CRUZ VS SEC. DENR
167707; Oct 8, 2008
Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional
Law; IPRA; Regalian Doctrine
GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for
prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing
the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No.
8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act
of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations
(IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and
its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public
domain as well as minerals and other natural resources
therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in
section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the
Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law
that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural
resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the
natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the
State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over
the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives
them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the
resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of
these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large
scale development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not
part of the lands of the public domain. They are private lands
and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept
of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant
from the State. However, the right of ownership and
possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a
limited form of ownership and does not include the right to
alienate the same.
SEC DENR VS YAP
Natural Resources and Environmental Laws: Regalian
Doctrine
GR No.
FACTS:
This petition is for a review on certiorari of the decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Kalibo Aklan, which granted the petition for
declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose
Yap et al, and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling
purposes.
On Nov. 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No.
1801 declaring Boracay Island as a tourist zone and marine
reserve. Claiming that Proc. No. 1801 precluded them from
filing an application for a judicial confirmation of imperfect
title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-
claimants filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in
Kalibo, Aklan.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) opposed the petition countering that Boracay Island
was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part
of the mass of lands classified as “public forest,” which was
not available for disposition pursuant to section 3(a) of PD
No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code.
ISSUE:
Whether unclassified lands of the public domain are
automatically deemed agricultural land, therefore making
these lands alienable.
HELD:
No. To prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order, an
administrative action, investigative reports of the Bureau of
Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is
required. In keeping with the presumption of state
ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that
there must be a positive act of the government, such as an
official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public
domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of
any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Thus, all
lands that have not been acquired from the government,
either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of
the inalienable public domain.
CHAVEZ V. PUBLIC ESTATE AUTHORITY
FACTS:
From the time of Marcos until Estrada, portions of Manila Bay
were being reclaimed. A law was passed creating the Public
Estate Authority which was granted with the power to
transfer reclaimed lands. Now in this case, PEA entered into a
Joint Venture Agreement with AMARI, a private corporation.
Under the Joint Venture Agreement between AMARI and
PEA, several hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the
Freedom Islands and several portions of submerged areas of
Manila Bay were going to be transferred to AMARI .
ISSUE:
Whether or not the stipulations in the Amended JVA for the
transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed,
violate the Constitution
RULING: YES!
Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed
lands are classified as alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain Section 3 of the Constitution: Alienable lands
of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands.
Private corporations or associations may not hold such
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease The
157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom
Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of
PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease
these lands to private corporations but may not sell or
transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations.
PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine
citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987
Constitution and existing laws. Clearly, the Amended JVA
violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts
whose “object or purpose is contrary to law,” or whose
“object is outside the commerce of men,” are “inexistent and
void from the beginning.” The Court must perform its duty to
defend and uphold the Constitution, and therefore declares
the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.
Held:
On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the
Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the
name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA
may lease these lands to private corporations but may not
sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private
corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine
citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987
Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay
remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain
until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to
disposition and declared no longer needed for public service.
The government can make such classification and declaration
only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only
then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public
domain, which are the only natural resources the government
can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of
submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce
of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a
private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of the
Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land
of the public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI
ownership of 290.156 hectares111 of still submerged areas of
Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section
2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the
alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands
of the public domain.
PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the
government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or
disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for
public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable
lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987Constitution which prohibits
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land
of the public domain.
CHAVEZ VS NHA  Whether respondents can be compelled to disclose
all information related to the SMDRP
Facts
 Whether the operative fact doctrine applies to the
In his capacity as taxpayer, Francisco Chavez petitioned the instant position
Court directly for, among other things, access to all
Decision
documents and information relating to the Smokey Mountain
Development and Reclamation Project (the “Project”), Deciding on the issue of whether the NHA must be compelled
including its underlying Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) to disclose all information related to the Project, the Court
between the National Housing Authority (NHA), a ruled that relief must be granted because the right of the
government body, and R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) ( pg. 1-3). people to information on matters of public concern is
enshrined in the 1987 Constitution (pg. 86). Specifically,
With Congress having approved the Project as a boost to
Article II, Section 28 and Article III, Section 7 of the
infrastructure through its development of low-cost housing
Constitution, taken together as “twin provisions,” adopt a
projects, a private sector joint venture scheme was pursued
policy of full public disclosure on all transactions involving
in accordance with the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Law
public interest and acknowledge the people’s right to
whereby “the contractor undertakes the construction . . .
information. Case law further elucidates these constitutional
[for] the government agency or local government unit
tenets by stating that “an essential element of these
concerned which shall pay the contractor its total investment
freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of
expended on the project, plus reasonable rate of return” (pg.
communication between the government and the people . . .
5-10). After multiple design changes, cost overruns, and
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote
corresponding amendments to the JVA, the Project was
transparency in policy-making and in the operations of the
ultimately suspended, and RBI made demands for payment. A
government, as well as provide the people sufficient
few years later, the Housing and Urban Development
information to exercise effectively other constitutional rights”
Coordinating Council initiated a bidding process for the work
(pg. 86-87). In defining the limits of these freedoms, the Court
remaining on the Project, and the NHA reached a settlement
noted that such information requests must pertain to definite
with RBI to terminate the original JVA (pg.39-47). Raising
propositions of the government and that information might
constitutional issues and asserting his right to all information
be shielded by applicable privileges (e.g. military secrets and
related to the Project, Mr. Chavez filed a petition directly with
information relating to national security) (pg. 88-90). Finally,
the Court. the Court recognized that because no enabling law exists
providing government agencies with the procedural
ISSUES:
mechanics to disclose such information, the NHA cannot be
 Whether respondents NHA and RBI have been faulted for an inability to disclose. Nevertheless, where a duty
granted the power and authority to reclaim lands of to disclose does not exist, there still may exist a duty to
the public domain as this power is vested exclusively permit access, and so the Court ordered the NHA to permit
in PEA as claimed by petitioner access to all information related to the Project (pg. 89-90).
 Whether respondents NHA and RBI were given the
power and authority by DENR to reclaim foreshore
and submerged lands
 Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed
foreshore and submerged lands considered as
alienable and outside the commerce of man
 Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed
lands when there was no declaration that said lands
are no longer needed for public use
 Whether there is a law authorizing sale of reclaimed
lands
 Whether the transfer of reclaimed lands to RBI was
done by public bidding
 Whether RBI, being a private corporation, is barred
by the Constitution to acquire lands of public domain