working at the conjugal home of a
complaint for kidnapping and illegal detention against private
respondent. This came about after private respondent, armed with
a TPO, went to said home to get her and her children’s belongings.
Finding some of her things inside a housemaid’s (Sheryl Jamola)
bag in the maids’ room, private respondent filed a case for qualified
theft against Jamola.27
On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO,28 effective for thirty
(30) days, which reads as follows:
_______________
24 Id., at pp. 154-166.
25 Id., at p. 156.
26 Id., at p. 157.
27 Id., at pp. 158-159.
28 Id., at pp. 167-174.
392
Garcia vs. Drilon
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
Prohibited from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through
another, acts of violence against the offended party; 1)
Prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise
communicating in any form with the offended party, either directly or indirectly; 2)
Required to stay away, personally or through his friends, relatives, employees or
agents, from all the Petitioners Rosalie J. Garcia and her children, Rosalie J.
Garcia’s three brothers, her mother Primitiva Jaype, cook Novelita Caranzo, driver
Romeo Hontiveros, laundrywoman Mercedita Bornales, security guard Darwin
Gayona and the petitioner’s other household helpers from a distance of 1,000
meters, and shall not enter the gate of the subdivision where the Petitioners are
temporarily residing, as well as from the schools of the three children; Furthermore,
that respondent shall not contact the schools of the children directly or indirectly in
any manner including, ostensibly to pay for their tuition or other fees directly,
otherwise he will have access to the children through the schools and the TPO will
be rendered nugatory; 3)
Directed to surrender all his firearms including .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther
PPK to the Court; 4)
Directed to deliver in full financial support of Php200,000.00 a month and
Php50,000.00 for rental for the period from August 6 to September 6, 2006; and
support in arrears from March 2006 to August 2006 the total amount of
Php1,312,000.00; 5)
Directed to deliver educational expenses for 2006-2007 the amount of Php75,000.00
and Php25,000.00; 6)
Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan Patrol with Plate No. FEW 508 and
a Starex van with Plate No. FFD 991 and should the respondent fail to deliver said
vehicles, respondent is ordered to provide the petitioner another vehicle which is the
one taken by J Bros Tading; 7)393
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Garcia vs. Drilon
Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate, sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the
conjugal assets, or those real properties in the name of Jesus Chua Garcia only and
those in which the conjugal partnership of gains of the Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia
and respondent have an interest in, especially the conjugal home located in No. 14,
Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City, and other properties which are
conjugal assets or those in which the conjugal partnership of gains of Petitioner
Rosalie J. Garcia and the respondent have an interest in and listed in Annexes “I,”
“I-1,” and “I-2,” including properties covered by TCT Nos. T-186325 and T-168814;
8)
Ordered that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City and E.B. Magalona shall be
served a copy of this TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER and are ordered not to
allow the transfer, sale, encumbrance or disposition of these above-cited properties
to any person, entity or corporation without the personal presence of petitioner
Rosalie J. Garcia, who shall affix her signature in the presence of the Register of
Deeds, due to the fear of petitioner Rosalie that her signature will be forged in order
to effect the encumbrance or sale of these properties to defraud her or the conjugal
partnership of gains. 9)
In its Order29 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court extended
the aforequoted TPO for another ten (10) days, and gave petitioner
a period of five (5) days within which to show cause why the TPO
should not be renewed, extended, or modified. Upon petitioner’s
manifestation,30 however, that he has not received a copy of private
respondent’s motion to modify/renew the TPO, the trial court
directed in its Order31 dated October 6, 2006 that petitioner be
furnished a copy of said motion. Nonetheless, an Order32dated a
day earlier, October
_______________
29 Id., at p. 182.
30 Id., at pp. 183-184.
31 Id., at p. 185.
32 Id., at pp. 186-187.
394
Garcia vs. Drilon
5, had already been issued renewing the TPO dated August 23,
2006. The pertinent portion is quoted hereunder:
xxxx
x x x it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be finally terminated, the
Temporary Protection Order issued on August 23, 2006 is hereby renewed and
extended for thirty (30) days and continuously extended and renewed for thirty (30)
days, after each expiration, until further orders, and subject to such modifications as
may be ordered by the court.
After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no

longer submitted the required comment to private respondent’s
motion for renewal of the TPO arguing that it would only be an
“exercise in futility.”33
Proceedings before the CA
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed
before the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition34 for prohibition (CA-
G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698), with prayer for injunction and
temporary restraining order, challenging (1) the constitutionality
of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due process and the equal
protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified TPO issued
in the civil case for being “an unwanted product of an invalid law.”
On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary
Restraining Order35 (TRO) against the enforcement of the TPO, the
amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto.
_______________
33 See Manifestation dated October 10, 2006. Id., at pp. 188-189.
34 Id., at pp. 104-137.
35 Id., at pp. 151-152.
395
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Garcia vs. Drilon
Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court
dismissed36 the petition for failure of petitioner to raise the
constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial court in the
civil case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same.
Secondly, the challenge to the validity of R.A. 9262 through a
petition for prohibition seeking to annul the protection orders
issued by the trial court constituted a collateral attack on said law.
His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having
been denied in the Resolution37 dated August 14, 2007, petitioner is
now before us alleging that—
The Issues
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE THEORY
THAT THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT RAISED AT THE EARLIEST
OPPORTUNITY AND THAT, THE PETITION CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK
ON THE VALIDITY OF THE LAW.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN FAILING TO
CONCLUDE THAT R.A. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT FINDING THAT
R.A. 9262 RUNS COUNTER TO THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION.
_______________
36 Decision dated January 24, 2007. Penned by Associate Justice Priscilla Baltazar-Padilla, with Associate
Justices Arsenio J. Magpale and Romeo F. Barza, concurring. Id., at pp. 47-57.
37 Id., at pp. 60-61.
396

Garcia vs. Drilon
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LAW DOES
VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A BASIC
SOCIAL INSTITUTION.
V.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING R.A. No. 9262 AS
INVALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE
DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO THE BARANGAY OFFICIALS.38
The Ruling of the Court

Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner
against the constitutionality of R.A. 9262, we shall first tackle the
propriety of the dismissal by the appellate court of the petition for
prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698) filed by petitioner.
As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity so that if not raised in the
pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised in the trial, and if not
raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on
appeal.39 Courts will not anticipate a question of constitutional law
in advance of the necessity of deciding it.40
In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A.
9262 before the RTC of Bacolod City, petitioner argues that the
Family Court has limited authority and jurisdiction that is
“inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality.”41
_______________
38 Petition, Id., at p. 22.
39 ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Philippine Multi-Media System, Inc., G.R. Nos. 175769-70,
January 19, 2009, 576 SCRA 262, 289.
40 Philippine National Bank v. Palma, 503 Phil. 917, 932; 466 SCRA 307, 323 (2005).
41 Petition, Rollo, p. 24.
397
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Garcia vs. Drilon
We disagree.
Family Courts have authority
and jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of a statute.
At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special
courts, of the same level as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A.
8369, otherwise known as the “Family Courts Act of 1997,” family
courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases
of domestic violence against women and children.42 In accordance
with said law, the Supreme Court designated from among the
branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court in
each of several key cities identified.43 To achieve harmony with the
first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides that
Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined
under the latter law, viz.:
_______________
42 5. SEC.Jurisdiction of Family Courts.—The Family Courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
xxxx
Cases of domestic violence against: k)
Women—which are acts of gender based violence that results, or are likely to result in
physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women; and other forms of physical abuse
such as battering or threats and coercion which violate a woman’s personhood, integrity and
freedom movement; and 1)
Children—which include the commission of all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation,
violence, and discrimination and all other conditions prejudicial to their development. 2)
43 Sec. 17, R.A. 8369.
398
Garcia vs. Drilon
7. SEC.Venue.—The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family
Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against
women and their children under this law. In the absence of such court in the place
where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court
where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the
complainant. (Emphasis supplied)
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod

City remains possessed of authority as a court of general original
jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal,
special proceedings, land registration, guardianship,
naturalization, admiralty or insolvency.44 It is settled that RTCs
have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, 45 “this
authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial
power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the
criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law.”46The
Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to
declare the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty,
international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in
all RTCs.47 We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA48 that,
“[p]lainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts
should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any
treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of
inferior courts
_______________
44 Manalo v. Mariano, 161 Phil. 108, 120; 69 SCRA 80, 89 (1976).
45 Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 485,
504.
46 Drilon v. Lim, G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994, 235 SCRA 135, 140.
47 Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, supra note 45, at 505, citing Mirasol v. CA, 403
Phil. 760; 351 SCRA 44 (2001).
48 G.R. Nos. L-18128 & L-18672, December 26, 1961, 3 SCRA 696, 703-704.
399
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 399
Garcia vs. Drilon
in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue.”
Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads in part as
follows:
The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: 5. SEC.
xxx
Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or 2. certiorari, as
the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders
of lower courts in:
All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question. a.
xxxx
Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of

constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could have been raised at the earliest
opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for protection order
before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction to
determine the same, subject to the review of this Court.
Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against
Women and Their Children, lays down a new kind of procedure
requiring the respondent to file an opposition to the petition and
not an answer.49 Thus:
20. SEC.Opposition to petition.—(a) The respondent may file an opposition to the
petition which he himself shall verify. It must be accompanied by the affidavits of
witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order
should not be issued.
_______________
49 RATIONALE OF THE PROPOSED RULES ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN.
400

Garcia vs. Drilon
Respondent shall (b) not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-
claim or third-party complaint, but any cause of action which could be the
subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)
We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that,

since a counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party complaint are to
be excluded from the opposition, the issue of constitutionality
cannot likewise be raised therein. A counterclaim is defined as
any claim for money or other relief which a defending party may
have against an opposing party.50 A crossclaim, on the other hand,
is any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the
original action or of a counterclaim therein.51 Finally, a third-
party complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with
leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action for
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect
of his opponent’s claim.52 As pointed out by Justice Teresita J.
Leonardo-De Castro, the unconstitutionality of a statute is not a
cause of action that could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-
claim or a third-party complaint. Therefore, it is not prohibited
from being raised in the opposition in view of the familiar
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the
resolution of the case a quo because the right of private respondent
to a protection order is founded solely on the very
_______________
50 Korea Exchange Bank v. Hon. Rogelio C. Gonzales, 496 Phil. 127, 143-144; 456 SCRA 224, 241
(2005); Spouses Sapugay v. CA, 262 Phil. 506, 513; 183 SCRA 464, 479 (1990).
51 Sec. 8, Rule 6, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
52 Sec. 11, Rule 6, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
401
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Garcia vs. Drilon
statute the validity of which is being attacked53 by petitioner who
has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. The alleged unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, for all
intents and purposes, a valid cause for the non-issuance of a
protection order.That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are
summary in nature should not have deterred petitioner from
raising the same in his Opposition. The question relative to the
constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does not need to
be supported by evidence.54 Be that as it may, Section 25 of A.M.
No. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless allows the conduct of a hearing to
determine legal issues, among others, viz.:
25. SEC.Order for further hearing.—In case the court determines the need for
further hearing, it may issue an order containing the following:
Facts undisputed and admitted; (a)
Factual and (b) legal issues to be resolved;
Evidence, including objects and documents that have been marked and will be
presented; (c)
Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their direct testimonies in the
form of affidavits; and (d)
Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties which shall be done in one
day, to the extent possible, within the 30-day period of the effectivity of the
temporary protection order issued. (Emphasis supplied) (e)
To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the

conduct of a hearing when necessary, Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-
10-11-SC provides that if a temporary protection
_______________
53 See People of the Philippine Islands and Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation v. Vera, 65
Phil. 199 (1937); Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) v. Republic, G.R. Nos.
177857-58, January 24, 2012, 663 SCRA 514, 594.
54 Recreation and Amusement Association of the Philippines v. City of Manila, 100 Phil. 950, 956
(1957).
402
Garcia vs. Drilon
order issued is due to expire, the trial court may extend or renew
the said order for a period of thirty (30) days each time until final
judgment is rendered. It may likewise modify the extended or
renewed temporary protection order as may be necessary to meet
the needs of the parties. With the private respondent given ample
protection, petitioner could proceed to litigate the constitutional
issues, without necessarily running afoul of the very purpose for
the adoption of the rules on summary procedure.
In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly
dismissed the petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction
and temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. CEB - SP. No. 01698).
Petitioner may have proceeded upon an honest belief that if he
finds succor in a superior court, he could be granted an injunctive
relief. However, Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly
disallows the filing of a petition for certiorari, mandamus or
prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the trial
court. Hence, the 60-day TRO issued by the appellate court in this
case against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and
other orders pursuant thereto was improper, and it effectively
hindered the case from taking its normal course in an expeditious
and summary manner.
As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal
or certiorari before judgment is prohibited. Moreover, if the appeal
of a judgment granting permanent protection shall not stay its
enforcement,55 with more reason that a TPO, which is valid only for
thirty (30) days at a time,56 should not be enjoined.The mere fact
that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not
of itself entitle a litigant to have the same enjoined.57 In Younger v.
Harris, Jr.,58 the Supreme Court of the United States declared,
thus:
_______________
55 Secs. 22 and 31, A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC.
56 Sec. 26 (b), A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC.
57 Sto. Domingo v. De Los Angeles, 185 Phil. 94, 102; 96 SCRA 139, 147 (1980).
403
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Garcia vs. Drilon
Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or
with respect to their separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted as a
matter of course, even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or member of
the community is immune from prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal
acts. The imminence of such a prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized
and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief in equity which exerts its
extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its
aid. (Citations omitted)
The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status

quo until the trial court hears fully the merits of the case. It bears
stressing, however, that protection orders are granted ex parte so
as to protect women and their children from acts of violence. To
issue an injunction against such orders will defeat the very
purpose of the law against VAWC.
Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk
from our obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of first
impression, with far-reaching implications. We have, time and
again, discharged our solemn duty as final arbiter of constitutional
issues, and with more reason now, in view of private respondent’s
plea in her Comment59to the instant Petition that we should put
the challenge to the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest. And so
we shall.
Intent of Congress in
enacting R.A. 9262.
Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and
criminalize spousal and child abuse, which could very well be
committed by either the husband or the wife,
_______________
58 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), cited in The Executive Secretary v. Court of Appeals, 473 Phil. 27, 56-57; 429
SCRA 81, 102 (2004).
59 Rollo, pp. 214-240, 237.
404
Garcia vs. Drilon
gender alone is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of
the remedies under the law.60
A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No.
2723,61 which became R.A. 9262, reveals that while the sponsor,
Senator Luisa Pimentel-Ejercito (better known as Senator Loi
Estrada), had originally proposed what she called a “synthesized
measure”62 — an amalgamation of two measures, namely, the
“Anti-Domestic Violence Act” and the “AntiAbuse of Women in
Intimate Relationships Act”63 — providing protection to “all family
members, leaving no one in isolation” but at the same time giving
special attention to women as the “usual victims” of violence and
abuse,64 nonetheless, it was eventually agreed that men be denied
protection under the same measure. We quote pertinent portions of
the deliberations:
Wednesday, December 10, 2003
Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr. President. Some
women’s groups have expressed concerns and relayed these concerns to me
that if we are to include domestic violence apart from against women as well
as other members of the household, including children or the husband, they
fear that this would weaken the efforts to address domestic violence of which
the main victims or the bulk of the victims really are the wives, the spouses
or the female partners in a relationship. We would like to place that on
record. How does the good Senator respond to this kind of observation?
_______________
60 Petition, Id., at pp. 26-27.
61 An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Members of the Family,
Prescribing Penalties Therefor, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims and
for Other Purposes.
62 Congressional Records, Vol. III, No. 45, December 10, 2003, p. 27.
63 Id., at p. 25.
64 Id., at p. 27.
405
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Garcia vs. Drilon
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of women who call
themselves “WIIR” Women in Intimate Relationship. They do not want to
include men in this domestic violence. But plenty of men are also being
abused by women. I am playing safe so I placed here members of the family,
prescribing penalties therefor and providing protective measures for victims.
This includes the men, children, live-in, common-law wives, and those
related with the family.65
xxxx
Wednesday, January 14, 2004
xxxx
The President Pro Tempore. x x x
Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the discussion whether
to limit this to women and not to families which was the issue of the AWIR
group. The understanding that I have is that we would be having a broader
scope rather than just women, if I remember correctly, Madam sponsor.
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.
As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator Pangilinan during the
interpellation period.
I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.
Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of the measure. Do
not get me wrong. However, I believe that there is a need to protect women’s
rights especially in the domestic environment.
As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless women who have
not had the opportunity to file a case against their spouses, their live-in
_______________
65 Id., at pp. 43-44.
406

Garcia vs. Drilon
partners after years, if not decade, of battery and abuse. If we
broaden the scope to include even the men, assuming they can at
all be abused by the women or their spouses, then it would not
equalize the already difficult situation for women, Mr. President.
I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations, concurs with
this position. I am sure that the men in this Chamber who love their women
in their lives so dearly will agree with this representation. Whether we like it
or not, it is an unequal world. Whether we like it or not, no matter how
empowered the women are, we are not given equal opportunities especially in
the domestic environment where the macho Filipino man would always feel
that he is stronger, more superior to the Filipino woman.
xxxx
The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?
Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the committee came up
with this bill because the family members have been included in this
proposed measure since the other members of the family other than women
are also possible victims of violence. While women are most likely the
intended victims, one reason incidentally why the measure focuses on
women, the fact remains that in some relatively few cases, men also stand to
be victimized and that children are almost always the helpless victims of
violence. I am worried that there may not be enough protection extended to
other family members particularly children who are excluded. Although
Republic Act No. 7610, for instance, more or less, addresses the special needs
of abused children. The same law is inadequate. Protection orders for one are
not available in said law.
I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about granting the same
protection to men, fearing that they may use this law to justify their abusive
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behavior against women. However, we should also recognize that
there are established procedures and standards in our courts
which give credence to evidentiary support and cannot just
arbitrarily and whimsically entertain baseless complaints.
Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family relations and to
protect the family as the basic social institution. Though I recognize the
unequal power relations between men and women in our society, I believe we
have an obligation to uphold inherent rights and dignity of both husband and
wife and their immediate family members, particularly children.
While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to include other
family members as a critical input arrived at after a series of
consultations/meetings with various NGOs, experts, sports groups and other
affected sectors, Mr. President.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the other senators.
Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on the Floor.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is recognized.
Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed amendment of Senator
Legarda would be removing the “men and children” in this particular bill and
focus specifically on women alone. That will be the net effect of that proposed
amendment. Hearing the rationale mentioned by the distinguished sponsor,
Sen. Luisa “Loi” Ejercito Estrada, I am not sure now whether she is inclined
to accept the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda.
I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not because if she is
going to accept this, I will propose an amendment to the amendment rather
than object to the amendment, Mr. President.408

Garcia vs. Drilon
xxxx
Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?
xxxx
Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an amendment to the amendment.
The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the amendment?
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the rationale used by the
distinguished proponent of the amendment. As a matter of fact, I tend to
agree. Kung may maaabuso, mas malamang iyong babae kaysa sa lalake. At
saka iyong mga lalake, puwede na talagang magulpi iyan. Okey lang iyan.
But I cannot agree that we remove the children from this particular measure.
So, if I may propose an amendment—
The President Pro Tempore. To the amendment.
Senator Sotto.—more than the women, the children are very much abused. As a
matter of fact, it is not limited to minors. The abuse is not limited to seven,
six, 5-year-old children. I have seen 14, 15-year-old children being abused by
their fathers, even by their mothers. And it breaks my heart to find out about
these things.
Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children, this particular
measure will update that. It will enhance and hopefully prevent the abuse of
children and not only women.409
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SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS
Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we remove the aspect of
the men in the bill but not the children.
Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority Leader.
The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be women AND
CHILDREN.
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being
none, the amendment, as amended, is approved.66
It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom,

justice, policy, or expediency of a statute.67 Hence, we dare not
venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the members of
Congress in limiting the protection against violence and abuse
under R.A. 9262 to women and children only. No proper challenge
on said grounds may be entertained in this proceeding. Congress
has made its choice and it is not our prerogative to supplant this
judgment. The choice may be perceived as erroneous but even then,
the remedy against it is to seek its amendment or repeal by the
legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the
legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and
expediency of any law.68We only step in when there is a violation of
the Constitution. However, none was sufficiently shown in this
case.
_______________
66 Congressional Records, Vol. III, No. 51, January 14, 2004, pp. 141-147.
67 Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) v. The Secretary of Budget and Management, G.R.
No. 164987, April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 373, 391.
68 Garcia v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 111511, October 5, 1993, 227 SCRA 100, 113-114.
410
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R.A. 9262 does not violate the
guaranty of equal protection
of the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated
disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workers’ Union69 is instructive:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a
requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that
every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of
operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as
such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that
things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same.
The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are
different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to
which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the
grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in
certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea
of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere
fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that
is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on
_______________
69 158 Phil. 60, 86-87; 59 SCRA 54, 77-78 (1974).
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substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane
to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court
has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on
a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. (Emphasis
supplied)
Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we

find that R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification as shall
hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not violate the equal
protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of
violence and abuse to whom the State extends its protection.
R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions. I.
The unequal power relationship between women and men; the
fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence;
and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all
make for real differencesjustifying the classification under the
law. As Justice McIntyre succinctly states, “the accommodation of
differences ... is the essence of true equality.”70
Unequal power relationship A.
between men and women
According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National
Machinery for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment),
violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with
the unequal power relationship between women and
men otherwise known as “gender-based violence”. Societal norms
and traditions dictate people to
_______________
70 Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, p. 169.
412
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think men are the leaders, pursuers, providers, and take on
dominant roles in society while women are nurturers, men’s
companions and supporters, and take on subordinate roles in
society. This perception leads to men gaining more power over
women. With power comes the need to control to retain that power.
And VAW is a form of men’s expression of controlling women to
retain power.71
The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a
human rights issue, passed its Resolution 48/104 on the
Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women on
December 20, 1993 stating that “violence against women is a
manifestation of historically unequal power relations
between men and women, which have led to domination over
and discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of
the full advancement of women, and that violence against women
is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced
into subordinate positions, compared with men.”72
Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical and
social context of gender-based violence and developments in
advocacies to eradicate VAW, in his remarks delivered during the
Joint Launching of R.A. 9262 and its Implementing Rules last
October 27, 2004, the pertinent portions of which are quoted
hereunder:
History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of violence against women.
The patriarch of a family was accorded the right to use force on members of the
family under his control. I quote the early studies:
_______________
71 Philippine Commission on Women, National Machinery for Gender Equality and Women’s
Empowerment, “Violence Against Women (VAW),” <http://www.pcw.gov.ph> (visited November 16, 2012).
72 <http://www.lawphil.net/international/treaties/dec_dec_1993.html> (visited November 16, 2012).
413
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Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in patriarchy—the
institutional rule of men. Women were seen in virtually all societies to be naturally
inferior both physically and intellectually. In ancient Western societies, women
whether slave, concubine or wife, were under the authority of men. In law, they
were treated as property.
The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or even kill,
his wife if she endangered his property right over her. Judaism, Christianity and
other religions oriented towards the patriarchal family strengthened the male
dominated structure of society.
English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women. Even the
eminent Blackstone has been quoted in his commentaries as saying husband and
wife were one and that one was the husband. However, in the late 1500s and
through the entire 1600s, English common law began to limit the right of husbands
to chastise their wives. Thus, common law developed the rule of thumb, which
allowed husbands to beat their wives with a rod or stick no thicker than their
thumb.
In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of these rights to chastise
wives or inflict corporeal punishment ceased. Even then, the preservation of the
family was given more importance than preventing violence to women.
The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United States followed that of
the English common law. In 1871, the Supreme Court of Alabama became the first
appellate court to strike down the common law right of a husband to beat his wife:
The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one’s wife with a stick, to
pull her hair, choke her, spit in her face or kick her about the floor, or to
inflict upon her like indignities, is not now acknowledged by our law... In
person, the wife is entitled to the same protection of the law that the
husband can invoke for himself.414

Garcia vs. Drilon
As time marched on, the women’s advocacy movement became more organized.
The temperance leagues initiated it. These leagues had a simple focus. They
considered the evils of alcoholism as the root cause of wife abuse. Hence, they
demonstrated and picketed saloons, bars and their husbands’ other watering holes.
Soon, however, their crusade was joined by suffragette movements, expanding the
liberation movement’s agenda. They fought for women’s right to vote, to own
property, and more. Since then, the feminist movement was on the roll.
The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of the domestic violence
to the public gaze. They succeeded in transforming the issue into an important
public concern. No less than the United States Supreme Court, in 1992
case Planned Parenthood v. Casey, noted:
In an average 12-month period in this country, approximately two million
women are the victims of severe assaults by their male partners. In a 1985
survey, women reported that nearly one of every eight husbands had
assaulted their wives during the past year. The [American Medical
Association] views these figures as “marked underestimates,” because the
nature of these incidents discourages women from reporting them, and
because surveys typically exclude the very poor, those who do not speak
English well, and women who are homeless or in institutions or hospitals
when the survey is conducted. According to the AMA, “researchers on family
violence agree that the true incidence of partner violence is
probably double the above estimates; or four million severely assaulted
women per year.”
Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to one-third of all women
will be physically assaulted by a partner or ex-partner during their lifetime...
Thus on an average day in the United States, nearly 11,000 women are
severely assaulted by their male partners. Many of these incidents involve
sexual assault... In families where wife beat-
415
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ing takes place, moreover, child abuse is often present as well.
Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical violence is
only the most visible form of abuse. Psychological abuse, particularly forced
social and economic isolation of women, is also common.
Many victims of domestic violence remain with their abusers, perhaps
because they perceive no superior alternative...Many abused women who
find temporary refuge in shelters return to their husbands, in large part
because they have no other source of income... Returning to one’s abuser can
be dangerous. Recent Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics disclose that
8.8 percent of all homicide victims in the United States are killed by their
spouses...Thirty percent of female homicide victims are killed by their male
partners.
Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the Violence Against Women
Act.
In the International front, the women’s struggle for equality was no less
successful. The United States Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights affirmed the equality of all human beings. In 1979, the UN General
Assembly adopted the landmark Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). In 1993, the UN General Assembly also
adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women. World
conferences on the role and rights of women have been regularly held in Mexico
City, Copenhagen, Nairobi and Beijing. The UN itself established a Commission on
the Status of Women.
The Philippines has been in cadence with the half — and full — steps of all these
women’s movements. No less than Section 14, Article II of our 1987 Constitution
mandates the State to recognize the role of women in nation building and to ensure
the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. Our Senate has ratified
the CEDAW as well as the Convention on the Rights of
416

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the Child and its two protocols. To cap it all, Congress, on March 8, 2004, enacted
Rep. Act No. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their
Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties
therefor and for other Purposes.” (Citations omitted)
Women are the “usual” and “most likely” victims of

violence. B.
At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723, official
statistics on violence against women and children show that —
x x x physical injuries had the highest number of cases at 5,058 in 2002
representing 55.63% of total cases reported (9,903). And for the first semester of
2003, there were 2,381 reported cases out of 4,354 cases which represent 54.31%.
xxx (T)he total number of women in especially difficult circumstances served by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) for the year 2002, there are
1,417 physically abused/maltreated cases out of the total of 5,608 cases. xxx (T)here
are 1,091 DSWD cases out of a total number of 3,471 cases for the first semester of
2003. Female violence comprised more than 90% of all forms of abuse and violence
and more than 90% of these reported cases were committed by the women’s intimate
partners such as their husbands and live-in partners.73
Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women presented

comparative statistics on violence against women across an eight-
year period from 2004 to August of 2011 with violations
_______________
73 As reported by Senator Loi Estrada in her Sponsorship Speech, Congressional Records, Vol. III, No.
45, December 10, 2003, p. 22.
417
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under R.A. 9262 ranking first among the different VAW
categories since its implementation in 2004,74 thus:
Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence Against Women, 2004 - 2011* Table 1.
Reported Cases 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Rape 997 927 659 837 811 770 1,042 832
Incestuous Rape 38 46 26 22 28 27 19 23
Attempted Rape 194 148 185 147 204 167 268 201
Acts of Lasci-viousness 580 536 382 358 445 485 745 625
Physical Injuries 3,553 2,335 1,892 1,505 1,307 1,498 2,018 1,588
Sexual Harassment 53 37 38 46 18 54 83 63
RA 9262 218 924 1,269 2,387 3,599 5,285 9,974 9,021
Threats 319 223 199 182 220 208 374 213
Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence Against Women, 2004 - 2011* Table 1.
Seduction 62 19 29 30 19 19 25 15
Concubinage 121 102 93 109 109 99 158 128
RA 9208 17 11 16 24 34 152 190 62
Abduction / Kidnapping 29 16 34 23 28 18 25 22
Unjust Vexation 90 50 59 59 83 703 183 155
Total 6,271 5,374 4,881 5,729 6,905 9,485 15,104 12,948
*2011 report covers only from January to August
Source: Philippine National Police – Women and Children Protection Center (WCPC)
On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be obtained on
domestic abuse and violence against men in the Philippines
because incidents thereof are relatively low and, perhaps, because
many men will not even attempt to report the
_______________
74 Philippine Commission on Women, “Statistics on Violence Against Filipino Women,”
<http://pcw.gov.ph/statistics/201210/statistics-violence-against-filipino-women> (visited October 12, 2012).
418
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situation. In the United Kingdom, 32% of women who had ever
experienced domestic violence did so four or five (or more) times,
compared with 11% of the smaller number of men who had ever
experienced domestic violence; and women constituted 89% of all
those who had experienced 4 or more incidents of domestic
violence.75 Statistics in Canada show that spousal violence by a
woman against a man is less likely to cause injury than the other
way around (18 percent versus 44 percent). Men, who experience
violence from their spouses are much less likely to live in fear of
violence at the hands of their spouses, and much less likely to
experience sexual assault. In fact, many cases of physical violence
by a woman against a spouse are in self-defense or the result of
many years of physical or emotional abuse.76
While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and
abuse perpetrated against men in the Philippines, the same cannot
render R.A. 9262 invalid.
In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance
requiring drivers of animal-drawn vehicles to pick up, gather and
deposit in receptacles the manure emitted or discharged by their
vehicle-drawing animals in any public highways, streets, plazas,
parks or alleys, said ordinance was challenged as violative of the
guaranty of equal protection of laws as its application is limited to
owners and drivers of vehicle-drawing animals and not to those
animals, although not utilized, but similarly pass through the
same streets.
The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for the reason
that, while there may be non-vehicle-drawing animals
_______________
75 Women’s Aid, “Who are the victims of domestic violence?,” citing Walby and Allen, 2004,
<www.womensaid.org.uk/domestic-violence-articles.asp?section=00010001002200410001&itemid=1273
(visited November 16, 2012).
76 Toronto District School Board, Facts and Statistics <www.tdsb.on.ca/site/viewitem.asp?siteid=15&
menuid=23082&pageid=20007>(visited November 16, 2012).
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that also traverse the city roads, “but their number must be
negligible and their appearance therein merely occasional,
compared to the rig-drawing ones, as not to constitute a menace to
the health of the community.”77 The mere fact that the legislative
classification may result in actual inequality is not violative of the
right to equal protection, for every classification of persons or
things for regulation by law produces inequality in some degree,
but the law is not thereby rendered invalid.78
C. Gender bias and prejudices
From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial,
and sentencing, crimes against women are often treated differently
and less seriously than other crimes. This was argued by then
United States Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., now Vice President,
chief sponsor of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), in
defending the civil rights remedy as a valid exercise of the U.S.
Congress’ authority under the Commerce and Equal Protection
Clauses. He stressed that the widespread gender bias in the
U.S. has institutionalized historic prejudices against victims of
rape or domestic violence, subjecting them to “double
victimization”—first at the hands of the offender and then of the
legal system.79
Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her Sponsorship
Speech for Senate Bill No. 2723 that “(w)henever violence occurs in
the family, the police treat it as a private matter and advise the
parties to settle the conflict themselves. Once the complainant
brings the case to the prosecutor, the latter is hesitant to file the
complaint for fear that it might later be
_______________
77 People v. Solon, 110 Phil. 39, 41 (1960).
78 Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, supra note 69, p. 90; p. 80.
79 Biden, Jr., Joseph R., “The Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act: A Defense,” 37
Harvard Journal on Legislation 1 (Winter, 2000).
420
Garcia vs. Drilon
withdrawn. This lack of response or reluctance to be involved by
the police and prosecution reinforces the escalating, recurring and
often serious nature of domestic violence.”80
Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices and
biases against our women.
In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined RTC Judge
Venancio J. Amila for Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge. He used
derogatory and irreverent language in reference to the
complainant in a petition for TPO and PPO under R.A. 9262,
calling her as “only a live-in partner” and presenting her as an
“opportunist” and a “mistress” in an “illegitimate relationship.”
Judge Amila even called her a “prostitute,” and accused her of
being motivated by “insatiable greed” and of absconding with the
contested property.81 Such remarks betrayed Judge Amila’s
prejudices and lack of gender sensitivity.
The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination
brought about by biases and prejudices against women. As
emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting
discrimination through specific measures focused on women
does not discriminate against men.82 Petitioner’s
contention,83 therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that it
is an “anti-male,” “husband-bashing,” and “hate-men” law deserves
scant consideration. As a State Party to the CEDAW, the
Philippines bound itself to take all appropriate measures “to
modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and
women, with a view to achieving the elimi-
_______________
80 Congressional Records, Vol. III, No. 45, December 10, 2003, pp. 22-23.
81 Benancillo v. Amila, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2149, March 9, 2011, 645 SCRA 1, 8.
82 “General recommendation No. 25, on article 4, paragraph 1, of the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination against Women, on temporary special measures” <www.un.org/
womenwatch/.../recommendation> (visited January 4, 2013).
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nation of prejudices and customary and all other practices which
are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of
the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.”84 Justice Puno
correctly pointed out that “(t)he paradigm shift changing the
character of domestic violence from a private affair to a public
offense will require the development of a distinct mindset on the
part of the police, the prosecution and the judges.”85
The classification is germane to the purpose of the
law. II.
The distinction between men and women is germane to the
purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed
against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of
Policy, as follows:
2. SEC.Declaration of Policy.—It is hereby declared that the State values the
dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The
State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly
women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed
against women and children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed
under the Constitution and the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international human
rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.
_______________
84 Article 5(a), CEDAW.
85 “The Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children,” Remarks delivered during the Joint
Launching of R.A. 9262 and its Implementing Rules last October 27, 2004 at the Session Hall of the
Supreme Court.
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In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which
the Philippines ratified on August 5, 1981. Subsequently, the
Optional Protocol to the CEDAW was also ratified by the
Philippines on October 6, 2003.86 This Convention mandates that
State parties shall accord to women equality with men before the
law87 and shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage
and family relations on the basis of equality of men and
women.88 The Philippines likewise ratified the Convention on the
Rights of the Child and its two protocols.89 It is, thus, bound by said
Conventions and their respective protocols.
The classification is not limited to existing conditions
only, and apply equally to all members III.
Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the
existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to future
conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women
and their children are threatened by violence and abuse.
R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer
violence and abuse. Section 3 thereof defines VAWC as:
x x x any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is
his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual
or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child
whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result
in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or
economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harass-
_______________
86 Supra note 49.
87 Article 15.
88 Article 16.
89 Supra note 49.
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ment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the
following acts:
A.“Physical Violence” refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;
B.“Sexual violence” refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a
woman or her child. It includes, but is not limited to:
rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her
child as a sex object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks,
physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim’s body, forcing her/him to
watch obscene publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman or her
child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and
mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in the same
room with the abuser; a)
acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual
activity by force, threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical
or other harm or coercion; b)
Prostituting the woman or child. c)
C.“Psychological violence” refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause
mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation,
harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated
verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to
witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to
which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness
abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody
and/or visitation of common children.
D.“Economic abuse” refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman
financially dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following:
withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in
any legitimate profes- 1.
424

Garcia vs. Drilon
sion, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the other
spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in
Article 73 of the Family Code;
deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to
the use and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in
common; 2.
destroying household property; 3.
controlling the victims’ own money or properties or solely controlling the
conjugal money or properties. 4.
It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the

aforequoted provision are attributable to research that has exposed
the dimensions and dynamics of battery. The acts described here
are also found in the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of
Violence Against Women.90 Hence, the argument advanced by
petitioner that the definition of what constitutes abuse removes
the difference between violent action and simple marital tiffs is
tenuous.
There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and
ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense. The acts
enumerated above are easily understood and provide adequate
contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. They are
worded with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary
intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited, and need
not guess at its meaning nor differ in its application.91 Yet,
petitioner insists92 that phrases like “depriving or threatening to
deprive the woman or her child of a legal right,” “solely controlling
the conjugal or common money or properties,” “marital infidelity,”
and “causing mental or
_______________
90 Supra note 49.
91 Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 290, 351-352; 369 SCRA 394, 439 (2001).
425
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Garcia vs. Drilon
emotional anguish” are so vague that they make every quarrel a
case of spousal abuse. However, we have stressed that the
“vagueness” doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of
certainty for the statute to be upheld — not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest.
Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as
long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated.
An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been
more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions.93
There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262
singles out the husband or father as the culprit. As defined above,
VAWC may likewise be committed “against a woman with whom
the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship.” Clearly, the
use of the gender-neutral word “person” who has or had a sexual or
dating relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian
relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the offender
be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage,
or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the
application of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised
Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses
Tan,94 the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the victim,
were held to be proper respondents in the case filed by the latter
upon the allegation that they and their son (Go-Tan’s husband)
had community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving
her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to
be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her
verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically.
_______________
93 Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 91, at pp. 352-353; p. 440.
94 G.R. No. 168852, September 30, 2008, 567 SCRA 231.
426
Garcia vs. Drilon
R.A. 9262 is not violative of the due
process clause of the Constitution.
Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the
issuance of POs, of all protections afforded by the due process
clause of the Constitution. Says he: “On the basis of
unsubstantiated allegations, and practically no opportunity to
respond, the husband is stripped of family, property, guns, money,
children, job, future employment and reputation, all in a matter of
seconds, without an inkling of what happened.”95
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of
violence against women and their children, their family or
household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its
purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm,
minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the
opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.96“The scope of
reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim
or offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail
access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the
victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any
designated family or household member safety in the family
residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts
that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also
enables the court to award temporary custody of minor children to
protect the children from violence, to prevent their abduction by
the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support.”97
The rules require that petitions for protection order be in
writing, signed and verified by the petitioner98 thereby under-
_______________
96 Sec. 4 (o), A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC.
97 Supra note 49.
98 Sec. 7, A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC.
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Garcia vs. Drilon
taking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation
therein. Since “time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further
violence is to be prevented,”99 the court is authorized to issue ex
parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the
life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is
reasonable ground to believe that the order is necessary to protect
the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or
to prevent such violence, which is about to recur.100
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational
basis to issue an ex parte order. The victim is required not only to
verify the allegations in the petition, but also to attach her
witnesses’ affidavits to the petition.101
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as
violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary
attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the
time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the
defendant to abscond or dispose of his property,102 in the same way,
the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing
experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even
death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be
prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary
requirements of procedural due process must yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests,103 among which is
protection of women and children from violence and threats to
their personal safety and security.
_______________
99 Supra note 49.
100 Id.
101 Supra note 85.
102 Cuartero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102448, August 5, 1992, 212 SCRA 260, 265.
103 Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110120, March 16, 1994, 231
SCRA 292, 307, citing Pollution Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93891, March 11, 1991,
195 SCRA 112.
428
Garcia vs. Drilon
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte,
the court shall likewise order that notice be immediately given to
the respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5)
days from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice,
copies of the petition and TPO be served immediately on the
respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective
for thirty (30) days from service on the respondent.104
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless
order the immediate issuance and service of the notice upon the
respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the petition
within five (5) days from service. The date of the preliminary
conference and hearing on the merits shall likewise be indicated on
the notice.105
The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall
verify, must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and
shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order
should not be issued.106
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a
petition for protection order should be apprised of the charges
imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side.
Thus, the fear of petitioner of being “stripped of family, property,
guns, money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all
in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened” is a
mere product of an overactive imagination. The essence of due
process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard
and submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense.
“To be heard” does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one
may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be
heard, either
_______________
104 Sec. 15, A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC.
105 Sec. 16, A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC.
106 Sec. 20, A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC.
429
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Garcia vs. Drilon
through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no
denial of procedural due process.107
It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006 an
Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO
that was granted only two days earlier on April 24, 2006. Likewise,
on May 23, 2006, petitioner filed a motion for the modification of
the TPO to allow him visitation rights to his children. Still, the
trial court in its Order dated September 26, 2006, gave him five
days (5) within which to show cause why the TPO should not be
renewed or extended. Yet, he chose not to file the required
comment arguing that it would just be an “exercise in futility,”
conveniently forgetting that the renewal of the questioned TPO
was only for a limited period (30 days) each time, and that he could
prevent the continued renewal of said order if he can show
sufficient cause therefor. Having failed to do so, petitioner may not
now be heard to complain that he was denied due process of law.
Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the
respondent in the VAWC case from the residence of the victim,
regardless of ownership of the residence, is virtually a “blank
check” issued to the wife to claim any property as her conjugal
home.108
The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any
stretch of the imagination suggest that this is so. It states:
11. SEC.Reliefs available to the offended party.—The protection order shall
include any, some or all of the following reliefs:
xxxx
Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the offended party,
regardless of owner- (c)
_______________
107 Esperida v. Jurado, Jr., G.R. No. 172538, April 25, 2012, 671 SCRA 66, 74.
108 Petition, Rollo, pp. 30-31.
430

Garcia vs. Drilon
ship of the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting the offended
party, or permanently where no property rights are violated. If the respondent must
remove personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement
agent to accompany the respondent to the residence, remain there until the
respondent has gathered his things and escort him from the residence;
xxxx
Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from

private respondent’s residence, regardless of ownership, only
temporarily for the purpose of protecting the latter. Such removal
and exclusion may be permanent only where no property rights are
violated. How then can the private respondent just claim any
property and appropriate it for herself, as petitioner seems to
suggest?
The non-referral of a VAWC case
to a mediator is justified.
Petitioner argues that “by criminalizing run-of-the-mill
arguments, instead of encouraging mediation and counseling, the
law has done violence to the avowed policy of the State to “protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution.”109
Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not
refer the case or any issue thereof to a mediator. The reason
behind this provision is well-explained by the Commentary on
Section 311 of the Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence as
follows:110
This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to mediation in a
proceeding for an order for pro-
_______________
109 Id., at p. 36.
110 Supra note 49.
431
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Garcia vs. Drilon
tection. Mediation is a process by which parties in equivalent bargaining positions
voluntarily reach consensual agreement about the issue at hand. Violence,
however, is not a subject for compromise. A process which involves parties
mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault. In
addition, mediation of issues in a proceeding for an order of protection is
problematic because the petitioner is frequently unable to participate equally with
the person against whom the protection order has been sought. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no undue delegation of

judicial power to barangay officials.
Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of
judicial power which, under the Constitution, is placed upon the
“Supreme Court and such other lower courts as may be established
by law” and, thus, protests the delegation of power to barangay
officials to issue protection orders.111 The pertinent provision reads,
as follows:
14. SEC.Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How.—
Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by
the Punong Barangayordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts under
Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong Barangaywho receives applications for a
BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant on the date of filing after ex
parte determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is
unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon
by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad,
the order must be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that
the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time of the issuance of the BPO. BPOs
shall be effective for fifteen
_______________
111 Petition, Rollo, pp. 130-131.
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Garcia vs. Drilon
(15) days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong
Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the same on the
respondent, or direct any barangay official to effect its personal service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before
the Punong Barangay.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle

actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.112 On the other hand, executive power “is generally
defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the
power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing
their due observance.”113
As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO
issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any
available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to
desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child;
and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm.
Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in
nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code
to “enforce all laws and ordinances,” and to “maintain public order
in the barangay.”114
We have held that “(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by
law to inquire into the existence of certain facts and to apply the
law thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall be
and the fact that these acts may affect
_______________
112 Sec. 1, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution.
113 Laurel v. Desierto, 430 Phil. 658; 381 SCRA 48 (2002).
114 People v. Tomaquin, 478 Phil. 885, 899; 435 SCRA 23, 36 (2004), citing Section 389, Chapter 3,
Title One, Book III, Local Government Code of 1991, as amended.
433
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Garcia vs. Drilon
private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers.”115
In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through
a preliminary inquiry or proceeding “whether there is reasonable
ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the
accused is probably guilty thereof,” the Punong Barangay must
determine reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger
of violence against the woman and her children exists or is about to
recur that would necessitate the issuance of a BPO. The
preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is,
concededly, an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds
true with the issuance of a BPO.
We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that
since barangay officials and other law enforcement agencies are
required to extend assistance to victims of violence and abuse, it
would be very unlikely that they would remain objective and
impartial, and that the chances of acquittal are nil. As already
stated, assistance by barangay officials and other law enforcement
agencies is consistent with their duty to enforce the law and to
maintain peace and order.
Conclusion
Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an
unequivocal breach or a clear conflict with the Constitution, not
merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in
such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. In
other words, the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable
doubt.116 In the instant case, however, no concrete evidence and
convincing arguments were presented by petitioner to warrant a
declaration
_______________
115 Lovina and Montilla v. Moreno and Yonzon, 118 Phil 1401, 1406; 9 SCRA 557, 561 (1963).
116 Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, G.R. No. 171101, July 5,
2011, 653 SCRA 154, 258.
434
Garcia vs. Drilon
of the unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is an act of Congress
and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive
department. As we said in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,117 courts
must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders
and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full
knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is
right and advancing the welfare of the majority.
We reiterate here Justice Puno’s observation that “the history of
the women’s movement against domestic violence shows that one of
its most difficult struggles was the fight against the violence of law
itself. If we keep that in mind, law will not again be a hindrance to
the struggle of women for equality but will be its
fulfillment.”118 Accordingly, the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, as
it should be, sustained.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ.), Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Bersamin, Del Castillo,
Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Leonardo-De Castro, Abad and Leonen JJ., See Separate
Concurring Opinion.
Brion, J., See: Concurring Opinion.
Peralta, J., On official leave.
_______________
117 Supra note 91.
118 Supra note 85.
435
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Garcia vs. Drilon
CONCURRING OPINION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,J.:
I concur with the conclusion reached in the ponencia ably
written by the Honorable Estela Perlas-Bernabe. With due respect,
however, I submit that the test to determine an equal protection
challenge against the law, denying statutory remedies to men who
are similarly situated as the women who are given differential
treatment in the law, on the basis of sex or gender, should be at
the level of intermediate scrutiny or middle-tier judicial
scrutiny rather than the rational basis test used in
the ponencia of Justice Bernabe.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails: (1) the Decision
dated January 24, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-
SP No. 01698 dismissing the Petition for Prohibition with
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order (Petition for
Prohibition) which questioned the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 9262, otherwise known as the “Anti-Violence Against Women
and Their Children Act of 2004,” and sought a temporary
restraining order and/or injunction to prevent the implementation
of the Temporary Protection Order (TPO) and criminal prosecution
of herein petitioner Jesus A. Garcia under the law; and (2) the
Resolution dated August 14, 2007, denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration of the said Decision.
At the outset, it should be stressed that the Court of Appeals, in
its assailed Decision and Resolution, did not pass upon the issue of
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 and instead dismissed
the Petition for Prohibition on technical grounds, as follows:
The constitutional issue was raised for the first time on appeal
before the Court of Appeals by petitioner and not at the earliest
opportunity, which should be before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 41, Bacolod City, acting as a Family Court, where
private respondent Rosalie Garcia, wife of 1.436
Garcia vs. Drilon
petitioner, instituted a Petition for Temporary and Permanent
Protection Order[s]1 under Republic Act No. 9262, against her
husband, petitioner Jesus C. Garcia; and
The constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 can only be
questioned in a direct action and it cannot be the subject of a
collateral attack in a petition for prohibition, as the inferior court
having jurisdiction on the action may itself determine the
constitutionality of the statute, and the latter’s decision on the
matter may be reviewed on appeal and not by a writ of prohibition,
as it was held in 2. People v. Vera.2
Hence, the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution denied due
course to the Petition for Prohibition “for being fraught with fatal
technical infirmities” and for not being ripe for judicial review.
Nevertheless, four out of the five issues raised by the petitioner
here dealt with the alleged unconstitutionality of Republic Act No.
9262. More accurately put, however, the Court of Appeals refrained
from touching at all those four substantive issues of
constitutionality. The Court of Appeals cannot therefore be faulted
for any erroneous ruling on the aforesaid substantive
constitutional issues.
In this instant Petition for Review, the only issue directly in
point that can be raised against the Court of Appeals Decision and
Resolution is the first one cited as a ground for the appeal, which I
quote:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE THEORY
THAT THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT RAISED AT THE FIRST
OPPORTUNITY AND THAT, THE PETITION WAS A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE
VALIDITY OF THE LAW.3
Under the circumstances, whether this Court should consider

this Petition for Review as a proper occasion to pass
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 63-83.
2 65 Phil. 56 (1937).
3 Rollo, p. 22.
437
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Garcia vs. Drilon
upon the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 shall be a
separate subject matter that is tackled below after the above-
quoted first issue is disposed of.
On the Propriety of Raising the
Issue of Constitutionality in a
Summary Proceeding Before the
RTC Designated as a Family Court
Petitioner assails the Court of Appeals ruling that he should
have raised the issue of constitutionality in his Opposition4 to
private respondent’s petition for protective orders pending before
the RTC for the following reasons:
The Rules on Violence Against Women and Children (A.M. No.
04-10-11-SC), particularly Section 20 thereof, expressly prohibit
him from alleging any counterclaim, cross-claim or third party
claim, all of which are personal to him and therefore with more
reason, he cannot impugn the constitutionality of the law by way of
affirmative defense. 1.5
Since the proceedings before the Family Court are summary in
nature, its limited jurisdiction is inadequate to tackle the complex
issue of constitutionality. 2.6
I agree with Justice Bernabe that the RTC, designated as a
Family Court, is vested with jurisdiction to decide issues of
constitutionality of a law, and that the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 9262 can be resolved in a summary proceeding, in
accordance with the rule that the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity, otherwise it may not be
considered on appeal.
Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Republic Act No.
9262 provides:
_______________
4 Id., at pp. 98-103.
5 Id., at p. 23.
6 Id., at p. 24.
438
Garcia vs. Drilon
20. Sec.Opposition to Petition.—(a) The respondent may file an opposition to
the petition which he himself shall verify. It must be accompanied by the affidavits
of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order
should not be issued.
Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or
third-party complaint, (b) but any cause of action which could be the subject
thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner cites the above provision, particularly paragraph (b)

thereof, as one of his grounds for not challenging the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 in his Opposition. The
error of such reasoning is that it treats “any cause of action”
mentioned in Section 20(b) as distinct from the “counterclaim,
cross-claim or third-party complaint” referred to in the said Section
20(b). On the contrary, the language of said section clearly refers to
a cause of action that is the “subject” of the counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party complaint, which is barred and
which may be litigated in a separate civil action. The issue of
constitutionality is not a “cause of action” that is a subject of the
aforementioned prohibited pleadings. In fact, petitioner admitted
that such prohibited pleadings would allege “claims which
are personal to him.”7 Hence, Section 20(b) cannot even be
invoked as a basis for filing the separate special civil action of
Petition for Prohibition before the Court of Appeals to question the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262.
What obviously escapes petitioner’s understanding is that the
contents of the Opposition are not limited to mere refutations of
the allegations in the petition for temporary and permanent
protection order. While it is true that A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC
requires the respondent to file an Opposition and not
_______________
7 Id., at p. 309, Petitioner’s Memorandum.
439
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Garcia vs. Drilon
an Answer,8 it does not prevent petitioner from challenging the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 in such Opposition. In
fact, Section 20(a) directs petitioner to state in his Opposition why
a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued
against him. This means that petitioner should have raised in his
Opposition all defenses available to him, which may be either
negative or affirmative. Section 5(b), Rule 6 of the Rules of Court
define negative and affirmative defenses as follows:
A negative defense is the specific denial of the material fact or facts alleged in the
pleading of the claimant essential to his cause or causes of action. (a)
An affirmative defense is an allegation of a new matter which, while
hypothetically admitting the material allegations in the pleading of the claimant,
would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by him. The affirmative defenses include
fraud, statute of limitations, release, payment, illegality, statute of frauds, estoppel,
former recovery, discharge in bankruptcy, and any other matter by way of
confession and avoidance. (b)
In Bayog v. Hon. Natino,9 the respondent, in a complaint for

ejectment before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), raised
as one of his defenses, the MCTC’s lack of jurisdiction over the case
in light of the agricultural tenancy relationship between him and
the petitioner. The MCTC applied the Rule on Summary Procedure
and issued an Order stating that it could not take cognizance of the
Answer, for being filed belatedly. This Court ruled that while the
MCTC was correct in applying the Rule on Summary Procedure as
the complaint was one for ejectment, it should have met and ruled
squarely on the issue of jurisdiction, as there was nothing in the
rules that barred it from admitting the Answer.
_______________
8 Rationale of the Proposed Rule on Violence Against Women and their Children, 15th Salient
Feature.
9 327 Phil. 1019; 258 SCRA 378 (1996).
440
Garcia vs. Drilon
Hence, the MCTC should have heard and received evidence for the
precise purpose of determining whether or not it possessed
jurisdiction over the case.10
Similarly, the alleged unconstitutionality of Republic Act No.
9262 is a matter that would have prevented the trial court from
granting the petition for protection order against the petitioner.
Thus, petitioner should have raised it in his Opposition as a
defense against the issuance of a protection order against him.
For all intents and purposes, the Petition for Prohibition filed
before the Court of Appeals was precipitated by and was ultimately
directed against the issuance of the TPO, an interlocutory order,
which under Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC is a prohibited
pleading. An action questioning the constitutionality of the law
also cannot be filed separately even with another branch of the
RTC. This is not technically feasible because there will be no
justiciable controversy or an independent cause of action that can
be the subject of such separate action if it were not for the issuance
of the TPO against the petitioner. Thus, the controversy, subject of
a separate action, whether before the Court of Appeals or the RTC,
would still have to be the issuance of the TPO, which is the subject
of another case in the RTC.
Moreover, the challenge to the constitutionality of the law must
be raised at the earliest opportunity. In Dasmariñas Water District
v. Monterey Foods Corporation,11 we said:
A law is deemed valid unless declared null and void by a competent court; more
so when the issue has not been duly pleaded in the trial court. The question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity. x x x. The settled rule is
that courts will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the
necessity of deciding it. (Citation omitted.)
_______________
10 Id., at pp. 1036-1037; p. 394.
11 G.R. No. 175550, September 17, 2008, 565 SCRA 624, 637.
441
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Garcia vs. Drilon
This Court held that such opportunity is in the pleadings before
a competent court that can resolve it, such that “if it is not raised
in the pleadings, it cannot be considered at the trial, and, if not
considered at the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal.” 12 The
decision upon the constitutional question is necessary to determine
whether the TPO should be issued against petitioner. Such
question should have been raised at the earliest opportunity as an
affirmative defense in the Opposition filed with the RTC handling
the protection order proceedings, which was the competent court to
pass upon the constitutional issue. This Court, in Drilon v.
Lim,13 held:
We stress at the outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider
the constitutionality of Section 187, this authority being embraced in the
general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid
and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental
law.Specifically, BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil
cases in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation, even as the accused in a criminal action has the right to
question in his defense the constitutionality of a law he is charged with
violating and of the proceedings taken against him, particularly as they
contravene the Bill of Rights. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the
Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments
and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of
any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. (Citation
omitted, emphases ours.)
_______________
12 Matibag v. Benipayo, 429 Phil. 554, 578; 380 SCRA 49, 65 (2002).
13 G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994, 235 SCRA 135, 139-140.
442
Garcia vs. Drilon
Furthermore, the filing of a separate action before the Court of
Appeals or the RTC for the declaration of unconstitutionality of
Republic Act No. 9262 would result to multiplicity of suits. It is
clear that the issues of constitutionality and propriety of issuing a
protection order raised by petitioner are inextricably intertwined.
Another court, whether it is an appellate court or a trial court,
cannot resolve the constitutionality question in the separate action
without affecting the petition for the issuance of a TPO. Bringing a
separate action for the resolution of the issue of constitutionality
will result in an unresolved prejudicial question to the validity of
issuing a protection order. If the proceedings for the protection
order is not suspended, it does create the danger of having
inconsistent and conflicting judgments between the two separate
courts, whether of the same or different levels in the judicial
hierarchy. These two judgments would eventually be the subject of
separate motions for reconsideration, separate appeals, and
separate petitions for review before this Court — the exact
scenario the policy against multiplicity of suits is avoiding. As we
previously held, “the law and the courts frown upon split
jurisdiction and the resultant multiplicity of actions.”14
It must be remembered that aside from the “earliest
opportunity” requirement, the court’s power of judicial review is
subject to other limitations. Two of which are the existence of an
actual case or controversy and standing. An aspect of the actual
case or controversy requirement is the requisite of “ripeness.” This
is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. Thus,
a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged
had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. This
direct adverse effect on the individual will also be the basis of his
standing as it is necessary that the person challenging the law
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
he has
_______________
14 Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Peña, 243 Phil. 93, 106; 159 SCRA 556, 565
(1988).
443
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 443
Garcia vs. Drilon
sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result of its
enforcement.15
In this case, the petitioner’s challenge on the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 9262 was on the basis of the protection order
issued against him. Verily, the controversy became ripe only when
he was in danger of or was directly adversely affected by the
statute mandating the issuance of a protection order against him.
He derives his standing to challenge the statute from the direct
injury he would sustain if and when the law is enforced against
him. Therefore, it is clear that the proper forum to challenge the
constitutionality of the law was before the RTC handling the
protection order proceedings. The filing of a separate action to
question the constitutionality of the law amounts to splitting a
cause of action that runs counter to the policy against multiplicity
of suits.
Moreover, the filing of the Petition for Prohibition with the Court
of Appeals countenanced the evil that the law and the rules sought
to avoid. It caused the delay in the proceedings and inconvenience,
hardship and expense on the part of the parties due to the
multiplicity of suits between them at different court levels. The
RTC where the petition for protection orders is filed should be
trusted, instead of being doubted, to be able to exercise its
jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of constitutionality within the
mandatory period set by the rules.
In gist, there is no statutory, reglementary, or practical basis to
disallow the constitutional challenge to a law, which is sought to be
enforced, in a summary proceeding. This is particularly true
considering that the issue of a statute’s constitutionality is a
question of law which may be resolved without the reception of
evidence or a full-blown trial. Hence, said issue should have been
raised at the earliest opportunity in
_______________
15 Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) v. The Secretary of Budget and Management, G.R.
No. 164987, April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 373, 383-384.
444
Garcia vs. Drilon
the proceedings before the RTC, Bacolod City and for failure of the
petitioner to do so, it cannot be raised in the separate Petition for
Prohibition before the Court of Appeals, as correctly ruled by the
latter, nor in a separate action before the RTC.
On the Court Resolving the
Issue of Constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 9262
Notwithstanding my position that the Court of Appeals properly
dismissed the Petition for Prohibition because of petitioner’s
failure to raise the issue of constitutionality of Republic Act No.
9262 at the earliest opportunity, I concur that the Court, in the
exercise of its sound discretion,16should still pass upon the said
issue in the present Petition. Notable is the fact that not only the
petitioner, but the private respondent as well,17 pray that the Court
resolve the constitutional issue considering its novelty and
paramount importance. Indeed, when public interest requires the
resolution of the constitutional issue raised, and in keeping with
this Court’s duty of determining whether other agencies or even co-
equal branches of government have remained within the limits of
the Constitution and have not abused the discretion given them,
the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure and resolve
the constitutional issue.18
Aside from the technical ground raised by petitioner in his first
assignment of error, petitioner questions the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 9262 on the following grounds:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN FAILING TO
CONCLUDE THAT R.A. NO. 9262 IS DIS-
_______________
16 People v. Vera, supra note 2.
17 Rollo, p. 237, Private Respondents’ Comment.
18 Matibag v. Benipayo, supra note 12 at p. 579; p. 66.
445
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Garcia vs. Drilon
CRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT FINDING
THAT R.A. NO. 9262 RUNS COUNTER TO THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LAW DOES
VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A
BASIC SOCIAL INSTITUTION.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING R.A. NO.
9262 AS INVALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE
DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO THE BARANGAY OFFICIALS.19
On the Constitutional Right to Equal

Protection of the Laws
Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
9262 for making a gender-based classification, thus, providing
remedies only to wives/women and not to husbands/men. He claims
that even the title of the law, “An Act Defining Violence Against
Women and Their Children” is already pejorative and sex-
discriminatory because it means violence by men against
women.20 The law also does not include violence committed by
women against children and other women. He adds that gender
alone is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the
remedies under it because its avowed purpose is to curb and
punish spousal violence. The said remedies are discriminatory
against the husband/male gender. There being no reasonable
difference between an abused husband and an abused wife, the
equal protection guarantee is violated.
_______________
19 Rollo, p. 22.
20 Id., at p. 26.
446
Garcia vs. Drilon
Pertinently, Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The above provision was lifted verbatim from the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, which in turn was a slightly modified version of the
equal protection clause in Section 1, Amendment 1421 of the United
States Constitution.
In 1937, the Court established in People v. Vera22 the four-fold
test to measure the reasonableness of a classification under the
equal protection clause, to wit:
This basic individual right sheltered by the Constitution is a restraint on all the
three grand departments of our government and on the subordinate
instrumentalities and subdivisions thereof, and on many constitutional powers, like
the police power, taxation and eminent domain. The equal protection of the laws,
sententiously observes the Supreme Court of the United States, “is a pledge of the
protection of equal laws.” Of course, what may be regarded as a denial of the equal
protection of the laws is a question not always easily determined. No rule that will
cover every case can be formulated. Class legislation discriminating against some
and favoring others is prohibited. But classification on a reasonable basis,
_______________
21 All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens
of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
22 Supra note 2 at pp. 125-126.
447
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Garcia vs. Drilon
and not made arbitrarily or capriciously, is permitted. The classification,
however, to be reasonable must be based on substantial distinctions which
make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it
must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to
each member of the class. (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied.)
In our jurisdiction, the standard and analysis of equal protection

challenges in the main have followed the foregoing “rational basis”
test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative
classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a
showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.23
However, over time, three levels of tests were developed, which
are to be applied in equal protection cases, depending on the
subject matter24 involved:
1.Rational Basis Scrutiny — the traditional test, which requires “only that government must not
impose differences in treatment except upon some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the
object of regulation.” Simply put, it merely demands that the classification in the
statute reasonably relates to the legislative purpose.25
2.Intermediate Scrutiny — requires that the classification (means) must serve an important
governmental objective (ends) and is substantially related to the achievement of such
objective. A
_______________
23 Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 487 Phil. 531, 583-584;
446 SCRA 299, 370 (2004).
24 Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010, 618 SCRA 32, citing BERNAS, THE 1987
CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY, pp. 139-140 (2009).
25 Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, supra note 23.
448

Garcia vs. Drilon
classification based on sex is the best-established example of an intermediate level of review.26
3.Strict Scrutiny — requires that the classification serve a compelling state interest and
is necessary to achieve such interest. This level is used when suspect classifications or
fundamental rights are involved.27
Recent Philippine jurisprudence has recognized the need to

apply different standards of scrutiny in testing the
constitutionality of classifications. In British American Tobacco v.
Camacho,28 this Court held that since the case therein neither
involved a suspect classification nor impinged on a fundamental
right, then “the rational basis test was properly applied to gauge
the constitutionality of the assailed law in the face of an equal
protection challenge.”29 We added:
It has been held that “in the areas of social and economic policy, a statutory
classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes constitutional
rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.”
Under the rational basis test, it is sufficient that the legislative classification is
rationally related to achieving some legitimate State interest. x x x.30 (Citations
omitted.)
Echoing the same principle, this Court, speaking through then

Chief Justice Puno in Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas) Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas,31 stated:
_______________
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 G.R. No. 163583, April 15, 2009, 585 SCRA 36.
29 Id., at p. 40.
30 Id., at pp. 40-41.
31 Supra note 23 at pp. 597-600.
449
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 449
Garcia vs. Drilon
Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its
policies should be accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except
when they run afoul of the Constitution. The deference stops where the
classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded
special protection by the Constitution. When these violations arise, this Court
must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and
require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional
limitations. Rational basis should not suffice.
xxxx
Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding
questions of constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in
exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the “rational
basis” test, and the legislative discretion would be given deferential treatment.
But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a
fundamental right, or the perpetuation of prejudice against persons
favored by the Constitution with special protection, judicial scrutiny ought
to be more strict. A weak and watered down view would call for the abdication of
this Court’s solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the Constitution and
the rights it enshrines. This is true whether the actor committing the
unconstitutional act is a private person or the government itself or one of its
instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down regardless of the character or
nature of the actor. (Citations omitted.)
This was reiterated in League of Cities of the Philippines v.

Commission on Elections,32 and Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v.
Commission on Elections,33 wherein the Court, although ap-
_______________
32 G.R. Nos. 176951, 177499, and 178056, November 18, 2008, 571 SCRA 263.
33 Supra note 24.
450
Garcia vs. Drilon
plying the rational basis test, noted that there are tests, which are
more appropriate in other cases, especially those involving suspect
classes and fundamental rights. In fact, Chief Justice Puno
expounded on this in his Separate Concurring Opinion in the Ang
Ladlad case. He said that although the assailed resolutions therein
were correctly struck down, since the classification was based
on gender or sexual orientation, a quasi-suspect
classification, a heightened level of review should have
been applied and not just the rational basis test, which is
the most liberal basis of judicial scrutiny. Citing American
authority, Chief Justice Puno continued to elucidate on the three
levels of scrutiny and the classes falling within each level, to wit:
If a legislative classification disadvantages a “suspect class” or impinges upon the
exercise of a “fundamental right,” then the courts will employ strict scrutiny and
the statute must fall unless the government can demonstrate that the classification
has been precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. Over the
years, the United States Supreme Court has determined that suspect classes for
equal protection purposes include classifications based on race, religion, alienage,
national origin, and ancestry. The underlying rationale of this theory is that where
legislation affects discrete and insular minorities, the presumption of
constitutionality fades because traditional political processes may have broken
down. In such a case, the State bears a heavy burden of justification, and the
government action will be closely scrutinized in light of its asserted purpose.
On the other hand, if the classification, while not facially invidious,
nonetheless gives rise to recurring constitutional difficulties, or if a
classification disadvantages a “quasi-suspect class,” it will be treated
under intermediate or heightened review. To survive intermediate scrutiny,
the law must not only further an important governmental interest and be
substantially related to that interest, but the justification for the classification must
be genuine and must not de-
451
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Garcia vs. Drilon
pend on broad generalizations. Noteworthy, and of special interest to us in this
case, quasi-suspect classes include classifications based on gender or
illegitimacy.
If neither strict nor intermediate scrutiny is appropriate, then the statute will be
tested for mere rationality. This is a relatively relaxed standard reflecting the
Court’s awareness that the drawing of lines which creates distinctions is peculiarly
a legislative task and an unavoidable one. The presumption is in favor of the
classification, of the reasonableness and fairness of state action, and of legitimate
grounds of distinction, if any such grounds exist, on which the State
acted.34 (Citations omitted, emphases supplied.)
This case presents us with the most opportune time to adopt the
appropriate scrutiny in deciding cases where the issue of
discrimination based on sex or gender is raised. The assailed
Section 3, among other provisions, of Republic Act No. 9262
provides:
3. SEC.Definition of Terms.—As used in this Act:
“Violence against women and their children” refers to any act or a series of acts
committed by any person against a woman who is (a) his wife, former wife,
or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is
likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic
abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty. x x x. (Emphases supplied.)
The aforesaid law also institutionalized remedies such as the
issuance of protection orders in favor of women and chil-
_______________
34 Id., at pp. 93-95.
452
Garcia vs. Drilon
dren who are victims of violence and prescribed public penalties for
violation of the said law.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
9262 which denies the same protection orders to husbands who are
victims of wife-abuse. It should be stressed that under aforecited
section of said law violence may not only be physical or sexual but
also psychological and economic in nature.
The Honorable Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen in his
concurring opinion notes that “Husband abuse maybe an under
reported form of family violence.” While concurring with the
majority opinion, he opines as follows:
Nevertheless, in a future case more deserving of our attention, we should be open
to realities which may challenge the dominant conception that violence in intimate
relationships only happens to women and children. This may be predominantly true,
but even those in marginal cases deserve fundamental constitutional and statutory
protection. We should be careful that in correcting historical and cultural injustices,
we may typecast all women as victims, stereotype all men as tormentors or make
invisible the possibility that in some intimate relationships, men may also want to
seek succor against acts defined in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9262 in an
expeditious manner.
Since statutory remedies accorded to women are not made

available to men, when the reality is that there are men,
regardless of their number, who are also suffering from domestic
violence, the rational basis test may be too wide and liberal to
justify the statutory classification which in effect allows different
treatment of men who are similarly situated. In the context of the
constitutional policy to “ensure the fundamental equality before
the law of women and men”35 the level of scrutiny applicable, to test
whether or not the classifi-
_______________
35 1987 Constitution, Article II, Section 14.
453
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 453
Garcia vs. Drilon
cation in Republic Act No. 9262 violates the equal protection
clause, is the middle-tier scrutiny or the intermediate
standard of judicial review.
To survive intermediate review, the classification in the
challenged law must (1) serve important governmental objectives,
and (2) be substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives.36
Important and Essential
Governmental Objectives: Safeguard
Human Rights, Ensure Gender
Equality and Empower Women
Republic Act No. 9262 is a legislation that furthers important, in
fact essential, governmental objectives as enunciated in the law’s
Declaration of Policy, as quoted below:
2. SEC.Declaration of Policy.—It is hereby declared that the State values the
dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The
State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly
women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed
against women and children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed
under the Constitution and the Provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of discrimination Against
Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international human
rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.
_______________
36 Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas, supra note 23 at 586; p. 373, citing Justice Marshall’s dissent in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
454
Garcia vs. Drilon
This policy is in consonance with the constitutional
provisions,37 which state:
The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect
for human rights. 11. SEC.
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution. x x x. 12. SEC.
By constitutional mandate, the Philippines is committed to
ensure that human rights and fundamental freedoms are fully
enjoyed by everyone. It was one of the countries that voted in favor
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which was
a mere two years after it gained independence from the United
States of America. In addition, the Philippines is a signatory to
many United Nations human rights treaties such as the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, the Convention Against Torture, and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, among others.
As a signatory to the UDHR, the Philippines pledged itself to
achieve the promotion of universal respect for and observance of
human rights and fundamental freedoms,38keeping in mind the
standards under the Declaration. Among the standards under the
UDHR are the following:
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are
endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit
of brotherhood. 1. Article
xxxx
_______________
37 1987 Constitution, Article II.
38 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
455
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Garcia vs. Drilon
7. ArticleAll are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal
protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against
any incitement to such discrimination.
Everyone has the right to an 8. Article effective remedy by the competent
national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the
constitution or by law. (Emphasis ours.)
The Declaration of Policy in Republic Act No. 9262 enunciates

the purpose of the said law, which is to fulfill the government’s
obligation to safeguard the dignity and human rights of women
and children by providing effective remedies against domestic
violence or physical, psychological, and other forms of abuse
perpetuated by the husband, partner, or father of the victim. The
said law is also viewed within the context of the constitutional
mandate to ensure gender equality, which is quoted as follows:
The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men. 14. Section39
It has been acknowledged that “gender-based violence is a form

of discrimination that seriously inhibits women’s ability to enjoy
rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with men.” 40 Republic
Act No. 9262 can be viewed therefore as the Philippines’
compliance with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which is committed to
condemn discrimination against women and directs its members to
undertake, without delay, all appropriate means to eliminate
discrimination against women in all forms both in law and in
practice.41 Known as
_______________
39 1987 Constitution, Article II.
40 General Recommendation No. 19, CEDAW/par. 1 (1992).
41 CEDAW, Article 2.
456
Garcia vs. Drilon
the International Bill of Rights of Women,42 the CEDAW is the
central and most comprehensive document for the advancement of
the welfare of women.43 It brings the women into the focus of
human rights concerns, and its spirit is rooted in the goals of the
UN: to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity
and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and
women.44The CEDAW, in its preamble, explicitly acknowledges the
existence of extensive discrimination against women, and
emphasized that such is a violation of the principles of
equality of rights and respect for human dignity.
In addition, as a state party to the CEDAW, the Philippines is
under legal obligation to to ensure their development and
advancement for the improvement of their position from one of de
jure as well as de factoequality with men.45 The CEDAW, going
beyond the concept of discrimination used in many legal standards
and norms, focuses on discrimination against women, with the
emphasis that women have suffered and are continuing to suffer
from various forms of discrimination on account of their biological
sex.46
The Philippines’ accession to various international instruments
requires it to promote and ensure the observance of human rights
and “continually affirm its commitment to ensure that it pursues
gender equality in all aspects of the development process to
eventually make real, a genderresponsive society.”47 Thus, the
governmental objectives of protecting human rights and
fundamental freedoms, which includes promoting gender
equality and empowering
_______________
42 http://pcw.gov.ph/international-commitments/cedaw last visited on April 9, 2013.
43 CEDAW, Introduction.
44 Id.
45 General Recommendation No. 25, CEDAW/par. 4 (2004).
46 Id., par. 5 (2004).
47 http://pcw.gov.ph/international-commitments last visited on April 9, 2013.
457
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 457
Garcia vs. Drilon
women, as mandated not only by our Constitution, but also by
commitments we have made in the international sphere, are
undeniably important and essential.
The Gender-Based Classification
in Republic Act No. 9262 is Sub-
stantially Related to the Achieve-
ment of Governmental Objectives
As one of the country’s pervasive social problems, violence
against women is deemed to be closely linked with the unequal
power relationship between women and men and is otherwise
known as “gender-based violence.”48Violent acts towards women
has been the subject of an examination on a historic world-wide
perspective.49 The exhaustive study of a foreign history professor
noted that “[f]rom the earliest civilizations on, the subjugation of
women, in the form of violence, were facts of life,”50 as three great
bodies of thought, namely: Judeo-Christian religious ideas; Greek
philosophy; and the Common Law Legal Code, which have
influenced western society’s views and treatment of women, all
“assumed patriarchy as natural; that is, male domination
stemming from the view of male superiority.”51 It cited 18th
century legal expert William Blackstone, who explained that the
common law doctrine of coverture reflected the theological
assumption that husband and wife were ‘one body’ before God; thus
“they were ‘one person’ under the law, and that one person was the
husband,”52 a concept that evidently found its way in some of our
_______________
48 http://pcw.gov.ph/focus-areas/violence-against-women last visited on April 10, 2013.
49 Historical Perspectives on Violence Against Women. November 2002.
50 Vivian C. Fox, Ph.D. Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 4 #1, Historical Perspectives on
Violence Against Women. November 2002, p. 20.
51 Id., at p. 15.
52 Id., at p. 19.
458
Garcia vs. Drilon
Civil Code provisions prior to the enactment of the Family Code.
Society and tradition dictate that the culture of patriarchy
continue. Men are expected to take on the dominant roles both in
the community and in the family. This perception naturally leads
to men gaining more power over women —power, which must
necessarily be controlled and maintained. Violence against women
is one of the ways men control women to retain such power.53
The enactment of Republic Act No. 9262 was in response to the
undeniable numerous cases involving violence committed against
women in the Philippines. In 2012, the Philippine National Police
(PNP) reported54 that 65% or 11,531 out of 15,969 cases involving
violence against women were filed under Republic Act No. 9262.
From 2004 to 2012, violations of Republic Act No. 9262 ranked first
among the different categories of violence committed against
women. The number of reported cases showed an increasing trend
from 2004 to 2012, although the numbers might not exactly
represent the real incidence of violence against women in the
country, as the data is based only on what was reported to the
PNP. Moreover, the increasing trend may have been caused by the
continuous information campaign on the law and its strict
implementation.55Nonetheless, statistics show that cases involving
violence against women are prevalent, while there is a dearth of
reported cases involving violence committed by women against
men, that will require legislature intervention or solicitous
treatment of men.
Preventing violence against women and children through their
availment of special legal remedies, serves the govern-
_______________
53 http://pcw.gov.ph/focus-areas/violence-against-women last visited on April 10, 2013.
54 As Submitted by the Philippine Commission on Women.
55 http://pcw.gov.ph/statistics/201210/statistics-violence-against-filipino-women, last visited on March
18, 2013.
459
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Garcia vs. Drilon
mental objectives of protecting the dignity and human rights of
every person, preserving the sanctity of family life, and promoting
gender equality and empowering women. Although there exists
other laws on violence against women56 in the Philippines, Republic
Act No. 9262 deals with the problem of violence within the family
and intimate relationships, which deserves special attention
because it occurs in situations or places where women and children
should feel most safe and secure but are actually not. The law
provides the widest range of reliefs for women and children who
are victims of violence, which are often reported to have been
committed not by strangers, but by a father or a husband or a
person with whom the victim has or had a sexual or dating
relationship. Aside from filing a criminal case in court, the law
provides potent legal remedies to the victims that theretofore were
not available. The law recognizes, with valid factual support based
on statistics that women and children are the most vulnerable
victims of violence, and therefore need legal intervention. On the
other hand, there is a dearth of empirical basis to anchor a
conclusion that men need legal protection from violence
perpetuated by women.
The law takes into account the pervasive vulnerability of women
and children, and the seriousness and urgency of the situation,
which, in the language of the law result in or is likely to result in
physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic
abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.57 Hence, the law
permits the issuance of protec-
_______________
56 Republic Act No. 3815, The Revised Penal Code; Republic Act No. 7877, The Anti-Sexual
Harassment Act of 1995; Republic Act No. 8353, The Anti-Rape Law of 1997; Republic Act No. 8505, The
Rape Victims Assistance Act of 1998; Republic Act No. 6955; Republic Act No. 9208, The Anti-Trafficking
in Persons Act of 2003; Republic Act No. 8369, The Family Courts Act of 1997; and Republic Act No. 9710,
The Magna Carta of Women of 2009.
57 Republic Act No. 9262, Section 3.
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Garcia vs. Drilon
tion orders and the granting of certain reliefs to women victims,
even without a hearing. The law has granted authority
for barangay officials to issue a protection order against the
offender, based on the victim’s application. The RTC may likewise
grant an application for a temporary protection order (TPO) and
provide other reliefs, also on the mere basis of the application.
Despite the ex parteissuance of these protection orders, the
temporary nature of these remedies allow them to be availed of by
the victim without violating the offender’s right to due process as it
is only when a full-blown hearing has been done that a permanent
protection order may be issued. Thus, these remedies are suitable,
reasonable, and justified. More importantly, they serve the
objectives of the law by providing the victims necessary immediate
protection from the violence they perceive as threats to their
personal safety and security. This translates to the fulfillment of
other governmental objectives as well. By assuring the victims
instant relief from their situation, they are consequently
empowered and restored to a place of dignity and equality. Such is
embodied in the purpose to be served by a protection order, to wit:
8. SEC.Protection Orders.—A protection order is an order issued under this act
for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence against a woman or her child
specified in Section 5 of this Act and granting other necessary relief. The relief
granted under a protection order serve the purpose of safeguarding the
victim from further harm, minimizing any disruption in the victim’s daily
life, and facilitating the opportunity and ability of the victim to
independently regain control over her life. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
In furtherance of the governmental objectives, especially that of

protecting human rights, violence against women and children
under this Act has been classified as a public of-
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Garcia vs. Drilon
fense,58 making its prosecution independent of the victim’s initial
participation.
Verily, the classification made in Republic Act No. 9262 is
substantially related to the important governmental
objectives of valuing every person’s dignity, respecting
human rights, safeguarding family life, protecting children,
promoting gender equality, and empowering women.
The persistent and existing biological, social, and cultural
differences between women and men prescribe that they be treated
differently under particular conditions in order to
achieve substantive equality for women. Thus, the
disadvantaged position of a woman as compared to a man requires
the special protection of the law, as gleaned from the following
recommendations of the CEDAW Committee:
[T]he Convention requires that women be given an equal start and that they be
empowered by an enabling environment to achieve equality of results. It is not
enough to guarantee women treatment that is identical to that of men. 8. Rather,
biological as well as socially and culturally constructed differences
between women and men must be taken into account. Under certain
circumstances, non-identical treatment of women and men will be required
in order to address such differences. Pursuit of the goal of substantive equality
also calls for an effective strategy aimed at overcoming underrepresentation of
women and a redistribution of resources and power between men and women.
9.Equality of results is the logical corollary of de facto or substantive
equality. These results may be quantitative and/or qualitative in nature; that is,
women enjoying their rights in various fields in fairly equal numbers with men,
enjoying the same income levels, equality in decision-making and political influence,
_______________
58 Id., Section 25.
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Garcia vs. Drilon
and women enjoying freedom from violence.59(Emphases supplied.)
The government’s commitment to ensure that the status of a

woman in all spheres of her life are parallel to that of a man,
requires the adoption and implementation of ameliorative
measures, such as Republic Act No. 9262. Unless the woman is
guaranteed that the violence that she endures in her private
affairs will not be ignored by the government, which is committed
to uplift her to her rightful place as a human being, then she can
neither achieve substantive equality nor be empowered.
The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not
guarantee an absolute prohibition against classification. The non-
identical treatment of women and men under Republic Act No.
9262 is justified to put them on equal footing and to give substance
to the policy and aim of the state to ensure the equality of women
and men in light of the biological, historical, social, and culturally
endowed differences between men and women.
Republic Act No. 9262, by affording special and exclusive
protection to women and children, who are vulnerable victims of
domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental
objectives of protecting human rights, insuring gender equality,
and empowering women. The gender-based classification and the
special remedies prescribed by said law in favor of women and
children are substantially related, in fact essentially necessary, to
achieve such objectives. Hence, said Act survives
the intermediate review or middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The
gender-based classification therein is therefore not violative of the
equal protection clause embodied in the 1987 Constitution.
_______________
59 General Recommendation No. 25, CEDAW/pars. 8-9 (2004).
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Garcia vs. Drilon
The Issuance of the TPO did not
Violate Petitioner’s Right to Due
Process
A protection order is issued under Republic Act No. 9262 for the
purpose of preventing further acts of violence against a woman or
her child.60 The circumstances surrounding the availment thereof
are often attended by urgency; thus, women and child victims must
have immediate and uncomplicated access to the same. Hence,
Republic Act No. 9262 provides for the issuance of a TPO:
15. SEC.Temporary Protection Orders.—Temporary Protection Orders (TPOs)
refers to the protection order issued by the court on the date of filing of the
application after ex parte determination that such order should be issued. A court
may grant in a TPO any, some or all of the reliefs mentioned in this Act and shall be
effective for thirty (30) days. The court shall schedule a hearing on the issuance of a
PPO prior to or on the date of the expiration of the TPO. The court shall order the
immediate personal service of the TPO on the respondent by the court sheriff who
may obtain the assistance of law enforcement agents for the service. The TPO shall
include notice of the date of the hearing on the merits of the issuance of a PPO.
The ex parte issuance of the TPO does not make it

unconstitutional. Procedural due process refers to the method or
manner by which the law is enforced. It consists of the two basic
rights of notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being
heard by an impartial and competent tribunal.61 However, it is a
constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of
procedural due process yield to the necessi-
_______________
60 Section 8.
61 China Banking Corporation v. Lozada, G.R. No. 164919, July 4, 2008, 557 SCRA 177, 193.
464
Garcia vs. Drilon
ties of protecting vital public interests like those involved herein.
Republic Act No. 9262 and its implementing regulations were
enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive,
sovereign power of the State to protect the safety, health, and
general welfare and comfort of the public (in this case, a particular
sector thereof), as well as the protection of human life, commonly
designated as the police power.62
In Secretary of Justice v. Lantion,63 the Court enumerated three
instances when notice and/or hearing may be dispensed with in
administrative proceedings:
These twin rights may, however, be considered dispensable in certain
instances, such as:
In proceedings where there is an urgent need for immediate action, like
the summary abatement of a nuisance 1. per se (Article 704, Civil
Code), the preventive suspension of a public servant facing
administrative charges (Section 63, Local Government Code, B.P. Blg.
337), the padlocking of filthy restaurants or theaters showing obscene
movies or like establishments which are immediate threats to public
health and decency, and the cancellation of a passport of a person
sought for criminal prosecution;
Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, that is, where the
respondent is not precluded from enjoying the right to notice and
hearing at a later time without prejudice to the person affected, such
as the summary distraint and levy of the property of a delinquent
taxpayer, and the replacement of a temporary appointee; and 2.
Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to
exercise them had not been claimed. 3.
_______________
62 Pollution Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93891, March 11, 1991, 195 SCRA 112,
123.
63 379 Phil. 165, 203-204; 322 SCRA 160, 187-188 (2000).
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The principles behind the aforementioned exceptions may also
apply in the case of the ex parte issuance of the TPO, although it is
a judicial proceeding. As mentioned previously, the urgent need for
a TPO is inherent in its nature and purpose, which is to
immediately provide protection to the woman and/or child victim/s
against further violent acts. Any delay in the issuance of a
protective order may possibly result in loss of life and limb of the
victim. The issuing judge does not arbitrarily issue the TPO as he
can only do so if there is reasonable ground to believe that an
imminent danger of violence against women and their children
exists or is about to recur based on the verified allegations in the
petition of the victim/s.64Since the TPO is effective for only thirty
(30) days,65 any inconvenience, deprivation, or prejudice the person
enjoined — such as the petitioner herein — may suffer, is generally
limited and temporary. Petitioner is also not completely precluded
from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time.
Following the issuance of the TPO, the law and rules require that
petitioner be personally served with notice of the preliminary
conference and hearing on private respondent’s petition for a
Permanent Protection Order (PPO)66 and that petitioner submit his
opposition to private respondent’s petition for protections
orders.67 In fact, it was petitioner’s choice not to file an opposition,
averring that it would only be an “exercise in futility.” Thus, the
twin rights of notice and hearing were subsequently afforded to
petitioner but he chose not to take advantage of them. Petitioner
cannot now claim that the ex parte issuance of the TPO was in
violation of his right to due process.
_______________
64 A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, Section 15(a).
65 Id.
66 Id., Section 15(b).
67 Id., Section 15(c).
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Garcia vs. Drilon
There is No Undue Delegation of
Judicial Power to Barangay Officials
A Barangay Protection Order (BPO) refers to the protection
order issued by the Punong Barangay, or in his absence
the Barangay Kagawad, ordering the perpetrator to desist from
committing acts of violence against the family or household
members particularly women and their children.68 The authority
of barangay officials to issue a BPO is conferred under Section 14
of Republic Act No. 9262:
14. SEC.Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How.—
Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by
the Punong Barangayordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts under
Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong Barangaywho receives applications for a
BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant on the date of filing after ex
parte determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is
unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon
by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by aBarangay
Kagawad the order must be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay
Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time for the issuance of
the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the
issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall
personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any barangay
official to effect is personal service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding
before the Punong Barangay.
Once more, the urgency of the purpose for which protection

orders under Republic Act No. 9262 are issued justifies the grant of
authority to barangay officials to issue BPOs. Baran-
_______________
68 Id., Section 4(p).
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gay officials live and interact closely with their constituents and
are presumably easier to approach and more readily available than
any other government official. Their issuance of the BPO is but
part of their official executive function of enforcing all laws and
ordinances within their barangay69 and maintaining public order in
the barangay.70 It is true that the barangay officials’ issuance of a
BPO under Republic Act No. 9262 necessarily involves the
determination of some questions of fact, but this function, whether
judicial or quasi-judicial, are merely incidental to the exercise of
the power granted by law.71The Court has clarified that:
“The mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire the existence of
certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his official
conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect private rights do not
constitute an exercise of judicial powers. Accordingly, a statute may give to non-
judicial officers the power to declare the existence of facts which call into operation
its provisions, and similarly may grant to commissioners and other subordinate
officers power to ascertain and determine appropriate facts as a basis for procedure
in the enforcement of particular laws.” (11 Am. Jur., Const. Law, p. 950, sec. 235) 72
Furthermore, while judicial power rests exclusively in the

judiciary, it may be conceded that the legislature may confer on
administrative boards or bodies, or even particular government
officials, quasi-judicial power involving the exercise of judgment
and discretion, as incident to the performance of
_______________
69 Section 389(b)(1), Chapter III, Title I, Book III of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as The
Local Government Code of 1991.
70 Section 389(b)(3), Chapter III, Title I, Book III of The Local Government Code of 1991.
71 Lovina v. Moreno, 118 Phil. 1401, 1405; 9 SCRA 557, 561 (1963).
72 Id., at p. 1406; pp. 561-562.
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Garcia vs. Drilon
administrative functions. But in so doing, the legislature must
state its intention in express terms that would leave no doubt, as
even such quasi-judicial prerogatives must be limited, if they are to
be valid, only to those incidental to or in connection with the
performance of administrative duties, which do not amount to
conferment of jurisdiction over a matter exclusively vested in the
courts.73 In the case of a BPO, it is a mere provisional remedy
under Republic Act No. 9262, meant to address the pressing need
of the victims for instant protection. However, it does not take the
place of appropriate judicial proceedings and remedies that provide
a more effective and comprehensive protection to the victim. In
fact, under the Implementing Rules of Republic Act No. 9262, the
issuance of a BPO or the pendency of an application for a BPO
shall not preclude the victim from applying for, or the court from
granting, a TPO or PPO. Where a TPO has already been granted
by any court, the barangay official may no longer issue a BPO.74The
same Implementing Rules also require that within twenty-four (24)
hours after the issuance of a BPO, the barangay official shall assist
the victim in filing an application for a TPO or PPO with the
nearest court in the victim’s place of residence. If there is no
Family Court or RTC, the application may be filed in the Municipal
Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court or the Metropolitan
Trial Court.75
All things considered, there is no ground to declare Republic Act
No. 9262 constitutionally infirm.
_______________
73 Miller v. Mardo, 112 Phil. 792, 802; 2 SCRA 898, 907 (1961).
74 Section 14(g).
75 Section 14(d).
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CONCURRING OPINION
BRION,J.:
I concur with the ponencia’s conclusion that Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9262 (An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their
Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims,
Prescribing Penalties Therefore and for Other Purposes)
is constitutional and does not violate the equal
protection clause. As traditionally viewed, the constitutional
provision of equal protection simply requires that similarly
situated persons be treated in the same way. It does not connote
identity of rights among individuals, nor does it require that every
person is treated identically in all circumstances. It acts as a
safeguard to ensure that State-drawn distinctions among persons
are based on reasonable classifications and made pursuant to a
proper governmental purpose. In short, statutory classifications
are not unconstitutional when shown to be reasonable and made
pursuant to a legitimate government objective.
In my view, Congress has presented a reasonable classification
that focuses on women and children based on protective provisions
that the Constitution itself provides. Section 11, Article II of the
Constitution declares it a state policy to value the dignity of every
human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.
Further, under Section 14, Article II of the Constitution, the State
recognizes the role of women in nation-building and ensures
fundamental equality before the law of women and men. These
policies are given purposeful meaning under Article XV of the
Constitution on family, which states:
The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development. 1. Section470

Garcia vs. Drilon
Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State. 2. Section
The State shall defend: 3. Section
The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood; (1)
The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and
special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other
conditions prejudicial to their development[.] (2)
From the terms of the law, I find it plain that Congress enacted
R.A. No. 9262 as a measure intended to strengthen the family.
Congress found that domestic and other forms of violence against
women and children contribute to the failure to unify and
strengthen family ties, thereby impeding the State’s mandate to
actively promote the family’s total development. Congress also
found, as a reality, that women and children are more susceptible
to domestic and other forms of violence due to, among others, the
pervasive bias and prejudice against women and the stereotyping
of roles within the family environment that traditionally exist in
Philippine society. On this basis, Congress found it necessary to
recognize the substantial distinction within the family between
men, on the one hand, and women and children, on the other
hand. This recognition, incidentally, is not the first to be
made in the laws as our law on persons and family under
the Civil Code also recognize, in various ways, the
distinctions between men and women in the context of the
family.1
_______________
1 Examples of this distinction are found in the following provisions of the Family Code, as amended:
On the Ownership, Administrative, Enjoyment and Disposition of the Community Property:
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Garcia vs. Drilon
To be sure, Congress has not been alone in addressing violence
committed against women and children as this move is
_______________
The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In
case of disagreement, 96. “Art. the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court
by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.”
On the Liquidation of the Absolute Community Assets and Liabilities:
Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply: 102. “Art.
xxxx
Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling
and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the
common (6) children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to
have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there in no such majority, the
court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children.” (emphases ours)
On the Administration of the Conjugal Partnership Property:
The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly. In
case of disagreement, the 124. “Art. husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the
court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.” (emphasis ours)
On the Liquidation of the Conjugal Partnership Assets and Liabilities:
Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following procedure shall apply: 129.
“Art.
xxxx
In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall,
unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the
majority of the common children choose to remain. (9) Children below the age of seven
years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In
case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best
interests of said children.” (emphases ours)
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Garcia vs. Drilon
“in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the
Constitution and the Provisions of the Universal Declara-
_______________
On Parental Authority:
Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of their
unemancipated children, parental authority and responsibility shall include the caring for and rearing
them for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical
character and well-being. 209. “Art.
xxxx
The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common
children. 211. Art. In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is a
judicial order to the contrary.” (emphasis ours)
On the Effect of Parental Authority Upon the Persons of the Children:
The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with the respect to their
unemancipated children on wards the following rights and duties: 220 “Art.
To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and good
example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means; (1)
To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding; (2)
To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity,
selfdiscipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and
inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship; (3)
To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their activities,
recreation and association with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them from
acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals; (4)
To represent them in all matters affecting their interests; (5)
To demand from them respect and obedience; (6)
To impose discipline on them as may be required under the circumstances; and (7)
To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents and guardians. (8)
On the Effect of Parental Authority Upon the Property of the Children:
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Garcia vs. Drilon
tion of Human Rights, the convention on the Elimination of all
forms of discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights
of the Child and other international human rights instruments of
which the Philippines is a party.”2The only question perhaps is
whether the considerations made in these international
instruments have reason or basis for recognition and active
application in the Philippines.
I believe that the policy consideration Congress made in this
regard is not without basis in history and in contemporary
Philippine society so that Congress was acting well within its
prerogative when it enacted R.A. No. 9262 “to protect the family
and its members particularly women and children, from violence
and threats to their personal safety and security.”3
I consider, too, the statutory classification under R.A. No. 9262
to be valid, and that the lowest level of scrutiny of
review should be applied in determining if the law has established
a valid classification germane to the Constitution’s objective to
protect the family by protecting its women and children members.
In my view, no need exists to further test the law’s validity from
the perspective of an expanded equal protection based on
social justice. The Constitution itself has made special mention of
women and their role in society (Article II) and the assistance and
protection that must be given to children irrespective of sex. It
appears highly inconsistent to me under this situation if the Court
would impose a strict level of scrutiny on government — the
primary implementor of constitutional policies — and lay on it the
burden of
_______________
The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of the
unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court appointment. In case of disagreement,
225. Art. the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.”
2 R.A. No. 9262, Section 2.
3 Ibid.; italics ours.
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Garcia vs. Drilon
establishing the validity of an Act directly addressing violence
against women and children.
My serious reservation on the use of an expanded equal
protection clause and in applying a strict scrutiny standard is,
among others, based on lack of necessity; we do not need these
measures when we can fully examine R.A. No. 9262’s
constitutionality using the reasonableness test. The family is a
unit, in fact a very basic one, and it cannot operate on an uneven
standard where measures beyond what is necessary are extended
to women and children as against the man — the head of the
family and the family provider. The use of an expanded equal
protection clause only stresses the concept of an uneven equality
that cannot long stand in a unit living at close quarters in a
situation of mutual dependency on one another. The
reasonableness test, on the other hand, has been consistently
applied to allow the courts to uphold State action as long as the
action is found to be germane to the purpose of the law, in this case
to support the unity and development of the family. If we are to
deviate from or to modify this established standard of
scrutiny, we must do so carefully and for strong justifiable
reasons.
If we are to use a strict level of scrutiny of government action, we
must be aware of the risks that this system of review may open. A
very real risk is to open the possibility that our social
legislations will always be subject to heightened scrutiny.
Are we sure of what this approach entails for the government and
for our society in the long run? How will this approach affect the
social legislation that our society, particularly the most vulnerable
members, need? What other effects will a system of review — that
regards governmental action as illegal unless the government can
actively justify the classifications it has made in the course of
pursuing its actions — have? These are the questions that, in
the long run, we have to contend with, and I hate to provide
an answer through a case that is not, on its face and even
475
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Garcia vs. Drilon
in deeper reality, representative of the questions we are
asking or need to ask.
The cases of Central Bank Employees Assoc., Inc. v. Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas4 and Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services,
Inc.5 demonstrate the Court’s application of a heightened sense of
scrutiny on social legislations. In Central Bank and Serrano, we
held that classifications in the law that result in prejudice to
persons accorded special protection by the Constitution require a
stricter judicial scrutiny.6 In both cases, the question may well be
asked: was there an absolute necessity for a strict scrutiny
approach when, as in Serrano, the same result emerges when
using the lowest level of scrutiny? In short, I ask if a strict scrutiny
is needed under the circumstances of the present case as the
Concurring Opinion of J. Roberto Abad suggests.
Not to be forgotten or glossed over in answering this question is
the need to consider what a strict scrutiny requires, as well as the
consequences of an expanded concept of equal protection clause
and the accompanying use of a strict scrutiny standard. Among
others, this approach affects the application of constitutional
principles that we vigilantly adhere to in this jurisdiction.
I outline below what a strict scrutiny approach entails.
First, the use of strict scrutiny only applies when the challenged
law or clause results in a “suspect classification”;
Second, the use of a strict scrutiny standard of review creates a
reverse onus: the ordinary presumption of constitution-
_______________
4 487 Phil. 531; 446 SCRA 299 (2004).
5 G.R. No. 167614, March 24, 2009, 582 SCRA 254.
6 See note 4. In Central Bank, the classification was based on salary grade or officer-employee status.
In the words of the decision, “It is akin to a distinction based on economic class and status, with higher
grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades” (p. 391).
476
Garcia vs. Drilon
ality is reversed and the government carries the burden of proving
that the challenged law or clause is constitutional;
And third, the reverse onus in a strict scrutiny standard of
review directly strikes, in the most glaring manner, at the
regularity of the performance of functions of a co-equal branch of
government.
When the court uses a strict standard for review to evaluate the
constitutionality of a law, it proceeds from the premise that the law
established a “suspect classification.” A suspect classification is one
where distinctions are made based on the most invidious bases
for classification that violate the most basic human rights, i.e., on
the basis of race, national origin, alien status, religious affiliation
and, to a certain extent, sex and sexual orientation.7 With a suspect
classification, the most stringent scrutiny of the classification is
applied: the ordinary presumption of constitutionality is reversed
and the government carries the burden of proving the statute’s
constitutionality. This approach is unlike the lowest level of
scrutiny (reasonableness test) that the Court has applied in the
past where the classification is scrutinized and constitutionally
upheld if found to be germane to the purpose of the law. Under a
reasonableness test, there is a presumption of constitutionality and
that the laws enacted by Congress are presumed to fall within its
constitutional powers.
To pass strict scrutiny, the government must actively show that
the classification established in the law is justified by a compelling
governmental interest and the means chosen by the State to
effectuate its purpose must be narrowly tailored to the
achievement of that goal.8 In the context of the present
_______________
7 See note 5, at p. 321. Citing City of Cleburn, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 413 U.S. 432
(1985); Loving v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
8 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). See Pamore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984); Loving v.
Commonwealth of Virginia, supra note 7; and Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375 (1971).
477
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Garcia vs. Drilon
case, is the resulting classification in the present law so
outstandingly harmful to men in general so that a strict scrutiny is
called for?I
do not really see any indication that Congress actually intended
to classify women and children as a group against men, under the
terms of R.A. No. 9262. Rather than a clear intent at classification,
the overriding intent of the law is indisputably to
harmonize family relations and protect the family as a
basic social institution.9 After sifting through the comprehensive
information gathered, Congress found that domestic and other
forms of violence against women and children impedes the
harmony of the family and the personal growth and development of
family members. In the process, Congress found that these types of
violence must pointedly be addressed as they are more commonly
experienced by women and children due to the unequal power
relations of men and women in our society; Congress had removed
these types of violence as they are impediments that block the
harmonious development that it envisions for the family, of which
men are important component members.
Even granting that a classification resulted in the law, I do not
consider the classification of women and children to be within the
“suspect classification” that jurisprudence has established. As I
mentioned earlier, suspect classifications are distinctions based on
the most invidious bases for classification that violate the most
basic human rights. Some criteria used in determining suspect
classifications are: (1) the group possesses an immutable and/or
highly visible trait;10 and (2) they are powerless to protect
themselves via the political process.11 The group is a “discrete” and
“insular” minority.12
_______________
9 Congressional Records, Vol. III, No. 51, January 14, 2004, pp. 141-147. See p. 25 of the ponencia.
10 477 U.S. 635 (1986).
11 United States v. Carolene Products Company, 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
12 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
478
Garcia vs. Drilon
Women and children, to my mind, simply do not fall within these
criteria.
In my view, a suspect classification and the accompanying strict
scrutiny should depend on the circumstances of the case, on the
impact of the illegal differential treatment on the group involved,
on the needed protection and the impact of recognizing a suspect
classification on future classification.13 A suspect classification
label cannot solely and automatically be triggered by the
circumstance that women and children are accorded special
protection by the Constitution. In fact, there is no place for a strict
level of scrutiny when the Constitution itself has recognized the
need for special protection; where such recognition has been made,
congressional action should carry the presumption of validity.
Similarly, a suspect classification and the accompanying strict
scrutiny standard cannot be solely based on the circumstance that
the law has the effect of being “gender-specific.” I believe that the
classification in the law was not immediately brought on by
considerations of gender or sex; it was simply a reality as
unavoidable as the reality that in Philippine society, a
marriage is composed of a man, a woman and their
children. An obvious reason, of course, why the classification did
not solely depend on gender is because the law also covers children,
without regard to their sex or their sexual orientation.
Congress was sensitive to these realities and had to address the
problem as it existed in order to pinpoint and remove the obstacles
that lay along the way. With this appreciation of reality, Congress
had no recourse but to identify domestic and other forms of
violence committed on women and their children as among the
obstacles that intrude on the development, peace and harmony of
the family. From this perspective, the objective of the law — the
productive devel-
_______________
13 Concurring Opinion in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., supra note 5, at p. 322.
479
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Garcia vs. Drilon
opment of the family as a whole and the Congress’ view of what
may be done in the area of violence — stand out.
Thus, with the objective of promoting solidarity and the
development of the family, R.A. No. 9262 provides the legal redress
for domestic violence that particularly affects women and their
children. Significantly, the law does not deny, restrict or
curtail civil and human rights of other persons falling
outside the classification, particularly of the men members
of the family who can avail of remedies provided by other
laws to ensure the protection of their own rights and
interests. Consequently, the resulting classification under R.A.
No. 9262 is not wholly intended and does not work an injustice by
removing remedies that are available to men in violence committed
against them. The law furthermore does not target men against
women and children and is there simply to achieve a legitimate
constitutional objective, and it does not achieve this by a
particularly harmful classification that can be labeled “suspect” in
the sense already established by jurisprudence. Under the
circumstances, the use and application of strict scrutiny review, or
even the use of an expanded equal protection perspective, strike
me as both unnecessary and disproportionate.
As my final point, the level of review that the Court chooses to
apply is crucial as it determines both the process and the outcome
of a given case. The reverse onus that a strict scrutiny brings
ignores the most basic presumption of constitutionality that the
courts consistently adhere to when resolving issues of
constitutionality. It also infringes on the regularity of performance
of functions of co-equal branches of government. As the Court
pronounced in Drilon v. Lim:14
In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the
utmost circumspection, bearing in
_______________
14 G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994, 235 SCRA 135, 140; citation omitted.
480

Garcia vs. Drilon
mind the consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of
laws, no less than on the doctrine of separation of powers. As the questioned act is
usually the handiwork of the legislative or the executive departments, or both, it
will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the
higher judgment of this Court in the consideration of its validity, which is better
determined after a thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and with the
concurrence of the majority of those who participated in its discussion.
It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is charged with the
duty of a purposeful hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the
theory that the measure was first carefully studied by the executive and the
legislative departments and determined by them to be in accordance with the
fundamental law before it was finally approved. To doubt is to sustain. The
presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that
there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion
is reached by the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of
the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck down.
Inter-government harmony and courtesy demand that we

reserve the strict scrutiny standard of review to the worst possible
cases of unacceptable classification, abject forms of discrimination,
and the worst violations of the Constitution.15 R.A. No. 9262 does
not present such a case.
In these lights, I conclude that a valid classification exists to
justify whatever differential treatment may exist in the law. I vote
to deny the petition and uphold the constitutionality of R.A.
No. 9262 using the lowest level of scrutiny under the
reasonableness test.
_______________
15 Concurring Opinion in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., supra note 5, at p. 322.
481
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Garcia vs. Drilon
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
ABAD,J.:
Republic Act 9262 (R.A. 9262) or the Anti-Violence against
Women and their Children Act is a historic step in the Filipino
women’s long struggle to be freed from a long-held belief that men
are entitled, when displeased or minded, to hit their wives or
partners and their children. This law institutionalizes prompt
community response to this violent behavior
through barangay officials who can command the man to
immediately desist from harming his home partner and their
children. It also establishes domestic violence as a crime, not only
against its victims but against society as well. No longer
is domestic violence lightly dismissed as a case of marital
dispute that law enforcers ought not to get into.1
Almost eight years after the passage of this landmark
legislation, petitioner Jesus C. Garcia, a husband charged with the
offense, claims before the Court that R.A. 9262 violates his
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection and that
it constitutes an undue delegation of judicial power
to barangay officials with respect to the Temporary Protection
Order (TPO) that the latter could issue against him for his alleged
maltreatment of his wife and children.
This separate concurring opinion will address the issue of equal
protection since it presents the more serious challenge to the
constitutionality of the law. Men and women are supposed to be
equal yet this particular law provides immediate relief to
complaining women and harsh consequences to their men even
before the matter reaches the courtroom, a relief not available to
the latter. The law, Garcia says, violates his right to equal
protection because it is gender-specific, favoring
_______________
1 SALIGAN Women’s Unit, “Strengthening Responses to Violence against Women: Overcoming Legal
Challenges in the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act” (March 2008), Ateneo Law
Journal.
482
Garcia vs. Drilon
only women when men could also be victims of domestic violence.
Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe ran the issue of equal protection
in her ponencia through the litmus test for holding a law valid
even when it affects only a particular class, a test that the Court
laid down in People v. Vera.2 A legislative classification, according
to Vera, is reasonable as long as: 1) it rests on substantial
distinctions which make real differences; 2) it is germane to the
purpose of the law; 3) it is not limited to existing conditions but
applies as well to future identical conditions; and 4) it applies
equally to all members of the same class.3 I dare not improve on
Justice Bernabe’s persuasive reasoning and conclusions.
I agree with her but would like to hinge my separate concurring
opinion on the concept of an Expanded Equal Protection Clause
that former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno espouses in his
book: Equal Dignity and Respect: The Substance of Equal
Protection and Social Justice.
Chief Justice Puno’s thesis is that the right to equal protection
casts another shadow when the issue raised under it involves
persons protected by the social justice provision of the
Constitution, specifically, Section 1, Article XIII. The equal
protection clause can no longer be interpreted as only a guarantee
of formal equality4 but of substantive equality. “It ought to be
construed,” said the Chief Justice, “in consonance with social
justice as ‘the heart’ particularly of the 1987 Constitution — a
transformative covenant in which the Filipino people agreed to
enshrine asymmetrical equality to uplift
_______________
2 65 Phil. 56 (1937).
3 Id., at p. 126.
4 It holds that two persons with equal status in at least one normatively relevant respect must be
treated equally with regard to this respect.
483
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Garcia vs. Drilon
disadvantaged groups and build a genuinely egalitarian
democracy.”5
This means that the weak, including women in relation to men,
can be treated with a measure of bias that they may cease to be
weak.
Chief Justice Puno goes on: “The Expanded Equal Protection
Clause, anchored on the human rights rationale, is designed as a
weapon against the indignity of discrimination so that in the
patently unequal Philippine society, each person may be restored
to his or her rightful position as a person with equal moral
status.”6 Specifically, the expanded equal protection clause should
be understood as meant to “reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing
wealth and political power for the common good.”7Borrowing the
language of Law v. Canada8 case and adding his own thoughts, the
Chief Justice said:
The purpose of the Expanded Equal Protection Clause is to protect and enhance
the right to dignity by: 1) preventing the imposition, perpetuation and aggravation
“of disadvantage, stereotyping, or political [,economic, cultural,] or social prejudice;”
and 2) promo[ting a Philippine] society in which all persons enjoy equal recognition
at law as human beings.9
Chief Justice Puno points out that the equal protection clause
must be interpreted in connection with the social justice provisions
of the Constitution “so as not to frustrate or
_______________
5 Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno (ret.), “Equal Dignity and Respect: The Substance of Equal Protection
and Social Justice,” (2012), p. 546.
6 Id., at p. 523.
7 1987 Philippine Constitution, Art. XIII, Section 1.
8 1 S.C.R. 497 (1999).
9 Supra note 5, at pp. 512-513.
484
Garcia vs. Drilon
water down the constitutional commitment to promote
substantive equality and build the genuinely “just and humane
society” that Filipinos aspire for, as stated in the Preamble of the
1987 Constitution.”
But the expanded concept of equal protection, said Chief Justice
Puno, only applies to the government’s ameliorative action or
discriminatory actions intended to improve the lot of the
disadvantaged. Laws challenged for invalid classification because
of being unreasonable or arbitrary, but not discriminatory, are
outside the scope of the expanded equal protection clause. Such
cases fall under the traditional equal protection clause which
protects the right to formal equality and determines the validity of
classifications through the well established reasonableness test.10
Here, petitioner Garcia argues that R.A. 9262 violates the
guarantee of equal protection because the remedies against
personal violence that it provides may be invoked only by the wives
or women partners but not by the husbands or male partners even
if the latter could possibly be victims of violence by their women
partners. Women, he claims, are also capable of committing
physical, psychological, emotional, and even sexual abuse against
their husbands and children.
Garcia further assails the title of the law — “An Act Defining
Violence against Women and Their Children, Providing for
Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor,
and for Other Purposes” — as pejorative and sex-discriminatory.
R.A. 9262 is an “anti-male,” “husbandbashing,” and “hate-men”
law. It establishes a special category of domestic violence offenses
which is akin to legislating hate crimes and imposes penalties
based solely on gender; it singles out the husband or father as the
culprit, a clear form of “class legislation.”
_______________
10 Id., at pp. 543-544.
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Garcia vs. Drilon
But the Constitution requires the State to “ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of men and women.” Further,
it commands Congress to “give highest priority to the enactment of
measures that protect and enhance the rights of all the people to
human dignity x x x.” and this includes women. In his speech
during the joint launching on October 27, 2004 of R.A. 9262 and its
Implementing Rules, Chief Justice Puno recalled the historical and
social context of gender-based violence that underpin its
enactment. Thus:
History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of violence against women.
The patriarch of a family was accorded the right to use force on members of the
family under his control. I quote the early studies:
Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in
patriarchy—the institutional rule of men. Women were seen in virtually all
societies to be naturally inferior both physically and intellectually. In ancient
western societies, women whether slave, concubine or wife, were under the
authority of men. In law, they were treated as property.
The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or even kill,
his wife if she endangered his property right over her. Judaism, Christianity and
other religions oriented towards the patriarchal family strengthened the male
dominated structure of society.
English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women. Even the
eminent Blackstone has been quoted in his commentaries as saying husband and
wife were one and that one was the husband. However, in the late 1500s and
through the entire 1600s, English common law began to limit the right of husbands
to chastise their wives. Thus, common law developed the rule of thumb, which
allowed husbands to beat their wives with a rod or stick no thicker than their
thumb.
Article II, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution states:486

Garcia vs. Drilon
The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
Also, Article XIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution further

states:
The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the rights of all the people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably
diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.
xxxx
The above provisions of the Constitution abundantly authorize

Congress or the government to actively undertake ameliorative
action that would remedy existing inequalities and inequities
experienced by women and children brought about by years of
discrimination. The equal protection clause when juxtaposed to
this provision provides a stronger mandate for the government to
combat such discrimination. Indeed, these provisions order
Congress to “give highest priority to the enactment of measures
that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human
dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities and
remove cultural inequities.”
No doubt, historically, the Philippine tribal and family model
hews close to patriarchy, a pattern that is deeply embedded in the
society’s subconscious. Consequently, it can be said that in
enacting R.A. 9262, Congress has taken an ameliorative action
that would address the evil effects of such social model on Filipino
women and children and elevate their status as human beings on
the same level as the father or the husband.
What remedies does R.A. 9262 especially provide women and
children? The law is gender-specific as only they may file the
prescribed actions against offenders, whether men or women, with
whom the victims are or were in lesbian rela-
487
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Garcia vs. Drilon
tionships.11 The definition includes past or present marital, live-in,
sexual or dating relationships.
This law also provides for the remedy of a protection order in a
civil action or in a criminal action, aside from the criminal action
for its violation. It makes the process of securing a restraining
order against perpetrators easier and more immediate by providing
for the legal remedy of protection orders from both the courts
and barangayofficials.
R.A. 9262 aims to put a stop to the cycle of male abuses borne of
discrimination against women. It is an ameliorative measure, not a
form of “reverse discrimination” against men as Garcia would have
it. Ameliorative action “is not, as Hogg remarked, an exception to
equality, but an expression and attainment of de facto equality, the
genuine and substantive equality which the Filipino people
themselves enshrined as a goal of the 1987
Constitution.”12 Ameliorative measures are necessary as a
redistributive mechanism in an unequal society to achieve
substantive equality.13
In the context of women’s rights, substantive equality has been
defined by the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) as equality which
requires that women be given an equal start and that they be
empowered by an enabling environment to achieve equality of
results. It is not enough to guarantee women treatment that is
identical to that of men. Rather, biological as well as socially and
culturally constructed differences between women and men must
be taken into account. Under certain circumstances, non-identical
treatment of women and men will be required in order to address
such differences.
_______________
11 Maria Rowena Amelia V. Guanzon, “The Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of
2004 (Republic Act No. 9262),” 2009.
12 Supra note 5 at p. 527.
13 Id., at p. 497.
488
Garcia vs. Drilon
Women’s struggle for equality with men has evolved under three
models:
Formal equality — women and men are to be regarded and
treated as the same. But this model does not take into account
biological and socially constructed differences between women and
men. 1.14 It uses male standards and assumes that women have
equal access to such standards.15 By failing to take into account
these differences, a formal equality approach may in fact
perpetuate discrimination and disadvantage.16
Protectionist model — this recognizes differences between
women and men but considers women’s weakness as the rationale
for different treatment. 2.17 This approach reinforces the inferior
status of women and does not address the issue of discrimination of
women on account of their gender.18
Substantive equality model — this assumes that women are “not
vulnerable by nature, but suffer from imposed disadvantage” and
that “if these imposed disadvantages were eliminated, there was
no further need for protection.” 3.19 Thus, the substantive equality
model gives prime importance to women’s contexts, realities, and
experiences, and the outcomes or results of acts and measures
directed, at or affecting them, with a view to eliminating the
disadvantages they experience as women.20
_______________
14 IWRAW Asia Pacific Manual on CEDAW: Building Capacity for Change
15 Id.
16 Supra note 11, at p. 42, citing Fredman, S. and Spencer, S., “Beyond Discrimination: It’s Time for
Enforceable Duties on Public Bodies to promote Equality of Outcomes,” E.H.R.L.R. Issue 6, 601 (2006)”
17 Supra note 14.
18 Supra note 11, at p. 43.
19 Id., at pp. 43-44, citing Goonesekere.
20 Id., at p. 44.
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Clearly, the substantive equality model inspired R.A. 9262. For
one thing, Congress enacted it because of compelling interest in
preventing and addressing the serious problem of violence against
women in the context of intimate relationships — recognized all
over the world as one of the most insidious forms of gender
discrimination.21For another, R.A. 9262 is based on the experiences
of women who have been victims of domestic violence. The list of
acts regarded as forms of violence22 come from true-to-life stories of
women who have suffered abuses from their male partners.
Finally, R.A. 9262 seeks women’s full participation in society.
Hence, the law grants them needed relief to ensure equality,
protection, and personal safety, enabling them to enjoy their civil,
political, social, and economic rights. The provision on protection
orders, for instance, precisely aims to safeguard “the victim from
further harm, minimizing any disruption in the victim’s daily life,
and facilitating the opportunity and ability of the victim to
independently regain control over her life.”23
For the above reasons, I vote to dismiss the petition for lack of
merit.
_______________
21 Id., at p. 45.
22 3. SEC.Definition of Terms.—As used in this Act.
(a)“Violence against women and their children” refers to any act or a series of acts committed
by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person
has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child
whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result
in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of
such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. (Emphasis
supplied)
23 REPUBLIC ACT 9262, Sec. 8.
490
Garcia vs. Drilon
CONCURRING OPINION
LEONEN,J.:
I join the ponencia in denying the challenge to the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 otherwise known as the
“Anti-Violence against Women and their Children Act of 2004” at
least for this case. I write separately to clarify the basis of my
agreement.
The petitioner is not the victim in this case. He does not have
legal standing to raise the constitutional issue.
He appears to have inflicted violence against private
respondents. Petitioner admitted having an affair with a bank
manager. He callously boasted about their sexual relations to the
household help. His infidelity emotionally wounded private
respondent. Their quarrels left her with bruises and hematoma.
Petitioner also unconscionably beat up their daughter, Joann,
whom he blamed for squealing on him.
All these drove respondent to despair causing her to attempt
suicide on December 17, 2005 by slitting her wrist. Instead of
taking her to the hospital, petitioner left the house. He never
visited her when she was confined for seven (7) days. He even told
his mother-in-law that respondent should just accept his
extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting with his paramour
and has not sired a child with her.
The private respondent was determined to separate from
petitioner. But she was afraid he would take away their children
and deprive her of financial support. He warned her that if she
pursued legal battle, she would not get a single centavo from him.
After she confronted him of his affair, he forbade her to hold office
at JBTC Building. This deprived her of access to full information
about their businesses.
Thus, the Regional Trial Court found reasonable ground to
believe there was imminent danger of violence against respondent
and her children and issued a series of Temporary
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Garcia vs. Drilon
Protection Orders (TPO) ordering petitioner, among other things,
to surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and
a Walther PPK.
This is the quintessential case where the full effects of Republic
Act No. 9262 or the “VAWC” should take effect.
Seen in this light, petitioner’s belated challenge to the law is
nothing but a cheap attempt to raise cherished fundamental
constitutional principles to escape legal responsibility for causing
indignities in another human being. There is enough in our legal
order to prevent the abuse of legal principles to condone immoral
acts.
For us to proceed to rule on Constitutional issues, we have
required that: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy
calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging
the act must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or
will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case.1
Legal standing in cases that raise constitutional issues is
essential. Locus standi is defined as “a right of appearance in a
court of justice on a given question.”2 The fundamental question is
“whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon
_______________
1 Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936), People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937). See
also Mariano Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 312 Phil. 259, 270; 242 SCRA 211, 220-221 (1995); Funa v.
Executive Secretary Ermita, G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 308, 317.
2 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705, 755; 489 SCRA 160, 216 (2006) citing BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 941 (Sixth Edition, 1991).
492
Garcia vs. Drilon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.3
In private suits, standing is governed by the “real-parties-in-
interest” rule under Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure in that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party-in-interest.”4 “Interest” means material
interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the judgment of the
case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question
involved.5
Thus, there must be a present substantial interest as
distinguished from a mere inchoate expectancy or a future,
contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.6Standing is
based on one’s own right to the relief sought.
The doctrine of locus standi in cases raising constitutional issues
frames the power of judicial review that we wield. This is the
power “to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable” as well as “to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government.”7
The presence of an “actual case” prevents this Court from
providing advisory opinions or using its immense power of judicial
review absent the presence of a party with real and substantial
interests to clarify the issues based upon his/her experience and
standpoint. It prevents this Court from speculating and rendering
rulings on the basis of pure theory. Our
_______________
3 Galicto v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 193978, February 28, 2012, 667 SCRA 150, 170.
4 Baltazar v. Ombudsman, 539 Phil. 131, 139; 510 SCRA 74, 83 (2006).
5 Goco, et al. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157449, April 6, 2010, 617 SCRA 397, 405. See also IBP v.
Zamora, 392 Phil. 618, 633; 338 SCRA 81, 100 (2000).
6 Galicto v. Aquino III, supra.
7 CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 1, par. (2).
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Garcia vs. Drilon
doctrines on justiciability are self-imposed applications of a
fundamental view that we accord a presumption of
constitutionality to acts done by the other constitutional organs
and departments of government. Generally, we do not strike down
acts done by co-equal departments until their repugnancy to the
Constitution can be shown clearly and materially.
I am aware of our precedents where this Court has waived
questions relating to the justiciability of the constitutional issues
raised when they have “transcendental importance” to the
public.8 In my view, this accommodates our power to promulgate
guidance “concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights”.9 We choose to rule squarely on the
constitutional issues in a petition wanting all or some of the
technical requisites to meet our general doctrines on justiciability
but raising clear conditions showing imminent threat to
fundamental rights. The imminence and clarity of the threat to
fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for
prudence. In a sense, our exceptional doctrine relating to
constitutional issues of “transcendental importance” prevents
courts from the paralysis of procedural niceties when clearly faced
with the need for substantial protection.
That necessity is wanting in this case.
The extraordinary discretion to move beyond the well
established doctrines on justiciability must be carefully exercised
in cases involving social legislation that seeks to rectify historical
and cultural injustices present in our communities
_______________
8 Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994, 232 SCRA 110, 139. See
also Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 899; 415 SCRA 44, 113 (2003), Funa v. Villar,
G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 579, 595.
9 CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5, par. (5) relates to the power of the Court to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. It was introduced only in the 1987
Constitution borne of historical experiences where judicial succor was wanting.
494
Garcia vs. Drilon
and societies. As carefully pointed out in the erudite ponencia of
Justice Perlas-Bernabe, Republic Act No. 9262 was borne out of the
struggles of countless women who suffered indignities. It cannot be
undone by a petition filed by someone who cannot, by any stretch
of the most fertile imagination, be considered the victim.
Nevertheless, in a future case more deserving of our attention,
we should be open to realities which may challenge the dominant
conception that violence in intimate relationships only happens to
women and children. This may be predominantly true, but even
those in marginal cases deserve fundamental constitutional and
statutory protection. We should be careful that in correcting
historical and cultural injustices, we may typecast all women as
victims, stereotype all men as tormentors or make invisible the
possibility that in some intimate relationships, men may also want
to seek succor against acts defined in Section 5 of Republic Act No.
926210in an expeditious manner.
_______________
10 5. SectionActs of Violence Against Women and Their Children.—The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
Causing physical harm to the woman or her child; (a)
Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm; (b)
Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm; (c)
Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm; (d)
Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the
woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her
child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman’s or her child’s
freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of
physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include,
but not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or
restricting the woman’s or her child’s movement or conduct: (e)
Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child of custody to her/his
family; (1)
495
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 495
Garcia vs. Drilon
Husband abuse may be an underreported form of family
violence.11 According to a Quezon City Police District Crime
_______________
Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support
legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman’s children insufficient
financial support; (2)
Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right; (3)
Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or
activity or controlling the victim’s own money or properties, or solely controlling the
conjugal or common money, or properties (4)
Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the purpose of controlling her
actions or decisions; (f)
Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in any sexual activity which
does not constitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical harm, or through intimidation
directed against the woman or her child or her/his immediate family; (g)
Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms
or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall
include, but not be limited to, the following acts: (h)
Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places; (1)
Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child; (2)
Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child
against her/his will; (3)
Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets of
the woman or her child; and (4)
Engaging in any form of harassment or violence (5)
Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child,
including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support
or custody of minor children of access to the woman’s child/children. (i)
11 T. Lewin, Battered Men Sounding Equal-Rights Battle Cry, THE NEW YORK TIMES NATIONAL (April
20, 1992) <http://www.nytimes.com/1992/04/20/us/battered-men-sounding-equal-rights-
battlecry.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm> (visited May 27, 2013). See also C. M.
496
Garcia vs. Drilon
Laboratory chief, in his 10 years as medico-legal officer, he had
only received three cases of men complaining of spousal abuse.12
Another recent study found the same underreporting but
explored the experiences of abuse in intimate relationships of six
Filipino husbands.13 Their experiences were described as follows:
All the participants acknowledged that they experienced abuse, but the forms
differed from one husband to another. Four out of the six participants admitted that
their spouses’ abusive behavior would initially start with verbal attacks and put-
downs then would shift to physical abuse as their verbal tussle intensified. Most of
the abuses cited by the participants happened in the confines of their home, but
could also happen in public places.
The constant threats, in the long term, affected the emotional and psychological
well being of the participants. Four of the husbands felt that their spouses were
capable of carrying out their threats. The frequent and long fights could be
emotionally draining. Throughout the duration of marriage, EC suffered emotionally
from
_______________
RENZETTI AND D. J. CURRAN, WOMEN, MEN AND SOCIETY 164 (Second Edition, 1992) citing Steinmetz, 1978.
12 C. Delfin, Ever Heard of Battered Husbands? GMA News Online (February 13, 2008)
<http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/
story/80412/lifestyle/ever-heard-of-battered-husbands> (visited May 27, 2013). Seealso ATTY. A. Ordoñez Sison,
Abused and the Battered Man (2009).
13 J. J. Jurisprudencia, Coming out of the Shadows: Husbands Speak About Their Experience of Abuse in
Intimate Relationships, 40 PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY No. 2 (2007). In the study, JL was a teacher in
one of the schools in Metro Manila. RE was a university teacher. HM is a medical doctor. DL was a Physics and
Engineering graduate. EC was a teacher. TG finished his MBA as well as his Bachelor of Laws at a reputable
institution but did not take the bar.
497
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Garcia vs. Drilon
the “weird” marital set-up. For TG, emotional abuse was associated with shattered
trust.
The physical abuse for some participants became life-threatening to the extent
that the injury incurred needed medical attention. Their spouses could use weapons
against them. Four participants described the incidents that led to their injuries.
Coming home one night, RE saw “this mono block chair flying…hit me…right on the
nose.” DL narrated “…pumunta ako ng doctor on my own para ipalinis yung sugat
ko.” According to HM, his wound from a knife attack was wide and deep and needed
“…some stiches.” JL had to contend with the long scratches in his chest and back.
RE almost lost an eye when he was hit with a straight punch of the spouse. JL, RE,
and DL would lie to colleagues to avoid being laughed at. DL had to be absent from
his work after being hit by a flying de lata (canned good) thrown at him during a
fight.
Emotional abuse co-existed with verbal and/or physical abuse. The participants
who were recipients of physical abuse were also emotionally abused when they
became susceptible to stress and threats of the abuser. JL felt guilty when the
spouse carried out her threat of killing herself by intentionally taking an overdose of
pills in the middle of an intense disagreement.
Emotional abuse could occur without physical abuse and yet its effects were still
devastating. For instance, EC and TG were devastated by the lies and deceit of their
spouses. The spouse’s threats of suicide (JL), abandonment (RE), or taking their
children away after a fight (DL) were as distressing as the other forms of abuse
experienced by the participants.14
Social and cultural expectations on masculinity and male

dominance urge men to keep quiet about being a victim, adding to
the unique experience of male victims of domestic
_______________
14 Id., at pp. 41-42.
498
Garcia vs. Drilon
abuse.15 This leads to latent depression among boys and men.16 In a
sense, patriarchy while privileging men also victimizes them.
It is true that numerous literature relate violence against
women with the historically unequal power relations between men
and women, leading to domination over and discrimination against
the latter.17 Sociologists cite the 18th-century
_______________
15 K. F. Hogan, J. R. Hegarty, T. Ward, and L. J. Dodd, Counsellors’ Experiences of Working with Male
Victims of Female-Perpetrated Domestic Abuse, COUNSELLING AND PSYCHOTHERAPY RESEARCH (2011).
16 See S. V. Cochran and F. E. Rabinowitz, Men and Depression: Clinical and Empirical
Perspectives (2000).<http://books.google.
com.ph/books?id=bOVTz8HgDoC&pg=PR12&lpg=PR12&dq=Early+workers+in+the+field+including+Plec
k+and+Sawyer&source=bl&ots=G8bTheyAtB&sig=86_y6WVG_36VuTj3Lh6w585N2qM&hl=en&sa=X&ei
=yizKUYzZEMeZiAe6y4CwCw&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=
Early%20workers%20in%20the%20field%20including%20
Pleck%20and%20Sawyer&f=false > (visited March 7, 2013).
Early workers in the field including Pleck and Sawyer (1974), Farrell (1975), Fasteau (1974)
and Goldberg (1976) took up the challenge to traditional masculine values that feminists had
made and began to examine the negative and oppressive aspects of traditionally constructed
gender roles. These efforts included an examination of the psychologically restrictive nature of
most of the cultural conditioning little boys and men experience. Pleck (1981), in his seminal
critique of male gender identity ideology, introduced the concept of male gender role strain and
conflict.
See also J. H. Pleck, The Gender Role Strain: An Update and S. J. Bergman, Men’s Psychological
Development: A Relational Perspective, in R.F. LEVANT AND W.S. POLLACK, A NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF MEN 11-
32 AND 68-90 (1995). ALSO T. REAL, I DON’T WANT TO TALK ABOUT IT: OVERCOMING THE SECRET LEGACY OF
MALE DEPRESSION (1997) AND HOW CAN I GET THROUGH TO YOU? CLOSING THE INTIMACY GAP BETWEEN MEN
AND WOMEN (2002).
17 Domestic Violence Against Women and Girls, No. 6, UNICEF Innocenti Digest (2000).
499
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 499
Garcia vs. Drilon
English legal tradition on the “rule of thumb” giving husbands
the right to beat their wives with a stick no thicker than a
thumb.18 In America, women were regarded as property until the
latter half of the 19th century with marital violence considered a
husband’s privilege and men, as of right, exercised physical
domination over women.19
The perspective portraying women as victims with a heritage of
victimization20 results in the unintended consequence of
permanently perceiving all women as weak. This has not always
been accepted by many other strands in the Feminist Movement.
As early as the 70s, the nationalist movement raised questions
on the wisdom of a women’s movement and its possible divisive
effects, as “class problems deserve unified and concentrated
attention [while] the women question is vague, abstract, and does
not have material base.”21
In the early 80s, self-identifying feminist groups were
formed.22 The “emancipation theory” posits that female crime
_______________
18 S.D. Amussen, Being Stirred to Much Unquietness: Violence and Domestic Violence in Early Modern
England, Vol. 6 No. 2 JOURNAL OF WOMEN’S HISTORY, 70-89 (1994).
19 P. M. Jablow, Victims of Abuse and Discrimination: Protecting Battered Homosexuals Under
Domestic Violence Legislation, 28 Hofstra L Rev 1096-1097 (2000).
20 C. Sorisio, A Tale of Two Feminism: Power and Victimization in Contemporary Feminist Debate,
137 in THIRD WAVE AGENDA: BEING FEMINIST, DOING FEMINISM, edited by L. Heywood and J. Drake (1997).
21 See C. I. Sobritchea, The Second Wave of the Women’s Movement in the Philippines and the
Evolution of Feminist Politics, 47, quoting A. F. Santos from The Philippine Women’s Movement: Problems
of Perception, GENDER CULTURE AND SOCIETY: SELECTED READINGS IN WOMEN STUDIES IN THE
PHILIPPINES (2004).
22 Id., at p. 44.
500
Garcia vs. Drilon
has increased and has become more masculine in character as a
result of the women’s liberation movement.23
Feminism also has its variants among Muslims. In
2009, Musawah (“equality” in Arabic) was launched as a global
movement for equity and justice in the Muslim family. It brought
together activists, scholars, legal practitioners, policy makers, and
grassroots women and men from all over the world.34 Their belief is
that there cannot be justice without equality, and its holistic
framework integrates Islamic teachings, universal human rights,
national constitutional guarantees of equality, and the lived
realities of women and men.25
There is now more space to believe that portraying only women
as victims will not always promote gender equality before the law.
It sometimes aggravates the gap by conceding that women have
always been dominated by men. In doing so, it renders empowered
women invisible; or, in some cases, that men as human beings can
also become victims.
In this light, it may be said that violence in the context of
intimate relationships should not be seen and encrusted as a
gender issue; rather, it is a power issue.26 Thus, when laws are not
gender-neutral, male victims of domestic violence may also suffer
from double victimization first by their abusers and second by the
judicial system.27Incidentally, focusing on women as the victims
entrenches some level of heteronorma-
_______________
23 See C. M. Renzetti and D. J. Curran, Chapter 9 on Gender, Crime and Justice, WOMEN, MEN AND
SOCIETY 220-249 (Second Edition, 1992).
24 See <http://www.musawah.org/> (visited February 26, 2013). MUSAWAH is considered a movement
rather than an organization.
25 Id. Musawa is represented in the Philippines by Nisa Ul Haqq Fi Bangsamoro or “Women for
Justice in the Bangsamoro.”
26 A. Detschelt, Recognizing Domestic Violence Directed Towards Men: Overcoming Societal
Perceptions, Conducting Accurate Studies, and Enacting Responsible Legislation, 12 Kan. J.L. & Pub.
Pol’y 249 (2003).
27 Id.
501
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 501
Garcia vs. Drilon
tivity.28 It is blind to the possibility that, whatever moral positions
are taken by those who are dominant, in reality intimate
relationships can also happen between men.29
I accept that for purposes of advocacy and for a given historical
period, it may be important to highlight abuse of women qua
women.30 This strategy was useful in the passing of Republic Act
No. 9262. It was a strategy that assured that the problem of
battered women and children in the context of various intimate
relationships becomes publicly visible. However, unlike advocacy,
laws have the tendency to be resilient and permanent. Its existence
may transcend historical per-
_______________
28 “[H]eteronormativity is defined as the predominance and privileging of a definitively
heterosexualbased ideology and social structure that acts as the exclusive interpreter of itself and of all
other sexualities in relation to it.” Definition found in A. Ponce, Shoring up Judicial Awareness: LGBT
Refugees and the Recognition of Social Categories, 18 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 185 (2012) citing M.
Warner, FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET: QUEER POLITICS AND SOCIAL THEORY (1993).
29 For a comparative analysis of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) issues and strategies,
see M. P. Ofreneo and T. Casal de Vela, Spheres of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Struggles: A
Comparative Feminist Analysis, 14 GENDER TECHNOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENTNo. 2, 197-215 (July 2010).
For an understanding, see B. Fone, HOMOPHOBIA: A HISTORY (2000).
30 x x x essentialism is, among other things, a tool for redressing power imbalances, as when the
group under study is seen by the dominant group as illegitimate or trivial, or when a stigmatized group
forms an oppositional identity to counter such negative ideologies. Essentialism may therefore be a
deliberate move to enable scholarly activity, to forge a political alliance through the creation of a common
identity, or to otherwise provide a temporarily stable ground for further social action. Such uses of
essentialism have been termed strategic essentialism (Spivak 1988) as discussed in M. BUCHOTZ,
SOCIOLINGUISTIC NOSTALGIA AND THE AUTHENTICATION OF IDENTITY, 401 (2003). See also M. Lloyd, BEYOND
IDENTITY POLITICS: FEMINISM, POWER AND POLITICS, 64-67 (2005). Similarly, D. Fuss, ESSENTIALLY
SPEAKING: FEMINISM, NATURE AND DIFFERENCE (1989).
502
Garcia vs. Drilon
iods that dictate effective advocacy. Laws also have a constitutive
function — the tendency to create false consciousness when the
labels and categories it mandates succeed in reducing past evils
but turn a blind eye to other issues.
For instance, one of the first cases that laid down the requisites
for determining whether there was a violation of the equal
protection of the law clause of the Constitution was the 1939 case
of People v. Cayat.31 It laid down the requirements of reasonable
classification which requires that it (a) must rest on substantial
distinctions, (b) must be germane to the purposes of the law, (c)
must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (d) must apply
equally to all members of the same class.32 Even
as early as 1919, the Court in Rubi v. Provincial Board of
Mindoro33 recognized the concept of reasonable classification
holding that “[t]he pledge that no person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws is not infringed by a statute which is
applicable to all of a class. The classification must have a
reasonable basis and cannot be purely arbitrary in nature.” 34
Yet, it is in these two cases that the Court concluded the
following:
As authority of a judicial nature is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case
of United States vs. Tubban [Kalinga] ([1915], 29, Phil., 434). The question here
arose as to the effect of a tribal marriage in connection with article 423 of the Penal
Code concerning the husband who surprises his wife in the act of adultery. In
discussing the point, the court makes use of the following language:
x x x we are not advised of any provision of law which recognizes as legal
a tribal marriage of so-called non-Christians or members of uncivilized
_______________
31 68 Phil. 12 (1939).
32 Id., at p. 18.
33 39 Phil. 660 (1919).
34 Id., at p. 707.
503
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Garcia vs. Drilon
tribes, celebrated within that province without compliance with the
requisites prescribed by General Orders No. 68 x x x. We hold also that the
fact that the accused is shown to be a member of an uncivilized tribe, of a low
order of intelligence, uncultured and uneducated, should be taken into
consideration as a second marked extenuating circumstance...35(Emphasis
supplied)
The description of the label and the stereotype of “non-Christian

tribe” would later on be corrected by the Constitution,36 law,37and
jurisprudence.38
The description of the label and the stereotype that only women
can be considered victims may also evolve in the same way. We
should hope that the situation of patriarchy will not be permanent.
Better cultural structures more affirming of human dignity should
evolve.39
In a future case, the fact that there may be battered men should
not cause the nullification of protections given to women and
children.
The Constitution states that: “[t]he State values the dignity of
every human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights.”40 The guarantee of full respect should not mean that
_______________
35 Id., at p. 686.
36 Indigenous Cultural Communities, See Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 22; Art. XII, Sec. 5; Art. XIII, Sec.
1.
37 Republic Act No. 8371; see also the Manahan amendments in Com. Act No. 141, Sec. 48 (c).
38 See for instance Pit-og v. People of the Philippines, 268 Phil. 413; 190 SCRA 386 (1990) and Cruz v.
DENR Secretary, et al., 400 Phil. 904; 347 SCRA 128 (2000).
39 See S. Walby, The ‘Declining Significance’ or the ‘Changing Forms’ of Patriarchy? in PATRIARCHY
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: WOMEN’S POSITIONS AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1996).
40 CONSTITUTION, Art. II, Sec.11. See also the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which similarly
provides that “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” (Art. 1, UDHR)
504
Garcia vs. Drilon
protections already given to those who suffer historical or cultural
prejudices should be automatically rescinded if only the scope of
the law is found wanting.
Our Constitution also mandates that the State “shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.” 41 This is
similar to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)42 which requires that the
Philippines as state party take all appropriate measures “[to]
modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and
women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and
customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of
the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on
stereotyped roles for men and women.”43 The use of affirmative
language should imply that in the proper suit, a declaration of
unconstitutionality on the ground of the equal protection should
not automatically mean that the entire social legislation that
provides effective and efficient protection of women be set aside.
We have declared that “[a]n unconstitutional act is not a law; it
confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it
creates no office; it is x x x as inoperative as though it had never
been passed.”44 However, the seemingly
_______________
and “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without
distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status.” (Art. 2, UDHR)
41 CONSTITUTION, Art. II, Sec. 14.
42 The Philippines signed the CEDAW on July 15, 1980 and ratified the same on August 5,
1981. Available at <http://treaties.un.
org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV 8&chapter
=4&lang=en>
43 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, Article 5(a).
44 Municipality of Malabang, Lanao Del Sur v. Benito, et al., 137 Phil. 358, 364; 27 SCRA 533, 539
(1969) citing Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886).
505
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 505
Garcia vs. Drilon
all-inclusive statement of absolute retroactive invalidity may not
always be justified.45 One established exception is the doctrine of
operative fact.
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as
a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by
recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot
always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose
an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid Law.46
The possibility that the constitutionality of Republic Act No.

9262 may be challenged by male victims of abuse in intimate
relationships ventures to carve another exception if this court is to
ensure the guarantee of fundamental equality before the law of
women and men47 as well as value the dignity of every human
person.48 Applying the general rule or the existing doctrine of
operative facts would mean removing the protection afforded to
women. It will thus contradict the very reason it is being assailed
and result to an even worse state of laws where none is protected
from intimate violence.
But again, it is not in this case that we consider these
possibilities.
_______________
45 Id.
46 Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012, 676 SCRA 579, 608
citing Planter’s Products Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 485,
516-517.
506
Garcia vs. Drilon
By concurring with these statements I express a hope: that the
normative constitutional requirements of human dignity and
fundamental equality can become descriptive reality. The socially
constructed distinctions between women and men that have
afflicted us and spawned discrimination and violence should be
eradicated sooner. Power and intimacy should not co-exist.
The intimate spaces created by our human relationships are our
safe havens from the helter skelter of this world. It is in that space
where we grow in the safety of the special other who we hope will
be there for our entire lifetime. If that is not possible, then for such
time as will be sufficient to create cherished memories enough to
last for eternity.
I concur in the ponencia. Against abominable acts, let this law
take its full course.
Petition denied.
Note.—Judge Arcaya-Chua is guilty of gross ignorance of the
law for issuing a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) in favor of
petitioner Albert Chang Tan, since a TPO cannot be issued in favor
of a man against his wife under R.A. No. 9292, known as the Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004. (Ocampo
vs. Arcaya-Chua, 619 SCRA 59 [2010])
——o0o——
April 2, 2014. G.R. No. 179155.*
NICOMEDES J. LOZADA, petitioner, vs. EULALIA
BRACEWELL, EDDIE BRACEWELL, ESTELLITA BRACEWELL,
JAMES BRACEWELL, JOHN BRACEWELL, EDWIN
BRACEWELL, ERIC BRACEWELL, and HEIRS OF GEORGE
BRACEWELL, respondents.
Civil Law; Property; Land Registration; Property Registration
Decree (P.D. No. 1529); The land registration laws were updated
and codified under PD 1529, which took effect on January 23, 1979,
and under Section 17 thereof, jurisdiction over an application for
land registration is still vested on the Courts of First Instance CFIs
(now, Regional Trial Courts [RTCs]) of the province or city where
the land is situated.—Under Act No. 496 (Act 496), or the “Land
Registration Act,” as amended, — which was the law in force at the
time of the commencement by both parties of their respective
registration proceedings — jurisdiction over all applications for
registration of title was conferred upon the Courts of First Instance
(CFIs, now RTCs) of the respective provinces in which the land
sought to be registered is situated. The land registration laws
were updated and codified under PD 1529, which took effect on
January 23, 1979, and under Section 17 thereof, jurisdiction over
an application for land registration is still vested on the CFI (now,
RTC) of the province or city where the land is situated.
Remedial Law; Courts; Regional Trial Courts; Jurisdiction;
Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) now have the power to hear and
determine all questions, even contentious and substantial ones,
arising from applications for original registration of titles to lands
and petitions filed after such registration.—To be clear, the only
issue in Joson was which court should take cognizance of the
nullification of the decree, i.e., the cadastral court that had issued
the decree, or the competent CFI in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction. It should be pointed out, however, that with the
passage of PD 1529, the distinction between the general
jurisdiction vested in the RTC and the limited jurisdiction
conferred upon it as a cadastral court was eliminated. RTCs
now have the power to hear
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
372and determine all questions, even contentious and substantial

ones, arising from applications for original registration of titles to
lands and petitions filed after such registration. Accordingly, and
considering further that the matter of whether the RTC resolves
an issue in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited
jurisdiction as a special court is only a matter of procedure and has
nothing to do with the question of jurisdiction, petitioner cannot
now rely on the Joson pronouncement to advance its theory.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Case law instructs that for “as long as
a final decree has not been entered by the (Land Registration
Authority [LRA]) and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed
from the date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally
adjudicated and the decision in the registration proceeding
continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court
rendering it.”—Since the LRA’s issuance of a decree of registration
only proceeds from the land registration court’s directive, a petition
taken under Section 32 of PD 1529 is effectively a review of the
land registration court’s ruling. As such, case law instructs that for
“as long as a final decree has not been entered by the [LRA] and
the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from the date of entry of
such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in
the registration proceeding continues to be under the control and
sound discretion of the court rendering it.”
Same; Civil Procedure; Venue; Venue is only a matter of
procedure and, hence, should succumb to the greater interests of the
orderly administration of justice.—As the land subject of this case
is undeniably situated in Las Piñas City, the application for its
original registration should have been filed before the Las Piñas
City-RTC were it not for the fact that the said court had yet to be
created at the time the application was filed. Be that as it may,
and considering further that the complication at hand is actually
one of venue and not of jurisdiction (given that RTCs do retain
jurisdiction over review of registration decree cases pursuant to
Section 32 of PD 1529), the Court, cognizant of the peculiarity of
the situation, holds that the Las Piñas City-RTC has the
authority over the petition for the review of Decree No. N-
217036 filed in this case. Indeed, the filing of the petition for
review before the Las Piñas City-RTC was only but a rectificatory
implementation of the rules of procedure then-existing, which was
temporarily set back only because of past exigencies. In light of the
circumstances now prevail-
373ing, the Court perceives no compelling reason to deviate from
applying the rightful procedure. After all, venue is only a matter of
procedure and, hence, should succumb to the greater interests of
the orderly administration of justice.
Stephen L. Monsanto for petitioner.
Wenceslao V. Jarin for respondents.
PERLAS-BERNABE,J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the
Decision[2] dated May 23, 2007 and the Resolution[3]dated
August 14, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
81075, which affirmed the Decision[4] dated July 31, 2003 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City, Branch 275 in Civil
Case No. LP 98-0025, directing the Land Registration Authority
(LRA) to set aside Decree of Registration No. N-217036 (Decree No.
N-217036) and Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-78 in the
name of petitioner Nicomedes J. Lozada (petitioner), and ordering
the latter to cause the amendment of Plan PSU-129514 as well as
segregate therefrom Lot 5 of Plan PSU-180598.
The Facts
On December 10, 1976, petitioner filed an application for
registration and confirmation of title over a parcel of land
_______________
[1] Rollo, pp. 8-43.
[2] Id., at pp. 179-191. Penned by Associate Justice Aurora Santiago-Lagman, with Associate Justices
Bienvenido L. Reyes (now, member of the Court) and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., concurring.
[3] Id., at pp. 202-203.
[4] Id., at pp. 102-107. Penned by Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda.
374covered by Plan PSU-129514, which was granted
on February 23, 1989 by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134,
acting as a land registration court.[5] Consequently, on July 10,
1997, the LRA issued Decree No. N-217036 in the name of
petitioner, who later obtained OCT No. 0-78 covering the said
parcel of land.[6]
On February 6, 1998, within a year from the issuance of the
aforementioned decree, James Bracewell, Jr. (Bracewell) filed a
petition for review of a decree of registration under Section
32 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529,[7] otherwise known as
the “Property Registration Decree,” before the RTC of Las Piñas
City, Branch 275 (Las Piñas City-RTC), docketed as Civil Case
No. LP 98-0025,[8] claiming that a portion of Plan PSU-129514,
consisting of 3,097 square meters identified as Lot 5 of Plan PSU-
180598 (subject lot) — of which he is the absolute owner and
possessor — is fraudulently included in Decree No. N-217036.[9] He
allegedly filed on September 19, 1963 an application for
registration and confirmation of the subject lot, as well as of Lots 1,
2, 3 and 4 of Plan PSU-180598, situated in Las Piñas City, which
was granted by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 58, on May 3,
1989.[10]He further averred that petitioner deliberately concealed
the fact that he (Bracewell) is one of the adjoining owners, and left
him totally ignorant of the registration proceedings involving the
lots covered by Plan PSU-129514.[11] Instead of impleading him,
petitioner listed Bracewell’s grandmother, Maria Cailles, as an
adjoining owner, although she had already died by that time.[12]
_______________
[5] Id., at p. 104.
[6] Id.
[7] Entitled “AMENDING AND CODIFYING THE LAWS RELATIVE TO REGISTRATION OF PROPERTY AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.”
[8] Rollo, pp. 45-51.
[9] Id., at p. 47.
[10] Id., at pp. 46-47.
[11] Id., at pp. 48-49.
[12] Id., at p. 48.
375
In his answer[13] to the foregoing allegations, petitioner called

Bracewell a mere interloper with respect to the subject lot, which
the Bureau of Lands had long declared to be part and parcel of
Plan PSU-129514.[14] He argued that his Plan PSU-129514 was
approved way back in 1951 whereas Bracewell’s Plan PSU-180598
was surveyed only in 1960, and stated that the latter plan, in fact,
contained a footnote that a portion known as Lot 5, i.e., the subject
lot, is a portion of the parcel of land covered by Plan PSU-
129514.[15]
The overlapping was confirmed by LRA Director Felino M.
Cortez in his 2 Supplementary Report dated August 5, 1996,
nd
which was submitted to the RTC of Makati City, Branch

134.[16] The report, which contains a recommendation that
petitioner be ordered to cause the amendment of Plan PSU-129514
in view of Bracewell’s claims, reads as follows:
COMES NOW the Land Registration Authority (LRA) and to the

Honorable Court respectfully submits this report:
LRA records show that a decision was rendered by the Honorable
Court on February 23, 1989, confirming the title of the herein
applicant [petitioner] over the parcel of land covered by plan PSU-
129514; 1.
Upon updating of plotting on our Municipal Index Sheet, thru its tie
line, it was found to overlap with plan PSU-180598, Lot 5, applied in
LRC Record No. N-24916, which was referred to the Lands
Management Services, El Bldg., Quezon City, for verification and/or
correction in our letter dated January 12, 1996 x x x; 2.
In reply, the Regional Technical Director, thru the Chief, Surveys
Division, in his letter dated 20 June 1996, x x x, informed this
Authority that after [re-verification] and research of the plan, they
found out that Lot 5, PSU-180598 applied in 3.
_______________
[13] Id., at pp. 71-73.
[14] Id., at p. 72.
[15] Id., at p. 71.
[16] Id., at p. 104.
376LRC Record No. N-24916 is a portion of plan PSU-129514,

applied in the instant case;
Our records further show that 4. the petition for registration of
title to real property pertaining to Lot 5, PSU-180598 filed by
the petitioner James Bracewell, Jr. under Land Reg. Case
No. N-4329, LRC Record No. N-24916 has been granted by the
Honorable Court per his decision dated May 3, 1989.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing is respectfully submitted to the
Honorable Court for its information with the recommendation that
the applicant [herein petitioner] in the instant case be ordered to
cause for the amendment of plan PSU-129514, subject of
registration, by segregating therefrom the portion of Lot 5, PSU-
180598 also decided in Land Reg. Case No. N-4328. The approved
amended plan and the corresponding certified technical descriptions shall
forthwith be submitted to the Honorable Court for its approval to enable
us to comply with the decision of the Court dated May 3, 1989 in the
instant case.[17] (Emphases supplied)
The Las Piñas City-RTC Ruling

Finding that petitioner obtained Decree No. N-217036 and OCT
No. 0-78 in bad faith, the Las Piñas City-RTC rendered a
Decision[18] on July 31, 2003 in favor of Bracewell, who had died
during the pendency of the case and was substituted by Eulalia
Bracewell and his heirs (respondents). Accordingly, it directed the
LRA to set aside Decree No. N-217036 and OCT No. 0-78, and
ordered petitioner (a) to cause the amendment of Plan PSU-129514
and to segregate therefrom the subject lot, and (b) to pay
respondents the sum of P100,000.00 as attorney’s fees, as well as
the cost of suit.[19]
The Las Piñas City-RTC faulted petitioner for deliberately
preventing respondents from participating and objecting to
_______________
[17] Id., at p. 105.
[18] Id., at pp. 102-107.
[19] Id., at p. 107.
377his application for registration when the documentary evidence

showed that, as early as 1962, Bracewell had been paying taxes for
the subject lot; and that he (Bracewell) was recognized as the
owner thereof in the records of the Bureau of Lands way back in
1965, as well as in the City Assessor’s Office.[20]
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated his case on appeal[21]before the
CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 81075, arguing mainly that the
Las Piñas City-RTC had no jurisdiction over a petition for review
of a decree of registration under Section 32 of PD 1529, which
should be filed in the same branch of the court that rendered the
decision and ordered the issuance of the decree.[22] He likewise
raised (a) the failure of Bracewell to submit to conciliation
proceedings,[23] as well as (b) the commission of forum shopping,
considering that the decision granting Bracewell’s application for
registration over Lots 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Plan PSU-180598 was still
pending resolution before the Court at the time he filed Civil Case
No. LP 98-0025.[24]
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[25] dated May 23, 2007, the appellate court affirmed
the assailed judgment of the RTC, finding that respondents were
able to substantiate their claim of actual fraud in the procurement
of Decree No. N-217036, which is the only ground that may be
invoked in a petition for review of a decree of registration under
Section 32 of PD 1529. It held that, since the petition for review
was filed within one (1) year from the issuance of the questioned
decree, and considering that the subject lot is located in Las Piñas
City, the RTC of
_______________
[20] Id., at p. 106.
[21] Id., at pp. 109-152. Appellant’s Brief dated August 15, 2004.
[22] Id., at pp. 121-122.
[23] Id., at pp. 137-139.
[24] Id., at pp. 139-140.
[25] Id., at pp. 179-191.
378said city had jurisdiction over the case.[26] It further declared

that: (a) there was no need to submit the case a quo for conciliation
proceedings because the LRA, which is an instrumentality of the
government, had been impleaded; (b) no forum shopping was
committed because the petition for review of the decree of
registration before the Las Piñas City-RTC and the application for
land registration then pending before the Court involved different
parties and issues; and (c) the award of attorney’s fees was well
within the sound discretion of the RTC.[27]
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration[28] having been
denied,[29] he now comes before the Court via the instant petition
for review, challenging primarily the jurisdiction of the Las Piñas
City-RTC which set aside and nullified the judgment rendered by
the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134 that had not yet become final
and was still within its exclusive control and discretion because the
one (1) year period within which the decree of registration issued
by the LRA could be reviewed has not yet elapsed.[30]
The core issue raised for the Court’s resolution is whether or not
the Las Piñas City-RTC has jurisdiction over the petition for
review of Decree No. N-217036, which was issued as a result of the
judgment rendered by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition must fail.
_______________
[26] Id., at pp. 185-186.
[27] Id., at pp. 186-187 and p. 190.
[28] Dated June 7, 2007; id., at pp. 192-201.
[29] Id., at p. 202.
[30] Id., at p. 9.
379
Under Act No. 496[31] (Act 496), or the “Land Registration Act,”
as amended,[32] — which was the law in force at the time of the
commencement by both parties of their respective registration
proceedings — jurisdiction over all applications for registration of
title was conferred upon the Courts of First Instance (CFIs, now
RTCs) of the respective provinces in which the land sought to
be registered is situated.[33]
The land registration laws were updated and codified under PD
1529, which took effect on January 23, 1979,[34]and under Section
17[35] thereof, jurisdiction over an application for land registration
is still vested on the CFI (now, RTC) of the province or city
where the land is situated.[36]
Worth noting is the explanation proffered by respondents in
their comment to the instant petition that when petitioner filed his
land registration case in December 1976, jurisdiction over
applications for registration of property situated in Las Piñas City
was vested in the RTC of Makati City in view of the fact that there
were no RTC branches yet in the Las Piñas
_______________
[31] Entitled “AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE ADJUDICATION AND REGISTRATION OF TITLES TO LANDS IN THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.”
[32] As amended by Act No. 2347, entitled “AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE REORGANIZATION OF THE COURTS OF
FIRST INSTANCE AND OF THE COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION.”
[33] See City of Dumaguete v. Philippine Ports Authority, G.R. No. 168973, August 24, 2011, 656 SCRA 102, 120.
[34] Esconde v. Hon. Barlongay, 236 Phil. 644, 651; 152 SCRA 603, 608 (1987).
[35]17. SectionWhat and where to file.—The application for land registration
shall be filed with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the land
is situated. The applicant shall file together with the application all original
muniments of titles or copies thereof and a survey plan of the land approved by the
Bureau of Lands.
The clerk of court shall not accept any application unless it is shown that the applicant has furnished the Director
of Lands with a copy of the application and all annexes.
[36] See City of Dumaguete v. Philippine Ports Authority, supra note 33 at pp. 120-121.
380City at that time.[37] Bracewell’s own application over Lots 1, 2,

3, 4, and 5 of Plan PSU-180598, all situated in Las Piñas City, was
thus granted by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 58.[38]
Subsequently, Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129,[39]otherwise
known as “The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,” was enacted
and took effect on August 14, 1981,[40]authorizing the creation of
RTCs in different judicial regions, including the RTC of Las Piñas
City as part of the National Capital Judicial Region.[41] As pointed
out by the court a quo in its Decision dated July 31, 2003, the RTC
of Las Piñas City was established “in or about
1994.”[42]Understandably, in February 1998, Bracewell sought the
review of Decree No. N-217036 before the Las Piñas City-RTC,
considering that the lot subject of this case is situated in Las Piñas
City.
Petitioner maintains that the petition for review should have
been filed with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134, which
rendered the assailed decision and ordered the issuance of Decree
No. N-217036, citing the 1964 case of Amando Joson, et al. v.
Busuego[43] (Joson) among others. In said case, Spouses Amando
Joson and Victoria Balmeo (Sps. Joson) filed a petition to set aside
the decree of registration issued in favor of Teodora Busuego
(Busuego) on the ground that the latter misrepresented herself to
be the sole owner of the lot when in truth, the Sps. Joson were
owners of one-half thereof, having purchased the same from
Busuego’s mother.[44] The court a quo therein dismissed the
petition for the reason that since its jurisdiction as a cadastral
court was special and
_______________
[37] Rollo, p. 242.
[38] Id., at pp. 46-47.
[39] Entitled “AN ACT REORGANIZING THE JUDICIARY, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.”
[40] Tomawis v. Balindong, G.R. No. 182434, March 5, 2010, 614 SCRA 354, 364.
[41] BP 129, Chater II, Sec. 13.
[42] Rollo, p. 105.
[43] 120 Phil. 1473; 12 SCRA 678 (1964).
[44] Id., at p. 1474; p. 679.
381limited, it had no authority to pass upon the issues raised.

Disagreeing, the Court held that, as long as the final decree has
not been issued and the period of one (1) year within which it may
be reviewed has not elapsed, the decision remains under the
control and sound discretion of the court rendering the decree,
which court after hearing, may even set aside said decision or
decree and adjudicate the land to another.[45]
To be clear, the only issue in Joson was which court should take
cognizance of the nullification of the decree, i.e., the cadastral court
that had issued the decree, or the competent CFI in the exercise of
its general jurisdiction.[46]It should be pointed out, however,
that with the passage of PD 1529, the distinction between
the general jurisdiction vested in the RTC and the limited
jurisdiction conferred upon it as a cadastral court was
eliminated. RTCs now have the power to hear and determine all
questions, even contentious and substantial ones, arising from
applications for original registration of titles to lands and petitions
filed after such registration.[47] Accordingly, and considering
further that the matter of whether the RTC resolves an issue in
the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction
as a special court is only a matter of procedure and has nothing to
do with the question of jurisdiction,[48]petitioner cannot now rely on
the Joson pronouncement to advance its theory.
Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that the review of a decree of
registration falls within the jurisdiction of and, hence, should be
filed in the “proper Court of First Instance,” viz.:
_______________
[45] Id., at p. 1476; p. 681.
[46] Id., at p. 1475; Id.
[47] See Philippine National Bank v. International Corporate Bank, 276 Phil. 551, 558-559; 199 SCRA 508, 514
(1991).
[48] See Manalo v. Hon. Mariano, 161 Phil. 108, 120; 69 SCRA 80, 89 (1976), citations omitted. See also Romero v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 188921, April 18, 2012, 670 SCRA 218, 227, citing Coca v. Borromeo, 171 Phil. 246; 81
SCRA 278 (1978).
382
32. SectionReview of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for

value.—The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised by
reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely
affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing
judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person, including the
government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or
interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by
actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition
for reopening and review of the decree of registration not later
than one year from and after the date of the entry of such decree
of registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the
court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an
interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase
“innocent purchaser for value” or an equivalent phrase occurs in this
Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or
other encumbrancer for value.
Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration
and the certificate of title issued shall become incontrovertible. Any person
aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue his
remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other persons
responsible for the fraud. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Since the LRA’s issuance of a decree of registration only proceeds

from the land registration court’s directive, a petition taken under
Section 32 of PD 1529 is effectively a review of the land
registration court’s ruling. As such, case law instructs that for “as
long as a final decree has not been entered by the [LRA] and the
period of one (1) year has not elapsed from the date of entry of such
decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the
registration proceeding continues to be under the control and
sound discretion of the court rendering it.”[49]
While it is indeed undisputed that it was the RTC of Makati
City, Branch 134 which rendered the decision direct-
_______________
[49] Atty. Gomez v. Court of Appeals, 250 Phil. 504, 510; 168 SCRA 503, 509 (1988).
383ing the LRA to issue Decree No. N-217036, and should,

applying the general rule as above-stated, be the same court before
which a petition for the review of Decree No. N-217036 is filed, the
Court must consider the circumstantial milieu in this case that, in
the interest of orderly procedure, warrants the filing of the said
petition before the Las Piñas City-RTC.
Particularly, the Court refers to the fact that the application for
original registration in this case was only filed before the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 134 because, during that time, i.e., December
1976, Las Piñas City had no RTC. Barring this situation, the
aforesaid application should not have been filed before the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 134 pursuant to the rules on venue prevailing
at that time. Under Section 2, Rule 4 of the 1964 Revised Rules of
Court, which took effect on January 1, 1964, the proper venue for
real actions, such as an application for original registration, lies
with the CFI of the province where the property is situated, viz.:
2. Sec. Venue in Courts of First Instance.—(a) Real actions.—Actions
affecting title to, or for recovery of possession, or for partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property, shall be
commenced and tried in the province where the property or any part
thereof lies.
As the land subject of this case is undeniably situated in Las

Piñas City, the application for its original registration should have
been filed before the Las Piñas City-RTC were it not for the fact
that the said court had yet to be created at the time the application
was filed. Be that as it may, and considering further that the
complication at hand is actually one of venue and not of
jurisdiction (given that RTCs do retain jurisdiction over review of
registration decree cases pursuant to Section 32 of PD 1529), the
Court, cognizant of the peculiarity of the situation, holds that the
Las Piñas City- RTC has the authority over the petition for
the review of Decree No. N-217036 filed in this case. Indeed,
the filing of the petition for review before the Las Piñas City-RTC
was only but a rectificatory implementation of the rules of
384procedure then-existing, which was temporarily set back only
because of past exigencies. In light of the circumstances now
prevailing, the Court perceives no compelling reason to deviate
from applying the rightful procedure. After all, venue is only a
matter of procedure[50]and, hence, should succumb to the greater
interests of the orderly administration of justice.[51]
Anent the other ancillary issues raised by petitioner on forum
shopping, submission to conciliation proceedings, and award of
attorney’s fees, suffice it to say that the same have been adequately
discussed by the appellate court and, hence, need no further
elucidation.
Finally, on the matter of petitioner’s objections against the trial
judge’s “unusual interest” in the case, the Court concurs with the
CA in saying that such tirades are not helpful to his cause.
Besides, as pointed out in the Decision dated July 31, 2003 of the
RTC of Las Piñas City, Branch 275, petitioner already had his
chance to disqualify the trial judge from further hearing the case,
but the appellate court dismissed his petition in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
74187 for lack of merit.[52]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
May 23, 2007 and the Resolution dated August 14, 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 81075 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo and Perez, JJ.,
concur.
_______________
[50] See Heirs of Lopez v. De Castro, 381 Phil. 591, 610; 324 SCRA 591, 609 (2000).
[51] See Vallacar Transit, Inc. v. Yap, 211 Phil. 641, 643; 126 SCRA 500, 503 (1983).
[52] Rollo, p. 103.
385
Note.—Under the Rules of Court before the 1997 amendments,
an objection to an improper venue must be made before a
responsive pleading is filed. Otherwise, it will be deemed waived.
(Salas vs. Matusalem, 705 SCRA560 [2013])
——o0o——
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December 3, 2014. G.R. No. 180364.

TZE SUN WONG, petitioner, vs. Kenny Wong, respondent.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the

Petitioner is a Chinese citizen who immigrated to the

1 Rollo, pp. 22-51.

The BOI’s Ruling

In a Judgment 14 dated October 2, 2002, the BOI Board of

7 Id., at pp. 152-153.

The Secretary of Justice’s Ruling

In a Resolution22 dated March 22, 2004, Acting Secretary of

The CA’s Ruling

In a Decision31 dated May 15, 2007, the CA

27 Rollo, pp. 97-98.

The Issue Before the Court

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is without merit.

1. SectionScope.—This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of

Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy

The statutory basis of the CA’s appellate jurisdiction over

38 Entitled “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor,

Notably, in Cayao-Lasam v. Spouses Ramolete,40 it was clarified

Thus, although unmentioned in the enumeration, the Court, in

40 595 Phil. 56; 574 SCRA 439 (2008).

48 518 Phil. 501; 483 SCRA 341 (2006).

Thus, to recap, from the denial of the BOI Board of

53 Id., at p. 855; p. 379.

8. Sec.Decision of the Board.—The board of Commissioners, hereinafter referred to in

Petitioner argues that the foregoing rule only refers to the

60 Rollo, pp. 43-44.

In particular, the presumption that the Judgment had been

August 11, 2015. G.R. No. 209447.*

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT

August 11, 2015. G.R. No. 210901.*

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT

PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the orders of the Regional

It is an important fundamental principle in our judicial system

The factual background of this case is gathered from the records

4 Id., at pp. 528-536; pp. 527-535.

5 Id., at pp. 525-526; p. 525.

AND THE CONVERTED SMC SERIES 1 PREFERRED SHARES

On December 28, 2012, a petition for declaratory relief 11was filed

Civil Case No. 12-1251

UCPB alleged that the capital or equity used in establishing the

10 Id., at pp. 609-613.

PCGG filed a motion to dismiss citing the following grounds: (1)

13 Rollo (G.R. No. 209447), p. 193.

Civil Case No. 12-1252

COCOLIFE raised similar claims of ownership in the subject

13-b Id., at pp. 233-247.

PCGG contends that respondent judge gravely abused his

14 COCOFED v. Republic, supra note 3.

Respondents question the authority of Commissioner Vicente L.

15 556 Phil. 615; 529 SCRA 782 (2007).

16 257 Phil. 459; 176 SCRA 447 (1989).

17 Rollo (G.R. No. 210901), pp. 197-200.

The issues generated by this controversy are the following:

The petitions are meritorious.

Alleged Lack of Authority of PCGG

Under Rule 46, Section 3, paragraph 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

18 Rollo (G.R. No. 209447), pp. 344-345 and back page.

20 Id., Rule 7, Section 4.

The RTC has no jurisdiction