Yap vs. Atty.

Buri
March 19, 2018

Complainant Michelle Yap was the vendor in a contract of sale of a condominium unit, while Atty.
Grace C. Buri, Yap's close friend and her daughter's godmother, was the vendee. Of the total amount of
purchase price of P1,200,000.00, P200,000.00 remains unpaid; Buri insisted that she would just pay the
balance on installment starting in but without specifying the amount to be paid on each installment. Because
she trusted the respondent, Yap gave Buri the full and immediate possession of the condominium unit upon
completion of the P1,000,000.00 despite the outstanding balance and even without the necessary Deed of
Absolute Sale. However, when Yap finally asked for the balance in January 2011, Buri said she would pay it on
a monthly installment of P5,000.00 until fully paid. When Yap disagreed, Buri said she would just cancel the
sale. Thereafter, Buri also started threatening her through text messages, and then later on filed a case for
estafa against her.
Buri alleged in the criminal case that when she found out that the sale of the condominium unit was
made without the consent of Yap's husband, Yap cancelled the sale and promised to return the amount of
P1,000,000.00 initially paid. Despite several demands, however, she failed and refused to return the money.
Thus, Buri was constrained to file a case for estafa against Yap. Said case was later dismissed.

When ordered to submit her answer, Buri failed to comply. She did not even appear during the
mandatory conference. Thus, the mandatory conference was terminated and the parties were simply required
to submit their respective position papers. However, only Yap complied with said order.

Commission on Bar Discipline recommended 1 year suspension from practice of law, along with the
payment of 200,000. IBP Board of Governors adopted the recommendation, but with modification that the
200,000 payment be deleted but without prejudice to the filing of the proper action in court.

Issue: W/N the IBP is correct in suspending Atty. Buri for her actions.

Ruling:

Yes. Buri's persistent refusal to pay her obligation despite frequent demands clearly reflects her lack of
integrity and moral soundness; she took advantage of her knowledge of the law and clearly resorted to threats
and intimidation in order to get away with what she wanted, constituting a gross violation of professional
ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.

Buri indubitably swept aside the Lawyer's Oath that enjoins her to support the Constitution and obey
the laws. She forgot that she must not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful
suit nor give aid nor consent to the same.

The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the practice of law is imbued with public interest and that a lawyer
owes substantial duties, not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to
the public, and takes part in the administration of justice, one of the most important functions of the State, as
an officer of the court. Accordingly, lawyers are bound to maintain, not only a high standard of legal
proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.
Time and again, the Court has stressed the settled principle that the practice of law is not a right but a
privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions. A high sense of morality, honesty, and fair dealing is expected and required of a
member of the bar.

Verily, Buri has fallen short of the high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing
expected of her. On the contrary, she employed her knowledge and skill of the law in order to avoid fulfillment
of her obligation, thereby unjustly enriching herself and inflicting serious damage on Yap. Her repeated failure
to file her answer and position paper and to appear at the mandatory conference aggravate her misconduct.
These demonstrate high degree of irresponsibility and lack of respect for the IBP and its proceedings. Her
attitude severely stains the nobility of the legal profession.

Arnold Pacao vs. Atty. Sinamar Limos

June 14, 2016

Mariadel Pacao, wife of the herein complainant was charged with qualified theft by the BHF Pawnshop.
To buy peace, the complainant initiated a negotiation with Pacao, through Atty. Limos for a possible
settlement. Such arrangement was agreed upon where the complainant shall pay 530,000 in full or
installments. Further negotiations led to Pacao to pay 200,000 as initial amount and entrusted to Atty. Limos,
who will then deliver the affidavit of desistance, a compromise agreement, and a joint motion to approve
compromise agreement with the court.
When Pacao paid the initial amount of 200,000, Atty. Limos signed an acknowledged receipt,
recognizing her undertakings as counsel of BHF. However, the latter failed to meet the terms of their
agreement. Despite this, Atty. Limos still sought to get the installments from Pacao, but was refused.

In 2010, the complainant met the BHF representative and informed him that Atty. Limos was no longer
BHF’s counsel and was not authorized to receive any payment or negotiate any settlement.

The complainant then filed a disbarment case against Atty. Limos before the IBP, where the latter did
not participate in any of the proceedings and was ordered to be disbarred and return the 200,000 with
interest.

Issue: W/N the instant complaint constitutes a sufficient basis to disbar Atty. Limos from practice of law.

Ruling:

Yes, gago. To begin with, the Court notes that this is not the first time that Atty. Limos is facing an
administrative case, for she had already been twice suspended from the practice of law, by this Court, for
three months each in Villaflores v. Atty. Limos15 and Wilkie v. Atty. Limos.16 In Villaflores, Atty. Limos received
attorney's fees of P20,000.00 plus miscellaneous expenses of P2,000.00, but she failed to perform her
undertaking with her client; thus she was found guilty of gross negligence and dereliction of duty. Likewise,
in Wilkie, Atty. Limos was held administratively liable for her deceitful and dishonest conduct when she
obtained a loan of P250,000.00 from her client and issued two postdated checks in the latter's favor to pay the
said loan despite knowledge of insufficiency of funds to cover the same. In both cases, the Court, gave Atty.
Limos a warning that repetition of the same or similar acts by her will merit a more severe penalty.

Once again, for the third time, Atty. Limos is facing an administrative case before this Court for receiving the
amount of P200,000.00 from the complainant purportedly for a possible amicable settlement with her client
BHF. However, Atty. Limos was no longer BHF's counsel and was not authorize to negotiate and conclude a
settlement for and on behalf of BHF nor was she authorized to receive any money in behalf of BHF. Her
blunder is compounded by the fact that she did not turn over the money to BHF, nor did she return the same
to the complainant, despite due demand. Furthermore, she even tried to get the next installment knowing
fully well that she was not authorized to enter into settlement negotiations with the complainant as her
engagement as counsel of BHF had already ceased.

The fact that this is Atty. Limos' third transgression exacerbates her offense. The foregoing factual antecedents
demonstrate her propensity to employ deceit and misrepresentation. It is not too farfetched for this Court to
conclude that from the very beginning, Atty. Limos had planned to employ deceit on the complainant to get
hold of a sum of money. Such a conduct is unbecoming and does not speak well of a member of the Bar.

The present case comes clearly under the grounds given in Section 27,18 Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court. The Court, however, does not hesitate to impose the penalty of disbarment when the guilty party has
become a repeat offender. Considering the serious nature of the instant offense and in light of Atty. Limos'
prior misconduct which grossly degrades the legal profession, the imposition of the ultimate penalty of
disbarment is warranted.

In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon Atty. Limos, the Court is aware that the power to disbar is one to
be exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and
character of the lawyer as a legal professional and as an officer of the Court. 19 However, Atty. Limos'
recalcitrant attitude and unwillingness to heed with the Court's warning, which is deemed to be an affront to
the Court's authority over members of the Bar, warrant an utmost disciplinary sanction from this Court. Her
repeated desecration of her ethical commitments proved herself to be unfit to remain in the legal profession.
Worse, she remains apathetic to the need to reform herself.

"[T]he practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State upon those who show that they
possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege.
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions."20 "Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is
most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to
repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bonds of society, argues
recreancy to his position and office, and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous
elements of the body politic."21ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Indeed, Atty. Limos has disgraced the legal profession. The facts and evidence obtaining in this case definitely
establish her failure to live up to her duties as a lawyer in accordance with the strictures of the lawyer's oath,
the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics, thereby making her unworthy to
continue as a member of the bar.
Stephan Brunet vs. Atty. Ronald Guaren
March 10, 2014

Complainant spouses engaged the services of Atty. Guaren for titling of a residential lot in Bonbon,
Nueva Caseres. The latter asked for an acceptance fee of 10,000 including expenses relative to its proceeding,
that the full payment shall be made after the delivery of the title. An advance fee of 1,000 was given by the
spouses along with it all the pertinent documents related to said titling.
Atty. Guaren asked for an additional 6,000 which the spouses dutifully gave, but between 1997-2001,
no progress was made as to the titling of the residential lot. Complainants demanded the return of the money
and respondent agreed to return the same provided that he be paid 5,000 for his professional services.
Despite the existing attorney-client relationship, Atty. Guaren made an appearance in a case against them
before the MCTC of Oslob, Cebu.

Atty. Guaren admitted the acceptance fee of 10,000, but denied that the amount was inclusive of the
expenses for the services. He claimed that he would file the case in court after full payment of the acceptance
fee, that he did not take documents related to the lot except a photocopy of the tax declaration, and that the
special appearance was on behalf of Atty. Estandante, the counsel on record in Oslob, who failed to appear.

The CBD recommended 6 months of suspension after being found out that Atty. Guaren was remiss in
his obligation for 5 years. The IBP issued a resolution, suspending him for 3 months.

Issue: W/N Atty. Guaren may be held liable for unethical conduct.

Ruling:

Yes. The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money,
is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law
advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary
consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary
consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves.

In the present case, Atty. Guaren admitted that he accepted the amount of ₱7,000.00 as partial
payment of his acceptance fee. He, however, failed to perform his obligation to file the case for the titling of
complainants' lot despite the lapse of 5 years. Atty. Guaren breached his duty to serve his client with
competence and diligence when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him.

Cayetano vs. Monsod

September 3, 1991

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not posses
required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987
constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates
for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years.

Issue: W/N the respondent possesses the qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for 10 years.
Ruling:
Yes.

Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any
court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal
advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an
extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no
direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They
require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity
for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at
law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as
concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which
involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is
of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy
trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the
Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-
entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the
poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance
with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that
another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of
a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing
authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to
the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law.

CRUZ, J., dissenting: (IMPORTANTTTTT!)

I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same. There are
certain points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting hisviewpoint.

To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent simply
because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a
political question that we are barred from resolving. Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on
the basis of the established facts, not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that
discretion would still be subject to our review.

In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing authority
to choose between two claimants to the same office who both possessed the required qualifications. It was
that kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed.

If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of the required
qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee simply because he has passed the
Commission on Appointments.

Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate proceeding
notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is
that what we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be
elected in the first place.

Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been too
sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification practically toothless.
From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one
does not even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the
application of some law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor
could come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become
involved in litigation."

The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another business and he
interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That covers every company organized
under the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the
modern society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government regulation the
businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have
to be part of a business concern to be considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he
rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws
regulating such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would
still be deemed engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and
regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.

The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of any acts ... in or
out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision
goes on to say that "because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and
governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable."

The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in the
practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his
activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The
possible exception is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting
wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.

The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that he has been
engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as an executive and
economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in
his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose
principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied
in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission
(together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not
proved that his activities in these capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of
the law. He is doubtless eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not
as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.

I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must regretfully vote
to grant the petition.

Heirs of Juan De Dios Carlos vs. Atty. Linsangan

AC 11494

The parcel of land located in Alabang, Muntilupa City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 139061 with an area of 12,331 square meters was previously owned by the Spouses Felix and Felipa
Carlos. Their son, Teofilo Carlos (Teofilo), convinced them to transfer said title to his name with a promise to
distribute the same to his brothers and sisters. Teofilo delivered the owner's duplicate copy of the title to his
brother, Juan. However, Teofilo sold the entire property to Pedro Balbanero (Pedro). Pedro, however, failed to
pay the agreed installment payments.

For purposes of recovering the subject property from Teofilo (and Teofilo's supposed wife, Felicidad), and
from Pedro, Juan engaged the services of Atty. Linsangan. It appears that Atty. Linsangan, for Juan, filed the
following cases: (a) a case1 against Felicidad which was settled with the latter acknowledging Juan's one-half
interest and ownership over the property; (b) a case against Pedro which was concluded on September 12,
1997; and (c) another case2 against Felicidad, albeit filed by another lawyer who acted under the direct control
and supervision of Atty. Linsangan. In this case against Felicidad, it appears that the other half of the property
was adjudicated to Juan, as Teofilo's sole heir. Said adjudication was appealed to the CA.3

It finally appears that Atty. Linsangan also represented Juan in the certiorari cases and petitions for review
filed before the CA7 and this Court,8 likewise involving the same property.

During the pendency of the above cases, Atty. Linsangan and Juan executed a Contract for Professional
Services9 enumerating the above cases being handled by Atty. Linsangan for Juan.
However, it was not only Juan who went after the property, but also Bernard Rillo and Alicia Carlos, a sister-in-
law. The latter also filed an action11 for recovery of their share and by Compromise Agreement, an area of
2,331 square meters was awarded in their favor, leaving a 10,000 square meter portion of the property. 12

This remaining 10,000 square meter portion was eventually divided in the case filed by Juan against Felicidad,
through a Compromise Agreement wherein 7,500 square meters of the subject property was given to the heirs
of Juan while the remaining 2,500 square meters thereof was given to Felicidad. In said Compromise
Agreement, the parties likewise agreed to waive as against each other any and all other claims which each
may have against the other, including those pending in the CA 15 and this Court. This Compromise Agreement
was approved by the trial court.

Subsequently, a Supplemental Compromise Agreement was submitted by the heirs of Juan and Atty.
Linsangan, dividing among them the 7,500 square meter-portion of the property as follows: 3,750 square
meters to the heirs of Juan and 3,750 square meters to Atty. Linsangan pursuant to the Contract for
Professional Services. In said Supplemental Compromise Agreement, Atty. Linsangan waived in favor of his
wife and children his 3,750 square meter share, except as to the 250 square meters thereof.

In 2015, Atty. Linsangan executed a Deed of Absolute Sale with a certain Helen S. Perez (Helen) covering the
entire 12,331 square meters of the subject property for a purchase price of One Hundred Fifty Million Pesos
(PhP150,000,000).

Upon learning of the sale, complainants allegedly requested from Atty. Linsangan for their shares in the
proceeds and for the copies of the Special Power of Attorney as well as the case records, but that Atty.
Linsangan refused.31 Complainants also requested from Atty. Linsangan, this time through another lawyer,
Atty. Victor D. Aguinaldo, that their shares in the subject property be at least segregated from the portion
sold.32

On August 20, 2016, complainants wrote a letter33 to Atty. Linsangan revoking the Special Power of Attorney
which they executed in the latter's favor. In said letter, complainants accused Atty. Linsangan of conniving
with their mother, Bella N. Vda. De Carlos, in submitting the Compromise Agreement and in selling the subject
property. Complainants, however, recognized Atty. Lisangan's services for which they proposed that the latter
be paid on the basis of quantum meruit instead of fifty percent (50%) of the subject property. 34

Subsequently, complainants filed the instant administrative complaint 35 against Atty. Linsangan accusing the
latter of forcing them to sign pleadings filed in court, copies of which were not furnished them; of selling the
subject property in cahoots with their mother; of evading the payment of income taxes when he apportioned
his share in the subject property to his wife and children. 36

By way of Comment,37 Atty. Linsangan avers that the Supplemental Compromise Agreement was never
questioned by the complainants until now38 and that they had never requested for a copy thereof from him.
Atty. Linsangan admits that the subject of the sale with Helen is the property in Alabang, Muntinlupa City and
that complainants were not given a share from the payments because such were specifically made applicable
to his and his family's share in the subject property only. 39 Atty. Linsangan also contends that the proposal
that he be paid on the basis of quantum meruit is only for the purpose of reducing his 50% share as stated in
the Contract for Professional Services he executed with Juan, so that the balance thereof may accrue to
complainants.40

Issue: W/N respondent is liable for violation of the Lawyer’s Oath.

Ruling:

Yes. We begin by emphasizing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the
State upon those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for
the conferment of such privilege.41 Whether or not a lawyer is still entitled to practice law may be resolved by
a proceeding to suspend or disbar him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise
the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. The avowed purpose of suspending or disbarring an attorney is
not to punish the lawyer, but to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit
to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to an office of an attorney, and thus to protect
the public and those charged with the administration of justice. 42 The lawyer's oath is a source of obligations
and its violation is a ground for suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action. 43

The record shows and Atty. Linsangan does not deny, that while the cases involving the subject property were
still pending resolution and final determination, Atty. Linsangan entered into a Contract for Professional
Services with Juan wherein his attorney's fees shall be that equivalent to 50% of the value of the property, or a
portion thereof, that may be recovered. It is likewise not denied by Atty. Linsangan that he apportioned upon
himself, and to his wife and children, half of the property awarded to complainants as heirs of Juan, through a
Supplemental Compromise Agreement. Similarly, such Supplemental Compromise Agreement was entered
into by Atty. Linsangan and the heirs of Juan concurrently with the pendency of several cases before the CA
and this Court44 involving the very same property. What is more, Atty. Linsangan, probably anticipating that he
may be charged of having undue interest over his client's property in litigation, caused another lawyer to
appear but all the while making it absolutely clear to Juan that the latter's appearance was nevertheless under
Atty. Linsangan's "direct control and supervision."

Plainly, these acts are in direct contravention of Article 1491(5)45 of the Civil Code which forbids lawyers from
acquiring, by purchase or assignment, the property that has been the subject of litigation in which they have
taken part by virtue of their profession. While Canon 10 of the old Canons of Professional Ethics, which states
that "[t]he lawyer should not purchase any interests in the subject matter of the litigation which he is
conducting," is no longer reproduced in the new Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), such proscription
still applies considering that Canon 1 of the CPR is clear in requiring that "a lawyer shall uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal process " and Rule 13 8, Sec. 3
which requires every lawyer to take an oath to "obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein."46 Here, the law transgressed by Atty. Linsangan is Article 1491(5) of the Civil
Code, in violation of his lawyer's oath.

While jurisprudence provides an exception to the above proscription, i.e., if the payment of contingent fee is
not made during the pendency of the litigation involving the client's property but only after the judgment has
been rendered in the case handled by the lawyer, 47 such is not applicable to the instant case. To reiterate, the
transfer to Atty. Linsangan was made while the subject property was still under litigation, or at least
concurrently with the pendency of the certiorari proceedings in the CA and the petitions for review in this
Court.48 As mentioned, there was nothing in the record which would show that these cases were likewise
dismissed with finality either before the execution of, or by virtue of, the Compromise Agreement and the
Supplemental Compromise Agreement between complainants and Atty. Linsangan.

What is more, Atty. Linsangan, at the guise of merely waiving portions of the subject property in favor of his
wife and children, actually divided his attorney's fee with persons who are not licensed to practice law in
contravention of Rule 9.02,49 Canon 950 of the CPR.

Another misconduct committed by Atty. Linsangan was his act of selling the entire 12,331 square meters
property and making it appear that he was specifically authorized to do so by complainants as well as by the
other persons51 to whom portions of the property had been previously adjudicated. However, a perusal of the
supposed Special Power of Attorney attached to the Deed of Absolute Sale, save for that executed by his wife
and children, only authorizes Atty. Linsangan to represent complainants in the litigation of cases involving
Juan's properties. Nothing in said Special Power of Attorney authorizes Atty. Linsangan to sell the entire
property including complainants' undivided share therein.

Atty. Linsangan's reasoning that he only took it upon himself to sell the property because complainants were
unfamiliar with real estate transactions does not exculpate him from liability. If indeed that were the case,
then it is incumbent upon Atty. Linsangan to make it clear to the complainants that he was acting in such
capacity and not as their lawyer.52 But even this, Atty. Linsangan failed to do.

Worse, Atty. Linsangan does not deny having received the downpayment for the property from Helen. Atty.
Linsangan does not also deny failing to give complainants' share for the reason that he applied said payment
as his share in the property. In so doing, Atty. Linsangan determined all by himself that the downpayment
accrues to him and immediately appropriated the same, without the knowledge and consent of the
complainants. Such act constitutes a breach of his client's trust and a violation of Canon 1653 of the CPR.
Indeed, a lawyer is not entitled to unilaterally appropriate his client's money for himself by the mere fact that
the client owes him attorneys fees.54 The failure of an attorney to return the client's money upon demand
gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice and violation of
the general morality, as well as of professional ethics; it also impairs public confidence in the legal profession
and deserves punishment. In short, a lawyer's unjustified withholding of money belonging to his client, as in
this case, warrants the imposition of disciplinary action. 55

Pointedly, the relationship of attorney and client has consistently been treated as one of special trust and
confidence. An attorney must therefore exercise utmost good faith and fairness in all his relationship with his
client. Measured against this standard, respondent's act clearly fell short and had, in fact, placed his personal
interest above that of his clients. Considering the foregoing violations of his lawyer's oath, Article 1491 (5) of
the Civil Code, Rule 9.02, Canon 9, and Canon 16 of the CPR, the Court deems it appropriate to impose upon
respondent the penalty of six (6) months suspension from the practice of law.56

Qualifications for admission to the Bar

Section 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. — Every applicant for admission as a
member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral
character, and resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence
of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are
pending in any court in the Philippines.

Section 3. Requirements for lawyers who are citizens of the United States of America. — Citizens of the United
States of America who, before July 4, 1946, were duly licensed members of the Philippine Bar, in active
practice in the courts of the Philippines and in good and regular standing as such may, upon satisfactory proof
of those facts before the Supreme Court, be allowed to continue such practice after taking the following oath
of office:

I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the

Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the
Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will
not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent
to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to
the best of may knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients;
and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion. So help me God.

Section 4. Requirements for applicants from other jurisdictions. — Applicants for admission who, being Filipino
citizens, are enrolled attorneys in good standing in the Supreme Court of the United States or in any circuit
court of appeals or district court therein, or in the highest court of any State or Territory of the United States,
and who can show by satisfactory certificates that they have practiced at least five years in any of said courts,
that such practice began before July 4, 1946, and that they have never been suspended or disbarred, may, in
the discretion of the Court, be admitted without examination.

Section 5. Additional requirements for other applicants. — All applicants for admission other than those
referred to in the two preceding section shall, before being admitted to the examination, satisfactorily show
that they have regularly studied law for four years, and successfully completed all prescribed courses, in a law
school or university, officially approved and recognized by the Secretary of Education. The affidavit of the
candidate, accompanied by a certificate from the university or school of law, shall be filed as evidence of such
facts, and further evidence may be required by the court.

No applicant shall be admitted to the bar examinations unless he has satisfactorily completed the following
courses in a law school or university duly recognized by the government: civil law, commercial law, remedial
law, criminal law, public and private international law, political law, labor and social legislation, medical
jurisprudence, taxation and legal ethics.

Maria Victoria Ventura vs. Atty. Danilo Samson

AC 9604
 Complainant filed for disbarment or suspension of Atty. Samson, for grossly immoral conduct.
Complainant alleges that during her stay with the residence of the respondent, she was repeatedly raped by
the latter during which she was only 13 years of age. In one instance, Ventura narrated that she was brought
to the farm of Atty. Samson where after she was sexually molested; the latter gave her 500 pesos for her
silence.

In his Answer, Atty. Samson admits that he and complainant had sex but with the consent of the latter.
Respondent then submits that his act of having sex does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. He further
alleges that the mother of the complainant, Corazon Ventura was a former employee of the law office of Atty.
Samson wherein the former was terminated due to misunderstanding, and Corazon demanded the payment
of 2,000,000 pesos or otherwise she will file against him in Court for rape and disbarment.

The IBP issued a resolution, finding Atty. Samson guilty not for rape but of qualified seduction which
merits him a 5 year suspension from practicing law. Both parties filed their respective MRs, where the
complainant asserts that the suspension is not commensurate to the gravity and depravity of the offense,
while the respondent asserts that since this is the first time he was found to be administratively liable, he is
entitled to a reduction to 1 year of suspension from practicing law.

Issue: W/N respondent should be disbarred.

Ruling:

Yes, WTF. As we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo,14 the possession of good moral character is both a
condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership
in the legal profession. It is the bounden duty of members of the bar to observe the highest degree of morality
in order to safeguard the integrity of the Bar.15 Consequently, any errant behavior on the part of a lawyer, be it
in the lawyer’s public or private activities, which tends to show said lawyer deficient in moral character,
honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or disbarment.

Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to
the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community. 16 Immoral conduct is gross when it is
so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when
committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency.17

From the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of respondent himself, we find that
respondent’s act of engaging in sex with a young lass, the daughter of his former employee, constitutes gross
immoral conduct that warrants sanction. Respondent not only admitted he had sexual intercourse with
complainant but also showed no remorse whatsoever when he asserted that he did nothing wrong because
she allegedly agreed and he even gave her money. Indeed, his act of having carnal knowledge of a woman
other than his wife manifests his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow
of fidelity. Moreover, the fact that he procured the act by enticing a very young woman with money showed
his utmost moral depravity and low regard for the dignity of the human person and the ethics of his
profession.
Likewise, it was held in Maligsa v. Cabanting 21 that a lawyer may be disbarred for any misconduct, whether in
his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and
good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. Similarly, in Dumadag v. Lumaya, 22 the
Court pronounced:

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness,
maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession
are the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege
to practice law.

Illicit sexual relations have been previously punished with disbarment, indefinite or definite suspension,
depending on the circumstances.24 In this case, respondent’s gross misbehavior and unrepentant demeanor
clearly shows a serious flaw in his character, his moral indifference to sexual exploitation of a minor, and his
outright defiance of established norms. All these could not but put the legal profession in disrepute and place
the integrity of the administration of justice in peril, hence the need for strict but appropriate disciplinary
action.

Father Ranhilio Aquino et. al vs. Atty. Edwin Pascua

AC 5095

Complainants sent a letter-complaint against herein respondent Atty. Pascua for falsification of two
documents. In his comment on the letter-complaint, respondent admitted having notarized the two
documents but they were not entered in his Notarial Register due to oversight of his legal secretary. Upon
referral to the Office of the Bar Confidant for investigation, the said office finds respondent to be liable for
falsification. The only supporting evidence of the respondent was his legal secretary’s affidavit, which is hardly
credible since the latter cannot be considered as a disinterested witness or party.

Atty. Pascua claims that the omission was not intentional but due to oversight of his staff. Whichever is
the case, Atty. Pascua cannot escape liability. His failure to enter into his notarial register the documents that
he admittedly notarized is a dereliction of duty on his part as a notary public and he is bound by the acts of his
staff.

Issue: W/N respondent should be held liable for suspension.

Ruling:

Yes. "Misconduct" generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a

premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. 4 The term, however, does not necessarily imply corruption or
criminal intent.5
 The penalty to be imposed for such act of misconduct committed by a lawyer is addressed to the sound
discretion of the Court. In Arrieta v. Llosa,6 wherein Atty. Joel A. Llosa notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale
knowing that some of the vendors were already dead, this Court held that such wrongful act "constitutes
misconduct" and thus imposed upon him the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six months,
this being his first administrative offense. Also, in Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,7 we revoked the notarial
commission of Atty. Mario G. Ramos and suspended him from the practice of law for six months for violating
the Notarial Law in not registering in his notarial book the Deed of Absolute Sale he notarized. In Mondejar v.
Rubia,8 however, a lesser penalty of one month suspension from the practice of law was imposed on Atty.
Vivian G. Rubia for making a false declaration in the document she notarized.

In the present case, considering that this is Atty. Pascua's first offense, we believe that the imposition
of a three-month suspension from the practice of law upon him is in order. Likewise, since his offense is a
ground for revocation of notarial commission, the same should also be imposed upon him.

Ong vs. Atty. Delos Santos

AC 10179

In January 2008, complainant Benjamin Ong was introduced to respondent Atty. William F. Delos
Santos by Sheriff Fernando Mercado of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. After several calls and personal
interactions between them, Ong and Atty. Delos Santos became friends.1 In time, according to Ong, Atty.
Delos Santos asked him to encash his postdated check inasmuch as he was in dire need of cash. To reassure
Ong that the check would be funded upon maturity, Atty. Delos Santos bragged about his lucrative practice
and his good paying clients. Convinced of Atty. Delos Santos’ financial stability, Ong handed to Atty. Delos
Santos on January 29, 2008 the amount of P100,000.00 in exchange for the latter’s Metrobank Check No.
0110268 postdated February 29, 2008.2 However, the check was dishonored upon presentment for the reason
that the account was closed.3 Ong relayed the matter of the dishonor to Atty. Delos Santos, and demanded
immediate payment, but the latter just ignored him. 4 When efforts to collect remained futile, Ong brought a
criminal complaint for estafa and for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against Atty. Delos Santos. 5 Ong also
brought this disbarment complaint against Atty. Delos Santos in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
which docketed the complaint as CBD Case No. 11-2985.

In his Commissioner’s Report,6 IBP Bar Commissioner Jose I. Dela Rama, Jr. stated that Ong had
sufficiently established the existence of the dishonored check; and that Atty. Delos Santos did not file his
answer despite notice, and did not also present contrary evidence. 7 He recommended that Atty. Delos Santos
be held liable for violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and that the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two years, plus the return of the
amount of P100,000.00 to the complainant,8 be meted on Atty. Delos Santos in view of an earlier disbarment
case brought against him (Lucman v. Atty. Delos Santos, CBD Case No. 09-253). (SUSPENDED SIYA 3 YEARS +
RETURN 100K)

Issue: W/N the act of issuing a worthless check violates the CPR.

Ruling:
 Yes (Modified yung sa IBP). We agree with the findings of the IBP but modify the recommended
penalty.

Every lawyer is an officer of the Court. He has the duty and responsibility to maintain his good moral
character. In this regard, good moral character is not only a condition precedent relating to his admission into
the practice of law, but is a continuing imposition in order for him to maintain his membership in the
Philippine Bar.10 The Court unwaveringly demands of him to remain a competent, honorable, and reliable
individual in whom the public may repose confidence. 11 Any gross misconduct that puts his moral character in
serious doubt renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law.

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A Lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

These canons, the Court has said in Agno v. Cagatan,17 required of him as a lawyer an enduring high sense of
responsibility and good fidelity in all his dealings, thus:

The afore-cited canons emphasize the high standard of honesty and fairness expected of a lawyer not only in
the practice of the legal profession but in his personal dealings as well. A lawyer must conduct himself with
great propriety, and his behavior should be beyond reproach anywhere and at all times. For, as officers of the
courts and keepers of the public's faith, they are burdened with the highest degree of social responsibility and
are thus mandated to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and honor. Likewise, the oath that
lawyers swear to impresses upon them the duty of exhibiting the highest degree of good faith, fairness and
candor in their relationships with others. Thus, lawyers may be disciplined for any conduct, whether in their
professional or in their private capacity, if such conduct renders them unfit to continue to be officers of the
court.18

That his act involved a private dealing with Ong did not matter. His being a lawyer invested him – whether he
was acting as such or in a non- professional capacity – with the obligation to exhibit good faith, fairness and
candor in his relationship with others. There is no question that a lawyer could be disciplined not only for a
malpractice in his profession, but also for any misconduct committed outside of his professional capacity. 19 His
being a lawyer demanded that he conduct himself as a person of the highest moral and professional integrity
and probity in his dealings with others.

Accordingly, Atty. Delos Santos was guilty of serious misconduct, warranting appropriate administrative
sanction. Noting that the criminal complaint charging him with the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was
already dismissed, and that he already repaid to Ong the full amount of P100,000.00, 23 both of which are
treated as mitigating circumstances in his favor, we find the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to
suspend him from the practice of law for a period of three years harsh. Thus, we reduce the penalty to
suspension from the practice of law to six months in order to accord with the ruling in Philippine Amusement
and Gaming Corporation v. Carandang.24

Mercullo vs. Atty. Frances Ramon

AC 11078

National Home Mortgage Finance Corp. (NHMFC) sent demand letters to complainants, regarding
unpaid obligations covering the residential property in Caloocan City. To avoid foreclosure, Carmelita (owner)
authorized her children (complainants) to inquire as to obligations. Upon meeting with the sheriff, they were
told that they have an outstanding balance of 350,000 with the right to redeem within 1 year from
foreclosure.

Complainants then called up respondent, who was connected with NHMFC. They were informed of the
procedure and paid up the balance. Subsequently, the complainants followed up as to the redemption of the
property, they discovered that Atty. Ramon did not deposit the balance with the Court.

2013, complainants went to Makati RTC and handed the demand letter to respondent, but with futility.
Complainants then filed a disbarment complaint with the IBP. The IBP found Atty. Ramon to have violated the
CPR (Rule 1.01) and recommended suspension for 2 years plus payment of 350,000 plus interest.

Issue: W/N respondent is guilty of dishonesty and deceit.

Ruling:

YES! Hahaha The Lawyer's Oath is a source of the obligations and duties of every lawyer. Any violation
of the oath may be punished with either disbarment, or suspension from the practice of law, or other
commensurate disciplinary action.[16] Every lawyer must at no time be wanting in probity and moral fiber
which are not only conditions precedent to his admission to the Bar, but are also essential for his continued
membership in the Law Profession.[17] Any conduct unbecoming of a lawyer constitutes a violation of his oath.

The respondent certainly transgressed the Lawyer's Oath by receiving money from the complainants after
having made them believe that she could assist them in ensuring the redemption in their mother's behalf. She
was convincing about her ability to work on the redemption because she had worked in the NHFMC. She did
not inform them soon enough, however, that she had meanwhile ceased to be connected with the agency. It
was her duty to have so informed them. She further misled them about her ability to realize the redemption
by falsely informing them about having started the redemption process. She concealed from them the real
story that she had not even initiated the redemption proceedings that she had assured them she would do.
Everything she did was dishonest and deceitful in order to have them part with the substantial sum of
P350,000.00. She took advantage of the complainants who had reposed their full trust and confidence in her
ability to perform the task by virtue of her being a lawyer. Surely, the totality of her actuations inevitably
eroded public trust in the Legal Profession.
As a lawyer, the respondent was proscribed from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct in her dealings with others, especially clients whom she should serve with competence and
diligence.[18] Her duty required her to maintain fealty to them, binding her not to neglect the legal matter
entrusted to her. Thus, her neglect in connection therewith rendered her liable. [19] Moreover, the unfulfilled
promise of returning the money and her refusal to communicate with the complainants on the matter of her
engagement aggravated the neglect and dishonesty attending her dealings with the complainants.

Evil intent was not essential in order to bring the unlawful act or omission of the respondent within the
coverage of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility[20] The Code exacted from her not only a firm
respect for the law and legal processes but also the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with
clients and the moneys entrusted by them pursuant to their fiduciary relationship. [21]

Yet another dereliction of the respondent was her wanton disregard of the several notices sent to her by the
IBP in this case. Such disregard could only be wrong because it reflected her undisguised contempt of the
proceedings of the IBP, a body that the Court has invested with the authority to investigate the disbarment
complaint against her. She thus exhibited her irresponsibility as well as her utter disrespect for the Court and
the rest of the Judiciary. It cannot be understated that a lawyer in her shoes should comply with the orders of
the Court and of the Court's duly constituted authorities, like the IBP, the office that the Court has particularly
tasked to carry out the specific function of investigating attorney misconduct. [22]

The respondent deserves severe chastisement and appropriate sanctions. In this regard, the IBP Board of
Governors recommended her suspension for two years from the practice of law, and her return of the amount
of P350,000.00 to the complainants. The recommended penalty is not commensurate to the gravity of the
misconduct committed. She merited a heavier sanction of suspension from the practice of law for five years.
Her professional misconduct warranted a longer suspension from the practice of law because she had caused
material prejudice to the clients' interest.[23] She should somehow be taught to be more ethical and
professional in dealing with trusting clients like the complainants and their mother, who were innocently too
willing to repose their utmost trust in her abilities as a lawyer and in her trustworthiness as a legal
professional. In this connection, we state that the usual mitigation of the recommended penalty by virtue of
the misconduct being her first offense cannot be carried out in her favor considering that she had disregarded
the several notices sent to her by the IBP in this case. As to the return of the P350,000.00 to the complainant,
requiring her to restitute with legal interest is only fair and just because she did not comply in the least with
her ethical undertaking to work on the redemption of the property of the mother of the complainants. In
addition, she is sternly warned against a similar infraction in the future; otherwise, the Court will have her
suffer a more severe penalty. (5 YEARS SUSPENSION GINAWA SA KANYA SAD + PAYMENT WITH INTEREST)

Bienvenida Flor Suarez vs. Atty. Maravilla-Ona

AC 11064

Bienvenida the old woman (84 sad) went to the office of respondent Attorney scammer Maravilla-Ona
for transferring of title to a certain land, under her name. Respondent agreed for 48,000 pesos. After turnover
of documents and fulfillment of payment, Bienvenida the old woman did not receive any updates as to the
transfer. Apparently, hindi pala ginawa ni tarantado yung pinagawa sa kanya! So the poor Bienvenida
demanded return of payment but Atty. Maravilla-Ona was nowhere to be found. Gone with the wind.

Joke lang, nakita nila si Atty. Maravilla and issued a check but the same had no funds so again, she
promised to pay, which did not materialize. Aggrieved, complainant initiated a case against respondent for
recovery of the 58,000 with the IBP.

In its Report and Recommendation[9] dated July 22, 2014, the CBD found that Atty. Maravilla-Ona was
guilty of gross misconduct and violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility for: (1) issuing a worthless
check; (2) refusing to settle due obligations despite demand; (3) failing to serve the complainant with
competence and diligence; and (4) failing to apprise her client of the status of the transactions. [10] Thus, the
CBD recommended that Atty. Maravilla-Ona be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year
and ordered to pay Bienvenida the amount of P58,000. However, the IBP issued a resolution, disbarring her
from practicing law.

Issue: W/N Atty. Maravilla-Ona is liable administratively.

Ruling:

YES NA YES. Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code provides that "[lawyers] shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." By taking the lawyer's oath, lawyers become guardians of the law
and indispensable instruments for the orderly administration of justice. [14] As such, they can be disciplined for
any conduct, in their professional or private capacity, which renders them unfit to continue to be officers of
the court.[15]

In the instant case, it is clear that Atty. Maravilla-Ona violated her sworn duties under the Lawyer's Oath and
the Code. The records plainly show that Atty. Maravilla-Ona was completely remiss and negligent in fulfilling
her obligations as a lawyer to Bienvenida. After collecting the full amount of her professional and legal fees,
Atty. Maravilla-Ona did not take a single step to process the registration of land title in Bienvenida's name.
Worse, when asked to return the money she received from Bienvenida, Atty. Maravilla-Ona issued a worthless
check which consequently bounced when presented for payment.

In Belleza v. Atty. Macasa, the Court ruled that a lawyer's failure to return the client's money upon demand
gives rise to the presumption that the lawyer has misappropriated it for his or her own use to the prejudice of
and in violation of the trust reposed in him or her by the client. It is a gross violation of general morality as
well as of professional ethics; it impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment

Atty. Maravilla-Ona's agreement to render her legal services to Bienvenida, sealed by her receipt of her legal
fees, is an assurance and representation that she would be diligent and competent in fulfilling her
responsibilities as Bienvenida's lawyer. However, Atty. Maravilla-Ona acted to the contrary. Thus, the IBP
correctly found that she violated Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 thereof, which state:
Canon 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence;

Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.

Atty. Maravilla-Ona's negligence, her failure to return her client's money, and her act of issuing a worthless
check constitute dishonesty, abuse of trust and confidence, and betrayal of her client's interests. These acts
undoubtedly speak of deceit Deceitful conduct involves moral turpitude and includes anything done contrary
to justice, modesty or good morals. It is an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social
duties which a person owes to his or her fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals.[17] Such malfeasance is not only unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the
legal profession; it also reveals a basic moral flaw that makes her unfit to practice law.

QUALIFICATIONS FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR

Paulino Lim vs. Atty. Rivera (Nag issue ng worthless check si kumag)

AC 12156

Complainant and respondent became chummy chummy when they met at the RTC after having a
conversation with each other. The following month, respondent borrowed 75,000 where complainant agreed
after the former issued a guarantee check. Subsequently, the gagong respondent borrowed 150k, 10k, and
another 10k w/o issuing a check. Na sweet talk daw si complainant.

When complainant deposited the check, the same was dishonored. Thereafter, respondent wouldn’t
answer calls hahaha so the complainant’s lawyer sent a demand letter but to no avail. This prompted Lim to
file an administrative case with the IBP.

The IBP IC declared that respondent's act of issuing a worthless check was a violation of Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) which requires that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

ISSUE: W/N respondent should be held liable for issuance of a worthless check in violation of the CPR

RULING:

YES. It has been consistently held that "[the] deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of
worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from
the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal
system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty,
integrity and fair dealing so that the peoples' faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must
at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients, which include
prompt payment of financial obligations.
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and
legal processes.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
In Enriquez v. De Vera,[24] the Court categorically pronounced that a lawyer's act of issuing a worthless check,
punishable under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, constitutes serious misconduct penalized by suspension from the
practice of law for one (1) year, for which no conviction of the criminal charge is even necessary. Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 was '"designed to prohibit and altogether eliminate the deleterious and pernicious practice
of issuing checks with insufficient funds, or with no credit, because the practice is deemed a public nuisance, a
crime against public order to be abated."[25] Being a lawyer, respondent was well aware of, or was nonetheless
presumed to know, the objectives and coverage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. Yet, he knowingly violated the law
and thereby "exhibited his indifference towards the pernicious effect of his illegal act to public interest and
public order."[26]

In addition, respondent's failure to answer the complaint against him and his failure to appear at the
scheduled mandatory conference/hearing despite notice are evidence of his flouting resistance to lawful
orders of the court and illustrate his despiciency for his oath of office in violation of Section 3, Rule 138, Rules
of Court.[27] Respondent should stand foremost in complying with the directives of the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline not only because as a lawyer, he is called upon to obey the legal orders of duly constituted
authorities, as well as court orders and processes, but also because the case involved the very foundation of
his right to engage in the practice of law. Therefore, his lack of concern or interest in the status or outcome of
his administrative case would show how much less he would regard the interest of his clients.

Indisputably, respondent has fallen short of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal
profession. His transgressions showed him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his
license and the law confer to him, for which he must suffer the consequence.

Cabiles vs. Atty. Cedo

AC 10245

Complainant engaged the services of Atty. Cedo (respondent) to handle an illegal dismissal case,
wherein the latter was paid 5,500 for drafting Cabiles’ position paper as well as 2,000 for his every appearance
at the hearings in NLRC.

In one instance, hindi nag file ng reply si Atty. Cedo despite being paid the appearance fee (Danilo, the
other party filed the same). In short, natalo sila. Worse still, on October 27, 2009, the NLRC likewise dismissed
the appeal of the clients of respondent lawyer for failure to post the required cash or surety bond, an essential
requisite in perfecting an appeal. Respondent lawyer misled them by claiming that it was Danilo who was
absent during the said hearing on March 26, 2009; and that moreover, because of the failure to submit a
Reply, they were prevented from presenting the cash vouchers, hence they did not complete the filing of
appeal within the appropriate period. (Tapos hindi nag indicate ng MCLE compliance si Atty. Cedo sa position
paper)

In another case, si Cabiles hinire din si Atty. Cedo to file for unjust vexation but the latter did not even
lift a finger despite being paid.
 In his Answer,17 respondent lawyer argued that the March 26, 2009 hearing was set to provide the
parties the opportunity either to explore the possibility of an amicable settlement, or give time for him
(respondent lawyer) to decide whether to file a responsive pleading, after which the case would be routinely
submitted for resolution, with or without the parties' further appearances. As regards the cash vouchers,
respondent lawyer opined that their submission would only contradict their defense of lack of employer-
employee relationship. Respondent lawyer likewise claimed that Elibena was only feigning ignorance of the
cost of the appeal bond, and that in any event, Elibena herself could have paid the appeal bond. With regard
to Elibena's allegation that she was virtually forced to sell her car to respondent lawyer to complete payment
of the latter's professional fee, respondent lawyer claimed that he had fully paid for the car.

The IBP found him to have violated Canons 5, 17, 18 of the CPR. He was to be suspended for a year.

ISYU: W/N respondent may be held liable for violating the CPR (5, 18, 17)

RULING:

Yes. Firstly, Bar Matter 850 mandates continuing legal education for IBP members as an additional
requirement to enable them to practice law.1âwphi1 This is "to ensure that throughout their career, they
keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of
the practice of law."20 Non-compliance with the MCLE requirement subjects the lawyer to be listed as a
delinquent IBP member.

CANON 5 - A LAWYER SHALL KEEP ABREAST OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS, PARTICIPATE IN CONTINUING

LEGAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS, SUPPORT EFFORTS TO ACH1EVE HIGH ST AND ARDS IN LAW SCHOOLS AS
WELL AS IN THE PRACTICAL TRAINING OF LAW STUDENTS AND ASSIST IN DISSEMINATING INFORMATION
REGARDING THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.

The circumstances of this case indicated that respondent lawyer was guilty of gross negligence for failing to
exert his utmost best in prosecuting and in defending the interest of his client. Hence, he is guilty of the
following:

CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE
TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.

Furthermore, respondent lawyer's act of receiving an acceptance fee for legal services, only to subsequently
fail to render such service at the appropriate time, was a clear violation of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.24

Respondent lawyer did not diligently and fully attend to the cases that he accepted, although he had been
fully compensated for them. First off, respondent lawyer never successfully refuted Elibena's claim that he was
paid in advance his Php2,000.00 appearance fee on March 21, 2009 for the scheduled hearing of the labor
case on March 26, 2009, during which he was absent. Furthermore, although respondent lawyer had already
received the sum of Php45,000.00 to file an unjust vexation case, he failed to promptly file the appropriate
complaint therefor with the City Prosecutor's Office, in consequence of which the crime prescribed, resulting
in the dismissal of the case.

Case law further illumines that a lawyer's duty of competence and diligence includes not merely reviewing the
cases entrusted to the counsel's care or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly representing
the client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the
required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination
without waiting for the client or the court to prod him or her to do so.

APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERSZXC (AM 19-03-24)

The Supreme Court en banc, on June 25, 2019, adopted and promulgated A.M. No. 19-03-24-SC Rule
138-A Law Student Practice, otherwise known as the Revised Law Student Practice Rule (Revised Rule).
The Revised Rule is an amendment to the existing provisions of Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court. A salient
feature of the Revised Rule is that a law student must now be certified to be able to engage in the limited
practice of law.

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court used its
power to adopt and promulgate rules concerning legal assistance to the underprivileged through the
amendment of the provisions of Rule 138-A. This amendment ensures access to justice of the marginalized
sectors, enhances learning opportunities of law students by instilling in them the value of legal professional
social responsibility, and to prepare them for the practice of law. The Supreme Court also addressed the need
to institutionalize clinical legal education program in all law schools in order to enhance, improve, and
streamline law student practice, and regulate their limited practice of law. The Revised Rule is now more
comprehensive with 14 sections and shall take effect at the start of the Academic Year 2020-2021 following its
publication in two newspapers of general circulation.

Under Section 3 of the Revised Rule, a law student shall apply for and secure a Level 1 or 2 Certification, as the
case may be, in order to be permitted to engage in any of the activities under the Clinical Legal Education
Program of a law school. The basic distinction between the two levels involve the minimum academic
requirement the law student has successfully completed: for Level 1 Certification – first-year law courses,
while for Level 2 Certification – third-year law courses.

Section 4 enumerates the practice areas for law student practitioners for both Level 1 and 2 Certifications.
Section 5 itemizes the certification application requirements, which include a duly-accomplished application
form under oath in three copies accompanied by proof of payment of the necessary legal and filing fees. It also
distinguishes where each level certification is valid. Level 1 is valid before all courts, quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies within the judicial region where the law school is located, whereas Level 2 is valid before
all courts, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies.
Once the law student is certified, the certificate number must be used in signing briefs, pleadings, letters, and
other similar documents produced under the direction of a supervising lawyer. (Section 7) The law student
shall also take the Law Student Practitioner’s Oath, a modified lawyer’s oath, under Section 8 before engaging
in the limited practice of law.

The duties of law student practitioners, law schools, and supervising lawyers are also enumerated in Sections
6, 9, and 11 respectively.

The Revised Rule also enumerates in Section 13 acts considered as unauthorized practice of lawas well as the
corresponding sanctions, without prejudice to existing laws, rules, regulations, and circulars. It stresses that
“unauthorized practice of law shall be a ground for revocation of the law student practitioner’s certification
and/or disqualification for a law student from taking the bar examinations for a period to be determined by
the Supreme Court.

Cruz vs. Mina

GR 154207

Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private
prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for Grave Threats, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining
witness. The petitioner is a third year law student and justifies his appearance as counsel on the basis of Rule
138, Sec. 34.

However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as
private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in conjunction
with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence.

On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the MeTC a Motion for Reconsideration seeking to reverse the
February 1, 2002 Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, does not have the effect of
superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to interpret the rule is the source itself of the rule, which
is the Supreme Court alone.

In short, denied yung bata hanggang SC, same reason with the lower courts.

Issue: W/N the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a
party litigant.

Ruling:

YESSSSS.

RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. – A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the
regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education
program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or
administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by
the legal clinic of the law school.

Sec. 2. Appearance. – The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct
supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law
school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the
supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.

However, in Resolution6 dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified:

The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and
procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity without
the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an
attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his
appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the
supervision of a member of the bar.7 (Emphasis supplied)

The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" in Bar Matter No. 730 is subsequently changed to "In the
court of a municipality" as it now appears in Section 34 of Rule 138, thus:8

SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the Court of a municipality a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In
any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney and his appearance must
be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)

which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his Entry of Appearance with the MeTC on
September 25, 2000. No real distinction exists for under Section 6, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court, the term
"Municipal Trial Courts" as used in these Rules shall include Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in
Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the former, the
appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly allowed, while the latter rule
provides for conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, may appear before
the courts.
Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously held that, by its very nature, no civil liability may flow from
the crime of Grave Threats, and, for this reason, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not possible.

It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had been intended by the RTC. In denying the
issuance of the injunctive court, the RTC stated in its Decision that there was no claim for civil liability by the
private complainant for damages, and that the records of the case do not provide for a claim for indemnity;
and that therefore, petitioner’s appearance as private prosecutor appears to be legally untenable.

Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable
except in instances when no actual damage results from an offense, such as espionage, violation of neutrality,
flight to an enemy country, and crime against popular representation. 9 The basic rule applies in the instant
case, such that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from
the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

PROCEEDINGS WHERE LAWYERS ARE PROHIBITED FROM APPEARING AS COUNSELS

Fajardo vs. Atty. Alvarez

AC 9018

Complainant Teresita P. Fajardo (Teresita) was the Municipal Treasurer of San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija.
She hired respondent Atty. Nicanor C. Alvarez (Atty. Alvarez) to defend her in criminal and administrative
cases before the Office of the Ombudsman.

Atty. Alvarez was then working in the Legal Section of the National Center for Mental Health.[2] He
asked for P1,400,000.00 as acceptance fee.[3] However, Atty. Alvarez did not enter his appearance before the
Office of the Ombudsman nor sign any pleadings.

Atty. Alvarez assured Teresita that he had friends connected with the Office of the Ombudsman who
could help with dismissing her case for a certain fee.[5] Atty. Alvarez said that he needed to pay the amount of
P500,000.00 to his friends and acquaintances... working at the Office of the Ombudsman to have the cases
against Teresita dismissed.[6]

However, just two (2) weeks after Teresita and Atty. Alvarez talked, the Office of the Ombudsman
issued a resolution and decision recommending the filing of a criminal complaint against Teresita, and her
dismissal from service, respectively.[7]

Teresita then demanded that Atty. Alvarez return at least a portion of the amount she gave.[8] Atty.
Alvarez promised to return the amount to Teresita; however, he failed to fulfill this promise.[9] Teresita sent a
demand letter to Atty. Alvarez, which he failed to heed.

ISSUE: whether respondent Atty. Nicanor C. Alvarez, as a lawyer working in the Legal Section of the National
Center for Mental Health under the Department of Health, is authorized to engage in the private practice of
law;

RULING:
 No. Respondent practiced law even if he did not sign any pleading. In the context of this case, his
surreptitious actuations reveal illicit intent. Not only did he do unauthorized practice, his acts also show
badges of offering to peddle influence in the Office of the Ombudsman.

In this case, respondent was given written permission by the Head of the National Center for Mental
Health, whose authority was designated under Department of Health Administrative Order No. 21, series of
1999.[58]

However, by assisting and representing complainant in a suit against the Ombudsman and against
government in general, respondent put himself in a situation of conflict of interest.

Respondent's practice of profession was expressly and impliedly conditioned on the requirement that
his practice will not be "in conflict with the interest of the Center and the Philippine government as a whole

There is basic conflict of interest here. Respondent is a public officer, an employee of government. The
Office of the Ombudsman is part of government. By appearing against the Office of the Ombudsman,
respondent is going against the same employer he swore to serve.

Likewise, we find that respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he communicated to or, at the very least, made it appear to complainant that he knew
people from the Office of the Ombudsman who could help them get a favorable decision... in complainant's
case.

Thus, respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 1, Rules 1.01, and 1.02[78]
prohibit lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.[79] Respondent's act of
ensuring that the case... will be dismissed because of his personal relationships with officers or employees in
the Office of the Ombudsman is unlawful and dishonest. Canon 7[80] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility requires lawyers to always "uphold the integrity and dignity... of the legal profession."

In relation, Canon 13[81] mandates that lawyers "shall rely upon the merits of his [or her] cause and
refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court."

A lawyer that approaches a judge to try to gain influence and receive a favorable outcome for his or
her client violates Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Nevertheless, as found by the Investigating Commissioner and as shown by the records, we rule that
there is... enough proof to hold respondent guilty of influence peddling.

Respondent Arty. Nicanor C. Alvarez is guilty of violating the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees, the Lawyer's Oath, and the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)... year with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. Respondent is ORDERED to return the amount of P500,000.00
with legal interest to complainant Teresita P. Fajardo.

Santos vs. Atty. Arrojado

AC 8502
 In an Affidavit1 dated December 7, 2009, complainant Christopher R. Santos (Complainant Santos)
sought the disbarment of respondent Atty. Joseph A. Arrojado (Atty. Arrojado) for violation of Article 1491 of
the Civil Code, by acquiring an interest in the land involved in a litigation in which he had taken part by reason
of the exercise of his profession

Complainant Santos alleged that he was the defendant in the unlawful detainer case filed by Lilia Rodriguez
(Lilia) wherein the respondent lawyer, Atty. Arrojado, was the counsel for Lilia. The case eventually reached
the Supreme Court which resolved2 the same in favor of Atty. Arrojado's client.

Complainant, however, claimed that on August 7, 2009, while the case was pending before the Supreme
Court, Lilia sold one of the properties in litis pendentia to Atty. Arrojado's son, Julius P. Arrojado (Julius) and
that Atty. Arrojado even signed as a witness of that sale. Believing that Atty. Arrojado committed malpractice
when he acquired, through his son Julius, an interest in the property subject of the unlawful detainer case in
violation of Article 1491 of the Civil Code, complainant instituted the instant complaint.

In his Verified Comment,3 Atty. Arrojado admitted: (1) that Lilia was a client of the law firm wherein he was a
senior partner; (2) that Julius was his son; and (3) that one of the subject properties in the ejectment suit was
purchased by his son from Lilia. Atty. Arrojado maintained that he did not violate Article 1491 as he had
absolutely no interest in the property purchased by his son; and that the proscription in the said article did not
extend to the relatives of the judicial officers mentioned therein. He postulated that, when the sale took place,
Julius was already of legal age and discretion, as well as a registered nurse and an established businessman;
and that while it was through him (respondent lawyer) that Lilia and Julius met, he did not at all facilitate the
transaction. Respondent lawyer also pointed out that complainant failed to cite a specific provision or canon in
the Code of Professional Responsibility which he had allegedly transgressed or violated.

Investigating Commissioner Winston A. Abuyuan of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines - Commission
on Bar Discipline, (IBP-CBD), recommended the exoneration of Atty. Arrojado. The Board of Governors (BOG)
of the IBP, in Resolution No. XX- 2012-359 dated July 21, 2012, adopted the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner and his recommendation to dismiss the complaint for lack of merit.

Issue: Whether or not the prohibition in Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code against justices, judges, prosecuting
attorneys, clerks of court, and other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, as
well as lawyers, from purchasing property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they
may take part by virtue of their profession, extends to their respective immediate families or relatives.

Ruling:

No. Undeniably, Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code prohibits the purchase by lawyers of any interest in
the subject matter of the litigation in which they participated by reason of their profession. Here, however,
respondent lawyer was not the purchaser or buyer of the property or rights in litigation. For, in point of fact, it
was his son Julius, and not respondent lawyer, who purchased the subject property.

Were we to include within the purview of the law the members of the immediate family or relatives of the
lawyer laboring under disqualification, we would in effect be amending the law. We apply to this case the old
and familiar Latin maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which means that the express mention of one
person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. Stated otherwise, "where the terms are expressly
limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be stretched or extended to other
matters.

As worded, Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code covers only (1) justices;

(2) judges; (3) prosecuting attorneys; (4) clerks of court; (5) other officers and employees connected with the
administration of justice; and (6) lawyers.1âwphi1 The enumeration cannot be stretched or extended to
include relatives of the lawyer - in this case, Julius, son of respondent lawyer.

Concededly, Article 1491 provides that "[t]he following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public
or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another xx x." However, perusal of the records
would show that complainant failed to adduce any shred of evidence that Julius acted or mediated on behalf
of respondent lawyer, or that respondent lawyer was the ultimate beneficiary of the sale transaction. The
mere fact that it was Julius, son of respondent lawyer, who purchased the property, will not support the
allegation that respondent lawyer violated Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code. As aptly noted by the Investigating
Commissioner, "[t]here is no evidence to show that respondent had used his son as a conduit to gain the
property in question xx x." 10

In addition, it must be stressed that the "prohibition which rests on considerations of public policy and
interests is intended to curtail any undue influence of the lawyer upon his client on account of his fiduciary
and confidential relationship with him." 11 Again, we adopt the findings of the Investigating Commissioner that
"a scrutiny of complainant's arguments would reveal that he himself [was] even unsure if respondent had
indeed taken advantage of his fiduciary relationship with his client, as he safely uses the words "it looks like"
or "we believe". 12 Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner aptly observed that there was no "slightest
proof showing that [Julius] was used by respondent to acquire the property of his clients. Affidavits executed
by the owners, as well as [Julius] himself showed that respondent did not even actively participate in the
negotiations concerning the property." 13 At most, although respondent lawyer's role or participation in the
sale in question, if any, might ruffle very sensitive scruples, it is not, however, per se prohibited or forbidden
by said Article 1491.