PART I

Laurel vs. Misa, GR No. L-200, March 28, 1946

FACTS: Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus contending that he cannot be prosecuted for
the crime of treason defined and penalized by the Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code on the grounds
that the sovereignty of the legitimate government and the allegiance of Filipino citizens was then
suspended, and that there was a change of sovereignty over the Philippines upon the proclamation of the
Philippine Republic.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the absolute allegiance of the citizens suspended during Japanese occupation
2. Whether the petitioner is liable under Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code

RULING: No. The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the
enemy of their legitimate government on the sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy
occupation because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred to the
occupier. There is no such thing as suspended allegiance.

Yes. The petitioner is subject to the Revised Penal Code for the change of form of government does not
affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason because it is an offense to the same
government and same sovereign people.

US vs. Lagnason
FACTS: From the time of the occupation of the province of Occidental Negros by the American troops,
there had existed therein a band of men in arms against the Government of the United States. This band
was led by the defendant. The defendant with this band made an attack upon the pueblo of Murcia in the
Province of Occidental Negros, but was driven off by the force of Constabulary there stationed. During
that night two inspectors of the Constabulary arrived with additional fortes and early in the morning they
left the pueblo in search of the defendant. He was encountered with his party about three kilometers
from the pueblo and was attacked by the Constabulary. The defendant was captured in the battle.

ISSUE: Whether the defendant is guilty of treason

RULING: Yes. Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission states that every person, resident in the Philippine
Islands, owing allegiance to the United States, or the Government of the Philippine Islands, who levies war
against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the Philippine Islands or
elsewhere, is guilty of treason.

People vs. Abad, G.R. No. L-430, July 30, 1947

FACTS: Francisco Abad was found guilty on three counts of the complex crime of treason with homicide.
The information charged appellant of the crime of treason by giving aid and comfort to the Empire of
Japan and the Japanese Imperial Forces. The first question raised by appellant is that the lower court erred
in finding the accused guilty on the first count, notwithstanding the fact that only one witness testified to
the overt act alleged therein.

ISSUE: Whether the two-witness rule requirement should be observed?

DECISION: Yes. The two-witness rule must be adhered to as to each and every one of all the external
manifestations of the overt act in issue. Although both overt acts are inter-related, it would be too much
to strain the imagination if they should be identified as a single act or even as different manifestations,
phases, or stages of the same overt act. Although both acts may logically be presumed to have answered
the same purpose, the singleness of purpose is not enough to make one of two acts.

People vs. Carmelito Victoria

FACTS: Appellant was sentenced by the lower court to supreme penalty of death and fine of P20,000. His
crime: Treason (in violation of duty of allegiance, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably did
knowingly adhere to their enemy, the Empire of Japan and the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines,
with which the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines were then at war, giving to said
enemy aid and/or comfort). In all of these instances, appellant maintains that he is not a spy, and was
only forced to be one. He also claims to be a guerrilla and that he tried to help Filipino prisoners.
Aggravating circumstances (lower court): treachery, the aid of armed persons to insure or afford impunity,
and deliberately augmenting the crimes by causing other wrongs not necessary in the commission thereof.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty and if so, whether or not his act of saving some Filipinos justify
or mitigate his criminal responsibility

RULING: Yes. The Court ruled on his guilt. The fact that he helped some Filipinos does not relieve him from
criminal responsibility for the acts he had committed. The performance of righteous action, no matter
how meritorious they may be is not a justifying, exempting, or mitigating circumstance in the commission
of wrongs.

US vs. Bautista
FACTS: Appellants convicted in CFI Manila of conspiracy to overthrow by force US government and PH
government as defined in Act292. Francisco Bautista was sentenced with Aniceto de Guzman and Tomas
Puzon to imprisonment with fine and hard labor. During latter 1903 a junta was organized and a
conspiracy entered into by Filipino residents in HK for overthrowing the government by force of arms and
establishing in its stead a government known as Republica Universal Democratica Filipina. Toward the end
of 1903, Artemio Ricarte would come to Manila from Hong Kong and hold meetings to further the
conspiracy hatched in HK, like for the plan to enlist a revolution army and raising money for it. The
conspirators took to the field and offered armed resistance, only failing because of their failure to combat
and of the failure of the people to rise en masse in response to their propaganda. Bautista, a Manila
resident, was an intimate friend of Ricarte, notified by Ricarte of his coming to Manila, Bautista giving him
money for the trip, present in meetings, “held the people in readiness.” Puzon distributed the bonds and
appointed certain officials for the revolutionary forces. Puzon said he only acted to not vex his friend, that
“joking tone,” that he did not know Ricarte was organizing a conspiracy.

ISSUE: Whether or not appellants are guilty of the crime.

RULING: No. Puzon himself signed a written statement at the time he was arrested saying he was part of
the new revolution presided over by Ricarte, that he was brigadier-general, chief of signal corps since they
were childhood friends. Puzon did not deny this statement. His confession was clear and in no way
supports his pretense that he was excited as not to know what he was saying when he made it. The
accused voluntarily accepted the appointment and in doing so assumed all obligations implied by such
acceptance. “Mere possession of such an appointment, when it is not shown that the possessor executed
some external act by the virtue of the same, does not constitute sufficient proof of the guilt of the
defendant," applies only the case of Enrique Camonas, against whom the only evidence of record was ‘the
fact that a so-called appointment of sergeant was found at his house.’” It may be the case that
conspirators may send appoints to an unsuspecting person in the hope that such person would accept it,
and the person is entirely innocent of all intention to join. A genuine conspiracy must be shown to exist,
and it must be proven that accused voluntarily accepted the appointment. The two-witness rule cannot
apply in proving conspiracy to commit treason, only in treason. Aniceto de Guzman cannot be convicted
on his acceptance of a number of bonds from conspirators. It does not mean he knew about the
conspiracy, receiving the wrapped bonds not knowing what they were, then destroying them thereafter.

People vs. Lol-lo

FACTS: Days after leaving Matuta, Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) on Jun. 30, 1920, two boats carrying
12 Dutch nationals (1 person in one boat, 11 men, women and children in another) were boarded by 24
armed Moros (including the accused Lol-lo and Saraw) at around 7:00 PM. The Moros took all the cargo
from the Dutch. They also raped and abducted the two women on board. The Moros poked holes in the
boat and left the rest of the Dutch in it (they were later rescued). The two women were able to escape
once the Moros docked in the island of Maruro (also a Dutch possession). Lol-lo and Saraw were arrested
after returning to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-tawi. They were charged w/ Piracy before the Sulu CFI
and were found guilty, with punishment of life imprisonment; and to return the stolen 39 sacks of copra
plus 924 rupees in damages, plus costs.

ISSUES: Whether the CFI has jurisdiction over the crime and whether the defendants are guilty of the said
crime

RULING: Yes. Piracy is a crime against all mankind. The jurisdiction of piracy has no territorial limits, pirates
being hostes humani generis (enemies of mankind). Piracy may be prosecuted in any court where the
offender may be found or into which he may be carried.

Yes. The provisions of the Spanish Penal Code on piracy (Arts. 153-154) remained in force after the
American takeover, by virtue of Pres. McKinley’s Instructions. Art. 154 specified that piracy with rape shall
be punished by cadena perpetua to death. Lol-lo, who was proven to have taken part in the rape of the
two women, should therefore be put to death - the crime being aggravated by cruelty, ignominy, and
abuse of superior strength (rape of the women, abandonment of the other victims, 24 armed men vs. 12
men, women & children) with the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction.
 People vs. Catantan
FACTS: Catantan was found guilty with violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 otherwise known as the
Anti-Piracy and Highway Robbery Law of 1974. He contends that the trial court erred in convicting him of
piracy as the facts proved only constitute grave coercion. He further argues that in order that piracy may
be committed it is essential that there be an attack on or seizure of a vessel.

ISSUE: Whether the contention of Catantan is tenable.

RULING: No, the contention of Catantan is untenable. Under the definition of piracy in PD No. 532 as well
as grave coercion as penalized in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, this case falls squarely within the
purview of piracy. While it may be true that victims were compelled to go elsewhere other than their
place of destination, such compulsion was obviously part of the act of seizing their boat. The testimony of
one of the victims shows that the appellant actually seized the vessel through force and intimidation.

Part II
Milo vs. Salanga
FACTS: An information for Arbitrary Detention was filed against herein private respondent (accused Barrio
Captain Tuvera, Sr.) and some other private persons for maltreating petitioner Valdez by hitting him with
butts of their guns and fist blows. Immediately thereafter, without legal grounds and with deliberate
intent to deprive the latter of his constitutional liberty, accused respondent and two members of the
police force of Mangsat conspired and helped one another in lodging and locking petitioner inside the
municipal jail of Manaoag, Pangasinan for about eleven (11) hours.

Accused-respondent then filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged
do not constitute the elements of said crime and that the proofs adduced at the investigation are not
sufficient to support the filing of the information. Petitioner Asst. Provincial Fiscal Milo filed an opposition
thereto. Consequently, averring that accused-respondent was not a public officer who can be charged
with Arbitrary Detention, respondent Judge Salanga granted the motion to quash in an order. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused-respondent, being a Barrio Captain, can be liable for the crime of Arbitrary
Detention.

RULING: Yes. The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be vested with authority to detain or
order the detention of persons accused of a crime. One need not be a police officer to be chargeable with
Arbitrary Detention. It is accepted that other public officers like judges and mayors, who act with abuse
of their functions, may be guilty of this crime. A perusal of the powers and function vested in mayors
would show that they are similar to those of a barrio captain except that in the case of the latter, his
territorial jurisdiction is smaller. Having the same duty of maintaining peace and order, both must be and
are given the authority to detain or order detention. Noteworthy is the fact that even private respondent
Tuvera himself admitted that with the aid of his rural police, he as a barrio captain, could have led the
arrest of petitioner Valdez.
 Astorga vs. People
FACTS: On September 1, 1997, private offended parties together with SPO3 Andres B. Cinco, Jr. and SPO1
Rufo Capoquian, were sent to the Island of Daram, Western Samar to conduct intelligence operations on
possible illegal logging activities. At around 4:30-5:00 p.m., the team found two boats measuring 18
meters in length and 5 meters in breadth being constructed at Barangay Locob-Locob. There they met
petitioner Benito Astorga, the Mayor of Daram, who turned out to be the owner of the boats. A heated
altercation ensued between petitioner and the DENR team. Petitioner called for reinforcements and,
moments later, a boat bearing ten armed men, some wearing fatigues, arrived at the scene. The DENR
team was then brought to petitioner’s house in Daram, where they had dinner and drinks. The team left
at 2:00 a.m.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of Arbitrary Detention

RULING: Petitioner Benito Astorga is acquitted of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the ground of
reasonable doubt.

The determinative factor in Arbitrary Detention, in the absence of actual physical restraint, is fear. After
a careful review of the evidence on record, the court find no proof that petitioner instilled fear in the
minds of the private offended parties. The court fail to discern any element of fear from the narration of
SPO1 Rufo Capoquian, the police officer who escorted the DENR Team during their mission. SPO1
Capoquian in fact testified that they were free to leave the house and roam around the barangay.
Furthermore, he admitted that it was raining at that time. Hence, it is possible that petitioner prevented
the team from leaving the island because it was unsafe for them to travel by boat.

Verily, the circumstances brought out by SPO1 Capoquian created a reasonable doubt as to whether
petitioner detained the DENR Team against their consent. The events that transpired are, to be sure,
capable to two interpretations. While it may support the proposition that the private offended parties
were taken to petitioner’s house and prevented from leaving until 2:00 a.m. the next morning, it is equally
plausible, if not more so, that petitioner extended his hospitality and served dinner and drinks to the team
at his house. He could have advised them to stay on the island inasmuch as sea travel was rendered unsafe
by the heavy rains and ate together with the private offended parties and even laughed with them while
conversing over dinner. This scenario is inconsistent with a hostile confrontation between the parties.
Moreover, considering that the Mayor also served alcoholic drinks, it is not at all unusual that his guests
left the house at 2:00 a.m. the following morning.

As held in several cases, when the guilt of the accused has not been proven with moral certainty, the
presumption of innocence of the accused must be sustained and his exoneration be granted as a matter
of right. When the circumstances are capable of two or more inferences, as in this case, one of which is
consistent with the presumption of innocence while the other is compatible with guilt, the presumption
of innocence must prevail and the court must acquit. It is better to acquit a guilty man than to convict an
innocent man.
 People vs. Camerino
FACTS:(Not available)

ISSUE: Whether the accused is liable for arbitrary detention under Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code

RULING: YES. "Private individuals who conspired with public officers in detaining certain policemen are
guilty of arbitrary detention"(Reyes, p. 43). Moreover, it is in the law that any restraint on one’s liberty,
even for a mere short period of time, is criminally actionable: “Even if the persons detained could move
freely in and out of their prison cell and could take their meals outside the prison, nevertheless, if they
were under the surveillance of the guards and they could not escape for fear of being apprehended again,
there would still be arbitrary detention.” (as cited in Lozada vs. Atienza, et al)

People vs. Domasian

FACTS: Enrico while walking with a classmate was approached by a man who requested his assistance in
getting his father's signature on a medical certificate. Enrico agreed to help and rode with the man in a
tricycle to Calantipayan, where he waited outside while the man went into a building to get the certificate.
Enrico became apprehensive and started to cry when, instead of taking him to the hospital, the man
flagged a minibus and forced him inside, holding him firmly all the while. They rode another tricycle.
Domasian talked to a jeepney driver and handed him a letter addressed to Dr. Agra, the boy’s father. The
two then boarded a tricycle again, the tricycle driver became suspicious of Domasian and reported to the
Barangay Tanods. They went after Domasian and Enrico. Enrico was recovered but Domasian escaped. A
ransom note arrived at Dr. Agra’s place. Dr. Agra identified the handwriting in the letter as Dr. Tan’s. The
Regional Trial Court convicted Domasian and Tan of Kidnapping.

ISSUE: Whether the conviction of the lower court is correct.

RULING: Yes. It is settled that conspiracy can be inferred from and proven by the acts of the accused
themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of
interests. In the instant case, the trial court correctly held that conspiracy was proved by the act of
Domasian in detaining Enrico; the writing of the ransom note by Tan; and its delivery by Domasian to Agra.
These acts were complementary to each other and geared toward the attainment of the common ultimate
objective, viz., to extort the ransom of P1 million in exchange for Enrico's life. The Court was satisfied that
Tan and Domasian, in conspiracy with each other, committed the crime of kidnapping as defined and
penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and so deserve the penalty imposed upon them by
the trial court.

People vs. Sanchez

FACTS: Eulogio Sanchez was accused of the crime of illegal detention, provided for and punished in article
200 of the Penal Code, for having detained one Benigno Aranzanso by keeping him in the municipal jail of
the pueblo of Caloocan, Province of Rizal, for a period of less than three days. The defendant, being a
municipal policeman, arrested Benigno Aranzanso in a cockpit and took him to a town hall, where he was
detained until just before nightfall of the same day, when he was set at liberty by order of the president.

ISSUE: Whether the defendant is guilty of the crime of illegal detention.

RULING: The defendant acted in compliance with orders of his chief, the sergeant of police, in asserting
Benigno Aranzanso and his detention was justified for the purpose of identifying his person, since, the
sergeant himself, reasonable grounds existed for believing in the existence of a crime and suspicion
pointed to that individual. It was not necessary that the fact of the robbery committed in the boat should
have been established in order to regard such detention as legal.

One of the duties of the police is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them at the disposal of the judicial
or executive authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the act constituting the violation or
to prosecute and secure the punishment thereof. One of the means conducing to these ends being the
identification of the person of the alleged criminal or lawbreaker, the duty that directly devolves upon the
police to make the arrests or detentions for the purposes of such investigation cannot be questioned.

It is, therefore, beyond dispute that the defendant Eulogio Sanchez did not commit the crime charged
against him in the complaint.

Sayo vs. Chief of Police

FACTS: Bernardino Malinao complained and charged Melencio Sayo and Joaquin Mostero with having
committed the crime of robbery, Benjamin Dumlao, a policeman of the City of Manila, arrested Sayo and
Mostero, and presented a complaint against them with the fiscal's office of Manila. When the petition
for habeas corpus was heard, Sayo and Mostero were still detained or under arrest, and the city fiscal had
not yet released or filed charges against them with the proper courts justice.

ISSUE: Whether the detention as a result of the warrantless arrest valid; Whether the peace officer
violated Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code

RULING: 1. No. Under the constitution, no person may be deprived of his liberty except by warrant of
arrest or commitment issued upon probable cause by a judge after examination of the complainant and
his witness. A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person without a warrant upon complaint
of the offended party or any other person, except in those cases expressly authorized by law. What he or
the complainant may do in such case is to file a complaint with the city fiscal or directly with the justice of
the peace courts in municipalities and other political subdivisions. A fortiori a police officer has no
authority to arrest and detain a person charged with an offense upon complaint of the offended party or
other persons even though, after investigation, he becomes convinced that the accused is guilty of the
offense charged.

2. Yes. Article 125 of the RPC punishes any public officer or employee who, after detaining a person, "shall
fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of six hours." In the case at
bar, the arresting officer did not deliver Sayo and Mostero to any authority, and much less to any judicial
authority. Their filing of a complaint with the office of the fiscal of Manila is not a delivery of the persons
of petitioners. The continued detention and confinement of petitioners for more than six hours is a clear
violation under Article 125 of the RPC. Hence, Sayo and Mostero were immediately released.
 Lino vs. Fuguso
FACTS: This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed in behalf of twelve persons alleged to be
unlawfully detained by respondents Valeriano E. Fugoso, Lamberto Javalera and John Doe in their capacity
as mayor, chief of police and officer in charge of the municipal jail of the City of Manila, respectively. It is
alleged in respondent's return that ten of the petitioners had already been released, no sufficient
evidence having been found to warrant their prosecution for inciting to sedition, but that the remaining
two, Pascual Montaniel and Pacifico Deoduco, are being held in custody because of charges filed against
them in the municipal court for unjust vexation and disobedience to police orders, respectively. The case
of the ten petitioners has become academic by their release. After hearing, by minute-resolution the Court
dismissed the case with respect to the ten petitioners already released and ordered the release of the
remaining two, Montaniel and Deoduco.

Pascual Montaniel was arrested without warrant by the police officers of Manila on November 8, 1946,
for inciting to sedition, and Pacifico Deoduco, on November 7, 1946, for resisting arrest and disobedience
to police orders. On November 11 when this petition for habeas corpus was filed, these two petitioners
were still under arrest. They were thus held in confinement for three and four days respectively, without
warrants and without charges formally filed in court.

Upon investigation, no sufficient evidence was found to warrant the prosecution of Pascual Montaniel for
inciting to sedition and Pacifico Deoduco for resisting arrest, but both remained under custody because
of informations filed with the municipal court charging Montaniel with unjust vexation and Deoduco with
disobedience to an agent of a person in authority

ISSUE: Whether the detention of Deoduco and Montaniel is legal

RULING: Under these facts, the detention of Pacifico Deoduco and Pascual Montaniel is illegal. Even
assuming that they were legally arrested without warrant on November 7 and 8, 1946, respectively, their
continued detention became illegal upon the expiration of six hours without their having been delivered
to the corresponding judicial authorities. (Article 125, Rev. Pen. Code, as amended by Act No. 3940.)

People vs. Acosta

FACTS: Pointed to as among those who laid hands on the two policemen, were Hipolito Mamuric, Tiburcio
Portacio, Perfecto Garcia, Ursulo Diego and Feliciano Cruz. They were arrested and confined in the
municipal jail that night. On the following morning, a complaint for assault upon agents of persons in
authority was filed against them with the justice of the peace. After the filing of the complaint at 8
o'clock that morning, no action for the preliminary investigation, as required by law, was taken and
Mamuric, Portacio, Diego and Cruz remained in jail for 6 days without the benefit thereof. The entry in
the police blotter showed that Mayor Acosta ordered their arrest and detention.

ISSUE: Whether Mayor Acosta is liable under Art. 125

RULING: The answer is positively in the negative. Mamuric and others who were jailed with him on the
evening of June 17, 1958, were delivered to the judicial authority upon the filing of the complaint for
assault against them at 8 o'clock in the morning of the following day. As the duty of the detaining officer
is deemed complied with upon the filing of the complaint, further action rests upon
the judicial authority. It is for the judicial authority to determine

Papa vs. Mago

FACTS: Petitioner Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department, acting
upon a reliable information received that a certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared
and undervalued, would be released the following day from the customs zone of the port of Manila and
loaded on two trucks, and upon orders of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly
deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs, conducted surveillance at gate No. 1 of the customs zone.
When the trucks left gate No. 1, elements of the counter-intelligence unit went after the trucks and
intercepted them. The load of the two trucks consisting of nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, were
seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership of the goods
and showed to the policemen a “Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected in Informal Entry No. 147-
5501”, issued by the Bureau of Customs to respondents. Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure
and detention of the two trucks and their cargo, Private Respondents filed with the Court of First Instance
of Manila a petition “for mandamus with restraining order. That the goods were seized by members of
the Manila Police Department without search warrant issued by a competent court; Respondent Judge
Hilarion Jarencio issued an order ex parte restraining the petitioners from opening the nine bales in
question, and at the same time set the hearing of the petition for preliminary injunction on November 16,
1966. However, when the restraining order was received by herein petitioners, some bales had already
been opened by the examiners of the Bureau of Customs in the presence of officials of the Manila Police
Department, an assistant city fiscal and a representative of herein respondent Remedios Mago.

ISSUE: Whether a warrant issued by a competent court is required to search and seize a moving cargo or
vehicle.

RULING: No, The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the instant case. The Code
authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter,
pass through or search any land, enclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and
also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or envelope or any
person on board, or to stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or
conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without
mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code
provides that said “dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or
justice of the peace. The court view, therefor, that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house,
persons exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search
warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.

Ignacio et. al., vs. Ela

FACTS: Fernando Ignacio and Simeon de la Cruz, both members of a religion called Jehovah’s Witnesses
requested that they be allowed to use the town plaza proper, including the stand or kiosko for the purpose
of holding a meeting for religious purposes. They were permitted to hold said meeting but only on the
north western part of the plaza. They contend that they should be allowed to use the town plaza proper
including the kiosko for it allegedly infringed upon the constitutionally guaranteed rights of freedom of
speech, assembly, and worship.

The respondent countered that he did not prohibit the said meeting from occurring but merely regulated
where they could hold their religious gathering. He also advanced the defense that he was merely
exercising the police power to regulate said meeting to maintain public order and public safety and to
prevent any untoward incident from occurring, for the plaza and the kiosko were located near a church
of the Catholics.

ISSUE: WON the Jehovah’s witnesses were denied the right to assembly and worship?

RULING: It therefore appears that the right to freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble, though
guaranteed by our Constitution, is not absolute, for it may be regulated in order that it may not be
“injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the
community or society”, and this power may be exercised under the “police power” of the state, which is
the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety,
and general welfare of the people.

It cannot therefore be said that Petitioners were denied their constitutional right to assemble for, as was
said, such right is subject to regulation to maintain public order and public safety. This is especially so
considering that the tenets of Petitioners’ congregation are derogatory to those of the Roman Catholic
Church, a factor which Respondent must have considered in denying their request.

People vs. Baes

FACTS: The Villaroca, Lacbay and Rosario while holding a funeral, in accordance with the rites of religious
sect known as the "Church of Christ", caused the funeral to pass through the church yard fronting the
Roman Catholic Church, which churchyard belongs to the said Church devoted to the religious worship
thereof. The complainant, Jose Baes, alleged that through force and threats of physical violence he was
forced to allow the funeral to pass through. An act committed in grave profanation of the place, in open
disregard of the religious feelings of the Catholics, and in violation of article 133 of the Revised Penal Code.

The fiscal, instead of filing the information moved to dismiss the case. The fiscal contended that the mere
act of causing the passage through the churchyard belonging to the Church, of the funeral of one who in
life belonged to the Church of Christ, neither offends nor ridicules the religious feelings of those who
belong to the Roman Catholic Church

ISSUE: Whether the act complained of is notoriously offensive to the religious feelings of the Catholics,
thereby violating Article 133 of the Revised Penal Code

RULING: Yes. The Court believes that such ground of the motion by the fiscal is indefensible. The motion
raises a question of law, not one of fact. In the second place, whether or of the act complained of is
offensive to the religious feelings of the Catholics, is a question of fact which must be judged only
according to the feelings of the Catholics and not those of other faithful ones, for it is possible that certain
acts may offend the feelings of those who profess a certain religion, while not otherwise offensive to the
feelings of those professing another faith. We, therefore, take the view that the facts alleged in the
complaint constitute the offense defined and penalized in article 133 of the Revised Penal Code
 Part III
People Vs. Federico Geronimo; G.R. No. L-8936; October 23, 1956

FACTS :On June 24, 1954, Federico Geronimo, et al. were charged with the complex crime of rebellion with murders,
robberies, and kidnapping. These are the ranking officers/ or members of CCP and Huks. In the information it alleged
5 instances including an ambush on Mrs. Aurora Quezon’s convoy on April 28, 1949 and ending on February 1954
where Geronimo killed Policarpio Tipay a Barrio Lieutenant. He pleaded guilty to the accusation and the trial court
found him guilty of the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings, sentencing him to
reclusion perpetua. He appealed raising the sole question of whether the crime committed by him is not the complex
crime of rebellion, but simply rebellion, thus punishable only by prision mayor.

ISSUE: Whether rebellion can be complexed with murder, robbery or kidnapping?

RULING: No. Not every act of violence is to be deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion solely because it happens
to be committed simultaneously with or in the course of the rebellion. If the killing, robbing, etc. were done for
private purposes or profit, without any political motivation, the crime would be separately punishable and would
not be absorbed by the rebellion. But ever then, the individual misdeed could not be taken with the rebellion to
constitute a complex crime, for the constitutive acts and intent would be unrelated to each other; and the individual
crime would not be a means necessary for committing the rebellion as it would not be done in preparation or in
furtherance of the latter. This appears with utmost clarity in the case where an individual rebel should commit
rape; certainly the latter felony could not be said to have been done in furtherance of the rebellion or facilitated its
commission in any way.

People vs. Hernandez et al; GR Nos. L-6025-26; July 18, 1956

FACTS: Amado HERNANDEZ5 (member of the CPP and President of the Congress of Labor Organizations) re-filed for
bail (previous one denied) for his conviction of rebellion complexed with murders, arsons and robberies. The
prosecution said to deny this again because the capital punishment may be imposed. The defense however contends
that rebellion cannot be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery. The information states that the “…murders,
arsons and robberies allegedly perpetrated by the accused “as a necessary means to commit the crime of rebellion,
in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof.”

ISSUE: Whether rebellion can be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery.

RULING: Under the allegations of the amended information, the murders, arsons and robberies described therein
are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by HERNANDEZ, as means “necessary” for the
perpetration of said offense of rebellion and that the crime charged in the amended information is, therefore, simple
rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies. Under Article 1346 and
1357, these five (5) classes of acts constitute only one offense, and no more, and are, altogether, subject to only one
penalty. One of the means by which rebellion may be committed, in the words of said Article 135, is by “engaging in
war against the forces of the government” and “committing serious violence” in the prosecution of said “war”. These
expressions imply everything that war connotes. Since Article 135 constitute only 1 crime, Article 48 doesn’t apply
since it requires the commission of at least 2 crimes.

People vs. Abilong; GR No. L-1960; November 26, 1948

FACTS: Abilong, being then a convict for attempted robbery, was sentenced for destierro during which he should
not enter any place within the radius of 100 kilometers from the City of Manila, by virtue of final judgment rendered
by the municipal court. However, Abilong, On September 17, 1947, while serving such sentence, unlawfully and
feloniously went beyond the limits made against him and commit vagrancy. Florentino Abilong was charged in the
Court of First Instance of Manila with evasion of service of sentence under Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellant argues that Article 157 refers only to persons who are imprisoned in a penal institution and completely
deprived of their liberty. Solicitor General in his brief says otherwise.

ISSUE: Whether appellant, for having violated his judgment of destierro rendered by the Municipal Court of Manila,
can be sentenced under article 157 of the Revised Penal Code.

RULING: Yes. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General. It is clear that the word "imprisonment" used in the English
text is a wrong or erroneous translation of the phrase "sufriendo privacion de libertad" used in the Spanish text. It
is equally clear that although the Solicitor General impliedly admits destierro as not constituting imprisonment, it is
a deprivation of liberty, though partial, in the sense that as in the present case, the appellant by his sentence
of destierro was deprived of the liberty to enter the City of Manila. The Court noted that it was held that one evades
the service of his sentence of destierro when he enters the prohibited area specified in the judgment of conviction.
In conclusion the Court affirms that the appellant is guilty of evasion of service of sentence under article 157 of the
Revised Penal Code

People vs. Pontillas; GR No. 45627; June 15, 1938

FACTS: Remigio Pontillas is charged of violation of conditional pardon. Pontillas was granted pardon remitting the
unexecuted portion of this sentence of six years one day of prision correccional imposed upon him for the crime of
illegal marriage. The pardon is subject to the condition that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the
Philippine Islands, which condition was accepted by him. However, Pontillas violated the conditions of such pardon,
by committing the crime of damage to property thru reckless driving. He interposed a demurrer based on the ground
that the facts charged do not constitute a public offense and, if true, would exempt him from criminal liability. The
lower court sustained the demurrer. The opinion of the lower court was that the first penalty imposed upon the
accused having already prescribed when he committed his second offense, he could no longer be prosecuted for
violation of conditional pardon.

ISSUE: Whether the accused can be criminally prosecuted for violation of the conditional pardon

RULING: No. The period of prescription of his penalty of six years and one day was interrupted by the mere fact of
his acceptance of his pardon, which acceptance was precisely subject to the condition that he could enjoy and would
continue to enjoy is liberty without being obliged to serve the remainder of his sentence so long as he did not violate
any of the penal laws of the country. In this jurisdiction a conditional pardon is certainly a contract between two
parties: The Chief Executive, who grants the pardon, and the convict, who accepts it. It does not become perfected
until the convict is notified of the same and accepts it with all its conditions. Accordingly, if it is a contract, it cannot
be doubted that the pardoned convict is bound to fulfill its conditions and accept all its consequences, not as he
chooses, but according to its strict terms. Otherwise, he would find himself in the same situation as before he was
pardoned and he could be compelled to serve the remainder of his sentenced, which he has not yet served.

People vs. Layson et al; GR No. 105689; October 31, 1946

FACTS: On January 17, 1964 when the four accused stabbed Regino Gasang to death, they were inmates of the Davao
Penal Colony serving sentences of conviction of their crimes. Layson locked the door of the room. Without warning
and acting in concert they then swiftly took turns in stabbing Gasang. They thereafter barricaded themselves,
refusing to surrender to the trustees who had come to the scene of the crime, agreeing to surrender only to Vicente
Afurong, the supervising prison guard. Afurong arrived, and they surrendered. They admitted that they killed Gasang
because the latter urinated on their coffee cups a number of times. Death penalty was imposed on the accused.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in considering quasi-recidivism and imposing death penalty

RULING: No. The special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism (Art. I60, Revised Penal Code) was correctly
considered against all the accused, who, at the time of the commission of the offense, were undoubtedly serving
their respective sentences for previous convictions. Quasi-recidivism has for its effect the punishment of the accused
with the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony, and cannot be offset by an ordinary
mitigating circumstance. The crime of murder is punished with reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death.
Because of the attendance of the special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism, this Court is left with no
alternative to affirming the death penalty imposed by the court a quo.

PART IV

US. Vs Alejandro Mateo; G.R. No. 8025; September 17, 1913

FACTS: The defendant, a priest, was called on in the performance of his duties to execute an affidavit.
When asked to produce his personal cedula, it was observed that the age therein had been altered, the
figure “23” having been changed to “25”. It appeared that defendant’s real age was 25. He was prosecuted
for falsification of his cedula, for altering the age appearing therein.

ISSUE: Whether a mere change of age constitutes the crime of falsification of public documents

RULING: The defendant did not commit any crime in changing his age. He simply made the cedula speak
the truth. It was a correction, not falsification. Generally, the word alteration has inherent in it the idea of
deception – of making the instrument speak something which the parties did not intend to speak. To be
an alteration in violation of the law, it must be one “which causes the instrument to speak a language
different in legal effect from that which it originally spoke.

United States vs. Asensi; GR No. L-11159; August 7, 1916

FACTS: Asensi is an employee of the Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas. The complaint alleges that
he defrauded the said corporation by appropriating to himself P400 of the P3,487.50 that was given to
him for the purpose of employing it in the purchase of internal revenue stamps for the use of the said
company. Defendant was charged with the crime of estafa.

ISSUE: Whether court erred in holding that the defendant appropriated to himself the difference between
the sums received by him for the purchase of stamps and the sums spent for this purpose.

RULING: No. He made his representation to the officer of the corporation who delivered to him the check,
he represented that he needed the sum of P3,487.50, whereas he had theretofore represented to other
officers of the corporation who had nothing to do with the delivery of the money to the defendant that
he needed the sum of P3,087.50, and the fact is that he purchased stamps amounting to P3,087.50
only. He has neither offered to return the same to the offended corporation nor to account for it.

United States vs. Orera; GR No. 3810; October 18, 1907

FACTS: The accused was charged with falsifying a theatre ticket which entitled the accused to be admitted
into the theatre.

ISSUE: Whether a ticket may be considered as a document

RULING: Yes. Theatre ticket is a document, the subject-matter of the complaint, because if, according to
the authority cited by the appellant, a document is "a deed, instrument or other duly authorized paper by
which something is proved, evidenced or set forth," and a private document is, according to another
authority cited by the same appellant, "every deed or instrument executed by a private person, without
the intervention of a public notary or of other person legally authorized, by which document some
disposition or agreement is proved, evidenced or set forth," it follows that the ticket in question, being an
authorized document evidencing an agreement for the rent of a place in a theater to enable the possessor
to witness a theatrical performance, is a private document.
United States vs Antero Inosanto ; G.R. No. 6896; October 23, 1911

FACTS: Antero Inosanto was charged with having committed this falsification in an official register, as he
was the municipal secretary whose duty it was to keep the same. A record of the registry of births was
previously tampered with which records that a certain child was a legitimate daughter of Pedro and
Caridad Zausa when it in fact was in the contrary. The accused then issued a certificate based on the
records not knowing that it was falsified.

ISSUE: Whether the accused was guilty of falsification of documents

RULING: Although the accused, as municipal secretary, issued a certificate which is an exact reproduction
of the falsified inscription in the register of births, under his charge among the municipal files, knowing of
such falsity, he is not guilty of falsification as defined in article 310 of the Penal Code, as the said certificate
is not one of merit or service, of good conduct, of poverty or of other similar circumstances, that is, of
matters purely personal, the falsification of which is penalized by the said article, but is a certificate of an
inscription in a register under his charge, with which it substantially agrees. Therefore he concluded that,
with a reversal of the judgment appealed from, the defendant should be acquitted, and the costs assessed
de oficio.

People vs. Vicente P. Castro ; G.R. Nos. L-22642; December 19, 1924

FACTS: The accused were members of the provincial board. They falsified several minutes of the meeting
by the provincial board as well as committing the crime of estafa by falsification of public documents. The
accused raised that there was no criminal intent on their part and the whole suit was merely a result of
political intrigue.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lack of intent in the falsification will not result in criminal liability
RULING: Evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be crime. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens
sit rea. Ignorance or mistake as to particular facts, will as a general rule, exempt the doer from criminal
responsibility. The exception, of course, is neglect in the discharge of a duty or indifference to
consequences, which is equivalent to a criminal intent. The element of malicious intent is supplied by the
element of negligence and imprudence. It is a serious matter to be responsible for sending the accused to
prison for long terms. All reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate error and not crime should be
indulged in to the benefit of the prisoners at bar. The Government has suffered no loss. If the inculpatory
facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused of the crime charged and the other consistent with their guilt, then the evidence
does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.

United States vs. To Lee Piu; GR No. 11522; September 26, 1916

FACTS: The appellant was charged with using a false name. He came to the Philippine Islands in 1911 and
presented a section six certificate wherein his name appears as To Lee Piu. Thereafter, he attached to an
application for a passport the name of Toribio Jalijali. The charge is prosecuted on the theory that To Lee
Piu is appellant’s correct name and that the name Toribio Jalijali is false.

ISSUE: Whether the conviction of the appellant of the crime of using a false name is proper

RULING: Yes. The conviction must stand. To convict of the crime of using a false or fictitious name under
article 331 of the Penal Code it is necessary to show, first, that the name used was false and, second, that
it was used publicly. A name, when applied to a particular person, is a word or words used to distinguish,
that is, identify, that person; any other name which that person publicly applies to himself without
authority of law is a fictitious name. The signing of a fictitious name to an application for a passport is a
public use of a fictitious name. The names To Lee Piu and Toribio Jalijali are so different, both in sound
and appearance, that it would naturally be inferred by one who heard them that such names referred to
different persons.

People vs. Maneja Case – No Facts

People vs. Reyes; CA., 48 OG 1837

FACTS: The accused was the star witness in a prosecution for robbery against Jemenia. Before the trial,
the accused executed an affidavit in which he manifested that he was not interested in the prosecution
of the case and that he wanted to give the accused “ a chance to earn his living wisely and in the honest
way.” The fiscal refused to ask for the dismissal of the case. When the case was called for trial, the accused,
who was asked to identify Jemenia, testified that he could not remember anymore the face of Jemenia.
After further questions failed to elicit other data, the case against Jemenia was dismissed by the court.

ISSUE: Whether Reyes is guilty of false testimony

RULING: The contention of the defense that the acquittal of Jemenia was due to the failure of the fiscal
to call other witnesses who could have properly identified Jemenia, is irrelevant. It is not necessary that
the testimony given by the witness should directly influence the decision of acquittal, it being sufficient
that it was given with the intent to favor the accused.

United States vs. Soliman GR No. 11555; May 31, 1960

FACTS: A defendant, charged with estafa, testified falsely that the extrajudicial confession attributed to
him was procured by the police by the use of force, intimidation and prolonged torture. On the basis of
his testimony, he was acquitted.

ISSUE: Whether a defendant who falsely testified on his own behalf is guilty of false testimony

RULING: Yes. It must not be forgotten that the right of an accused person to testify in his own behalf is
secured to him, not that he may be enabled to introduce false testimony into the record, but to enable
him to spread upon the record the truth as to any matter within his knowledge which will tend to establish
his innocence.

People vs. Ambal; GR No. 187540; September 1, 2010

FACTS: On direct examination, the witness stated that the accused told him to get up for he had killed a
person. On cross-examination, the witness changed his testimony and stated he did not hear clearly what
the accused said.

ISSUE: Whether the witness is guilty of false testimony

RULING: No. The witness is not liable, there being no sufficient evidence that he acted with malice or with
criminal intent to testify falsely. Rectification made spontaneously after realizing the mistake is not false
testimony.

United States vs. Estrana; GR No. 5751; September 6, 1910

FACTS: Lope Estraña, having been duly sworn as a witness in the Court of First Instance of the said province
in a criminal case, falsely testified and declared, under oath that Dionisio Tambolero came to his house.
She also falsely testified that he remained in her house. The accused was arraigned, plead not guilty, tried,
convicted, and sentenced to be confined in the Insular penitentiary, for the period of one year and one
day, and "to hereafter be incapable of holding public office or of giving testimony in any court of the
Philippine Islands.” Counsel for the appellant insists that the court below should have dismissed this case
for the reason that the facts alleged in the complaint do not constitute the crime of perjury. Appellant
contends that it is necessary to show that the appellant had testified twice about a certain matter, his
latter testimony testified once he should have been charged with the crime of false swearing

ISSUE: Whether the appellant is guilty of the crime of perjury.

RULING: This testimony was false, but the record does not disclose (aside from the statement of the
counsel before mentioned) whether or not this false testimony did affect, or could have in any way
affected, the question involved in said murder case. it is well settled that an indictment for perjury must
show conclusively that the testimony given or assertion made by the defendant on the trial on which he
was sworn or it will be fatally defective. This may be done either by a direct allegation that it was material,
or by the allegation of facts from which its materiality will appear. The complaint in the case at bar is
fatally defective for the want of an allegation that the testimony, alleged to be false, was material to the
issues involved in the murder case. The Court ruled that the appellant is not guilty of the crime of perjury.

People vs. Abaya; GR No. 47710; December 28, 1942

FACTS: The accused filed a petition for voluntary insolvency. He included in the inventory of properties
attached to the petition his undivided half interest in certain parcels of land which had already been sold
by the sheriff to Zosimo Fernandez to satisfy the latter’s claim for 4000. He also included in the schedule
of debts the said debt of 4000. Both the schedule and the inventory were under oath. The accused was
charged with violation of Article 183 in that he stated under oath in his insolvency case that the undivided
half of the land was his, when he fully knew that the same no longer belonged to him, as it was already
owned by Fernandez.

ISSUE: Whether Abaya is guilty of violation of Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code

RULING: No. The accused did not act with malice. Since the land was still registered in his name, he might
be charged with concealing property standing in his name in the registry of property, which is a violation
of the Insolvency Law. The accused who could not be expected to determine the property, from a legal
point of view of the inclusion, merely stated a fact in said inventory. Good faith or lack of malice is a
defense in perjury.

United States vs. Ballena; GR No. L-6294; February 10, 1911

FACTS: In "United States vs. Ana Ramirez," the defendant was charged with the crime of perjury. In the
trial of this perjury case on Estefania Barruga, mother of the defendant Ana, was a witness for the
defendant, and at the instigation of one Leoncio Ballena she testified that the fiscal, Señor Bailon,
attempted to rape her daughter Ana, and asked for the hand of the girl in marriage, but she did not desire
to accept this proposition of the fiscal because he was a married man. The fiscal filed an information in
the Court of First Instance of that province against the said Leoncio Ballena, charging him with the crime
of subornation of perjury. The defendant contends that the testimony by given by Estefania Barruga in
that perjury case was immaterial to the issues involved therein.

ISSUE: Whether the conviction of the accused on the crime charged is proper.

RULING: Yes. The judgment is affirmed. There are certain well-defined and indispensable requisites which
must be established in every case of subornation of perjury before an accused person, charged with the
commission of this crime, can be convicted. The defendant not only knowingly and willfully induced this
witness to swear falsely, but he did so maliciously, as it appears from the record that he was an enemy of
the fiscal at that time, the fiscal having prosecuted him.

PART V
CRIMES RELATIVE TO OPIUM AND OTHER PROHIBITED DRUGS
People vs. Narciso Lopez Agulay G.R. No. 181747

FACTS: On August 24 2002, an informant arrived at Police Station 5 and reported to the Chief of
the Station Drug Enforcement Unit (SDEU) that a certain "Sing" had been selling shabu at Brgy.
Sta. Lucia, in Novaliches, Quezon City.

A police entrapment team was formed. PO2 Herrera was assigned as poseur-buyer and was given
a P100.00 bill, which he marked "RH," his initials. A pre-operation report bearing control No. 24-
SDEU-02 was made and signed by Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Palaleo Adag dated 24 August 2002.
The buy-bust team rode in two vehicles, a Space Wagon and a Besta van, with a group of police
officers inside. They stopped along J.P. Rizal St., Sta. Lucia, Novaliches, Quezon City. PO2 Herrera
and his informant stepped down from their vehicle and walked. The informant pointed the target
pusher to PO2 Herrera. They approached and after being introduced to Sing, PO2 Herrera bought
shabu using the marked P100.00 bill. Sing gave a small plastic sachet to PO2 Herrera who,
thereafter, scratched his head as a signal. The other police companions of PO2 Herrera, who were
deployed nearby, then rushed to the crime scene. PO2 Herrera grabbed Sing and then frisked
him. PO2 Herrera recovered two (2) plastic sachets from Sing’s pocket. He also got the marked
money from Sing.

ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged

RULING: This Court finds no justification to deviate from the lower court's findings and conclusion
that accused-appellant was arrested in flagrante delicto selling shabu. The testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses proved that all the elements of the crime have been established: that the
buy-bust operation took place, and that the shabu subject of the sale was brought to and
identified in court. Moreover, PO2 Herrera, the poseur-buyer, positively identified accused-
appellant as the person who sold to him the sachet containing the crystalline substance which
was confirmed to be shabu. Accused-appellant contends his arrest was illegal, making the sachets
of shabu allegedly recovered from him inadmissible in evidence. Accused-appellant's claim is
devoid of merit for it is a well-established rule that an arrest made after an entrapment operation
does not require a warrant inasmuch as it is considered a valid "warrantless arrest,"

Considering that the legitimacy of the buy-bust operation is beyond question, the subsequent
warrantless arrest and warrantless search and seizure, were permissible. The defense contends
there is a clear doubt on whether the specimens examined by the chemist and eventually
presented in court were the same specimens recovered from accused-appellant. This Court held
that what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence
of the accused. In the instant case, we find the integrity of the drugs seized intact.

PART VI CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS

US vs. Catajay

FACTS: The acts complained of were committed at night, in a private house, and at a time when
no one was present except the accused, the mistress of the house, and one servant

ISSUE: Whether the accused is guilty of the crime of public scandal in violation of the provisions
of article 441 of Penal Code

RULING: No, the circumstances do not constitute the degree of publicity which is an essential
element of the crime

US vs. Kottinger

FACTS: On November 24, 1922, detective Juan Tolentino raided the premises known as Camera
Supply Co. at 110 Escolta, Manila. He found and confiscated the post-cards which subsequently
were used as evidence against J. J. Kottinger, the manager of the company. Out of these facts
arose the criminal prosecution of J. J. Kottinger in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The
information filed in court charged him with having kept for sale in the store of the Camera Supply
Co., obscene and indecent pictures, in violation of section 12 of Act No. 277.

ISSUE: Whether pictures portraying the inhabitants of the country in native dress and as they
appear and can be seen in the regions in which they live, are obscene or indecent.

RULING: No. The Philippine statute does not attempt to define obscene or indecent pictures,
writings, papers, or books. But the words "obscene or indecent" are themselves descriptive. They
are words in common used and every person of average intelligence understand their meaning.
Indeed, beyond the evidence furnished by the pictures themselves, there is but little scope for
proof bearing on the issue of obscenity or indecency. Whether a picture is obscene or indecent
must depend upon the circumstances of the case.
The pictures in question merely depict persons as they actually live, without attempted
presentation of persons in unusual postures or dress. The aggregate judgment of the Philippine
community, the moral sense of all the people in the Philippines, would not be shocked by
photographs of this type. We are convicted that the post-card pictures in this case cannot be
characterized as offensive to chastity, or foul, or filthy.

Fernando vs. Court Appeals

GAUDENCIO E. FERNANDO and RUDY ESTORNINOS v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 159751
December 6, 2006

Facts: Acting on reports of sale and distribution of pornographic materials, a search was
conducted on the premises of the store of the petitioner. The police confiscated VHS tapes and
various magazines which they deemed pornographic. Consequently, petitioners were prosecuted
for violation of Art. 201 of the RPC which prohibits the selling, giving away, or exhibiting of films,
prints, or literature which are offensive to morals.

Issue: Whether the petitioners are guilty of the crime charged.

Ruling: The law does not require that a person be caught in the act of selling, giving away or
exhibiting obscene materials to be liable, as long as the said materials are offered for sale,
displayed or exhibited to the public. In the present case, the petitioners are engaged in selling
and exhibiting obscene materials.

PART VII CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS

Maniego vs. People

FACTS: Maniego, although appointed as a laborer, had been placed in charge of issuing summons
and subpoenas for traffic. According to Felix Rabia and Agent No. 19 (La forteza) of the National
Bureau of Investigation, the accused informed Rabia that the latter was subject to a fine of P15;
that Rabia inquired whether the same could be reduced because he had no money, and that the
accused informed Rabia that he could fix the case if Rabia would pay him P10; which Rabia did
and the accused pocketed. This charged was denied by the accused. Petitioner contends that he
cannot be regarded as public officer.

ISSUE: Whether the accused is a public officer and thus guilty of violation of Article 210 of the
Revised Penal Code.

RULING: Yes. There can be no question that petitioner was a public officer within the meaning
of article 203, which includes all persons "who, by direct provision of law, popular election or
appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in
the Philippine Government, or shall perform in said government or any of its branches, public
duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official or any rank or class." That definition is
quite comprehensive, embracing as it does, every public servant from the highest to the lowest.

Heirs of Yasin vs. Judge Felix

FACTS: Sonny Sapad filed a petition for habeas corpus he alleged that he was arrested without a
warrant; that his arrest was illegal because he was deprived of his substantial right to a
preliminary investigation; that the subsequent filing of the complaint and information against
him did not cure his continued detention; and that he was entitled to be released from custody.
Respondent judge granted the petition for habeas corpus. Petitioners alleged that the
respondent judge is grossly ignorant of the law and/or has knowingly rendered an unjust
judgment. Respondent judge is likewise accused of being negligent in failing to notify the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor of the hearing on the petition for habeas corpus.

ISSUE: Whether respondent judge knowingly rendered unjust judgement in violation of Art. 204
of the Revised Penal Code

RULING: No. The charge of gross ignorance of the law and/or knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment has no factual basis. If ever respondent judge committed any error at all, it was an error
of judgment and not every error of judgment can be attributable to a judge's ignorance of the
law. Neither can it be said that he knowingly rendered an unjust judgment given the antecedents
of the instant case

Yaranon vs. Judge Rubio

FACTS: Atty. Pedro H. Yaranon filed a charge of estafa with respondent's court against the
spouses Puzon, his tenants or overseers who had earlier filed a case against him and his wife for
reinstatement as such tenants in Civil Case No. 1351 of the Court of Agrarian Relations at Ormoc
City, which said complainant eventually lost. Complainant accused said tenants with having failed
to account for agricultural items given to them in trust. After due trial wherein the only witness
of complainant was himself, respondent judge acquitted the accused. Complainant charges that
said decision of acquittal constitutes knowingly rendering an unjust and/or unfair decision

ISSUE: Whether respondent judge is guilty of knowingly rendering unjust and/or unfair decision

RULING: No. The Court is satisfied that absent any evidence of ill-motive or improper
consideration, the same cannot by itself prove the charge laid against respondent. The decision
discusses creditably the evidence of the parties and We see no indication therein of any untoward
factor that could have induced respondent to be unfair to complainant.

People vs. Vicente Sope

FACTS: Cruz and Dimalanta and Sope pretended to be peace officers who had apprehended
Juliana Chan because they had found her violating the law, pointing to her a bag in the rig which
they themselves had brought along, by which they meant that she was unlawfully dealing in U.S.
Army goods. All the time they kept intimidating and threatening her if she did not give them
money. As a result of their concerted action, she finally gave them P200.

ISSUE: Whether the accused are guilty or bribery or robbery.

RULING: The accused, by pretending that they were officers of the law and by employing threats
and intimidation to obtain the amount of P200, are guilty of the crime of robbery. It is not well
founded to consider that the offense committed by the accused appears to be bribery.

Formileza vs. Sandiganbayan

FACTS:. Mrs. Mutia testified that she took steps to obtain either a permanent or at the least a
renewed appointment; that when she approached the regional director about the matter she
was advised to see the petitioner who was to determine the employees to be appointed or
promoted; and that the petitioner refused to attend to her appointment papers unless the latter
were given some money. Mrs. Mutia reported this to authorities and an entrapment was
planned.The petitioner was arrested by the soldiers despite her objections to the
entrapment. The case was brought to the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE: Whether Formileza is guilty of Indirect Bribery?

RULING: No. The essential ingredient of indirect bribery as defined in Article 211 of the Revised
Penal Code is that the public officer concerned must have accepted the gift or material
consideration. There must be a clear intention on the part of the public officer to take the gift so
offered and consider the same as his own property from then on, such as putting away the gift
for safekeeping or pocketing the same. Mere physical receipt unaccompanied by any other sign,
circumstance or act to show such acceptance is not sufficient to lead the court to conclude that
the crime of indirect bribery has been committed.

Pozar vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS: Gregory James Pozar, in applying for probation, unlawfully gave the sum of P100.00 to
Mr. Danilo Ocampo, who is the City Probation Officer under circumstances that would make the
said City Probation Officer Mr. Danilo Ocampo liable for bribery. The City Court found the
petitioner guilty of the crime of corruption of a public official. The evidence for the defense is
that the one hundred peso bill the accused-appellant placed in the envelope delivered to the
Probation Officer was allegedly intended to take care of the expenses in the xerox copying or
reproduction of documents that may be needed by the Probation Office.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner is guilty of Corruption of Public Officials under Art. 212 of the Revised
Penal Code

RULING: No. The trial court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of Corruption of Public
Official as consummated offense for it is clear from the evidence of the prosecution as recited in
both decisions of the trial and appellate courts, that the complainant Probation Officer did not
accept the one-hundred-peso bill Hence, the crime would be attempted corruption of a public
official. There being no criminal intent to corrupt the Probation Officer, the accused petitioner is
entitled to acquittal of the crime charged.

US vs. Udarbe

FACTS: Clemente Udarbe, Municipal President of Magsingal province of Ilocus Sur was charged
with violation of Section 28 of the Municipal Code. Udarbe allegedly became interested and took
direct part unlawfully in the fishery business of the municipality of which he was a president
having at said time and place leased various fishponds in violation of law.

ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred in convicting the accused.

RULING: No. "No municipal officer," says said section 28 [as amended by section 1 of Act No.
663], "shall be directly or indirectly interested in any contract work, or cockpits, or any other
permitted games and amusements, or business of the municipality, or in the purchase of any real
estate or any other property belonging to the corporation,". The defendant became interested
and took direct part in the leasing of property of the municipality of Magsingal, wherein he had
to intervene by reason of his office as president of said municipality, and he has therefore openly
violated the provisions of said section of the Municipal Code.

People vs. Chavez (No Full-Text)

Morong Water District vs. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, Edgard Sta. Maria et. al.,

FACTS: Edgard Sta. Maria, while still the General Manager of MOWAD, received from petitioner
a cash advance of P33,190.73 representing an initial release of funds for the design and execution
of the Wawa pipeline extension project. Sta. Maria submitted a partial liquidation of expenses
amounting to P15,000.00 against the cash advance. Sta. Maria allegedly used the money as
payment for the design of the Sitio Wawa Pipeline Extension. Sta. Maria made a final liquidation
of expenses amounting to P16,790.40. The amount was used for the Paglabas Pipeline Extension
in compliance with the request of the Municipal Mayor. On December 1992, Sta. Maria was
ousted as General Manager of petitioner Morong Water District. Maximo San Diego, petitioner's
officer-in-charge, filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman-Luzon against private
respondents for alleged violations of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code on malversation of public funds. The complaint alleged that
no such design was made, and that respondents made it appear that the amount of P15,000.00
was given to a certain Engineer when in fact, they personally pocketed the aforesaid amount and
the rest was spent in installing the water connections of the new market site of Morong, Rizal. On
March 28, 1994, public respondent office issued the questioned Resolution dismissing the
complaint. The resolution stated that "(a)fter a meticulous examination of the records of the
case, there is no sufficient evidence to establish a probable cause for malversation or violation of
RA 3019."

ISSUE: Whether the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman erred in dismissing the case

RULING: No. The findings of the Office of the Ombudsman regarding the liability of private
respondents are supported by substantial evidence. The conclusion that the amounts allegedly
malversed by private respondents were actually liquidated by them finds support not only in the
evidence of private respondents but even in the evidence submitted by petitioner in its
complaint. Such factual findings of the Office of the Ombudsman deserve due respect from the
Supreme Court and should not be disturbed on appeal. The petition fails to show a grave abuse
of discretion or any act without or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of private respondents.
The public respondent's act of dismissing the complaint against herein private respondents is
neither whimsical or capricious. Petitioner likewise contends that the Office of the Ombudsman
erred in stating that demand from the Commission on Audit to settle or liquidate the amount is
needed before a case for malversation can mature. The court has held that previous demand is
not necessary for violation of Article 217 in spite of the last paragraph of the said provision. The
last paragraph of Article 217 provides only for a rule of procedural law. As held, "(d)emand merely
raises a prima facie presumption that missing funds have been put to personal use. The demand
itself, however, is not an element of, and not indispensable to constitute, malversation."

Quizo vs. Sandiganbayan

FACTS: After an audit conducted by the Commission on Audit, petitioner, the Money Order Teller
of Cagayan de Oro Post Office, was found to have incurred a shortage in his cash and other
accounts of P17,421.74. On the same day, petitioner reimbursed the amount of P406.18; three
days thereafter, P10,515.56; and on September 19, 1983, the balance of P6,500.00. An
information for malversation of public funds against petitioner was filed by the Tanodbayan
before the Sandiganbayan. On a motion for reinvestigation and/or reconsideration, the
Tanodbayan filed a motion to dismiss since no damage was inflicted on the government as there
was full restitution of the malversed funds within a reasonable time; and the accused never
pocketed the money, the shortages. Sandiganbayan denied the prosecutor's motion to dismiss.
It ruled that damage to the government is not an essential element of the crime of malversation
and that restitution of the malversed funds before the filing of a complaint is neither a defense

ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in denying the prosecutor’s motion to dismiss.

RULING: Yes. The Court is inclined to sustain petitioner's contention that the Sandiganbayan
gravely abused its discretion when it refused to grant the motion to dismiss. It is not fair to
compel the prosecutor to secure the conviction of an accused on evidence which in his opinion,
is insufficient and weak to establish even a prima facie case. The law establishes a presumption
that mere failure of an accountable officer to produce public funds which have come into his
hands on demand by an officer duly authorized to examine his accounts is prima facie evidence
of conversion. However, the presumption is merely prima facie and a rebuttable one. The
accountable officer may overcome the presumption by proof to the contrary. If he adduces
evidence showing that, in fact, he has not put said funds or property to personal use, then that
presumption is at an end and the prima facie case destroyed. In the case at bar, petitioner
successfully overthrew the presumption of guilt. He satisfactorily proved that not a single centavo
of the missing funds was used by him for his own personal interest, a fact conceded by the
Tanodbayan

US vs. Bandino

FACTS: Leon Bandino is charged with the crime of faithlessness in the custody of prisoners
committed with reckless negligence. The prosecution alleged that the accused, a municipal
policeman having under his care and guard one Juan Lescano, who was serving a sentence in the
municipal jail of the said pueblo, did, with great carelessness and unjustified negligence, grant
him permission to go and buy some cigarettes near the place where he was held in custody; that
the prisoner, taking advantage of the confusion in the crowd there, fled from the custody of the
accused; with violation of article 358 in connection with article 558 of the Penal Code. Article 358
of the Penal Code prescribes that "any public officer guilty of connivance in the escape of a
prisoner in his custody shall be punished,"

ISSUE: Whether there is connivance between Bandino and Lescano thus making him guilty of the
charged crime.

RULING: In the existence and commission of the crime of faithlessness in the custody of
prisoners, it is essential that there should have been, on the part of the custodian, connivance in
the escape of the prisoner. If the public officer charged with guarding the fugitive did not connive
with him, then he did not violate the law and is not guilty of the crime of faithlessness in the
discharge of his duty to guard the prisoner. It may perhaps be true that the accused had no
knowledge that the prisoner Lescano would escape, and that he did not permit him to do so, but
it is unquestionable that he did permit him to go out of the municipal jail, thus affording him an
opportunity to get away with ease. Therefore, the prisoner's escape was effected through the
tolerance of his custodian, and is deemed also to have been by connivance with the latter. For
the foregoing reasons Court revoked the order appealed from and remanded remanded the
record to the court from whence it came in order that such proceedings be had as the law
requires.

People vs. Revilla

(No Full-Text)

People vs. Silvosa

FACTS: C was detailed as prison guard from 9:00 to 11:00 in the evening. S was to succeed C from
11:00 of the same evening until 1:00 the following morning. When the time came for S to take
over his duty at 11:00, he was sleeping; so C woke him up to deliver the post to him. S did not
pay attention, refused to be bothered and continued to sleep. A prisoner escaped while C was
the one in the guard post.

ISSUE: Whether S is liable under Art. 224

RULING: No. The custody of the prisoner was not yet transferred to him by C when the evasion
took place. The second element of the crime stating “that he is charged with the conveyance or
custody of a prisoner, either detention prisoner or prisoner by final judgment” is absent in the
case at bar.

Kataniag vs. People of the Philippines

Whether during or after office hours, if the removal by a public officer of any official document
from its usual place of safe-keeping is for an illicit purpose, such as to tamper with or to otherwise
profit by it, or to do in connection therewith an act which would constitute a breach of trust in
his official care thereof, the crime of infidelity in the custody of public documents is committed.
On the other hand, where the act of removal is actuated with lawful or commendable motives,
as when the public officer removes the public documents committed to his trust for examination
in connection with official duty, or with a view to securing them from imminent danger of loss,
there would be no crime committed under the law. This is so, because the act of removal,
destruction or concealment of public documents is punished by law only when any of such acts
would constitute infidelity in the custody thereof. Several circumstances are set out in the body
of the decision to show conclusively that in the instant case there has been a removal effected
for illicit purposes.

People vs. Baring

(No Full-Text)
 Part VIII CRIMES AGAINST PERSON
People vs. Dalag; GR No. 129895; April 30, 2003

FACTS: Armando Dalag, a member of the Philippine National Police, was lawfully married to Leah
Nolido Dalag. They had three children. The marriage of Armando and Leah was marred by violent
quarrels, with Leah always at the losing end. On August 15, 1996, Armando, who was drinking
hard liquor, and Leah were in the yard sitting under a tree. Momentarily, the children heard their
parents quarreling. Leah was admonishing Armando not to drink liquor. The children were
horrified when from a distance, they saw Armando pushing and kicking Leah on the left side of
her body. She fell to the ground. Even as Leah was already lying posthaste on the ground,
Armando continued to beat her up, punching her on the different parts of the body. In the
process of beating her wife, Armando stepped on a nail. Even as she was being assaulted by her
husband, she told him that she will find some medicine for his wound. Leah then fled to the house
of their neighbor. Armando ran after Leah and herded her back to their house. Leah fell to the
ground and lost consciousness. Armando and her daughter then tried to revive Leah but to no
avail. Leah never regained her consciousness. She died on August 22, 1996. Based on the autopsy
result, Dr. Cruel testified that Leah suffered severe beatings and traumatic physical violence
resulting in intracranial hemorrhage which caused her death. Armando vigorously denied killing
his wife. After due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment finding Armando guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of parricide for killing his wife and sentenced him to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

ISSUE: Whether the accused Dalag is guilty of parricide punishable under Art 246 of the Revised
Penal Code

RULING: Yes. The trial court thus correctly concluded that the injuries sustained by Leah that
caused her death were the consequence of the appellant's deliberate and intentional acts. In the
crime of parricide, the prosecution is mandated to prove the following essential elements: (1) a
person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father,
mother or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other
descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. The key element in parricide is the
relationship of the offender with the victim. In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof
of the relationship between the accused and the deceased would be the marriage certificate. In
this case, the prosecution proved all the essential elements of parricide.
 People vs. Tomotorgo; GR No. L-47941; April 30, 1985

FACTS: The victim, Magdalena de los Santos, was the wife of the herein accused. Several months
prior to the occurrence of the fatal incident, Magdalena de los Santos had been persistently
asking her husband to sell the conjugal home. She wanted their family to transfer to the house
of her husband's in-laws. Accused would not accede to his wife's request. He did not like to
abandon the house. Furthermore, he had no inclination to leave because he has many plants and
improvements on the land. On June 23, 1977, the accused left his home and upon his return, he
found his wife and his three-month old baby already gone. He proceeded to look for both of
them. He finally saw his wife carrying his infant son and bringing a bundle of clothes. He pleaded
with his wife’s return but she adamantly refused to do so. When appellant sought to take the
child from his wife, the latter threw the baby on the grassy portion of the trail. This conduct of
his wife aroused the ire of the herein accused. Incensed with wrath, appellant picked lip a piece
of wood nearby and started hitting his wife with it until she fell to the ground. Realizing what he
had done, the accused picked his wife in his arms and brought her to their home. He then
returned to the place where the child was thrown (hahaha y u leave me father?) and he likewise
took this infant home. Soon thereafter, Magdalena de los Santos died despite the efforts of her
husband to alleviate her pains. The court below found him guilty of the crime of parricide, but
with three mitigating circumstances in his favor, namely: voluntary surrender, plea of guilty, and
that he acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion and
obfuscation.

ISSUE: Whether the court erred in disregarding the provisions of Article 49 of the Revised Penal
Code which prescribes the proper applicable penalty where the crime committed is different
from that intended

RULING: No. Appellant maintains the belief that he should be punished only for the offense he
intended to commit which he avers to be serious physical injuries, qualified by the fact that the
offended party is his spouse. These contentions of the accused are manifestly untenable and
incorrect. Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code expressly states that criminal liability shall be
incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act be different from
that which he intended and that the accused is liable for all the consequences of his felonious
acts. Article 49 of the Revised Penal Code does not apply to cases where more serious
consequences not intended by the offender result from his felonious act because, under Article
4, par. I of the same Code, he is liable for all the direct and natural consequences of his unlawful
act. His lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong is, at best mitigating. Article 49 applies only
to cases where the crime committed is different from that intended and where the felony
committed befalls a different person. We hold that the fact that the appellant intended to
maltreat the victim only or inflict physical injuries does not exempt him from liability for the
resulting and more serious crime committed. The crime committed is parricide no less.
 People vs. Embalido; GR No. L-37379; March 18, 1933

FACTS: The appellant in this case was charged with the crime of parricide. He admits having killed
his wife, but claims that he surprised her in the act of committing adultery. The lower court found
him guilty of the crime of parricide as defined and penalized by article 246 of the Revised Penal
Code, and sentenced him to suffer cadena perpetua, with the accessory penalties provided by
law, and to pay the costs. On this appeal, he contends that he should have been sentenced in
accordance with article 247 of the Revised Penal Code

ISSUE: Whether the accused is guilty of parricide

RULING: In cases of parricide, prosecution is required to prove three facts, namely: (1) That death
of the deceased: (2) that he or she was killed by the accused; and (3) that the deceased was a
legitimate ascendant or descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. If the deceased is
either the father, mother, or the child of the accused, proof of legitimacy is not required. Once
these facts are established beyond a reasonable doubt, conviction is warranted. Matters of
defense, mitigation, excuse, or justification must appear by a preponderance of evidence. We
have carefully considered the evidence presented in this case and we find no sufficient ground
to hold that the appellant surprised his wife in the act of committing adultery. The case,
therefore, does not come within the purview of article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.
 People vs. Araquel; GR No. L-12629; December 9, 1959

FACTS: The acting chief of police of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, filed with the Justice of the Peace Court
a complaint for homicide against Alfredo Araquel accusing him of having hacked and killed
Alberto Pagadian with a bolo. While said complaint, was still pending in the justice of the peace
court, the chief moved for the amendment thereof, alleging that upon reinvestigation of the facts
he found that the crime committed by the accused was not homicide as charged in the original
complaint but that of homicide under exceptional circumstances as provided for in article 247 of
the Revised Penal Code. Finding the motion to be well taken, the justice of the peace court,
allowed the filing of the amended complaint. The accused was arraigned under the amended
complaint and pleaded “guilty” on the offense. During the service of the sentence by the accused,
the acting Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Sur was informed of the case through the Department of
Justice to which the private prosecutor had lodged a complaint. Said provincial fiscal then filed
with Court of First Instance an information against the accused Araquel charging him with
homicide as defined under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code for the killing Alberto Pagadian.
The accused moved to quash the information on the ground of double jeopardy. The fiscal
opposed the motion, but the trial court sustained the plea of double jeopardy and dismissed the
information.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in sustaining the plea of double jeopardy

RULING: Yes. The plea of jeopardy made by the accused was erroneously sustained by the lower
court. In order that a defendant may legally be placed in jeopardy, one of the necessary and
indispensable conditions is that he should have been tried before a court of competent
jurisdiction. The court below, in upholding the plea of double jeopardy, held that the Justice of
the Peace Court had jurisdiction on the theory that "the act defined" in that article "is a felony"
which is penalized with destierro. There can of course be no question that offenses penalized
with destierro fall under the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace and municipal courts. That
rule, however, cannot be made to apply to the present case, for it is apparent that Article 247 of
the Revised Penal Code does not define a crime distinct and separate from homicide, parricide,
or murder, as the case may be, depending, in so far as those crimes are concerned, upon the
relationship of the victim to the killer and the manner by which the killing is committed. The
jurisdiction of the justice of the peace and municipal courts, as enlarged, extends only to "assaults
where the intent to kill is not charged or evident at the trial."

The Court therefore concludes that Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code does not define and
provide for a specific crime, but grants a privilege or benefit to the accused for the killing of
another or the infliction of serious physical injuries under the circumstances therein
mentioned. Conformably to the above finding, we hold that defendant was not tried by a court
of competent jurisdiction. He has not legally been placed in jeopardy in the present case.
 United States vs. Vargas et. al; GR No. 1053; May 07, 1903

FACTS: Simeon Alberto on May 20, 1902, was attacked and severely wounded. To the persons
who went to his assistance he stated that the defendants had assaulted him. He said nothing of
the motive. He died the next day. There was no other evidence for the Government. Manalastas
was acquitted by the court below. The defendant Vargas testified that, on returning to his house
on the day in question, he found Alberto lying with his (the defendant's) wife. that he drew his
bolo; Alberto escaped through the window; that he, the defendant, pursued him, overtook him,
and killed him. The lower court believed the testimony of the defendant, but, being of the
opinion, that article 423 of the Penal Code was not applicable, sentenced the defendant to eight
years of prision mayor.

ISSUE: Whether the acts of Vargas qualify for homicide under exceptional circumstances under
Art. 423 of the Penal Code

RULING: Yes. The lower court erred in not applying Art. 423 of the Penal Code. This article fixes
the penalty of destierro when the husband kills the offender, "in the act." In this case the
discovery, the escape, the pursuit, and the killing were all parts of one continuous act.

People vs. Gonzales; GR No. 46310; October 31, 1939

FACTS: On returning to his house from the woods, he surprised his wife, Sixta Quilason, and
Isabelo Evangelio in the act, told her that the man was the very one who used to ask rice and
food from them, and counseled her not to repeat the same faithlessness. His wife, promised him
not to do the act again. Thereafter, he left the house again to see his carabaos. Upon returning,
and not finding his wife there, he looked for her and found her with Isabelo near the toilet of his
house in a place covered with underbush. The accused went after him, but unable to overtake
him, he returned to where his wife was and, completely obfuscated, attacked her with a knife
without intending to kill her. Thereafter, he took pity on her and took her dead body to his house.
The appellant contends that, having surprised his wife, in the afternoon of the date in question,
under circumstances indicative that she had carnal intercourse with Isabelo, he was entitled to
the privilege afforded by article 247 of the Revised Penal code

ISSUE: Whether the accused is entitled for the privilege afforded by Article 247 of the RPC

RULING: No. The Court does not believe that the accused can avail himself of the aforesaid article,
because the privilege there granted is conditioned on the requirement that the spouse surprise
the husband or the wife in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; the
accused did not surprise his wife in the very act or carnal intercourse, but after the act, if any
such there was, because from the fact that she was rising up and the man was buttoning his
drawers, it does not necessarily follow that a man and a woman had committed the carnal act.

People vs. Galura (No Full-Text)

 US vs. Campo; GR No. L-7321; November 12, 1912

FACTS: Patricio Campo, with a blunt instrument attack and strike Isidro Palejo, inflicting upon his
head various wounds and bruises which caused the death. He was convicted in the court below
of the crime of homicide as defined and penalized in article 404 of the Penal Code. The crime was
marked with the aggravating circumstances of alevosia (treachery). The trial judge convicted the
defendant of the crime of homicide, marked with the generic aggravating circumstance of
treachery (alevosia), and justified this conviction on the ground that, in the information upon
which the defendant was tried, he was charged, not with murder (asesinato), but with homicide
(homicidio).

ISSUE: Whether the accused should be convicted of Murder and not Homicide

RULING: No. The action of the trial judge in this regard must be sustained. We have invariably
held that an accused person cannot be convicted of a higher offense than that with which he is
charged in the complaint or information on which he is tried. It matters not how conclusive and
convincing the evidence of guilt may be, an accused person cannot be convicted in the courts of
these Islands of any offense, unless it is charged in the complaint or information on which he is
tried, or necessarily included therein.
 People vs. Dueno et al; GR No. L-31102; May 5, 1979

FACTS: Roque Dellomos was on his way to a certain hacienda where he met the three accused
Felipe Dueño, Sofronio Dueño and Andresito Belonio. Upon seeing Roque Dellomos, Felipe
Dueno fired a shot at Dellomos from a Caliber. 45 pistol he had. Dellomos immediately ran away
and while running he heard a second shot fired. In the evening of that day, Dellomos, who was
fixing the plates they use in eating heard a shot from a gun and at the same time heard his
nephew fall from the stairs of the house. He went towards the door where his nephew fell and
focused his flashlight outside his house. He saw the accused Felipe Dueno with a gun in hand
which was fired but missed him. He also saw the two accused, named Sofronio Dueño with a gun
in hand and accused Andresito Belonio with a bolo in hand. When the three accused left the
house of Roque Dellomos, the latter verified what happened to his nephew and he saw his dead
body downstairs of his house. After weighing the evidence, the trial Court found the three
defendants — Felipe Dueño, Sofronio Dueño and Andresito Belonio — "guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder with the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation, with the aggravating circumstance of nighttime to facilitate its commission,"

ISSUE: Whether the crime committed by the accused is murder under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code

RULING: Yes. In view of the attending circumstances in this case, Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code is clear that only one qualifying circumstance is necessary to qualify the offense as murder.
In the present case, the trial court found that the two qualifying circumstances treachery and
evident premeditation — attended the commission of the offense and utilized both conjointly to
qualify it to murder. This is error. As treachery sufficiently qualifies the killing to murder —
evident premeditation having been also alleged in the information and proved, should be
considered as a generic aggravating circumstance only. However, jurisprudence is settled that
evident premeditation cannot be appreciated in a case where, although the accused had planned
the perpetration of the killing, the victim was different from the person whom the accused had
originally intended to kill. In the case at bar, it was Roque Dellomos who accused-appellants
intended to kill, but it was his nephew, Bernardo Demontano instead, who was shot at and hit
and in instantaneously died. Nocturnity, like abuse of superiority is absorbed in treachery
because it forms part of the peculiar treacherous means and manner adopted to insure the
execution of the crime. It facilitates the treacherous character of the attack
 People vs. Sespene; GR No. L-9346; October 30, 1957

FACTS: Leonardo Enerio and went to the field to tend his carabao. In the evening of that day, a
sister of Leonardo arrived. Sajera and Sajona also arrived at the place and inquired for Leonardo.
While they are conversing, a sound of chopping of banana stalks in the backyard and the dropping
of stones atop the roof, were heard. Gloria invited Priscila and Sajona to the balcony, and as they
looked outside Gloria and Priscila saw three individuals hiding behind Gloria's store, which is
about half meter from the house. While they were watching the movements of said individuals,
Leonardo Enerio arrived, and just as he was about to step on the first rung of the ladder Mangilog
suddenly appeared and rushing towards him, attacked the latter with a bolo. The deceased was
struck on both shoulders, after which, he faced his assailant. Mangilog then stepped backward
and at this instance Sespeñe, Apolinario and Calizo, each armed with a firearm, arrived and fired
four shots at Leonardo. Sajona went downstairs upon seeing the victim stand up and make an
effort to escape, he fired his revolver at his victim. Immediately thereafter Sajera, who was
behind, knifed the deceased once on the nape. Still with life, Leonardo Enerio made an attempt
to flee from his assailants, but the latter surrounded him and so he was forced to lean against
the fence fronting the house. The fence broke due to weak condition and Leonardo Enerio fell
with it, his head touching the canal while his feet rested at the base of the fence. While in this
position, Sespeñe shouted "kill him" and one of them fired a shot at Leonardo Enerio.
Immediately afterwards, the assailants fled from the scene. After due bearing, all the defendants
were found guilty of murder, qualified by treachery. Defendants appealed alleging the
commission of several errors relative to the sufficiency of the evidence and the credibility of the
witnesses for the prosecution.

ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred in convicting the accused of the crime.

RULING: No. It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction, enunciated in a long line of decisions, "that the
appellate court will not disturb the findings of facts made by the trial court as to the credibility
of witnesses, in view of its opportunity to observe the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses
while testifying, and that the said findings will generally be accepted and acted upon". In the case
at bar the Court sees nothing on record to justify any disturbance of the findings of fact of the
trial court. As to the attending circumstances, the aggravating circumstances of superior strength
and aid of armed men, as well as night time which also concurred in the commission of the
offense, are included in the qualifying circumstance of treachery and cannot be appreciated
separately from the latter circumstance. The Court thus rule without any doubt that appellants
are the perpetrators of the crime of murder, qualified by treachery.
 People vs. Avecilla; GR No. 117033; February 15, 2001

FACTS: In the evening of December 24, 1991, accused-appellant arrived at a basketball court,
and, for no apparent reason, suddenly fired a gun in the air. He then went to a nearby alley and,
minutes later, proceeded to the closed store about four (4) meters away from the basketball
court. There, he initiated an argument with the group of Boy Manalaysay, Jimmy Tolentino and
Macario Afable, Jr. Afable tried to pacify accused-appellant, whereupon, the latter placed his left
arm around Afable's neck and shot him pointblank on the abdomen. Afable ran toward the alley
and accused-appellant ran after him. Another shot rang out, so one of the bystanders, Carlos
Taganas, went to the alley and there, he saw accused-appellant and Afable grappling for
possession of the gun. The Chief Barangay Tanod arrived and was able to wrest the gun away
from accused-appellant, who immediately fled from the scene of the incident. Afable was rushed
to the Philippine General Hospital, where he eventually expired. Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 38, rendered judgment convicting accused-appellant of the crime of Qualified Illegal
Possession of Firearm sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering
him to indemnify and pay damages to the victim's heirs.

ISSUE: Whether the lower court correctly convicted accused-appellant.

RULING: No. The law on illegal possession of firearms has been amended by Republic Act No.
8294. If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. It is clear from the
foregoing that where murder or homicide results from the use of an unlicensed firearm, the crime
is no longer qualified illegal possession, but murder or homicide, as the case may be. In such a
case, the use of the unlicensed firearm is not considered as a separate crime but shall be
appreciated as a mere aggravating circumstance. In view of the amendments introduced by
Republic Act No. 8294 to Presidential Decree NO. 1866, separate prosecutions for homicide and
illegal possession are no longer in order. Inasmuch as the amendatory law is favorable to accused-
appellant in this case, the same may be retroactively applied. With more reason, accused-
appellant cannot be convicted of homicide or murder with "the use of the unlicensed firearm as
aggravating," inasmuch as said felonies are not charged in the information but merely mentioned
as the result of the use of the unlicensed firearm. Hence, he cannot be convicted of any of these
crimes without violating his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, not to mention his right to due process. The appealed decision is reversed.
 US vs. Tandoc; GR No. 15635; March 16, 1920

FACTS: Melecio de Vera was gathering tobacco on said land assisted by his laborers, de Vera,
Moyalde, Para-an and Ferrer. While engaged in this work, they heard the sound of a horn, which
was repeated a few moments afterwards, and then towards the eastern side of the land they
discerned many men, more than thirteen in number, coming towards them, and when these
persons came the latter surrounded and attacked them. During the fight Louis Moyalde and
Fernando Ferrer were wounded; and when the aggressors saw them fallen on the ground
covered with blood, Jose Corpus, one of the aggressors, sounded the horn and his companions
withdrew. This land where the incident took place was claimed as his property by Jose Bengzon.
Although the injunction granted previously in favor of Bengzon was dissolved, the latter and his
tenants did not allow Melecio de Vera and his workmen to enter upon said land. De Vera accused
Jose Bengzon and his tenants of contempt, and the court issued an order requiring Bengzon,
Tandoc, Corpus and Campanero to appear in court and show cause why they should not be
punished for contempt. The aggressors in the event that mentioned were Jose Bengzon's men,
among whom were identified the fourteen accused in this cause, led by Fulgencio Tandoc. Tandoc
struck Moyalde's head with a bamboo stick, the latter falling to the ground; and while in this
position, others also gave him blows with clubs and canes. On the evening of the same day Luis
Moyalde died as a result of the blows received by him, the most serious of which was the one
dealt on his head by Fulgencio Tandoc. The lower court classified the facts proven in this case as
constituting the crime of homicide caused in a tumultuous affray.

ISSUE: Whether the classification of the lower court is correct

RULING: No. The classification is erroneous. A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel
occurs between several persons and they engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the
course of which some person is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained.
Such were not the facts in this case. The quarrel here was between two well-known groups of
men. The party formed by the deceased and his companions was the one attacked and that
formed by the appellants was the aggressor. The appellants and their companions were united
in their common purpose to attack. This unity of purpose determines the aggressors' common
responsibility for the consequences of the aggression, for which reason the act cannot be
considered as a tumultuous affray for the responsible authors are known. The act, therefore,
constitutes the crime of homicide. (appeal pa more haha)
 US vs. Samonte; GR No. 4200; March 27, 1908

FACTS: The accused fired his revolver at close range at one Simeon Ona. The trial court found
that he did not fire the revolver at Ona with intent to kill, but that he did fire the revolver in the
air with intent to intimidate Ona and others, and convicted him of the crime of unlawfully
discharging a firearm as defined and penalized in article 408 of the Penal Code. The accused
admitted that he discharged his revolver in the air just outside of Ona's house, but alleged that
when he did so he was attempting, with the aid of two policemen, to capture a number of
gamblers who had been playing prohibited games of chance in Ona's house, and that on account
of their number he thought it prudent to fire his revolver in the air, partly to frighten them and
prevent them from offering concerted resistance to his small party, and partly to prevent them
from attempting to escape by fight. On the other hand, Ona, the complaining witness, testified
that the shots were fired as a result of a quarrel he had with the accused.

ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred in convicting the accused.

RULING: Yes. The air of improbability which marks Ona's story as to his whereabouts prior to the
incident, his sworn statement that he heard the whistling of the bullet fired from a revolver within
a yard and half of his head, and a number of minor inconsistencies in his testimony as developed
on cross-examination, all tend to raise a doubt in our minds as to the truth of the principal facts
related by him; and while the trial court seemed to give great weight to the fact that the was
corroborated as to the principal facts by the testimony of his wife, we do not think that the
testimony of the couple, taken together, is so convincing as to establish the falsity of the
testimony of the accused and his witnesses beyond a reasonable doubt. The judgment of
conviction and the sentence imposed upon the appellant should be, and are hereby, reversed

Infanticide and Abortion

PEOPLE v. DETABLAN
CA, 40 OG, Supp. 5, 30 – Case not found

Physical Injuries

United States v. Baldomera Esparcia

G.R. No. 12694
September 6, 1917

Facts: The defendant was convicted of the crime of serious physical injuries as punished by
article 416, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code. (Note: Facts were not expressly provided. “The facts
established at the trial are so filthy that we feel that it will serve no good purpose to set them forth.
We merely content ourselves with the statement that the findings of the trial court as to the
sufficiency of the proof should be adhered to.”)

Issue: Whether the act constitutes the crime defined and penalized by Art. 414 of the Penal
Code.
Ruling: Yes. Mutilation or “castration” consists of the amputation of whatever organ necessary
for reproduction. It is the intention of the law to punish such a crime, which, although not
destroying life, deprives a person of the means to transmit it. However in order for "castration" to
exist, it is indispensable that it be made purposely. The law does not look only to the result but
also to the intention of the act. Consequently, if by reason of an injury or attack, a person is
deprived of the organs of generation, the act, although voluntary but not being intentional to that
end, it would not come under the provisions of the article.

People v. Alipio Balubar

G.R. No. L-40940
October 9, 1934

Facts: Defendant struck the offended party in the mouth with an iron instrument, thereby breaking
four of the latter’s front teeth and inflicting on his upper lip a wound which required medical
treatment for six days. The offended party had to have the broken teeth extracted because they
ached and hurt his gums. At the time of the trial, the judge found that the offended party had a
very noticeable disfigurement in the mouth. The defendant was held guilty of the offense charged.

Issue: Whether the physical injuries inflicted upon the offended party constitute a violation of
subsection 3 of article 263 of the Revised Penal Code.

Ruling: Yes. If, as a result of the unlawful wounding of another, the offended party is impaired in
his appearance in such a way that the disfigurement cannot be removed by nature, the person
causing the injuries is responsible, and he is not relieved of that responsibility because the
offended party might lessen the disfigurement by some artificial contrivance. In the case at bar,
the offended party was conspicuously disfigured by the loss of four front teeth. A front tooth is a
member of the body within the meaning of the words "or shall have lost any other member" as
used in the provision, thus the defendant is guilty of serious physical injuries.

People v. Timoteo Penesa

C.A. No. 263
August 19, 1948

Facts: Timoteo went to Rosario’s house to ask her to live with him again when Santiago Cerrado
came and asked Timoteo why he was there after they had agreed to live apart. Angered by this
remark, Timoteo unsheathed his bolo and assaulted Santiago. Rosario’s son Crescensio who
tried to prevent another blow was also assaulted by Timoteo. As a result of the assault two slight
wounds were inflicted upon Santiago, while Crescensio sustained several wounds one of which
was serious and would have resulted in his death had the hemorrhage not stopped.
Consequently, the trial court found Penesa guilty of frustrated homicide.

Issue: Whether the trial court erred in convicting Penesa of the crime of frustrated homicide.

Ruling: Yes. Accused’s intention in going to Rosario’s house is not to kill anybody but rather to
entreat her to live with him. Neither could the remarks uttered by the victims could have aroused
his temper to such an extent as to engender the desire and intent to kill them. The dagger was
carried only for self-defense and the wounds inflicted upon the offended parties were caused
indiscriminately and not deliberately. The crime committed was only physical injuries.
People v. Manolong
G.R. No. L-2288
March 30, 1950

Facts: The accused was charged with the crime of less serious physical injuries for having
inflicted on the Fortunato Sanoy injuries which would take "from 20 to 30 days to heal." Pleading
guilty of the complaint, the accused was convicted of the crime charged and began serving his
sentence. It would seem, however that Sanoy's injuries did not heal within the period formerly
estimated and so an information was filed in the same court charging the accused with serious
physical injuries. The accused moved to have him twice in jeopardy to which such motion was
granted.

Issue: Whether a new charge can be filed against the accused without placing him in double
jeopardy.

Ruling: Yes. Where the charge contained in the original information was for slight physical injuries
because at that time, the fiscal believed that the wound suffered by the offended party would
require medical attendance for a period of only eight days, but when the preliminary investigation
was conducted, he found that the wound would heal after 30 days, the act which converted the
crime into a more serious one had supervened after the filing of the original information and this
supervening event can still be the subject of amendment or of a new charge without necessarily
placing the accused in double jeopardy.

Rape

People v. Cesar Atento

G.R. No. 84728
April 26, 1991

Facts: Glenda is the neighbor of Atento who claims that the latter raped her five separate times.
She says that on the first occasion where she went to Atento's store to buy bread, the accused
cajoled her into coming inside the house where he succeeded in deflowering her. In the trial,
Glenda described the act of coitus as pleasurable. It was also found that she is a mental retardate
with an intellectual capacity of 9 to 12 years old.

Issue: Whether the accused is guilty of the crime charged.

Ruling: Yes. Atento is guilty of rape upon Glenda under paragraph 2 of Art. 335 of the RPC
because the girl was deprived of reason. Alternatively, he is liable under paragraph 3, because
his victim had the mentality of a girl less than twelve years old at the time she was raped. The
Court finds this to be the reason why, while a rape victim with normal intelligence would have said
that the attack on her caused her much physical pain and mental agony, Glenda naively declared
that Atento's sexual organ in hers gave her much pleasure.

xPeople v. Catalino Oscar

G.R. No. L-24055
December 28, 1925
Facts: The accused was charged with the crime of rape for having carnal knowledge with an eight
year-old girl while she was asleep in her uncle’s house. The court below found that the crime was
frustrated, and not consummated, on the ground that the evidence did not clearly show that the
defendant's genital organ was introduced to its full length into that of the offended party, and that
there were no signs of emission of semen.

Issue: Whether the trial court erred in convicting the accused of frustrated rape.

Ruling: Yes. Perfect penetration is not essential; any penetration of female body by the male
organ is sufficient to warrant conviction. In the present case, the physician who examined the
offended party testified that the hymen was lacerated and that there was coagulated blood, though
he found no semen. This shows sufficiently that the crime was consummated.

People v. Primo Campuhan y Bello

G.R. No. 129433
March 30, 2000

Facts: Campuhan was a helper of the family of the victim, a 4-year-old girl. One time, the mother
of the victim heard the latter cry, “Ayoko!” prompting her to rush upstairs. There, she saw
Campuhan kneeling before the victim, whose pajamas and panty were already removed, while
his short pants were down to his knees. Campuhan was later apprehended. Consequently, the
trial court found him guilty of statutory rape.

Issue: Whether Campuhan is guilty of statutory rape.

Ruling: No. The gravamen of the offense of statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below
twelve years old. In concluding that carnal knowledge took place, full penetration is not an
essential ingredient; the mere touching of the external genitalia by the penis is sufficient to
constitute carnal knowledge. Here, the prosecution failed to prove that Campuhan’s penis was
able to penetrate the victim’s vagina however slight. There were also no external signs of physical
injuries on the victim’s body to conclude that penetration had taken place. Absent any showing of
the slightest penetration of the female organ, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can
only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.

People v. Alfredo Bon

G.R. No. 166401
October 30, 2006 – Merely discusses the penalties for rape?

People v. Savellano
G.R. No. L-31227
May 31, 1974

Facts: The victim was on her way to her sister’s house when the accused seized her from behind
and dragged her away to a place near his house and forced her to lie down. She tried resisting
the assault but to no avail, succumbing to the superior force employed by her assailant. He
succeeded in pinning her down to the ground and had sexual intercourse with her. The accused
claims that he did not employ force as he is one-armed, his right hand having been amputated.

Issue: Whether the accused is guilty of rape through the use of force.

Ruling: Yes. In rape cases, it is not necessary that the force employed against the victim
be so great or of such a character as could not be resisted. It is sufficient that the force
used is sufficient to consummate the purpose of copulating with the offended woman. The
force or violence necessary in rape is naturally a relative term, depending on the age,
size and strength of the parties and their relation to each other.

Here, it is true that Savellano has only the full use of his left hand due to a physical
handicap. But the complainant was a petite teenager and used to be sickly, whereas,
Savellano is five feet tall and was quite strong as he was accustomed to manual labor as
a young farmer. Hence, is credible that, with his physical superiority, he was able to
overcome the resistance of the complainant and to have forcible carnal knowledge of her.

Part IX CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY

PART 9

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. FEDERICO MERCADO or ALBERTO MERCADO

G.R. No. L-65152 August 30, 1984

FACTS:
Defendant appellant was found guilty of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention. Accordingly, Mercado, while pointing a knife to one Yvonne Baylon, forcibly brought
the latter from place to place so that the latter would reveal the whereabouts of her sister, Susan,
which at the same time was appellant’s common-law-wife. For almost five (5) hours, he held
Yvonne in a store before he was subdued. From the judgment rendered by the lower court,
appellant claims, among others, that the lower court erred in convicting him of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:
1. Whether appellant is guilty of kidnapping and serious illegal detention penalized under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code.

RULING:
Yes. While the defendant contends that he should be convicted of grave coercion only since his
purpose was "to force Miss Yvonne Baylon to produce Miss Susan Baylon", the Court believes that this
was without merit. Following the case of People vs. Ablaza, 30 SCRA 173,176, "the victim was actually
restrained or deprived of her freedom, and that makes proper the prosecution of the herein accused
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. The extant evidence on record shows that "the accused held
complainant because he wanted her to produce her sister, Susan, who was the common-law wife of the
accused."
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. OLIMPIO DE PERALTA
G.R.No. L-17332 August 18, 1921

FACTS:
Olimpio de Peralta succeeded one Cecilio Toledo as president of the “Philippine Marine Union”.
The former, for the purpose of looking for a desk glass which he believed was the property of the union,
entered the room in question. This gave rise to the information for trespass to dwelling against Peralta, in
which it is alleged that he entered the room of Toledo against the will of the occupant. Trial was had and
the accused was found guilty of the crime of trespass to dwelling. From that judgment, the present appeal
was taken.

ISSUE:
Whether appellant is guilty of the crime of trespass to dwelling.

RULING:
In order that this crime may exist it is necessary that the entrance should be against the express
or presumed prohibition of the occupant, and the lack of permission should not be confused with
prohibition. In the decisions of the courts of Spain, as well as in those of this jurisdiction, it has been held
uniformly that this crime is committed when a person enters another's dwelling against the will of the
occupant, but not when the entrance is effected without his knowledge or opposition.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. MARCIAL

CA 50, OG 3122

*Alien. Next!*
JOSE “Pepito” TIMONER V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-62050 November 25, 1983

FACTS:

Petitioner Jose Timoner was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave coercion
penalized under Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, the Municipal Health Officer of Daet
recommended a closure of several establishments for non-compliance with certain health and sanitation
requirements. Being then mayor, petitioner ordered his laborers to nail together rough lumber slabs to
fence off the stalls which protruded into the sidewalk of the Maharlika highway. Among those affected
establishments was private complainant’s. As a consequence, the latter charged petitioner with grave
coercion.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner is guilty of the crime of grave coercion.

RULING:

In the case at bar, petitioner, as mayor of the town, merely implemented the aforesaid
recommendation of the Municipal Health Officer. Having then acted in good faith in the performance of
his duty, petitioner incurred no criminal liability. The third element being absent in the case at bar,
petitioner cannot be held guilty of grave coercion.
THE UNITED STATES V. ROMUALDO MENA
G.R. No. L-4812 October 30, 1908

FACTS:
Appellant owned three carabaos that trespassed the property of the complaining witness. When
asked to compensate for the damages, the appellant refused. As a consequence, complainant, along with
his son, brought the carabaos to the justice of the peace, for the purpose of depositing them in his care
until the question of damages could be settled in his court. On the road to the justice of the peace, they
met the appellant who, thereupon, drew his bolo, rushed to complainant’s son, threatened them with
further bodily injury, and compelled complainant to turn loose the carabao.

ISSUE:
Whether appellant is guilty of the crime of unlawful coercion.

RULING:

With violence he compelled the complaining witness to do that which he did not desire to do and
it matters not whether it was "just or unjust" that they should thus have been turned over to the
defendant. The defendant was not clothed with any judicial or administrative authority, and it is a maxim
of the law that no man is authorized to take the law into his own hands and enforce his rights with threats
of violence, except in certain well-defined cases.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. GOZUM
CA 54 OG 7409

*Alien. Next!*
HERMOGENES MORTERA and CANLUBANG WORKERS’ UNION (CLO) V.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, et al.
G.R. No. L-1340 October 31, 1947

FACTS:
The petitioners were protesting against their company by holding strikes and carrying
picket signs. The respondent court issued an order that prohibits the petitioners to utilize
picketing, under any guise or form. The petitioners then filed an action to annul the respondent
court’s decision to prohibit picketing.
ISSUE:
Whether the prohibition of picketing is valid
RULING:
The prohibition should be understood to cover only illegal picketing, that is, picketing
through the use of illegal means. Peaceful picketing cannot be prohibited. It is part of the freedom
of speech guaranteed by the Constitution. Therefore, the order of the Court of Industrial
Relations prohibiting picketing must be understood to refer only to illegal picketing, that is,
picketing through the use of illegal means.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. CARABALLO et al.
CA OG 5232

*Alien. End.*
*Nothing follows.*

PART X CRIMES AGAINST PROP

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
DATU ALIMPANG MANTAWAR, BITUANIN MACALANGAN and MAMANTAR BATIONG
G.R. No. L-1248
April 30, 1948

Facts:
Sergeants Cuaresma and Regaspe were accompanied by the three accused to Galigayan. While
on their way, the accused attacked Cuaresma and Regaspe and the latter both died
instantaneously. Mantawar then took the victims’ money and distributed them to his
companions. They also seized the goods consisting of weapons, ammunition, money, belts, hats
and shoes. In the trial it was shown that the accused killed with alevosia since the attack was
completely off guard. They were convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide.

Issue:
Whether the presence of alevosia qualifies the crime to murder.

Ruling:
No. The special complex crime of robbery with homicide, punishable by article 294, par. 1. of
the Revised Penal Code, is a single crime specifically defined by said article. The robbery and
murder committed, being bound together by the clause “by reason or occasion of” the robbery,
they become a single indivisible offense of robbery with homicide. Hence, the presence of
alevosia in the present case should be considered not as a qualifying circumstance but only as
an aggravating circumstance.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
RAFAEL MENDOZA, FELIPE SUIZO, AMBROSIO GARCIA, ANDRES DE MESA, JOSE DIMAANO, and
EUSEBIO HERNANDEZ, Defendants. FELIPE SUIZO, Appellant.
G.R. No. L-1797
June 30, 1949

Facts:
An armed band raided the house of Jose Evangelista and his wife, robbing them of P20, and
shooting both of them to death. Following the police investigation, six persons were accused of
robbery with double homicide for alleged participation in the above raid. In the trial, the defense
calls attention to the fact that appellant Suizo was a person well-known to the deceased spouses
so that he would not have dared commit the robbery without his face being covered, since there
was light in the house.

Issue:
Whether the contention of the defense is tenable.

Ruling:
No. Appellant’s participation in the crime charged is established, it appearing from the evidence
that he was the one who led the gang to the house of the deceased spouses, was the one who
informed them that they could get something from there, and was also the one who asked the
inmates of the house to open the door. Being a participant in the robbery, the accused cannot
escape liability for the killing of the spouses just because he did not actually take part in the
killing, there being no proof that he made any endeavor to prevent it. The circumstance that
accused was well known to the deceased couple may have been one of the reasons that
prompted him to silence them forever by putting them to death.
THE UNITED STATES v. PEDRO MAGSINO
G.R. No. 1339 November 28, 1903

Facts:
Dy-Seng loaded at a railway station 70 pilones of sugar to be shipped to Manila. When the car
arrived at Manila it contained only 36 pilones of sugar. It was alleged that the accused, agent at
the said station, abstracted by force by unnailing the strips of cloth used to seal up the door of
the car which contained the said sugar, and that, after the abstraction, again fastened the door
of the car. He was convicted of the crime of robbery. On appeal, the defendant contends that the
court erred in qualifying the offense as robbery, the facts charged in the complaint consisting in
the act of unnailing and renailing the strip of cloth placed over the door as a seal, this act being
not included within the provisions of article 512 of the Penal Code.

Issue:
Whether the offense committed is that of robbery as defined and punished by article 512 of the
Penal Code.

Ruling:
Yes. The evidence showed that there was a breaking by force. The car, after being loaded, was
by the owner of the cargo, Dy-Seng, closed by nailing a strip of cloth over the door so as to seal
it, the customary manner of sealing a freight car. Dy-Seng testified that, upon the examination of
the car at Manila, the strip of cloth had been unnailed and again nailed over the door. This was a
breaking by force within the meaning of the statute.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
ELIAS JARANILLA, RICARDO SUYO, FRANCO BRILLANTES and HEMAN GORRICETA
G.R. No. L-28547 February 22, 1974

Facts:
The appellants were convicted by the trial court of robbery with homicide for stealing six fighting
cocks from one Valentin Baylon, and killing Patrolman Jabatan on the occasion of the robbery.
The appellants contend that the taking of roosters was theft and, alternatively, that, if it was
robbery, the crime could not be robbery with homicide because the robbery was already
consummated when Jabatan was killed.

Issue:
Whether the taking of the roosters is robbery or theft.

Ruling:
One essential requisite of robbery with force upon things is that the malefactor should enter the
building where the object to be taken is found. If the culprit did not enter the building, there
would be no robbery with force upon things. In the instant case, the chicken coop where the six
roosters were taken cannot be considered a building within the meaning of article 302. Not being
a building, it cannot be said that the accused entered the same in order to commit the robbery
by means of any of the five circumstances enumerated in article 302. Hence, the taking of the six
roosters from their coop should be characterized as theft and not robbery.
THE UNITED STATES v. IGNACIO CARLOS
G.R. No. 6295 September 1, 1911

Facts:
The accused is charged with the crime of theft for taking and carrying away 2,273
kilowatts of electric current of the Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company without the latter’s
consent. Counsel for the accused insists that only corporeal property can be the subject of the
crime of larceny, and that since electricity is an unknown force it cannot be a subject of the crime.

Issue:
Whether electrical energy could be a subject of the crime of theft.

Ruling:
Yes. The true test of what is a proper subject of larceny seems to be not whether the
subject is corporeal, but whether it is capable of appropriation by another than the owner.
Electricity, the same as gas, is a valuable article of merchandise, bought and sold like other
personal property and is capable of appropriation by another.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FRANCISCO MERCADO
G.R. Nos. L-45471 and L-45472 June 15, 1938

Facts:
Two informations for theft of large cattle were filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga,
alleging that, on two separate occasions, the accused stole the carabaos owned by Pedro and
Leon. The court declared itself without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the two criminal cases
on the ground that, although the stolen animals were afterwards brought by the accused to the
municipality of Candaba, Pampanga, where they were found in his possession, said crimes had
taken place and had been committed in the municipality of Gapan, Nueva Ecija.

Issue:
Whether the CFI of Pampanga has jurisdiction over the criminal cases.

Ruling:
No. In our jurisdiction, it is not an indispensable requisite of theft that the offender carry away
the thing taken by him from its owner. The thefts charged in the two informations were wholly
committed in Gapan, and that for their consummation nothing else remained to be done from
the moment that the accused took away, with intent to gain, said animals while they were yet in
said municipality and province. It was not necessary that he had removed the stolen animals to
the town of Candaba, Pampanga, in order to make use of or derive some benefit from them. It
was enough that on taking them in Gapan, he was then actuated by the desire or intent to
gain. Thus, the sole court possessing jurisdiction over the cases is not that of Pampanga, but that
of Nueva Ecija in which they should have been and must be instituted.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. SY GESIONG
G.R. No. 38618 September 15, 1933

Facts:
Accused was charged with the crime of estafa for having concealed or otherwise disposed of
certain personal property belonging to him for the purpose of defrauding his creditors. The
accused raises the question of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the information filed against
the him. Prosecution maintains that the facts alleged in the information constitutes the crime of
fraud defined in article 314 of the Revised Penal Code.

Issue:
Whether appellant is guilty of fraudulent insolvency under Art. 314 of the Code.

Ruling:
No. One of the essential elements of the crime is that the absconding of the property by the
defendant must result in prejudice to his creditors. The information filed in this case contains no
such allegation. It is true that it alleges that the defendant fraudulently concealed his property
mentioned in the information, but such allegation is not sufficient to fulfill the requirement of
the law. A person may fraudulently dispose of some of his property, and yet such act may not
necessarily result in prejudice to his creditors; for he may have some other property with which
to satisfy his obligations. Thus, upon a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the
case, the Court found that the guilt of the appellant has not been established beyond a
reasonable doubt.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. CHONG CHUY LIMGOBO and LIM KAN
G.R. No. 20955 October 30, 1923

Facts:
The information alleges that Chong Chuy, a merchant by profession, maliciously absconded with
all of his property, stimulating a conveyance and transfer of all his business in favor of his brother
Lim Kan for the sole purpose of defrauding his lawful creditors who, by reason of said simulation
of sale, were prejudiced in their interests, because they will not be able to collect their credits.
The lower court dismissed the information, holding that the facts alleged therein do not
constitute the crime of concealment, defined in article 523 of the Penal Code, on the ground that
in order for this article to be applicable and the concealment to exist, it is necessary that the
accused should depart and physically conceal his personal, not real, property, such as that in
question.

Issue:
Whether the facts alleged in the information constitute the crime of fraudulent concealment.

Ruling:
Yes. the crime of fraudulent concealment is committed by any means whereby any property of
the debtor is made to disappear, for the purpose of evading the fulfillment of the obligations and
liabilities contracted with one or more creditors to the damage of the latter, it not being an
essential element of said crime that the debtor should depart or abscond in some way at the
same time that he abstracts said property, because neither the meaning of the word
"concealment" authorizes such an interpretation. Neither is it necessary that the property
concealed be personal property, so that it may be physically concealed, as was held among the
decisions by the supreme court of Spain.
 Tubb vs. People and CA; GR No. L-9811; April 22, 1957

FACTS: Tubb talked Quasha into investing in the rattan business. Quasha delivered the sum of
P6,000.00 to the accused for the purchase of rattan for resale in Manila and with an agreement
that profit shall be divided equally between the accused and the complainant. Eventually, the
complainant did not receive a word from accused. Then, Quasha met Tubb, Quasha asked the
accused about the money but the accused did not answer the question but promised that he will
pay the same. Quasha did not hear from the accused for a long time again after their chance
meeting at the Manila Hotel. Quasha filed a complaint and the trial court convicted the accused
of the crime of estafa. the defense insists that there was a lawful partnership between the
appellant and the complainant and the failure of the venture rendered the former liable only for
a liquidation of the partnership.

ISSUE: Whether appellant is criminally liable for estafa

RULING: Yes. It is clear from the foregoing that petitioner is accused of estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code. In other words, petitioner is charged with the
misappropriation of funds held by him in trust and with the obligation to return the same. It is
urged, that there can be no estafa without a previous demand, which allegedly has not made
upon herein petitioner, but the aforementioned query made to him by Quasha, in the Manila
Hotel, was tantamount to a demand. It is urged, that there can be no estafa without a previous
demand, which allegedly has not made upon herein petitioner, but the aforementioned query
made to him by Quasha, in the Manila Hotel, was tantamount to a demand. Besides, the law does
not require a demand as a condition precedent to the existence of the crime of embezzlement.
Thus, Tubb is guilty of embezzlement under Article 315, paragraph 1(b), of the Revised Penal
Code
 Galvez vs. CA; GR No. L-22760; November 29, 1971

FACTS: Galvez offered the husband of the complainant Feliciana Camara an exchange deal for
the spouses' car. Subsequently, the Cameras were shown a car which they readily liked. The
Camara spouses asked Galvez, whom they brought along, for an estimate of the customs duties
and other taxes which they would have to pay upon acquisition of the vehicle. Galvez volunteered
that he could settle the tax liabilities with the relatively small sum of P2,000. Feliciana Camara
delivered a check to the accused said amount for said purpose. Four months later, however, the
Cameras got wind of information what the taxes due on their car had not been paid. The lower
court convicted Galvez of the crime of estafa.

ISSUE: Whether the delivery of the check is considered delivery of money making the accused
guilty of the crime of estafa

RULING: Yes. The phrase "amount of P2,000.00" is broad enough to refer to either cash or a
negotiable instrument. A check, after all, while not regarded as legal tender, is normally accepted,
under commercial usage, as a substitute for cash. the delivery by Camara of the check in Pasay
City and its acceptance by Galvez signified not merely the transfer to the accused of money
belonging to the complainant. It also marked, as shown by the chain of events established by the
prosecution, the creation of a fiduciary relation between the parties. The existence of such
relation either in the form of a trust, commission or administration, is, of course, an essential
element of the crime of estafa by misappropriation or conversion
 United State vs. Yap Tian Jong; GR No. L-10675; February 28, 1916

FACTS: A case containing a number of bolts of sinamay cloth of the value of P625 was by mistake
unloaded from the steamship Batangueño by reason of its being marked the same as, or similar
to, certain cases consigned to the defendant. The accused upon opening the box and discovering
it, maliciously appropriated the bolts of sinamay to himself without the consent of the owner of
the goods. The accused denied having received the same goods. The lower court convicted him
of the crime of estafa

ISSUE: Whether the court erred in convicting him of the crime of estafa

RULING: No. The Court agrees with the trial judge that the evidence clearly discloses a violation
of the express provisions of subsection 5 of article 535 of the Penal Code, in that, "to the prejudice
of another he converted to his own use the box of sinamay, received by him under such
circumstances as to give rise to an obligation to return or make delivery of the same" to the
owner upon demand, and that he "denied having received these goods."
Intestate Estate of Manolita Gonzales vda. De Carungcong; GR No. 181409; February 11, 2010

FACTS: Complainant filed a case of estafa against her brother-in-law, William Sato. It was alleged
that the accused feloniously induced Manolita Gonzales, the owner of the estate and herein
deceased, to sign and thumb mark Special Power of Attorney (in the pretense of presenting a
document pertaining to taxes) which authorized the sale, assignment, transfer and disposition of
the latter’s properties. As defense, the accused invoked Art 332 of the Revised Penal Code. He
contends that he falls under the enumeration of those relatives who shall be exempt from
criminal prosecution. Being a relative by affinity, he cannot be held liable for the crime of estafa
as stated in the law.

ISSUE: Whether the accused should be exempt from criminal liability for reason of his
relationship to Manolita.

RULING: No. The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code only applies to
the felonies of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. However, the coverage of Article 332 is
strictly limited to the felonies mentioned therein. The plain language of the provision shows that
it applies exclusively to the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. It does not
apply where any of the crimes mentioned under Article 332 is complexed with another crime,
such as theft through falsification or estafa through falsification. Thus, the accused is not
exempted from criminal liability. The crime he committed falls under the nature of a complex
crime which is the crime estafa through falsification of public document and does not anymore
concern private relations of family members.
 People vs. Alvarez; GR No. 28447; September 13, 1928

FACTS: Vicente Alvarez is the stepfather of the offended party, Carlos Caponong, and both lived
in the same house. The appellant took the offended party's suit case, containing the latter's
clothes, and carried it to the orchard near a well. According to the offended party, when the
accused arrived at that place he opened the suit case, took out the contents and set fire to them.
Alvarez was found guilty of the crime of arson

ISSUE: Whether the judgment of the lower court was correct

RULING: No. In accordance with article 558 of the Penal Code, as the value of the clothing burned
does not exceed 625 pesetas, and as the burning was done under circumstances which excluded
all danger of the fire spreading, since it was done in the orchard by the side of a well, the act
merely constitutes the crime of malicious mischief. And, moreover, as the accused is the
stepfather of the offended party, and hence, an ascendant by affinity, he is exempt from criminal
liability, in accordance with article 567 of the Penal Code, and is only civilly liable.

PART XI CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY

PART 11

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. GUADALUPE ZAPATA and DALMACIO BONDOC

G.R. No. L-3047 May 16, 1951

FACTS:
In the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a complaint for adultery was filed by Andres
Bondoc against Guadalupe Zapata, his wife, and Dalmacio Bondoc, her paramour, for cohabiting
and having repeated sexual intercourse during the period from the year 1946 14 March 1947,
the date of the filing of the complaint, Dalmacio Bondoc knowing his codefendant to be a married
woman (criminal case No. 426). The defendant wife entered the plea of guilty and was sentenced
to suffer four months of arresto mayor which penalty she served. In the same court, on 17
September 1948, the offended husband filed another complaint for adulterous acts committed
by his wife and her paramour from 15 March 1947 to 17 September 1948, the date of the filing
of the second complaint (criminal case No. 735). On 21 February 1949, each of the defendants
filed a motion to quash the complaint of the ground that they would be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. The trial court upheld the contention of the defendants and
quashed the second complaint. From the other sustaining the motions to quash the prosecution
has appealed
ISSUE:
Whether the filling of another case of adultery constitutes double jeopardy
RULING:
 Adultery is a crime of result and not of tendency, as the Supreme Court of Spain has held
(S. 10 December 1945); it is a instantaneous crime which is consummated and exhausted or
completed at the moment of the carnal union. Each sexual intercourse constitutes a crime of
adultery (CuelloCalon, Derecho Penal, Vol. II, p. 569). True, two or more adulterous acts
committed by the same defendants are against the same person — the offended husband, the
same status — the union of the husband and wife by their marriage, and the same community
represented by the State for its interest in maintaining and preserving such status. But this
identity of the offended party, status society does not argue against the commission of the crime
of adultery as many times as there were carnal consummated, for as long as the status remain
unchanged, the nexus undissolved and unbroken, an encroachment or trespass upon that status
constitutes a crime. There is no constitutional or legal provision which bars the filing of as many
complaints for adultery as there were adulterous acts committed, each constituting one crime.

UNITED STATES V. TOMAS MACABABAG and MARIA BALISI

G.R. No. 10564 August 16, 1915

FACTS:
"That on or about, and for some five months prior to, July 11, 1914, in the municipality of
Tuguegarao, Province of Cagayan, P. I., the said Tomas Macababbag, being legally married to
DomingaBulaqui, did willfully, unlawfully, and criminally, with gross insult to and contempt of the
latter, take into the conjugal home and there keep the other accused, Maria Balisi, as his mistress,
with scandal to the public and in violation of the law."cralaw virtua1aw While the appellants
make no specific assignments of error, they argue that the evidence adduced during the trial of
the cause was insufficient to show that they are guilty of the crime charged. The appellants argue
that "according to the provisions of article 437 of the Penal Code, no crime is committed, unless
the acts alleged to have been committed were committed under scandalous circumstances." The
appellants argue that there was no public scandal connected with the commission of the crime
charged in the present case.

ISSUE:
Whether the element of scandalous circumstances is necessary to convict a person of
concubinage

RULING:
A married man who keeps a mistress in his conjugal dwelling is guilty of the crime of
concubinage. "Scandalous circumstances" are not necessary to make him guilty of said crime. It
is only when the mistress is kept elsewhere that "scandalous circumstances" become an element
of the crime. We find no reason for modifying the sentence of the lower court after a careful
examination of the evidence brought here. The same is, therefore, hereby affirmed, with costs.
So ordered.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ENGRACIO SANTOS, et al.,
G.R. No. L-8520 June 29, 1957

FACTS:
Respondents filed a motion to quash the judgement of the CFI convicting the same of
rape. Respondents alleged that the trial court, was without jurisdiction, there having been no
valid complaint subscribed and sworn to by the offended party as required by Article 344 of the
Revised Penal Code.It is contended that the "salaysay" executed and signed by petitioner
PolicarpiaBansuelo on January 12, 1954, before and in the presence of Fiscal Nicanor P. Nicolas
of Rizal and Capt. Hermogenes Marco of the PCAC, is sufficient in form and substance to serve as
the complaint required by Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code. That the law requiring that the
crime of rape, among others, shall be commenced by a complaint filed by the offended party is
merely "designed for the protection of the offended party and her family who may prefer to
suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through with the scandal of a public trial" that when
petitioner Bansuelo executed said "Salaysay", she had manifested her desire to prosecute the
maniacal abuse committed against her; that said "salaysay" has conformed substantially to the
requisites of a valid complaint; that it cannot be considered as her testimony during the
preliminary investigation because, if it were so, the other witnesses should have also signed it.

ISSUE:
Whether the salaysay can be considered as a valid complaint

RULING:
After a thorough examination of the "salaysay" in question, we agree with the appealed
decision that it is a narration of how the crime of rape was committed against petitioner
Bansuelo. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General in his comment on the motion for
reconsideration, such sworn statement "salaysay" is not the complaint contemplated in and
required by sections 1, 2 and 5 of Rule 106 of the Rules of Court and Article 344 of the Revised
Penal Code.And the complaint mentioned in this provision of law is precisely what is defined and
mentioned in the Rules of Court and the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, we hold the view that
in the case at bar, after the fiscal has investigated the case, he should have procured the filing of
a complaint by the offended party to properly initiate this case and not file by himself an
information as he did."
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. PEDRO PITOC
G.R. No. 18513 April 27, 1963

FACTS:
That on or about the 23d day of June, 1921, and for some time prior to this date, in the
city of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said accused, Pedro Pitoc, being legally married to the
undersigned, Petronila Roque, voluntarily, illegally and criminally cohabited, lied and had sexual
intercourse with his coaccused, Marciana del Basco, who voluntarily, illegally and criminally
cohabited, lied and had sexual intercourse with the said Pedro Pitoc, knowing that her coaccused
was legally united by marriage with the complaint referred to.They were both found guilty as
charged. Pedro Pitoc was sentenced to one year, eight months and twenty-one days
of prisioncorreccional with the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay one-half of the
costs, from which he appeals, claiming that the evidence was not sufficient to prove him guilty
of the crime of concubinage, beyond a reasonable doubt, and that there was no evidence that
the crime was committed "under scandalous circumstances." His codefendant did not
appeal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

ISSUE:
Whether respondent is guilty of concubinage

RULING:
Section 1 of Act No. 2716, as it amends article 437 of the Penal Code, is very awkwardly
worded, and is apparently misleading. But in the final analysis its meaning its clear. It will be
noted that article 437 specified two different grounds for invoking the penalty
of prisioncorreccional. First, that if any married man keeps a mistress in his conjugal dwelling, or,
second, if he shall keep a mistress anywhere else under "scandalous circumstances," then he
shall be guilty of the specified crime. The purpose and intent of the amendment was to add a
third ground for the commission of the crime. When analyzed, the two acts should read. First,
that, if any married man shall keep a mistress in his conjugal dwelling or second, should keep a
mistress elsewhere under "scandalous circumstance," or, third, if he should "cohabit with a
woman who is not his wife." In either event, he would then be guilty of the crime charged in
article 437, and a conviction of either one of them would be sufficient to entitle a spouse to a
divorce under the provisions of Act No. 2710.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. LUCIO PANOPIO

CA 48 OG 145
*???*
*THEFT ang naa sa compilation. Next!*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS V. PEDRO CRISOSTOMO, et al.,
G.R. No. L-19034 February 17, 1923

FACTS:
Herein petitioners were found guilty by CFI-Cavite of the crime of abduction through
violence. The facts of the case were undisputed. Accordingly, petitioners, particularly Pedro
Crisostomo abducted one Macaria Gabriel in view of the latter’s rejection elope and marry the
former.
In finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of abduction through
violence, petitioners appealed to this court.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioners are guilty of the crime of abduction through violence.

RULING:

No. Viada in in defining abduction under the old Spanish laws, says in general as follows:

By abduction is meant the taking away of a woman from her house or the place
where she may be for the purpose of carrying her to another place with intent to marry
or to corrupt her (libidinis causa).

But when, in explaining abduction through violence, he specifies the elements constituting the
same, he says:

The elements constituting this crime are these: . . . 3. That it be committed with
unchaste designs, that is to say, with intent to abuse her. If such an intention does not
exist, the act will no longer constitute the crime of abduction, but a crime against liberty,
or that of illegal detention defined and punished in article 495 and following of this Code.

Consequently, the unchaste designs that constitute the essential elements of the crime of
abduction through violence is the intention to abuse the abducted woman.

Here, the act proven in the record does not constitute abduction. We have, therefore, the
kidnapping of a woman which was not proven to have been committed with unchaste designs.
Abduction, being one of the ways which illegal detention, can be committed, specially qualified
by lewd intention, the kidnapping of a woman without unchaste designs must according to Viada
and to our Penal Code, be considered as illegal detention.
UNITED STATES V. RUFINO RAMIREZ, et al.,
G.R. No. 13997 March 8, 1919

FACTS:

Rufino Ramirez was, prior to October 13, 1916, an unsuccessful lover of a young lady
named Regina Tolentino. Disappointed, Ramirez along with his companions, sought to abduct
Tolentino. Having materialized the abduction, the accused took her to the rice paddies.
Meanwhile, the girl who had just come to her senses renewed her screaming. The neighboring
people responded promptly to the outcries for help, and the accused, upon seeing that many
people were coming to the aid of the girl, fled.

By an appropriate information, defendant-appellant was charged before CFI-Manila of

the crime of abduction with force.

ISSUE:

Whether defendant-appellant is guilty of the crime of abduction with force penalized

under Art 445 of the Penal Code.

RULING:

Yes. Article 445 of the Penal Code provides the elements for abduction, : (1) That the
person abducted be a woman; (2) that the abduction must have been against the will of the
woman; and (3) that the abduction must have been for lewd or unchaste designs.

Here, the first two elements are here present is incontestable. The "taking," as contemplated by
the Code, is demonstrated by the force used in snatching the offended girl from a street in the
city of Manila and carrying her to the rice paddies some distance away. Stress is laid by counsel
for appellants on the absence of the third essential element, namely, lewd or unchaste designs.
Necessarily, if this specific element is lacking, the defendant must be acquitted. However, the
presence of the lewd designs is here revealed by the actions of the accused. Among other
indications of this intent can be mentioned the taking of the girl at night by the use of force and
threats to overcome her resistance.

The trial court therefore committed no error in finding the accused guilty of a violation of
article 445 of the Penal Code.
UNITED STATES V. BRAULIO DE VIBAR
G.R. No. L-9298 February 11, 1915

FACTS:
Teodora Bondoc was being courted by BenignoIndiongco while the defendant served as an
intermediary between the lovers. Early in the morning of December 30, 1911, the said Teodoro
Bondoc left her house and, accompanied by defendant who was waiting for her outside, went to
a spot near a growth of sugar cane in the belief that her lover, Indiongco, was awaiting her there
for the purpose of joining her and eloping with her, and elopement which defendant made her
believe had been planned the night before. When defendant and the young woman arrived at
the place referred to, as the latter did not see her lover she inquired about him of defendant,
who replied that before delivering her to him she should be for defendant. Thereupon she
attempted to return home, but defendant caught her by the hand, gave her a slap and dragged
her into the midst of the sugar cane growing nearby, where, threatening her with a dagger he
had in his hand, he overcame her resistance and succeeded in lying with her. Defendant kept
Teodora Bondoc among the sugar cane until nighttime, when he took her, also by force, in a cart
through the fields to the house of a relative of his in the vicinity of a wood in the municipality of
Capas, Province of Tarlac. There he remained with her alone for three days and, taking
advantages of her helplessness and by intimidating her, lay with her several times during that
period, until, as a result of the search and inquiries made by her father and brother, she was
found in the said house and freed from defendant's control. Consequently a complaint was made
against the said Braulio de Vivar and later the information was filed that gave rise to this
prosecution.

ISSUE:
Whether the act of respondent constitutes as abduction
RULING:
It is unquestionable that Teodora Bondoc, who had freely gone to the place where she
believed she would find her fiance lost her liberty from the moment defendant opposed, in the
manner aforestated, her returning home, and that, consequently, it was against her will that she
was taken by defendant into the sugar cane. This was the commencement of the abduction of
the young woman, committed by defendant with violence and against her will. When he got her
into the cane field, he abused her by means of force and intimidation. If defendant had then left
her free, the crime committed by him might perhaps have been classified as rape, because the
deprivation of her liberty would have been but brief and only for the purpose of his lying with
her. But, considering that defendant retained her among the sugar cane until night, continued to
retain her in Capas for three days longer in his company and against her will, and that he also
enjoyed her carnally there; and considering the deprivation of liberty of the aggrieved party
during all of the time, in connection with the unchaste designs which defendant entertained
toward her and which were the motive of his abducting her against her will, the acts committed
by this defendant, and which were proved at the trial, constitute the crime of abduction, provided
for and punished by article 445 of the code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanroblesvirtu

PART XII CRIMES AGAINST THE CIVIL STATUS OF PERSONS

TITLE TWELVE: CRIMES AGAINST THE CIVIL STATUS OF PERSONS

US vs. Capillo and Paduga; GR No. L-9279; March 25, 1915

FACTS: Defendants feloniously expose a child, 1 month old, the legitimate son of the accused
Capillo and his wife, to lose his civil status. Capillo took the said child without the permission of his
mother and agreed with one Chua Pue Tee to deliver to him the said child and never to claim it
again. Capillo received a sum of money from Chua Pue Tee. Capillo and Paduga were charged of
the crime of exposing a legitimate child to lose his civil status. The court thereupon decided that
the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute the crime charged. The case was
dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred in dismissing the case

RULING: No. The Court is confirmed in their conclusion that true meaning of word "expusiere"
(shall expose) in this article of the code involves the idea of abandonment. Examining the
information, the Court find no facts which allege an abandonment of a child in the sense indicated,
and the ruling of the court below sustaining the demurrer to the information must therefore be
sustained. The Court’s ruling at this time is merely that the offense defined and penalized in article
468 of the Penal Code is not the unlawful sale of a child by its father, and that such conduct cannot
properly be penalized under its provisions.

Mercado vs. Tan; GR No. 137110; August 1, 2000

FACTS: Accused Dr. Vincent Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan got married on June 27,
1991. There is no dispute also that at the time of the celebration of the wedding with complainant,
accused was actually a married man. A letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by complainant Tan.
More than a month after the bigamy case was lodged, the previous marriage of the accused was
declared null and void.

ISSUE: Whether the accused is guilty of violating Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.

RULING: Yes. The defense of judicial declaration is immaterial since the crime had already been
consummated. In this case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no
judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first
marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with
bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, he committed the acts
punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.

Te vs. Court of Appeals and Choa; GR No. 126746; November 29, 2000

FACTS: Arthur Te and Lilian Choa married in civil rites. In 1989, Liliana gave birth to their daughter.
Thereafter, Arthur stopped visiting her. In 1990, Arthur contracted another marriage while still
married to Liliana. Hence, Liliana filed a bigamy case against Te and administrative case for the
revocation of his and his mistress’ engineering license. Te filed a petition for nullity of marriage.
RTC rendered a decision on the bigamy case even the petition for annulment was pending.

ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred in not resolving the annulment case first.

RULING: No. Outcome The annulment case had no bearing on Te’s guilt in the bigamy case. The
ground cited by Te for the annulment was for voidable marriage. Hence, he was still validly married
when he committed bigamy.

People vs. Aragon; GR No. L-5930; February 17, 1954

FACTS: The defendant is charged with the crime of bigamy, for having contracted a second
marriage with one Efigenia C. Palomer, while his previous valid marriage was still subsisting. While
the case was pending trial, Palomer filed a civil action in the court against the defendant-appellant,
alleging that the latter "by means of force, threats and intimidation of bodily harm, forced plaintiff
to marry him", and praying that their marriage be annulled. Defendant-appellant filed a praying
that the criminal charge be provisionally dismissed, on the ground that the civil action for
annulment of the second marriage is a prejudicial question. The court denied this motion.

ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred in denying the motion.

RULING: No. The pendency of the civil action for the annulment of the marriage filed by Palomer,
is absolutely immaterial to the criminal. This civil action does not decide that defendant-appellant
did not enter the marriage against his will and consent, because the complaint does not allege
that he was the victim of force and intimidation in the second marriage; it does not determine the
existence of any of the elements of the charge of bigamy. A decision thereon is not essential to
the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.

People vs. Dungao; GR No. 34330; October 26, 1931 – Alien!!

Son Cui et al., vs. Guepangco et al.; GR No. L-6163; March 14, 1912 ConfusingG
People vs. Nepomuceno; GR. No. L-40624; June 27, 1975

FACTS: Ricardo Nepomuceno, Jr., being then previously married with Dolores Desiderio,
contracted a second marriage with Norma Jimenez without legally dissolving the first contracted
marriage. A motion to quash was filed on the ground that the information is defective as it charged
only the accused for bigamy without including the second wife and such failure, according to
accused, conferred no jurisdiction on the lower court to try and decide the case. The lower court
convicted the accused of the crime.

ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred in not quashing the information

RULING: No. The crime of bigamy is committed when a person contracts a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
been judicially declared as presumptively dead. Appellant's contention that the crime of bigamy
entails the joint liability of two persons who marry each other is completely devoid of merit.
Bigamy is not similar to the crimes of adultery and concubinage, wherein the law specifically
requires that the culprits, if both are alive, should he prosecuted or included in the information.

PART XIIi CRIMES AGAINST HONOR

Novicio vs. Aggabao; GR No. 141332; December 11, 2003

FACTS: Ligaya Novicio, stockholder and treasurer of Philinterlife, sent a letter to its depository
banks, informing them that several stockholders of Philinterlife, including respondent Alma
Aggabao, had been restrained by the Court of Appeals, from exercising their rights as
shareholders of Philinterlife. Upon learning of the petitioner’s letter, respondent filed a
complaint-affidavit charging petitioner with libel. Respondent claimed that the letter injured her
reputation and credibility. Novicio moved to quash the informations alleging that the facts
charged therein did not constitute libel but was denied.

ISSUE: Whether the letter written by petitioner Novicio was libelous.

RULING: No. For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must concur: (a) it must
be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity and (d) the victim must be
identifiable. Except for the element of identification, the informations filed against petitioner
failed to establish the three other elements of libel. The words used by petitioner in her letter
did not cast aspersion on respondent’s character, integrity and reputation. They were intended
merely to notify the banks. There is also no malice in the letter since it was a qualified privileged
communication. There is no publicity, for the petitioner sent the letter only to the branch
managers of the banks concerned. Ligaya Novicio is certainly entitled to the dismissal of the case
 MVRS Pub. Inc. vs. Islamic Da’wah Council; GR No. 135306; January 28, 2003

FACTS: Islamic Da’wah Council filed a complaint for damages in their own behalf and as a class
suit in behalf of the Muslim members nationwide against the herein appellant. The complaint
alleged that the libelous statement was insulting and damaging to the Muslims; that these words
alluding to the pig as the God of the Muslims was not only published out of sheer ignorance but
with intent to hurt the feelings, cast insult and disparage the Muslims. Appellants contended that
the article did not mention respondents as the object of the article and therefore were not
entitled to damages; and, that the article was merely an expression of belief or opinion and was
published without malice nor intention to cause damage, prejudice or injury to Muslims.

ISSUE: Whether the acts of herein appellant constitute libel

RULING: No. It must be stressed that words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel
or slander per se, and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or
vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an action for defamation in
the absence of an allegation for special damages. The fact that the language is offensive to the
plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself. In the present case, there was no fairly identifiable
person who was allegedly injured by the Bulgar article. Since the persons allegedly defamed
could not be identifiable, private respondents have no individual causes of action. The
statements published by petitioners in the instant case did not specifically identify nor refer to
any particular individuals who were purportedly the subject of the alleged libelous publication.
 Lu Chi Sing & Tan Chiong. vs. Lu Tiong Gui; GR No. L-122; May 11, 1946

FACTS: Tan Chiong is the defendant’s cook. The defendant’s home was robbed. The defendant
imputed to the plaintiff Lu Tian Chiong complicity in that robbery. After the city fiscal had
conducted the corresponding investigation the criminal charge was dropped for lack of evidence.
The prayer was that the court declare the criminal charge filed by the defendant in the City
Fiscal's Office against the plaintiff Lu Tian Chiong to be malicious, "and consequently it ruined
and destroyed the good reputation and credit of the plaintiff Lu Chu Sing. Defendant's
contention, which the lower court declared to be well founded, is that plaintiffs' action is
predicated upon an allegation of defamation or libel. The plaintiffs on the other hand maintain
that their action is not based on libel or defamation but on malicious prosecution.

ISSUE: Whether the plaintiffs’ contentions are tenable

RULING: No. Under the Revised Penal Code one who falsely accuses another of a crime may he
held liable either for libel or for perjury, depending upon the manner or form in which the act is
committed. Plaintiffs' legal theory of their case is therefore untenable.

People vs. Santiago; GR No. L-17663; May 30, 1962

FACTS: The complaint alleges that the accused, before a crowd of hundred persons, said the
following words "Arsenio Hayop Lacson, pinakawalang hiyang Alkalde, Mayor Lacson raped a
woman at the Aroma Cafe and another City Hall employee in Shellborne Hotel", which are false,
malicious and highly defamatory statements against Mayor Arsenio H. Lacson, delivered with no
good intentions or justifiable motive, but solely for the purpose of injuring the name and
reputation of said Mayor Arsenio H. Lacson and to expose him to public hatred, contempt and
ridicule. Defendant moved to quash this information upon the ground that the crime charged
therein is, not libel, but oral defamation, which has already prescribed. Court of First Instance
granted the motion.

ISSUE: Whether the crime charged in the information is oral defamation

RULING: Yes. The facts alleged in the information constitute the crime of oral defamation. The
prosecution maintains that "the medium of an amplifier system", thru which the defamatory
statements imputed to the accused were allegedly made, falls within the purview of the terms
“writing, printing, … radio…”. This pretense is untenable. The word "radio" used in said Article
355, should be considered in relation to the terms with which it is associated — all of which have
a common characteristic, namely, their permanent nature as a means of publication, and this
explains the graver penalty for libel than that prescribed for oral defamation.

Borjal vs. Court of Appeals; GR No. 126466; January 14, 1999

FACTS: Petitioners Arturo Borjal and Maximo Soliven are among the incorporators of Philippines
Today, Inc. (PTI), now PhilSTAR Daily, Inc., owner of The Philippine Star, a daily newspaper. Private
respondent Francisco Wenceslao, on the other hand, is a civil engineer, businessman, business
consultant and journalist by profession. Between May and July 1989 a series of articles written
by petitioner Borjal was published on different dates in his column Jaywalker. The articles dealt
with the alleged anomalous activities of an "organizer of a conference" without naming or
identifying private respondent. Private respondent reacted to the articles.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that private respondent has a valid cause of
action for libel against petitioners although he failed to prove actual malice on their part

RULING: Yes. While, generally, malice can be presumed from defamatory words, the privileged
character of a communication destroys the presumption of malice. The onus of proving actual
malice then lies on plaintiff. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty
but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed, and implies an intention to do ulterior
and unjustifiable harm. Every citizen has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but we
do not consider that petitioner Borjal has violated that right in this case nor abused his press
freedom.

United States vs. Eguia; GR No. 13540; October 24, 1917

FACTS: Salvador A. Eguia and Sebastian Lozano, conspiring and confederating with each other,
threatened one Maria S. Tuason to publish in The Independent, a libel consisting of certain letters
which, according to the said defendants, would expose the name of said Maria S. Tuason to public
contempt. Defendants however promised to prevent the publication if Tuason pays the sum of
P4000. The lower court rendered a single decision, convicting the defendants.

ISSUE: Whether the defendants are guilty of libel.

RULING: Yes. Defendants insist that as these letters were written by the offended party, they
could not constitute a libel, as a person cannot libel himself or herself. This argument is fallacious.
The prime requisite of the crime of libel is not necessarily the composing of the article, but the
publishing of it. The Court held that Salvador A. Eguia and Sebastian Lozano have been proven
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of a violation of section 10 or blackmailing under Act No. 277
or the Philippine Libel Law.

Villanueva vs. People; GR No. 160531; April 10, 2006

FACTS: The application for monetized leave of Councilor Noel Villanueva was not
immediately attended to by complainant. Accused then entered the complainant’s office
bringing with him his Application for Monetized Leave. Complainant got the monetized leave and
filed it in her "in and out" files and while doing this, the paper accidentally fell on the floor. When
she was about to pick it up, the accused allegedly got a yellow pad and swung it at complainant’s
face, but she was able to evade it. Eventually the accused uttered disparaging remarks to the
complainant also pointed “dirty finger” at her. A verbal squabble ensued. The MCTC found
petitioner guilty of Grave Oral Defamation and Serious Slander by Deed

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the conviction of the accused

RULING: Yes. In the case at bar, as a public official, petitioner, who was holding the position of
Councilor at that time, is hidebound to be an exemplar to society against the use of intemperate
language particularly because the offended party was a Vice-Mayor. However, we cannot keep a
blind eye to the fact that such scathing words were uttered by him in the heat of anger triggered
by the fact, as found by the Court of Appeals, that complainant refused, without valid
justification to approve the monetization of accrued leave credits of petitioner. In a manner of
speaking, she sowed the wind that reaped the storm. Unquestionably, the words uttered were
defamatory. Considering, however, the factual backdrop of the case, the oral defamation was
only slight.

Slander by deed is a crime against honor, which is committed by performing any act, which casts
dishonor, discredit, or contempt upon another person. It is libel committed by actions rather than
words. Moreover, pointing a dirty finger ordinarily connotes the phrase "Fuck You," which is
similar to the expression "Puta" or "Putang Ina mo," in local parlance. Such expression was not
held to be libelous. Thus, we find that the poking of dirty finger in the case at bar, while it smacks
of slander by deed, is of a lesser magnitude than the acts committed in the foregoing cases.