PRACTICE OF LAW
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended
1.CONCEPT
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No.11156 [Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3680],
March 19, 2018
MICHELLE YAP, Complainant, v. ATTY. GRACE C.
BURI, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
The instant case stemmed from the complaint of Michelle
Yap against respondent Atty. Grace C. Buri for refusing to
pay her monetary obligation and for filing a criminal case
of Estafa against her based on false accusations.
The factual backdrop of the case is as follows:
Complainant Michelle Yap was the vendor in a contract of
sale of a condominium unit, while Atty. Grace C. Buri,
Yap's close friend and her daughter's godmother, was the
vendee. Buri made an offer to purchase the property but
asked for the reduction of the price from P1,500,000.00 to
P1,200,000.00. After consulting with her husband, Yap
agreed. Of the total amount of purchase price of
P1,200,000.00, P200,000.00 remains unpaid; Buri insisted
that she would just pay the balance on installment
starting in but without specifying the amount to be paid
on each installment. Because she trusted the respondent,
Yap gave Buri the full and immediate possession of the
condominium unit upon completion of the P1,000,000.00
despite the outstanding balance and even without the
necessary Deed of Absolute Sale. However, when Yap
finally asked for the balance in January 2011, Buri said
she would pay it on a monthly installment of P5,000.00
until fully paid. When Yap disagreed, Buri said she would
just cancel the sale. Thereafter, Buri also started
threatening her through text messages, and then later on
filed a case for estafa against her.
Buri alleged in the criminal case that when she found out
that the sale of the condominium unit was made without
the consent of Yap's husband, Yap cancelled the sale and
promised to return the amount of P1,000,000.00 initially
paid. Despite several demands, however, she failed and
refused to return the money. Thus, Buri was constrained
to file a case for estafa against Yap. Said case was later
dismissed.
Yap then filed an administrative complaint against Buri for
the alleged false accusations against her.
When ordered to submit her answer, Buri failed to comply.
She did not even appear during the mandatory
conference. Thus, the mandatory conference was
terminated and the parties were simply required to submit
their respective position papers. However, only Yap
complied with said order.
On July 2, 2014, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Buri's suspension to wit:1
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, undersigned
Commissioner recommends to impose the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for a period of three
(3) months upon the respondent, Atty. Grace C. Buri, and
for her to pay the complainant the amount of
PhP200,000.00 upon execution by complainant and
spouse of the Deed of Absolute Sale of the condominium
unit subject of the sale between the parties.
On January 31, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued
Resolution No. XXI-2015-062,2 which adopted the
foregoing recommendation but with modification, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A," finding Respondent's violation of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Hence,
Atty. Grace C. Buri is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year. The order to pay
P200,000.00 is deleted without prejudice to the filing of
proper action by Complainant in Court.
The Court's Ruling
The Court finds no sufficient reason to overturn the
findings and recommendation of the IBP that Buri must be
disciplined accordingly.
Here, instead of paying Yap the remaining balance of the
purchase price of the condominium unit, Buri opted to
simply threaten her and file a criminal case against her.
Obviously, this strategy was to intimidate Yap and prevent
her from collecting the remaining P200,000.00. When
given a chance to defend herself, Buri chose to stay silent
and even refused to file an answer, attend the hearing, or
to submit her position paper, despite due notice. Hence,
Yap's version of the facts stands and remains
uncontroverted.
Buri's unwarranted tenacity simply shows, not only her
lack of responsibility, but also her lack of interest in
clearing her name, which, as pronounced in case law, is
indicative of an implied admission of the charges levelled
against her.3
Buri's persistent refusal to pay her obligation despite
frequent demands clearly reflects her lack of integrity and
moral soundness; she took advantage of her knowledge of
the law and clearly resorted to threats and intimidation in
order to get away with what she wanted , constituting a
gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of
public confidence in the legal profession.4
Buri indubitably swept aside the Lawyer's Oath that
enjoins her to support the Constitution and obey the laws.
She forgot that she must not wittingly or willingly promote
or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid
nor consent to the same. She also took for granted the
express commands of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), specifically Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and
Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the CPR.
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR provide:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 -A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxxx
While Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the CPR state:
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD
THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF
THE INTEGRATED BAR.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
The foregoing canons require of Buri, as a lawyer, an
enduring high sense of responsibility and good fidelity in
all her dealings and emphasize the high standard of
honesty and fairness expected of her, not only in the
practice of the legal profession, but in her personal
dealings as well. A lawyer must conduct himself with great
propriety, and his behavior should be beyond reproach
anywhere and at all times. For, as officers of the courts
and keepers of the public's faith, they are burdened with
the highest degree of social responsibility and are thus
mandated to behave at all times in a manner consistent
with truth and honor. Likewise, the oath that lawyers
swear to impresses upon them the duty of exhibiting the
highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor in their
relationships with others. Thus, lawyers may be
disciplined for any conduct, whether in their professional
or in their private capacity, if such conduct renders them
unfit to continue to be officers of the court.5
That Buri's act involved a private dealing with Yap is
immaterial. Her being a lawyer calls for - whether she was
acting as such or in a non professional capacity - the
obligation to exhibit good faith, fairness and candor in her
relationship with others. There is no question that a
lawyer could be disciplined not only for a malpractice in
his profession, but also for any misconduct committed
outside of his professional capacity. Buri's being a lawyer
demands that she conduct herself as a person of the
highest moral and professional integrity and probity in her
dealings with others.6
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the practice of
law is imbued with public interest and that a lawyer owes
substantial duties, not only to his client, but also to his
brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the
public, and takes part in the administration of justice, one
of the most important functions of the State, as an officer
of the court. Accordingly, lawyers are bound to maintain,
not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of
morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.7
condition precedent to the admission to the legal
profession, but its continued possession is essential to
maintain one's good standing in the profession.
Consequently, a lawyer can be deprived of his license for
misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the
Court after giving him the opportunity to be heard.8
Verily, Buri has fallen short of the high standard of
morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing expected of
her. On the contrary, she employed her knowledge and
skill of the law in order to avoid fulfillment of her
obligation, thereby unjustly enriching herself and inflicting
serious damage on Yap. Her repeated failure to file her
answer and position paper and to appear at the
mandatory conference aggravate her misconduct. These
demonstrate high degree of irresponsibility and lack of
respect for the IBP and its proceedings. Her attitude
severely stains the nobility of the legal profession.9
The Court sustains the modified recommendation of the
IBP Board of Governors. The Court has held that the
deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes gross
misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with
one (1) year-suspension from the practice of law.10 The
Court likewise upholds the deletion of the payment of the
P200,000.00 since the same is not intrinsically linked to
Buri's professional engagement. Disciplinary proceedings
should only revolve around the determination of the
respondent lawyer's administrative and not his civil
liability. Thus, when the claimed liabilities are purely civil
in nature, as when the claim involves money owed by the
lawyer to his client in view of a separate and distinct
transaction and not by virtue of a lawyer-client
relationship, the same should be threshed out in a
separate civil action.11
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
Court SUSPENDS Atty. Grace C. Buri from the practice of
law for a period of one (1) year and WARNS her that a
repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt
with more severely.
Let copies of this decision be included in the personal
records of Atty. Grace C. Buri and entered in her file in the
Office of the Bar Confidant.
Let copies of this decision be disseminated to all lower
courts by the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

Time and again, the Court has stressed the settled

principle that the practice of law is not a right but a
privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that
they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications
required by law for the conferment of such privilege.
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. A high sense of morality, honesty, and fair
dealing is expected and required of a member of the bar.
The nature of the office of a lawyer requires that he shall
be of good moral character. This qualification is not only a
 A.C. No. 11246, June 14, 2016
ARNOLD PACAO, Complainant, v. ATTY. SINAMAR
LIMOS, Respondent.
DECISION
Before this Court is a verified complaint1 filed on
November 4, 2011 by Arnold Pacao (complainant),
seeking the disbarment of Atty. Sinamar Limos (Atty.
Limos) for conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar.
Sometime in March 2008, complainant's wife Mariadel
Pacao, former vault custodian of BHF Pawnshop (BHF)
branch in Mandaluyong City, was charged with qualified
theft by BHF. At the preliminary investigation, Atty. Limos
appeared as counsel for BHF. Thereafter, the case was
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong
City.2
ChanRoblesVirt ualawli bra ry
To buy peace, the complainant initiated negotiation with
BHF, through Atty. Limos, for a possible settlement. A
meeting was then arranged between the complainant and
Atty. Limos, where the latter represented that she was
duly authorized by BHF. After a series of negotiations,
Atty. Limos relayed that BHF is demanding the sum of
P530,000.00 to be paid in full or by installments. Further
negotiation led to an agreement whereby the complainant
would pay an initial amount of P200,000.00 to be
entrusted to Atty. Limos, who will then deliver to the
complainant a signed affidavit of desistance, a
compromise agreement, and a joint motion to approve
compromise agreement for filing with the court.3
On October 29, 2009, the complainant gave the initial
amount of P200,000.00 to Atty. Limos, who in turn,
signed an Acknowledgment Receipt4 recognizing her
undertakings as counsel of BHF. However, Atty. Limos
failed to meet the terms of their agreement.
Notwithstanding such failure, Atty. Limos still sought to
get from the complainant the next installment amount of
their purported agreement, but the latter refused.5
Thereafter, in June 2010, the complainant met BHF's
representative, Camille Bonifacio, who informed him that
Atty. Limos was no longer BHF's counsel and was not
authorized to negotiate any settlement nor receive any
money in behalf of BHF. The complainant also learned that
BHF did not receive the P200,000.00 initial payment that
he gave to Atty. Limos.6
This prompted the complainant to send a demand
letter7 to Atty. Limos to return the P200,000.00 initial
settlement payment, but the latter failed and refused to
do so.8 ChanRobles Virtualawl ibra ry
The complainant then filed a disbarment case against
Atty. Limos before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) - Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD). The IBP-CBD
required Atty. Limos to file an answer but she did not file
any responsive pleading.9 A mandatory conference was
then set on March 1 and 29, 2012, and April 19, 2012, but
Atty. Limos failed to attend. Thereafter, the IBP-CBD
ordered the parties to submit their position paper, but
PER CURIAM:
The Facts
ChanRobles Virtualawl ibra ry
ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary
ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry
once again, Atty. Limos did not bother to submit her
position paper.
On May 5, 2014, the Investigating Commissioner
recommended the disbarment of Atty. Limos.10 The
Investigating Commissioner found enough evidence on
record to prove that Atty. Limos committed fraud and
practiced deceit on the complainant to the latter's
prejudice by concealing or omitting to disclose the
material fact that she no longer had the authority to
negotiate and conclude a settlement for and on behalf of
BHF, nor was authorized to receive the P200,000.00 from
the complainant. Atty. Limos was likewise ordered to
return to the complainant the full amount of P200,000.00
with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum from
the date of her receipt of the said amount to the date of
her return of the full amount.11 ChanRobles Vi rtualawl ib rary
In a Resolution12 dated April 19, 2015, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the Investigating
Commissioner's report and recommendation.
On March 8, 2016, the IBP transmitted the notice of the
resolution and the case records to the Court for final
action pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.13 As
per verification of the Court, neither party has filed a
motion for reconsideration or a petition for review
thereafter.
The Issue
Whether or not the instant disbarment complaint
constitutes a sufficient basis to disbar Atty. Limos from
the practice of law?14
ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry
Ruling of the Court
To begin with, the Court notes that this is not the first
time that Atty. Limos is facing an administrative case, for
she had already been twice suspended from the practice
of law, by this Court, for three months each in Villaflores
v. Atty. Limos15 and Wilkie v. Atty. Limos.16 In Villaflores,
Atty. Limos received attorney's fees of P20,000.00 plus
miscellaneous expenses of P2,000.00, but she failed to
perform her undertaking with her client; thus she was
found guilty of gross negligence and dereliction of duty.
Likewise, in Wilkie, Atty. Limos was held administratively
liable for her deceitful and dishonest conduct when she
obtained a loan of P250,000.00 from her client and issued
two postdated checks in the latter's favor to pay the said
loan despite knowledge of insufficiency of funds to cover
the same. In both cases, the Court, gave Atty. Limos a
warning that repetition of the same or similar acts by her
will merit a more severe penalty.
Once again, for the third time, Atty. Limos is facing an
administrative case before this Court for receiving the
amount of P200,000.00 from the complainant purportedly
for a possible amicable settlement with her client BHF.
However, Atty. Limos was no longer BHF's counsel and
was not authorize to negotiate and conclude a settlement
for and on behalf of BHF nor was she authorized to receive
any money in behalf of BHF. Her blunder is compounded
by the fact that she did not turn over the money to BHF,
nor did she return the same to the complainant, despite
due demand. Furthermore, she even tried to get the next
installment knowing fully well that she was not authorized
to enter into settlement negotiations with the complainant
as her engagement as counsel of BHF had already ceased.

The fact that this is Atty. Limos' third transgression
exacerbates her offense. The foregoing factual
antecedents demonstrate her propensity to employ deceit
and misrepresentation. It is not too farfetched for this
Court to conclude that from the very beginning, Atty.
Limos had planned to employ deceit on the complainant to
most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn
servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate
and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to
ignore the very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his
position and office, and sets a pernicious example to the
insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body
politic."21
ChanRob les Virtualawl ibra ry

get hold of a sum of money. Such a conduct is

unbecoming and does not speak well of a member of the
Bar.
Atty. Limos' case is further highlighted by her lack of
regard for the charges brought against her. Similar
with Wilkie, despite due notice, Atty. Limos did not bother
to answer the complaint against her. She also failed to file
her mandatory conference brief and her verified position
paper. Worse, Atty. Limos did not even enter appearance
either personally or by counsel, and she failed to appear
at the scheduled date of the mandatory conferences which
she was duly notified.17ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
By her failure to present convincing evidence, or any
evidence for that matter, to justify her actions, Atty.
Limos failed to demonstrate that she still possessed the
integrity and morality demanded of a member of the Bar.
Her seeming indifference to the complaint brought against
her was made obvious by her unreasonable absence from
the proceedings before the IBP. Her disobedience to the
IBP is, in fact, a gross and blatant disrespect for the
authority of the Court.
Indeed, Atty. Limos has disgraced the legal profession.
The facts and evidence obtaining in this case definitely
establish her failure to live up to her duties as a lawyer in
accordance with the strictures of the lawyer's oath, the
Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of
Professional Ethics, thereby making her unworthy to
continue as a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Sinamar Limos, having
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by
committing grave misconduct and willful insubordination,
is DISBARRED and her name ordered STRICKEN
OFF the Roll of Attorneys effective immediately.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the records of
Atty. Sinamar Limos. Further, let other copies be served
on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office
of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate
them to all the courts in the country for their information
and guidance.
This Decision is immediately executory.

Despite her two prior suspensions, still, Atty. Limos is SO ORDERED.

once again demonstrating to this Court that not only is
she unfit to stay in the legal profession for her deceitful
conduct but is also remiss in following the dictates of the
Court, which has supervision over her. Atty. Limos'
unwarranted obstinacy is a great insolence to the Court
which cannot be tolerated.

The present case comes clearly under the grounds given

in Section 27,18 Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The Court, however, does not hesitate to impose the
penalty of disbarment when the guilty party has become a
repeat offender. Considering the serious nature of the
instant offense and in light of Atty. Limos' prior
misconduct which grossly degrades the legal profession,
the imposition of the ultimate penalty of disbarment is
warranted.

In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon Atty. Limos,

the Court is aware that the power to disbar is one to be
exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of
misconduct that seriously affect the standing and
character of the lawyer as a legal professional and as an
officer of the Court.19 However, Atty. Limos' recalcitrant
attitude and unwillingness to heed with the Court's
warning, which is deemed to be an affront to the Court's
authority over members of the Bar, warrant an utmost
disciplinary sanction from this Court. Her repeated
desecration of her ethical commitments proved herself to
be unfit to remain in the legal profession. Worse, she
remains apathetic to the need to reform herself.

"[T]he practice of law is not a right but a privilege

bestowed by the State upon those who show that they
possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications
required by law for the conferment of such privilege.
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions."20 "Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is
A.C. No. 10164 March 10, 2014
STEPHAN BRUNET and VIRGINIA ROMANILLOS
BRUNET, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. RONALD L. GUAREN, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
On August 9, 2002, complainant spouses Stephan
and Virginia Brunet (complainants) filed a complaint
against respondent Atty. Ronald L. Guaren (Atty.
Guaren) before the Commission on Bar Discipline
(CED), Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
Complainants alleged that in February 1997, they
engaged the services of Atty. Guaren for the titling of
a residential lot they acquired in Bonbon, Nueva
Caseres; that Atty. Guaren asked for a fee of Ten
Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00) including expenses
relative to its proceeding; that it was agreed that full
payment of the fee shall be made after the delivery of
the title; that Atty. Guaren asked for an advance fee of
One Thousand Pesos (Pl,000.00) which they gave;
that Atty. Guaren took all the pertinent documents
relative to the titling of their lot-certified true copy of
the tax declaration, original copy of the deed of
exchange, sketch plan, deed of donation, survey plan,
and original copy of the waiver; that on March 10,
1997, Atty. Guaren asked for additional payment of
Six Thousand Pesos (₱6,000.00) which they dutifully
gave; that from 1997 to 2001, they always reminded
Atty. Guaren about the case and each time he would
say that the titling was in progress; that they became
bothered by the slow progress of the case so they
demanded the return of the money they paid; and that
respondent agreed to return the same provided that
the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00) be
deducted to answer for his professional fees.
Complainants further alleged that despite the
existence of an attorney-client relationship between
them, Atty. Guaren made a special appearance
against them in a case pending before the
Metropolitan Circuit Trial Court, Oslob, Cebu (MCTC).
Atty. Guaren admitted that he indeed charged
complainants an acceptance fee of ₱10,000.00, but
denied that the amount was inclusive of expenses for
the titling of the lot. He claimed, however, that he
received the payment of ₱1,000.00 and ₱6,000.00;
that their agreement was that the case would be filed
in court after the complainants fully paid his
acceptance fee; that he did not take the documents
relative to the titling of the lot except for the photocopy
of the tax declaration; and that he did not commit
betrayal of trust and confidence when he participated
in a case filed against the complainants in MCTC
explaining that his appearance was for and in behalf
of Atty. Ervin Estandante, the counsel on record, who
failed to appear in the said hearing.
In the Report and Recommendation,1 dated August
24, 2012, the Investigating Commissioner found Atty.
Guaren to have violated the Canon of Professional
Responsibility when he accepted the titling of
complainants’ lot and despite the acceptance of
₱7,000.00, he failed to perform his obligation and
allowed 5 long years to elapse without any progress in
the titling of the lot. Atty. Guaren should also be
disciplined for appearing in a case against
complainants without a written consent from the latter.
The CBD recommended that he be suspended for six
(6) months.
In its May 20, 2013 Resolution,2 the IBP Board of
Governors, adopted and approved with modification
the Report and Recommendation of the CBD,
suspending Atty. Guaren from the practice of law for
three (3) months only.
The Court adopts the findings of the IBP Board of
Governors on the unethical conduct of Atty. Guaren,
except as to the penalty.
The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession
in which duty to public service, not money, is the
primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily
meant to be a money-making venture, and law
advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields
profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a
secondary consideration. The duty to public service
and to the administration of justice should be the
primary consideration of lawyers, who must
subordinate their personal interests or what they owe
to themselves.3
Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that:
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence.
In the present case, Atty. Guaren admitted that he
accepted the amount of ₱7,000.00 as partial payment
of his acceptance fee. He, however, failed to perform
his obligation to file the case for the titling of
complainants' lot despite the lapse of 5 years. Atty.
Guaren breached his duty to serve his client with
competence and diligence when he neglected a legal
matter entrusted to him. 1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ronald L. Guaren is

found GUILTY of having violated Canons 17 and 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
SIX (6) MONTHS effective from receipt of this
Resolution, with a warning that a similar infraction in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar

Confidant to be included in the records of the
respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the
Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts
throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991.]
RENATO L. CAYETANO, Petitioner, v. CHRISTIAN
MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION
ON APPOINTMENTS, and HON. GUILLERMO
CARAGUE in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, Respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-
counsel for petitioner.
DECISION
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching
proportions While ostensibly only legal issues are
involved, the Court’s decision in this case would
indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect
of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1(1), Article IX-
C:jgc:chanro bles.c om.ph
"There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-
born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for
any elective position in the immediately preceding
elections. However, a majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who
have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years." (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section 1(1),
Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly
provides: jg c:chan roble s.com.p h
"There shall be an independent Commission on Elections
composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who
shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the
time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age
and holders of a college degree. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of
law for al least ten years." (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence
as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal
qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as: jgc:chanrobles .com.p h
"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the
application of legal principles and technique to serve the
interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to
appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the
conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice
to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions
taken for them in matters connected with the law. An
attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an
office where he is held out to be an attorney, using a
letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling
clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel
about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for
services rendered by his associate." (Black’s Law
Dictionary, 3rd ed.).
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken,
129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also
considered to be in the practice of law when he: jgc:chan robles. com.ph
". . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of
advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to
their rights under the law, or appears in a representative
capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or
PARAS, J.: prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee,
board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law
or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their
clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of
advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while
so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or
outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the
practice of law." (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley
and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.
Agrava, (105 Phil. 173, 176-177) stated: jgc:chan robles. com.ph
"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected
with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship
have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the
work done involves the determination by the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions." (5 Am. Jr.
p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no
small part of work performed outside of any court and
having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
chan roble s virtual lawl ibra ry embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a
large variety of subjects, and the preparation and
execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field
of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although
these transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to become
involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high
degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and
affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and
complex situations. These customary functions of an
attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to
the administration of justice by the courts. No valid
distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the
order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the
lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part
which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his
office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that
these manifold customary functions be performed by
persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of
sound moral character, and acting at all times under the
heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys." (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol.
3 [1953 ed.], p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the
Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar
Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,
144). (Emphasis ours).
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting
orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed
the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader
terms as advocacy, counseling and public service.
"One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of
employment in the profession. If what he does exacts
knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys
engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he
follows some one or more lines of employment such as
this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning
of the statute." (Barr D. Cardell, 155 NW 312).
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the
practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law
is to give notice or render any kind of service, which
device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23).
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law." chanrobles vi rt ual lawli bra ry
"MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a
manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the
provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed
to make a very brief statement?
"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
"MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the
members of the Commission on Audit. Among others, the
qualifications provided for by Section 1 is that ‘They must
be Members of the Philippine Bar’ — I am quoting from
the provision — ‘who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.’"
"To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in
excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in
the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make
the clarification that this provision on qualifications
regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer
or involve actual practice of law outside the COA. We have
to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who
are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge
or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then
they are qualified to be considered for appointment as
members or commissioners, even chairman, of the
Commission on Audit.
"This has been discussed by the Committee on
Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it
important to take it up on the floor so that this
interpretation may be made available whenever this
provision on the qualifications as regards members of the
Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least
ten years is taken up.
"MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one
question.
"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
"MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA
by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law
practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission
on Audit?"
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA
although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work;
it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are
employed in COA now would have the necessary
qualifications in accordance with the provision on
qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on
Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.
"MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is
that this is equivalent to the practice of law.
"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
"MR. OPLE. Thank you." cralaw virt ua1aw lib rary
. . . (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution,
provides, among others, that the Chairman and two
Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should
either be certified public accountants with not less than
ten years of auditing practice, or members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and
which is in many ways synonymous with the word
"lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in
private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of
lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke,
Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons:
Illinois), 1986], p. 15]).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice.
The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual
or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal
services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often
called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called
"firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of
the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized
as professional corporations and the members called
shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are
the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are
younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneys called
"associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional
areas of law practice is essentially tautologies, unhelpful
defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do.
(Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West
Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of
law is defined as "the performance of any acts . . . in or
out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of
law. (State Bar Ass’n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145
Conn. 222, 140 A. 2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance
Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A. 2d 623, 626
[1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function
known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a
definition would obviously be too global to be workable.
(Wolfram, op. cit.)
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a
client is at once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers
as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most
lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large
percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a
case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do
continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer’s role colors
much of both the public image and the self-perception of
the legal profession. (Ibid.).chan robles. com:c ralaw:red
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the
public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this
so? Recall that the late Alexander Sycip, a corporate
lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as
a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are
still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is
one who principally tries cases before the courts. The
members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen
such as businessmen, know that in most developed
societies today, substantially more legal work is
transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General
practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-
litigation work also know that in most cases they find
themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely
describe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases.
The business lawyer has been described as the planner,
the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t]
need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine,
surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be
effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan.
11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general
practitioner will engage in a number of legal tasks, each
involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal
processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested
parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in
specialized practice will usually perform at least some
legal services outside their specialty. And even within a
narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift
from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an
importantly different one such as representing a client
before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p.
687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation,
unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types — a
litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of
much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to
have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of
client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and
negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new
skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for
many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in
litigation work that is constrained in very important ways,
at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the
salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special
roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some
lawyers’ work the constraints are imposed both by the
nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is
organized into a social unit to perform that work. The
most common of these roles are those of corporate
practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily,
herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate law
practice, a departure from the traditional concept of
practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a
revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice.
Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those
members participating in various legal-policy decisional
contexts, are finding that understanding the major
emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to
intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of
today requires an accurate understanding of the nature
and implications of the corporate law research function
accompanied by an accelerating rate of information
accumulation. The recognition of the need for such
improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly
"model-making" and contingency planning," has
impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional
procedures in many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be
processed, the sorting and weighing of significant
conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the
necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses
of action, and the need for fast decision and response in
situations of acute danger have prompted the use of
sophisticated concepts of information flow theory,
operational analysis, automatic data processing, and
electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an
improved decisional structure must stress the predictive
component of the policy-making process, wherein a
model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is
developed to test projected alternative courses of action in
terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly
engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of the
law, the subject of corporate finance law has received
relatively little organized and formalized attention in the
philosophy of advancing corporate legal education.
Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal
research has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive
contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be
improved through an early introduction to multi-variable
decisional contexts and the various approaches for
handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either
a master’s or doctorate degree in business administration
or management, functioning at the legal policy level of
decision-making now have some appreciation for the
concepts and analytical techniques of other professions
which are currently engaged in similar types of complex
decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance
problems would require the services of an astute attorney
because of the complex legal implications that arise from
each and every necessary step in securing and
maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is
assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla."
He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a
clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of
business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many
people could not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer
does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a
single corporation will vary with the size and type of the
corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations
farm out all their legal problems to private law firms.
Many others have in-house counsel only for certain
matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to
handle most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a
lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His
areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia:
corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as
corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in
both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the
Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other
capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.
chanrobles. com:cha nrob les.com. ph
chan roble s v irtua lawlib rary
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume
responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business
of the corporation he is representing. These include such
matters as determining policy and becoming involved in
management. (Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of
being isolated from the action, or not understanding how
one’s work actually fits into the work of the organization.
This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the
results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer
is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely
involved in the running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer’s services may sometimes
be engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some
large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available
to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field.
After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small
number of companies and law firms. Because working in a
foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, this is
an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases,
however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys
while the younger attorneys do their "international
practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law
Practice," May 25, 1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer
in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-
educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer
is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one
who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is
one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a
"shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking of
the traditional law teaching method of confining the
subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities
Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern
management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily
with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights
into current advances which are of particular significance
to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable
disciplinary skills applicable to a corporate counsel’s
management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the
organization and management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as
intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them.
Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial
jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate
counsel’s total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences
affect the counsel’s role. For that matter, the corporate
lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the
resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides
counsel for are required to make, and the need to think
about a corporation’s strategy at multiple levels. The
salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal
both with global multinational entities and simultaneously
with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly
collaborate not only with public entities but with each
other — often with those who are competitors in other
arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer’s participation in decision-
making within the corporation is rapidly changing. The
modern corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a
stockholder — in some cases participating in the
organization and operations of governance through
participation on boards and other decision-making roles.
Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal
institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These
trends are complicated as corporations organize for global
operations. (Emphasis supplied).
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with
governmental policies toward the promotion and
management of technology. New collaborative
arrangements for promoting specific technologies or
competitiveness more generally require approaches from
industry that differ from older, more adversarial
relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned
from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race
are examples of collaborative efforts between
governmental and business Japan’s MITI is world famous.
(Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of
the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within
the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations.
Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups
within organizations has been found to be related to
indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such
as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the
environment, coordinating work with outsiders, promoting
team achievements within the organization. In general,
such external activities are better predictors of team
performance than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of
the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of
corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking
ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures
and to understand relationships of financial liability and
insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel,
three factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has
been found an effective tool for new managerial thinking
regarding both planning and pressing immediate
problems. An understanding of the role of feedback loops,
inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to
simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical,
economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New
programming techniques now make the systems dynamics
principles more accessible to managers — including
corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied).
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make
better decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. In
the context of a law department, it can be used to
appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in
negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk
involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis
supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-
based models can be used directly by parties and
mediators in all kinds of negotiations. All integrated set of
such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation
support, including hands-on on instruction in these
techniques. A simulation case of an international joint
venture may be used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of
the legal function, concern three pointed areas of
consideration, thus: chanrob 1es vi rtua l 1aw lib rary
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires
special skills that comprise a major part of the general
counsel’s responsibilities. They differ from those of
remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with
minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal
rights for such legal entities at that time when
transactional or similar facts are being considered and
made. chanrob les lawli bra ry : redna d
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within
which are undertaken those activities of the firm to which
legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly
supportive of this nation’s evolving economic and
organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive
in a global, interdependent environment. The practice and
theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the
relationships needed in trying to make a global economy
work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel’s
Office. The general counsel has emerged in the last
decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal
profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for
key aspects of the firm’s strategic issues, including
structuring its global operations, managing improved
relationships with an increasingly diversified body of
employees, managing expanded liability exposure,
creating new and varied interactions with public decision-
makers, coping internally with more complex make or by
decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing
corporate law is not enough to make one a good general
chanrob 1es vi rtual 1 aw libra ry
corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the
legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the
corporate lawyer’s aim is not the understand all of the
law’s effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very
least, also gain a working knowledge of the management
issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal
"constitution" or make-up of the modern corporation.
"Business Star, The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p.
4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench)
is to have more than a passing knowledge of financial law
affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would
admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law
territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of
professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and
risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk
exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jar.
11, 1989, p. 4).chanroble s law lib rary : red
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President
Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the
Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner
opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does
not possess the required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments
confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office.
On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the
COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s nomination,
petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant
petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said
confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod
as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared
null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar,
having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade
of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in
1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license
fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo).
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and
having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law
office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank
Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations
officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama,
which involved getting acquainted with the laws of
member-countries, negotiating loans and coordinating
legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon
returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the
Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an
investment bank and subsequently of a business
conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to
various companies as a legal and economic consultant or
chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General
(1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL.
Monsod’s work involved being knowledgeable in election
law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation
hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy,
Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-
Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen’s Conference for
Human Development, has worked with the under
privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor
groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in
affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately
the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his
legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission,
a quasi-judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings
(1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission
(1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by
the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-
Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile
government functions with individual freedoms and public
accountability and the party-list system for the House of
Representative." (pp. 128-129 Rollo) (Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which
Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts
as a team, and which is adequately constituted to meet
the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation.
Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are
the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance
manager, and an operations officer (such as an official
involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the
members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan
Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers,"
Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila,
1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country’s
Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan
transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan
Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5)
fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower’s
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants;
and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13)
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any
debt restructuring program. For aside from performing the
tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score
national development policies as key factors in
maintaining their countries’ sovereignty. (Condensed from
the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers
for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager,
regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for
International Development, during the Session on Law for
the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World
Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace
Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). (Emphasis
supplied).
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more
so than purely re negotiation policies, demand expertise in
the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting
and in re negotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may
work with an international business specialist or an
economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement.
Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a
mixture of technical language that they should be
carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of
competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of
adequate technical support personnel. (See International
Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an
unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law,
1987, p. 321). (Emphasis supplied).
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract
construction is the set of terms and conditions which
determines the contractual remedies for a failure to
perform one or more elements of the contract. A good
agreement must not only define the responsibilities of
both parties, but must also state the recourse open to
either party when the other fails to discharge an
obligation. For a complete debt restructuring represents a
devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis is
sine qua non for foreign loan agreements — an adherence
to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of
whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. once said: ‘They carry no banners, they beat
no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and
bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene
mastery.’ (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in
Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine
Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters,
1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the
term "practice of law", particularly the modern concept of
law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal
construction intended by the framers of the Constitution,
Atty. Monsod s past work experiences as a lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of
industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-
legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than
satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service
Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said: chanroble s.com : vi rtual law lib rary
"Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and
must be performed by the officer in which it is vested
according to his best lights, the only condition being that
the appointee should possess the qualifications required
by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be
faulted on the ground that there are others better
qualified who should have been preferred. This is a
political question involving considerations of wisdom which
only the appointing authority can decide." (Emphasis
supplied).
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of Central
Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it
stated:jgc:chanro bles. com.ph
"It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as
in this case, and all the other legal requirements are
satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest
to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service
Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an
appointment on the ground that another person is more
qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority
to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To
do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested
upon the appointing authority. An appointment is
essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever
it is vested, subject to the only condition that the
appointee should possess the qualifications required by
law." (Emphasis supplied).
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the
case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination;
(2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3)
issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon
submission by the Commission on Appointments of its
certificate of confirmation, the President issues the
permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-
taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No.
L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public
Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its
consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2)
Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which
provides:jg c:chan roble s.com.p h
"The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed
by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without re
appointment. Of those first appointed, three Members
shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five
years, and the last Members for three years, without re
appointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only
for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case
shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity."
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla’s separate opinion, suffice it
to say that his definition of the practice of law is the
traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as
distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of
law, which modern connotation is exactly what was
intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution.
Moreover, Justice Padilla’s definition would require
generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practiced two or
three times a week and would outlaw say, law practice
once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly,
this is far from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice
Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made use
of a definition of law practice which really means nothing
because the definition says that law practice." . . is what
people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I
cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident
from my statement that the definition of law practice by
"traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase
itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law
covers almost all situations, most individuals, in making
use of the law, or in advising others on what the law
means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps,
but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is
a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been
practicing law for over ten years. This is different from the
acts of persons practicing law, without first becoming
lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even
disqualify an elected President of the Philippines, say, on
the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This
matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action
or petition be brought against the President? And even
assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the
action be entertained since he is the incumbent President?
We now proceed: cha nro b1es vi rtua l 1aw lib ra ry
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted
during the public hearings on Monsod’s confirmation,
implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary
qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered
by the Commission in the exercise of such an
acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except
only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec.
1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of
discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with
the Commission’s judgment. In the instant case, there is
no occasion for the exercise of the Court’s corrective
power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of
discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs
prayed, for has been clearly shown. chanrobles lawlib rary : rednad
Additionally, consider the following: c hanro b1es vi rt ual 1aw li bra ry
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee
by the President, may the Supreme Court reverse the
Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment?
Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary (2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee,
whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer is
likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming
body in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirm a
Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S.
Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is: jgc:chan roble s.com.p h
"We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by
the spirit that giveth life."
cra law virtua1aw li bra ry
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once,
the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson’s
beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on
condition that —
"No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins." cralaw virtua1aw li bra ry
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured,
the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or
three inches away from in front of Samson’s eyes. This
blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to
her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and
fuming with righteous fury, Accused the procurator of
reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did
any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his
veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter,
not the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby
DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., concurs in the result.
Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition.
(Fernan, C.J.).
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions

NARVASA, J., concurring: chan rob1es v irt ual 1aw l ib rary
I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr.
Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does not appear
to me that there has been an adequate showing that the
challenged determination by the Commission on
Appointments — that the appointment of respondent
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections
should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and after
due assessment thereof, be confirmed — was attended by
error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion
and consequently merits nullification by this Court in
accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY
the petition.
PADILLA, J., dissenting: chanrob1es v irt ual 1aw li bra ry
The records of this case will show that when the Court
first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted not only to
require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I
was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from
assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the
Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the
office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the
inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties
concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent
Monsod’s disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the
Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence
already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did
not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years
prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod’s comment,
I am even more convinced that the constitutional
requirement of" practice of low for at least ten (10) years"
has not been met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents
deserve scant consideration because, ultimately, the core
issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal
of the constitutional provision requiring a majority of the
membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof
to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten (10) years." (Art IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987
Constitution). Questions involving the construction of
constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution.
As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil.
139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn
and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution
and defining constitutional boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards
for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these are that he must
have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
(10) years." It is the bounded duty of this Court to ensure
that such standard is met and complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly
understood, "practice" refers to the actual performance or
application of knowledge as distinguished from mere
possession of knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual,
repeated or customary action. 1 To "practice" law, or any
profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue
an employment or profession actively, habitually,
cralaw virt ua1aw lib ra ry
repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is
habitually performing the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot
be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified
public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to
practice his profession as an accountant. In the same
way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or
a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a
Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental
agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People v.
Villanueva: 2
"Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it
consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent
habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864,
42 LRA, M S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the
prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily
or habitually holding one’s self out to the public as a
lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State
v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647.) . . ." (Emphasis
supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on
Appointments in a Memorandum it prepared, enumerated
several factors determinative of whether a particular
activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:
jgc:chanroble s.com.p h
"1. Habituality. The term ‘practice of law’ implies
customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the
public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109
citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as
when one sends a circular announcing the establishment
of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney
Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office
as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a
manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his
intention to practice law in all courts in the country
(People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it
consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual
exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State
v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must
have presented himself to be in the active and continued
practice of the legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for compensation, as a
service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said
services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging
for services such as preparation of documents involving
the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term
‘practice of law’ (Ernani Paño, Bar Reviewer in Legal and
Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People’s
Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who
renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a
statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent,
practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v.
Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If
compensation is expected, `all advice to clients and all
action taken for them in matters connected with the law;
are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette Et. Al., v. Arthur C.
Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359).
3. Application of law, legal principle, practice, or
procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training and
experience is within the term `practice of law’. (Martin
supra).
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of
law presupposes the existence of lawyer-client
relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity
which requires knowledge of law but involves no attorney-
client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law
books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the
practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal
Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30)." 3
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful
aids in determining whether or not respondent Monsod
meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for
at least ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which
are peculiar to the practice of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or
habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks
habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN
(10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC
Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent
Monsod as appears from the records, I am persuaded that
if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute
the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at
least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC
Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and
activities which could be latitudinarianly considered
activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting
of legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion or
advice, such were isolated transactions or activities which
do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To
become engaged in the practice of law, there must be a
continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the
Solicitor General in People v. Villanueva: 4
"Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that
one must have presented himself to be in the active and
continued practice of the legal profession and that his
professional services are available to the public for a
compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to
declare respondent Monsod as not qualified for the
position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his
appointment to such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting: chan rob1e s virtual 1aw l ibra ry
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother
Paras but find I must dissent just the same. There are
certain points on which I must differ with him while of
course respecting his viewpoint.
chanrob1e s virtual 1aw lib rary
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from
examining the qualifications of the respondent simply
because his nomination has been confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a
political question that we are barred from resolving.
Determination of the appointee’s credentials is made on
the basis of the established facts, not the discretion of
that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion
would still be subject to our review.cha nrob les vi rtua l lawlib ra ry
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was
involved was the discretion of the appointing authority to
choose between two claimants to the same office who
both possessed the required qualifications. It was that
kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people
may be ousted by this Court for lack of the required
qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualify
an appointee simply because he has passed the
Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared
ineligible by this Court in an appropriate proceeding
notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no
less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that
what we would be examining is not the wisdom of his
election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected
in the first place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private
respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been too
sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as
to render the qualification practically toothless. From the
numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I
have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even
have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law
as long as his activities involve the application of some
law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the
insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the
definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that
are likely "to become involved in litigation." cralaw vi rtua1aw l ibra ry
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law
even if his main occupation is another business and he
interprets and applies some law only as an incident of
such business. That covers every company organized
under the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC
under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the
modern society, there is hardly any activity that is not
affected by some law or government regulation the
businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again
going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be
part of a business concern to be considered a practitioner.
He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house
or buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts involve his
knowledge and application of the laws regulating such
transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his
main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed
engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the
Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of the
Energy Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the
practice of law as the "performance of any acts . . . in or
out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of
law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes
on to say that "because lawyers perform almost every
function known in the commercial and governmental
realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to
be workable." cralaw vi rtua 1aw lib rary
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to
consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in the
practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at
least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his activities
are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with
some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception
is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching
ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with
pubescent pretensions.
The respondent’s credentials are impressive, to be sure,
but they do not persuade me that he has been engaged in
the practice of law for ten years as required by the
Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in
business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished
himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a
practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied
the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his
experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an
attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on
the law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a
lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and
urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the
Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like
farmers and priests) and was a member of the Davide
Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these
capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period of
actual practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently
qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant
talents but not as Chairman of the Commission on
Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less
than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must regretfully vote to
grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that
engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for public
office would be settled one way or another in fairly
definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that
Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the practice of law (with
one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official
leave but not expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4
categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting
in the result because there was no error so gross as to
amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave
with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the
issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the
decision.cha nrob les law li bra ry
There are two key factors that make our task difficult.
First is our reviewing the work of a constitutional
Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to
look into the qualifications of persons appointed to high
office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no power to
set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of
discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our
belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in
terms of executive ability, proficiency in management,
educational background, experience in international
banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public.
chan rob1es v irt ual 1aw l ibra ry
His integrity and competence are not questioned by the
petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a specific
requirement written into the Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk
my constitutional duty. He has never engaged in the
practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the
bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching the
term beyond rational limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he
has not dedicated his life to the law, if he has not engaged
in an activity where membership in the bar is a
requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been
engaged in the practice of law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only
for COMELEC chairman but also for appointment to the
Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges
or Justices will we have if there main occupation is selling
real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in
fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a
farm with no active involvement in the law, whether in
Government or private practice, except that in one joyful
moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the
bar examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years." The deliberate choice of
words shows that the practice envisioned is active and
regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent,
incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged"
in an activity for ten years requires committed
participation in something which is the result of one’s
decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and
involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to
carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-year
period.
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data
submitted by respondent Monsod to the Commission on
Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if appears
that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an
alleged one year period after passing the bar
examinations when he worked in his father’s law firm.
Even then his law practice must have been extremely
limited because he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D.
degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania
during that period. How could he practice law in the
United States while not a member of the Bar there?
The professional life of the respondent follows: jgc:c han robles. com.ph
"1.15.1 Respondent Monsod’s activities since his passing
the Bar examinations in 1961 consist of the following: cha nrob 1es vi rtua l 1aw libra ry
1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate),
University of Pennsylvania
2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry
Department; Operations, Latin American Department;
Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International
Finance Corporation
3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group Executive of various
companies, i.e., Meralco Securities Corporation, Philippine
Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation
4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital
Development Corporation and affiliated companies
5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer
6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies Chief
Executive Officer
7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission —
Member
8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the
December 1989 Coup Attempt — Member
9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive
Officer of the following companies: chan rob1e s virtual 1aw l ibra ry
a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
b. Dataprep, Philippines
c. Philippine SUN systems Products, Inc.
d. Semirara Coal Corporation
e. CBL Timber Corporation
Member of the Board of the Following:
a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines
b. First Philippine Energy Corporation
c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
e. Graphic Atelier
f. Manila Electric Company
g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
h. Philippine Electric Corporation
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation"
(Rollo, pp. 21-22)
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even
remotely indicates that respondent Monsod has given the
law enough attention or a certain degree of commitment
and participation as would support in all sincerity and
candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at
least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has
lawyers working for him. Instead of giving legal advice of
legal services, he was the one receiving that advice and
those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments
show an effort to equate "engaged in the practice of law"
with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of
endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue
c han rob1es v irt ual 1aw l ibra ry
ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such
knowledge would be helpful. c hanrob les lawl ibra ry : redna d
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a
term, which even an ordinary layman accepts as having a
familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every
resident of this country who has reached the age of
discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at
various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not
necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor,
barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman,
market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet,
can these people honestly assert that as such, they are
engaged in the practice of law?.
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years." It is not satisfied
with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at
least ten years.."
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as
follows:jgc:c hanrobles. com.ph
"The practice of law involves not only appearance in court
in connection with litigation but also services rendered out
of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the
rendering of any services requiring the use of legal skill or
knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other
instrument, the legal effect of which, under the facts and
conditions involved, must be carefully determined. People
ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass’n v. Tinkoff, 399 III. 282, 77
N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass’n v.
People’s Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N.E.
901, and cases cited.
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a
formula or definition of what constitutes the practice of
law.’Practicing law’ has been defined as ‘Practicing as an
attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and
customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition
of any sort of service by any person, firm or corporation
when the giving of such advice or rendition of such service
requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill.’
Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being
substantially correct in People ex rel . Illinois State Bar
Ass’n v. People’s Stock Yards State Bank, 344 III. 462,
176 N.E. 901." (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776).
For one’s actions to come within the purview of practice of
law they should not only be activities peculiar to the work
of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually,
frequently or customarily, to wit: chan rob1e s virtual 1aw lib rary
x x x
"Respondent’s answers to questions propounded to him
were rather evasive. He was asked whether or not he ever
prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate
transactions where he was not the procuring agent. He
answered: ‘Very seldom.’ In answer to the question as to
how many times he had prepared contracts for the parties
during the twenty-mine years of his business, he said: ‘I
have no idea.’ When asked if it would be more than half a
dozen times his answer was I suppose.’ Asked if he did
not recall making the statement to several parties that he
had prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he
answered: ‘I don’t recall exactly what was said.’ When
asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a
practice of preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and
charging a fee to the parties therefor in instances where
he was not the broker in the deal, he answered: Well, I
don’t believe so, that is not a practice.’ Pressed further for
an answer as to his practice in preparing contracts and
deeds for parties where he was not the broker, he finally
answered: ‘I have done about everything that is on the
books as far as real estate is concerned.’
x x x when one sends a circular announcing the establishment
Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-
estate broker he has a lawful right to do any legal work in
connection with real-estate transactions, especially in
drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes
and the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in
these practices over the years and has charged for his
services in that
x x x exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA log citing State v.
". . . An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person
designated or employed by another to act in his stead; an
agent; more especially, one of a class of persons
authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in
legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are
attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are properly
styled ‘attorneys in fact;’ but the single word is much used
as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an
attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at
law.’ Abb. Law Dict.’Attorney.’ ‘A public attorney, or
attorney at law, says Webster, ‘is an officer of a court of
law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend actions in
such court on the retainer of clients.’The principal duties
of an attorney are (1) to be true to the court and to his
client; (2) to manage the business of his client with care,
skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to
the state of his business; (4) to keep his secrets confided
to him as such. . . . His rights are to be justly
compensated for his services.’ Bouv. Law Dict.
tit.’Attorney.’ The transitive verb ‘practice,’ as defined by
Webster, means ‘to do or perform frequently, customarily,
or habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as, to
practice gaining; . . . to carry on in practice, or repeated
action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a
profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or
medicine,’ etc. . . ." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522,
523; Emphasis supplied)
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law
denotes frequency or a succession of acts. Thus, we
stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109
[1965]): cha nro blesvi rtua lawlib rary
x x x
". . . Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it
consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent
habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864,
42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the
prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily
or habitually holding one’s self out to the public, as a
lawyer and demanding payment for such services. . . ."
(at p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment
itself recognizes habituality as a required component of
the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared
and issued by it, to wit:
jgc:chan roble s.com.p h
"1. Habituality. The term ‘practice of law’ implies
customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the
public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109
citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as
of a law office for the general practice of law (U S. v. Noy
Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office
as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a
manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his
intention to practice law in all courts in the country
(People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it
consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual
Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115).
x x x
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod
may have profited from his legal knowledge, the use of
such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated
activities which do not fall under the denomination of
practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was not
required for membership in the Constitutional Commission
or in the Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989 Coup
Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been
assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened
to isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the
Philippines which do not categorize the foreign
corporations as doing business in the Philippines. As in the
practice of law, doing business also should be active and
continuous. Isolated business transactions or occasional,
incidental and casual transactions are not within the
context of doing business. This was our ruling in the case
of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 143
SCRA 288 [1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader,
and member of the Constitutional Commission may
possess the background, competence, integrity, and
dedication, to qualify for such high offices as President,
Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but
the Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of
having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10)
years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered
that he may not be confirmed for that office. The
Constitution charges the public respondents no less than
this Court to obey its mandate.
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on
Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in
confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as
Chairman of the COMELEC.
I vote to GRANT the petition.
Bidin, J., dissents.
 A.C. No. 11494, July 24, 2017
HEIRS OF JUAN DE DIOS E. CARLOS, NAMELY,
JENNIFER N. CARLOS, JOCELYN N. CARLOS,
JACQUELINE CARLOS-DOMINGUEZ, JO-ANN
CARLOS-TABUTON, JIMMY N. CARLOS, LORNA A.
During the pendency of the above cases, or on September
22, 1997, Atty. Linsangan and Juan executed a Contract
for Professional Services9 enumerating the above cases
being handled by Atty. Linsangan for Juan. In said
Contract, Atty. Linsangan and Juan agreed, as follows: chanRoblesvi rt ualLa wlibra ry

CARLOS, JERUSHA ANN A. CARLOS AND JAN JOSHUA xxxx

A. CARLOS, Complainants, v. ATTY. JAIME S.
LINSANGAN, Respondent. WHEREAS, the Parties have decided to consolidate their
agreements in connection with ATTORNEY's engagement
as CLIENT's attorney to recover the subject property;
DECISION
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the
TIJAM, J.: foregoing premises, the parties hereto have mutually
agreed and bound themselves as follows:
Complainants are children of the late Juan De Dios E.
1. That ATTORNEY shall continue to take all legal steps to
Carlos (Juan) who presently seek to disbar respondent
recover the 10,000 square meters covered by TCT No.
Atty. Jaime S. Linsangan (Atty. Linsangan). Atty.
139061, or any portion thereof acceptable to CLIENT,
Linsangan acted as counsel for their late father in several
through any or all of the Court cases mentioned above, or
cases, one of which involving the recovery of a parcel of
such other Court cases as may be necessary;
land located in Alabang, Muntinlupa City. Complainants
alleged that Atty. Linsangan forced them to sign pleadings
2. That ATTORNEY shall not enter into any compromise
and documents, sold the parcel of land in Alabang,
agreement without the written consent of CLIENT. CLIENT
Muntinlupa City in cahoots with complainants' estranged
may enter into any compromise agreement only upon
mother, and evaded payment of income taxes when he
consultation with ATTORNEY;
divided his share in the subject property as his supposed
attorney's fees to his wife and children, all in violation of
3. That ATTORNEY shall avail of all legal remedies in order
his oath as lawyer.
to recover the property and shall continue the prosecution
of such remedies to the best of his knowledge, ability, and
The Facts and Antecedent Proceedings
experience, all within legal and ethical bounds;
The parcel of land located in Alabang, Muntilupa City and
4. That CLIENT shall shoulder all necessary and incidental
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 139061
expenses in connection with the said cases;
with an area of 12,331 square meters was previously
owned by the Spouses Felix and Felipa Carlos. Their son,
5. That considering, among others, the extent of services
Teofilo Carlos (Teofilo), convinced them to transfer said
rendered by ATTORNEY; the value of the property sought
title to his name with a promise to distribute the same to
to be recovered; the importance of the case to CLIENT;
his brothers and sisters. Teofilo delivered the owner's
the difficulty of recovery (considering that the Balbanero
duplicate copy of the title to his brother, Juan. However,
spouses have a favorable Court of Appeals['] Decision in
Teofilo sold the entire property to Pedro Balbanero C.V. No. 29379, while Felicidad Sandoval's name appears
(Pedro). Pedro, however, failed to pay the agreed
in the TCT No. 139061 as wife of the registered owner,
installment payments.
Teofilo Carlos), the professional ability and experience of
ATTORNEY; as well as other considerations, CLIENT
For purposes of recovering the subject property from
hereby confirms and ratifies that he has agreed and
Teofilo (and Teofilo's supposed wife, Felicidad), and from
bound himself to pay ATTORNEY a contingent fee in
Pedro, Juan engaged the services of Atty. Linsangan. It
an amount equivalent to FIFTY PERCENT (50%) of
appears that Atty. Linsangan, for Juan, filed the following
the market value of the property, or portion thereof,
cases: (a) a case1 against Felicidad which was settled with
which may be recovered, or the zonal value thereof,
the latter acknowledging Juan's one-half interest and
whichever is higher.
ownership over the property; (b) a case against Pedro
which was concluded on September 12, 1997; and (c)
The said attorney's fees shall become due and payable
another case2 against Felicidad, albeit filed by another upon recovery of the property, or any portion thereof, (a)
lawyer who acted under the direct control and supervision
upon finality of a favorable Court decision, or (b)
of Atty. Linsangan. In this case against Felicidad, it
compromise settlement, whether judicially or
appears that the other half of the property was
extrajudicially, through the execution of any document
adjudicated to Juan, as Teofilo's sole heir. Said
acknowledging or transferring CLIENT's rights over the
adjudication was appealed to the CA.3
property, or any portion thereof, whether or not through
ATTORNEY's, CLIENT's, or other person's efforts or
It further appears that Atty. Linsangan represented Juan
mediation, or (c) or by any other mode by which CLIENT's
in the following cases, likewise all involving the subject
interest on the subject property, or a portion thereof, is
property: (a) an action for partition4 filed by Bernard Rillo
recognized, or registered, or transferred to him; or (d)
against Pedro; (b) an ejectment case5 filed by Juan
should CLIENT violate this contract; or (e) should CLIENT
against Pedro; and (c) Juan's intervention in the
terminate ATTORNEY's services without legal or just
case6 between Pedro and Teofilo.
cause.
It finally appears that Atty. Linsangan also represented
6. That CLIENT undertakes and binds himself to pay the
Juan in the certiorari cases and petitions for review filed
said attorney's fees to the following:
before the CA7 and this Court,8 likewise involving the
chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

same property.
(a) To ATTORNEY himself;
(b) In case of ATTORNEY'S death or disability, to LORNA
OBSUNA LINSANGAN;
(c) In case of death or disability of ATTORNEY and LORNA
OBSUNA LINSANGAN, jointly and severally, to LAUREN
KYRA LINSANGAN, LORRAINE FREYJA LINSANGAN, and
JAMES LORENZ LINSANGAN;
(d) In default of all the [foregoing], to the estate of
ATTORNEY.
7. That this Contract shall be binding and enforceable
upon CLIENT's heirs, successors-in-interest,
administrators, and assigns, if any.
8. That finally, CLIENT hereby authorizes, at ATTORNEY's
option, the annotation of this contract on TCT No. 139061
or any subsequent title which may be issued. (Emphasis
supplied)
x x x x10
However, it was not only Juan who went after the
property, but also Bernard Rillo and Alicia Carlos, a sister-
in-law. The latter also filed an action11 for recovery of
their share and by Compromise Agreement, an area of
2,331 square meters was awarded in their favor, leaving a
10,000 square meter portion of the property.12
This remaining 10,000 square meter portion was
eventually divided in the case filed by Juan against
Felicidad (which Atty. Linsangan admits13 to have filed
albeit through another lawyer who acted under his control
and supervision), through a Compromise Agreement
wherein 7,500 square meters of the subject property was
given to the heirs of Juan while the remaining 2,500
square meters thereof was given to Felicidad.14 In said
Compromise Agreement, the parties likewise agreed to
waive as against each other any and all other claims
which each may have against the other, including those
pending in the CA15 and this Court. This Compromise
Agreement was approved by the trial court on December
11, 2009.16
Subsequently, a Supplemental Compromise
Agreement17 dated December 16, 2009 was submitted by
the heirs of Juan and Atty. Linsangan, dividing among
them the 7,500 square meter-portion of the property as
follows: 3,750 square meters to the heirs of Juan and
3,750 square meters to Atty. Linsangan pursuant to the
Contract for Professional Services. In said Supplemental
Compromise Agreement, Atty. Linsangan waived in favor
of his wife and children his 3,750 square meter share,
except as to the 250 square meters thereof, as
follows:
cha nRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary
(a) To Mrs. Lorna O. Linsangan - 2,000 square meters;
(b) To Lauren Kyra O. Linsangan - 500 square meters;
(c) To Lorraine Freyja O. Linsangan - 500 square meters;
(d) To James Lorenz O. Linsangan - 500 square meters;
(e) To Atty. Jaime S. Linsangan - 250 square meters.18
Said Supplemental Compromise Agreement was likewise
approved by the trial court in its Decision19 dated
December 18, 2009. There was no mention in the record,
however, that the Compromise Agreement and the
Supplemental Compromise Agreement were likewise
presented for approval before the several courts where
the other cases were pending.
On December 10, 2015, Atty. Linsangan executed a Deed
of Absolute Sale20 with a certain Helen S. Perez (Helen)
covering the entire 12,331 square meters of the subject
property for a purchase price of One Hundred Fifty Million
Pesos (PhP150,000,000). Atty. Linsangan sold the entire
property using the following: chanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry
1. a Special Power of Attorney21 dated August 26, 2010,
executed by his wife Lorna Linsangan, and children,
Lauren Kyra O. Linsangan, Lorraine Freyja O. Linsangan
and James Lorenz O. Linsangan to sell their shares in the
subject property;
2. a Special Power of Attorney22 dated September 2009,
executed by Juan's wife, Bella N. Vda. de Carlos, and their
children, Jo-Ann Carlos Tabuton, Jacqueline Carlos-
Dominguez and Jimmy N. Carlos to represent them in all
cases involving their interests and shares in the properties
of Juan;
3. a Special Power of Attorney23 dated September 30,
2009 executed by Lorna A. Carlos, Jerusha Ann A. Carlos
and Jan Joshua A. Carlos to represent them in all cases
involving their interests and shares in the properties of
Juan;
4. a Special Power of Attorney24 dated May 2013 executed
by Porfirio C. Rillo and Jose Rillo to sell their shares
consisting of 200 square meter portion and 199 square
meter portion, respectively, of the subject property;
5. a Special Power of Attorney25 dated October 15, 2009
executed by Jocelyn N. Carlos and Jennifer N. Carlos to
represent them in all cases involving their interests and
shares in the properties of Juan;
6. a Special Power of Attorney26 dated May 28, 2010
executed by Bernard Rillo in favor of Alicia D. Carlos to
sell his share in the subject property by virtue of a
Compromise Agreement dated September 3, 1987 in the
case of Bernard Rillo, et al. vs. Teofilo Carlos, et al., Civil
Case No. 11975, Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch CXLIV.
On November 28, 2015, Helen issued several checks27 in
varying amounts either made payable to Cash or to Jaime
S. Linsangan or Lorna O. Linsangan and simultaneous
thereto, Atty. Linsangan released the owner's duplicate
original of TCT No. 139061 to Helen.28 It further appears
that in lieu of one check in the amount of PhP2,500,000,
Atty. Linsangan received, in cash, the amounts of
PhP2,000,000 on December 4, 2015,29 and PhP500,000
on December 10, 2015,30 from Helen.
Upon learning of the sale, complainants allegedly
requested from Atty. Linsangan for their shares in the
proceeds and for the copies of the Special Power of
Attorney as well as the case records, but that Atty.
Linsangan refused.31 Complainants also requested from
Atty. Linsangan, this time through another lawyer, Atty.
Victor D. Aguinaldo, that their shares in the subject
property be at least segregated from the portion sold.32
On August 20, 2016, complainants wrote a letter33 to Atty.
Linsangan revoking the Special Power of Attorney which
they executed in the latter's favor. In said letter,
complainants accused Atty. Linsangan of conniving with
their mother, Bella N. Vda. De Carlos, in submitting the
Compromise Agreement and in selling the subject
property. Complainants, however, recognized Atty.
Lisangan's services for which they proposed that the latter
be paid on the basis of quantum meruit instead of fifty
percent (50%) of the subject property.34
Subsequently, or in September 2016, complainants filed
the instant administrative complaint35 against Atty.
Linsangan accusing the latter of forcing them to sign
pleadings filed in court, copies of which were not furnished
them; of selling the subject property in cahoots with their
mother; of evading the payment of income taxes when he
apportioned his share in the subject property to his wife
and children.36
By way of Comment,37 Atty. Linsangan avers that the
Supplemental Compromise Agreement was never
questioned by the complainants until now38 and that they
had never requested for a copy thereof from him. Atty.
Linsangan admits that the subject of the sale with Helen is
the property in Alabang, Muntinlupa City and that
complainants were not given a share from the payments
because such were specifically made applicable to his and
his family's share in the subject property only.39 Atty.
Linsangan also contends that the proposal that he be paid
on the basis of quantum meruit is only for the purpose of
reducing his 50% share as stated in the Contract for
Professional Services he executed with Juan, so that the
balance thereof may accrue to complainants.40
The Issue
The threshold issue to be resolved is whether respondent
is guilty of violating his lawyer's oath.
The Ruling of this Court
After a careful review of the record of the case, the Court
finds that respondent committed acts in violation of his
oath as an attorney thereby warranting the Court's
exercise of its disciplinary power.
We begin by emphasizing that the practice of law is not a
right but a privilege bestowed by the State upon those
who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such
privilege.41 Whether or not a lawyer is still entitled to
practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend
or disbar him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to
hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities
of an attorney. The avowed purpose of suspending or
disbarring an attorney is not to punish the lawyer, but to
remove from the profession a person whose misconduct
has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities belonging to an office of an attorney, and
thus to protect the public and those charged with the
administration of justice.42 The lawyer's oath is a source of
obligations and its violation is a ground for suspension,
disbarment or other disciplinary action.43
The record shows and Atty. Linsangan does not deny, that
while the cases involving the subject property were still
pending resolution and final determination, Atty.
Linsangan entered into a Contract for Professional
Services with Juan wherein his attorney's fees shall be
that equivalent to 50% of the value of the property, or a
portion thereof, that may be recovered. It is likewise not
denied by Atty. Linsangan that he apportioned upon
himself, and to his wife and children, half of the property
awarded to complainants as heirs of Juan, through a
Supplemental Compromise Agreement. Similarly, such
Supplemental Compromise Agreement was entered into
by Atty. Linsangan and the heirs of Juan concurrently with
the pendency of several cases before the CA and this
Court44 involving the very same property. What is more,
Atty. Linsangan, probably anticipating that he may be
charged of having undue interest over his client's property
in litigation, caused another lawyer to appear but all the
while making it absolutely clear to Juan that the latter's
appearance was nevertheless under Atty. Linsangan's
"direct control and supervision."
Plainly, these acts are in direct contravention of Article
1491(5)45 of the Civil Code which forbids lawyers from
acquiring, by purchase or assignment, the property that
has been the subject of litigation in which they have taken
part by virtue of their profession. While Canon 10 of the
old Canons of Professional Ethics, which states that "[t]he
lawyer should not purchase any interests in the subject
matter of the litigation which he is conducting," is no
longer reproduced in the new Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), such proscription still applies
considering that Canon I of the CPR is clear in requiring
that "a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws
of the land and promote respect for law and legal process"
and Rule 138, Sec. 3 which requires every lawyer to take
an oath to "obey the laws as well as the legal orders of
the duly constituted authorities therein."46 Here, the law
transgressed by Atty. Linsangan is Article 1491(5) of the
Civil Code, in violation of his lawyer's oath.
While jurisprudence provides an exception to the above
proscription, i.e., if the payment of contingent fee is not
made during the pendency of the litigation involving the
client's property but only after the judgment has been
rendered in the case handled by the lawyer,47 such is not
applicable to the instant case. To reiterate, the transfer to
Atty. Linsangan was made while the subject property was
still under litigation, or at least concurrently with the
pendency of the certiorari proceedings in the CA and the
petitions for review in this Court.48 As mentioned, there
was nothing in the record which would show that these
cases were likewise dismissed with finality either before
the execution of, or by virtue of, the Compromise
Agreement and the Supplemental Compromise Agreement
between complainants and Atty. Linsangan.
What is more, Atty. Linsangan, at the guise of merely
waiving portions of the subject property in favor of his
wife and children, actually divided his attorney's fee with
persons who are not licensed to practice law in
contravention of Rule 9.02,49 Canon 950 of the CPR.
Another misconduct committed by Atty. Linsangan was his
act of selling the entire 12,331 square meters property
and making it appear that he was specifically authorized
to do so by complainants as well as by the other
persons51 to whom portions of the property had been
previously adjudicated. However, a perusal of the
supposed Special Power of Attorney attached to the Deed
of Absolute Sale, save for that executed by his wife and
children, only authorizes Atty. Linsangan to represent
complainants in the litigation of cases involving Juan's
properties. Nothing in said Special Power of Attorney
authorizes Atty. Linsangan to sell the entire property
including complainants' undivided share therein.
Atty. Linsangan's reasoning that he only took it upon
himself to sell the property because complainants were
unfamiliar with real estate transactions does not exculpate
him from liability. If indeed that were the case, then it is
incumbent upon Atty. Linsangan to make it clear to the
complainants that he was acting in such capacity and not
as their lawyer.52 But even this, Atty. Linsangan failed to
do.

Worse, Atty. Linsangan does not deny having received the

downpayment for the property from Helen. Atty.
Linsangan does not also deny failing to give complainants'
share for the reason that he applied said payment as his
share in the property. In so doing, Atty. Linsangan
determined all by himself that the downpayment accrues
to him and immediately appropriated the same, without
the knowledge and consent of the complainants. Such act
constitutes a breach of his client's trust and a violation of
Canon 1653 of the CPR. Indeed, a lawyer is not entitled to
unilaterally appropriate his client's money for himself by
the mere fact that the client owes him attorneys
fees.54 The failure of an attorney to return the client's
money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that
he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice
and violation of the general morality, as well as of
professional ethics; it also impairs public confidence in the
legal profession and deserves punishment. In short, a
lawyer's unjustified withholding of money belonging to his
client, as in this case, warrants the imposition of
disciplinary action.55

Pointedly, the relationship of attorney and client has

consistently been treated as one of special trust and
confidence. An attorney must therefore exercise utmost
good faith and fairness in all his relationship with his
client. Measured against this standard, respondent's act
clearly fell short and had, in fact, placed his personal
interest above that of his clients. Considering the
foregoing violations of his lawyer's oath, Article 1491(5) of
the Civil Code, Rule 9.02, Canon 9, and Canon 16 of the
CPR, the Court deems it appropriate to impose upon
respondent the penalty of six (6) months suspension from
the practice of law.56

WHEREFORE, We find Atty. Jaime S.

Linsangan LIABLE for violations of his lawyer's oath,
Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, Rule 9.02, Canon 9, and
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and he
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX
(6) months effective from the date of his receipt of this
Decision. Let copies of this Decision be circulated to all
courts of the country for their information and guidance,
and spread in the personal record of Atty. Linsangan.

SO ORDERED.
2.QUALIFICATIONS FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR (BAR
MATTER 1153)
I. REQUIREMENT OF GOOD MORAL
CHARACTER
A.C. No. 9608 : November 27, 2012
MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA, Complainant, v. ATTY.
DANILO S. SAMSON, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The Court has often reminded members of the bar to live
up to the standards and norms of the legal profession by
upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Lawyers are bound to
maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but
also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
Lawyers are at all times subject to the watchful public eye
and community approbation. Needless to state, those
whose conduct both public and private fail this scrutiny
have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings,
accordingly penalized.1 ς rνll
Complainant Maria Victoria B. Ventura filed on July 29,
2004 a Complaint2 for Disbarment or Suspension before
ςrν ll
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on
Bar Discipline against respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson
for "grossly immoral conduct."
In her complaint, complainant alleged that
2. The herein Complainant MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA
executed a Sworn Statement dated 19 April 2002 and a
Supplemental-Complaint dated 10 May 2002 stating
therein that the crime of RAPE was committed against her
person sometime in December, 2001 and on 19 March
2002 when she was merely thirteen (13) years of age by
herein Respondent ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON, then thirty
eight (38) years old, married to Teresita B. Samson,
Filipino and resident of Barangay 5, San Francisco, Agusan
Del Sur, Philippines.
3. In his Counter-Affidavit, herein Respondent ATTY.
DANILO S. SAMSON admitted that sexual intercourse
indeed transpired between the herein Complainant MARIA
VICTORIA B. VENTURA and himself.
4. After the conduct of preliminary investigation, the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan Del Sur,
Philippines issued a RESOLUTION dated 10 June 2002
dismissing the charge of RAPE and finding the existence of
probable cause for the crime of QUALIFIED SEDUCTION
and issued the corresponding INFORMATION for
QUALIFIED SEDUCTION on 04 July 2002.
5. Thereafter, the herein Complainant filed a MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION dated 26 August 2002 which was
denied in the RESOLUTION dated 02 October 2002 of the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan Del Sur.
6. The aforesaid RESOLUTION dated 02 October 2002 was
elevated to the Department of Justice, by way of a
PETITION FOR REVIEW, and is pending resolution by the
Department of Justice.
xxx
8. The act/s committed by the herein Respondent Atty.
Danilo S. Samson against the herein Complainant MARIA
VICTORIA B. VENTURA as hereinbefore stated clearly
constitute "grossly immoral conduct" under Section 27 of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines which
provides for a penalty of "DISBARMENT or SUSPENSION
of an Attorney by the SUPREME COURT."
Complainant narrated in her Sworn Statement3 that ςrν ll
sometime in December 2001, at around midnight, she was
sleeping in the maids room at respondents house when
respondent entered and went on top of her. Respondent
kissed her lips, sucked her breast, and succeeded in
having sexual intercourse with her. She felt pain and
found blood stain in her panty. She stated that another
incident happened on March 19, 2002 at respondents
poultry farm in Alegria, San Francisco, Agusan del Sur.
Respondent asked her to go with him to the farm. He
brought her to an old shanty where he sexually abused
her. Thereafter, respondent gave her five hundred pesos
and warned her not to tell anyone what had happened or
he would kill her and her mother.
In her Supplemental-Complaint,4 complainant averred
ςrνll
that respondent allowed her to sleep in his house after her
mother agreed to let her stay there while she studied at
the Agusan National High School. She further stated that
on the night she was sexually abused, she was awakened
when respondent went on top of her. She struggled to
free herself and shouted, but respondent covered her
mouth and nobody could hear as nobody was in the
house. Complainant also claimed that on March 19, 2002,
between 5:00 p.m. to 6:00 pm, respondent forced her to
ride a multi-cab. When they arrived at his poultry farm in
Alegria, respondent dragged her to a dilapidated shack.
She resisted his advances but her efforts proved futile.
Respondent alleged in his Answer5 that
ς rν ll
2. Respondent admits the allegations in paragraph 2 of
the complaint to the effect that Maria Victoria Ventura
filed a complaint against him for Rape at the Provincial
Prosecutors Office with qualification that the said
complaint for Rape was dismissed. Respondent, however,
has no knowledge or information as to the truth of the
allegation that she was 13 years.
xxx
5. Respondent vehemently denies the truth of the
allegations in paragraph 8 of the complaint to the effect
that the acts of respondent in having sex with complainant
constitute grossly immoral conduct. The truth is that the
act of respondent in having sex with complainant was
done with mutual agreement after respondent gave
money to complainant. Respondent respectfully submits
that his act of having sex with complainant once does not
constitute grossly immoral conduct.
There is no human law that punishes a person who has
sex with a woman with mutual agreement and
complainant accepts compensation therefore. Having sex
with complainant once with just compensation does not
amount to immoral conduct.
xxx
6. The complaint is instigated by Corazon Ventura who
was an employee at the Law Office of respondent herein.
The said Corazon Ventura entertained hatred and had a
grudge against the herein respondent who terminated her
services due to misunderstanding.
7. The filing of the Criminal Case against respondent as
well as this Administrative Case is a well orchestrated and
planned act of Corazon Ventura as vengeance against
respondent as a result of her separation from the
employment in the Law Office of the respondent. This
claim is supported by the Affidavit of Natividad Ruluna,
the former Office Clerk at the Law Office of respondent.
8. To show that Corazon Ventura desires to get back at
respondent, she demanded from respondent to settle with
her and demanded the payment of the amount of
P2,000,000.00; otherwise she will file a case against him
in Court for Rape and for disbarment. Respondent did not
come across with Corazon Ventura, the latter made good
her threats and filed the criminal case for Rape. [sic]
When the case for rape did not prosper because the
Prosecutor dropped the Rape Case, Corazon Ventura sent
word to respondent that she is amenable for the amount
of P400,000.00. In effect, Corazon Ventura wanted to
extort from respondent so that she can get even with him
and his wife for separating her from the employment;
9. Complainant is a woman of loose moral character. This
is supported by the Affidavit of Patronio Punayan, Jr.
which is hereto attached as Annex "3". And Corazon
Ventura can afford to utilize Maria Victoria Ventura as her
instrument in putting down the respondent herein because
Maria Victoria Ventura is not her biological daughter and
she knows before hand that her ward has a questionable
reputation. The fact that Corazon Ventura is not the
biological mother of Maria Victoria Ventura is shown by
the pre-trial order in Criminal Case No. 5414.
xxx
Respondent has not violated any grounds mentioned in
this rule. Respondent respectfully submits that his having
sex with complainant with just compensation once does
not amount to immoral conduct. For who among men will
not yield to temptation when a woman shall invite him for
sex?
Attached to respondents Answer is his Counter-
Affidavit6 which he submitted to the Provincial Prosecutor.
ςrνll
He alleged therein that complainant usually stayed late at
night with her male friends when her mother was out of
the house. He claimed that he heard rumors that
complainant had sexual affairs with different boys.
Respondent narrated that on March 19, 2002, he saw
complainant with some of her classmates near their
rented house. Complainant told him that they wanted to
go out to swim but they did not have money. When she
asked if he could spare some amount, he gave her
money. He told her in jest that he wanted to see her that
afternoon and go to a place where they could be alone,
and he was surprised when she agreed. He just thought
that for complainant, sex is a common thing despite her
age. At around 5:00 p.m., he fetched complainant at her
house. She casually walked towards the car and boarded
it. He told her that they will not check in a lodging house
because people might recognize him. Upon reaching his
poultry farm, respondent met his farm worker and asked
him if he could use the latters hut. The farm worker
agreed and they went straight to the hut.
Inside the farm workers hut, complainant did not hesitate
in entering the room. Respondent did not notice any
involuntariness on her part as she undressed herself. He
asserted that they had sexual intercourse based on their
mutual understanding. Thereafter, the complainant
dressed up and walked back to the multi-cab where she
waited for him. He told her not to tell anyone about what
had happened, to which she replied "natural buang kay
motug-an" meaning, shes not crazy as to tell anyone. He
alleged that she accepted the money he gave because she
needed to buy some things but her mother did not give
her any allowance. Respondent insisted that what
happened between them was the first and the last
incident. He claimed that he was able to confirm that
complainant is no longer a virgin.
It likewise appears that the Investigating Prosecutors
found that probable cause exists for respondent to stand
trial for qualified seduction.7 The charge of rape,
ς rνll
however, was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. An
Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Agusan del Sur, Branch 6, but complainant who was not
satisfied with the dismissal of the rape charge, filed a
motion for reconsideration. When said motion was denied,
complainant filed a petition for review with the
Department of Justice (DOJ). However, the DOJ sustained
the findings of the prosecutor.
Then, on December 14, 2006, complainant and her
mother appeared before the public prosecutor and
executed their respective Affidavits of
Desistance.8 Complainant stated that what happened
ςrν ll
between respondent and her in March 2002 was based on
mutual understanding. Thus, she was withdrawing the
complaint she filed against respondent before the RTC as
well as the one she filed before the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline. Accordingly, the criminal case against
respondent was dismissed.9 ς rνll
In its Report and Recommendation10 dated October 10,
ςrν ll
2007, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended
that respondent be suspended for a period of one year
from the practice of law for immorality with the warning
that repetition of the same or similar act will merit a more
severe penalty.
On November 10, 2007, the Board of Governors of the IBP he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
issued Resolution No. XVIII-2007-237, to wit: chan roble svirtual lawlib rary scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby As we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo,14 the possession
ςrνl l

unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED with modification, of good moral character is both a condition precedent and
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made and to retain membership in the legal profession. It is the
part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the bounden duty of members of the bar to observe the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the
record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering integrity of the Bar.15 Consequently, any errant behavior
ςrνl l

that respondent is found guilty of immorality, the victim is on the part of a lawyer, be it in the lawyers public or
a minor, respondent and his wife was victims guardians private activities, which tends to show said lawyer
and for being a married man, Atty. Danilo S. Samson is deficient in moral character, honesty, probity or good
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for five (5) demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or
years with Stern Warning that repetition of the same or disbarment.
similar act in the future will be dealt with more
severely.11ςrνl l

Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or

shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the
Complainant now moves to reconsider the IBP Resolution. opinion of the upright and respectable members of the
She argues that the penalty imposed by the IBP is not community.16 Immoral conduct is gross when it is so
ςrνll

commensurate to the gravity and depravity of the offense. corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled
She contends that respondent committed grossly immoral as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when
conduct by forcing himself to have sexual intercourse with committed under such scandalous or revolting
a young and innocent lass of 13 years of age. He also took circumstances as to shock the communitys sense of
advantage of his moral ascendancy over complainant decency.17ςrν ll

considering that she was then staying at respondents

residence. Moreover, there was a betrayal of the marital From the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence
vow of fidelity considering that respondent was a married and the admissions of respondent himself, we find that
man. She insists that this detestable behavior renders respondents act of engaging in sex with a young lass, the
respondent unfit and undeserving of the honor and daughter of his former employee, constitutes gross
privilege which his license confers upon him.Thus, immoral conduct that warrants sanction. Respondent not
complainant prays that the penalty of disbarment be only admitted he had sexual intercourse with complainant
imposed.12 ςrνll

but also showed no remorse whatsoever when he asserted

that he did nothing wrong because she allegedly agreed
Meanwhile, respondent also filed a Motion for and he even gave her money. Indeed, his act of having
Reconsideration13 of the IBP Resolution. He asserts that
ςrν ll carnal knowledge of a woman other than his wife
complainant has not presented any proof of her minority. manifests his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of
Likewise, during the sexual encounter, complainant was marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. Moreover,
not under their custody. He contends that complainants the fact that he procured the act by enticing a very young
mother even testified that her daughter stayed at woman with money showed his utmost moral depravity
respondents house only until February 2002. He further and low regard for the dignity of the human person and
stresses that because of his admission and remorse, and the ethics of his profession.
since this is the first time he has been found
administratively liable, he is entitled to a reduction of the In Cordova v. Cordova,18 we held that the moral
penalty to one year suspension from the practice of law.
ςrνll

delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the

bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the
The pertinent provisions in the Code of Professional generally accepted moral standards of the community,
Responsibility provide: c han roblesv irt uallawl ibra ry conduct for instance, which makes a mockery of the
inviolable social institution of marriage.
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND Respondent has violated the trust and confidence reposed
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. on him by complainant, then a 13-year-old minor,19 who ς rνll

for a time was under respondents care. Whether the

Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, sexual encounter between the respondent and
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. complainant was or was not with the latters consent is of
no moment. Respondent clearly committed a disgraceful,
grossly immoral and highly reprehensible act. Such
xxx conduct is a transgression of the standards of morality
required of the legal profession and should be disciplined
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE accordingly.
INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly
states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or
xxx suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for, among others, any deceit, grossly immoral
conduct, or violation of the oath that he is required to
Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
take before admission to the practice of law. It bears to
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
stress that membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately
with conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law through executory, be made part of the records of respondent in
the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be the Office of the. Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the
withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be furnished the
lawyers lack of the essential qualifications required of Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all
lawyers.20ς rν ll courts.

Likewise, it was held in Maligsa v. Cabanting21 that a ςrν ll This Decision takes effect immediately. ς rαl αωl ιb rα r

lawyer may be disbarred for any misconduct, whether in

his professional or private capacity, which shows him to SO ORDERED.
be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and
good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of
the court. Similarly, in Dumadag v. Lumaya,22 the Court ςrν ll

pronounced: chan roble svirtuallaw lib rary

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.

Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness,
maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful
compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the
conditions required for remaining a member of good
standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to
practice law.

The fact that complainant filed an Affidavit of Desistance

during the pendency of this case is of no moment.
Complainants Affidavit of Desistance cannot have the
effect of abating the instant proceedings in view of the
public service character of the practice of law and the
nature of disbarment proceedings as a public interest
concern. A case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis
and not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil
case, but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal
profession of its undesirable members in order to protect
the public and the courts. A disbarment case is not an
investigation into the acts of respondent but on his
conduct as an officer of the court and his fitness to
continue as a member of the Bar.23 ςrνll

Illicit sexual relations have been previously punished with

disbarment, indefinite or definite suspension, depending
on the circumstances.24 In this case, respondents gross ςrνl l

misbehavior and unrepentant demeanor clearly shows a

serious flaw in his character, his moral indifference to
sexual exploitation of a minor, and his outright defiance of
established norms. All these could not but put the legal
profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the
administration of justice in peril, hence the need for strict
but appropriate disciplinary action.25 ςrνll

The Court is mindful of the dictum that the power to

disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a
clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
Court and as a member of the bar. Thus, where a lesser
penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish
the end desired, disbarment should never be
decreed.26 However, in the present case, the seriousness
ςrνl l

of the offense compels the Court to wield its power to

disbar as it appears to be the most appropriate penalty.27 ςrν ll

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson is

hereby DISBARRED for Gross Immoral Conduct, Violation
of his oath of office, and Violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01
and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
 [A.C. NO. 5095 : November 28,
2007]
FATHER RANHILIO C. AQUINO,
LINA M. GARAN, ESTRELLA C.
LOZADA, POLICARPIO L.
MABBORANG, DEXTER R.
MUNAR, MONICO U. TENEDRO,
ANDY R. QUEBRAL, NESTOR T.
RIVERA, EDUARDO C.
RICAMORA, ARTHUR G. IBAÑEZ,
AURELIO C. CALDEZ and DENU A.
AGATEP, Complainants, v. ATTY.
EDWIN PASCUA, Respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the letter-
complaint dated August 3, 1999 of
Father Ranhilio C. Aquino, then
Academic Head of the Philippine
Judicial Academy, joined by Lina M.
Garan and the other above-named
complainants, against Atty. Edwin
Pascua, a Notary Public in Cagayan.
In his letter-complaint, Father
Aquino alleged that Atty. Pascua
falsified two documents committed
as follows:
(1) He made it appear that he had
notarized the "Affidavit-Complaint"
of one Joseph B. Acorda entering the
same as "Doc. No. 1213, Page No.
243, Book III, Series of 1998, dated
December 10, 1998".
(2) He also made it appear that he
had notarized the "Affidavit-
Complaint" of one Remigio B.
Domingo entering the same as "Doc.
No. 1214, Page 243, Book III, Series
of 1998, dated December 10, 1998.
Father Aquino further alleged that
on June 23 and July 26, 1999, Atty.
Angel Beltran, Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court, Tuguegarao,
certified that none of the above
entries appear in the Notarial
Register of Atty. Pascua; that the
last entry therein was Document No.
1200 executed on December 28,
1998; and that, therefore, he could
not have notarized Documents Nos.
1213 and 1214 on December 10,
1998.
In his comment on the letter-
complaint dated September 4, 1999,
Atty. Pascua admitted having
notarized the two documents on
December 10, 1998, but they were
not entered in his Notarial Register
due to the oversight of his legal
secretary, Lyn Elsie C. Patli, whose
affidavit was attached to his
comment.
The affidavit-complaints referred to
in the notarized documents were
filed by Atty. Pascua with the Civil
Service Commission. Impleaded as
respondents therein were Lina M.
Garan and the other above-named
complainants. They filed with this
Court a "Motion to Join the
Complaint and Reply to
Respondent's Comment." They
maintain that Atty. Pascua's
omission was not due to
inadvertence but a clear case of
falsification.1 On November 16,
1999, we granted their motion.2
Thereafter, we referred the case to
the Office of the Bar Confidant for
investigation, report and
recommendation.
On April 21, 2003, the Office of the
Bar Confidant issued its Report and
Recommendation partly reproduced
as follows:
A notarial document is by law
entitled to full faith and credit upon
its face. For this reason, notaries
public must observe the utmost care
to comply with the formalities and
the basic requirement in the
performance of their duties (Realino
v. Villamor, 87 SCRA 318).
Under the notarial law, "the notary
public shall enter in such register, in
chronological order, the nature of
each instrument executed, sworn to,
or acknowledged before him, the
person executing, swearing to, or
acknowledging the instrument, xxx
xxx. The notary shall give to each
instrument executed, sworn to, or
acknowledged before him a number
corresponding to the one in his
register, and shall also state on the
instrument the page or pages of his
register on which the same is
recorded. No blank line shall be left
between entries" (Sec. 246, Article
V, Title IV, Chapter II of the Revised
Administrative Code).
Failure of the notary to make the
proper entry or entries in his notarial
register touching his notarial acts in
the manner required by law is a
ground for revocation of his
commission (Sec. 249, Article VI).
In the instant case, there is no
question that the subject documents
allegedly notarized by Atty. Pascua
were not recorded in his notarial
register.
Atty. Pascua claims that the
omission was not intentional but due
to oversight of his staff. Whichever
is the case, Atty. Pascua cannot
escape liability. His failure to enter
into his notarial register the
documents that he admittedly
notarized is a dereliction of duty on
his part as a notary public and he is
bound by the acts of his staff.
The claim of Atty. Pascua that it was
simple inadvertence is far from true.
The photocopy of his notarial
register shows that the last entry
which he notarized on December 28,
1998 is Document No. 1200 on Page
240. On the other hand, the two
affidavit-complaints allegedly
notarized on December 10, 1998 are
Document Nos. 1213 and 1214,
respectively, under Page No. 243,
Book III. Thus, Fr. Ranhilio and the
other complainants are, therefore,
correct in maintaining that Atty.
Pascua falsely assigned fictitious
numbers to the questioned affidavit-
complaints, a clear dishonesty on his
part not only as a Notary Public, but
also as a member of the Bar.
This is not to mention that the only
supporting evidence of the claim of
inadvertence by Atty. Pascua is the
affidavit of his own secretary which
is hardly credible since the latter
cannot be considered a disinterested
witness or party.
Noteworthy also is the fact that the
questioned affidavit of Acorda (Doc.
No. 1213) was submitted only when
Domingo's affidavit (Doc. No. 1214)
was withdrawn in the administrative
case filed by Atty. Pascua against
Lina Garan, et al. with the CSC. This
circumstance lends credence to the
submission of herein complainants
that Atty. Pascua ante-dated
another affidavit-complaint making
it appear as notarized on December
10, 1998 and entered as Document
No. 1213. It may not be sheer
coincidence then that both
documents are dated December 10,
1998 and numbered as 1213 and
1214.
A member of the legal fraternity
should refrain from doing any act
which might lessen in any degree
the confidence and trust reposed by
the public in the fidelity, honesty
and integrity of the legal profession
(Maligsa v. Cabanting, 272 SCRA
409).
As a lawyer commissioned to be a
notary public, Atty. Pascua is
mandated to subscribe to the sacred
duties appertaining to his office,
such duties being dictated by public
policy and impressed with public
interest.
A member of the Bar may be
disciplined or disbarred for any
misconduct in his professional or
private capacity. The Court has
invariably imposed a penalty for
notaries public who were found
guilty of dishonesty or misconduct
in the performance of their
duties.
In Villarin v. Sabate, Jr. (325 SCRA
123), respondent lawyer was
suspended from his Commission as
Notary Public for a period of one
year for notarizing a document
without affiants appearing before
him, and for notarizing the same
instrument of which he was one of
the signatories. The Court held that
respondent lawyer failed to exercise
due diligence in upholding his duties
as a notary public.
In Arrieta v. Llosa (282 SCRA 248),
respondent lawyer who certified
under oath a Deed of Absolute Sale
knowing that some of the vendors
were dead was suspended from the
practice of law for a period of six (6)
months, with a warning that another
infraction would be dealt with more
severely. In said case, the Court did
not impose the supreme penalty of
disbarment, it being the
respondent's first offense.
In Maligsa v. Cabanting (272 SCRA
409), respondent lawyer was
disbarred from the practice of law,
after being found guilty of notarizing
a fictitious or spurious document.
The Court considered the
seriousness of the offense and his
previous misconduct for which he
was suspended for six months from
the practice of law.
It appearing that this is the first
offense of Atty. Pascua, a
suspension from the practice of law
for a period of six (6) months may
be considered enough penalty for
him as a lawyer. Considering that
his offense is also a ground for
revocation of notarial commission,
the same should also be imposed
upon him.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most
respectfully recommended that the
notarial commission of Atty. EDWIN
V. PASCUA, if still existing, be
REVOKED and that he be
SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of six (6) months."3
After a close review of the records of
this case, we resolve to adopt the
findings of facts and conclusion of
law by the Office of the Bar
Confidant. We find Atty. Pascua
guilty of misconduct in the
performance of his duties for failing
to register in his Notarial Register
the affidavit-complaints of Joseph B.
Acorda and Remigio B. Domingo.
"Misconduct" generally means
wrongful, improper or unlawful
conduct motivated by a
premeditated, obstinate or
intentional purpose.4 The term,
however, does not necessarily imply
corruption or criminal intent.5
The penalty to be imposed for such
act of misconduct committed by a
lawyer is addressed to the sound
discretion of the Court. In Arrieta v.
Llosa,6 wherein Atty. Joel A. Llosa
notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale
knowing that some of the vendors
were already dead, this Court held
that such wrongful act "constitutes
misconduct" and thus imposed upon
him the penalty of suspension from
the practice of law for six months,
this being his first administrative
offense. Also, in Vda. de Rosales v.
Ramos,7 we revoked the notarial
commission of Atty. Mario G. Ramos
and suspended him from the
practice of law for six months for
violating the Notarial Law in not
registering in his notarial book the
Deed of Absolute Sale he notarized.
In Mondejar v. Rubia,8 however, a
lesser penalty of one
month suspension from the practice
of law was imposed on Atty. Vivian
G. Rubia for making a false
declaration in the document she
notarized.
In the present case, considering that
this is Atty. Pascua's first offense,
we believe that the imposition of a
three-month suspension from the
practice of law upon him is in order.
Likewise, since his offense is a
ground for revocation of notarial
commission, the same should also
be imposed upon him.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edwin Pascua is
declared GUILTY of misconduct and
is SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for three (3) months with
a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar act
will be dealt with more severely. His
notarial commission, if still existing,
is ordered REVOKED.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10179
(Formerly CBD 11-2985)
BENJAMIN Q. ONG, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. WILLIAM F. DELOS SANTOS, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A lawyer's issuance of a worthless check renders him
in breach of his oath to obey the laws. To accord with
the canon of professional responsibility that requires
him to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the
land, and promote respect for the law and legal
processes, he thereby becomes administratively liable
for gross misconduct.
Antecedents
In January 2008, complainant Benjamin Ong was
introduced to respondent Atty. William F. Delos
Santos by Sheriff Fernando Mercado of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. After several calls
and personal interactions between them, Ong and
Atty. Delos Santos became friends.1 In time, according
to Ong, Atty. Delos Santos asked him to encash his
postdated check inasmuch as he was in dire need of
cash. To reassure Ong that the check would be
funded upon maturity, Atty. Delos Santos bragged
about his lucrative practice and his good paying
clients. Convinced of Atty. Delos Santos’ financial
stability, Ong handed to Atty. Delos Santos on
January 29, 2008 the amount of P100,000.00 in
exchange for the latter’s Metrobank Check No.
0110268 postdated February 29, 2008.2 However, the
check was dishonored upon presentment for the
reason that the account was closed.3 Ong relayed the
matter of the dishonor to Atty. Delos Santos, and
demanded immediate payment, but the latter just
ignored him.4 When efforts to collect remained futile,
Ong brought a criminal complaint for estafa and for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against Atty.
Delos Santos.5 Ong also brought this disbarment
complaint against Atty. Delos Santos in the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP), which docketed the
complaint as CBD Case No. 11-2985.
Findings and Recommendation
of the IBP Bar Commissioner
In his Commissioner’s Report,6 IBP Bar Commissioner
Jose I. Dela Rama, Jr. stated that Ong had sufficiently
established the existence of the dishonored check;
and that Atty. Delos Santos did not file his answer
despite notice, and did not also present contrary
evidence.7 He recommended that Atty. Delos Santos
be held liable for violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and
Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and that the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for two years, plus the return
of the amount of P100,000.00 to the complainant,8 be
meted on Atty. Delos Santos in view of an earlier
disbarment case brought against him (Lucman v. Atty.
Delos Santos, CBD Case No. 09-253).
Resolution No. XX-2013-253
On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors
issued Resolution No. XX-2013-253 adopting and
approving the findings of IBP Commissioner Dela
Rama, Jr.,9 to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A," and finding
the recommendation fully supported by the evidence
on record and the applicable laws and rules and
considering that Respondent violated Canon 1, Rule
1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. William F. Delos
Santos is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for three (3) years and ORDERED to RETURN
the amount of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00)
Pesos to complainant with legal interest within thirty
days from receipt of notice.
Issue
By issuing the worthless check, did Atty. Delos Santos
violate Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility?
Ruling
We agree with the findings of the IBP but modify the
recommended penalty.
Every lawyer is an officer of the Court. He has the
duty and responsibility to maintain his good moral
character. In this regard, good moral character is not
only a condition precedent relating to his admission
into the practice of law, but is a continuing imposition
in order for him to maintain his membership in the
Philippine Bar.10 The Court unwaveringly demands of
him to remain a competent, honorable, and reliable
individual in whom the public may repose
confidence.11 Any gross misconduct that puts his
moral character in serious doubt renders him unfit to
continue in the practice of law.12
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 has been enacted in order to
safeguard the interest of the banking system and the
legitimate public checking account users.13 The
gravamen of the offense defined and punished by
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, according to Lozano v.
Martinez,14 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check, or any check that is dishonored upon
its presentment for payment and putting it in
circulation; the law is designed to prohibit and
altogether eliminate the deleterious and pernicious
practice of issuing checks with insufficient funds, or
with no credit, because the practice is deemed a
public nuisance, a crime against public order to be
abated. The Court has observed in Lozano v.
Martinez:
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check
transcends the private interests of the parties directly
involved in the transaction and touches the interests
of the community at large. The mischief it creates is
not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an
injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting
valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied
a thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels of
trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public
interest.15 xxx
Being a lawyer, Atty. Delos Santos was well aware of
the objectives and coverage of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22. If he did not, he was nonetheless presumed to
know them, for the law was penal in character and
application. His issuance of the unfunded check
involved herein knowingly violated Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22, and exhibited his indifference towards the
pernicious effect of his illegal act to public interest and
public order.16 He thereby swept aside his Lawyer’s
Oath that enjoined him to support the Constitution and
obey the laws. He also took for granted the express
commands of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
specifically Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule
7.03, viz:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND
LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A Lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES
UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
These canons, the Court has said in Agno v.
Cagatan,17 required of him as a lawyer an enduring
high sense of responsibility and good fidelity in all his
dealings, thus:
The afore-cited canons emphasize the high standard
of honesty and fairness expected of a lawyer not only
in the practice of the legal profession but in his
personal dealings as well. A lawyer must conduct
himself with great propriety, and his behavior should
be beyond reproach anywhere and at all times. For,
as officers of the courts and keepers of the public's
faith, they are burdened with the highest degree of
social responsibility and are thus mandated to behave
at all times in a manner consistent with truth and
honor. Likewise, the oath that lawyers swear to
impresses upon them the duty of exhibiting the
highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor in
their relationships with others. Thus, lawyers may be
disciplined for any conduct, whether in their
professional or in their private capacity, if such
conduct renders them unfit to continue to be officers
of the court.18
That his act involved a private dealing with Ong did
not matter. His being a lawyer invested him – whether
he was acting as such or in a non- professional
capacity – with the obligation to exhibit good faith,
fairness and candor in his relationship with others.
There is no question that a lawyer could be disciplined
not only for a malpractice in his profession, but also
for any misconduct committed outside of his
professional capacity.19 His being a lawyer demanded
that he conduct himself as a person of the highest
moral and professional integrity and probity in his
dealings with others.20
Moreover, in issuing the dishonored check, Atty.
Delos Santos put into serious question not only his
personal integrity but also the integrity of the entire
Integrated Bar. It cannot be denied that Ong acceded
to Atty. Delos Santos’ request for encashment of the
check because of his complete reliance on the nobility
of the Legal Profession. The following excerpts from
Ong’s testimony bear this out, to wit:
COMM. DELA RAMA: What did you feel when you
were issued a bounced check by the respondent?
MR. ONG: Actually, the reason I even loaned him
money because actually he was not even my friend.
He was just referred to me. The reason why I felt at
ease to loan him money was because the sheriff told
me that abogado eto. It is his license that would be at
stake that’s why I lent him the money.21
 xxxx GUILTY of violating the Lawyer’s Oath, and Canon 1,
Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of
COMM. DELA RAMA: In other words, what you are
saying is that you felt betrayed when the lawyer Professional Responsibility, and, accordingly,
issued a bounced check in your favor. SUSPENDS HIM FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW
FOR A PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS EFFECTIVE
MR. ONG FROM NOTICE, with a stern warning that any similar
infraction in the future will be dealt with more severely.
:
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of
Yes, Commissioner. the Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty. Delos
Santos' personal record as an attorney; to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to all courts in
COMM. DELA RAMA:
the country for their information and guidance.
Why, what is your expectation of a lawyer?
SO ORDERED.
MR. ONG

They uphold the law, they know the law. He

should not have issued the check if you know it

cannot be funded because actually I have many
lawyer friend[s] and I have always high regard for
lawyers.22

Atty. Delos Santos should always be mindful of his

duty to uphold the law and to be circumspect in all his
dealings with the public. Any transgression of this duty
on his part would not only diminish his reputation as a
lawyer but would also erode the public’s faith in the
Legal Profession as a whole. His assuring Ong that
he was in good financial standing because of his
lucrative law practice when the contrary was true
manifested his intent to mislead the latter into giving a
substantial amount in exchange for his worthless
post-dated check. Such actuation did not speak well
of him as a member of the Bar.

Accordingly, Atty. Delos Santos was guilty of serious

misconduct, warranting appropriate administrative
sanction. Noting that the criminal complaint charging
him with the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was
already dismissed, and that he already repaid to Ong
the full amount of P100,000.00,23 both of which are
treated as mitigating circumstances in his favor, we
find the recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors to suspend him from the practice of law for
a period of three years harsh. Thus, we reduce the
penalty to suspension from the practice of law to six
months in order to accord with the ruling in Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Carandang.24

ACCORDINGLY, the Court PRONOUNCES

respondent ATTY. WILLIAM F. DELOS SANTOS
 A.C. No. 11078, July 19, 2016
VERLITA V. MERCULLO AND RAYMOND
VEDANO, Complainants, v. ATTY. MARIE FRANCES E.
RAMON, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This case concerns the complaint for the disbarment of
Atty. Marie Frances E. Ramon for violating Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Lawyer's Oath for deceiving the complainants in order to
obtain the substantial amount of P350,000.00 on the
pretext of having the foreclosed asset of the latter's
mother redeemed.
Antecedents
In the period from 2002 to 2011, the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) sent several
demand letters to Carmelite T. Vedaño1 regarding her
unpaid obligations secured by the mortgage covering her
residential property in Novaliches, Caloocan City.2 To
avoid the foreclosure of the mortgage, Carmelita
authorized her children, Verlita Mercullo and Raymond
Vedaño (complainants herein), to inquire from the NHMFC
about the status of the obligations. Verlita and Raymond
learned that their mother's arrears had amounted to
P350,000.00, and that the matter of the mortgage was
under the charge of respondent Atty. Ramon, but who was
not around at that time.
On June 20, 2012, Carmelita received a letter from the
sheriff of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Caloocan City,
stating that her property would be put up for auction in
July 2013. Verlita and Raymond thus went to the NHMFC
to see the respondent, who advised them about their right
to redeem the property within one year from the
foreclosure.3 cha nrob leslaw
In August 2013, Verlita and Raymond called up the
respondent, and expressed their intention to redeem the
property by paying the redemption price. The latter
agreed and scheduled an appointment with them on
August 30, 2013.
On August 30, 2013, the respondent arrived at the
designated meeting place at around 1:30 p.m., carrying
the folder that Verlita and Raymond had seen at the
NHFMC when they inquired on the status of their mother's
property. After the respondent had oriented them on the
procedure for redemption, the complainants handed
P350,000.00 to the respondent, who signed an
acknowledgment receipt.4 The respondent issued two
acknowledgment receipts for the redemption price and for
litigation expenses,5 presenting to the complainants her
NHMFC identification card. Before leaving them, she
promised to inform them as soon as the documents for
redemption were ready for their mother's signature.6
On September 4, 2013, the respondent met with Verlita
and handed a letter7 that she had signed, along with the
special power of attorney (SPA) for Carmelita's
signature.8 The letter reads:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex Officio Sheriff
Regional Trial Court
Caloocan City
Re: Redemption of the property covered by EJF No. 7484-
2013
Dear Arty. Dabalos,
Please assist Ms. Carmelita Vedano, through her Attorney-
in-Fact in redeeming the property covered by EJF No.
7484-2013. Please provide the necessary computation as
to the full redemption amount in order for Ms. Vedano to
redeem the same.
Thank you. Truly yours,
(Sgd.)
Atty. Marie Frances E. Ramon
Verlita and Raymond went to the NHMFC on September 9,
2013 to follow up on the redemption, but discovered that
the respondent had already ceased to be connected with
the NHMFC. On September 20, 2013, they met with her at
Branch 145 of the Regional Trial Court in Makati City
where she was attending a hearing. She informed them
that the redemption was under process, and that the
certificate of redemption would be issued in two to three
weeks time.9 chan roble slaw
After communicating through text messages with the
respondent, Verlita and Raymond finally went to see the
Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court in Caloocan City
On November 27, 2013 to inquire on the status of the
redemption. There, they discovered that the respondent
had not deposited the redemption price and had not filed
the letter of intent for redeeming the property.10 cha nro bleslaw
On December 5, 2013, Verlita and Raymond again went to
Branch 145 of the Regional Trial Court in Makati City
where the respondent had a hearing, and handed to her
their demand letter requiring her to return the amount
she had received for the redemption.11 She acknowledged
the letter and promised to return the money on December
16, 2013 by depositing the amount in Verlita's bank
account. However, she did not fulfill her promise and did
not show up for her subsequent scheduled hearings in
Branch 145.12 chanrobles law
With their attempts to reach the respondent being in vain,
Verlita and Raymond brought their disbarment complaint
in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
The respondent did not submit her answer when required
to do so. She also did not attend the mandatory
conference set by the IBP despite notice. Hence, the
investigation proceeded ex parte.13 chan robles law
IBP Commissioner Arsenio P. Adriano submitted his Report
chan roble slaw
and Recommendation,14 whereby he found the respondent
to have violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for engaging in deceitful conduct, and
recommended her suspension from the practice of law for
two years, and her return to the complainants of
P350,000.00. with legal interest from December 2, 2013.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted Commissioner
Adriano's recommendation as stated in its Resolution No.
XXI-2014-929,15viz.:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED AND APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution
as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation to be fully
supported by the evidence on record and applicable laws,
and for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Atty. Marie Frances E. Ramon is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two
(2) years and Ordered to Return the amount of
Three Hundred Fifty Thousand (P350,000.00) Pesos
to Complainant.
Ruling of the Court
The Court declares the respondent guilty of dishonesty
and deceit.
The Lawyer's Oath is a source of the obligations and
duties of every lawyer. Any violation of the oath may be
punished with either disbarment, or suspension from the
practice of law, or other commensurate disciplinary
action.16 Every lawyer must at no time be wanting in
probity and moral fiber which are not only conditions
precedent to his admission to the Bar, but are also
essential for his continued membership in the Law
Profession.17 Any conduct unbecoming of a lawyer
constitutes a violation of his oath.
The respondent certainly transgressed the Lawyer's Oath
by receiving money from the complainants after having
made them believe that she could assist them in ensuring
the redemption in their mother's behalf. She was
convincing about her ability to work on the redemption
because she had worked in the NHMFC. She did not
inform them soon enough, however, that she had
meanwhile ceased to be connected with the agency. It
was her duty to have so informed them. She further
misled them about her ability to realize the redemption by
falsely informing them about having started the
redemption process. She concealed from them the real
story that she had not even initiated the redemption
proceedings that she had assured them she would do.
Everything she did was dishonest and deceitful in order to
have them part with the substantial sum of P350,000.00.
She took advantage of the complainants who had reposed
their full trust and confidence in her ability to perform the
task by virtue of her being a lawyer. Surely, the totality of
her actuations inevitably eroded public trust in the Legal
Profession.
As a lawyer, the respondent was proscribed from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct in her dealings with others, especially clients
whom she should serve with competence and
diligence.18 Her duty required her to maintain fealty to
them, binding her not to neglect the legal matter
entrusted to her. Thus, her neglect in connection
therewith rendered her liable.19 Moreover, the unfulfilled
promise of returning the money and her refusal to
communicate with the complainants on the matter of her
engagement aggravated the neglect and dishonesty
attending her dealings with the complainants.
The respondent's conduct patently breached Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey
the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for
legal processes.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.
Evil intent was not essential in order to bring the unlawful
act or omission of the respondent within the coverage of
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility20 The
Code exacted from her not only a firm respect for the law
and legal processes but also the utmost degree of fidelity
and good faith in dealing with clients and the moneys
entrusted by them pursuant to their fiduciary
relationship.21 c hanro bles law
Yet another dereliction of the respondent was her wanton
disregard of the several notices sent to her by the IBP in
this case. Such disregard could only be wrong because it
reflected her undisguised contempt of the proceedings of
the IBP, a body that the Court has invested with the
authority to investigate the disbarment complaint against
her. She thus exhibited her irresponsibility as well as her
utter disrespect for the Court and the rest of the Judiciary.
It cannot be understated that a lawyer in her shoes should
comply with the orders of the Court and of the Court's
duly constituted authorities, like the IBP, the office that
the Court has particularly tasked to carry out the specific
function of investigating attorney misconduct.22 chanro bleslaw
The respondent deserves severe chastisement and
appropriate sanctions. In this regard, the IBP Board of
Governors recommended her suspension for two years
from the practice of law, and her return of the amount of
P350,000.00 to the complainants. The recommended
penalty is not commensurate to the gravity of the
misconduct committed. She merited a heavier sanction of
suspension from the practice of law for five years. Her
professional misconduct warranted a longer suspension
from the practice of law because she had caused material
prejudice to the clients' interest.23 She should somehow
be taught to be more ethical and professional in dealing
with trusting clients like the complainants and their
mother, who were innocently too willing to repose their
utmost trust in her abilities as a lawyer and in her
trustworthiness as a legal professional. In this connection,
we state that the usual mitigation of the recommended
penalty by virtue of the misconduct being her first offense
cannot be carried out in her favor considering that she
had disregarded the several notices sent to her by the IBP
in this case. As to the return of the P350,000.00 to the
complainant, requiring her to restitute with legal interest
is only fair and just because she did not comply in the
least with her ethical undertaking to work on the
redemption of the property of the mother of the
complainants. In addition, she is sternly warned against a
similar infraction in the future; otherwise, the Court will
have her suffer a more severe penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and HOLDS ATTY .
MARIE FRANCES E. RAMON guilty of violating Canon 1,
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
the Lawyer's Oath; SUSPENDS HER FROM THE
PRACTICE OF LAW FOR A PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS
EFFECTIVE FROM NOTICE, with the STERN
WARNING that any similar infraction in the future will be
dealt with more severely; ORDERS her to return to the
complainants the sum of P350,000.00 within 30 days from
notice, plus legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from
the finality of this decision until full payment;
and DIRECTS her to promptly submit to this Court written
proof of her compliance within the same period of 30 days
from notice of this decision.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the

Bar Confidant, to be appended to Atty. Marie Frances E.
Ramon's personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines; and to the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout
the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 11064, September 27, 2016
BIENVENIDA FLOR SUAREZ, Complainant, v. ATTY.
ELEONORA. MARAVILLA-ONA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This administrative case arose from a verified letter-
complaint1 dated July 19, 2012 filed by complainant
Bienvenida Flor Suarez before the Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) seeking for the refund of the professional and legal
fees which she paid to respondent Atty. EleonorA.
Maravilla-Ona.
The Facts
On February 22, 2011, Bienvenida went to the office of
Atty. Maravilla-Ona to seek the latter's legal assistance in
transferring title to a land, under her name. Atty.
Maravilla-Ona agreed to render her services for a
consideration of forty-eight thousand pesos (P48,000) by
way of professional and legal fees. Accepting the
engagement, Bienvenida turned over the necessary
documents to Atty. Maravilla-Ona and gave the latter the
amount of one thousand pesos (P1,000) as down
payment, as evidenced by Official Receipt No.
515532 dated February 22, 2011.
On March 4, 2011, Bienvenida returned to Atty. Maravilla-
Ona's office to make another payment in the amount of
thirty-five thousand pesos (P35,000), as evidenced by
Official Receipt No. 49376. Thereafter, on March 28, 2011,
Bienvenida made her final payment to Atty. Maravilla-Ona
in the amount of twelve thousand pesos (P12,000), as
evidenced by Official Receipt No. 52163.3
chanrob leslaw
Despite the lapse of a considerable period, Bienvenida did
not receive any update on the status of the transfer of
land title under her name. Apparently, Atty. Maravilla-Ona
failed to do anything to facilitate the said transfer of title.
Thus, Bienveriida opted not to push through with the
transaction and, instead, claimed reimbursement for the
amounts she paid to Atty. Maravilla-Ona, to which the
latter agreed.
After a year of waiting, Atty. Maravilla-Ona issued to
Bienvenida a Bank of Commerce check dated May 9, 2012
in the amount of fifty-eight thousand pesos
(P58,000).4 However, to Bienvenida's dismay, when she
presented the check to the bank, it was dishonored due to
insufficiency of funds. Atty. Maravilla-Ona thereafter made
several promises to return Bienvenida's money, which, up
to this moment, remain unfulfilled.
Aggrieved, Bienvenida filed the instant administrative case
before the CBD praying for the recovery of P58,000,
representing the amount of the dishonored check issued
by Atty. Maravilla-Ona.
Acting on the complaint, the CBD, through Director for Bar
Discipline Pura Angelica Y. Santiago, issued an
Order5 dated August 1, 2012 requiring Atty. Maravilla-Ona
to submit her Answer to the complaint, with a warning
that failing to do so would render her in default. However,
notwithstanding the said warning, Atty. Maravilla-Ona did
not submit any Answer.
On January 31, 2013, IBP Commissioner Loreto C. Ata
(Commissioner Ata) notified the parties to appear for a
mandatory conference scheduled on March 7, 2013. The
notice stated that "nonappearance by any of the parties
shall be deemed a waiver of their right to participate in
further proceedings."6 chan rob leslaw
At the mandatory conference, only Bienvenida appeared.
Thus, Commissioner Ata issued an Order7 noting Atty.
Maravilla-Ona's absence during the mandatory conference
and her failure to file an Answer. Accordingly, Atty.
Maravilla-Ona was declared in default.
Considering the condition and age of Bienvenida, who was
already 84 years old at that time, Commissioner Ata found
it imperative to proceed with the investigation ex parte.
Hence, after clarificatory questions were propounded on
Bienvenida, the mandatory conference was terminated
and the case was submitted for report and
recommendation.8
chanro bles law
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
In its Report and Recommendation9 dated July 22, 2014,
the CBD found that Atty. Maravilla-Ona was guilty of gross
misconduct and violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for: (1) issuing a worthless check; (2)
refusing to settle due obligations despite demand; (3)
failing to serve the complainant with competence and
diligence; and (4) failing to apprise her client of the status
of the transactions.10 Thus, the CBD recommended that
Atty. Maravilla-Ona be suspended from the practice of law
for a period of one (1) year and ordered to pay Bienvenida
the amount of P58,000.
On December 13, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors
passed a Resolution11 adopting the Report and
Recommendation of the CBD with the modification
increasing Atty. Maravilla-Ona's penalty to disbarment, to
wit:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
RESOLUTION NO. XXI-2014-917
CBD Case No. 12-3534
Bienvenid[a] Flor Suarez vs.
Atty. EleonorA. Maravilla-Ona
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A", and finding Respondent guilty of
gross misconduct and violation of the Code of Canon 18
and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
for issuing a worthless check, for her refusal to settle due
obligations despite demand, for her failure to serve the
Complainant with competence and diligence, and for her
failure to apprise her client of the status of transactions in
relation to a plethora of cases, Atty. Eleanor A. Maravilla-
Ona is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law
and [her] name ORDERED stricken off from the Roll
of Attorneys.12 chanrob lesvi rtua llawli bra ry
On January 11, 2016, the CBD transmitted to this Court
the Notice of Resolution along with the records of this
case. 13 chanrob leslaw
 The Court's Ruling
We concur with the IBP Board of Governors' finding of
administrative liability.
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code provides that "[lawyers]
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct." By taking the lawyer's oath, lawyers
become guardians of the law and indispensable
instruments for the orderly administration of justice.14 As
such, they can be disciplined for any conduct, in their
professional or private capacity, which renders them unfit
to continue to be officers of the court.15 chanrob leslaw
In the instant case, it is clear that Atty. Maravilla-Ona
violated her sworn duties under the Lawyer's Oath and the
Code. The records plainly show that Atty. Maravilla-Ona
was completely remiss and negligent in fulfilling her
obligations as a lawyer to Bienvenida. After collecting the
full amount of her professional and legal fees, Atty.
Maravilla-Ona did not take a single step to process the
registration of land title in Bienvenida's name. Worse,
when asked to return the money she received from
Bienvenida, Atty. Maravilla-Ona issued a worthless check
which consequently bounced when presented for
payment.
In Belleza v. Atty. Macasa, the Court ruled that a lawyer's
failure to return the client's money upon demand gives
rise to the presumption that the lawyer has
misappropriated it for his or her own use to the prejudice
of and in violation of the trust reposed in him or her by
the client. It is a gross violation of general morality as well
as of professional ethics; it impairs public confidence in
the legal profession and deserves punishment.16 Atty.
Maravilla-Ona's failure to return Bienvenida's money is a
breach of Rule 16.01 of the Code, which provides:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
Rule 16.01 -A lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected or received for or from the client.
Atty. Maravilla-Ona's agreement to render her legal
services to Bienvenida, sealed by her receipt of her legal
fees, is an assurance and representation that she would
be diligent and competent in fulfilling her responsibilities
as Bienvenida's lawyer. However, Atty. Maravilla-Ona
acted to the contrary. Thus, the IBP correctly found that
she violated Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 thereof, which
state:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
Canon 18 A lawyer shall serve his client with competence
and diligence;
xxxx
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
Atty. Maravilla-Ona's negligence, her failure to return her
client's money, and her act of issuing a worthless check
constitute dishonesty, abuse of trust and confidence, and
betrayal of her client's interests. These acts undoubtedly
speak of deceit Deceitful conduct involves moral turpitude
and includes anything done contrary to justice, modesty
or good morals. It is an act of baseness, vileness or
depravity in the private and social duties which a person
owes to his or her fellowmen or to society in general,
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals.17 Such malfeasance is not only unacceptable,
disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal profession; it
also reveals a basic moral flaw that makes her unfit to
practice law.18 chan robles law
In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules
of Court mandates that a lawyer may be disbarred or
suspended by this Court for any of the following acts: (1)
deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4)
grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer's
oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney
for a party without authority to do so.19 Thus, a lawyer
may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his
oath, a patent disregard of his duties, or an odious
deportment unbecoming an attorney. However, the
question as to what disciplinary sanction should be meted
out against a lawyer found guilty of misconduct requires
consideration of a number of factors.
In the instant case, the misconduct of Atty. Maravilla-Ona
is aggravated by her unjustified refusal to obey the orders
of the IBP directing her to file an answer to the complaint
of Bienvenida and to appear at the scheduled mandatory
conference. This .constitutes blatant disrespect for the IBP
which amounts to conduct unbecoming lawyer.
In Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, We held that a lawyer must
maintain respect not only to the courts, but also to judicial
officers and other duly constituted authorities, including
the IBP:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
The misconduct of respondent is aggravated by his
unjustified refusal to heed the orders of the IBP requiring
him to file an answer to the complaint-affidavit and,
afterwards, to appear at the mandatory conference.
Although respondent did not appear at the conference, the
IBP gave him another chance to defend himself through a
position paper. Still, respondent ignored this directive,
exhibiting a blatant disrespect for authority. Indeed, he is
justly charged with conduct unbecoming a lawyer, for a
lawyer is expected to uphold the law and promote respect
for legal processes. Further, a lawyer must observe and
maintain respect not only to the courts, but also to judicial
officers and other duly constituted authorities, including
the IBP. Under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the Court
has empowered the IBP to conduct proceedings for the
disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys.20
We also take note of the past disbarment complaints that
had been filed against Atty. Maravilla-Ona. In A.C. No.
10107 entitled Beatrice C. Yatco, represented by her
Attorney-In-Fact, Marivic Yatco v. Atty. Eleanor Ma illa-
Ona, the complainant filed a disbarment case against Atty.
Maravilla-Ona for issuing several worthless checks as
rental payments for the complainant's property and for
refusing to vacate the said property, thus forcing the
latter to file an ejectment case against Atty. MaraviJla-
Ona. The IBP required Atty. Maravilla-Ona to file her
Answer, but she failed to do so. Neither did she make an
appearance during the scheduled mandatory conference.
In its Resolution21 dated February 13, 2013, IBP found
Atty. Maravilla-Ona guilty of serious misconduct and for
violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code. The Court latter
adopted and approved the IBP's findings in its Resolution
dated September 15, 2014 and suspended Atty. Maravilla
Ona from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
In yet another disbarment case against Atty. Maravilla-
Ona, docketed as A.C. No. 10944 and entitled Norma M.
Gutierrez v. Atty. Eleanor Maravilla-Ona, the complainant
therein alleged that she engaged the services of Atty.
Maravilla-Ona and gave her the amount of P80,000 for the
filing of a case in court. However, Atty. Maravilla-Ona
failed to file the case, prompting the complainant to
withdraw from the engagement and to demand the refund
of the amount she paid. Atty. Maravilla-Onreturned
P15,000 and executed a promissory note to pay the
remaining P65,000. However, despite several demands,
Atty. Maravilla-Ona failed to refund the complainant's
money. Thus, a complaint for disbarment was filed against
Atty. Maravilla-Ona for grave misconduct, gross
negligence and incompetence. But again, Atty. Maravilla-
Ona failed to file her Answer and appear in the mandatory
conference before the IBP. The IBP found that Atty.
Maravilla-Ona violated Canon 16, Rule 16.03 of the
Code22 and recommended her suspension for a period of
five ( )years, considering her pr ious infractions. The
Court, however, reduced Atty. Maravilla-Ona's penalty to
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eleonor A. Maravilla-
Ona is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and violation of
Canons 1, 16, and 18; and Rules 1.01, 16.01, 18.03, and
18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, she is hereby DISBARRED from the practice
of law and her name is ordered stricken off from the Roll
of Attorneys, effective immediately. The Court orders
respondent to RESTITUTE complainant Bienvenida Flor
Suarez the amount of fifty-eight thousand pesos
(P58,000) within thirty (30) days from receipt of this
Decision. Otherwise, respondent may be held liable for
contempt.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts of the
land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the
Office of the Bar Confidant for their information and
guidance, and let it be entered in Atty. Eleonor A.
Maravilla-Ona's record in this Court.
SO ORDERED. chanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary

suspension from the practice of law for a period of three

(3) years, with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar offense will be dealt with more severely. She was
also ordered to return the complainant's money.

Clearly, Atty. Maravilla-Ona exhibits the habit of.violating

her oath as a lawyer and the Code, as well as defying the
processes of the IBP. The Court cannot allow her blatant
disregard of the Code and her sworn duty as a member of
the Bar to continue. She had been warned that a similar
violation will merit a more severe penalty, and yet, her
reprehensible conduct has, again, brought embarrassment
and dishonor to the legal profession.

In her previous disbarment case, We showed leniency by

reducing her penalty to suspension for a period of three
(3) years. We cannot similarly treat Atty. Maravilla-Ona
this time. It is clear that she did not learn any lesson from
her past experiences and since then has continued to
exhibit traits of incorrigibility. It is time to write finis to
Atty. Maravilla-Ona's professional legal career for the sake
of the public, the profession and the interest of justice.23 chan robles law

In Overgaard v. Valdez,24 the respondent was disbarred

for deserting his client after collecting the full amount of
his legal fees without attending to any of the cases for
which he was engaged. This Court ruled that respondent
committed manifestly deceitful and dishonest acts, which
violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Canon 15; and Rule 16.01
of Canon 16 of the Code.

Similarly in Arellano University, Inc. v. Mijares III,25 the

cralawred

Court disbarred the· lawyer therein for misappropriating

the client's money intended for securing a certificate of
title on the latter's behalf. Finally, in CF Sharp Crew
Management Incorporated v. Atty. Torres,26 the Court
disbarred the respondent for failing to account for, and
misappropriating, the various amounts he received from
his client.

Considering all of the foregoing, We deem it fit to affirm

the imposition of the ultimate penalty of disbarment from
the practice of law upon Atty. Maravilla-Ona. Membership
in the legal profession is a privilege, and whenever it is
made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of
the trust and confidence of her clients and the public, it
becomes not only the right but also the duty of the Court
to withdraw the same.27 chanrobles law
3.CONTINUING REQUIREMENT FOR MEMBERSHIP IN
THE BAR
A.C. No. 12156, June 20, 2018
PAULINO LIM, Complainant, v. ATTY. SOCRATES R.
RIVERA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 dated
March 9, 2015 filed by Paulino Lim (complainant) against
respondent Atty. Socrates R. Rivera (respondent), praying
that the latter be meted disciplinary sanctions for
defrauding the former by issuing a worthless check as
guarantee for the payment of respondent's loan.
The Facts
Complainant alleged that he met respondent sometime in
June 2014 in the hallway of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City while accompanying his cousin who was then
inquiring about the status of a case. The two (2) became
acquainted after striking a conversation with each other.
The following month, or in July 2014, respondent
borrowed from complainant the amount of P75,000.00,
which the former needed immediately.2 Complainant did
not think twice in lending money to respondent and
issuing in his favor BDO Check No. 03565553 dated July 3,
2014 for P75,000.00, especially since the latter issued a
guarantee check (Union Bank Check No.
00034057804 dated July 19, 2014) to ensure payment of
the loan. Subsequently, respondent made several other
loans in the amounts of P150,000.00, P10,000.00, and
another P10,000.00, for which he no longer issued any
guarantee checks. Complainant claimed to have been
taken by respondent's sweet talk and promises of
payment considering the millions he expects to receive as
contingent fee in one (1) of his cases.5
However, when complainant deposited Union Bank Check
No. 0003405780, it was dishonored for the reason
"Account Closed." Thereafter, respondent would not take
or return complainant's calls nor respond to the latter's
text messages. He completely avoided
complainant.6 Consequently, complainant's lawyer wrote a
demand letter7 dated October 15, 2014 for the payment of
respondent's indebtedness in the aggregate amount of
P245,000.00, but to no avail. Thus, complainant was
constrained to file an administrative case before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).8
In an Order9 dated April 17, 2015, the IBP directed
respondent to submit his answer to the complaint within a
period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of said Order,
failing which the case shall be heard ex parte.10 However,
respondent filed no answer.11 Subsequently, a Notice of
Mandatory Conference/Hearing12 scheduled on November
13, 2015 was sent to respondent on October 20, 2015,
during which the latter did not appear.13
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation14 dated November 14,
2016, the IBP Investigating Commissioner (IC) found
respondent administratively liable, and accordingly,
recommended that he be meted the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for one (1) year and be ordered
to return to complainant the amount of P75,000.00 with
legal interest reckoned from July 19, 2014.15 The other
loans alleged by complainant were not duly proven. 16
The IBP IC declared that respondent's act of issuing a
worthless check was a violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility (CPR) which requires that "a
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct." Citing the case of Foronda v. Alvarez,
Jr.,17 the IBP IC held that the issuance of a check that was
later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed
account indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and
confidence reposed on him and hence, constitutes a
ground for disciplinary action.18 The penalty of one (1)-
year suspension from the practice of law was based on the
case of Lao v. Medel,19 where the Court meted the same
penalty for gross misconduct committed by deliberately
failing to pay just debts and issuing worthless checks.20
In a Resolution21 dated June 14, 2017, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted the aforesaid report and
recommendation.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not
respondent should be held administratively liable for the
issuance of a worthless check in violation of the CPR.
The Court's Ruling
After a judicious perusal of the records showing the
existence of the loan obligation incurred by respondent as
evidenced by complainant's BDO Check No. 0356555
dated July 3, 2014, as well as Union Bank Check No.
0003405780 dated July 19, 2014 issued by respondent to
guarantee the payment of said loan but which was
dishonored upon presentment for the reason "Account
Closed," the Court concurs with the findings and adopts
the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors,
except for the return to complainant of the amount of
P75,000.00 with legal interest.
Time and again, the Court has imposed the penalty of
suspension or disbarment for any gross misconduct that a
lawyer may have committed, whether it is in his
professional or in his private capacity. Good character is
an essential qualification for the admission to and
continued practice of law. Thus, any wrongdoing, whether
professional or non-professional, indicating unfitness for
the profession justifies disciplinary action,22 as in this
case.
It is undisputed that respondent had obtained a loan from
complainant for which he issued a post-dated check that
was eventually dishonored and had failed to settle his
obligation despite repeated demands. It has been
consistently held that "[the] deliberate failure to pay
just debts and the issuance of worthless
checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer
may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of
law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of
justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are
expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a
high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair
dealing so that the peoples' faith and confidence in the
judicial system is ensured. They must at all times
faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the
courts and to their clients, which include prompt
payment of financial obligations. They must conduct
themselves in a manner that reflects the values and
norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility."23 Thus, the IBP IC correctly
ruled that respondent's act of issuing a worthless check
was a violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, which
explicitly states:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey
the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
In Enriquez v. De Vera,24 the Court categorically
pronounced that a lawyer's act of issuing a worthless
check, punishable under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22,
constitutes serious misconduct penalized by suspension
from the practice of law for one (1) year, for which no
conviction of the criminal charge is even necessary. Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 was '"designed to prohibit and
altogether eliminate the deleterious and pernicious
practice of issuing checks with insufficient funds, or with
no credit, because the practice is deemed a public
nuisance, a crime against public order to be
abated."25 Being a lawyer, respondent was well aware of,
or was nonetheless presumed to know, the objectives and
coverage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. Yet, he knowingly
violated the law and thereby "exhibited his indifference
towards the pernicious effect of his illegal act to public
interest and public order."26
In addition, respondent's failure to answer the complaint
against him and his failure to appear at the scheduled
mandatory conference/hearing despite notice are evidence
of his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and
illustrate his despiciency for his oath of office in violation
of Section 3, Rule 138, Rules of Court.27 Respondent
should stand foremost in complying with the directives of
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline not only because as
a lawyer, he is called upon to obey the legal orders of duly
constituted authorities, as well as court orders and
processes, but also because the case involved the very
foundation of his right to engage in the practice of law.
Therefore, his lack of concern or interest in the status or
outcome of his administrative case would show how much
less he would regard the interest of his clients.
Indisputably, respondent has fallen short of the exacting
standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal
profession. His transgressions showed him to be unfit for
the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license
and the law confer to him, for which he must suffer the
consequence.
The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on
the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the
surrounding facts.28 In the cases of Lao v.
Medel,29Rangwani v. Dino,30 and Enriquez v. De
Vera,31 the Court imposed the penalty of one (1)-year
suspension from the practice of law for deliberate failure
to pay just debts and for the issuance of worthless checks.
In Sanchez v. Torres,32 the Court increased the penalty to
two (2) years in light of the amount of the loan which was
P2,200,000.00, and the fact that respondent therein had
repeatedly asked for extensions of time to file an answer
and a motion for reconsideration, which he nonetheless
failed to submit, and had likewise failed to attend the
disciplinary hearings set by the IBP. Considering,
therefore, that the amount of the loan proven by
complainant herein is P75,000.00, the Court sustains the
recommended penalty of one (1)-year suspension from
the practice of law. With respect, however, to the return
of the amount of P75,000.00 which respondent received
from complainant, the same cannot be sustained. It is
settled that in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers,
the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit
to be allowed to continue as a member of the
Bar.33 In Tria-Samonte v. Obias,34 the Court held that its
"findings during administrative-disciplinary proceedings
have no bearing on the liabilities of the parties involved
which are purely civil in nature – meaning, those liabilities
which have no intrinsic link to the lawyer's professional
engagement – as the same should be threshed out in a
proper proceeding of such nature."35 Thus, the return of
the P75,000.00 clearly lies beyond the ambit of this
administrative case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Socrates R. Rivera is
found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, as well as the Lawyer's
Oath, and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for one (1) year to commence immediately from the
receipt of this Decision, with a WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant a
more severe penalty.
He is DIRECTED to immediately file a Manifestation to the
Court that his suspension has started, copy furnished all
courts and quasi-judicial bodies where he has entered his
appearance as counsel.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to: the Office of
the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's
personal record as an attorney; the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for its information and guidance; and the Office
of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in
the country.
SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 10245, August 16, 2017
ELIBENA A. CABILES, Complainant, v. ATTY. LEANDRO
S. CEDO, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Complainant Elibena Cabiles (Elibena) filed this
administrative complaint1 before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) seeking the disbarment of Atty. Leandro
Cedo (respondent lawyer) for neglecting the two cases
she referred to him to handle.
The Facts
According to Elibena, she engaged the services of
respondent lawyer to handle an illegal dismissal case, i.e.,
NLRC NCR Case No. 00-11-16153-08 entitled "Danilo
Ligbos v. Platinum Autowork and/or Even Cabiles and Rico
Guido," where therein respondents were Elibena's
business partners. Respondent lawyer was paid
Php5,500.002 for drafting therein respondents' position
paper3 and Php2,000.004 for his every appearance in the
NLRC hearings.
During the hearing set on March 26, 2009, only Danilo
Ligbos (Danilo), the complainant therein, showed up and
submitted his Reply.5 On the other hand respondent
lawyer did not file a Reply for his clients,6 despite being
paid his appearance fee earlier.7
In a Decision8 dated March 31, 2009, the Labor Arbiter
ruled for Danilo, and ordered the clients of respondent
lawyer to pay Danilo backwages, separation pay, and
13th month pay.
Worse still, on October 27, 2009, the NLRC likewise
dismissed the appeal of the clients of respondent lawyer
for failure to post the required cash or surety bond, an
essential requisite in perfecting an appeal.9
According to Elibena, respondent lawyer misled them by
claiming that it was Danilo who was absent during the
said hearing on March 26, 2009; and that moreover,
because of the failure to submit a Reply, they were
prevented from presenting the cash vouchers10 that would
refute Danilo's claim that he was a regular employee.
With regard to the non-perfection of the appeal before the
NLRC, Elibena claimed that respondent lawyer instructed
them (his clients) to pick up the said Memorandum only
on the last day to file the appeal, i.e., on May 28, 2009;
that the memorandum was ready for pick up only at
around 2:30 p.m. that day; that left to themselves, with
no help or assistance from respondent lawyer, they
rushed to file their appeal with the NLRC in Quezon City
an hour later; that the NLRC Receiving Section informed
them that their appeal was incomplete, as it lacked the
mandatory cash/surety bond, a matter that respondent
lawyer himself did not care to attend to; and,
consequently, their appeal was dismissed for non-
perfection.
Elibena moreover claimed that respondent lawyer failed to
indicate his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)
compliance11 in the position paper and in the
memorandum of appeal that he prepared. Elibena pointed
to a certification12 issued on June 29, 2010 by the MCLE
Office that respondent lawyer had not at all complied with
the first, second, and third compliance periods13 of the
(MCLE) requirement.
Elibena also averred that in May 2009, she hired
respondent lawyer to file a criminal case for unjust
vexation against Emelita Claudit; that as evidenced by a
May 5, 2009 handwritten receipt,14 she paid respondent
lawyer his acceptance fees, the expenses for the filing of
the case, and the appearance fees totalling Php45,000.00;
and that in order to come up with the necessary amount,
she sold 'to respondent lawyer her 1994 Model Mitsubishi
Lancer worth Php85,000.00, this sale being covered by an
unnotarized Deed of Sale15 dated August 1, 2009.
Elibena claimed that, despite payment of his professional
fees, respondent lawyer did not exert any effort to
seasonably file her Complaint for unjust vexation before
the City Prosecutor's Office; that the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City dismissed her Complaint for
unjust vexation on September 10, 2009 on the ground of
prescription; and that although she moved for
reconsideration of the Order dismissing the case, her
motion for reconsideration was denied by the City
Prosecutor's Office in a resolution dated October 19,
2009.16
In his Answer,17 respondent lawyer argued that the March
26, 2009 hearing was set to provide the parties the
opportunity either to explore the possibility of an amicable
settlement, or give time for him (respondent lawyer) to
decide whether to file a responsive pleading, after which
the case would be routinely submitted for resolution, with
or without the parties' further appearances. As regards
the cash vouchers, respondent lawyer opined that their
submission would only contradict their defense of lack of
employer-employee relationship. Respondent lawyer
likewise claimed that Elibena was only feigning ignorance
of the cost of the appeal bond, and that in any event,
Elibena herself could have paid the appeal bond. With
regard to Elibena's allegation that she was virtually forced
to sell her car to respondent lawyer to complete payment
of the latter's professional fee, respondent lawyer claimed
that he had fully paid for the car.18
Respondent lawyer did not refute Ebilena's claim that he
failed to indicate his MCLE compliance in the position
paper and in the memorandum of appeal.
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In a May 18, 2011 Report and Recommendation,19 the
Investigating Commissioner found respondent lawyer
guilty of having violated Canons 5, 17, and 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and recommended his
suspension from the practice of law for two years. Aside
from respondent lawyer's failure to comply with the MCLE
requirements, the Investigating Commissioner also found
him grossly negligent in representing his clients,
particularly (1) in failing to appear on the March 26, 2009
hearing in the NLRC, and file the necessary responsive
pleading; (2) in failing to advise and assist his clients who
had no knowledge of, or were not familiar with, the NLRC
rules of procedure, in filing their appeal and; 3) in failing
to file seasonably the unjust vexation complaint before the
city prosecutor's office, in consequence of which it was
overtaken by prescription.
In its March 20, 2013 Resolution, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the Investigating
Commissioner's Report and Recommendation, but
modified the recommended administrative sanction by
reducing the suspension to one year.
The Court's Ruling
We adopt the IBP's finding that respondent lawyer
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. We also
agree with the recommended penalty.
Violation of Canon 5
Firstly, Bar Matter 850 mandates continuing legal
education for IBP members as an additional requirement
to enable them to practice law. This is ''to ensure that
throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and
jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and
enhance the standards of the practice of law."20 Non-
compliance with the MCLE requirement subjects the
lawyer to be listed as a delinquent IBP
member.21 In Arnado v. Adaza,22 we administratively
sanctioned therein respondent lawyer for his non-
compliance with four MCLE Compliance Periods. We
stressed therein that in accordance with Section 12(d) of
the MCLE Implementing Regulations,23 even if therein
respondent attended an MCLE Program covered by the
Fourth Compliance Period, his attendance therein would
only cover his deficiency for the First Compliance Period,
and he was still considered delinquent and had to make
up for the other compliance periods. Consequently, we
declared respondent lawyer therein a delinquent member
of the IBP and suspended him from law practice for six
months or until he had fully complied with all the MCLE
requirements for all his non-compliant periods.
In the present case, respondent lawyer failed to indicate
in the pleadings filed in the said labor case the number
and date of issue of his MCLE Certificate of Compliance for
the Third Compliance Period, i.e., from April 15, 2007 to
April 14, 2010, considering that NLRC NCR Case No. 00-
11-16153-08 had been pending in 2009. In fact, upon
checking with the MCLE Office, Elibena discovered that
respondent lawyer had failed to comply with the three
MCLE compliance periods. For this reason, there is no
doubt that respondent lawyer violated Canon 5, which
reads:
CANON 5 - A LAWYER SHALL KEEP ABREAST OF LEGAL
DEVELOPMENTS, PARTICIPATE IN CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUCATION PROGRAMS, SUPPORT EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE
HIGH STANDARDS IN LAW SCHOOLS AS WELL AS IN THE
PRACTICAL TRAINING OF LAW STUDENTS AND ASSIST IN
DISSEMINATING INFORMATION REGARDING THE LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE.
Violation of Canons 17 and 18 and Rule 18.03
The circumstances of this case indicated that respondent
lawyer was guilty of gross negligence for failing to exert
his utmost best in prosecuting and in defending the
interest of his client. Hence, he is guilty of the following:
CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF
HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST
AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
Furthermore, respondent lawyer's act of receiving an
acceptance fee for legal services, only to subsequently fail
to render such service at the appropriate time, was a clear
violation of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.24
Respondent lawyer did not diligently and fully attend to
the cases that he accepted, although he had been fully
compensated for them. First off, respondent lawyer never
successfully refuted Elibena's claim that he was paid in
advance his Php2,000.00 appearance fee on March 21,
2009 for the scheduled hearing of the labor case on March
26, 2009, during which he was absent. Furthermore,
although respondent lawyer had already received the sum
of Php45,000.00 to file an unjust vexation case, he failed
to promptly file the appropriate complaint therefor with
the City Prosecutor's Office, in consequence of which the
crime prescribed, resulting in the dismissal of the case.
We have held that:
Case law further illumines that a lawyer's duty of
competence and diligence includes not merely reviewing
the cases entrusted to the counsel's care or giving sound
legal advice, but also consists of properly representing the
client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled
hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the required
pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable
dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for
the client or the court to prod him or her to do so.
Conversely, a lawyer's negligence in fulfilling his duties
subjects him to disciplinary action. While such negligence
or carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the
Court has consistently held that the lawyer's mere failure
to perform the obligations due his client is per se a
violation.25
"[A] lawyer 'is expected to exert his best efforts and
[utmost] ability to [protect and defend] his client's cause,
for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his client likewise
serves the ends of justice."'26 However, in the two cases
for which he was duly compensated, respondent lawyer
was grossly remiss in his duties as counsel. He exhibited
lack of professionalism, even indifference, in the defense
and protection of Elibena's rights which resulted in her
losing the two cases.
With regard to the labor case tor which he opted not to
file a Reply and refused to present the cash vouchers
which, according to Elibena, ought to have been submitted SO ORDERED.
to the NLRC, we hold that even granting that he had the
discretion being the handling lawyer to present what he
believed were available legal defenses for his client, and
conceding, too, that it was within his power to employ an
allowable legal strategy, what was deplorable was his way
of handling the appeal before the NLRC. Aside from
handing over or delivering the requisite pleading to his
clients almost at the end of the day, at the last day to file
the appeal before the NLRC, he never even bothered to
advise Elibena and the rest of his clients about the
requirement of the appeal bond. He should not expect
Elibena and her companions to be conversant with the
indispensable procedural requirements to perfect the
appeal before the NLRC. If the averments in his Answer
are any indication, respondent lawyer seemed to have
relied heavily on the NLRC's much vaunted 'leniency' in
gaining the successful prosecution of the appeal of his
clients in the labor case; no less censurable is his
propensity for passing the blame onto his clients for not
doing what he himself ought to have done. And, in the
criminal case, he should have known the basic rules
relative to the prescription of crimes that operate to
extinguish criminal liability. All these contretemps could
have been avoided had respondent lawyer displayed the
requisite zeal and diligence.

As mentioned earlier, the failure to comply with the MCLE

requirements warranted a six-month suspension in
the Adaza case. Respondent lawyer must likewise be
called to account for violating Canons 17, 18, and Rule
18.03. In one case involving violation of Canons 17 and
18 where a lawyer failed to file a petition for review with
the Court of Appeals, the lawyer was penalized with a six-
month suspension.27 In another case,28 involving
transgression of the same Canons, the guilty lawyer was
meted out the penalty of suspension from the practice of
law for a period of six months and admonished and
sternly warned that a commission of the same or similar
acts would be dealt with more severely.

"[T]he appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends

on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the
surrounding facts."29 Given herein respondent lawyer's
failure to maintain a high standard of legal proficiency
with his refusal to comply with the MCLE as well as his
lack of showing of his fealty to Elibena's interest in view of
his lackadaisical or indifferent approach in handling the
cases entrusted to him, we find it apt and commensurate
to the facts of the case to adopt the recommendation of
the IBP to suspend him from the practice of law for one
year.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Leandro S. Cedo is

hereby found GUILTY of violating Canons 5, 17, 18, and
Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year effective upon receipt of this
Decision, and warned that a repetition of the same or a
similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Cedo's

personal record as attorney-at-law. Further, let copies of
this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator,
which is directed to circulate said copies to all courts in
the country for their information and guidance.
4.APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS
A.NEW LAW STUDENT PRACTICE
G.R. No. 154207 April 27, 2007
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO
and HON. ZENAIDA LAGUILLES, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, grounded on pure questions
of law, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction assailing
the Resolution dated May 3, 2002 promulgated by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116, Pasay City,
in Civil Case No. 02-0137, which denied the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction against the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 45, Pasay
City, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705;1 and the RTC’s
Order dated June 5, 2002 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration. No writ of preliminary injunction was
issued by this Court.
The antecedents:
On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz
(petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of
Appearance, as private prosecutor, in Criminal Case
No. 00-1705 for Grave Threats, where his father,
Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.
The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law
student, justifies his appearance as private prosecutor
on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc
in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr.2 that a non-lawyer
may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or
friend of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore
avers that his appearance was with the prior
conformity of the public prosecutor and a written
authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his
agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.
However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the
MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as
private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19
governing limited law student practice in conjunction
with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student
Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling
of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the
case for continuation of trial.3
On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the
MeTC a Motion for Reconsideration seeking to
reverse the February 1, 2002 Order alleging that Rule
138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, does not
have the effect of superseding Section 34 of Rule
138, for the authority to interpret the rule is the source
itself of the rule, which is the Supreme Court alone.
In an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied
the Motion for Reconsideration.
On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a
Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order against the private respondent and the public
respondent MeTC.
After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to
restrain public respondent MeTC Judge from
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending
the Certiorari proceedings, the RTC, in a Resolution
dated May 3, 2002, resolved to deny the issuance of
an injunctive writ on the ground that the crime of
Grave Threats, the subject of Criminal Case No. 00-
1705, is one that can be prosecuted de oficio, there
being no claim for civil indemnity, and that therefore,
the intervention of a private prosecutor is not legally
tenable.
On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a
Motion for Reconsideration. The petitioner argues that
nowhere does the law provide that the crime of Grave
Threats has no civil aspect. And last, petitioner cites
Bar Matter No. 730 dated June 10, 1997 which
expressly provides for the appearance of a non-
lawyer before the inferior courts, as an agent or friend
of a party litigant, even without the supervision of a
member of the bar.
Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for
Reconsideration before the RTC, the petitioner filed a
Second Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7,
2002 with the MeTC seeking the reversal of the March
4, 2002 Denial Order of the said court, on the strength
of Bar Matter No. 730, and a Motion to Hold In
Abeyance the Trial dated June 10, 2002 of Criminal
Case No. 00-1705 pending the outcome of the
certiorari proceedings before the RTC.
On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying
the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC
denied the petitioner’s Second Motion for
Reconsideration and his Motion to Hold in Abeyance
the Trial on the ground that the RTC had already
denied the Entry of Appearance of petitioner before
the MeTC.
On July 30, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this
Court, the instant Petition and assigns the following
errors:
I.
the respondent regional trial court abused its
discretion when it resolved to deny the prayer for the
writ of injunction of the herein petitioner despite
petitioner having established the necessity of granting
the writ;
II.
THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION, TANTAMOUNT TO IGNORANCE OF
THE LAW, WHEN IT RESOLVED TO DENY THE
PRAYER FOR THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION AND THE SUBSEQUENT MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE HEREIN
PETITIONER ON THE BASIS THAT [GRAVE]
THREATS HAS NO CIVIL ASPECT, FOR THE SAID
BASIS OF DENIAL IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE
LAW;
III.
THE RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
DENIED THE MOTION TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE
TRIAL, WHEN WHAT WAS DENIED BY THE
RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS THE
ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION and WHEN THE RESPONDENT
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS YET TO DECIDE ON
THE MERITS OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI;
IV.
THE RESPONDENT COURT[s] ARE CLEARLY
IGNORING THE LAW WHEN THEY PATENTLY
REFUSED TO HEED TO [sic] THE CLEAR
MANDATE OF THE LAPUT, CANTIMBUHAN AND
BULACAN CASES, AS WELL AS BAR MATTER NO.
730, PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF
NON-LAWYERS BEFORE THE LOWER COURTS
(MTC’S).4
This Court, in exceptional cases, and for compelling
reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the issues
reviewed, may take cognizance of petitions filed
directly before it.5
Considering that this case involves the interpretation,
clarification, and implementation of Section 34, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court, Bar Matter No. 730,
Circular No. 19 governing law student practice and
Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, and the ruling of the
Court in Cantimbuhan, the Court takes cognizance of
herein petition.
The basic question is whether the petitioner, a law
student, may appear before an inferior court as an
agent or friend of a party litigant.
The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice
Rule as encapsulated in Rule 138-A of the Rules of
Court, prohibits the petitioner, as a law student, from
entering his appearance in behalf of his father, the
private complainant in the criminal case without the
supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law
school.
Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule,
provides:
RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. – A law
student who has successfully completed his 3rd year
of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and
is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal
education program approved by the Supreme Court,
may appear without compensation in any civil,
criminal or administrative case before any trial court,
tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients
accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.
Sec. 2. Appearance. – The appearance of the law
student authorized by this rule, shall be under the
direct supervision and control of a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by
the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs,
memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be
signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of
the legal clinic.
However, in Resolution6 dated June 10, 1997 in Bar
Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified:
The rule, however, is different if the law student
appears before an inferior court, where the issues and
procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a
law student may appear in his personal capacity
without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule
138 provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the
court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct
his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or
friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the
aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may
conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an
attorney, and his appearance must be either personal
or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior
court as an agent or friend of a party without the
supervision of a member of the bar.7 (Emphasis
supplied)
The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" in
Bar Matter No. 730 is subsequently changed to "In the
court of a municipality" as it now appears in Section
34 of Rule 138, thus:8
SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the
Court of a municipality a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of
an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct
his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney and
his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)
which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner
filed his Entry of Appearance with the MeTC on
September 25, 2000. No real distinction exists for
under Section 6, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court, the
term "Municipal Trial Courts" as used in these Rules
shall include Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts.
There is really no problem as to the application of
Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the former,
the appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend
of a party litigant, is expressly allowed, while the latter
rule provides for conditions when a law student, not
as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, may appear
before the courts.
Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on
Section 34 of Rule 138. The court a quo must have
been confused by the fact that petitioner referred to
himself as a law student in his entry of appearance.
Rule 138-A should not have been used by the
courts a quo in denying permission to act as private
prosecutor against petitioner for the simple reason
that Rule 138-A is not the basis for the petitioner’s
appearance.
Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before
the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed,
irrespective of whether or not he is a law student. As
succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of
Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as
an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without the
supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.
Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously
held that, by its very nature, no civil liability may flow
from the crime of Grave Threats, and, for this reason,
the intervention of a private prosecutor is not possible.
It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such
conclusion had been intended by the RTC. In denying
the issuance of the injunctive court, the RTC stated in
its Decision that there was no claim for civil liability by
the private complainant for damages, and that the
records of the case do not provide for a claim for
indemnity; and that therefore, petitioner’s appearance
as private prosecutor appears to be legally untenable.
Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable
except in instances when no actual damage results
from an offense, such as espionage, violation of
neutrality, flight to an enemy country, and crime
against popular representation.9 The basic rule
applies in the instant case, such that when a criminal
action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the
right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.10
The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no
reservation, waiver, nor prior institution of the civil
aspect in Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that
the civil aspect arising from Grave Threats is deemed
instituted with the criminal action, and, hence, the
private prosecutor may rightfully intervene to
prosecute the civil aspect.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The
assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 116, Pasay City
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch 45, Pasay City is DIRECTED to
ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in
Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as a private prosecutor
under the direct control and supervision of the public
prosecutor.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
B. NON LAWYERS IN COURT / AND OR ADMINISTRATIVE On the other hand, Atty. Alvarez claims the following:
TRIBUNALS
Atty. Alvarez is Legal Officer III of the National Center for
Mental Health under the Department of Health.11 He has
authority to engage in private practice of the
profession.12 He represented Teresita in several cases
C. PROCEEDINGS WHERE LAWYERS ARE PROHIBITED before the Office of the Ombudsman.13
FROM APPEARING AS COUNSELS
ChanRoblesVi rtua lawlib rary

Atty. Alvarez and Teresita had an arrangement that

Teresita would consult Atty. Alvarez whenever a case was
filed against her.14 Atty. Alvarez would then advise
A.C. No. 9018, April 20, 2016 Teresita to send him a copy of the complaint and its
attachments through courier.15 Afterwards, Atty. Alvarez
would evaluate the case and call Teresita to discuss his
TERESITA P. FAJARDO, Complainant, v. ATTY. fees in accepting and handling the case.16 A 50%
NICANOR C. ALVAREZ, Respondent. downpayment would be deposited to Atty. Alvarez's or his
secretary's bank account.17 The balance would then be
DECISION paid in installments.18 The success fee was voluntary on
Teresita's part.19
ChanRobles Virtualawl ibra ry

LEONEN, J.:
On July 10, 2009, Atty. Alvarez received a call from
Teresita regarding a meeting at Shangri-La Mall to discuss
This administrative case involves the determination of the decision and resolution she received from the Office of
whether a lawyer working in the Legal Section of the the Ombudsman dismissing her from service for
National Center for Mental Health under the Department dishonesty and indicting her for violation of Section 3 of
of Health is authorized to privately practice law, and Republic Act No. 3019, respectively.20 Atty. Alvarez
consequently, whether the amount charged by respondent accepted the case and asked for P500,000.00 as
for attorney's fees is reasonable under the principle acceptance fee.21 According to Atty. Alvarez, he arrived at
of quantum meruit. the amount after considering the difficulty of the case and
the workload that would be involved, which would include
Complainant Teresita P. Fajardo (Teresita) was the appeals before the Court of Appeals and this
Municipal Treasurer of San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija. She Court.22 However, the fee is exclusive of filing fees,
hired respondent Atty. Nicanor C. Alvarez (Atty. Alvarez) appearance fees, and other miscellaneous fees such as
to defend her in criminal and administrative cases before costs for photocopying and mailing.23 ChanRoble sVirtualawl ibra ry

the Office of the Ombudsman.

Atty. Alvarez claimed that he prepared several pleadings
The parties have differing versions of the facts as in connection with Teresita's case:
summarized by the Investigating Commissioner of the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. Teresita's version of the facts is as follows: (1) motion for reconsideration filed
Around 2009, Teresita hired Atty. Alvarez to handle on July 23, 2009 in connection
several cases filed against her before the Office of the with the administrative case;
Ombudsman.1 Atty. Alvarez was then working in the Legal
Section of the National Center for Mental Health.2 He
asked for P1,400,000.00 as acceptance fee.3 However, (2) motion for reconsideration filed
Atty. Alvarez did not enter his appearance before the on July 23, 2009 in connection
Office of the Ombudsman nor sign any pleadings.4 ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

with the criminal case;

Atty. Alvarez assured Teresita that he had friends
connected with the Office of the Ombudsman who could (3) petition for injunction filed on
help with dismissing her case for a certain fee.5 Atty.
October 15, 2009 before the
Alvarez said that he needed to pay the amount of
P500,000.00 to his friends and acquaintances working at Regional Trial Court of Gapan
the Office of the Ombudsman to have the cases against City; and
Teresita dismissed.6ChanRob les Virtualawl ibra ry

However, just two (2) weeks after Teresita and Atty. (4) petition for preliminary injunction
Alvarez talked, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a with prayer for a temporary
resolution and decision recommending the filing of a
criminal complaint against Teresita, and her dismissal
restraining order filed before the
from service, respectively.7 ChanRoble s Vi rtualaw lib rary Court of Appeals on November
18, 2009, and the amended
Teresita then demanded that Atty. Alvarez return at least
a portion of the amount she gave.8 Atty. Alvarez promised petition on November 26, 2009.24
to return the amount to Teresita; however, he failed to
fulfill this promise.9 Teresita sent a demand letter to Atty.
Alvarez, which he failed to heed.10 Atty. Alvarez also said that he prepared several letters to
different government officials and agencies.25
ChanRoble sVirt ualawli bra ry

ChanRoblesVi rt ualawlib ra ry
Atty. Alvarez alleged that Teresita made staggered
payments for the amounts they agreed on.26 Teresita only
paid the balance of the agreed acceptance fee equivalent
to P450,000.00 on February 11, 2010.27 While Teresita
paid P60,000.00 for the miscellaneous expenses, she did
not pay the expenses for other legal work performed and
advanced by Atty. Alvarez.28
On the last day for filing of the petition for review of the
Office of the Ombudsman's Decision, Teresita informed
Atty. Alvarez that she was no longer interested in
retaining Atty. Alvarez's services as she had hired Atty.
Tyrone Contado from Nueva Ecija, who was Atty. Alvarez's
co-counsel in the cases against Teresita.29
On June 1, 2011, Teresita filed before the Office of the Bar
Confidant a Verified Complaint praying for the disbarment
of Atty. Alvarez.30 This Court required Atty. Alvarez to file
his comment on the complaint within 10 days from
notice.31
ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
On December 7, 2011, the case was referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report,
and recommendation.32
In his Report and Recommendation33 dated November 12,
2012, Investigating Commissioner Honesto A. Villamayor
found Atty. Alvarez guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility and recommended Atty.
Alvarez's suspension from the practice of law for one (1)
year.34 Atty. Alvarez was also ordered to return the
amount of P700,000.00 to Teresita with legal interest
from the time of demand until its full payment.35 The
dispositive portion of the Investigating Commissioner's
Report and Recommendation reads:
WHEREFORE, finding Respondent guilty of committing
unlawful, immoral and deceitful acts of the Canon of
Professional Responsibility, [it] is recommended that he
be suspended for one (1) year in the practice of law and
he be ordered to return the amount of P700,000.00 to the
Complainant within two (2) months from receipt of this
order with legal interest from the time of demand, until
fully paid, with a warning that repetition of [a] similar
offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.36
On the unauthorized practice of law, the Investigating
Commissioner found that while Atty. Alvarez claimed that
he was authorized by his superior to privately practice
law, the pleadings he allegedly prepared and filed did not
bear his name and signature.37 Hence, the Investigating
Commissioner stated that:
The time that Respondent spent in following up the case
of Complainant in the Office of the Ombudsman is a time
lost to the government which could have been used in the
service of many taxpayers[.]38
In any case, granting that Atty. Alvarez was authorized by
his superior to practice his profession, the Investigating
Commissioner stated that Atty. Alvarez was prohibited to
handle cases involving malversation of funds by
government officials such as a municipal treasurer.39
Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner found that the
attorney's fees Atty. Alvarez asked for were
unreasonable:
chanRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary
From all indication, Complainant was forced to give to the
Respondent the amount of P1,400,000.00 because of the
words of Respondent that he has friends in the Office of
the Ombudsman who can help with a fee. That because of
that guarantee, Complainant was obligated to shell out
every now and then money for the satisfaction of the
allege[d] friend of the Respondent[.]
Complainant is an ordinary Municipal Treasurer of a 4th or
5th class municipality and the amount of attorney's fees
demanded by the Respondent is very much excessive. . . .
ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary The exorbitant amount that he demanded from
complainant is too much for a lowly local government
employee. What the Respondent did is not only illegal,
immoral and dishonest but also taking advantage of a
defenseless victim.
....
ChanRoblesVirtualawli bra ry
While a lawyer should charge only fair and reasonable
fees, no hard and fast rule may be set in the
determination of what a reasonable fee is, or what is not.
That must be established from the facts of each case[.]
....
The fees claimed and received by the Respondent for the
alleged cases he handled despite the fact that the records
ChanRoblesVi rt ualawlib ra ry and evidence does not show that he ever signed pleadings
filed, the amount of P700,000.00 is reasonable, thus,
fairness and equity dictate, he has to return the excess
amount of P700,000.00 to the complainant[.]40 cralawre d
In Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-778 dated June 21, 41
2013, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors adopted the findings and recommendations of
the Investigating Commissioner:
chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry
RESOLVED to ADOPT AND APPROVE, as it is hereby
unanimously ADOPTED AND APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution
chanRoblesv irtual Lawlib rary
as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules and considering that complaint [sic] is
guilty of unlawful, immoral and deceitful acts, Atty.
Nicanor C. Alvarez is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year with [a]
Warning that repetition of the same acts shall be dealt
with more sever[ejly. Further, he is Ordered to Return the
amount of P700,000.00 to complainant with legal interest
cra lawred
from the time of demand.42 (Emphasis in the original) c ralawred
Atty. Alvarez moved for reconsideration of the
Resolution,43 but the Motion was denied by the Board of
Governors in Notice of Resolution No. XXI-2014-
28644 dated May 3, 2014. The Resolution reads:
cha nRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary
RESOLVED to DENY Respondent's Motion for
chanRoblesvirtua lLawli bra ry
Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason to reverse
the findings of the Commission and the resolution subject
of the motion, it being a mere reiteration of the matters
which had already been threshed out and taken into
cra lawred
consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XX-2013-778 dated
June 21, 2013 is hereby AFFIRMED.45 (Emphasis in the
original)
cralaw red
We resolve the following issues:
ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary
First, whether respondent Atty. Nicanor C. Alvarez, as a
lawyer working in the Legal Section of the National Center
for Mental Health under the Department of Health, is
authorized to engage in the private practice of law; and
Second, whether the amount charged by respondent for
attorney's fees is reasonable under the principle
of quantum meruit.
The Investigating Commissioner did not make a
categorical declaration that respondent is guilty of
unauthorized practice of his profession. The Investigating
Commissioner merely alluded to respondent's
unauthorized practice of law.
We find that respondent committed unauthorized practice
of his profession.
Respondent claims that he is authorized to practice his
profession46 as shown in the letter dated August 1, 2001
of National Center for Mental Health Chief Bernardino A.
Vicente.47 The letter reads:
....
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting
orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed
the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader
terms as advocacy, counseling and public service.
"One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of
employment in the profession. If what he does exacts
knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys
engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he
follows some one or more lines of employment such as
this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning
chanRob lesv irtua lLawl ibra ry of the statute." cralawred

TO : ATTY. NICANOR C. ALVAREZ

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court,
Legal Officer III
which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
This Center
knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the
practice of law is to perform those acts which are
Subject : Authority to engage in private practice
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law
of profession
is to give notice or render any kind of service, which
device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
This refers to your request for permission to engage in
knowledge or skill."
private practice of your profession.
....
In accordance with Administrative Order No. 21, s. 1999
of the Department of Health, which vested in the
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the
undersigned the authority to grant permission for the
term "practice of law," particularly the modern concept of
exercise of profession or engage in the practice of
law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal
profession, you are hereby authorized to teach or engage
construction intended by the framers of the Constitution,
in the practice of your profession provided it will not run in
Arty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-
conflict with the interest of the Center and the Philippine
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of
government as a whole. In the exigency of the service
industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-
however, or when public interest so requires, this
legislator of both the rich and the poor—verily more than
authority may be revoked anytime.
satisfy the constitutional requirement—that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
Please be guided accordingly.
years.50 (Emphasis supplied) cralaw red

[sgd.] Cayetano was reiterated in Lingan v. Calubaquib:51

BERNARDINO A. VICENTE, MD, FFPPA, MHA, CESO IV Practice of law is "any activity, in or out of court, which
Medical Center Chief II48 (Emphasis supplied) c ralaw red requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience." It includes
Respondent practiced law even if he did not sign any
"[performing] acts which are characteristics of the [legal]
pleading. In the context of this case, his surreptitious
profession" or "[rendering any kind of] service [which]
actuations reveal illicit intent. Not only did he do
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."
unauthorized practice, his acts also show badges of
offering to peddle influence in the Office of the
Work in government that requires the use of legal
Ombudsman.
knowledge is considered practice of law. In Cayetano v.
Monsod, this court cited the deliberations of the 1986
In Cayetano v. Monsod,49 the modern concept of the term
Constitutional Commission and agreed that work rendered
"practice of law" includes the more traditional concept of
by lawyers in the Commission on Audit requiring "[the use
litigation or appearance before courts:
of] legal knowledge or legal talent" is practice of
chanRob lesvi rtual Lawli bra ry

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases

law.52 (Citations omitted)
in court. A person is also considered to be in the practice
cralaw red

of law when he: chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ib rary By preparing the pleadings of and giving legal advice to
"x x x for valuable consideration engages in the business complainant, respondent practiced law.
of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as
to their rights under the law, or appears in a Under Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, Public Officials and Employees, and Memorandum Circular
referee, board, body, committee, or commission No. 17, series of 1986,53 government officials or
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies employees are prohibited from engaging in private
and there, in such representative capacity performs any practice of their profession unless authorized by their
act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the department heads. More importantly, if authorized, the
rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one practice of profession must not conflict nor tend to conflict
who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business with the official functions of the government official or
of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or employee: chanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry

while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court Republic Act No. 6713:
or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the
practice of law."cralawred Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition
to acts and omissions of public officials and employees
now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the
following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions
of any public official and employee and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
....
(b) Outside employment and other activities related
thereto. - Public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:
....
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession
unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided,
that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with
their official functions[.]
....
Memorandum Circular No. 17:
The authority to grant permission to any official or
employee shall be granted by the head of the ministry or
agency in accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the
Revised Civil Service Rules, which provides: c hanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
"Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in
any private business, vocation, or profession or be
connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or
industrial undertaking without a written permission from
the head of Department; Provided, That this prohibition
will be absolute in the case of those officers and
employees whose duties and responsibilities require that
their entire time be at the disposal of the
Government: Provided, further, That if an employee is
granted permission to engage in outside activities, the
time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by
the chief of the agency to the end that it will not impair in
any way the efficiency of the other officer or
employee: And provided, finally, That no permission is
necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer
or employee, which do not involve any real or apparent
conflict between his private interests and public duties, or
in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties,
and he shall not take part in the management of the
enterprise or become an officer or member of the board of
directors",cralaw red
subject to any additional conditions which the head of the
office deems necessary in each particular case in the
interest of the service, as expressed in the various
issuances of the Civil Service Commission.
cralawred
In Abella v. Cruzabra,54 the respondent was a Deputy
Register of Deeds of General Santos City. While serving as
an incumbent government employee, the respondent
"filed a petition for commission as a notary public and was
commissioned . . . without obtaining prior authority from
the Secretary of the Department of Justice."55 According
to the complainant, the respondent had notarized around
3,000 documents.56 This Court found the respondent
guilty of engaging in notarial practice without written
authority from the Secretary of Justice. Thus:
It is clear that when respondent filed her petition for
commission as a notary public, she did not obtain a
written permission from the Secretary of the
D[epartment] [of] J[ustice]. Respondent's superior, the
Register of Deeds, cannot issue any authorization because
he is not the head of the Department. And even assuming
that the Register of Deeds authorized her, respondent
failed to present any proof of that written permission.
Respondent cannot feign ignorance or good faith because
respondent filed her petition for commission as a notary
public after Memorandum Circular No. 17 was issued in
1986.57 ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
In this case, respondent was given written permission by
the Head of the National Center for Mental Health, whose
authority was designated under Department of Health
Administrative Order No. 21, series of 1999.58 ChanRobles Vi rt ualawlib ra ry
However, by assisting and representing complainant in a
suit against the Ombudsman and against government in
general, respondent put himself in a situation of conflict of
interest.
Respondent's practice of profession was expressly and
impliedly conditioned on the requirement that his practice
will not be "in conflict with the interest of the Center and
the Philippine government as a whole."59 ChanRoblesVi rtua lawlib rary
In Javellana v. Department of Interior and Local
Government,60 the petitioner was an incumbent City
Councilor or member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Bago City. He was a lawyer by profession and had
continuously engaged in the practice of law without
securing authority from the Regional Director of the
Department of Local Government.61 In 1989, the
petitioner acted as counsel for Antonio Javiero and
Rolando Catapang and filed a case for Illegal Dismissal
and Reinstatement with Damages against Engr. Ernesto C.
Divinagracia, City Engineer of Bago City.62 ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry
Engr. Ernesto C. Divinagracia filed an administrative case
before the Department of Local Government for violation
of Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713 and relevant
Department of Local Government memorandum circulars
on unauthorized practice of profession, as well as for
oppression, misconduct, and abuse of authority.63 While
the case was pending before Department of Local
Government, the petitioner was able to secure a written
authority to practice his profession from the Secretary of
Interior and Local Government, "provided that such
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his official
functions."64 ChanRoblesVi rtua lawlib rary
This Court in Javellana observed that the petitioner
practiced his profession in conflict with his functions as
City Councilor and against the interests of
government:
chanRob lesvi rtual Lawl ibra ry
In the first place, complaints against public officers and
employees relating or incidental to the performance of
their duties are necessarily impressed with public interest
for by express constitutional mandate, a public office is a
public trust. The complaint for illegal dismissal filed by
Javiero and Catapang against City Engineer Divinagracia is
in effect a complaint against the City Government of Bago
City, their real employer, of which petitioner Javellana is a
councilman. Hence, judgment against City Engineer
Divinagracia would actually be a judgment against the
City Government. By serving as counsel for the
complaining employees and assisting them to prosecute
their claims against City Engineer Divinagracia, the
petitioner violated Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 (in
relation to Section 7[b-2] of R[epublic] A[ct] [No.] 6713)
prohibiting a government official from engaging in the
private practice of his profession, if such practice would
represent interests adverse to the government.
Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular
No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the
Constitution is completely off tangent. Neither the statute
nor the circular trenches upon the Supreme Court's power
and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law. The
Local Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular
No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of conduct for public
officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the
discharge of their public duties and the private practice of
their profession, in those instances where the law allows
it.65
cra lawred
There is basic conflict of interest here. Respondent is a
public officer, an employee of government. The Office of
the Ombudsman is part of government. By appearing
against the Office of the Ombudsman, respondent is going
against the same employer he swore to serve.
In addition, the government has a serious interest in the
prosecution of erring employees and their corrupt acts.
Under the Constitution, "[p]ublic office is a public
trust."66 The Office of the Ombudsman, as "protectors of
the [P]eople,"67 is mandated to "investigate and prosecute
. . . any act or omission of any public officer or employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient."68
Thus, a conflict of interest exists when an incumbent
government employee represents another government
employee or public officer in a case pending before the
Office of the Ombudsman. The incumbent officer
ultimately goes against government's mandate under the
Constitution to prosecute public officers or employees who
have committed acts or omissions that appear to be
illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.69 Furthermore, this
is consistent with the constitutional directive that "[p]ublic
officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable
to the [P]eople, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives."70
The objective in disciplinary cases is not to punish the
erring officer or employee but to continue to uplift the
People's trust in government and to ensure excellent
public service:
cha nRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary
[W]hen an officer or employee is disciplined, the object
sought is not the punishment of that officer or employee,
but the improvement of the public service and the
preservation of the public's faith and confidence in the
government. . . . These constitutionally-enshrined
principles, oft-repeated in our case law, are not mere
rhetorical flourishes or idealistic sentiments. They should
be taken as working standards by all in the public
service.71
c ralawre d
Having determined that respondent illicitly practiced law,
we find that there is now no need to determine whether
the fees he charged were reasonable.
In disbarment or disciplinary cases pending before this
Court, the complainant must prove his or her allegations
through substantial evidence.72 In Advincula v.
Macabata,73 this Court dismissed a complaint for
disbarment due to the lack of evidence in proving the
complainant's allegations:
As a basic rule in evidence, the burden of proof lies on the
party who makes the allegations—ei incumbit probation,
qui decit, non qui negat; cum per rerum naturam factum
negantis probation nulla sit. In the case at bar,
complainant miserably failed to comply with the burden of
proof required of her. A mere charge or allegation of
wrongdoing does not suffice. Accusation is not
synonymous with guilt.74 (Emphasis in the original,
citations omitted) cra lawred
Moreover, lawyers should not be hastily disciplined or
penalized unless it is shown that they committed a
transgression of their oath or their duties, which reflects
on their fitness to enjoy continued status as a member of
the bar:
chanRoblesv irtual Lawlib rary
The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be
exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive
principle, with great caution and only for the most weighty
reasons and only on clear cases of misconduct which
seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer
as an officer of the court and member of the Bar. Only
those acts which cause loss of moral character should
merit disbarment or suspension, while those acts which
neither affect nor erode the moral character of the lawyer
should only justify a lesser sanction unless they are of
such nature and to such extent as to clearly show the
lawyer's unfltness to continue in the practice of law. The
dubious character of the act charged as well as the
motivation which induced the lawyer to commit it must be
clearly demonstrated before suspension or disbarment is
ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary meted out. The mitigating or aggravating circumstances
that attended the commission of the offense should also
be considered.75 cralaw red
Likewise, we find that respondent violated the Lawyer's
Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility when he
communicated to or, at the very least, made it appear to
complainant that he knew people from the Office of the
Ombudsman who could help them get a favorable decision
in complainant's case.
Lawyers are mandated to uphold, at all times, integrity
and dignity in the practice of their
profession.76 Respondent violated the oath he took when
he proposed to gain a favorable outcome for
complainant's case by resorting to his influence among
ChanRoblesVirtualawli bra ry
staff in the Office where the case was pending.77
ChanRoblesVirt ualawli bra ry
Thus, respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Canon 1, Rules 1.01, and 1.0278 prohibit
lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or
deceitful conduct.79 Respondent's act of ensuring that the
case will be dismissed because of his personal
relationships with officers or employees in the Office of
the Ombudsman is unlawful and dishonest. Canon 780 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to
always "uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession."
In relation, Canon 1381 mandates that lawyers "shall rely
upon the merits of his [or her] cause and refrain from any
impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the
appearance of influencing the court."
A lawyer that approaches a judge to try to gain influence
and receive a favorable outcome for his or her client
violates Canon 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.82 This act of influence peddling is highly
immoral and has no place in the legal profession: c hanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry
chanRoblesv irt ual Lawl ibra ry The highly immoral implication of a lawyer approaching a
judge—or a judge evincing a willingness—to discuss, in
private, a matter related to a case pending in that judge's
sala cannot be over-emphasized. The fact that Atty.
Singson did talk on different occasions to Judge Reyes,
initially through a mutual friend, Atty. Sevilla, leads us to
conclude that Atty. Singson was indeed trying to influence
the judge to rule in his client's favor. This conduct is not
acceptable in the legal profession.83
cralaw red
In Jimenez v. Verano, Jr.,84 we disciplined the respondent
for preparing a release order for his clients using the
letterhead of the Department of Justice and the stationery
of the Secretary: chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry
The way respondent conducted himself manifested a clear
intent to gain special treatment and consideration from a
government agency. This is precisely the type of improper
behavior sought to be regulated by the codified norms for
the bar. Respondent is duty-bound to actively avoid any
act that tends to influence, or may be seen to influence,
the outcome of an ongoing case, lest the people's faith in
the judicial process is diluted.
The primary duty of lawyers is not to their clients but to
the administration of justice. To that end, their clients'
success is wholly subordinate. The conduct of a member
of the bar ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not
honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the
lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his client's
cause, is condemnable and unethical.
....
Zeal and persistence in advancing a client's cause must
always be within the bounds of the law. A self-respecting
independence in the exercise of the profession is expected
if an attorney is to remain a member of the bar. In the
present case, we find that respondent fell short of these
exacting standards. Given the import of the case, a
warning is a mere slap on the wrist that would not serve
as commensurate penalty for the offense.85
cralaw red
Similar to the present case, in Bueno v. Rañeses,86 we
disbarred a lawyer who solicited bribe money from his
client in violation of Canon 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:c hanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry
Rather than merely suspend Atty. Rañeses as had been
done in Bildner, the Court believes that Atty. Rañeses
merits the ultimate administrative penalty of disbarment
because of the multi-layered impact and implications of
what he did; by his acts he proved himself to be what a
lawyer should not be, in a lawyer's relations to the client,
to the court and to the Integrated Bar.
First, he extracted money from his client for a purpose
that is both false and fraudulent. It is false because no
bribery apparently took place as Atty. Rañeses in fact lost
the case. It is fraudulent because the professed purpose
of the exaction was the crime of bribery. Beyond these, he
maligned the judge and the Judiciary by giving the
impression that court cases are won, not on the merits,
but through deceitful means—a decidedly black mark
against the Judiciary. Last but not the least, Atty. Rañeses
grossly disrespected the IBP by his cavalier attitude
towards its disciplinary proceedings.
From these perspectives, Atty. Rañeses wronged his
client, the judge allegedly on the "take," the Judiciary as
an institution, and the IBP of which he is a member. The
Court cannot and should not allow offenses such as these
to pass unredressed. Let this be a signal to one and all—to
all lawyers, their clients and the general public—that the
Court will not hesitate to act decisively and with no
quarters given to defend the interest of the public, of our
judicial system and the institutions composing it, and to
ensure that these are not compromised by unscrupulous
or misguided members of the Bar.87 (Emphasis supplied) cralaw red
In the interest of ridding itself of corrupt personnel who
encourage influence peddling, and in the interest of
maintaining the high ethical standards of employees in the
judiciary, this Court did not hesitate in dismissing its own
employee from government service when she peddled
influence in the Court of Appeals:88
What brings our judicial system into disrepute are often
the actuations of a few erring court personnel peddling
influence to party-litigants, creating the impression that
decisions can be bought and sold, ultimately resulting in
the disillusionment of the public. This Court has never
wavered in its vigilance in eradicating the so-called "bad
eggs" in the judiciary. And whenever warranted by the
gravity of the offense, the supreme penalty of dismissal in
an administrative case is meted to erring personnel.89 c ralawred
The Investigating Commissioner found that complainant
was "forced to give . . . Respondent the amount of
P1,400,000.00 because of the words of Respondent that
he ha[d] friends in the Office of the Ombudsman who
c[ould] help with a fee."90 It is because of respondent's
assurances to complainant that she sent him money over
the course of several months.91 These assurances are
seen from the text messages that respondent sent
complainant: chanRoblesvi rt ualLaw lib rary
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
SUBJECT:
Cnbi ko dun sa kontak dati na magbibigay tayo na pera sa
allowance lang muna later na ang bayad pag labas ng
reso at kaliwaan pero sbi nya mas maganda kung
isasabay na ang pera pagbgay ng letter mo sa omb..
Parang dun tayo nagkamali pero ang solusyon ay sana
ibalik nila ang pera . . in d meantime hindi dapat apektado
ang kaso at kailangan an Appeal sa CA at may deadline
yun
DATE: 31-05-2010
TIME: 5:24 pm
TYPE: Text Message
....
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
SUBJECT:
Gud pm pnro, naLBC n b ang Reso? Kung Jan un pnrmahn
...
DATE: 21-05-2010
TIME: 5:13 pm
TYPE: Text Message
....
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
SUBJECT:
Pnro sbi ng Dep Omb la png cnabi sa knya ng Omb. Ang
CA Reso pnaiwan n Orly @ studyohn nya (txt kontal)
DATE: 30-03-2010
DATE: 15-04-2010
TIME: 5:00 pm
TIME: 6:07 pm
TYPE: Text Message
TYPE: Text Message
....
....
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
SUBJECT:
SUBJECT:
Gud pm pnro. Ang Dep. Omb. My closd dor mtng pro
Yung blessing pala ni gutierez ang hnhntay ng overall dep pnkta s knya ang note q at sabi rw bumalik aq aftr Holy
omb si orly at dun din siya subok kuha letter pero wk. C Orly nman ay ngsabi n es2dyuhn p rw nya.
nasbhan na si gutierez ng dep omb for Luzon sbi ko
pwwde b nila gawin total alam na ni gutierez. . . Maya DATE: 30-03-2010
tawag ko sayo update
TIME: 4:52 pm
DATE: 15-04-2010
TYPE: Text Message
TIME: 12:44 pm
....
TYPE: Text Message
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
....
SUBJECT:
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
Binigay ko na pera kahapon at kinausap ko para sa letter
SUBJECT: magkikita pa kami marnaya las 2 at kukunin nya copy
letter natin kay sales at CA reso
Gud mrng Tess hindi na svmagot kahapon tnxt ko pero
minsan hndi tlga sumasagot yun nag ttxt lang pagkatapos DATE: 15-04-2010
kaya lang d mo pala naiintindihan ang txt nya bisaya
"istudyahun" ibig sabihn kausapin pa so nasbi na nya sa TIME: 12:32 pm
omb yung letter at istudzahan pa
TYPE: Text Message
DATE: 31-03-2010
....
TIME: 8:25 am
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
TYPE: Text Message
SUBJECT:
....
Tess ndpst mo na? Kakausapin ko kasi na qc na lang kami
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224> kita at malapit ako dun maya at hindi na sa crsng. Tnx

SUBJECT: DATE: 14-04-2010

Ok panero update ko na lang client pero nag txt tlga TIME: 1:29 pm
kailangan daw nya letter habang wala pa omb reso., Txt
mo lang ko panero, have a nice holidays., (sagot ko yan TYPE: Text Message
tess)
....
DATE: 03-03-2010
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
TIME: 5:03 pm
SUBJECT:
TYPE: Text Message
Gud pm pnro. Ok ba ang 15k rep maya 6pm? Thnx (txt ng
.... kontak tess kausapin ko mbuti sa letter)

FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224> DATE: 14-04-2010

SUBJECT: TIME: 10:25 am

Sa dep omb for Luzon na nya follow up ang MR at saka TYPE: Text Message
overall dep omb si orly dun nya kukunin letter
....
....
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
SUBJECT:
SUBJECT:
Pnro ung rep alo n bngay mo 1st Mar 24 ay ok Ing pra s 2
falo-ups q Mar 25 @ Mar 30. As usual, magkita tau Apr 14 Gud pm uli pnro. Kung subukan q n lkrn ky Orly ung cnabi
@ kunin q 20th para sa falo-up Apr 15 thnx mong letr adrsd 2 DOF Sec @ synd n Orly ang letr,
pktanong s rspndnt kung ok b s knya nab yarn nya aq ng
DATE: 08-04-2010 Atty's fee n 75thou upfront @ another 75thou upon
receipt of a DOF ordr holdng n abyans implmntation of hr
TIME: 10:58 am dsmsal due 2 Orly's letr? thnx

TYPE: Text Message DATE: 11-03-2010

.... TIME: 7:03 pm

FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224> TYPE: Text Message92 cralawred

In response to his alleged text messages, respondent

SUBJECT:
claims that complainant must have confused him with her
other contacts.93 Respondent found it "mesmerizing" that
Ok panero kailangan malinaw din ang presentation lp sa
complainant was able to save all those alleged text
client panero at ang impression nya yun na ang hningi
messages from two (2) years ago.94 Moreover, assuming
natin... so april 15 panero an balik mo sa MR at yung
these messages were "true, still they [were] not legally
letter form omb to dof bhala ka na sa diskarte panero pag
admissible as they [were] covered by the lawyer-client
nakakuha tayo nakahanda na 150k dun
privileged communication as those supposed texts '[had
been] made for the purpose and in the course of
DATE: 08-04-2010
employment, [were] regarded as privileged and the rule
of exclusion [was] strictly enforced.'"95
TIME: 10:56 am
ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry

In cases involving influence peddling or bribery, "[t]he

TYPE: Text Message
transaction is always done in secret and often only
between the two parties concerned."96 Nevertheless, as
....
found by the Investigating Commissioner and as shown by
the records, we rule that there is enough proof to hold
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
respondent guilty of influence peddling.
SUBJECT:
We agree with the penalty recommended by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors. We
Pnero dapat maalala mo n ung purpose ng 400 hindi
th
find respondent's acts of influence peddling, coupled with
directly delivery ng Reso granting d MR pro ung delivery
unauthorized practice of law, merit the penalty of
by the Dep Omb ng letr of appeal 2 d Omb at pgpaliwang
suspension of one (1) year from the practice of law. To be
nya sa Omb. Re sa hnhngi ng rspondnt n modfcation ng
so bold as to peddle influence before the very institution
Dcsion. Nung 1st mtng ntn Mar 24, ngin4m q sau n ngawa
that is tasked to prosecute corruption speaks much about
n i2 ng Dep Omb pro kausapn p ng Omb c Orly. Itong huli
respondent's character and his attitude towards the courts
ang nabtn p, pro yon ay dscrtion n ng Omb@ wing control
and the bar.
d2 and Dep. Omb.
Lawyers who offer no skill other than their acquaintances
DATE: 08-04-2010
or relationships with regulators, investigators, judges, or
Justices pervert the system, weaken the rule of law, and
TIME: 10:55 am
debase themselves even as they claim to be members of a
noble profession. Practicing law should not degenerate to
TYPE: Text Message
one's ability to have illicit access. Rather, it should be
about making an honest appraisal of the client's situation
....
as seen through the evidence fairly and fully gathered. It
should be about making a discerning and diligent reading
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
of the applicable law. It is foremost about attaining justice
in a fair manner. Law exists to temper, with its own
SUBJECT:
power, illicit power and unfair advantage. It should not be
conceded as a tool only for those who cheat by unduly
Tess gud mrng, wag mo kalimutan mgdpst 25k today 6pm
influencing people or public officials.
mtng naming omb tnx.
It is time that we unequivocally underscore that to even
DATE: 24-03-2010
imply to a client that a lawyer knows who will make a
decision is an act worthy of the utmost condemnation. If
TIME: 10:23 am
we are to preserve the nobility of this profession, its
members must live within its ethical parameters. There is
TYPE: Text Message
never an excuse for influence peddling.
While this Court is not a collection agency for faltering
debtors,97 this Court has ordered restitution of amounts to
complainants due to the erroneous actions of
lawyers.98 Respondent is, therefore, required to return to
complainant the amount of P500,000.00—the amount that
respondent allegedly gave his friends connected with the
Office of the Ombudsman.

WHEREFORE, Respondent Arty. Nicanor C. Alvarez is

guilty of violating the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees, the Lawyer's
Oath, and the Code of Professional Responsibility. He
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year
with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
acts shall be dealt with more severely. Respondent
is ORDERED to return the amount of P500,000.00 with
legal interest to complainant Teresita P. Fajardo.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the

Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent's personal
record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
5. PROHIBITED PRACTICE OF NON LAWYERS AND
APPEARANCE W/OUT AUTHORITY
6. PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW;
PROHIBITIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS
A.C. No. 8502
CHRISTOPHER R. SANTOS, Complainant
vs.
ATTY. JOSEPH A. ARROJADO, Respondent
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Where a lawyer's integrity is questioned through a
disbarment complaint, this Court, as the ultimate
arbiter of such disbarment proceedings, is duty-bound
to ascertain the veracity of the charges involved
therein. But, when the charges lack merit, the Court
will not hesitate to dismiss the case.
In an Affidavit1 dated December 7, 2009, complainant
Christopher R. Santos (Complainant Santos) sought
the disbarment of respondent Atty. Joseph A.
Arrojado (Atty. Arrojado) for violation of Article 1491 of
the Civil Code, by acquiring an interest in the land
involved in a litigation in which he had taken part by
reason of the exercise of his profession
Complainant Santos alleged that he was the
defendant in the unlawful detainer case filed by Lilia
Rodriguez (Lilia) wherein the respondent lawyer, Atty.
Arrojado, was the counsel for Lilia. The case
eventually reached the Supreme Court which
resolved2 the same in favor of Atty. Arrojado's client.
Complainant, however, claimed that on August 7,
2009, while the case was pending before the
Supreme Court, Lilia sold one of the properties in litis
pendentia to Atty. Arrojado's son, Julius P. Arrojado
(Julius) and that Atty. Arrojado even signed as a
witness of that sale. Believing that Atty. Arrojado
committed malpractice when he acquired, through his
son Julius, an interest in the property subject of the
unlawful detainer case in violation of Article 1491 of
the Civil Code, complainant instituted the instant
complaint.
In his Verified Comment,3 Atty. Arrojado admitted: (1)
that Lilia was a client of the law firm wherein he was a
senior partner; (2) that Julius was his son; and (3) that
one of the subject properties in the ejectment suit was
purchased by his son from Lilia. Atty. Arrojado
maintained that he did not violate Article 1491 as he
had absolutely no interest in the property purchased
by his son; and that the proscription in the said article
did not extend to the relatives of the judicial officers
mentioned therein. He postulated that, when the sale
took place, Julius was already of legal age and
discretion, as well as a registered nurse and an
established businessman; and that while it was
through him (respondent lawyer) that Lilia and Julius
met, he did not at all facilitate the transaction.
Respondent lawyer also pointed out that complainant
failed to cite a specific provision or canon in the Code
of Professional Responsibility which he had allegedly
transgressed or violated.
Report and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines
In his Report and Recommendation,4 Investigating
Commissioner Winston A. Abuyuan of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines - Commission on Bar Discipline,
(IBP-CBD), recommended the exoneration of Atty.
Arrojado.
In recommending the dismissal of the administrative
case against respondent lawyer, the Investigating
Commissioner opined that:
Undeniably, [Julius] is the son of [Atty. Arrojado],
counsel of the owners of the parcel of land which was
leased by [Santos]. The subject property was
acquired by (Julius] while the unlawful detainer case
was still pending before the Supreme Court.
In an unlawful detainer case, the issue to be resolved
is possession and not ownership of the property in
question. This is very clear. There is no showing that
[Santos] is even claiming ownership of the property in
question. In fact, it appears that the issues that remain
to be resolved are [Santos'] obligation to pay the
rentals due (as lessee) to the owner of the property.
Did [Atty. Arrojado] take advantage of his fiduciary
relationship with his clients when his son bought the
property in question? We rule in the negative.
There is no evidence to show that [Atty. Arrojado] had
used his son as a conduit to gain the property in
question considering that (Julius] is a personality
separate and distinct from his father, herein
respondent. He is quite capable of acquiring property
on his own. x x x. Moreover, a scrutiny of
complainant's arguments would reveal that he himself
is even unsure if respondent had indeed taken
advantage of his fiduciary relationship with his client,
as he safely uses the words 'it looks like' or 'we
believe'. There is no established jurisprudence to the
effect that the prohibition applies to immediate family
members. In fact, Article 1491(5) is quite clear and
explicit, stating in unequivocal terms that the
prohibition solely applies to lawyers, with respect to
the property and rights to the object in litigation. There
is not even the slightest inkling that the prohibition
was qualified to extend to any family member.
xxxx
There is even no proof presented to show that [Atty.
Arrojado] had used his fiduciary relationship with his
client in order to obtain the property in question. What
merely changed was the ownership of the property,
and the lease of [Santos] was not in any [manner]
affected. In fact, records would reveal that [Julius] was
even thinking of allowing [Santos] to continue leasing
the property in question but the same was rejected by
the latter. As can be seen, no rights of (Santos] were
prejudiced by this sale.
xxxx
Considering that there is no proof presented by
[santos] to substantiate any of his allegations, we
have no other option but to dismiss the charges.5
The Board of Governors (BOG) of the IBP, in
Resolution No. XX- 2012-359 dated July 21, 2012,
adopted the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner and his recommendation to dismiss the
complaint for lack of merit.6
Similarly, in Resolution7 No. XX-2013-306 dated
March 21, 2013, the IBP-BOG denied complainant's
motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the case in now before us for final action
pursuant to Section 12(c), Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court.
Issue
Whether or not the prohibition in Article 1491(5) of the
Civil Code against justices, judges, prosecuting
attorneys, clerks of court, and other officers and
employees connected with the administration of
justice, as well as lawyers, from purchasing property
and rights which may be the object of any litigation in
which they may take part by virtue of their profession,
extends to their respective immediate families or
relatives.
Our Ruling
It is complainant's contention that respondent lawyer,
as counsel of record in the ejectment case in
question, cannot acquire the property subject of
litigation, either personally or through his son, without
violating the Civil Code and his ethical duties.
The Court does not agree.
For reference, Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code is
reproduced below:
Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by
purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in
person or through the mediation of another.
xxxx
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of
superior and inferior courts, and other officers and
employees connected with the administration of
justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied
upon on execution before the court within whose
jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective
functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring
by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with
respect to the property and rights which may be the
object of any litigation in which they may take part by
virtue of their profession.
In Pena v. Delos Santos, 8 we held that:
The rationale advanced for the prohibition in Article
1491(5) is that public policy disallows the transactions
in view of the fiduciary relationship involved, i.e., the
relation of trust and confidence and the peculiar
control exercised by these persons. It is founded on
public policy because, by virtue of his office, an
attorney may easily take advantage of the credulity
and ignorance of his client and unduly enrich himself
at the expense of his client. x x x
Undeniably, Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code prohibits
the purchase by lawyers of any interest in the subject
matter of the litigation in which they participated by
reason of their profession. Here, however, respondent
lawyer was not the purchaser or buyer of the property
or rights in litigation. For, in point of fact, it was his son
Julius, and not respondent lawyer, who purchased the
subject property.
Were we to include within the purview of the law the
members of the immediate family or relatives of the
lawyer laboring under disqualification, we would in
effect be amending the law. We apply to this case the
old and familiar Latin maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, which means that the express
mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence
excludes all others. Stated otherwise, "where the
terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may
not, by interpretation or construction, be stretched or
extended to other matters."9

As worded, Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code covers

only (1) justices;

(2) judges; (3) prosecuting attorneys; (4) clerks of

court; (5) other officers and employees connected
with the administration of justice; and (6)
lawyers. The enumeration cannot be stretched or
1âw phi 1

extended to include relatives of the lawyer - in this

case, Julius, son of respondent lawyer.

Concededly, Article 1491 provides that "[t]he following

persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public
or judicial auction, either in person or through the
mediation of another xx x." However, perusal of the
records would show that complainant failed to adduce
any shred of evidence that Julius acted or mediated
on behalf of respondent lawyer, or that respondent
lawyer was the ultimate beneficiary of the sale
transaction. The mere fact that it was Julius, son of
respondent lawyer, who purchased the property, will
not support the allegation that respondent lawyer
violated Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code. As aptly
noted by the Investigating Commissioner, "[t]here is
no evidence to show that respondent had used his
son as a conduit to gain the property in question xx
x." 10

In addition, it must be stressed that the "prohibition

which rests on considerations of public policy and
interests is intended to curtail any undue influence of
the lawyer upon his client on account of his fiduciary
and confidential relationship with him." 11 Again, we
adopt the findings of the Investigating Commissioner
that "a scrutiny of complainant's arguments would
reveal that he himself [was] even unsure if respondent
had indeed taken advantage of his fiduciary
relationship with his client, as he safely uses the
words "it looks like" or "we believe". 12 Moreover, the
Investigating Commissioner aptly observed that there
was no "slightest proof showing that [Julius] was used
by respondent to acquire the property of his clients.
Affidavits executed by the owners, as well as [Julius]
himself showed that respondent did not even actively
participate in the negotiations concerning the
property." 13 At most, although respondent lawyer's
role or participation in the sale in question, if any,
might ruffle very sensitive scruples, it is not,
however, per se prohibited or forbidden by said Article
1491.

WHEREFORE, the present administrative case

is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 [A.C. No. 6273 : March 15, 2010]
ATTY. ILUMINADA M. VAFLOR-FABROA,
COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. OSCAR PAGUINTO,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
An Information for Estafa[1] was filed on June 21, 2001
against Atty. Iluminada M. Vaflor-Fabroa (complainant)
along with others based on a joint affidavit-complaint
which Atty. Oscar Paguinto (respondent) prepared and
notarized. As the joint affidavit-complaint did not indicate
the involvement of complainant, complainant filed a
Motion to Quash the Information which the trial court
granted.[2] Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration of the
quashal of the Information was denied[3]
Respondent also filed six other criminal complaints against
complainant for violation of Article 31 of Republic Act No.
6938 (Cooperative Code of the Philippines) before the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, but he eventually filed
a Motion to Withdraw them.[4]
On October 10, 2001, complainant, who was Chairperson
of the General Mariano Alvarez Service Cooperative, Inc.
(GEMASCO), received a Notice of Special General
Assembly of GEMASCO on October 14, 2001 to consider
the removal of four members of the Board of Directors
(the Board), including her and the General
Manager.[5] The notice was signed by respondent.
At the October 14, 2001 Special General Assembly
presided by respondent and PNP Sr. Supt. Angelito L.
Gerangco (Gerangco), who were not members of the then
current Board,[6] Gerango, complainant's predecessor, as
Chair of the GEMASCO board, declared himself Chair,
appointed others to replace the removed directors, and
appointed respondent as Board Secretary.
On October 15, 2001, respondent and his group took over
the GEMASCO office and its premises, the pumphouses,
water facilities, and operations. On even date, respondent
sent letter-notices to complainant and the four removed
directors informing them of their removal from the Board
and as members of GEMASCO, and advising them to
cease and desist from further discharging the duties of
their positions.[7]
Complainant thus filed on October 16, 2001 with the
Cooperative Development Authority (CDA)-Calamba a
complaint for annulment of the proceedings taken during
the October 14, 2001 Special General Assembly.
The CDA Acting Regional Director (RD), by Resolution of
February 21, 2002, declared the questioned general
assembly null and void for having been conducted in
violation of GEMASCO's By-Laws and the Cooperative
Code of the Philippines.[8] The RD's Resolution of February
21, 2002 was later vacated for lack of jurisdiction[9] of
CDA.
In her present complainant[10] against respondent for
disbarment, complainant alleged that respondent:
X X X PROMOTED OR SUED A GROUNDLESS, FALSE OR
UNLAWFUL SUIT, AND GAVE AID AND CONSENT TO THE
SAME[11]
X X X DISOBEYED LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE[D]
DISRESPECT FOR LAW AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION[12]
X X X DID NOT CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY,
FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL
COLLEAGUE AND ENGAGED IN HARASSING TACTICS
AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL[13]
X X X VIOLATED CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL
REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS
OF THE LAW[14]
X X X RUINED AND DAMAGED NOT ONLY THE GEN.
MARIANO ALVAREZ SERVICES COOPERATIVE, INC.
(GEMASCO, INC.) BUT THE ENTIRE WATER-CONSUMING
COMMUNITY AS WELL[15]
Despite the Court's grant,[16] on respondent's
motion,[17] of extension of time to file Comment,
respondent never filed any comment. The Court thus
required him to show cause why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with,[18] but just the same he failed to
comply.[19]
The Court thus referred the complaint to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and
recommendation.[20]
It appears that during the mandatory conference before
the IBP, complainant proposed the following issues:
1. Whether or not the acts of respondent
constitute violations of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, particularly
the following:
1.1Canon 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for law and
legal [processes].
1.2Canon 8 - A lawyer shall conduct
himself with courtesy, fairness, and
candor toward his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing
tactics against opposing counsel.
1.3Canon 10 - A lawyer owes candor,
fairness and good faith to the court.
1.4Canon 19 - A lawyer shall represent
his client with zeal within the bounds
of the law.
1.5Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after
obtaining extensions of time to file
 pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let
the period lapse without submitting
the same or offering an explanation
for his failure to do so.
2.
3. Whether or not the above acts of
respondent constitute violations of his
lawyer's oath, particularly the following:
2.1support the Constitution and obey the
laws as well as the legal orders of the
duly constituted authorities therein
2.2will do no falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in court
2.3will not wittingly or willingly promote
or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent
to the same
2.4will delay no man for money or malice
4.
5. Whether or not the above acts of
[respondent] complained of are grounds
for disbarment or suspension of attorneys
by the Supreme Court as provided for in
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules
of Court.[21]
Respondent's counsel who represented him during the
conference proposed the issue of whether, on the basis of
the allegations of the complaint, misconduct was
committed by respondent.[22]
After the conclusion of the conference, both parties were
ordered to submit position papers.[23] Complainant filed
hers,[24] but respondent, despite grant, on his motion, of
extension of time, did not file any position paper.
In her Report and Recommendation,[25] Investigating
Commissioner Lolita A. Quisumbing found respondent
guilty of violating the Lawyer's Oath as well as Canons 1,
8, 10, and Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Noting that respondent had already been
previously suspended for six months, the Commissioner
recommended that respondent be suspended for two
years.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) Board of
Governors opted for the dismissal of the complaint,
however, for lack of merit.[26]
On Motion for Reconsideration,[27] the IBP-CBD Board of
Governors recommended that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for six months.
The Court finds that by conniving with Gerangco in taking
over the Board of Directors and the GEMASCO facilities,
respondent violated the provisions of the Cooperative
Code of the Philippines and the GEMASCO By-Laws. He
also violated the Lawyer's Oath, which provides that a
lawyer shall support the Constitution and obey the laws.
When respondent caused the filing of baseless criminal
complaints against complainant, he violated the Lawyer's
Oath that a lawyer shall "not wittingly or willingly promote
or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid
or consent to the same."
When, after obtaining an extension of time to file
comment on the complaint, respondent failed to file any
and ignored this Court's subsequent show cause order, he
violated Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which states that "A lawyer shall not, after
obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda
or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same
or offering an explanation for his failure to do
so." Sebastian v. Bajar[28] teaches:
x x x Respondent's cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring
the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter
disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondent's conduct
indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. A Court's
Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor
should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or
selectively". Respondent's obstinate refusal to comply with
the Court's orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in
her character; it also underscores her disrespect of the
Court's lawful orders which is only too deserving of
reproof.
Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and
processes and respondent's deference is underscored by
the fact that willful disregard thereof will subject the
lawyer not only to punishment for contempt but to
disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver responsibility
is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the
integrity of the courts and to show respect to their
processes.[29] (Citations omitted).
The Court notes that respondent had previously been
suspended from the practice of law for six months for
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility,[30] he
having been found to have received an acceptance fee
and misled the client into believing that he had filed a
case for her when he had not.[31] It appears, however,
that respondent has not reformed his ways. A more
severe penalty this time is thus called for.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Oscar P. Paguinto,
is SUSPENDED for two years from the practice of law for
violation of Canons 1, 8, 10, and Rule 12.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath,
effective immediately.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the
Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent's personal
record as an attorney; the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 3921, June 11, 2018
DELFINA HERNANDEZ
SANTIAGO, Complainant, v. ATTY. ZOSIMO SANTIAGO
AND ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,* J.:
We resolve the administrative case for disbarment1 filed
by complainant Judge Delfina Hernandez Santiago against
respondents Atty. Zosimo Santiago and Atty. Nicomedes
Tolentino, charging them with deceit, gross misconduct
and violating their oaths as members of the Bar.
During the time when the material events transpired in
this case, complainant was the City Personnel Officer of
Caloocan City while respondents Santiago and Tolentino
respectively held the positions of City Legal Officer and
Legal Officer II in the City Government of Caloocan.
In 1988, complainant applied for, and was granted, a sick
leave of absence with commuted pay covering 240 days
from January 25 to December 31, 1988.2 Sometime in
February 1988, complainant received a
Memorandum3 from then Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr.,
which cancelled all leaves of absence of city officials and
employees. She also received a memorandum,4 detailing
her to the Office of the Secretary to the Mayor.
Complainant apparently paid no heed to said memoranda.
She was later directed to return to work in a letter5 dated
April 21, 1988 signed by respondent Tolentino, which
pertinently state:
On February 5, 1988 you were served with a
[Memorandum] from the Office of the Mayor that all
[leaves] of absence of city officials and employees were
cancelled in the interest of public service. [In spite] of the
aforesaid memo you did not return to work thereby,
ignoring the memo of the Hon. Mayor Macario A. Asistio,
Jr.
In this [regard], we are giving you another five (5) days
from receipt hereof to report for work, otherwise, the
undersigned may be constrained to take drastic action
against you.
Complainant replied with a handwritten note,6 asking for
ten days within which to answer and/or act on the letter.
She, however, did not return to work. At the end of her
leave, she tendered her resignation.7 She subsequently
received a memorandum8 dated May 18, 1989 from Mayor
Asistio terminating her employment. Enclosed therewith
was a Resolution9dated December 19, 1988 signed by
respondents Santiago and Tolentino, which recommended
her dismissal from service.
Complainant then filed the present case, accusing the
respondents of making deceitful statements in said
Resolution, committing gross misconduct and violating
their Attorney's Oath for recommending her dismissal
without just cause or due process. Quoted hereunder is
the aforesaid resolution with emphasis on the allegedly
false statements:
RESOLUTION
This is a case involving Atty. Delfina H. Santiago, Asst.
City Administrator, indorsed to this office by the Hon.
Mayor, Macario A. Asistio, Jr. for appropriate action.
The facts of the case are as follows:
1. In 1972, Atty. Delfina H. Santiago was, per court
decision, dismissed illegally as Asst. City Administrator on
Personal Matters.
2. In 1976, Atty. Santiago, was appointed Chief,
Administrative Office, a position of lower rank.
3.In 1983, Atty. Santiago was charged
administratively for UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCES, in
violation of Civil Service laws. Upon recommendation
of the Office of the City Legal Office, Atty. Santiago was
validly and lawfully ordered to be dropped from the rolls
which was subsequently approved and affirmed by the
Civil Service Commission in the latter's order dated
October 1983 x x x.
xxxx
4. In 1985, the Supreme Court, in affirming an RTC
decision, ordered the reinstatement of Santiago as Asst.
City Administrator on Personal Matters and declaring the
1972 dismissal as illegal.
5. In 1986, Atty. Santiago was appointed by Mayor
Martinez as Asst. City Administrator, her former position,
pursuant to the Supreme Court decision.
6. In January 1988 Atty. Santiago filed a leave of
absence (Sick Leave & Vacation Leave) on advice of
her Doctor, a Med. Cert. was attached thereto and the
duration of the leave was 240 days starting January 25 up
to December 31, 1988.
The said leave of absence was initially approved but later
disapproved by the Hon. Macario A. Asistio, Jr. when the
latter issued a Memorandum dated February 5, 1988
cancelling all leave of absence of which Memo Atty.
Santiago was duly served with. However despite service of
the said Memo to Atty. Delfina H. Santiago she failed and
refused to report for work [continuously] up to the
present. There was not even a semblance of showing that
she would comply with the memorandum.
At this juncture the office of the City Mayor indorsed this
case against Atty. Delfina H. Santiago for appropriate
action. This office conducted an investigation and
summoned Atty. Delfina H. Santiago for several
times to appear before the undersigned; present her
evidence and explain her side in consonance with
the due process mandated by the constitution.
Despite several notice sent to Delfina Santiago the
latter did not heed the said notices, thereby, leaving
the undersigned without any alternative but to decide the
case on the basis of the evidence available and the
records pertaining to Atty. Delfina Santiago.
FINDINGS
The records disclosed that the memorandum dated
February 5, 1988 issued by the Hon. City Mayor, Macario
A. Asistio, Jr. to all employees of the City Government
cancelled all leave of absences in the interest of service
effective 5 February 1988. There is no doubt a so that
Atty. Santiago was duly served with the said memo as
appearing on the said memo is her signature, an evidence
of receipt thereof. Having received the said memo Atty.
Santiago was fully aware of the cancellation of her leave
of absence and therefore as a prudent employee she
should have obeyed the memorandum of the City Mayor
by way of reporting for work as called for. What happened
instead was that Atty. Santiago never showed-up,
thereby, neglecting her duty as Asst. City Administrator
and committed, in effect, insubordination.
What is nagging and aggravates the predicament of
Atty. Santiago is that the instant case is already her
second violation which places her in the category of
incorrigible employees. The first is when she was
charged of UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCES, punished for
said act and made to suffer the corresponding
penalty thereof.
Under the Civil Service Law, Art. 9, Section 36 Par. 3, "No
office or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended
except for the cause as provided by law and after due
process".
The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action:
x x x x 3. Neglect of Duty x x x
27. Insubordination
The actuations of the respondent Atty. Santiago squarely
falls on the aforequoted grounds for dismissal as her
failure to report for work amounts to [willful] disobedience
to her superior officer. Nothing can be more important to
the upholding and maintenance of the public service in its
integrity and good name than the enforcement of the
reasonable discipline of laws. In the discharge of an
official duty and obligation Atty. Santiago as a
government employee is expected to obey the order and
instruction of the duly constituted authorities and she
should not ignore or disregard a legitimate official order.
Her act is inimical to the public service. To tolerate
Santiago to get away with it would be tantamount to
allowing her to act as she suits and satisfies her personal
convenience in violation of her superior's order. An act
which would be certainly demoralizing to the public
service. As may be gleaned from the foregoing
discussions Atty. Santiago had [willfully] ignored
her superior's order without any attempt to comply
with it and therefore insubordination is clearly
present aside from neglect of duty.
RECOMMENDATION
WHEREFORE, the instant case being the second
[infraction] of the Civil Service law by Atty. Santiago, it is
respectfully. recommended that the latter be dismissed
from service.10 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
Complainant contended that she was not administratively
charged for any offense in 1983 or in 1988. Thus, she was
not an incorrigible employee. Instead of being sent a
notice or summons, she received respondent Tolentino's
letter dated April 21, 1988, but the same neither stated
that an administrative case had been filed against her nor
did it require her to appear in any investigation. Since she
was on a sick leave of absence, not a vacation leave, she
could not be guilty of neglect of duty as she had no duties
to perform. She was also not in a position to defy any
lawful order, which would have amounted to
insubordination. Annexed to the complaint were copies of:
(a) the Resolution December 19, 1988; (b) Mayor Asistio's
dismissal order dated May 18, 1989; (c) complainant's
resignation letter; (d) her approved sick leave of absence
application; and (e) the commutation voucher showing the
payment of her salaries.
In respondent Santiago's comment11 to the complaint, he
argued that the allegedly deceitful statements in the
above Resolution were not malicious imputations of
falsehoods. If the statements were inaccurate, the same
may have been caused by a misappreciation of facts or
evidence. As to whether complainant was formally
charged for unauthorized absences in 1983, the material
point considered was that she was dismissed because of
unauthorized absences. It also did not matter that she
filed a sick leave of absence, not a. vacation and sick
leave, as the issue of the investigation was whether she
was liable for disobeying Mayor Asistio's directives.
Respondent Santiago further alleged that Mayor Asistio
indorsed12 to the City Legal Office the matter of
complainant's noncompliance with the Mayor's return to
work order and this referral was equivalent to an
administrative complaint. Complainant was sent a notice
regarding her failure to report for work, thereby informing
her that she could be subjected to disciplinary action. Her
failure to answer indicated her intent to disregard Mayor
Asistio's order and her option not to participate in the
investigation. Respondents' investigation proceeded ex
parte and the assailed Resolution was issued on the basis
of the evaluation of the evidence at hand. Without proof of
bad faith or adverse personal motives, respondents
cannot be held administratively liable for issuing the
Resolution in the discharge of their official duties even if
the same turned out to be erroneous.
In respondent Tolentino's comment,13 he likewise argued
that Mayor Asistio's referral of the case to the City Legal
Office was treated as a complaint. Complainant was
apprised of the nature thereof and she even requested ten
days within which to answer the same. After the City
Legal Office conducted an investigation wherein
complainant failed to participate, respondents decided the
case on the basis of records and evidence available. Anent
the charge that she was not administratively charged in
1983, what was considered was that she did incur
unauthorized absences that led to her dropping from the
rolls. That she filed a sick leave of absence, not sick leave
and vacation leave, was immaterial as Mayor Asistio's
memorandum did not qualify the nature of the leaves of
absence being cancelled.
Among the documents attached to respondent Tolentino's
comment were copies of: (a) Mayor Asistio's letter 14 to
complainant dated August 4, 1982 about her sick leave of
absence; (b) Mayor Asistio's letter15 to complainant dated
July 5, 1983 about her unauthorized absences; (c)
letter16 dated August 4, 1982 of Administrative Officer
Soriano to Mayor Asistio, seeking advice on the action to
be taken on complainant's situation; (d) Mayor Asistio's
indorsement17 dated October 5, 1983 to the City Legal
Office of complainant's case; (e) the indorsement18 from
the City Legal Office dated October 6, 1983,
recommending that complainant be dropped from the roll
of employees; (f) the order19 of Mayor Asistio dated
October 19, 1983 regarding complainant's separation from
service; and (g) the Orders20 dated October 27, 1983 and
November 3, 1983 from the office of the Regional Director
of the Civil Service Commission (CSC)-National Capital
Region (NCR), approving the complainant's dismissal.
Complainant insisted in her Consolidated Reply21 that the
indorsement of Mayor Asistio was not at all signed by the
Mayor and it was merely an indorsement of documents for
study and recommendation. She was also not informed of
said document. She asked for a period of ten days within
which to answer and/or act on respondent Tolentino's
letter dated April 21, 1988 and she did report to Atty.
Enrique Cube, the Mayor's secretary to explain why she
cannot go back to work yet. As no administrative case was
filed against her in 1988, there could not have been a
valid investigation under Presidential Decree No.
807.22 Yet, respondents made up fictitious statements of
facts and conclusions of law in recommending her
dismissal.
The Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and
recommendation.23
The IBP Report and Recommendation
IBP Investigating Commissioner Mario V. Andres issued a
Report and Recommendation24 dated April 4, 2008, which
recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of
merit. Commissioner Andres found that complainant failed
to present convincing evidence that respondents acted in
bad faith in rendering the Resolution dated December 19,
1988. Thus, they were held to be entitled to the legal
presumption of innocence.
According to Commissioner Andres, respondents
concluded that complainant was previously charged for
unauthorized absences by relying on existing records that
showed that she was dropped from the rolls in 1983.
Complainant's letter asking for a period of ten days to
reply to respondents' April 21, 1988 letter also meant that
she understood that an investigation was underway. When
she failed to respond, respondents assumed that she
waived her right to present evidence. Respondents may
have only been careless in their choice of words when
they wrongly assumed that complainant was
administratively charged in 1983 and they used the term
summons in referring to the letter dated April 21, 1988.
Still, respondents cannot be held liable for deceit without
proof that they deliberately worded their Resolution to
mislead Mayor Asistio into dismissing complainant.
Respondents were also not found guilty of misconduct as
their actions neither indicated moral depravity, nor did it
affect their qualifications as lawyers. Respondents may
have erred in failing to follow the procedure under Section
3825 of Presidential Decree No. 807 and they may be
investigated for such lapses as government officials before
some other venue. However, absent evidence showing
respondents' moral depravity in issuing the said
Resolution, they cannot be penalized therefor as members
of the Bar.
Lastly, Commissioner Andres ruled that respondents did
not violate their oath as members of the Bar, particularly
the oath to "do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in court."26 The falsehood contemplated in the
Attorney's Oath is one that is intentional or committed
with malice. Although the allegedly deceitful statements in
respondents' Resolution may not be wholly accurate, the
same were found to be based on documents and made in
the discharge of respondents' official functions as City
Legal Officers.
In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-22527 passed on May 22,
2008, the IBP Board of Governors approved Commissioner
Andres's recommendation.
Complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration with
Motion to Vacate Resolution of the IBP,28 which the Office
of the Bar Confidant (OBC) of the Supreme Court referred
to the IBP for appropriate action.29
In an Order30 dated September 30, 2008, the IBP required
the respondents to comment on the above motion. Only
respondent Tolentino commented31 thereon, praying that
it be denied for being a mere rehash of complainant's
previous pleadings and issues that had already been
passed upon.
Complainant filed before this Court an Ex Parte Motion to
Vacate IBP Order dated September 30, 2008/to Declare
this Case Submitted for Decision,32 arguing that the
Court's referral of her complaint to the IBP did not include
the latter's authority to decide it. She averred that the IBP
was also not in a position to take cognizance of her
motion for reconsideration since the pleading was not
addressed to the latter. Moreover, since respondents
failed to present their case before the IBP, they were
allegedly precluded from presenting any evidence in their
behalf and any comment to complainant's motion for
reconsideration will not serve any purpose.
In a Resolution33 dated March 11, 2009, the Court
referred to the IBP complainant's Motion for
Reconsideration with Motion to Vacate Resolution of the
IBP and her Ex Parte Motion to Vacate IBP Order dated
September 30, 2008/to Declare this Case Submitted for
Decision.
In Resolution No. XIX-2011-41334 passed on June 26,
2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied complainant's
motion for reconsideration as it found no cogent reason to
reverse its previous ruling.
The IBP then transmitted the record of the case to the
Court for final action.
Undaunted, complainant filed with this Court a Motion to
Disregard IBP Resolution No. XIX-2011-413 dated June
26, 2011,35 arguing that the IBP had no jurisdiction to
dismiss her complaint or to rule on her motion for
reconsideration. She insisted that the Resolution Nos.
XVIII-2008-225 and XIX-2011-413 of the IBP Board of
Governors should have only been recommendatory in
nature and the IBP should not have arrogated unto itself
the power of the Court to decide on her complaint.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court finds no merit in the complaint.
At the outset, we reject complainant's contention that the
IBP infringed on this Court's jurisdiction in dismissing her
complaint and denying her motion for reconsideration
thereon.
The case was initiated upon the filing of the complaint for
disbarment with this Court and the same was
subsequently referred to the IBP for investigation, report,
and recommendation in accordance with Section 1, Rule
139-B36 of the Rules of Court. The Resolution Nos. XVIII-
2008-225 and XIX-2011-413 of the IBP Board of
Governors embody their recommendation to this Court. As
succinctly stated in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma37 :
Clearly, the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors is
merely recommendatory. The "power to recommend"
includes the power to give "advice, exhortation or
indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character,
not binding upon the party to whom it is made."
Necessarily, the "final action" on the resolution of the IBP
Board of Governors still lies with this Court. x x x (Citation
omitted.)
Verily, there is nothing in the IBP resolutions that would
suggest that the same already constituted the final
determination of the case and were beyond the power of
the Court to review.
After thoroughly reviewing the record of this case, the
Court affirms the recommendation of Commissioner
Andres and the IBP Board of Governors that the instant
complaint should be dismissed.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides for the
grounds for the imposition of the penalty of disbarment,
to wit:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney
by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice,
or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. x
xx
In this case, complainant accused the respondents of
deceit, gross misconduct and of violating their Attorney's
Oath in issuing the Resolution dated December 19, 1988
that allegedly contained false statements and which was
arrived at without her being informed of the charges or
given the opportunity to present evidence.
As Commissioner Andres correctly ruled, deceit covers
intentional falsehoods or false statements and
representations that are made with malice or with the
intent to do wrong. Gross misconduct, on the other hand,
is "any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct
on the part of a person concerned with the administration
of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the rights of the
parties or to the right determination of the cause. The
motive behind this conduct is generally a premeditated,
obstinate or intentional purpose."38 Similarly, on the
charge of the alleged violation of the Attorney's Oath, the
settled rule is that:
The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to
apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined the
government service. In fact, by the express provision of
Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of
lawyers '"shall apply to lawyers in government service in
the discharge of their official tasks." Thus, where a
lawyer's misconduct as a government official is of
such nature as to affect his qualification as a lawyer
or to show moral delinquency, then he may be
disciplined as a member of the bar on such
grounds. Although the general rule is that a lawyer who
holds a government office may not be disciplined as a
member of the bar for infractions he committed as a
government official, he may, however, be disciplined as a
lawyer if his misconduct constitutes a violation of his oath
[as] a member of the legal profession.39 (Citations
omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Before the Court may impose against respondents the
severe disciplinary sanction of disbarment, complainant
must be able to establish by substantial evidence the
malicious and intentional character of the misconduct
complained of that evince the moral delinquency of
respondents. Substantial evidence is the amount of
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.40
Except for complainant's allegations, however, she failed
to present sufficient evidence to substantiate her
complaint. The Court agrees with the findings of
Commissioner Andres that complainant has not proffered
any evidence that tended to show that respondents
intentionally and deliberately made false statements in the
Resolution dated December 19, 1988 in order to deceive
and induce Mayor Asistio to dismiss complainant from
service. She neither offered any documentary evidence to
buttress her arguments nor presented any witness to
corroborate her claims.
Quite the contrary, complainant herself revealed her lack
of certainty as to the malicious intent or other ill motives
of respondents when she made the following statements
on her Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Vacate
Resolution of the IBP before the Court:
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against
respondents Atty. Zosimo Santiago and Atty. Nicomedes
Tolentino is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

[Respondents] knew that there was never a first nor a

second administrative case against her. Yet they twisted
their facts and language to suit their purpose. Whether
they misled the Hon. Mayor Asistio to dismiss her
from the service, or they conspired to engineer her
removal from the service, or followed a directive
from Mayor Asistio to justify her dismissal, she does
not specifically know. But certainly, their Resolution
is not an honest mistake of judgment, as shown by
the malicious warp and woof of the Resolution
itself.41 (Emphasis supplied.)

We find such line of argumentation distinctly wanting.

Complainant cannot simply rely on speculations and
suspicions, no matter how deep-seated, without evidence
to support the same. We held in Osop v. Fontanilla42 that
charges meriting disciplinary action against a lawyer
generally involve the motives that induced him to commit
the act charged and that, to justifY disbarment or
suspension, the case against the lawyer must be clear and
free from doubt, not only as to the act charged but as to
his motive. Furthermore, in Cabas v. Sususco,43 we ruled
that "mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent
to proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and
speculation likewise cannot be given credence."

As a final point, the Court deliberately dispensed with any

discussion regarding the validity of the Resolution dated
December 19, 1988. Commissioner Andres aptly pointed
out that complainant may file in the proper tribunal a
separate case against respondents, as City Legal Officers,
for possible lapses in the procedure undertaken by them
in the administrative investigation of the charge against
her and/or the propriety of her dismissal. On this matter,
complainant admitted in her complaint and consolidated
reply that she had indeed filed administrative cases
against respondents before the CSC, as well as a separate
administrative case against Mayor Asistio, in order to
impugn the validity of her dismissal from service.
However, the specific details, stages and/or outcome of
said cases were not properly manifested before this Court.
Complainant merely stated that she was not satisfied with
these other proceedings so she opted to file the instant
case for disbarment.44

The Court cannot allow this to be done.

What is at once clear is that this case for disbarment

cannot be resorted to as another remedy in order to
attack the legality of said Resolution or to nullify its
consequences. The only issue that should be determined
in this case is whether respondents committed misconduct
that put into question their moral character and moral
fitness to continue in the practice of law. As previously
discussed, this issue had been answered in the negative.

Considering that complainant failed to discharge the

burden of proof to warrant the imposition of
administrative penalty against respondents Santiago and
Tolentino, we dismiss the complaint.

A.C. No. 7481 April 24, 2012
LORENZO D. BRENNISEN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RAMON U. CONTAWI, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 for
disbarment filed by complainant Lorenzo D. Brennisen
against respondent Atty. Ramon U. Contawi for deceit
and gross misconduct in violation of his lawyer's oath.
The Facts
Complainant is the registered owner of a parcel of
land located in San Dionisio, Parañaque City covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 211762 of the
Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal. Being a
resident of the United States of America (USA), he
entrusted the administration of the subject property to
respondent, together with the corresponding owner's
duplicate title.
Unbeknownst to complainant, however, respondent,
through a spurious Special Power of Attorney
(SPA)3 dated February 22, 1989, mortgaged and
subsequently sold the subject property to one Roberto
Ho ("Ho"), as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute
Sale4 dated November 15, 2001. As a result, TCT No.
21176 was cancelled and replaced by TCT No.
1508145 issued in favor of Ho.
Thus, on April 16, 2007, complainant filed the instant
administrative complaint against respondent for
having violated his oath as a lawyer, causing him
damage and prejudice.
In his counter-affidavit,6 respondent denied any formal
lawyer-client relationship between him and the
complainant, claiming to have merely extended his
services for free. He also denied receiving money
from the complainant for the purpose of paying the
real estate taxes on the property. Further, he averred
that it was his former office assistants, a certain Boy
Roque ("Roque") and one Danilo Diaz ("Diaz"), who
offered the subject property to Ho as collateral for a
loan. Nevertheless, respondent admitted to having
confirmed the spurious SPA in his favor already
annotated at the back of TCT No. 21176 upon the
prodding of Roque and Diaz, and because he was
also in need of money at that time. Hence, he signed
the real estate mortgage and received his
proportionate share of ₱130,000.00 from the
proceeds of the loan, which he asserted to have fully
settled.
Finally, respondent denied signing the Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of Ho and insisted that it was a
forgery. Nonetheless, he sought complainant's
forgiveness and promised to repay the value of the
subject property.
In the Resolution7 dated July 16, 2008, the Court
resolved to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The Action and Recommendation of the IBP
During the mandatory conference held on October 21,
2008, the parties stipulated on the following matters:
1. That complainant is the owner of a property
covered by TCT No. 21176 (45228) of the
Register of Deeds of Parañaque;
2. Respondent was in possession of the
Owner's Duplicate Certificate of the property
of the complainant;
3. The property of the complainant was
mortgaged to a certain Roberto Ho;
4. The title to the property of complainant was
cancelled in year 2000 and a new one, TCT
No. 150814 was issued in favor of Mr.
Roberto Ho;
5. The Special Power of Attorney dated 24
February 1989 in favor of Atty. Ramon U.
Contawi is spurious and was not signed by
complainant Lorenzo D. Brennisen;
6. That respondent received Php100,000.00
of the mortgage loan secured by the
mortgagee on the aforementioned property of
complainant;
 7. That respondent did not inform the
complainant about the unauthorized mortgage
and sale of his property;
8. That respondent has a loan obligation to
Mr. Roberto Ho;
9. That respondent has not yet filed any case
against the person whom he claims to have
falsified his signature;
10. That respondent did not notify the
complainant that the owner's copy of TCT No.
21176 was stolen and was taken out from his
office.8
In its Report9 dated July 10, 2009, the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), through
Commissioner Eduardo V. De Mesa, found that
respondent had undeniably mortgaged and sold the
property of his client without the latter's knowledge or
consent, facilitated by the use of a falsified SPA.
Hence, in addition to his possible criminal liability for
falsification, the IBP-CBD deduced that respondent
violated various provisions of the Canons of
Professional Responsibility and accordingly
recommended that he be disbarred and his name
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
On May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the report of Commissioner De
Mesa through Resolution No. XIX-2011-24810 as
follows:
"RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex 'A' and finding
the recommendation fully supported by the evidence
on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
finding Respondent guilty of falsification; making or
using falsified documents; and for benefiting from the
proceed[s] of his dishonest acts, Atty. Ramon U.
Contawi is hereby DISBARRED."
The Issue
The sole issue before the Court is whether
respondent violated his lawyer's oath when he
mortgaged and sold complainant's property, which
was entrusted to him, without the latter's consent.
The Court's Ruling
After a punctilious examination of the records, the
Court concurs with the findings and recommendation
of Commissioner De Mesa and the IBP Board of
Governors that respondent acted with deceit when,
through the use of a falsified document, he effected
the unauthorized mortgage and sale of his client's
property for his personal benefit.
Indisputably, respondent disposed of complainant's
property without his knowledge or consent, and
partook of the proceeds of the sale for his own
benefit. His contention that he merely accommodated
the request of his then financially-incapacitated office
assistants to confirm the spurious SPA is flimsy and
implausible, as he was fully aware that complainant's
signature reflected thereon was forged. As aptly
opined by Commissioner De Mesa, the fraudulent
transactions involving the subject property were
effected using the owner's duplicate title, which was in
respondent's safekeeping and custody during
complainant's absence.
Consequently, Commissioner De Mesa and the IBP
Board of Governors correctly recommended his
disbarment for violations of the pertinent provisions of
the Canons of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
Canon 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution,
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
and legal processes.
Canon 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys
and properties of his client which may come into his
possession.
Canon 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected or received for or from client.
Canon 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and
property of his client when due or upon demand.
Canon 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.
In Sabayle v. Tandayag,11 the Court disbarred one of
the respondent lawyers and ordered his name
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys on the grounds of
serious dishonesty and professional misconduct. The
respondent lawyer knowingly participated in a false
and simulated transaction not only by notarizing a
spurious Deed of Sale, but also – and even worse –
sharing in the profits of the specious transaction by
acquiring half of the property subject of the Deed of
Sale.
In Flores v. Chua,12 the Court disbarred the respondent
lawyer for having deliberately made false
representations that the vendor appeared personally information and guidance. Let a copy of this Decision
before him when he notarized a forged deed of sale. be attached to respondent's personal record as
He was found guilty of grave misconduct. attorney.

In this case, respondent's established acts exhibited SO ORDERED.

his unfitness and plain inability to discharge the
bounden duties of a member of the legal profession.
He failed to prove himself worthy of the privilege to
practice law and to live up to the exacting standards
demanded of the members of the bar. It bears to
stress that "[t]he practice of law is a privilege given to
lawyers who meet the high standards of legal
proficiency and morality. Any violation of these
standards exposes the lawyer to administrative
liability."13

Moreover, respondent's argument that there was no

formal lawyer-client relationship between him and
complainant will not serve to mitigate his liability.
There is no distinction as to whether the transgression
is committed in a lawyer's private or professional
capacity, for a lawyer may not divide his personality
as an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at
another.141âwphi1

With the foregoing disquisitions, the Court thus finds

the penalty of disbarment proper in this case, as
recommended by Commissioner De Mesa and the
IBP Board of Governors. Section 27, Rule 38 of the
Rules of Court provides:

"SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by

Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
xxx or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice xxx"
(emphasis supplied)

The Court notes that in administrative proceedings,

only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, is required.15 Having
carefully scrutinized the records of this case, the
Court therefore finds that the standard of substantial
evidence has been more than satisfied.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. RAMON U.

CONTAWI, having clearly violated his lawyer's oath
and the Canons of Professional Responsibility
through his unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct,
is DISBARRED and his name
ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.

Let copies of this Decision be served on the Office of

the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all courts in the country for their

A.C. No. 5581 January 14, 2014
ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated January
8, 2002 filed by complainant Rose Bunagan-Bansig
(Bansig) against respondent Atty. Rogelio Juan A.
Celera (respondent) for Gross Immoral Conduct.
In her complaint, Bansig narrated that, on May 8,
1997, respondent and Gracemarie R. Bunagan
(Bunagan), entered into a contract of marriage, as
evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate
of marriage issued by the City Civil Registry of
Manila.2 Bansig is the sister of Gracemarie R.
Bunagan, legal wife of respondent.
However, notwithstanding respondent's marriage with
Bunagan, respondent contracted another marriage on
January 8, 1998 with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres
Alba (Alba), as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of
the certificate of marriage issued by the City
Registration Officer of San Juan, Manila.3
Bansig stressed that the marriage between
respondent and Bunagan was still valid and in full
legal existence when he contracted his second
marriage with Alba, and that the first marriage had
never been annulled or rendered void by any lawful
authority.
Bansig alleged that respondent’s act of contracting
marriage with Alba, while his marriage is still
subsisting, constitutes grossly immoral and conduct
unbecoming of a member of the Bar, which renders
him unfit to continue his membership in the Bar.
In a Resolution4 dated February 18, 2002, the Court
resolved to require respondent to file a comment on
the instant complaint.
Respondent failed to submit his comment on the
complaint, despite receipt of the copy of the Court's
Resolution, as evidenced by Registry Return Receipt
No. 30639. Thus, the Court, in a Resolution5 dated
March 17, 2003, resolved to require respondent to
show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt
with or held in contempt for failing to file his comment
on the complaint against him.6
On December 10, 2002, Bansig filed an Omnibus Ex
Parte Motion7 praying that respondent's failure to file
his comment on the complaint be deemed as a waiver
to file the same, and that the case be submitted for
disposition.
On May 4, 2003, in a Motion, respondent claimed that
while it appeared that an administrative case was filed
against him, he did not know the nature or cause
thereof since other than Bansig's Omnibus Motion, he
received no other pleading or any processes of this
Court. Respondent, however, countered that Bansig's
Omnibus Motion was merely a ploy to frighten him
and his wife from pursuing the criminal complaints for
falsification of public documents they filed against
Bansig and her husband. He also explained that he
was able to obtain a copy of the Court's Show Cause
Order only when he visited his brother who is
occupying their former residence at 59-B Aguho St.,
Project 3, Quezon City. Respondent further averred
that he also received a copy of Bansig's Omnibus
Motion when the same was sent to his law office
address.
Respondent pointed out that having been the family's
erstwhile counsel and her younger sister's husband,
Bansig knew his law office address, but she failed to
send a copy of the complaint to him. Respondent
suspected that Bansig was trying to mislead him in
order to prevent him from defending himself. He
added that Bansig has an unpaid obligation
amounting to ₱2,000,000.00 to his wife which
triggered a sibling rivalry. He further claimed that he
and his wife received death threats from unknown
persons; thus, he transferred to at least two (2) new
residences, i.e., in Sampaloc, Manila and Angeles
City. He then prayed that he be furnished a copy of
the complaint and be given time to file his answer to
the complaint.
In a Resolution8 dated July 7, 2003, the Court
resolved to (a) require Bansig to furnish respondent
with a copy of the administrative complaint and to
submit proof of such service; and (b) require
respondent to file a comment on the complaint against
him.
In compliance, Bansig submitted an Affidavit of
Mailing to show proof that a copy of the administrative
complaint was furnished to respondent at his given
address which is No. 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino
Subdivision, Angeles City, as evidenced by Registry
Receipt No. 2167.9
On March 17, 2004, considering that respondent
failed anew to file his comment despite receipt of the
complaint, the Court resolved to require respondent to
show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt
with or held in contempt for such failure.10
On June 3, 2004, respondent, in his
Explanation,11 reiterated that he has yet to receive a
copy of the complaint. He claimed that Bansig
probably had not complied with the Court's Order,
otherwise, he would have received the same already.
He requested anew that Bansig be directed to furnish
him a copy of the complaint.
Again, on August 25, 2004, the Court granted
respondent's prayer that he be furnished a copy of the
complaint, and required Bansig to furnish a copy of
the complaint to respondent.12
On October 1, 2004, Bansig, in her
Manifestation,13 lamented the dilatory tactics allegedly
undertaken by respondent in what was supposedly a
simple matter of receipt of complaint. Bansig asserted
that the Court should sanction respondent for his
deliberate and willful act to frustrate the actions of the
Court. She attached a copy of the complaint and
submitted an Affidavit of Mailing stating that again a
copy of the complaint was mailed at respondent's
residential address in Angeles City as shown by
Registry Receipt No. 3582.
On May 16, 2005, the Court anew issued a Show
Cause Order to respondent as to why he should not
be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for
failure to comply with the Resolution dated July 7,
2003 despite service of copy of the complaint by
registered mail.14
On August 1, 2005, the Court noted the returned and
unserved copy of the Show Cause Order dated May
16, 2005 sent to respondent at 238 Mayflower St.,
Ninoy Aquino Subd. under Registry Receipt No.
55621, with notation "RTS-Moved." It likewise
required Bansig to submit the correct and present
address of respondent.15
On September 12, 2005, Bansig manifested that
respondent had consistently indicated in his
correspondence with the Court No. 238 Mayflower St.,
Ninoy Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City as his
residential address. However, all notices served upon
him on said address were returned with a note
"moved" by the mail server. Bansig averred that in
Civil Case No. 59353, pending before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Tuguegarao City,
respondent entered his appearance as counsel with
mailing address to be at "Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922
Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City."16
On February 13, 2006, the Court resolved to resend a
copy of the Show Cause Order dated May 16, 2005 to
respondent at his new address at Unit 8, Halili
Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City.17
On June 30, 2008, due to respondent's failure to
comply with the Show Cause Order dated May 16,
2005, for failure to file his comment on this
administrative complaint as required in the Resolution
dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to: (a) IMPOSE
upon Atty. Celera a FINE of ₱1,000.00 payable to the
court, or a penalty of imprisonment of five (5) days if
said fine is not paid, and (b) REQUIRE Atty. Celera to
COMPLY with the Resolution dated July 7, 2003 by
filing the comment required thereon.18
In a Resolution19 dated January 27, 2010, it appearing
that respondent failed to comply with the Court's
Resolutions dated June 30, 2008 and July 7, 2003,
the Court resolved to: (1) DISPENSE with the filing by
respondent of his comment on the complaint; (2)
ORDER the arrest of Atty. Celera; and (3) DIRECT
the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) to (a) ARREST and DETAIN Atty. Celera for
non-compliance with the Resolution dated June 30,
2008; and (b) SUBMIT a report of compliance with the
Resolution. The Court likewise resolved to REFER the
complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation.20
However, the Return of Warrant21 dated March 24,
2010, submitted by Atty. Frayn M. Banawa,
Investigation Agent II, Anti-Graft Division of the NBI,
showed that respondent cannot be located because
neither Halili Complex nor No. 922 Aurora Blvd., at
Cubao, Quezon City cannot be located. During
surveillance, it appeared that the given address, i.e.,
No. 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City was a
vacant lot with debris of a demolished building.
Considering that the given address cannot be found
or located and there were no leads to determine
respondent's whereabouts, the warrant of arrest
cannot be enforced.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, meanwhile, in
compliance with the Court's Resolution, reported that
as per their records, the address of respondent is at
No. 41 Hoover St., Valley View Royale Subd., Taytay,
Rizal.
Respondent likewise failed to appear before the
mandatory conference and hearings set by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD), despite several notices. Thus,
in an Order dated August 4, 2010, Commissioner
Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, of the IBP-CBD, declared
respondent to be in default and the case was
submitted for report and recommendation. The Order
of Default was received by respondent as evidenced
by a registry return receipt. However, respondent
failed to take any action on the matter.
On January 3, 2011, the IBP-CBD, in its Report and
Recommendation, recommended that respondent
Atty. Celera be suspended for a period of two (2)
years from the practice of law.
RULING
A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely
civil nor purely criminal, but is rather an investigation
by the court into the conduct of its officers.22 The issue
to be determined is whether respondent is still fit to
continue to be an officer of the court in the
dispensation of justice. Hence, an administrative
proceeding for disbarment continues despite the
desistance of a complainant, or failure of the
complainant to prosecute the same, or in this case,
the failure of respondent to answer the charges
against him despite numerous notices.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has
the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the
allegations in the complaint. Substantial evidence has
been defined as such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion. For the Court to exercise its disciplinary
powers, the case against the respondent must be
established by clear, convincing and satisfactory
proof. Considering the serious consequence of the
disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar,
this Court has consistently held that clear
preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of the administrative penalty.23
In the instant case, there is a preponderance of
evidence that respondent contracted a second
marriage despite the existence of his first marriage.
The first marriage, as evidenced by the certified xerox
copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on October
3, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of Manila, Gloria C.
Pagdilao, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A.
Celera contracted marriage on May, 8, 1997 with
Gracemarie R. Bunagan at the Church of Saint
Augustine, Intramuros, Manila; the second marriage,
however, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of
the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 4, 2001
by the City Civil Registry of San Juan, Manila, states
that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted
marriage on January 8, 1998 with Ma. Cielo Paz
Torres Alba at the Mary the Queen Church, Madison
St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.
Bansig submitted certified xerox copies of the
marriage certificates to prove that respondent entered
into a second marriage while the latter’s first marriage
was still subsisting. We note that the second marriage
apparently took place barely a year from his first
marriage to Bunagan which is indicative that indeed
the first marriage was still subsisting at the time
respondent contracted the second marriage with Alba.
The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts,
issued by a public officer in custody thereof, are
admissible as the best evidence of their contents, as
provided for under Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court, to wit:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document
is a public record. – When the original of a document
is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office, its contents may be proved by a certified
copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof.
Moreover, the certified xerox copies of the marriage
certificates, other than being admissible in evidence,
also clearly indicate that respondent contracted the
second marriage while the first marriage is subsisting.
By itself, the certified xerox copies of the marriage
certificates would already have been sufficient to
establish the existence of two marriages entered into
by respondent. The certified xerox copies should be
accorded the full faith and credence given to public
documents. For purposes of this disbarment
proceeding, these Marriage Certificates bearing the
name of respondent are competent and convincing
evidence to prove that he committed bigamy, which
renders him unfit to continue as a member of the
Bar.24
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in
a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree
of morality required of him as a member of the Bar.
He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution
demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting
a second marriage while his first marriage is
subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct and
are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule
138 of the Revised Rules of Court.25
This case cannot be fully resolved, however, without
addressing rather respondent’s defiant stance against
the Court as demonstrated by his repetitive disregard
of its Resolution requiring him to file his comment on
the complaint. This case has dragged on since 2002.
In the span of more than 10 years, the Court has
issued numerous directives for respondent's
compliance, but respondent seemed to have
preselected only those he will take notice of and the
rest he will just ignore. The Court has issued several
resolutions directing respondent to comment on the
complaint against him, yet, to this day, he has not
submitted any answer thereto. He claimed to have not
received a copy of the complaint, thus, his failure to
comment on the complaint against him. Ironically,
however, whenever it is a show cause order, none of
them have escaped respondent's attention. Even
assuming that indeed the copies of the complaint had
not reached him, he cannot, however, feign ignorance
that there is a complaint against him that is pending
before this Court which he could have easily obtained
a copy had he wanted to.
The Court has been very tolerant in dealing with
respondent's nonchalant attitude towards this case;
accommodating respondent's endless requests,
manifestations and prayers to be given a copy of the
complaint. The Court, as well as Bansig, as evidenced
by numerous affidavits of service, have relentlessly
tried to reach respondent for more than a decade;
sending copies of the Court's Resolutions and
complaint to different locations - both office and
residential addresses of respondent. However,
despite earnest efforts of the Court to reach
respondent, the latter, however conveniently offers a
mere excuse of failure to receive the complaint. When
said excuse seemed no longer feasible, respondent
just disappeared. In a manner of speaking,
respondent’s acts were deliberate, maneuvering the
liberality of the Court in order to delay the disposition
of the case and to evade the consequences of his
actions. Ultimately, what is apparent is respondent’s
deplorable disregard of the judicial process which this
Court cannot countenance.
Clearly, respondent's acts constitute willful
disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in
itself alone a sufficient cause for suspension or
disbarment. Respondent’s cavalier attitude in
repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court
constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution.
Respondent’s conduct indicates a high degree of
irresponsibility. We have repeatedly held that a
Court’s Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere
request, nor should it be complied with partially,
inadequately, or selectively." Respondent’s obstinate
refusal to comply with the Court’s orders "not only
betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also
underscores his disrespect of the Court's lawful
orders which is only too deserving of reproof."26
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court grounds therefor. - A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for
a party to a case without authority to do so. The
practice of soliciting cases for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.
Considering respondent's propensity to disregard not
only the laws of the land but also the lawful orders of
the Court, it only shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity and good demeanor. He
is, thus, unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find
respondent ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA,
guilty of grossly immoral conduct and willful
disobedience of lawful orders rendering him unworthy
of continuing membership in the legal profession. He
is thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law
and his name stricken of the Roll of Attorneys,
effective immediately. 1âwphi1
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of
the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith record it in the
personal file of respondent. All the Courts of the
Philippines and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
shall disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 8887
ROMAN DELA ROSA VERANO* , Complainant
vs.
ATTY. LUIS FERNAN DIORES, JR., Respondent
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This administrative case stemmed from a letter-
complaint1 filed with the Court on February 2, 2011 by
complainant Roman Dela Rosa Verano (Verano)
against respondent Atty. Luis Fernan Diores, Jr. (Atty.
Diores) for deceit, malpractice, gross ignorance of the
law and violation of the Lawyer's Oath for
surreptitiously using Verano's parcel of land to secure
bail bonds in connection with at least 61 cases
of Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
(B.P. Blg. 22) that had been filed against Atty. Diores.2
The salient facts, as borne by the records, are the
following:
On April 11, 2006, Verano executed a Special Power
of Attomey3 (SP A) in favor of Atty. Diores authorizing
the latter to use Verano's parcel of land covered by
TCT No. T-77901 (subject property) as guaranty to
obtain a bail bond for particular criminal cases4 that
had been filed against Atty. Diores.
Verano was surprised when he subsequently
discovered that Atty. Diores executed a Memorandum
of Agreement5 (MOA) dated August 31, 2006 with
Visayan Surety and Insurance Corporation (Visayan
Surety) in order to use the subject property as
guarantee to obtain bail bonds for at least 61 cases
of Estafa and Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 that had been
filed against him, which included, among others,
Criminal Case Nos. CBU-48996 and CBU-49706,
which were filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
6, Cebu City (RTC). Verano alleged that he did not
authorize Atty. Diores to enter into such MOA, much
less to use the subject property as collateral for bail
bonds of the more than 61 Estafa cases filed against
the latter which were other than those he authorized
under the SPA, causing great loss and damage to
Verano.
Thereafter, the aforementioned RTC branch, through
Presiding Judge Ester M. Veloso, promulgated a Joint
Judgment6 dated November 16, 2009 in the said
Criminal Case Nos. CBU-48996 and CBU-49706
together with Criminal Case Nos. CBU-50599, CBU-
50279, CBU-50335 and CBU-51277, finding Atty.
Diores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of six (6)
counts of Estafa through false pretenses and
fraudulent means under Article 315 (2) (a) of the
Revised Penal Code by engaging in a Ponzi
scheme,7 as follows:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby finds the accused
Luis F. Diores, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
six (6) counts of the crime of Estafa and sentences
him as follows:
(1) In Criminal Case No. CBU-50599, to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional as minimum, to twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to
pay the off ended party Irene Lumapas the sum of
[₱]3,050,000.00 plus legal interest to be computed
from June 2, 1999 until such time that the amount is
paid in full;
(2) In Criminal Case No. CBU-48996, to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional as minimum, to twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to
pay the offended party Calixto Ventic the sum of
[₱]500,000.00 plus legal interest to be computed from
December 7, 1998 until such time that the amount is
paid in full;
(3) In Criminal Case No. CBU-49706, to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional as minimum, to twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to
pay the offended party Lilia Amy Ursal the sum of
[₱]416,000.00 plus legal interest to be computed from
March 2, 1999 until such time that the amount is paid
in full;
(4) In Criminal Case No. CBU-50279, to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional as minimum, to twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to
pay the offended party Rolando Chiu the sum of
[₱]660,000.00 plus legal interest to be computed from
May 4, 1999 until such time that the amount is paid in
full;
(5) In Criminal [Case] No. CBU-50335, to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional as minimum, to twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to
pay the offended party Philholina Villamor the sum of
[₱]200,000.00 plus legal interest to be computed from
May 8, 1999 until such time that the amount is paid in
full; and
(6) In Criminal Case No. CBU-51277, to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional as minimum, to twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to
pay the offended party John Michael Velez the sum of
[₱]2,100,000.00 plus legal interest to be computed
from August 2, 1999 until such time that the amount is
paid in full.
SO ORDERED.8
Thus, Verano filed this letter-complaint against Atty.
Diores. In its Resolutions dated March 9, 20119 and
November 28, 2011,10 the Court directed Atty. Diores
to file his comment on the letter-complaint. However,
Atty. Diores failed to file any comment despite notice.
Consequently, in its Resolution11 dated July 25, 2012,
the Court considered as waived the filing of Atty.
Diores' comment, and referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
At the scheduled mandatory conference before the
IBP on April 1, 2013,12 only Verano appeared together
with his counsel, Atty. Manuel F. Ong. Atty. Diores, on
the other hand, failed to appear despite
notice.13 Thereafter, Verano filed his position
paper,14 adding that subsequent to the filing of the
letter-complaint before the Court, Atty. Diores had
jumped bail in some of his criminal cases and had
failed to serve his sentence on some of the decided
cases against him which had already become final
and executory.15 Atty. Diores, on the other hand, failed
to file his position paper.
After due proceedings, Commissioner Eldrid C.
Antiquiera (Commissioner Antiquiera) rendered a
Report and Recommendation16 on June 18, 2013,
finding Atty. Diores guilty of deceit in violation of
Canon 1, Rule 1.0117 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), holding that Atty. Diores: (1)
took undue advantage of the trust reposed on him by
Verano by secretly entering into the subject MOA; (2)
jumped bail on some of the criminal cases and failed
to serve sentence in those where he was duly
convicted by final judgment; and (3) refused to comply
with the orders of the Court and the IBP to submit his
comment and position paper, and to attend the
mandatory conference. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is
recommended that respondent be SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of TWO (2) YEARS
with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.18
In its Resolution19 dated October 10, 2014, the IBP
Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve
the said Report and Recommendation, but
recommended that Atty. Diores be disbarred, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex
"A ", and considering that Respondent is liable for
deceit in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility aggravated by his
recalcitrance to legal orders in his refusal to comply
with the resolution of the Supreme Court for him to file
Comment and his deliberate failure to file his Position
Paper with the IBP and attend the Mandatory
Conference before the Investigating Commissioner,
Atty. Luis Fernan Diores[, Jr.] is hereby DISBARRED
from the practice of law and his name stricken off the
Roll of Attorneys.20
After a judicious examination of the records and
submissions of the parties, the Court has no
compelling reason to diverge from the factual findings
of Commissioner Antiquiera and the recommended
penalty of the IBP Board of Governors.
In dealing with clients or other people, lawyers are
expected to observe the highest degree of good faith,
fairness and candor, both in their private and
professional capacities. Thus, any form of deception
or fraudulent act committed by a lawyer in either
capacity is not only disgraceful and dishonorable, but
also severely undermines the trust and confidence of
people in the legal profession, violates Canon 1, Rule
1.01 of the CPR, and puts the lawyer's moral
character into serious doubt as a member of the Bar,
rendering him unfit to continue his practice of
law.21 Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to obey lawful
orders of a superior court and the IBP. Willful
disobedience to such orders, especially to those
issued by this Court, is a sufficient ground to disbar a
lawyer or suspend him from the practice of law under
Section 27,22 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.23
In this case, Commissioner Antiquiera observed that
while there was an SPA executed by Verano in favor
of Atty. Di ores for the latter to use Verano's land as
guarantee for the bail bonds, it only authorized Atty.
Diores to use the same for specific criminal cases,
and not for the other criminal cases filed against him.
In addition, Atty. Diores failed to file his comment to
Verano's letter-complaint filed against him despite two
(2) notices from the Court ordering him to do so, failed
to attend the mandatory conference and file his
position paper despite orders from the IBP, and
jumped bail in the criminal cases filed against him.
The Court agrees with Commissioner Antiquiera's
observation. While the SPA executed by Verano
empowered Atty. Diores, in his private capacity, to
use the subject property as guaranty for his bail bond
a lawyer. Thus, the Court will not hesitate to adopt the
penalty of the IBP and hereby disbar Atty. Diores to
protect the trust and confidence of the people in this
noble profession.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis Fernan Diores,
Jr. is found GUILTY of Deceit in violation of Rule 1.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Willful
Disobedience to a Lawful Order of the Court and
Conviction for Estafa, both in violation of Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. He is
1âwphi1

in some of his criminal cases, this did not grant
him carte blanche to use the said property to secure
bail bonds in his other criminal cases which were not
included in the SP A, much less enter into a MOA with
Visayan Surety for the said purpose. Such act not
only violates the trust granted to him by Verano, but
also shows doubt as to his moral character.
Moreover, the fact that Atty. Diores jumped bail in the
criminal cases filed against him, failed to file a
comment in the instant case despite notice from the
Court, and also failed to attend the mandatory
conference and file his position paper when he was
directed to do so by the IBP, shows his propensity to
willfully disobey the orders - of the Court, no less -
and other judicial authorities, including the IBP, which
is a grave affront to the legal profession, and which
should be penalized to the greatest extent.
hereby DISBARRED, and his name is
ordered STRICKEN FROM the Roll of Attorneys
effective immediately upon the date of his receipt of
this Decision.
Atty. Diores is hereby DIRECTED to immediately file a
Manifestation to the Court that his disbarment has
commenced, copy furnished to all courts and quasi-
judicial bodies where he has entered his appearance
as counsel.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to: (a) the
Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to
all courts throughout the country for their information
and guidance; (b) the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and (c) the Office of the Bar Confidant to
be appended to Atty. Di ores' personal record as a
member of the Bar.

As for the recommended penalty, the Court agrees SO ORDERED.

with, and hereby adopts, the IBP's recommendation
that Atty. Diores should be disbarred, in view of the
totality of infractions he had committed, compounded
by his conviction for six (6) counts of Estafa by the
RTC.

It is also well-settled that Estafa, which is an act of

defrauding another person, whether committed
through abuse of confidence, false pretenses or other
fraudulent acts,24 is a crime involving moral
turpitude25 which is also a violation of Canon 1, Rule
1.01 of the CPR, and a ground to disbar or suspend a
lawyer as gross misconduct under Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court.

Here, Atty. Diores was convicted of not only one, but

six (6) counts of Estafa through false pretenses and
fraudulent means under Article 315(2)(a) of the
Revised Penal Code. Such conviction simply shows
his criminal tendency to defraud and deceive other
people into remitting to him their hard-earned money,
which the legal profession condemns in the strongest
terms. This, together with his willful disobedience of
court orders and his act of using Verano's subject
property as guaranty for his bail bond outside the
criminal cases wherein he was authorized, cements
his utter unfitness to continue exercising his duties as

A.C. No. 10910
[Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3594)
ANTERO M. SISON, JR., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MANUEL N. CAMACHO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERCURIAM:
In his verified affidavit-complaint,1 dated September
17, 2012, filed before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (JBP-
CBD), complainant Atty. Antero M. Sison, Jr. (Atty.
Sison), president of Marsman-Drysdale Agribusiness
Holdings Inc. (MDAHI), charged respondent Atty.
Manuel Camacho (Atty. Camacho) with violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). He
accused Atty. Camacho of violating Rule 1.01, for
dishonestly entering into a compromise agreement
without authorization, and Rule 16.01, for failure to
render an accounting of funds which were supposed
to be paid as additional docket fees.
Complaint's Position
Atty. Sison alleged that Atty. Camacho was the
counsel of MDAHI in an insurance claim action
against Paramount Life & General Insurance
Corp. (Paramount Insurance), docketed as Civil Case
No. 05-655, before the Regional Trial Court, Makati
City, Branch 139 (RTC). The initial insurance claim of
MDAHI against Paramount Insurance was
P14,863,777.00.
On March 4, 2011, Atty. Camacho met with Atty.
Enrique Dimaano (Atty. Dimaano), corporate
secretary of MDAHI, and proposed to increase their
claim to P64,412,534. l 8 by taking into account the
interests imposed. Atty. Camacho, however, clarified
that the increase in the claim would require additional
docket fees in the amount of Pl,288,260.00, as shown
in his hand-written computation.2 MDAHI agreed and
granted the said amount to Atty. Dimaano which was
evidenced by a Payment Request/Order
Form.3 On May 27, 2011, Atty. Dimaano gave the
money for docket fees to Atty. Camacho who
promised to issue a receipt for the said amount, but
never did.4
Atty. Sison later discovered that on May 26, 2011, the
RTC had already rendered a decision5 in favor of
MDAHI granting its insurance claim plus interests in
the amount of approximately P65,000,000.00.
On August 11, 2011, Atty. Camacho sent a letter6 to
MDAHI recommending a settlement with Paramount
Insurance in Civil Case No. 05-655 in the amount of
Pl5,000,000.00 allegedly to prevent a protracted
appeal with the appellate court. MDAHI refused the
offer of compromise and did not indicate its conforme
on the letter of Atty. Camacho. Surprisingly, even
without the written conformity of MDAHI, Atty.
Camacho filed the Satisfaction of Judgment,7 dated
August 15, 2011, before the R TC stating that the
parties had entered into a compromise agreement.
On August 18, 2011, Atty. Sison met with Atty.
Camacho to clarify the events that transpired.8 He
asked Atty. Camacho whether he paid the amount of
Pl,288,260.00 as additional dockets fees, and the
latter replied that he simply gave it to the clerk of court
as the payment period had lapsed.
Disappointed with the actions of Atty. Camacho, Atty.
Sison sent a letter,9 dated August 24, 2011, stating
that he was alarmed that the former would accept a
disadvantageous compromise; that it was against
company policy to bribe any government official with
respect to the Pl,288,260.00 given to the clerk of
court; and that MDAHI would only pay P200,000.00 to
Atty. Camacho as attorney's fees.
Respondent's Position
In his verified answer,10 dated October 30, 2012, Atty.
Camacho denied all the allegations against him. He
stressed that he had the authority to enter into the
compromise agreement. Moreover, the alleged docket
fees given to him by MDAHI formed part of his
attorney's fees.
He further stated in his position paper11 that the
judgment debt was paid and accepted by MDAHI
without any objection, as duly evidenced by an
acknowledgment receipt.12 Thus, there was no
irregularity in the compromise agreement.
With respect to the amount handed to him, Atty.
Camacho averred that he filed a Motion to Compel
Plaintiff to Pay Attorney's Fee on September 13, 2011
before the RTC. The Court granted the said motion in Accordingly, the penalty of one (1) year suspension
its April 12, 2012 Order13 stating that the amount of imposed was lowered to six (6) months suspension
Pl,288,260.00 was considered as part of his attorney's from the practice of law.
fees.
Hence, the case was elevated to the Court.
On July 6, 2012, the R TC issued an Order14 resolving
the motion for reconsideration filed by both parties in The Court's Ruling
favor of Atty. Camacho. In the said order, the RTC
opined that only P300,000.00 was previously paid to The Court finds that Atty. Camacho violated Rules
Atty. Camacho15 as attorney's fees. Based on the 1.01 and 16.01 of the CPR.
foregoing, Atty. Camacho asserted that the amount of
Pl,288,260.00 which he received, truly formed part of
Entering into a compromise
his unpaid attorney's fees. He stressed that the said
agreement without written
RTC order had attained finality and constituted res
authority of the client
judicata on the present administrative case. He added
that MDAHI disregarded the RTC order as it filed an
estafa case against him concerning the amount Those in the legal profession must always conduct
ofl:ll,288,260.00. themselves with honesty and integrity in all their
dealings. Members of the Bar took their oath to
conduct themselves according to the best of their
Report and Recommendation
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well
to the courts as to their clients and to delay no man
After the mandatory conference on January 24, 2013 for money or malice. These mandates apply
and upon a thorough evaluation of the evidence especially to dealings of lawyers with their clients
presented by the parties in their respective position considering the highly fiduciary nature of their
papers, the IBP-CBD submitted its Report and relationship.22
Recommendation,16 dated April 1, 2013 finding Atty.
Camacho to have violated the provisions of Rule 1.01
In the practice of law, lawyers constantly formulate
and Rule 16.01 of the CPR and recommending the
compromise agreements for the benefit of their
imposition of the penalty of one (1) year suspension
clients. Article 1878 of the Civil Code provides that " [
from the practice of law against him. In its Resolution
s ]pecial powers of attorney are necessary in the
No. XX-2013-474,17 dated April 16, 2013, the Board of
following cases: xxx (3) To compromise, to submit
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
questions to arbitration, to renounce the right to
Philippines (Board) adopted the said report and
appeal from a judgment, to waive objections to the
recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Eldrid
venue of an action or to abandon a prescription
C. Antiquiera.
already acquired xxx."
Aggrieved, Atty. Camacho filed a motion for
In line with the fiduciary duty of the Members of the
reconsideration18 before the Board reiterating that the
Bar, Section 23, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
compromise agreement was valid because MDAHI
specifies a stringent requirement with respect to
did not reject the same and that the amount of
compromise agreements, to wit:
Pl,288,260.00 formed part of his attorney's fees.
Sec. 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. -
In his Comment/Opposition,19 Atty. Sison countered
Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any
that Atty. Camacho never denied that he filed the
case by any agreement in relation thereto made in
satisfaction of judgment without the written authority
writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of
of MDAHI and that there was ca pending estafa case
ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without
against him before the Regional Trial Court, Makati
special authority, compromise their client's
City, Branch 146, docketed as Criminal Case No. 13-
litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a
1688, regarding the Pl,288,260.00 handed to him.
client's claim but the full amount in cash.
In its Resolution No. XXI-2014-532,20 dated August 10,
[Emphasis and Underscoring Supplied]
2014, the Board adopted the report and
recommendation21 of National Director Dominic C.M.
Solis. The Board partially granted the motion for In the case at bench, the R TC decision, dated May
reconsideration and dismissed, without prejudice, the 26, 2011, awarded MDAHI approximately
charge regarding the failure to account for the money, P65,000,000.00. When Paramount Insurance offered
because it was premature to act on such issue due to a compromise settlement in the amount of
the pending criminal case against the Atty. Camacho. Pl5,000,000.00, it was clear as daylight that MDAHI
never consented to the said offer. As can be gleaned
from Atty. Camacho's letter, MDAHI did not sign the
conforme regarding the compromise agreement.23
Glaringly, despite the lack of a written special
authority, Atty. Camacho agreed to a lower judgment
award on behalf of his client and filed a satisfaction of
judgment before the R TC. The said pleading also
failed to bear the conformity of his client.24 Although
MDAHI subsequently received the payment of P15M
from Paramount Insurance, it does not erase Atty.
Camacho's transgression in reaching the compromise
agreement without the prior consent of his client.
For entering into a compromise agreement without the
written authority of his client, Atty. Camacho violated
Rule 1.01 of the CPR, which states that " [a] lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct." Members of the Bar must always
conduct themselves in a way that promotes public
confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.25
Failing to account for
the money of the client
Atty. Camacho was also charged with violation of
Rule 16.01 of the CPR, which provides for a lawyer's
duty to "account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client."
Here, Atty. Sison alleged that MDAHI gave Atty.
Camacho the amount of P 1,288,260.00 as payment
of additional docket fees but the latter failed to apply
the same for its intended purpose. In contrast, Atty.
Camacho invoked the July 6, 2012 Order of the RTC
which declared the MDAHI allegation as
unsubstantiated, and claimed that the said amount
formed part of his attorney's fees. The Board, on the
other hand, opined that it was still premature to decide
such issue because there was a pending estafa case,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 13-1688, filed by
MDAHI against Atty. Camacho involving the same
amount of P 1,288,260.00.
The Court is of the view that it is not premature to rule
on the charge against Atty. Camacho for his failure to
account for the money of his client. The pending case
against him is criminal in nature. The issue therein is
whether he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
misappropriating the amount of Pl,288,260.00
entrusted to him by his client. The present case,
however, is administrative in character, requiring only
substantial evidence. It only entails a determination of
whether Atty. Camacho violated his solemn oath by
failing to account for the money of his client.
Evidently, the adjudication of such issue in this
administrative case shall not, in any way, affect the
separate criminal proceeding.
In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only
issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be
allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. The 1âwphi1
only concern of the Court is the determination of the
respondent's administrative liability. The findings in
this case will have no material bearing on other
judicial action which the parties may choose to file
against each other. While a lawyer's wrongful
actuations may give rise at the same time to criminal,
civil, and administrative liabilities, each must be
determined in the appropriate case; and every case
must be resolved in accordance with the facts and the
law applicable and the quantum of proof required in
each.26
Delving into the substance of the allegation, the Court
rules that Atty. Camacho indeed violated Rule 16.01
of the CPR. When Atty. Camacho personally
requested MDAHI for additional docket fees, the latter
obediently granted the amount of Pl ,288,260.00 to
the former. Certainly, it was understood that such
amount was necessary for the payment of supposed
additional docket fees in Civil Case No. 05-655. Yet,
when Atty. Sison confronted Atty. Camacho regarding
the said amount, the latter replied that he simply gave
it to the clerk of court as the payment period had
lapsed. Whether the said amount was pocketed by
him or improperly given to the clerk of court as a form
of bribery, it was unmistakably clear that Atty.
Camacho did not apply the amount given to him by
his client for its intended legal purpose.
Atty. Camacho did not even deny making that request
to MDAHI for additional docket fees and receiving
such amount from his client. Rather, he set up a
defense that the said amount formed part of his
attorney's fees. Such defense, however, is grossly
contradictory to the established purpose of the
Pl,288,260.00. In its Payment Request/Order
Form,27 it is plainly indicated therein that MDAHI
released the said amount only to be applied as
payment for additional docket fees, and not for any
other purposes. Consequently, the lame excuse of
Atty. Camacho is bereft of merit because it constitutes
a mere afterthought and a manifest disrespect to the
legal profession. Atty. Camacho is treading on a
perilous path where the payment of his attorney's fees
is more important than his fiduciary and faithful duty of
accounting the money of his client. Well-settled is the
rule that lawyers are not entitled to unilaterally
appropriate their clients' money for themselves by the
mere fact that the clients owe them attorney's fees.28
Moreover, Atty. Camacho failed to issue a receipt to
MDAHI from the moment he received the said
amount. In Tarog v. Ricafort,29 the Court held that
ethical and practical considerations made it both
natural and imperative for a lawyer to issue receipts,
even if not demanded, and to keep copies of the
receipts for his own records. Pursuant to Rule 16.01
of the CPR, a lawyer must be aware that he is
accountable for the money entrusted to him by the
clients, and that his only means of ensuring
accountability is by issuing and keeping receipts.
Worse, on May 26, 2011, the RTC already rendered
its decision in Civil Case No. 05-655, adjudging
MDAHI entitled to an insurance claim in the amount of
approximately P.65,000,000.00. From that date on,
there was no more need for additional docket fees.
Apparently, still unaware of the judgment, MDAHI
subsequently released the money for additional
docket fees to Atty. Dimaano, who handed it to Atty.
Camacho on May 27, 2011. Despite a decision having
been rendered, Atty. Camacho did not reject the said
amount or return it to his client upon receipt. Instead,
he unilaterally withheld the said amount by
capriciously invoking the payment of his attorney's
fees.
The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the
counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer the duty
to account for the money or property collected or
received for or from his client. Money entrusted to a
lawyer for a specific purpose but not used for the
purpose should be immediately returned. A lawyer's
failure, to return upon demand, the funds held by him
on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption
that he has appropriated the same for his own use in
violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such
act is a gross violation of general morality as well as
of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in
the legal profession and deserves punishment.30
Administrative penalty
A member of the Bar may be penalized, even
disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney,
for violation of the lawyer's oath and/or for breach of
the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the
CPR. The practice of law is a profession, a form of
public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to
those who are qualified and who possess good moral
character. The appropriate penalty for an errant
lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial
discretion based on the surrounding facts.31
In Luna v. Galarrita,32 the Court suspended the
respondent lawyer for two (2) years because he
accepted a compromise agreement without valid
authority and he failed to tum over the payment to his
client. In the case of Melendrez v. Decena,33 the
lawyer therein was disbarred because he entered
into a compromise agreement without the special
authority of his client and he drafted deceptive and
dishonest contracts. Similarly, in Navarro v. Meneses
III,34 another lawyer, who misappropriated the money
entrusted to him by his client which he failed and/or
refused to account for despite repeated demands,
was disbarred because his lack of personal honesty
and good moral character rendered him unworthy of
public confidence.
In this case, Atty. Camacho entered into a
compromise agreement without the conformity of his
client which is evidently against the provisions of the
CPR and the law. Moreover, he deliberately failed to
account for the money he received from his client,
which was supposed to be paid as additional docket
fees. He even had the gall to impute that the money
was illicitly given to an officer of the court. The
palpable indiscretions of Atty. Camacho shall not be
countenanced by the Court for these constitute as a
blatant and deliberate desecration of the fiduciary duty
that a lawyer owes to his client.
The Court finds that Atty. Camacho's acts are so
reprehensible, and his violations of the CPR are so
flagrant, exhibiting his moral unfitness and inability to
discharge his duties as a member of the Bar. His
actions erode rather than enhance the public
perception of the legal profession. Therefore, in view
of the totality of his violations, as well as the damage
and prejudice they caused to his client, Atty.
Camacho deserves the ultimate penalty of
disbarment.
Further, he must be ordered to return the amount of
Pl,288,260.00 to MDAHI, which he received in his
professional capacity for payment of the purported
additional docket fees. Disciplinary proceedings
revolve around the determination of the respondent-
lawyer's administrative liability, which must include
those intrinsically linked to his professional
engagement.35
WHEREFORE, Atty. Manuel N. Camacho is found
guilty of violating Rule 1.01 and Rule 16.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. For reasons
above-stated, he is DISBARRED from the practice of
law and his name stricken off the Roll of Attorneys,
effective immediately.
Furthermore, Atty. Manuel N. Camacho
is ORDERED to return to Marsman-Drysdale
Agribusiness Holdings Inc. the money intended to pay
for additional docket fees which he received from the
latter in the amount of P 1,288,260.00 within ninety
(90) days from the finality of this decision.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Office of
the Bar Confidant to be entered into the records of
respondent Atty. Manuel N. Camacho. Copies shall
likewise be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator
for circulation to all courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5582, January 24, 2017
ARTHUR O. MONARES, Complainant, v. ATTY. LEVI P.
MUÑOZ, Respondent.
A.C. No. 5604, January 24, 2017
ALBAY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE,
INC., Complainant, v. ATTY. LEVI P.
MUÑOZ, Respondent.
A.C. No. 5652, January 24, 2017
BENJILIEH M. CONSTANTE,1, Complainant, v. ATTY.
LEVI P. MUÑOZ, Respondent.
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J:
For resolution is the Joint Petition for Review with Prayer
for Absolution and/or Clemency2 (Joint Petition) dated May
14, 2009 filed by respondent Atty. Levi P. Muñoz (Muñoz)
, in connection with the complaints for disbarment filed by
by Arthur O. Monares (Monares), Atty. Oliver 0. Olaybal
(Olaybal) purportedly representing Albay Electric
Cooperative, Inc. (ALECO), and Benjilieh M. Constante
(Constante), dated January 17, 2002, February 4, 2002
and March 21, 2002, respectively.
Monares is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 9923 filed against
Ludolfo Muñoz (Ludolfo) before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Legazpi City. In his complaint, Monares alleged
that Muñoz represented his brother Ludolfo in the said
case during regular government hours while employed as
Provincial Legal Officer of Albay City.3
Under the chairmanship of Olaybal, ALECO's old board of
directors (BOD) engaged Muñoz as retained counsel
sometime in June 1998. Olaybal averred that Muñoz did
not inform ALECO's old BOD that he was employed as
Provincial Legal Officer at such time. Olaybal raised that
after its administrator, the National Electrification
Administration (NEA), deactivated the old BOD on the
ground of mismanagement, Muñoz served as retained
counsel of the NEA-appointed team which took over the
management of ALECO. Moreover, Olaybal alleged that
Muñoz illegally collected payments in the form of notarial
and professional fees in excess of what was agreed upon
in their retainer agreement.4
Constante is the Executive Assistant for Legal Affairs of
Sunwest Construction and Development Corporation
(Sunwest). Constante claimed that Muñoz filed ten (10)
cases against Sunwest on Ludolfo's behalf before the
Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) while he was
serving as Provincial Legal Officer.5
All three (3) complaints prayed that Muñoz be disbarred
for unlawfully engaging in private practice. In addition,
Olaybal sought Muñoz's disbarment for acts of disloyalty,
particularly, for violating the rule against conflict of
interest.6
To support their position, the complainants raised that
Muñoz had been previously disciplined by the Ombudsman
for two (2) counts of unauthorized practice of profession
in OMB-ADM-101-0462, and was meted the penalty of
removal and dismissal from service. The complainants
further manifested that Muñoz had been convicted by the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Legazpi City in
Criminal Case Nos. 25568 and 25569 for violation of
Section 7(b)(2) in relation to Section 11 of Republic Act
No. 6713.7 Muñoz's conviction has since become final
pursuant to the Court's Resolution dated June 14, 2004 in
G.R. No. 160668.8
In his respective comments to the complaints,9 Muñoz
claimed that he had requested Governor Al Francis C.
Bichara (Governor Bichara) for authority to continue his
private practice shortly after his appointment. This
request was granted on July 18, 199510 Thereafter, Muñoz
submitted the same request to Rafael C. Alunan III, then
Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG).11 On September 8, 1995, Acting
Secretary Alexander P. Aguirre granted Muñoz's request,
under the following conditions:
1. That no government time, personnel, funds or
supplies shall be utilized in connection (sic)
and that no conflict of interest with your present
position as Provincial Legal Officer shall arise
thereby;
chan rob leslaw
2. That the time so devoted outside of office hours,
the place(s) and under what circumstances you
can engage in private employment shall be fixed
by the Governor of Albay to the end that it will
not impair in any way your efficiency; and
3. That any violation of the above restrictions will be
a ground for the cancellation and/or revocation of
this authority.12 (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to the DILG's authorization, Governor Bichara
imposed the following conditions upon Muñoz:
a. [Y]ou cannot handle cases against the Province of
Albay;chanrob leslaw
b. [Y]ou will be on call and you will have no fix (sic)
working hours provided that the efficiency of the
Provincial Legal Office shall not be prejudiced;cha nrob leslaw
 c. [Y]ou are exempted in (sic) accomplishing your
Daily Time Record considering the limitation
already mentioned above; [and]
d. In addition to the above enumeration[,] you are
to perform functions subject to limitations in Sec.
481 of RA 7160.13
Muñoz emphasized that his authority to engage in private
practice was renewed by Governor Bichara on July 3,
1998 for his second term ending in July 2001, and again
on July 5, 2001 for his third term ending in July 2004.14
The complaints were separately referred by the Court to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.15 The
complaints were then consolidated through the Order
dated January 16, 2003 issued by Commissioner Milagros
V. San Juan.16 Subsequently, the complaints underwent a
series of re-assignments, until finally assigned to
Commissioner Dorotea B. Aguila.17
In his Report dated March 11, 200518 (IBP Report),
Commissioner Aguila recommended that Muñoz be found
guilty of gross misconduct and violation of Rules 1.01,
6.02, 15.01 and 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). The penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for an aggregate period of four (4)
years19 was recommended. On automatic review, the IBP
Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) approved and adopted
Commissioner Aguila's recommendation in a Resolution
dated October 22, 2005.20
On December 22, 2005, Muñoz filed an Ex-Parte Appeal
for Mercy, Clemency and Compassion before the IBP-BOG,
praying that the recommended penalty be reduced to one
(1) year.21 This appeal was denied on January 28, 2006.22
Muñoz filed before this Court an Ex-Parte Appeal for
Mercy, Clemency, Forgiveness and Compassion23 (Appeal)
dated April 8, 2006 praying for the reduction of the
recommended penalty of suspension for four (4) years to
one (1) year or less, and the dismissal of the complaints
for disbarment filed against him. As an alternative prayer,
Muñoz requested that he be granted special limited
authority to practice law until all his pending cases are
terminated.24
In his Appeal, Muñoz, insisted that when he served as
Provincial Legal Officer from June 1995 to May 2002, he
engaged in private practice pursuant to the three (3)
written authorities issued by Governor Bichara, and the
written authority of the DILG issued during his first term,
which he claims had never been revoked. Muñoz also
argued that no conflict of interest existed between
ALECO's old BOD and the NEA management team, since
he was engaged as retained counsel of ALECO as an
institution, not its management teams.25
On August 28, 2006, the Court resolved to remand
Muñoz's Appeal to the IBP for disposition.26
Acting on Muñoz's Appeal, the IBP-BOG issued a
Resolution reducing the recommended period of
suspension from four (4) to three (3) years.27 Unsatisfied,
Muñoz filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the IBP-
BOG denied on December 11, 2008.28
Aggrieved, Muñoz elevated his case anew to this Court
through this Joint Petition. In fine, Muñoz reiterates the
allegations in his Appeal, with the additional assertion that
the fees he collected from ALECO were contemplated
under their retainer agreement.29
The Court agrees with the IBP-BOG's findings and
recommendations.
Muñoz violated the conditions of his
DILG authorization.
Munoz's DILG authorization prohibited him from utilizing
government time for his private practice. As correctly
observed by Commissioner Aguila, Rule XVII of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order
No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws (Omnibus
Rules), requires government officers and employees of all
departments and agencies, except those covered by
special laws, to render not less than eight (8) hours of
work a day for five (5) days a week, or a total of forty
(40) hours a week.30 The number of required weekly
working hours may not be reduced, even in cases where
the department or agency adopts a flexible work
schedule.31
Notably, Muñoz did not deny Monares' allegation that he
made at least eighty-six (86) court appearances in
connection with at least thirty (30) cases from April 11,
1996 to August 1, 2001.32 He merely alleged that his
private practice did not prejudice the functions of his
office.
Court appearances are necessarily made within regular
government working hours, from 8:00 in the morning to
12:00 noon, and 1:00 to 5:00 in the
afternoon.33 Additional time is likewise required to study
each case, draft pleadings and prepare for trial. The sheer
volume of cases handled by Muñoz clearly indicates that
government time was necessarily utilized in pursuit of his
private practice, in clear violation of the DILG
authorization and Rule 6.0234 of the CPR.
Muñoz should have requested for
authority to engage in private practice
from the Secretary of DILG for his
second and third terms.
Acting Secretary Aguirre's grant of authority cannot be
unreasonably construed to have been perpetual.
Moreover, Muñoz cannot claim that he believed in good
faith that the authority granted by Governor Bichara for
his second and third terms sufficed.
Memorandum No. 17 dated September 4, 1986
(Memorandum 17) , which Muñoz himself cites in his Joint
Petition, is clear and leaves no room for interpretation.
The power to grant authority to engage in the practice of
one's profession to officers and employees in the public
service lies with the head of the department, in
accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised
Civil Service Rules which provides, in part:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in
any private business, vocation, or profession or be
connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or
industrial undertaking without a written permission
from the head of Department: Provided, That this
prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers
and employees whose duties and responsibilities require
that their entire time be at the disposal of the
Government: Provided, further, That if an employee is
granted permission to engage in outside activities, the
time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by
the chief of the agency to the end that it will not impair in
any way the efficiency of the officer or employee x x x.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Memorandum 17 was issued more than nine (9) years
prior to Muñoz's appointment as Provincial Legal Officer,
hence, he cannot feign ignorance thereof. As a local public
official, it was incumbent upon Muñoz to secure the proper
authority from the Secretary of the DILG not only for his
first term, but also his second and third. His failure to do
so rendered him liable for unauthorized practice of his
profession and violation of Rule 1.0135 of the CPR.
Muñoz represented conflicting interests.
Muñoz cannot elude Olaybal's allegations of disloyalty.
In Mabini Colleges, Inc. v. Pajarillo,36 the Court explained
the tests to determine the existence of conflict of interest,
thus:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents
inconsistent interests of two or more opposing
parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one
client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or
claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other
client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues
for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in
which confidential communications have been confided,
but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed
or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interest if the
acceptance of the new retainer will require the
attorney to perform an act which will injuriously
affect his first client in any matter in which he
represents him and also whether he will be called
upon in his new relation to use against his first
client any knowledge acquired through their
connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests
is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent
an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the
performance thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
As Muñoz himself detailed in his Joint Petition, he acted as
counsel for ALECO under the management of the old BOD
in the following cases:
A. Civil Case No. 10007 — ALECO (Petitioner) vs. Eleuterio
Adonay, NEA Project Supervisor and his team John Catral
et. al., a case filed by Oliver O. Olaybal and his
group. For: Injunction, Accounting with Prayer for Writs
of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
Order, seeking to stop the election of the new set of
member (sic) of the Board of Directors x x x.
B. Civil Case [N]o. 10066 entitled ALBAY ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVE, INC. as Petitioner, also filed by Oliver O.
Olaybal, a case for Prohibition, Mandamus and
Receivership, with Preliminary Prohibition and Mandatory
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining and Mandatory
Orders. Among others, this Petition was filed to stop
the second scheduled election of the ALECO Board of
Directors scheduled for February 23, and 24,
2002.37 (Underscoring omitted; additional emphasis
supplied)
Muñoz thereafter served as retained counsel of ALECO
under the direction of the NEA management team. Muñoz
could have easily anticipated that his advice would be
sought with respect to the prosecution of the members of
the old BOD, considering that the latter was deactivated
due to alleged mismanagement. The conflict of interest
between Olaybal's board on one hand, and NEA and its
management team on the other, is apparent. By
representing conflicting interests without the permission
of all parties involved, Muñoz violated Rules 15.01 and
15.03 of the CPR.38
In Catu v. Rellosa,39 the Court imposed the penalty of
suspension for six (6) months upon a punong
barangay who acted as counsel for respondents in an
ejectment case without securing the authority of the
Secretary of DILG. In Aniñon v. Sabitsana, Jr.,40 the Court
imposed the penalty of one (1) year suspension upon a
lawyer who accepted a new engagement that required him
to oppose the interests of a party whom he previously
represented. In view of Muñoz's multiple infractions, the
Court finds the recommended penalty of suspension for an
aggregate period of three (3) years proper.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Levi P. Muñoz is found GUILTY of
gross misconduct and violation of Rules 1.01, 6.02, 15.01
and 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of three (3) years effective upon receipt of this Decision,
with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of any
violation hereunder shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

JONAR SANTIAGO, COMPLAINANT,
VS. ATTY. EDISON V. RAFANAN,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Notaries public are expected to exert
utmost care in the performance of their
duties, which are impressed with public
interest. They are enjoined to comply
faithfully with the solemnities and
requirements of the Notarial Law. This
Court will not hesitate to mete out
appropriate sanctions to those who
violate it or neglect observance thereof.
The Case and the Facts
Before us is a verified Complaint[1] filed
by Jonar Santiago, an employee of the
Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology (BJMP), for the disbarment of
Atty. Edison V. Rafanan. The Complaint
was filed with the Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) on January 16,
2001. It charged Atty. Rafanan with
deceit; malpractice or other gross
misconduct in office under Section 27 of
Rule 138[2] of the Rules of Court; and
violation of Canons 1.01, 1.02 and 1.03[3],
Canon 5[4], and Canons 12.07[5] and
12.08 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).
In his Report, IBP Investigating
Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid Jr.
summarized the allegations of the
complainant in this wise:
"x x x. In his Letter-Complaint,
Complainant alleged, among others, that
Respondent in notarizing several
documents on different dates failed
and/or refused to: a)make the proper
notation regarding the cedula or
community tax certificate of the affiants;
b) enter the details of the notarized
documents in the notarial register; and
c) make and execute the certification
and enter his PTR and IBP numbers in
the documents he had notarized, all in
violation of the notarial provisions of the
Revised Administrative Code.
"Complainant likewise alleged that
Respondent executed an Affidavit in
favor of his client and offered the same
as evidence in the case wherein he was
actively representing his client. Finally,
Complainant alleges that on a certain
date, Respondent accompanied by
several persons waited for Complainant
after the hearing and after confronting
the latter disarmed him of his sidearm
and thereafter uttered insulting words
and veiled threats."[6]
On March 23, 2001, pursuant to the
January 19, 2001 Order of the
CBD,[7] Atty. Rafanan filed his verified
Answer.[8] He admitted having
administered the oath to the affiants
whose Affidavits were attached to the
verified Complaint. He believed,
however, that the non-notation of their
Residence Certificates in the Affidavits
and the Counter-affidavits was allowed.
He opined that the notation of residence
certificates applied only to documents
acknowledged by a notary public and
was not mandatory for affidavits related
to cases pending before courts and other
government offices. He pointed out that
in the latter, the affidavits, which were
sworn to before government
prosecutors, did not have to indicate the
residence certificates of the affiants.
Neither did other notaries public in
Nueva Ecija -- some of whom were older
practitioners -- indicate the affiants'
residence certificates on the documents
they notarized, or have entries in their
notarial register for these documents.
As to his alleged failure to comply with
the certification required by Section 3 of
Rule 112[9] of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, respondent explained that as
counsel of the affiants, he had the option
to comply or not with the certification.
To nullify the Affidavits, it was
complainant who was duty-bound to
bring the said noncompliance to the
attention of the prosecutor conducting
the preliminary investigation.
As to his alleged violation of Rule 12.08
of the CPR, respondent argued that
lawyers could testify on behalf of their
clients "on substantial matters, in cases
where [their] testimony is essential to
the ends of justice." Complainant
charged respondent's clients with
attempted murder. Respondent averred
that since they were in his house when
the alleged crime occurred, "his
testimony is very essential to the ends of
justice."
Respondent alleged that it was
complainant who had threatened and
harassed his clients after the hearing of
their case by the provincial prosecutor
on January 4, 2001. Respondent
requested the assistance of the
Cabanatuan City Police the following
day, January 5, 2001, which was the
next scheduled hearing, to avoid a
repetition of the incident and to allay the
fears of his clients. In support of his
allegations, he submitted
Certifications[10] from the Cabanatuan
City Police and the Joint Affidavit[11] of
the two police officers who had assisted
them.
Lastly, he contended that the case had
been initiated for no other purpose than
to harass him, because he was the
counsel of Barangay Captain Ernesto
Ramos in the cases filed by the latter
before the ombudsman and the BJMP
against complainant.
After receipt of respondent's Answer, the
CBD, through Commissioner Tyrone R.
Cimafranca, set the case for hearing on
June 5, 2001, at two o'clock in the
afternoon. Notices[12] of the hearing were
sent to the parties by registered mail. On
the scheduled date and time of the
hearing, only complainant appeared.
Respondent was unable to do so,
apparently because he had received the
Notice only on June 8, 2001.[13] The
hearing was reset to July 3, 2001 at two
o'clock in the afternoon.
On the same day, June 5, 2001,
complainant filed his Reply[14] to the
verified Answer of respondent. The
latter's Rejoinder was received by the
CBD on July 13, 2001.[15] It also received
complainant's Letter-Request[16] to
dispense with the hearings. Accordingly,
it granted that request in its
Order[17] dated July 24, 2001, issued
through Commissioner Cimafranca. It
thereby directed the parties to submit
their respective memoranda within
fifteen days from receipt of the Order,
after which the case was to be deemed
submitted for resolution.
The CBD received complainant's
Memorandum[18] on September 26,
2001. Respondent did not file any.
The IBP's Recommendation
On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board
of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-
2003-172[19] approving and adopting the
Investigating Commissioner's Report
that respondent had violated specific
requirements of the Notarial Law on the
execution of a certification, the entry of
such certification in the notarial register,
and the indication of the affiant's
residence certificate. The IBP Board of
Governors found his excuse for the
violations unacceptable. It modified,
however, the recommendation[20] of the
investigating commissioner by
increasing the fine to "P3,000 with a
warning that any repetition of the
violation will be dealt with a heavier
penalty."
The other charges -- violation of Section
27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; and
Canons 1.01 to 1.03, 12.07 and 12.08 of
the CPR --were dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.
The Court's Ruling
We agree with the Resolution of the IBP
Board of Governors.
Respondent's Administrative
Liability
Violation of the Notarial Law
The Notarial Law is explicit on the
obligations and duties of notaries public.
They are required to certify that the
party to every document acknowledged
before them has presented the proper
residence certificate (or exemption from
the residence tax); and to enter its
number, place of issue and date as part
of such certification.[21] They are also
required to maintain and keep a notarial
register; to enter therein all instruments
notarized by them; and to "give to each
instrument executed, sworn to, or
acknowledged before [them] a number
corresponding to the one in [their]
register [and to state therein] the page
or pages of [their] register, on which the
same is recorded."[22] Failure to perform
these duties would result in the
revocation of their commission as
notaries public.[23]
These formalities are mandatory and
cannot be simply neglected, considering
the degree of importance and
evidentiary weight attached to notarized
documents. Notaries public entering
into their commissions are presumed to
be aware of these elementary
requirements.
In Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,[24] the
Court explained the value and meaning
of notarization as follows:
"The importance attached to the act of
notarization cannot be overemphasized.
Notarization is not an empty,
meaningless, routinary act. It is invested
with substantive public interest, such
that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notaries public.
Notarization converts a private
document into a public document thus
making that document admissible in
evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. A notarial document is by
law entitled to full faith and credit upon
its face. Courts, administrative agencies
and the public at large must be able to
rely upon the acknowledgment executed
by a notary public and appended to a
private instrument."
For this reason, notaries public should
not take for granted the solemn duties
pertaining to their office. Slipshod
methods in their performance of the
notarial act are never to be
countenanced. They are expected to
exert utmost care in the performance of
their duties,[25] which are dictated by
public policy and are impressed with
public interest.
It is clear from the pleadings before us --
and respondent has readily admitted --
that he violated the Notarial Law by
failing to enter in the documents
notations of the residence certificate, as
well as the entry number and the pages
of the notarial registry.
Respondent believes, however, that
noncompliance with those requirements
is not mandatory for affidavits relative
to cases pending before the courts and
government agencies. He points to
similar practices of older notaries in
Nueva Ecija.
We cannot give credence to, much less
honor, his claim. His belief that the
requirements do not apply to affidavits
is patently irrelevant. No law dispenses
with these formalities. Au contraire, the
Notarial Law makes no qualification or
exception. It is appalling and
inexcusable that he did away with the
basics of notarial procedure allegedly
because others were doing so. Being
swayed by the bad example of others is
not an acceptable justification for
breaking the law.
We note further that the documents
attached to the verified Complaint are
the Joint Counter-Affidavit of
respondent's clients Ernesto Ramos and
Rey Geronimo, as well as their
witnesses' Affidavits relative to Criminal
Case No. 69-2000 for attempted
murder, filed by complainant's brother
against the aforementioned clients.
These documents became the basis of
the present Complaint.
As correctly pointed out by the
investigating commissioner, Section 3 of
Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure expressly requires
respondent as notary -- in the absence of
any fiscal, state prosecutor or
government official authorized to
administer the oath -- to "certify that he
has personally examined the affiants
and that he is satisfied that they
voluntarily executed and understood
their affidavits." Respondent failed to do
so with respect to the subject Affidavits
and Counter-Affidavits in the belief that
-- as counsel for the affiants -- he was
not required to comply with the
certification requirement.
It must be emphasized that the primary
duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for the law
and legal processes.[26] They are
expected to be in the forefront in the
observance and maintenance of the rule
of law. This duty carries with it the
obligation to be well-informed of the
existing laws and to keep abreast with
legal developments, recent enactments
and jurisprudence.[27] It is imperative
that they be conversant with basic legal
principles. Unless they faithfully comply
with such duty, they may not be able to
discharge competently and diligently
their obligations as members of the bar.
Worse, they may become susceptible to
committing mistakes.
Where notaries public are lawyers, a
graver responsibility is placed upon
them by reason of their solemn oath to
obey the laws.[28] No custom or age-old
practice provides sufficient excuse or
justification for their failure to adhere to
the provisions of the law. In this case,
the excuse given by respondent
exhibited his clear ignorance of the
Notarial Law, the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, and the importance of his
office as a notary public.
Nonetheless, we do not agree with
complainant's plea to disbar respondent
from the practice of law. The power to
disbar must be exercised with great
caution.[29] Disbarment will be imposed
as a penalty only in a clear case of
misconduct that seriously affects the
standing and the character of the lawyer
as an officer of the court and a member
of the bar. Where any lesser penalty can
accomplish the end desired, disbarment
should not be decreed.[30] Considering
the nature of the infraction and the
absence of deceit on the part of
respondent, we believe that the penalty
recommended by the IBP Board of
Governors is a sufficient disciplinary
measure in this case.
Lawyer as Witness for Client
Complainant further faults respondent
for executing before Prosecutor
Leonardo Padolina an affidavit
corroborating the defense of alibi
proffered by respondent's clients,
allegedly in violation of Rule 12.08 of the
CPR: "A lawyer shall avoid testifying in
behalf of his client."
Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the CPR
states:
"Rule 12.08 A lawyer shall avoid
testifying in behalf of his client, except:
a) on formal matters, such as the
mailing, authentication or custody of an
instrument and the like;
b) on substantial matters, in cases where
his testimony is essential to the ends of
justice, in which event he must, during
his testimony, entrust the trial of the
case to another counsel."
Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer
is not disqualified from being a
witness,[31] except only in certain cases
pertaining to privileged communication
arising from an attorney-client
relationship.[32]
The reason behind such rule is the
difficulty posed upon lawyers by the task
of dissociating their relation to their
clients as witnesses from that as
advocates. Witnesses are expected to tell
the facts as they recall them. In
contradistinction, advocates are
partisans -- those who actively plead and
defend the cause of others. It is difficult
to distinguish the fairness and
impartiality of a disinterested witness
from the zeal of an advocate. The
question is one of propriety rather than
of competency of the lawyers who testify
for their clients.
"Acting or appearing to act in the double
capacity of lawyer and witness for the
client will provoke unkind criticism and
leave many people to suspect the
truthfulness of the lawyer because they
cannot believe the lawyer as
disinterested. The people will have a
plausible reason for thinking, and if
their sympathies are against the lawyer's
client, they will have an opportunity, not
likely to be neglected, for charging, that
as a witness he fortified it with his own
testimony. The testimony of the lawyer
becomes doubted and is looked upon as
partial and untruthful."[33]
Thus, although the law does not forbid
lawyers from being witnesses and at the
same time counsels for a cause, the
preference is for them to refrain from
testifying as witnesses, unless they
absolutely have to; and should they do
so, to withdraw from active management
of the case.[34]
Notwithstanding this guideline and the
existence of the Affidavit executed by
Atty. Rafanan in favor of his clients, we
cannot hastily make him
administratively liable for the following
reasons:
First, we consider it the duty of a lawyer
to assert every remedy and defense that
is authorized by law for the benefit of
the client, especially in a criminal action
in which the latter's life and liberty are
at stake.[35] It is the fundamental right of
the accused to be afforded full
opportunity to rebut the charges against
them. They are entitled to suggest all
those reasonable doubts that may arise
from the evidence as to their guilt; and
to ensure that if they are convicted, such
conviction is according to law.
Having undertaken the defense of the
accused, respondent, as defense counsel,
was thus expected to spare no effort to
save his clients from a wrong conviction.
He had the duty to present -- by all fair
and honorable means -- every defense
and mitigating circumstance that the
law permitted, to the end that his clients
would not be deprived of life, liberty or
property, except by due process of
law.[36]
The Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan
was clearly necessary for the defense of
his clients, since it pointed out the fact
that on the alleged date and time of the
incident, his clients were at his residence
and could not have possibly committed
the crime charged against them.
Notably, in his Affidavit, complainant
does not dispute the statements of
respondent or suggest the falsity of its
contents.
Second, paragraph (b) of Rule 12.08
contemplates a situation in which
lawyers give their testimonies during the
trial. In this instance, the Affidavit was
submitted during the preliminary
investigation which, as such, was merely
inquisitorial.[37] Not being a trial of the
case on the merits, a preliminary
investigation has the oft-repeated
purposes of securing innocent persons hereby FINED P3,000 with a warning
against hasty, malicious and oppressive that similar infractions in the future will
prosecutions; protecting them from be dealt with more severely.
open and public accusations of crime
and from the trouble as well as expense SO ORDERED.
and anxiety of a public trial; and
protecting the State from useless and
expensive prosecutions.[38] The
investigation is advisedly called
preliminary, as it is yet to be followed by
the trial proper.

Nonetheless, we deem it important to

stress and remind respondent to refrain
from accepting employment in any
matter in which he knows or has reason
to believe that he may be an essential
witness for the prospective client.
Furthermore, in future cases in which
his testimony may become essential to
serve the "ends of justice," the canons of
the profession require him to withdraw
from the active prosecution of these
cases.

No Proof of Harassment

The charge that respondent harassed

complainant and uttered insulting words
and veiled threats is not supported by
evidence. Allegation is never equivalent
to proof, and a bare charge cannot be
equated with liability.[39] It is not the
self-serving claim of complainant but
the version of respondent that is more
credible, considering that the latter's
allegations are corroborated by the
Affidavits of the police officers and the
Certifications of the Cabanatuan City
Police.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Edison V. Rafanan

is found guilty of violating the Notarial
Law and Canon 5 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is

ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN v. ATTY.
RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO +
456 Phil. 560
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This administrative complaint arose
from a paid advertisement that appeared
in the July 5, 2000 issue of the
newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer,
which reads: "ANNULMENT OF
MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-
2667."[1]
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff
member of the Public Information Office
of the Supreme Court, called up the
published telephone number and
pretended to be an interested party. She
spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that
her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo,
was an expert in handling annulment
cases and can guarantee a court decree
within four to six months, provided the
case will not involve separation of
property or custody of children. Mrs.
Simbillo also said that her husband
charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of
which is payable at the time of filing of
the case and the other half after a
decision thereon has been rendered.
Further research by the Office of the
Court Administrator and the Public
Information Office revealed that similar
advertisements were published in the
August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the
Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000
issue of The Philippine Star.[2]
On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G.
Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant
Court Administrator and Chief of the
Public Information Office, filed an
administrative complaint against Atty.
Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper
advertising and solicitation of his legal
services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and
Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27
of the Rules of Court.[3]
In his answer, respondent admitted the
acts imputed to him, but argued that
advertising and solicitation per se are
not prohibited acts; that the time has
come to change our views about the
prohibition on advertising and
solicitation; that the interest of the
public is not served by the absolute
prohibition on lawyer advertising; that
the Court can lift the ban on lawyer
advertising; and that the rationale
behind the decades-old prohibition
should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed
that he be exonerated from all the
charges against him and that the Court
promulgate a ruling that advertisement
of legal services offered by a lawyer is
not contrary to law, public policy and
public order as long as it is dignified.[4]
The case was referred to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for investigation,
report and recommendation.[5] On June
29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline passed Resolution No. XV-
2002-306,[6] finding respondent guilty
of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of
Court, and suspended him from the
practice of law for one (1) year with the
warning that a repetition of similar acts
would be dealt with more severely. The
IBP Resolution was noted by this Court
on November 11, 2002.[7]
In the meantime, respondent filed an
Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration,[8] which was denied by
the IBP in Resolution No. XV-2002-606
dated October 19, 2002[9]
Hence, the instant petition
for certiorari, which was docketed as
G.R. No. 157053 entitled, "Atty. Rizalino
T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty.
Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court
Administrator and Chief, Public
Information Office, Respondents." This
petition was consolidated with A.C. No.
5299 per the Court's Resolution dated
March 4, 2003.
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003,
the parties were required to manifest
whether or not they were willing to
submit the case for resolution on the
basis of the pleadings.[10] Complainant
filed his Manifestation on April 25,
2003, stating that he is not submitting
any additional pleading or evidence and
is submitting the case for its early
resolution on the basis of pleadings and
records thereof. [11] Respondent, on the
other hand, filed a Supplemental
Memorandum on June 20, 2003.
We agree with the IBP's Resolutions
Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. - A lawyer shall not do or
permit to be done any act designed
primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01. - A lawyer shall not use or
permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-
laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal
services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of
Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension
of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefor. - A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court
for any deceit, malpractice or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before
the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a
party without authority to do so.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the
practice of law is not a business.[12] It is a
profession in which duty to public
service, not money, is the primary
consideration. Lawyering is not
primarily meant to be a money-making
venture, and law advocacy is not a
capital that necessarily yields
profits.[13] The gaining of a livelihood
should be a secondary
consideration.[14] The duty to public
service and to the administration of
justice should be the primary
consideration of lawyers, who must
subordinate their personal interests or
what they owe to themselves.[15] The
following elements distinguish the legal
profession from a business:
1. A duty of public service, of which
the emolument is a by-product,
and in which one may attain the
highest eminence without making
much money;
2. A relation as an "officer of the
court" to the administration of
justice involving thorough
sincerity, integrity and reliability;
3. A relation to clients in the highest
degree of fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar
characterized by candor, fairness,
and unwillingness to resort to
current business methods of
advertising and encroachment on
their practice, or dealing directly
with their clients.[16]
There is no question that respondent
committed the acts complained of. He
himself admits that he caused the
publication of the advertisements. While
he professes repentance and begs for the
Court's indulgence, his contrition rings
hollow considering the fact that he
advertised his legal services again after
he pleaded for compassion and after
claiming that he had no intention to
violate the rules. Eight months after
filing his answer, he again advertised his
legal services in the August 14, 2001
issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads
Newspaper.[17] Ten months later, he
caused the same advertisement to be
published in the October 5, 2001 issue of
Buy & Sell.[18] Such acts of respondent
are a deliberate and contemptuous
affront on the Court's authority.
What adds to the gravity of respondent's
acts is that in advertising himself as a
self-styled "Annulment of Marriage
Specialist," he wittingly or unwittingly
erodes and undermines not only the
stability but also the sanctity of an
institution still considered sacrosanct
despite the contemporary climate of
permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in
assuring prospective clients that an
annulment may be obtained in four to
six months from the time of the filing of
the case,[19] he in fact encourages people,
who might have otherwise been
disinclined and would have refrained
from dissolving their marriage bonds, to
do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal
business is not altogether proscribed.
However, for solicitation to be proper, it
must be compatible with the dignity of
the legal profession. If it is made in a
modest and decorous manner, it would
bring no injury to the lawyer and to the
bar.[20] Thus, the use of simple signs
stating the name or names of the
lawyers, the office and residence address
and fields of practice, as well as
advertisement in legal periodicals
bearing the same brief data, are
permissible. Even the use of calling
cards is now acceptable.[21] Publication
in reputable law lists, in a manner
consistent with the standards of conduct
imposed by the canon, of brief
biographical and informative data is
likewise allowable. As explicitly stated
in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:[22] is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law
Such data must not be misleading and practiced. The publication of a simple
may include only a statement of the announcement of the opening of a law
lawyer's name and the names of his firm or of changes in the partnership,
professional associates; addresses, associates, firm name or office address,
telephone numbers, cable addresses; being for the convenience of the
branches of law practiced; date and profession, is not objectionable. He may
place of birth and admission to the bar; likewise have his name listed in a
schools attended with dates of telephone directory but not under a
graduation, degrees and other designation of special branch of law.
educational distinctions; public or (emphasis and italics supplied)
quasi-public offices; posts of honor;
WHEREFORE, in view of the
legal authorships; legal teaching
foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T.
positions; membership and offices in bar
SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of
associations and committees thereof, in
violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the
legal and scientific societies and legal
Code of Professional Responsibility and
fraternities; the fact of listings in other
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of
reputable law lists; the names and
Court. He is SUSPENDED from the
addresses of references; and, with their
practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR
written consent, the names of clients
effective upon receipt of this Resolution.
regularly represented.
He is likewise STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same
The law list must be a reputable law list
or similar offense will be dealt with
published primarily for that purpose; it
more severely.
cannot be a mere supplemental feature
of a paper, magazine, trade journal or
Let copies of this Resolution be entered
periodical which is published
in his record as attorney and be
principally for other purposes. For that
furnished the Integrated Bar of the
reason, a lawyer may not properly
Philippines and all courts in the country
publish his brief biographical and
for their information and guidance.
informative data in a daily paper,
magazine, trade journal or
SO ORDERED.
society program. Nor may a lawyer
permit his name to be published in a
law list the conduct, management, or
contents of which are calculated or
likely to deceive or injure the public or
the bar, or to lower dignity or standing
of the profession.

The use of an ordinary simple

professional card is also permitted. The
card may contain only a statement of his
name, the name of the law firm which he

A.C. No. 9387 June 20, 2012
(Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1562)
EMILIA R. HERNANDEZ, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. VENANCIO B. PADILLA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, J.:
This is a disbarment case filed by Emilia Hernandez
(complainant) against her lawyer, Atty. Venancio B.
Padilla (respondent) of Padilla Padilla Bautista Law
Offices, for his alleged negligence in the handling of
her case.
The records disclose that complainant and her
husband were the respondents in an ejectment case
filed against them with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila (RTC).
In a Decision1 dated 28 June 2002, penned by Judge
Rosmari D. Carandang (Judge Carandang), the RTC
ordered that the Deed of Sale executed in favor of
complainant be cancelled; and that the latter pay the
complainant therein, Elisa Duigan (Duigan), attorney’s
fees and moral damages.
Complainant and her husband filed their Notice of
Appeal with the RTC. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals
(CA) ordered them to file their Appellants’ Brief. They
chose respondent to represent them in the case. On
their behalf, he filed a Memorandum on Appeal
instead of an Appellants’ Brief. Thus, Duigan filed a
Motion to Dismiss the Appeal. The CA granted the
Motion in a Resolution2 dated 16 December 2003.
No Motion for Reconsideration (MR) of the Resolution
dismissing the appeal was filed by the couple.
Complainant claims that because respondent ignored
the Resolution, he acted with "deceit, unfaithfulness
amounting to malpractice of law."3 Complainant and
her husband failed to file an appeal, because
respondent never informed them of the adverse
decision. Complainant further claims that she asked
respondent "several times" about the status of the
appeal, but "despite inquiries he deliberately withheld
response [sic]," to the damage and prejudice of the
spouses.4
The Resolution became final and executory on 8
January 2004. Complainant was informed of the
Resolution sometime in July 2005, when the Sheriff of
the RTC came to her house and informed her of the
Resolution.
On 9 September 2005, complainant filed an Affidavit
of Complaint5 with the Committee on Bar Discipline of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), seeking
the disbarment of respondent on the following
grounds: deceit, malpractice, and grave misconduct.
Complainant prays for moral damages in the amount
of ₱ 350,000.
Through an Order6 dated 12 September 2005, Director
of Bar Discipline Rogelio A. Vinluan ordered
respondent to submit an answer to the Complaint. In
his Counter-Affidavit/Answer,7 respondent prayed for
the outright dismissal of the Complaint.
Respondent explained that he was not the lawyer of
complainant. He averred that prior to the mandatory
conference set by the IBP on 13 December 2005, he
had never met complainant, because it was her
husband who had personally transacted with him.
According to respondent, the husband "despondently
pleaded to me to prepare a Memorandum on Appeal
because according to him the period given by the CA
was to lapse within two or three days."8 Thus,
respondent claims that he filed a Memorandum on
Appeal because he honestly believed that "it is this
pleading which was required."9
Before filing the Memorandum, respondent advised
complainant’s husband to settle the case. The latter
allegedly "gestured approval of the advice."10
After the husband of complainant picked up the
Memorandum for filing, respondent never saw or
heard from him again and thus assumed that the
husband heeded his advice and settled the case.
When respondent received an Order from the CA
requiring him to file a comment on the Motion to
Dismiss filed by Duigan, he "instructed his office staff
to contact Mr. Hernandez thru available means of
communication, but to no avail."11 Thus, when
complainant’s husband went to the office of
respondent to tell the latter that the Sheriff of the RTC
had informed complainant of the CA’s Resolution
dismissing the case, respondent was just as
surprised. The lawyer exclaimed, "KALA KO BA
NAKIPAG AREGLO NA KAYO."12
In his 5 January 2009 Report,13 IBP Investigating
Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. found that
respondent violated Canons 5, 17, and 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility (the Code). He
recommended that respondent be suspended from
practicing law from 3 to 6 months.
The board of governors of the IBP issued Resolution
No. XIX-2010-452 on 28 August 2010. Therein, they
resolved to adopt and approve the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Respondent was suspended from the practice of law
for six months.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration.14 He
prayed for the relaxation of the application of the
Canons of the Code. On 14 January 2012, the IBP
board of governors passed Resolution No. XX-2012-
1715 partly granting his Motion and reducing the
penalty imposed to one-month suspension from the
practice of law.
Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, acting
Director for Bar Discipline Dennis A.B. Funa, through
a letter16 addressed to then Chief Justice Renato C.
Corona, transmitted the documents pertaining to the
disbarment Complaint against respondent.
We adopt the factual findings of the board of
governors of the IBP. This Court, however, disagrees
with its Decision to reduce the penalty to one-month
suspension. We thus affirm the six-month suspension
the Board originally imposed in its 28 August 2010
Resolution.
Respondent insists that he had never met
complainant prior to the mandatory conference set for
the disbarment Complaint she filed against him.
However, a perusal of the Memorandum of Appeal
filed in the appellate court revealed that he had signed
as counsel for the defendant-appellants therein,
including complainant and her husband.17 The
pleading starts with the following sentence:
"DEFENDANT[S]-APPELLANTS, by counsel, unto
this Honorable Court submit the Memorandum and
further allege that: x x x."18 Nowhere does the
document say that it was filed only on behalf of
complainant’s husband.
It is further claimed by respondent that the relation
created between him and complainant’s husband
cannot be treated as a "client-lawyer" relationship, viz:
It is no more than a client needing a legal document
and had it prepared by a lawyer for a fee. Under the
factual milieu and circumstances, it could not be said
that a client entrusted to a lawyer handling and
prosecution of his case that calls for the strict
application of the Code; x x x19
As proof that none of them ever intended to enter into
a lawyer-client relationship, he also alleges that
complainant’s husband never contacted him after the
filing of the Memorandum of Appeal. According to
respondent, this behavior was "very unusual if he
really believed that he engaged" the former’s
services.20
Complainant pointed out in her Reply21 that respondent
was her lawyer, because he accepted her case and
an acceptance fee in the amount of ₱ 7,000.
According to respondent, however, "[C]ontrary to the
complainant’s claim that he charged ₱ 7,000 as
acceptance fee," "the fee was only for the preparation
of the pleading which is even low for a Memorandum
of Appeal: x x x."22
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an
attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty
of fidelity to the client’s cause.23 Once a lawyer agrees
to handle a case, it is that lawyer’s duty to serve the
client with competence and diligence.24 Respondent
has failed to fulfill this duty.
According to respondent, he merely drafted the
pleading that complainant’s husband asked from him.
Respondent also claims that he filed a Memorandum
of Appeal, because he "honestly believed" that this
was the pleading required, based on what
complainant’s husband said.
The IBP Investigating Commissioner’s observation on
this matter, in the 5 January 2009 Report, is correct.
Regardless of the particular pleading his client may
have believed to be necessary, it was respondent’s
duty to know the proper pleading to be filed in appeals
from RTC decisions, viz:
Having seen the Decision dated 18 June 2002 of the
trial court, respondent should have known that the
mode of appeal to the Court of Appeals for said
Decision is by ordinary appeal under Section 2(a)
Rule 41 of the1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
In all such cases, Rule 44 of the said Rules applies.25
When the RTC ruled against complainant and her
husband, they filed a Notice of Appeal. Consequently,
what should apply is the rule on ordinary appealed
cases or Rule 44 of the Rules on Civil Procedure.
Rule 44 requires that the appellant’s brief be filed after
the records of the case have been elevated to the CA.
Respondent, as a litigator, was expected to know this
procedure. Canon 5 of the Code reads:
CANON 5 — A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal
developments, participate in continuing legal
education programs, support efforts to achieve high
standards in law schools as well as in the practical
training of law students and assist in disseminating
information regarding the law and jurisprudence.
The obligations of lawyers as a consequence of their
Canon 5 duty have been expounded in Dulalia, Jr. v.
Cruz,26 to wit:
It must be emphasized that the primary duty of
lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for the law and legal processes. They are
expected to be in the forefront in the observance and
maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with
it the obligation to be well-informed of the existing
laws and to keep abreast with legal developments,
recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative
that they be conversant with basic legal principles.
Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may
not be able to discharge competently and diligently
their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they
may become susceptible to committing mistakes.
In his MR, respondent begged for the consideration of
the IBP, claiming that the reason for his failure to file
the proper pleading was that he "did not have enough
time to acquaint himself thoroughly with the factual
milieu of the case." The IBP reconsidered and
thereafter significantly reduced the penalty originally
imposed.
Respondent’s plea for leniency should not have been
granted.
The supposed lack of time given to respondent to
acquaint himself with the facts of the case does not
excuse his negligence.
Rule 18.02 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall
not handle any legal matter without adequate
preparation. While it is true that respondent was not
complainant’s lawyer from the trial to the appellate
court stage, this fact did not excuse him from his duty
to diligently study a case he had agreed to handle. If
he felt he did not have enough time to study the
pertinent matters involved, as he was approached by
complainant’s husband only two days before the
expiration of the period for filing the Appellant’s Brief,
respondent should have filed a motion for extension of
time to file the proper pleading instead of whatever
pleading he could come up with, just to "beat the
deadline set by the Court of Appeals."27
Moreover, respondent does not deny that he was
given notice of the fact that he filed the wrong
pleading. However, instead of explaining his side by
filing a comment, as ordered by the appellate court,
he chose to ignore the CA’s Order. He claims that he
was under the presumption that complainant and her
husband had already settled the case, because he
had not heard from the husband since the filing of the
latter’s Memorandum of Appeal.
This explanation does not excuse respondent’s
actions.
First of all, there were several remedies that
respondent could have availed himself of, from the
moment he received the Notice from the CA to the
moment he received the disbarment Complaint filed
against him. But because of his negligence, he chose
to sit on the case and do nothing.
Second, respondent, as counsel, had the duty to
inform his clients of the status of their case. His failure
to do so amounted to a violation of Rule 18.04 of the
Code, which reads:
18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the
status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client’s request for information.
If it were true that all attempts to contact his client
proved futile, the least respondent could have done
was to inform the CA by filing a Notice of Withdrawal
of Appearance as counsel. He could have thus
explained why he was no longer the counsel of
complainant and her husband in the case and
informed the court that he could no longer contact
them.28 His failure to take this measure proves his
negligence.
Lastly, the failure of respondent to file the proper
pleading and a comment on Duigan’s Motion to
Dismiss is negligence on his part. Under 18.03 of the
1âwphi1
Code, a lawyer is liable for negligence in handling the
client’s case, viz:
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
Lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to
them, otherwise their negligence in fulfilling their duty
would render them liable for disciplinary action.29
Respondent has failed to live up to his duties as a
lawyer. When a lawyer violates his duties to his client,
he engages in unethical and unprofessional conduct
for which he should be held accountable.30
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Venancio Padilla is
found guilty of violating Rules 18.02, 18.03, 18.04, as
well as Canon 5 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Hence, he is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS and STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered into the

personal records of respondent as a member of the
bar and furnished to the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts of the country for their
information and guidance.

No costs.

A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC December 7, 2010
JOVITO S. OLAZO, Complainant,
vs.
JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA (Ret.), Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is the disbarment case against retired
Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga
(respondent) filed by Mr. Jovito S. Olazo
(complainant). The respondent is charged of violating
Rule 6.02,1 Rule 6.032 and Rule 1.013 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting
interests.
Factual Background
In March 1990, the complainant filed a sales
application covering a parcel of land situated in
Barangay Lower Bicutan in the Municipality of Taguig.
The land (subject land) was previously part of Fort
Andres Bonifacio that was segregated and declared
open for disposition pursuant to Proclamation No.
2476,4 issued on January 7, 1986, and Proclamation
No. 172,5 issued on October 16, 1987.
To implement Proclamation No. 172, Memorandum
No. 119 was issued by then Executive Secretary
Catalino Macaraig, creating a Committee on Awards
whose duty was to study, evaluate, and make a
recommendation on the applications to purchase the
lands declared open for disposition. The Committee
on Awards was headed by the Director of Lands and
the respondent was one of the Committee members,
in his official capacity as the Congressman of Taguig
and Pateros (from 1987 to 1998); the respondent’s
district includes the areas covered by the
proclamations.
The First Charge: Violation of Rule 6.02
In the complaint,6 the complainant claimed that the
respondent abused his position as Congressman and
as a member of the Committee on Awards when he
unduly interfered with the complainant’s sales
application because of his personal interest over the
subject land. The complainant alleged that the
respondent exerted undue pressure and influence
over the complainant’s father, Miguel P. Olazo, for the
latter to contest the complainant’s sales application
and claim the subject land for himself. The
complainant also alleged that the respondent
prevailed upon Miguel Olazo to accept, on various
dates, sums of money as payment of the latter’s
alleged rights over the subject land. The complainant
further claimed that the respondent brokered the
transfer of rights of the subject land between Miguel
Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, who is the
nephew of the respondent’s deceased wife.
As a result of the respondent’s abuse of his official
functions, the complainant’s sales application was
denied. The conveyance of rights to Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez and his sales application were
subsequently given due course by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
The Second Charge: Violation of Rule 6.03
The second charge involves another parcel of land
within the proclaimed areas belonging to Manuel
Olazo, the complainant’s brother. The complainant
alleged that the respondent persuaded Miguel Olazo
to direct Manuel to convey his rights over the land to
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. As a result of the
respondent’s promptings, the rights to the land were
transferred to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.
In addition, the complainant alleged that in May 1999,
the respondent met with Manuel for the purpose of
nullifying the conveyance of rights over the land to
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The complainant claimed
that the respondent wanted the rights over the land
transferred to one Rolando Olazo, the Barangay
Chairman of Hagonoy, Taguig. The respondent in this
regard executed an "Assurance" where he stated that
he was the lawyer of Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez.
The Third Charge: Violation of Rule 1.01
The complainant alleged that the respondent engaged
in unlawful conduct considering his knowledge that
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez was not a qualified
beneficiary under Memorandum No. 119. The
complainant averred that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez is
not a bona fide resident of the proclaimed areas and
does not qualify for an award. Thus, the approval of
his sales application by the Committee on Awards
amounted to a violation of the objectives of
Proclamation No. 172 and Memorandum No. 119.
The complainant also alleged that the respondent
violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 since he engaged in
the practice of law, within the one-year prohibition
period, when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee
and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee
on Awards.
In his Comment,7 the respondent claimed that the
present complaint is the third malicious charge filed
against him by the complainant. The first one was
submitted before the Judicial and Bar Council when
he was nominated as an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court; the second complaint is now pending
with the Office of the Ombudsman, for alleged
violation of Section 3(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended.
With his own supporting documents, the respondent
presented a different version of the antecedent
events.
The respondent asserted that Miguel Olazo owned
the rights over the subject land and he later conveyed
these rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. Miguel
Olazo’s rights over the subject land and the transfer of
his rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez were duly
recognized by the Secretary of the DENR before
whom the conflict of rights over the subject land
(between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez, on one hand, and the complainant on the
other hand) was brought. In its decision, the DENR
found Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez a qualified applicant,
and his application over the subject land was given
due course. The respondent emphasized that the
DENR decision is now final and executory. It was
affirmed by the Office of the President, by the Court of
Appeals and by the Supreme Court.
The respondent also advanced the following
defenses:
(1) He denied the complainant’s allegation
that Miguel Olazo told him (complainant) that
the respondent had been orchestrating to get
the subject land. The respondent argued that
this allegation was without corroboration and
was debunked by the affidavits of Miguel
Olazo and Francisca Olazo, the complainant’s
sister.
(2) He denied the complainant’s allegation
that he offered the complainant ₱50,000.00
for the subject land and that he (the
respondent) had exerted undue pressure and
influence on Miguel Olazo to claim the rights
over the subject land. The respondent also
denied that he had an inordinate interest in
the subject land.
(3) He claimed that there was nothing wrong
in signing as a witness in Miguel Olazo’s
affidavit where the latter asserted his rights
over the subject land. The affidavit merely
attested to the truth.
(4) He asserted that he and Miguel Olazo
were cousins and that the latter decided to sell
his rights over the subject land for the medical
treatment of his heart condition and the illness
of his daughter, Francisca Olazo. The
respondent insisted that the money he
extended to them was a form of loan.
(5) The respondent’s participation in the
transaction between Miguel Olazo and Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez involved the payment of the
loan that the respondent extended to Miguel
Olazo.
(6) Manuel’s belated and secondhand
allegation in his Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated
January 20, 2000, regarding what his father
told him, cannot prevail over his earlier
Sinumpaang Salaysay with Francisca Olazo,
dated August 2, 1997. In the said Sinumpaang
Salaysay, Manuel categorically asserted that
his father Miguel Olazo, not the complainant,
was the farmer-beneficiary. Manuel also
expressed his agreement to the transfer of
rights (Pagpapatibay Sa Paglilipat Ng
Karapatan) in favor of Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez, and the withdrawal of his father’s
application to give way to Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez’s application.
(7) The complainant’s allegation that the
respondent had pressured and influenced
Miguel Olazo to sell the subject land was not
sufficient as it was lacking in specificity and
corroboration. The DENR decision was clear
that the complainant had no rights over the
subject land.
The respondent additionally denied violating Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He
alleged that during his third term as Congressman
from 1995 to 1997, the conflicting applications of the
complainant, Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez were not included in the agenda for
deliberation of the Committee on Awards. Rather,
their conflicting claims and their respective supporting
documents were before the Office of the Regional
Director, NCR of the DENR. This office ruled over the
conflicting claims only on August 2, 2000. This ruling
became the basis of the decision of the Secretary of
the DENR.
Similarly, the respondent cannot be held liable under
Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
since the provision applies to lawyers in the
government service who are allowed by law to
engage in private law practice and to those who,
though prohibited from engaging in the practice of
law, have friends, former associates and relatives who
are in the active practice of law.8 In this regard, the
respondent had already completed his third term in
Congress and his stint in the Committee on Awards
when he represented Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez on
May 24, 1999.
Lastly, the respondent claimed that he cannot be held
liable under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility since he did not intervene in the
disposition of the conflicting applications of the
complainant and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez because
the applications were not submitted to the Committee
on Awards when he was still a member.
The Court’s Ruling
Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office
may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a
government official.9 He may be disciplined by this
Court as a member of the Bar only when his
misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath as
a lawyer.10
The issue in this case calls for a determination of
whether the respondent’s actions constitute a breach
of the standard ethical conduct – first, while the
respondent was still an elective public official and a
member of the Committee on Awards; and second,
when he was no longer a public official, but a private
lawyer who represented a client before the office he
was previously connected with.
After a careful evaluation of the pleadings filed by
both parties and their respective pieces of evidence,
we resolve to dismiss the administrative complaint.
Accountability of a government lawyer in public office
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
highlights the continuing standard of ethical conduct
to be observed by government lawyers in the
discharge of their official tasks. In addition to the
standard of conduct laid down under R.A. No. 6713
for government employees, a lawyer in the
government service is obliged to observe the standard
of conduct under the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct
demanded upon lawyers in the government service is
more exacting than the standards for those in private
practice. Lawyers in the government service are
subject to constant public scrutiny under norms of
public accountability. They also bear the heavy
burden of having to put aside their private interest in
favor of the interest of the public; their private
activities should not interfere with the discharge of
their official functions.11
The first charge involves a violation of Rule 6.02 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. It imposes
the following restrictions in the conduct of a
government lawyer:
A lawyer in the government service shall not use his
public position to promote or advance his private
interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his
public duties.
The above provision prohibits a lawyer from using his
or her public position to: (1) promote private interests;
(2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private
interest to interfere with his or her public duties. We
previously held that the restriction extends to all
government lawyers who use their public offices to
promote their private interests.12
In Huyssen v. Gutierrez,13 we defined promotion of
private interest to include soliciting gifts or anything of
monetary value in any transaction requiring the
approval of his or her office, or may be affected by the
functions of his or her office. In Ali v. Bubong,14 we
recognized that private interest is not limited to direct
interest, but extends to advancing the interest of
relatives. We also ruled that private interest interferes
with public duty when the respondent uses the office
and his or her knowledge of the intricacies of the law
to benefit relatives.15
In Vitriolo v. Dasig,16 we found the act of the
respondent (an official of the Commission on Higher
Education) of extorting money from persons with
applications or requests pending before her office to
be a serious breach of Rule 6.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.17 We reached the same
conclusion in Huyssen, where we found the
respondent (an employee of the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation) liable under Rule 6.02
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, based on
the evidence showing that he demanded money from
the complainant who had a pending application for
visas before his office.18
Similarly, in Igoy v. Soriano19 we found the respondent
(a Court Attorney of this Court) liable for violating Rule
6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, after
considering the evidence showing that he demanded
and received money from the complainant who had a
pending case before this Court.
Applying these legal precepts to the facts of the case,
we find the absence of any concrete proof that the
respondent abused his position as a Congressman
and as a member of the Committee on Awards in the
manner defined under Rule 6.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
First, the records do not clearly show if the
complainant’s sales application was ever brought
before the Committee on Awards. By the complaint’s
own account, the complainant filed a sales application
in March 1990 before the Land Management Bureau.
By 1996, the complainant’s sales application was
pending before the Office of the Regional Director,
NCR of the DENR due to the conflicting claims of
Miguel Olazo, and, subsequently, of Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez. The records show that it was only on
August 2, 2000 that the Office of the Regional
Director, NCR of the DENR rendered its decision, or
after the term of the respondent’s elective public office
and membership to the Committee on Awards, which
expired in 1997.
These circumstances do not show that the respondent
did in any way promote, advance or use his private
interests in the discharge of his official duties. To
repeat, since the sales application was not brought
before the Committee on Awards when the
respondent was still a member, no sufficient basis
exists to conclude that he used his position to obtain
personal benefits. We note in this regard that the
denial of the complainant’s sales application over the
subject land was made by the DENR, not by the
Committee on Awards.
Second, the complainant’s allegation that the
respondent "orchestrated" the efforts to get the
subject land does not specify how the orchestration
was undertaken. What appears clear in the records is
the uncorroborated Sinumpaang Salaysay of Miguel
Olazo, dated May 25, 2003,20 categorically stating that
the respondent had no interest in the subject land,
and neither was he a contracting party in the transfer
of his rights over the subject land. In the absence of
any specific charge, Olazo’s disclaimer is the nearest
relevant statement on the respondent’s alleged
participation, and we find it to be in the respondent’s
favor.
Third, the other documents executed by Miguel Olazo,
that the complainant presented to support his claim
that the respondent exerted undue pressure and
influence over his father (namely: the letter, dated
June 22, 1996, to the DENR Regional Director-
NCR;21 the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 12,
1996;22 and the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 17,
199623), do not contain any reference to the alleged
pressure or force exerted by the respondent over
Miguel Olazo. The documents merely showed that the
respondent helped Miguel Olazo in having his farm
lots (covered by the proclaimed areas) surveyed.
They also showed that the respondent merely acted
as a witness in the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July
17, 1996. To our mind, there are neutral acts that may
be rendered by one relative to another, and do not
show how the respondent could have influenced the
decision of Miguel Olazo to contest the complainant’s
sales application. At the same time, we cannot give
any credit to the Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated
January 20, 2000, of Manuel. They are not only
hearsay but are contrary to what Miguel Olazo states
on the record. We note that Manuel had no personal
knowledge, other than what Miguel Olazo told him, of
the force allegedly exerted by the respondent against
Miguel Olazo.
In turn, the respondent was able to provide a
satisfactory explanation - backed by corroborating
evidence - of the nature of the transaction in which he
gave the various sums of money to Miguel Olazo and
Francisca Olazo in the year 1995. In her affidavits
dated May 25, 200324 and July 21, 2010,25 Francisca
Olazo corroborated the respondent’s claim that the
sums of money he extended to her and Miguel Olazo
were loans used for their medical treatment. Miguel
Olazo, in his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated May 25,
2003, asserted that some of the money borrowed
from the respondent was used for his medical
treatment and hospitalization expenses.
The affidavit of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez further
corroborated the respondent’s claim that the latter’s
involvement was limited to being paid the loans he
gave to Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo. According
to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, he and Miguel Olazo
agreed that a portion of the loan would be directly
paid by Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez to the respondent
and the amount paid would be considered as part of
the purchase price of the subject land.26
It also bears stressing that a facial comparison of the
documentary evidence, specifically the dates when
the sums of money were extended by the respondent
– on February 21, 1995, September 2, 1995 and
October 17, 1995, and the date when the Deed of
Conveyance27 over the subject land was executed or
on October 25, 1995, showed that the sums of money
were extended prior to the transfer of rights over the
subject land. These pieces of evidence are consistent
with the respondent’s allegation that Miguel Olazo
decided to sell his rights over the subject land to pay
the loans he obtained from the respondent and, also,
to finance his continuing medical treatment.
Private practice of law after separation from public
office
As proof that the respondent was engaged in an
unauthorized practice of law after his separation from
the government service, the complainant presented
the Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000,
of Manuel and the document entitled "Assurance"
where the respondent legally represented Ramon Lee
and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. Nevertheless, the
foregoing pieces of evidence fail to persuade us to
conclude that there was a violation of Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
In Cayetano v. Monsod,28 we defined the practice of
law as any activity, in and out of court, that requires
the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. Moreover, we ruled that to
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
which are characteristics of the profession; to practice
law is to give notice or render any kind of service,
which device or service requires the use in any
degree of legal knowledge or skill.
Under the circumstances, the foregoing definition
should be correlated with R.A. No. 6713 and Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
impose certain restrictions on government lawyers to
engage in private practice after their separation from
the service.
Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 reads:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. — In
addition to acts and
omissions of public officials and employees now
prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the
following shall constitute prohibited acts and
transactions of any public official and employee and
are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related
thereto. – Public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:
xxxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession
unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided,
that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict
with their official functions; x x x
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period
of one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or
separation from public office, except in the case of
subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional
concerned cannot practice his profession in
connection with any matter before the office he used
to be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall
likewise apply.
As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to
engage in the private practice of their profession
during their incumbency.29 By way of exception, a
government lawyer can engage in the practice of his
or her profession under the following conditions: first,
the private practice is authorized by the Constitution
or by the law; and second, the practice will not conflict
or tend to conflict with his or her official
functions.30 The last paragraph of Section 7 provides
an exception to the exception. In case of lawyers
separated from the government service who are
covered under subparagraph (b) (2) of Section 7 of
R.A. No. 6713, a one-year prohibition is imposed to
practice law in connection with any matter before the
office he used to be with.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
echoes this restriction and prohibits lawyers, after
leaving the government service, to accept
engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in the said
service. The keyword in Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is the term "intervene"
which we previously interpreted to include an act of a
person who has the power to influence the
proceedings.31 Otherwise stated, to fall within the
ambit of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the respondent must have accepted
engagement or employment in a matter which, by
virtue of his public office, he had previously exercised
power to influence the outcome of the proceedings. 1avv phi 1
As the records show, no evidence exists showing that
the respondent previously interfered with the sales
application covering Manuel’s land when the former
was still a member of the Committee on Awards. The
complainant, too, failed to sufficiently establish that
the respondent was engaged in the practice of law. At
face value, the legal service rendered by the
respondent was limited only in the preparation of a
single document. In Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap, Inc.,32 we
specifically described private practice of law as one
that contemplates a succession of acts of the same
nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self to
the public as a lawyer.
In any event, even granting that respondent’s act fell
within the definition of practice of law, the available
pieces of evidence are insufficient to show that the
legal representation was made before the Committee
on Awards, or that the Assurance was intended to be
presented before it. These are matters for the
complainant to prove and we cannot consider any
uncertainty in this regard against the respondent’s
favor.
Violation of Rule 1.01
6.03 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, filed against retired Supreme Court
Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga, for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Rule 1.01 prohibits a lawyer from engaging in

unlawful, immoral or deceitful conduct. From the
above discussion, we already struck down the
complainant’s allegation that respondent engaged in
an unauthorized practice of law when he appeared as
a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards.

We find that a similar treatment should be given to the

complainant’s claim that the respondent violated
paragraph 4(1)33 of Memorandum No. 119 when he
encouraged the sales application of Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez despite his knowledge that his nephew was
not a qualified applicant. The matter of Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez’s qualifications to apply for a sales
application over lots covered by the proclaimed areas
has been resolved in the affirmative by the Secretary
of the DENR in the decision dated April 3,
2004,34 when the DENR gave due course to his sales
application over the subject land. We are, at this point,
bound by this finding.

As pointed out by the respondent, the DENR decision

was affirmed by the Office of the President, the Court
of Appeals35 and, finally, the Court, per our Minute
Resolution, dated October 11, 2006, in G.R. No.
173453. In our Resolution, we dismissed the petition
for review on certiorari filed by the complainant after
finding, among others, that no reversible error was
committed by the Court of Appeals in its decision.36

All told, considering the serious consequences of the

penalty of disbarment or suspension of a member of
the Bar, the burden rests on the complainant to
present clear, convincing and satisfactory proof for the
Court to exercise its disciplinary powers.37 The
respondent generally is under no obligation to prove
his/her defense,38 until the burden shifts to him/her
because of what the complainant has proven. Where
no case has in the first place been proven, nothing
has to be rebutted in defense.39

With this in mind, we resolve to dismiss the

administrative case against the respondent for the
complainant’s failure to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the former committed unethical
infractions warranting the exercise of the Court’s
disciplinary power.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS

the administrative case for violation of Rule 6.02, Rule

G.R. No. 208290 December 11, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUANITO C. CASTANEDA, JR.,
HONORABLE CAESAR A. CASANOVA,
HONORABLE CIELITO N. MINDARO-GRULLA, AS
ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SPECIAL
SECOND DIVISION, COURT OF TAX APPEALS;
and MYRNA M. GARCIA AND CUSTODIO
MENDOZA VESTIDAS, JR., Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court seeking to review the March 26,
20131 and May 15, 20132 Resolutions of the Court of
Tax Appeals (CTA) in CTA Crim. Case No. 0-285,
ordering the dismissal of the case against the private
respondents for violation of Section 36023 in relation
to Sections 2503 and 2530 (f) (i) and 1, (3) (4) and (5)
of the Tariff and Customs Codeof the Philippines, as
amended, on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
The antecedentsas culled from the records:
Private respondents Myrna M. Garcia (Garcia) and
Custodio Mendoza Vestidas, Jr.(VestidasJr.)were
charged before the CTA under an Information which
reads:
That on or about November 5, 2011, or prior or
subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused Myrna M. Garcia and Custodio
Mendoza Vestidas, Jr. as owner/proprietress and
broker of Plinth Enterprise respectively, conspiring
and confederating with each other, with intent to
defraud the government, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and fraudulently import into the Port of
Manila, 858 cartons of 17,160 pieces of Anti-Virus
Software Kaspersky Internet Security Premium 2012,
subject to customs duties,by misdeclaration under
Import Entry No. C-181011 and Bill of Lading No.
PFCMAN1715, filed with the Bureau of Customs
(BOC),covering One Forty Footer (1x40) container
van shipment bearing No. KKFU7195683 which was
falsely declared to contain 40 pallets/1,690 cartons of
CD kit cleaner and plastic CD case, said imported
items having customs duties amounting to Three
Million Three Hundred Forty One Thousand Two
Hundred Forty Five Pesos (Php 3,341,245) of which
only the amount of One Hundred Thousand Three
Hundred Sixty Two Pesos (Php100,362) was paid, in
violation of the above-captioned law, and to the
prejudice and damage of the Government in the
amount of Three Million Two Hundred Forty Thousand
Eight Hundred Eighty Three Pesos (Php3,240,883).4
In a hearing held on August 1, 2012, Garcia and
VestidasJr.pleaded "Not Guilty" to the aforementioned
charge. Thereafter, a preliminary conference was held
on September 5, 2012 followed by thepre-trial on
September 13, 2012. Both the prosecution and the
defense agreed to adopt the joint stipulations of facts
and issues entered in the course of the preliminary
conference.
Thereafter, trial ensued.
The prosecution presented a number of witnesses
whoessentially observed5 the physical examination of
Container Van No. KKFU 7195638 conducted6 by the
Bureau of Customs (BOC) and explained7 the process
of electronic filing under the Electronic to Mobile
(E2M) Customs Systems of the BOC and the alleged
misdeclared goods therein.
Subsequent to the presentation of witnesses, the
prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Evidence on
December 10, 2012.
On January 15, 2013, Garcia and Vestidas, Jr. filed
their Omnibus Motion to File Demurrer to Evidence
with Leave of Court to Cancel Hearing Scheduled on
January 21, 2013,whichwas grantedby the CTA.
Thereafter, they filed theDemurrer to Evidence, dated
January 13, 2012, claimingthat the prosecution failed
to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the
following reasons:
a)The pieces of documentary evidence
submitted by the prosecution were
inadmissible incourt;
b)The object evidence consisting of the
allegedly misdeclared goods were not
presented as evidence; and
c)None of the witnesses for the prosecution
made a positive identification of the two
accused as the ones responsible for the
supposed misdeclaration.
Despite opposition, the CTA dismissed the
caseagainst Garcia and Vestidas Jr.in its March 26,
2013 Resolution, for failure of the prosecution to
establish theirguilt beyond reasonable doubt.
According to the CTA, "no proof whatsoever was
presented by the prosecution showing that the
certified true copies of the public documents offered in
evidence against both accused were in fact issued by
thelegal custodians."8 It cited Section 26, Rule 132 of
the Revised Rules of Court, whichprovidesthat"when
the original of a document is a public record, it should
not generally be removed from the office or place in
which it is kept."9 As stated in Section 7, Rule 130,10 its
contents may be proven using secondary evidence
and such evidence may pertain to the certified true
copy of the original document issued by the public
officer in custody thereof.Hence, the CTA wrotethat
the certified true copiesof the public documents
offered in evidence should have been presented in
court.
Anent its offer of private documents,11 the prosecution
likewise failed to comply with Section 27, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court, which reads, "[a]n authorized
public record of a private document may be proved by
the original record, or by a copy thereof, attested by
the legal custodian of the record, with an appropriate
certificate that such officer has the custody."
Considering that the private documents were
submitted and filed with the BOC, the same became
part of public records. Again, the records show that
the prosecution failed to present the certified true
copies of thedocuments.
The CTA noted that,in its Opposition to the
Demurrer,the prosecution even admitted that none of
their witnesses ever positively identified the accused
in open court and that the alleged misdeclared goods
were not competently and properly identified in court
by any of the prosecution witnesses.
The prosecution filed its motion for reconsideration,
but it was deniedby the CTAin its May 15, 2013
Resolution, stressing, among others, that to grant it
would place the accused in double jeopardy.12
On July 24, 2013, the Run After the Smugglers
(RATS) Group, Revenue Collection Monitoring Group
(RCMG), as counsel for the BOC, received a copy of
the July 15, 2013 Resolution of the CTA ordering the
entry of judgment in the case.
Hence,this petition for certiorari, ascribing grave
abuse of discretion on the part of theCTA when in
ruled that: 1) the pieces of documentary evidence
submitted by the prosecution were inadmissible in
evidence; 2) the object evidence consisting of the
alleged misdeclared goods were not presented as
evidence; and 3) the witnesses failed to positively
identifythe accused as responsible forthe
misdeclaration of goods.
The Court agrees with the disposition of the CTA.
At the outset, it should be noted that the petition was
filed beyond the reglementary periodfor the
filingthereof under Rule 65. The petition itself
statedthat a copy of the May 15, 2013 Resolution was
received by the BOC two (2) days after its
promulgation, or on May 17, 2013. Nonetheless, the
RATS was only alerted by the developments in the
case on July 24, 2013, when Atty. Danilo M. Campos
Jr. (Atty. Campos) received the July 15, 2013
Resolution of the CTA ordering the entry of judgment
in the case, considering that no appeal was taken by
any of the parties. According toAtty. Campos, it was
only on that occasion when he discovered the May
15, 2013 Resolution of the CTA.Thus, it was prayed
that the petitionbe given due course despite its late
filing.
This belated filing cannot be countenanced by the
Court.
Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedureis explicit in stating thatcertiorarishould be
instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of the
judgment, orderor resolution sought to be assailed.
The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any
unreasonable delay that would violate the
constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition
of their case.13 While there are recognized
exceptions14 to such strict observance, there should
be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality
to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation
for his/her failure to comply with the rules.15
In the case at bench, no convincing justification for the
belated filing of the petition was advanced to warrant
the relaxation of the Rules.Notably, the records show
that the petition was filedonly on August 12, 2013, or
almost a month late from the due date which fell on
July 16, 2013. To excuse this grave procedural lapse
will not only be unfairto the other party, but it will also
sanction a seeming rudimentary attempt to circumvent
standing rules of procedure. Suffice it to say, the
reasons proffered by the petitioner do not carry even
a tinge of merit that would deserve leniency.
The late filing of the petition was borne out of the
petitioner’s failure to monitor incoming court
processes that neededto be addressed by the office.
Clearly, this is an admission of inefficiency, if not lack
of zeal, on the part of an office tasked toeffectively
curb smuggling activities which rob the government of have been issued in accordance with the rules on
millions of revenue every year. evidence and existing jurisprudence.

The display of patent violations of even the
elementary rules leads the Court to suspectthat the
case against Garcia and Vestidas Jr. was doomed by
designfrom the start. The failure to present the
certified true copies of documentary evidence; the
failure to competently and properly identify the
misdeclared goods; the failure to identify the accused
in court; and,worse, the failure to file this petition on
time challenging a judgment of acquittal, are tell-tale
signs ofa reluctantand subduedattitude in pursuing the
case. This stance taken by the lawyers in government
service rouses the Court’s vigilance against
inefficiency in the administration of justice. Verily, the
lawyersrepresenting the offices under the executive
branchshould be reminded that theystill remain as
officers of the courtfrom whom a high sense of
competence and fervor is expected. The Courtwill not
close its eyes to this sense of apathy in RATS
lawyers, lest the government’s goal of revenue
enhancement continues to suffer the blows of
smuggling and similar activities.
Even the error committed by the RATS in filing a
motion for reconsideration with the CTA displays
gross ignorance as to the effects of an acquittal in a
criminal case and the constitutional proscription on
double jeopardy. Had the RATS been eager and keen
in prosecuting the respondents, it would have, in the
first place, presented its evidence with the CTA in
strict compliance with the Rules.
On a final note, the Court deems it proper to remind
the lawyers in the Bureau of Customs that the canons
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility
equally apply to lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official tasks. 17 Thus, RA TS
lawyers should exert every effort and consider it their
duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.18
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the
assailed March 26, 2013 and May 15, 2013
Resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals are
AFFIRMED.
The Office of the Ombudsman is hereby ordered to
conduct an investigation for possible criminal or
administrative offenses committed by the Run After
the Smugglers (RA TS) Group, Revenue Collection
Monitoring Group (RCMG), Bureau of Customs,
relative to the filing and handling of the subject
complaint for violations of the Tariff and Customs
Code of the Philippines.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Office of
the President, the Secretary of Finance, the Collector
of Customs, and the Office of the Ombudsman for
their guidance and appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.

In any case, even if the Court decides to suspend the

rules and permit this recourse, the end result would
remain the same. While a judgment of acquittal in a
criminal case may be assailed in a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,it must
be shown that there was grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial
of due process.In this case, a perusal of the
challenged resolutions ofthe CTAdoes not disclose
any indication of grave abuse of discretion on its
partor denial of due process.The records are replete
with indicators that the petitioner actively participated
during the trial and, in fact, presented its offer of
evidence and opposed the demurrer. 1âwphi1

Grave abuse of discretion is defined as capricious or

whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of
law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.16 Here, the subject resolutions of the CTA

A.C. No. 6683 June 21, 2011
RE: RESOLUTION OF THE COURT DATED 1 JUNE
2004 IN G.R. NO. 72954 AGAINST, ATTY. VICTOR
C. AVECILLA, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
The present administrative case is based on the
following facts:
Prelude
Sometime in 1985, respondent Atty. Victor C. Avecilla
(Atty. Avecilla) and a certain Mr. Louis C. Biraogo (Mr.
Biraogo) filed a petition before this Court impugning
the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 883, i.e.,
the law that called for the holding of a presidential
snap election on 7 February 1986. The petition was
docketed as G.R. No. 72954 and was consolidated
with nine (9) other petitions1 voicing a similar concern.
On 19 December 1985, the Court En banc issued a
Resolution dismissing the consolidated petitions,
effectively upholding the validity of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 883.2
On 8 January 1986, after the aforesaid resolution
became final, the rollo3 of G.R. No. 72954 was
entrusted to the Court’s Judicial Records Office (JRO)
for safekeeping.4
The Present Case
On 14 July 2003, the respondent and Mr. Biraogo
sent a letter5 to the Honorable Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (Chief
Justice Davide), requesting that they be furnished
several documents6 relative to the expenditure of the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). In order to show
that they have interest in the JDF enough to be
informed of how it was being spent, the respondent
and Mr. Biraogo claimed that they made contributions
to the said fund by way of the docket and legal fees
they paid as petitioners in G.R No. 72954.7
On 28 July 2003, Chief Justice Davide
instructed8 Atty. Teresita Dimaisip (Atty. Dimaisip),
then Chief of the JRO, to forward the rollo of G.R. No.
72954 for the purpose of verifying the claim of the
respondent and Mr. Biraogo.
On 30 July 2003, following a diligent search for the
rollo of G.R. No. 72954, Atty. Dimaisip apprised9 Chief
Justice Davide that the subject rollo could not be
found in the archives. Resorting to the tracer card10 of
G.R. No. 72954, Atty. Dimaisip discovered that the
subject rollo had been borrowed from the JRO on 13
September 1991 but, unfortunately, was never since
returned.11 The tracer card named the respondent,
although acting through a certain Atty. Salvador
Banzon (Atty. Banzon), as the borrower of the subject
rollo.12
The next day, or on 31 July 2003, Chief Justice
Davide took prompt action by directing13 Atty.
Dimaisip to supply information about how the
respondent was able to borrow the rollo of G.R. No.
72954 and also to take necessary measures to secure
the return of the said rollo.
Reporting her compliance with the foregoing
directives, Atty. Dimaisip sent to Chief Justice Davide
a Memorandum14 on 13 August 2003. In substance,
the Memorandum relates that:
1. At the time the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 was
borrowed from the JRO, the respondent was
employed with the Supreme Court as a
member of the legal staff of retired Justice
Emilio A. Gancayco (Justice Gancayco).
Ostensibly, it was by virtue of his confidential
employment that the respondent was able to
gain access to the rollo of G.R. No. 72954.15
2. Atty. Dimaisip had already contacted the
respondent about the possible return of the
subject rollo.16 Atty. Dimaisip said that the
respondent acknowledged having borrowed
the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 through Atty.
Banzon, who is a colleague of his in the office
of Justice Gancayco.17
On 18 August 2003, almost twelve (12) years after it
was borrowed, the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 was finally
turned over by Atty. Avecilla to the JRO.18
On 22 September 2003, Chief Justice Davide
directed19 the Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) of
this Court, to make a study, report and
recommendation on the incident. On 20 November
2003, the OCAT submitted a Memorandum20 to the
Chief Justice opining that the respondent may be
administratively charged, as a lawyer and member of
the bar, for taking out the rollo of G.R. No. 72954. The
OCAT made the following significant observations:
1. Justice Gancayco compulsorily retired from
the Supreme Court on 20 August
1991.21 However, as is customary, the
coterminous employees of Justice Gancayco
were given an extension of until 18 September
1991 to remain as employees of the court for
the limited purpose of winding up their
remaining affairs. Hence, the respondent was
already nearing the expiration of his "extended
tenure" when he borrowed the rollo of G.R.
No. 72954 on 13 September 1991.22
2. The above circumstance indicates that the
respondent borrowed the subject rollo not for
any official business related to his duties as a
legal researcher for Justice Gancayco, but
merely to fulfill a personal agenda.23 By doing
so, the respondent clearly abused his
confidential position for which he may be
administratively sanctioned.24
3. It must be clarified, however, that since the
respondent is presently no longer in the
employ of the Supreme Court, he can no
longer be sanctioned as such
employee.25 Nevertheless, an administrative
action against the respondent as a lawyer and
officer of the court remains feasible.26
Accepting the findings of the OCAT, the Court En
banc issued a Resolution27 on 9 December 2003
directing the respondent to show cause why he
should not be held administratively liable for
borrowing the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 and for failing to
return the same for a period of almost twelve (12)
years.
The respondent conformed to this Court’s directive by
submitting his Respectful Explanation
(Explanation)28 on 21 January 2004. In the said
explanation, the respondent gave the following
defenses:
1. The respondent maintained that he neither
borrowed nor authorized anyone to borrow the
rollo of G.R. No. 72954.29 Instead, the
respondent shifts the blame on the person
whose signature actually appears on the
tracer card of G.R. No. 72954 and who,
without authority, took the subject rollo in his
name.30 Hesitant to pinpoint anyone in
particular as the author of such signature, the
respondent, however, intimated that the same
might have belonged to Atty. Banzon.31
2. The respondent asserted that, for some
unknown reason, the subject rollo just ended
up in his box of personal papers and effects,
which he brought home following the
retirement of Justice Gancayco.32 The
respondent can only speculate that the one
who actually borrowed the rollo might have
been a colleague in the office of Justice
Gancayco and that through inadvertence, the
same was misplaced in his personal box.33
3. The respondent also denounced any ill-
motive for failing to return the rollo, professing
that he had never exerted effort to examine
his box of personal papers and effects up until
that time when he was contacted by Atty.
Dimaisip inquiring about the missing
rollo.34 The respondent claimed that after
finding out that the missing rollo was, indeed,
in his personal box, he immediately extended
his cooperation to the JRO and wasted no
time in arranging for its return.35
On 24 February 2004, this Court referred the
respondent’s Explanation to the OCAT for initial study.
In its Report36 dated 12 April 2004, the OCAT found
the respondent’s Explanation to be unsatisfactory.
On 1 June 2004, this Court tapped37 the Office of the
Bar Confidant (OBC) to conduct a formal investigation
on the matter and to prepare a final report and
recommendation. A series of hearings were thus held
by the OBC wherein the testimonies of the
respondent,38 Atty. Banzon,39 Atty. Dimaisip40 and one
Atty. Pablo Gancayco41 were taken. On 6 August
2007, the respondent submitted his Memorandum42 to
the OBC reiterating the defenses in his Explanation.
On 13 October 2009, the OBC submitted its Report
and Recommendation43 to this Court. Like the OCAT,
the OBC dismissed the defenses of the respondent
and found the latter to be fully accountable for taking
out the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 and failing to return it
timely.44 The OBC, thus, recommended that the
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
one (1) year.45
Our Ruling
We agree with the findings of the OBC. However,
owing to the peculiar circumstances in this case, we
find it fitting to reduce the recommended penalty.
The Respondent Borrowed The Rollo
After reviewing the records of this case, particularly
the circumstances surrounding the retrieval of the
rollo of G.R. No. 72954, this Court is convinced that it
was the respondent, and no one else, who is
responsible for taking out the subject rollo.
The tracer card of G.R. No. 72954 bears the following
information:
1. The name of the respondent, who was
identified as borrower of the rollo,46 and
2. The signature of Atty. Banzon who, on
behalf of the respondent, actually received the
rollo from the JRO.47
The respondent sought to discredit the foregoing
entries by insisting that he never authorized Atty.
Banzon to borrow the subject rollo on his behalf.48 We
are, however, not convinced.
First. Despite the denial of the respondent, the
undisputed fact remains that it was from his
possession that the missing rollo was retrieved about
twelve (12) years after it was borrowed from the JRO.
This fact, in the absence of any plausible explanation
to the contrary, is sufficient affirmation that, true to
what the tracer card states, it was the respondent who
borrowed the rollo of G.R. No. 72954.
Second. The respondent offered no convincing
explanation how the subject rollo found its way into
his box of personal papers and effects. The
respondent can only surmise that the subject rollo
may have been inadvertently placed in his personal
box by another member of the staff of Justice
Gancayco.49 However, the respondent’s convenient
surmise remained just that—a speculation incapable
of being verified definitively.
Third. If anything, the respondent’s exceptional
stature as a lawyer and former confidante of a Justice
of this Court only made his excuse unacceptable, if
not totally unbelievable. As adequately rebuffed by the
OCAT in its Report dated 12 April 2004:
x x x However, the excuse that the rollo "inadvertently
or accidentally" found its way to his personal box
through his officemates rings hollow in the face of the
fact that he was no less than the confidential legal
assistance of a Member of this Court. With this
responsible position, Avecilla is expected to exercise
extraordinary diligence with respect to all matters,
including seeing to it that only his personal belongings
were in that box for taking home after his term of
office in this Court has expired.50
Verily, the tracer card of G.R. No. 72954 was never
adequately controverted. We, therefore, sustain its
entry and hold the respondent responsible for
borrowing the rollo of G.R. No. 72954.
Respondent’s Administrative Liability
Having settled that the respondent was the one who
borrowed the rollo of G.R. No. 72954, We next
determine his administrative culpability.
We begin by laying the premises:
1. The respondent is presently no longer in
the employ of this Court and as such, can no
longer be held administratively sanctioned as
an employee.51 However, the respondent, as a
lawyer and a member of the bar, remains
under the supervisory and disciplinary aegis of
this Court.52
2. The respondent was already nearing the
expiration of his "extended tenure" when he
borrowed the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 on 13
September 1991.53 We must recall that Justice
Gancayco already retired as of 20 April 1991.
Hence, it may be concluded that for whatever
reason the respondent borrowed the subject
rollo, it was not for any official reason related
to the adjudication of pending cases.54
3. The respondent’s unjustified retention of the
subject rollo for a considerable length of time
all but confirms his illicit motive in borrowing
the same. It must be pointed out that the
subject rollo had been in the clandestine
possession of the respondent for almost
twelve (12) years until it was finally discovered
and recovered by the JRO.
Given the foregoing, We find that there are sufficient
grounds to hold respondent administratively liable.
First. Taking judicial records, such as a rollo, outside
court premises, without the court’s consent, is an
administratively punishable act. In Fabiculana, Sr. v.
Gadon,55 this Court previously sanctioned a sheriff for
the wrongful act of bringing court records home, thus:
Likewise Ciriaco Y. Forlales, although not a
respondent in complainant's letter-complaint, should
be meted the proper penalty, having admitted taking
the records of the case home and forgetting about
them. Court employees are, in the first place, not
allowed to take any court records, papers or
documents outside the court premises. It is clear that
Forlales was not only negligent in his duty of
transmitting promptly the records of an appealed case
to the appellate court but he also failed in his duty not
to take the records of the case outside of the court
and to subsequently forget about them.56 (Emphasis
supplied)

Second. The act of the respondent in borrowing a

rollo for unofficial business entails the employment of
deceit not becoming a member of the bar. It 1aw phi 1

presupposes the use of misrepresentation and, to a

certain extent, even abuse of position on the part of
the respondent because the lending of rollos are, as a
matter of policy, only limited to official purposes.

As a lawyer then employed with the government, the

respondent clearly violated Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:

Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service

shall not use his public position to promote or
advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to
interfere with his public duties. (Emphasis supplied).

Third. However, We find the recommended penalty of

suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year
as too harsh for the present case. We consider the
following circumstances in favor of the respondent:

1. G.R. No. 72954 was already finally resolved

when its rollo was borrowed on 13 September
1991. Thus, the act of respondent in keeping
the subject rollo worked no prejudice insofar
as deciding G.R. No. 72954 is concerned.

2. It was never established that the contents

of the rollo, which remained confidential
despite the finality of the resolution in G.R.
No. 72954, were disclosed by the respondent.

3. After his possession of the subject rollo was

discovered, the respondent cooperated with
the JRO for the return of the rollo.

We, therefore, temper the period of suspension to

only six (6) months.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, the

respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for six (6) months. The respondent is also
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar
offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5377 June 30, 2014
VICTOR C. LINGAN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTYS. ROMEO CALUBAQUIB and JIMMY P.
BALIGA, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
This court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the
practice of law. When this court orders a lawyer
suspended from the practice of law, the lawyer must
desist from performing all functions requiring the
application of legal knowledge within the period of
suspension. This includes desisting from holding a
position in government requiring the authority to
practice law.
For our resolution is respondent Atty. Jimmy P.
Baliga's motion to lift one-year suspension from the
practice of law.1
In the resolution2 dated June 15, 2006, this court
found Attys. Romeo I. Calubaquib and Jimmy P.
Baliga guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility3 and of the
Lawyer's Oath.4 Respondents allowed their
secretaries to notarize documents in their stead, in
violation of Sections 2455 and 2466 of the Notarial
Law. This court suspended respondents from the
practice of law for one year, revoked their notarial
commissions, and disqualified them from
reappointment as notaries public for two years.
Complainant Victor C. Lingan filed his motion for
reconsideration,7 praying that respondents be
disbarred, not merely suspended from the practice of
law. In the resolution8 dated September 6, 2006, this
court denied complainant Lingan's motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
On March 22, 2007, Atty. Baliga, also the Regional
Director of the Commission on Human Rights
Regional Office for Region II, filed the undated ex
parte clarificatory pleading with leave of court.9
In his ex parte clarificatory pleading, Atty. Baliga
alleged that on July 14, 2006, complainant Lingan
wrote the Commission on Human Rights. Lingan
requested the Commission to investigate Atty. Baliga
following the latter's suspension from the practice of
law.
After this court had suspended Atty. Baliga from the
practice of law, the Commission on Human Rights En
Banc issued the resolution10 dated January 16, 2007,
suspending him from his position as Director/Attorney
VI of the. Commission on Human Rights Regional
Office for Region II. According to the Commission on
Human Rights En Banc, Atty. Baliga's suspension
from the practice of law "prevent[ed] [him] from
assuming his post [as Regional Director] for want of
eligibility in the meantime that his authority to practice
law is suspended."11
Atty. Baliga · argued that he cannot be suspended for
acts not connected with his functions as Commission
on Human Rights Regional Director. According to
Atty. Baliga, his suspension from the practice of law
did not include his suspension from public office. He
prayed for clarification of this court's resolution dated
June 15, 2006 "to prevent further injury and prejudice
to [his] rights."12
This court noted without action Atty. Baliga's ex parte
clarificatory pleading as this court does not render
advisory opinions.13
On May 8, 2009, this court received ·a letter from
complainant Lingan. In his letter14 dated May 4, 2009,
Lingan alleged that Atty. Baliga continued practicing
law and discharging his functions as Commission on
Human Rights Regional Director, in violation of this
court's order of suspension.
Complainant Lingan allegedly received a copy of the
Commission on Human Rights En Banc 's resolution
suspending Atty. Baliga as Regional Director. On Atty.
Baliga's motion, the ommission reconsidered Atty.
Baliga's suspension and instead admonished him for
"[violating] the conditions of his commission as a
notary public."15 According to complainant Lingan, he
was not served a copy of Atty. Baliga's motion for
reconsideration.16
Complainant Lingan claimed that the discharge of the
functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional
Director necessarily required the practice of law. A
Commission on Human Rights Regional Director must
be a member of the bar and is designated as Attorney
VI. Since this court suspended Atty. Baliga from the
practice of law, Atty. Baliga was in effect "a non-
lawyer . . . and [was] disqualified to hold the position
of [Regional Director] [during the effectivity of the
order of suspension]."17 The Commission on Human
Rights, according to complainant Lingan, should have
ordered Atty. Baliga to desist from performing his
functions as Regional Director. Complainant Lingan
prayed that this court give "favorable attention and
action on the matter."18
This court endorsed complainant Lingan's letter to the
Office of the Bar Confidant for report and
recommendation.19
In its report and recommendation20 dated June 29,
2009, the Office of the Bar Confidant found that the
period of suspension of Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga
had already lapsed. It recommended that respondents
be required to file their respective motions to lift order
of suspension with certifications from the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and the Executive Judge of the
court where they might appear as counsel and state
that they desisted from practicing law during the
period of suspension.
On the claim that the Commission on Human Rights
allowed Atty. Baliga to perform his functions as
Regional Director during the period of suspension, the
Office of the Bar Confidant said that the Commission
"deliberate[ly] disregard[ed]"21 this court's order of
suspension. According to the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Commission on Human Rights had no
power to "[alter, modify, or set aside any of this court's
resolutions] which [have] become final and executory.
"22
Thus, with respect to Atty. Baliga, the Office of the Bar
Confidant recommended that this court require him to
submit a certification from the Commission on Human
Rights stating that he desisted from performing his
functions as Regional Director while he was
suspended from the practice of law.23
The Office of the Bar Confidant further recommended
that Atty. Baliga and the Commission .on Human
Rights be required to comment on complainant
Lingan's allegation that Atty. Baliga continued to
perform his functions as Regional Director while he
was suspended from the practice of law.
On July 17, 2009, Atty. Baliga filed a
manifestation,24 arguing that his suspension from the
practice of law did not include his suspension from
public office. Atty. Baliga said, "[t]o stretch the
coverage of [his suspension from the practice of law]
to [his] public office would be tantamount to [violating]
his constitutional rights [sic] to due process and to the
statutory principle in law that what is not included is
deemed excluded."25
In the resolution26 dated September 23, 2009, this
court required respondents to file their respective
motions to lift order of suspension considering the
lapse of the period of suspension. This court further
ordered Atty. Baliga and the Commission on Human
Rights to comment on complainant Lingari's allegation
that Atty. Baliga continued performing his functions as
Regional Director while he was suspended from the
practice of law. The resolution dated September 23,
2009 provides:
Considering that the period of suspension from the
practice of law and disqualification from being
commissioned as notary public imposed on
respondents have [sic] already elapsed, this Court
resolves:
(1) to require both respondents, within ten (10)
days from notice, to FILE their respective
motions to lift relative to their suspension and
disqualification from being commissioned as
notary public and SUBMIT certifications from
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
Executive Judge of the Court where they may
appear as counsel, stating that respondents
have actually ceased and desisted from the
practice of law during the entire period of their
suspension and disqualification, unless
already complied with in the meantime;
(2) to require Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga to
SUBMIT a certification from the Commission
on Human Rights [CHR] stating that he has
been suspended from office and has stopped
from the performance of his functions for the
period stated in the order of suspension and
disqualification, within ten (10) days from
notice hereof;
(3) to require respondent Atty. Baliga and the
CHR to COMMENT on the allegations of
complainant against them, both within ten (10)
days from receipt of notice hereof;
...27 (Emphasis in the original)
In compliance with this court's order, Attys.
Calubaquib and Baliga filed their respective motions
to lift order of suspension.28 Atty. Baliga also filed his
comment on complainant Lingan's allegation that he
continued performing his functions as Regional
Director during his suspension from the practice of
law.
In his comment29 dated November 13, 2009, Atty.
Baliga alleged that as Regional Director, he
"perform[ed], generally, managerial functions,"30 which
did not require the practice of law. These managerial
functions allegedly included ."[supervising] ... the day
to day operations of the regional office and its
personnel";31 "monitoring progress of investigations
conducted by the [Commission on Human Rights]
Investigation Unit";32 "monitoring the implementation of
all other services and assistance programs of the
[Commission on Human Rights] by the different units
at the regional level";33 and "[supervising] . . . the
budgetary requirement preparation and disbursement
of funds and expenditure of the [Regional
Office]."34 The Commission allegedly has its own
"legal services unit which takes care of the legal
services matters of the [Commission]."35
Stating that his functions as Regional Director did not
require the practice of law, Atty. Baliga claimed thaf
he "faithful[ly] [complied] with [this court's resolution
suspending him from the practice of law]."36
The Commission on Human Rights filed its
comment37 dated November 27, 2009. It argued that
"the penalty imposed upon Atty. Baliga as a member
of the bar is separate and distinct from any penalty
that may be imposed upon him as a public official for
the same acts."38 According to the Commission, Atty.
Baliga's suspension from the practice of law is a "bar
matter"39 while the imposition of penalty upon a
Commission on Human Rights official "is an entirely
different thing, falling as it does within the exclusive
authority of the [Commission as] disciplining body."40
Nevertheless, the Commission manifested that it
would defer to this court's resolution of the issue and
would "abide by whatever ruling or decision [this
court] arrives at on [the] matter. "41 In reply42 to Atty.
Baliga's comment, complainant Lingan argued that
Atty. Baliga again disobeyed this. court. Atty. Baliga
failed to submit a certification from the Commission on
Human Rights stating that he was suspended from
office and desisted from performing his functions as
Regional Director.
As to Atty. Baliga's claim that he did not practice law
while he held his position as Regional Director and
only performed generally managerial functions,
complainant Lingan countered that Atty. Baliga
admitted to defying the order of suspension. Atty.
Baliga admitted to performing the functions of a
"lawyer-manager,"43 which under the landmark case of
Cayetano v. Monsod44 constituted practice of law.
Complainant Lingan reiterated that the position of
Regional Director/ Attorney VI requires the officer "to
be a lawyer [in] good standing."45 Moreover, as
admitted by Atty. Baliga, he had supervision and
control over Attorneys III, IV, and V. Being a "lawyer-
manager," Atty. Baliga practiced law while he held his
position as Regional Director.
With respect to Atty. Baliga's claim that he was in
good faith in reassuming his position as Regional
Director, complainant Lingan countered that if Atty.
Baliga were really in good faith, he should have
followed the initial resolution of the Commission on
Human Rights suspending him from office. Atty.
Baliga did not even furnish this court a copy of his
motion for reconsideration of the Commission on
Human Right's resolution suspending him from office.
By "playing ignorant on what is 'practice of law',
twisting facts and philosophizing,"46 complainant
Lingan argued that Atty. Baliga "[no longer has that]
moral vitality imperative to the title of an
attorney."47 Compfainant Lingan prayed that Atty.
Baliga be disbarred.
On February 17, 2010, this court lifted the order of
suspension of Atty. Calubaquib.48 He was allowed to
resume his practice of law and perform notarial acts
subject to compliance with the requirements for
issuance of a notarial commission.
On the other hand, this court referred to the Office of
the Bar Confidant for evaluation, report, and
recommendation Atty. Baliga's motion to lift one-year
suspension and the respective comments of Atty.
Baliga and the Commission on Human Rights.49
In its report and recommendation50 dated October 18,
2010, the Office of the Bar Confidant stated that Atty.
Baliga "should not [have been] allowed to perform his
functions, duties, and responsibilities [as Regional
Director] which [required acts constituting] practice .of
law."51 Considering that Atty. Baliga claimed that he
did not perform his functions as Regional Director
which required the practice of law, the Office of the
Bar Confidant recommended that the Commission on
Human Rights be required to comment on this claim.
The Office of the Bar Confidant also recommended
holding in abeyance the resolution of Atty. Baliga's
motion to lift suspension "pending [the Commission
on Human Right's filing of comment]."52
In the resolution53 dated January 12, 2011, this court
held in abeyance the resolution of Atty. Baliga's
motion to lift one-year suspension. The Commission
on Human Rights was ordered to comment on Atty.
Baliga's claim that he did not practice law while he
held his position as Regional Director.
In its comment54 dated April 6, 2011, the Commission
on Human Rights reiterated that the penalty imposed
on Atty. Baliga as a member of the bar is separate
from the penalty that might be imposed on him as
Regional Director. The Commission added that it is
"of honest belief that the position of [Regional
Director] is managerial and does not [require the
practice of law]."55 It again manifested that it will "abide
by whatever ruling or decision [this court] arrives on
[the] matter."56
The issue for our resolution is whether Atty. Baliga's
motion to lift order of suspension should be granted.
We find that Atty. Baliga violated this court's order of
suspension. We, therefore, suspend him further from
the practice of law for six months.
Practice of law is "any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience."57 It includes
"[performing] acts which are characteristics of the
[legal] profession"58 or "[rendering any kind of] service
[which] requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill."59
Work in government that requires the use of legal
knowledge is considered practice. of law. In Cayetano
v. Monsod,60 this court cited the deliberations of the
1986 Constitutional Commission and agreed that work
rendered by lawyers in the Commission on Audit
requiring "[the use of] legal knowledge or legal
talent"61 is practice of law.
The Commission on Human Rights is an independent
office created under the Constitution with power to
investigate "all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights[.]"62 It is divided into
regional offices with each office having primary
responsibility to investigate human rights violations in
its territorial jurisdiction.63 Each regional office is
headed by the Regional Director who is given the
position of Attorney VI.
Under the Guidelines and Procedures in the
Investigation and Monitoring of Human Rights
Violations and Abuses, and the Provision of CHR
Assistance,64 the Regional Director has the following
powers and functions:
a. To administer oaths or affirmations with
respect to "[Commission on Human Rights]
matters;"65
b. To issue mission orders in their respective
regional offices;66
c. To conduct preliminary evaluation or initial
investigation of human rights complaints in the
absence of the legal officer or investigator;67
d. To conduct dialogues or preliminary
conferences among parties and discuss
"immediate courses of action and protection
remedies and/or possible submission of the
matter to an alternative dispute resolution";68
e. To issue Commission on Human Rights
processes, including notices, letter-invitations,
orders, or subpoenas within the territorial
jurisdiction of the regional office;69 and
f. To review and approve draft resolutions of
human rights cases prepared by the legal
officer.70
These powers and functions are characteristics of the
legal profession. Oaths and affirmations are usually
performed by members of the judiciary and notaries
public71 - officers who are necessarily members of the
bar.72 Investigating human rights complaints are
performed primarily by the Commission's legal
officer.73 Discussing immediate courses of action and
protection remedies and reviewing and approving
draft resolutions of human rights cases prepared by
the legal officer require the use of extensive legal
knowledge.
The exercise of the powers and functions of a
Commission on Human Rights Regional Director
constitutes practice of law. Thus, the Regional
Director must be an attorney - a member of the bar in
good standing and authorized to practice law.74 When
the Regional Director loses this authority, such as
when he or she is disbarred or suspended from the
practice of law, the Regional Director loses a
necessary qualification to the position he or she is
holding. The disbarred or suspended lawyer must
desist from holding the position of Regional Director.
This court suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of
law for one year on June 15, 2006, "effective
immediately."75 From the time Atty. Baliga received the
court's order of suspension on July 5, 2006,76 he has
been without authority to practice law. He lacked a
necessary qualification to his position as Commission
on Human Rights Regional Director/ Attorney VI. As
the Commission on Human Rights correctly resolved
in its resolution dated January 16, 2007:
WHEREAS, this suspension under ethical standards,
in effect, prevents Atty. Baliga from assuming his
post, for want of eligibility in the meantime that his
authority to practice law is suspended. This is without
prejudice to the investigation to be conducted to the
practice of law of Atty. Baliga, which in the case of all
Regional Human Rights Directors is not generally
allowed by the Commission;
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the
Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines
resolved to put into effect and implement the legal
implications of the SC decision by decreeing the
suspension of Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga in the discharge
of his functions and responsibilities as
Director/Attorney VI of CHRP-Region II in Tuguegarao
City for the period for which the Supreme Court
Resolution is in effect.77 (Emphasis in the original)
In ordering Atty. Baliga suspended from office as
Regional Director, the Commission on Human Rights
did not violate Atty. Baliga's right to due process.
First, he was only suspended after: investigation by
the Commission on Human Rights Legal and
Investigation Office.78 Second, the Commission gave
Atty. Baliga an opportunity to be heard when he filed
his motion for reconsideration.
Atty. Baliga's performance of generally managerial
functions was not supported by the record. It was also
immaterial. He held the position of Commission on
1âwphi 1
Human Rights Regional Director because of his
authority to practice law. Without this authority, Atty.
Baliga was disqualified to hold that position.
All told, performing the functions of a Commission on
Human Rights Regional Director constituted practice
of law. Atty. Baliga should have desisted from holding
his position as Regional Director.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior
court is a ground for disbarment or suspension from
the practice of law:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for
a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
In Molina v. Atty. Magat,79 this court suspended further
Atty. Ceferino R. Magat from the practice of law for six
months for practicing his profession despite this
court's previous order of suspension.
We impose the same penalty on Atty. Baliga for
holding his position as Regional Director despite
lack.of authority to practice law.
1âw phi 1
We note that the Commission on Human Rights En
Banc issued the resolution dated April 13, 2007,
reconsidering its first resolution suspending Atty.
Baliga as Regional Director/ Attorney VI. Instead, the
Commission admonished Atty. Baliga and sternly
warned him that repeating the same offense will
cause his dismissal from the service. The resolution
with CHR (III) No. A2007-045 dated April 13, 2007
reads:
In his Motion for Reconsideration dated March 15,
2007, respondent Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga prays before
the Honorable Commission to recall and annul his
suspension as Regional Director/ Attorney VI of the
Commission on Human Rights - Regional Office No.
II, per 16 January 2007 Commission en Banc
Resolution CHR (III) No. A2007-013.
The grounds relied upon the motion are not sufficient
to convince the Commission that Atty. Jimmy P.
Baliga is totally blameless and should not suffer the
appropriate penalty for breach of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and his Lawyer's oath.
The Commission, in the exercise of its authority to
discipline, is concerned with the transgression by Atty.
Baliga of his oath of office as government employee.
As records have it, the Commission granted Atty.
Baliga authority to secure a commission as a notary
public. With this, he is mandated to act as a notary
public in accordance with the rules and regulations, to
include the conditions expressly set forth by the
Commission.
With the findings clearly enunciated in the Supreme
Court resolution in SC Administrative Case No. 5277
dated 15 June 2006, the Commission cannot close its
eyes to the act of Atty. Baliga that is clearly repugnant
to the conduct of an officer reposed with public trust.
This is enough just cause to have this piece of word,
short of being enraged, and censure Atty. Baliga for
having contravened the conditions of his commission
as a notary public. What was granted to Atty. Baliga is
merely a privilege, the exercise of which requires such
high esteem to be in equal footing with the
constitutional mandate of the Commission. Clearly,
Atty. Baliga should keep in mind that the Commission
exacts commensurate solicitude from whatever
privilege the Commission grants of every official and
employee.
The Commission notes that by now Atty. Baliga is
serving the one year suspension imposed on him
pursuant to the Supreme Court resolution. The
Commission believes that the further suspension of
Atty. Baliga from the office may be too harsh in the
meantime that the Supreme Court penalty is being
served. This Commission is prevailed upon that the
admonition of Atty. Baliga as above expressed is
sufficient to complete the cycle of penalizing an erring
public officer.

WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby modifies its

ruling in Resolution CHR (III) No. A2007-013 and
imposes the penalty of admonition with a stem
warning that a repetition of the same will merit a
penalty of dismissal from the service.80 (Emphasis in
the original)

The Commission on Human Rights erred in issuing

the resolution dated April 13, 2007. This resolution
caused Atty. Baliga to reassume his position as
Regional Director/ Attorney VI despite lack of authority
to practice law.

We remind the Commission on Human Rights that we

have the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice
of law.81 The Commission cannot, by mere resolutions
and .other issuances, modify or defy this court's
orders of suspension from the practice of law.
Although the Commission on Human Rights has the
power to appoint its officers and employees,82 it can
only retain those with the necessary qualifications in
the positions they are holding.

As for Atty. Baliga, we remind him that the practice of

law is a "privilege burdened with conditions."83 To
enjoy the privileges of practicing law, lawyers must
"[adhere] to the rigid standards of mental fitness,
[maintain] the highest degree of morality[,] and
[faithfully comply] with the rules of [the] legal
profession."84

WHEREFORE, we further SUSPEND Atty. Jimmy P.

Baliga from the practice of law for six ( 6) months.
Atty. Baliga shall serve a total of one (1) year and six
(6) months of suspension from the practice of law,
effective upon service on Atty. Baliga of a copy of this
resolution.

SERVE copies of this resolution to the Integrated Bar

of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and
the Commission on Human Rights.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 10992, June 19, 2018
RODOLFO M. YUMANG, CYNTHIA V. YUMANG AND
ARLENE TABULA, Complainants, v. ATTY. EDWIN M.
ALAESTANTE, Respondent.
A.C. No. 10993, , June 19, 2018
BERLIN V. GABERTAN AND HIGINO
GABERTAN, Complainants, v. ATTY. EDWIN M.
ALAESTANTE, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Subject of the present Decision are two administrative
cases for disbarment, separately filed against Atty. Edwin
M. Alaestante (respondent lawyer) by complainants
Rodolfo M. Yumang (Rodolfo), Cynthia V. Yumang
(Cynthia), and Arlene Tabula (Arlene), in A.C. No. 10992,
and Berlin V. Gabertan (Berlin), and Higino Gabertan
(Higino), in A.C. No. 10993, (collectively, complainants).
Complainants charged respondent lawyer with violating
the Code of Professional Responsibility; gross ignorance of
the law; grave misconduct; grave abuse of authority;
gross dishonesty; malpractice; and infidelity to the client.1
Facts
On January 3, 2012, respondent lawyer wrote then
Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Leila De Lima
(Secretary De Lima) a letter,2viz.:
Dear Secretary De Lima:
May I respectfully request from your Honorable Office for
the conduct of preliminary investigation and/or
Prosecution of respondent Cynthia V. Yumang, et al., for
the crimes of syndicated Estafa, Qualified Theft and Grave
Threats.
Though mindful that venue/jurisdiction of the alleged
crimes is primarily vested with your Public Prosecutor at
Marikina City, we earnestly seek your good favor, and
instead take a direct action on our case since respondent
Cynthia V. Yumang is a savvy businesswoman and
possesses material wealth and tremendous political clout
and influence at Marikina City, and Complainants have [a]
well[-]grounded belief that they could not obtain justice in
[the] said venue. Complainants have already suffered
injustice when they [first] lodged their complaint before
the local police but they were instead given [a] run-
around and advised for the 9th time to go back and forth
to the Marikina Police Headquarters.
Compounding complainant[']s predicament, they are
Engineers/Contractors based at Balanga City[,] Bataan
and have no means and method[s] to steal-mate [sic]
respondents influence and political clout at Marikina City,
except via the direct intervention of your office.3
On even date, respondent lawyer's clients, Ernesto S.
Mallari (Ernesto) and Danilo A. Rustia, Jr. (Danilo),
executed a Joint Complaint Affidavit against herein
complainants for syndicated estafa, qualified theft and
grave threats cases.4
Claiming that respondent lawyer's January 3, 2012 letter
contained scurrilous statements intended to malign and
besmirch Cynthia's reputation and business standing,
Cynthia and her husband, the complainant Rodolfo, filed a
libel complaint against respondent lawyer, Ernesto, and
Danilo before the Pasig City Prosecutor's Office (libel
case).5
In their counter-affidavit, Ernesto and Danilo denied any
knowledge of, or participation in, the writing of the said
letter.6
On the other hand, respondent lawyer admitted that he
was the author of the letter.7 He denied, however, that
the letter was libelous or defamatory, and insisted that
the same was privileged communication. He claimed that
he wrote the letter to protect and advance the interests of
Ernesto and Danilo.8
In a Resolution9 dated October 5, 2015, the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Pasig found probable cause to indict
respondent lawyer, as well as Ernesto, and Danilo, for the
crime of libel.
In the meantime, in a Resolution10 dated November 28,
2012, the DOJ dismissed for lack of merit, the complaint
for syndicated estafa, qualified theft, and grave threats
filed by Ernesto and Danilo against herein complainants.
Based on the foregoing, herein complainants filed on
March 7, 2013, two separate disbarment complaints
against respondent lawyer before the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP).
In their Joint Affidavit of Complaint/Petition for
Disbarment,11 complainants Rodolfo, Cynthia, and Arlene
averred that respondent lawyer violated his Oath of Office
and the Code of Professional Responsibility, when he
prepared, wrote, signed, and published the malicious and
libelous January 3, 2012 letter.
For their part, complainants Berlin and Higino declared in
their Sinumpaang Salaysay12 that they were the
respondents in the alleged syndicated estafa, grave
threats and qualified theft cases alongside their relatives,
Cynthia and Arlene. They claimed that they had previously
engaged respondent lawyer's legal services in other
cases; that since they knew respondent lawyer, they
approached him regarding his letter dated January 3,
2012, but respondent lawyer told them not to worry about
the cases mentioned in the said letter, and promised to
draft the appropriate pleadings for their defense; that
indeed respondent lawyer drafted their Counter-Affidavit
and their Rejoinder by way of defense; and that in
payment for his professional legal services, they issued
respondent lawyer a Bank of Commerce check in the
amount of P50,000.00.
Higino stressed that respondent lawyer's act of preparing
their responsive pleadings in the syndicated estafa, grave
threats and qualified theft cases was violative of the
proscription against lawyers representing conflicting
interests since he was the very same lawyer who initiated
and/or drafted the complaint in these cases against them;
and that as a consequence thereof, he (Berlin) moved to
discharge respondent lawyer as counsel in another case.13
In his Answer,14 respondent lawyer admitted that he was
the author of the January 3, 2012 letter to then DOJ
Secretary De Lima; but he insisted that the letter was
privileged because it was written in response to a moral or
legal duty, he being the lawyer for his clients in the cases
mentioned in the letter. He denied that he was the
defense counsel for Berlin and Higino in the syndicated
estafa, grave threats and qualified theft cases, and
averred that the P50,000.00 check that was issued in his
favor by Berlin and Higino was just a "petty portion" of the
P1.1 million that he previously entrusted to Berlin and
Higino relative to a case that he lawyered for them.
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner:
In a Report and Recommendation15 dated September 10,
2013, the Investigating Commissioner16 recommended
respondent lawyer's suspension from the practice of law
for six months, in connection with the disbarment case
filed by Cynthia, Rodolfo, and Arlene; and suspension
from the practice of law for one year, in regard to the
disbarment case filed by Berlin and Higino.
The Investigating Commissioner ratiocinated that -
It is admitted that Respondent authored a letter
addressed to the Secretary of DOJ on January 03, 2012
and the matter was investigated by the DOJ but the same
was dismissed for lack of merit. x x x
That prior to January 03, 2012 x x x filing of the charges
with the DOJ, against herein Complainants, Berlin and
Higino Gabertan engaged the services of Respondent as
their counsel in several cases since April 2011 to August
31, 2012.
That Respondent received the amount of P50,000.00 from
Berlin and Higino Gabertan thru Bank of Commerce check
No. 0000008 dated June 11, 2012 and personally
encashed by the Respondent (Exh. H). x x x
That because of that letter filed with the DOJ by
Respondent and [which] was [later] dismissed,
complainants filed a libel case with the RTC, Pasig City
Branch 157 (Exh. D).
That the letter filed by Respondent with the DOJ [was]
correctly ruled by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig
City, as not privileged communication as it [was] not
made in the course of judicial proceedings. (Exh. C).
That Respondent acted as defense counsel for Berlin and
Higino Gabertan whom he charged together with the other
complainants with the DOJ (Exh. L).
Clearly, Respondent violated the prohibition that [a]
lawyer should not represent new clients whose interest
oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or
not they are parties in the same action or totally unrelated
cases. (In Re Dela Rosa, 27 Phil. 258. Lim et al. vs.
Villorosa A.C. 5303 June 15, 2006).
It is enough that the counsel of one party had a hand in
the preparation of the pleading of the other party,
claiming adverse and conflicting interest with that of his
original client. (Artezuela vs. Madferazo, A.C. No. 4354
April 22, 2002).
Respondent violated his Lawyer's Oath when he sent
unsealed malicious and libelous letter against herein
Complainants without any effort to ascertain the truth
thus constituted gross evident bad faith for which act he is
liable in CBD Case No. 13-3767 while for acting as counsel
for the complainant in the case before the DOJ and [at]
the same time preparing the counter affidavit of Berlin
and Higino Gabertan who were Respondents] in the DOJ
case he filed against herein complainants, thus he is also
liable under CBD Case No. 13-3767.
It was found out also [that] the Respondent was the
defense counsel of Berlin Gabertan whom he charged
before the DOJ in an ongoing civil case at San Mateo,
Rizal RTC Branch 76 but claimed that he was just acting
as counsel pro-bono.
Complainants having presented sufficient evidence thus
proving their case by clear preponderance of evidenced it
is hereby recommended that Respondent be meted the
appropriate penalty for the violation he committed.17
Report and Recommendation of the IBP-Board of
Governors (BOG):
Finding the Report and Recommendation supported by law
and the evidence, the IBP-BOG adopted and accepted the
Investigating Commissioner's recommendation, but with
modification as regards the recommended penalty in that
respondent lawyer be suspended from the practice of law
for one year in the complaint filed by Cynthia, Rodolfo,
and Arlene; and for two years, in the case filed by Berlin
and Higino,18 said penalties to be served successively.
Ruling
These administrative cases bear some factual
resemblance to Pacana, Jr. v. Atty. Pascual-
Lopez.19 In Pacana, Jr., the lawyer denied any lawyer-
client relationship with the complainant, saying that no
formal agreement had been entered to that effect; also,
the therein counsel questioned the admissibility of an
electronic mail he sent to therein complainant. In said
case, the lawyer likewise assured the complainant that
there was nothing to worry about when the latter
expressed doubts over the propriety of the lawyer's
representing conflicting interests. We therein rejected the
erring lawyer's defenses, thus:
Respondent also tries to disprove the existence of such
relationship by arguing that no written contract for the
engagement of her services was ever forged between her
and complainant. This argument all the more reveals
respondent's patent ignorance of fundamental laws on
contracts and of basic ethical standards expected from an
advocate of justice. The IBP was correct when it said:
The absence of a written contract will not preclude the
finding that there was a professional relationship between
the parties. Documentary formalism is not an
essential element in the employment of an attorney;
the contract may be express or implied. To establish
the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance
of an attorney is sought and received in any matter
pertinent to his profession.
Given the situation, the most decent and ethical tiling
which respondent should have done was either to advise
complainant to engage the services of another lawyer
since she was already representing the opposing parties,
or to desist from acting as representative of Multitel
investors and stand as counsel for complainant. She
cannot be permitted to do both because that would
amount to double-dealing and violate our ethical rules on
conflict of interest.20 (Emphasis in the original)
What is more, administrative cases are sui generis.21 This
Court, acting as the legal profession's sole disciplinary
body, is not strictly bound by the technical rules of
procedure and evidence.22 Indeed, hewing strictly to
technical rules of procedure and evidence could at times
thwart this Court's efforts to rid the legal profession of
unscrupulous individuals who use their very knowledge of
the law to perpetrate fraud or commit transgressions to
the detriment of their clients, who purposefully have
sought their legal opinion and assistance in the hopes of
attaining justice.
Here, even disregarding the electronic mail sent by
respondent lawyer, we are satisfied that other
incontrovertible evidence supports the allegation that a
lawyer-client relationship did exist, or had been
established, between respondent lawyer on the one hand,
and Berlin and Higino on the other. For one thing, it was
remarkable that respondent lawyer never refuted or
denied Berlin's claim that he (Atty. Alaestante)
represented him in a civil case pending before the
Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal (RTC-Rizal). As
against a Motion to Discharge Counsel duly filed with the
RTC-Rizal, respondent lawyer's bare denial of the
existence of a lawyer-client relationship is of no
avail.23 Caught in a web of lies, Atty. Alaestante even
contradicted himself when he stated that "[a]fter having
been convinced of the personalities of Berlin and Higino
Gabeitan in relation to counsel'[s] pro bono handling of
the case in RTC San Mateo, as well as the smell of estafa
having been committed by Berlin Gabeitan against the
plaintiff thereof, counsel decided not to pursue defending
defendant Gabertan."24 That is the problem with fibs,
falsehoods, dissemblances, prevarications, and half-
truths. They not only collide with the truth, they also
collide with each other.
More than these, guided by the tenor of a Memorandum of
Agreement25 (MOA) constituted between or amongst,
Berlin, respondent lawyer, and two other persons, it can
hardly be doubted that Berlin and respondent lawyer had
a close relationship with the parties therein, and that he
offered his legal expertise to the said parties. This is
evident from the language of the MOA where Berlin and
respondent lawyer were collectively referred to as the
"second parties" who were able to secure "a favorable
decision dated August 26, 2011 from the Honorable
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila[,] Branch 26" and were
hired "to recover actual and physical possession over" a
parcel of land.26
It is almost a cliche to say that a lawyer is forbidden "from
representing conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts. Such prohibition is founded on principles of public
policy and good taste as the nature of the lawyer-client
relations is one of trust and confidence of the highest
degree. Lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate
the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance
of [impropriety] and double-dealing for only then can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the
administration of justice.27
The alleged "non-payment of professional [fees, even if
true, would] not exculpate respondent [lawyer] from
liability. [The a]bsence of monetary consideration does
not exempt lawyers from complying with the prohibition
against pursuing cases with conflicting interests. The
prohibition attaches from the moment the attorney-client
relationship is established and extends even beyond the
duration of the professional relationship."28
The sending of the unsealed scurrilous letter by
respondent lawyer to DOJ Secretary De Lima, was a
violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which stipulates that "[a] lawyer shall not,
in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper." In that letter,
not only did respondent lawyer employ intemperate or
unbridled language, he was also guilty of corner-cutting
unprofessionally. His act of directly asking the Secretary
of Justice to intervene immediately in the syndicated
estafa, grave threats and qualified theft cases showed his
propensity for utterly disregarding the rules of procedure
which had been formulated precisely to regulate and
govern legal and judicial processes properly.
Under the circumstances, we find the penalty of
suspension for six (6) months from the practice of law, in
connection with A.C. No. 10992, and suspension for one
(1) year from the practice of law, in connection with A.C.
No. 10993, as recommended by the Investigating
Commissioner, proper and commensurate.
ACCORDINGLY, this Court resolves to SUSPEND Atty.
Edwin M. Alaestante from the practice of law for six (6)
months in A.C. No. 10992 and for one (1) year in A.C. No.
10993, reckoned from his receipt of this Decision, said
penalties to be sewed in succession, with
a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
offense will warrant a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the
Office of the Bar Confidant, and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for their information and guidance. The Office
of the Bar Confidant is also DIRECTED to append a copy
of this Decision to respondent's record as a member of the
Bar.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 11600, June 19, 2017
ROMULO DE MESA FESTIN, Complainant, v. ATTY.
ROLANDO V. ZUBIRI, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from an affidavit-
complaint1 filed by complainant Romulo De Mesa Festin
(complainant) against respondent Atty. Rolando V. Zubiri
(respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for gross violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).
The Facts
Complainant alleged that he was elected as Mayor of the
Municipality of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro in the May
2013 elections. His opponent, Jose Tapales Villarosa
(Villarosa), filed an election protest against him before the
Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro,
Branch 46 (RTC).2 After deciding in favor of Villarosa, the
RTC issued an Order3 dated January 15, 2014 (January
15, 2014 Order), granting his motion for execution
pending appeal, viz.:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal is
GRANTED.
The OIC-Branch Clerk of Court [(COC)] is hereby directed
to issue a Writ of Execution Pending Appeal after the
lapse of twenty (20) working days to be counted from
the time [complainant's] counsel receives a copy of this
Special Order, if no restraining order or status quo
order is issued pursuant to Section 11 (b),4 Rule 14 of
A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC.5 (Emphasis supplied)
Distressed, complainant filed a petition
for certiorari6 before the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), seeking a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
against the issuance of the writ of execution pending
appeal.7 In an Order8 dated February 13, 2014, the
COMELEC issued a TRO, directing Hon. Gay Marie F.
Lubigan-Rafael (RTC Judge), in her official capacity as
Presiding Judge of the RTC, to cease and desist from
enforcing the January 15, 2014 Order, effective
immediately.9 Accordingly, the RTC issued another
Order10 dated February 25, 2014 (February 25, 2014
Order), pertinent portion of which reads:
In view thereof, the OIC-Branch [COC] is directed NOT
TO ISSUE a Writ of Execution in accordance with the
[January 15, 2014] Order until further notice.11
Despite the TRO and the RTC's February 25, 2014 Order,
respondent, as counsel of Villarosa, filed five (5)
manifestations12 addressed to the COC insisting on the
writ's issuance. Notably, he did not serve copies of these
manifestations to the other party.13
In these manifestations, respondent claimed that his client
received the RTC's January 15, 2014 Order on January 18,
2014, and counting from said date, the twenty-day period
ended on February 12, 2014.14 Since the COMELEC only
issued the TRO on February 13, 2014, the TRO no longer
had any effect. Respondent further asserted that the TRO
was addressed only to the RTC Judge, and not to the
COC; therefore, the COC is not bound by the TRO. For
these reasons, respondent insisted that the COC could
legally issue the writ of execution pending appeal.15
The COC eventually issued a Writ of Execution Pending
Appeal addressed to the sheriff. However, complainant
only found out about respondent's manifestations when
the sheriff attempted to serve the writ on him.16 Soon
thereafter, complainant filed the disbarment complaint.
In his complaint, complainant argued that respondent
violated his ethical duties when he misled and induced the
COC to defy lawful orders - particularly, the COMELEC's
TRO and the RTC's February 25, 2014 Order.17 As a result,
respondent allegedly violated Canons 1, 10, 15, and 19 of
the CPR.18
In his answer,19 respondent claimed that, first, since the
case records had been transmitted to the COMELEC on
January 31, 2014, the RTC was divested of jurisdiction
over the case; therefore, it had no more power to issue
the February 25, 2014 Order.20 Respondent put forward
the same reason for filing the five manifestations with the
COC instead of the RTC Judge.21Second, the
manifestations contained no misleading statements or
factual deviations. He merely stated in his manifestations
his honest belief that the twenty-day period had already
lapsed when the COMELEC issued its TRO; hence, it no
longer had any binding effect. He explained that the filing
of manifestations to highlight his position did not violate
any rule.22Third, he allegedly filed those manifestations
pursuant to his duty under Canon 18 of the CPR to
represent his client with competence and diligence.23
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation24 dated September 1,
2014, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six
(6) months.25 He observed that by filing manifestations
instead of motions, respondent was able to disregard the
rule that motions shall be served on the other party and
shall contain a notice of hearing. In this regard, the
Investigating Commissioner noted that a manifestation
merely informs the court about a certain matter involving
the case, and does not require affirmative action by the
court. In the present case, however, the manifestations
filed by respondent were actually motions as these
contained arguments to support his prayer for the
issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal. Moreover,
the Investigating Commissioner also held that respondent
acted in bad faith when he convinced the COC to
disregard the COMELEC's TRO. He pointed out that when
the TRO enjoins the court, it includes the judge and all
officers and employees of the court, including the clerk of
court. Hence, respondent was unfair to the other party
and employed deceit when he filed the manifestations. As
a result, the other party was not afforded due process by
being deprived of an opportunity to oppose the
manifestations.26
In a Resolution27 dated December 14, 2014, the IBP Board
of Governors (IBP Board) adopted and approved the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigation
Commissioner.
Respondent moved for reconsideration,28 which was,
however, denied in a Resolution29 dated May 28, 2016.
On October 10, 2016, respondent filed a petition for
review30 before the Court purportedly pursuant to the
procedure laid out in Ramientas v. Reyala (Ramientas).31
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue in this case is whether or not respondent
should be held administratively liable for the acts
complained of.
The Court's Ruling
I.
At the outset, the Court deems it proper to clarify that
respondent's filing of the instant petition for review does
not conform with the standing procedure for the
investigation of administrative complaints against lawyers.
Section 12 (b) and (c) of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court,
as amended by Bar Matter No. 1645 dated October 13,
2015,32 states:
Section 12. Review and Recommendation by the Board
of Governors. -
xxxx
b) After its review, the Board, by the vote of a majority of
its total membership, shall recommend to the Supreme
Court the dismissal of the complaint or the imposition of
disciplinary action against the respondent. The Board shall
issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations, clearly and distinctly stating the facts
and the reasons on which it is based. The resolution shall
be issued within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days
from the next meeting of the Board following the
submission of the Investigator's report.
c) The Board's resolution, together with the entire
records and all evidence presented and submitted,
shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final
action within ten (10) days from issuance of the
resolution.
x x x x (Emphases supplied)
Under the old rule, the IBP Board had the power to "issue
a decision" if the lawyer complained of was either
exonerated or meted a penalty of "less than suspension of
disbarment." In this situation, the case would be deemed
terminated unless an interested party files a petition
before the Court.33 The case of Ramientas,34 which was
cited as respondent's basis for filing the present petition
for review, was pronounced based on the old rule.35
In contrast, under the amended provisions cited above,
the IBP Board's resolution is merely recommendatory
regardless of the penalty imposed on the lawyer. The
amendment stresses the Court's authority to discipline a
lawyer who transgresses his ethical duties under the CPR.
Hence, any final action on a lawyer's administrative
liability shall be done by the Court based on the entire
records of the case, including the IBP Board's
recommendation, without need for the lawyer-respondent
to file any additional pleading.
On this score, respondent's filing of the present petition
for review is unnecessary. Pursuant to the current rule,
the IBP Board's resolution and the case records were
forwarded to the Court. The latter is then bound to fully
consider all documents contained therein, regardless of
any further pleading filed by any party - including
respondent's petition for review, which the Court shall
nonetheless consider if only to completely resolve the
merits of this case and determine respondent's actual
administrative liability.
II.
After a judicious review of the case records, the Court
agrees with the IBP that respondent should be held
administratively liable for his violations of the CPR.
However, the Court finds it proper to impose a lower
penalty.
Canon 1 of the CPR mandates lawyers to uphold the
Constitution and promote respect for the legal
processes.36 Additionally, Canon 8 and Rule 10.03, Canon
10 of the CPR require lawyers to conduct themselves with
fairness towards their professional colleagues, to observe
procedural rules, and not to misuse them to defeat the
ends of justice. These provisions read thus:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAW OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
xxxx
CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH
COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARDS HIS
PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID
HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL
xxxx
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND
GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
xxxx
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure
and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
Contrary to these edicts, respondent improperly filed the
five (5) motions as "manifestations" to sidestep the
requirement of notice of hearing for motions. In effect, he
violated his professional obligations to respect and
observe procedural rules, not to misuse the rules to cause
injustice, and to exhibit fairness towards his professional
colleagues.
The difference between a manifestation and a motion is
essential in determining respondent's administrative
liability.
A manifestation is usually made merely for the
information of the court, unless otherwise indicated. In a
manifestation, the manifesting party makes a statement
to inform the court, rather than to contest or argue.37 In
contrast, a motion is an application for relief from the
court other than by a pleading38 and must be
accompanied by a notice of hearing and proof of service to
the other party, unless the motion is not prejudicial to the
rights of the adverse party.39 Settled is the rule that a
motion without notice of hearing is pro forma or a mere
scrap of paper; thus, the court has no reason to consider
it and the clerk has no right to receive it. The reason for
the rule is simple: to afford an opportunity for the other
party to agree or object to the motion before the court
resolves it. This is in keeping with the principle of due
process.40
In the present case, respondent filed five (5)
manifestations before the COC praying for affirmative
reliefs. The Court agrees with the IBP that these
"manifestations" were in fact motions, since reliefs were
prayed for from the court - particularly, the issuance of
the writ of execution pending appeal. By labelling them as
manifestations, respondent craftily sidestepped the
requirement of a notice of hearing and deprived the other
party of an opportunity to oppose his arguments.
Moreover, the fact that he submitted these manifestations
directly to COC, instead of properly filing them before the
RTC, highlights his failure to exhibit fairness towards the
other party by keeping the latter completely unaware of
his manifestations. Undoubtedly, respondent violated his
professional obligations under the CPR.
He attempts to justify his acts by arguing that he merely
represented his client with competence and diligence.
However, respondent should be reminded that a lawyer is
ethically bound not only to serve his client but also the
court, his colleagues, and society. His obligation to
represent his client is not without limits, but must be
"within the bounds of the law" pursuant to Canon 19 of
the CPR. Accordingly, he is ethically bound to employ only
fair and honest means to attain their clients' objectives.
Respondent further argues that his filing of the
manifestations with the COC is justified considering that
the RTC had already lost jurisdiction over the case and the
COC had the ministerial duty to issue the writ of
execution. His argument fails to persuade. The Court has
ruled that a COC has a ministerial duty to issue a writ of
execution when the judge directs its issuance.41 In this
case, however, the RTC Judge had issued the second
Order (dated February 25, 2014) explicitly directing the
COC "NOT TO ISSUE a Writ of Execution." Therefore, the
COC in this case did not have a ministerial duty to issue
the writ of execution. If respondent honestly believed that
his client was entitled to the writ, then he should not have
clandestinely submitted ex parte manifestations directly to
the COC to coerce the latter to grant his intended relief.
Instead, respondent should have filed the proper motions
before the court, which alone has the inherent power to
grant his prayer pursuant to Section 5 (c), (d), and (g),
Rule 135 of the Rules of Court.42
The Court has the plenary power to discipline erring
lawyers. In the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, it
may to impose a less severe punishment if such penalty
would achieve the desired end of reforming the errant
lawyer.43 In light of the foregoing discussion, the Court
deems that a penalty of suspension from the practice of
law for three (3) months is sufficient and commensurate
with respondent's infractions.44
As a final note, the Court stresses that a lawyer's primary
duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice.
Any conduct that tends to delay, impede, or obstruct the
administration of justice contravenes this
obligation.45 Indeed, a lawyer must champion his client's
cause with competence and diligence, but he cannot
invoke this as an excuse for his failure to exhibit courtesy
and fairness to his fellow lawyers and to respect legal
processes designed to afford due process to all
stakeholders.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Rolando V. Zubiri
(respondent) is found GUILTY of violating Canon 1,
Canon 8, and Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3)
months effective from the finality of this Decision, and
is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the
Bar Confidant, to be attached to respondent's personal
record as a member of the Bar. Furthermore, let copies of
the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator,
which is directed to circulate them to all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

[A.C. NO. 5338 : February 23, 2009]
EUGENIA MENDOZA, Complainant, v. ATTY. VICTOR V.
DECIEMBRE, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Any departure from the path which a lawyer must follow
as demanded by the virtues of his profession shall not be
tolerated by this Court as the disciplining authority for
there is perhaps no profession after that of the sacred
ministry in which a high-toned morality is more imperative
than that of law.1
Before the Court is the Petition filed by Eugenia Mendoza
(complainant) dated September 19, 2000, seeking the
disbarment of Atty. Victor V. Deciembre (respondent) for
his acts of fraudulently filling up blank postdated checks
without her authority and using the same for filing
unfounded criminal suits against her.
Complainant, a mail sorter at the Central Post Office
Manila, averred that: On October 13, 1998, she borrowed
from Rodela Loans, Inc., through respondent, the amount
of P20,000.00 payable in six months at 20% interest,
secured by 12 blank checks, with numbers 47253, 47256
to 47266, drawn against the Postal Bank. Although she
was unable to faithfully pay her obligations on their due
dates, she made remittances, however, to respondent's
Metrobank account from November 11, 1998 to March 15,
1999 in the total sum of P12,910.00.2 Claiming that the
amounts remitted were not enough to cover the penalties,
interests and other charges, respondent warned
complainant that he would deposit Postal Check No.
47253 filled up by him on March 30, 1999 in the amount
of P16,000.00. Afraid that respondent might sue her in
court, complainant made good said check and respondent
was able to encash the same on March 30, 1999.
Thereafter, complainant made subsequent payments to
the Metrobank account of respondent from April 13, 1999
to October 15, 1999,3 thereby paying respondent the total
sum of P35,690.00.4
Complainant further claimed that, later, respondent filled
up two of the postal checks she issued in blank, Check
Nos. 47261 and 47262 with the amount of P50,000.00
each and with the dates January 15, 2000 and January
20, 2000 respectively, which respondent claims was in
exchange for the P100,000.00 cash that complainant
received on November 15, 1999. Complainant insisted
however that she never borrowed P100,000.00 from
respondent and that it was unlikely that respondent would
lend her, a mail sorter with a basic monthly salary of less
than P6,000.00, such amount. Complainant also claimed
that respondent victimized other employees of the Postal
Office by filling up, without authorization, blank checks
issued to him as condition for loans.5
In his Comment dated January 18, 2000, respondent
averred that his dealings with complainant were done in
his private capacity and not as a lawyer, and that when he
filed a complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
(B.P. Blg.) 22 against complainant, he was only
vindicating his rights as a private citizen. He alleged
further that: it was complainant who deliberately deceived
him by not honoring her commitment to their November
15, 1999 transaction involving P100,000.00 and covered
by two checks which bounced for the reason "account
closed"; the October 13, 1999 transaction was a separate
and distinct transaction; complainant filed the disbarment
case against him to get even with him for filing the estafa
and B.P. Blg. 22 case against the former; complainant's
claim that respondent filled up the blank checks issued by
complainant is a complete lie; the truth was that the
checks referred to were already filled up when
complainant affixed her signature thereto; it was
unbelievable that complainant would issue blank checks,
and that she was a mere low-salaried employee, since she
was able to maintain several checking accounts; and if he
really intended to defraud complainant, he would have
written a higher amount on the checks instead of
only P50,000.00.6
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines7 (IBP), and the parties were required to file
their position papers.8
In her Position Paper, complainant, apart from reiterating
her earlier claims, alleged that respondent, after the
hearing on the disbarment case before the IBP on
September 5, 2001, again filled up three of her blank
checks, Check Nos. 47263, 47264 and 47265,
totaling P100,000.00, to serve as basis for another
criminal complaint, since the earlier estafa and B.P. Blg.
22 case filed by respondent against her before the Office
of the Prosecutor of Pasig City was dismissed on August
14, 2000.9
Respondent insisted in his Position Paper, however, that
complainant borrowed P100,000.00 in exchange for two
postdated checks, and that since he had known
complainant for quite some time, he accepted said checks
on complainant's assurance that they were good as
cash.10
Investigating Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes
submitted his Report dated September 6, 2002, finding
respondent guilty of dishonesty and recommended
respondent's suspension from the practice of law for one
year.11 The Report was adopted and approved by the IBP
Board of Governors in its Resolution dated October 19,
2002.12 Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which was denied, however, by the IBP Board of
Governors on January 25, 2003 on the ground that it no
longer had jurisdiction on the matter, as the same was
already endorsed to the Supreme Court.13
On June 9, 2003 this Court's Second Division issued a
Resolution remanding the case to the IBP for the conduct
of formal investigation, as the Report of Commissioner
Reyes was based merely on the pleadings submitted.14
After hearings were conducted,15 Investigating
Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa submitted his Report
dated December 5, 2006 finding respondent guilty of
gross misconduct and violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and recommended respondent's
suspension for three years.16
Commissioner Funa held that while it was difficult at first
to determine who between complainant and respondent
was telling the truth, in the end, respondent himself, with
his own contradicting allegations, showed that
complainant's version should be given more credence.17
Commissioner Funa noted that although complainant's
total obligation to respondent was only P24,000.00, since
the loan obtained by complainant on October 13, 1998
was P20,000.00 at 20% interest payable in six months, by
April 13, 1999, however, complainant had actually paid
respondent the total amount of P30,240.00. Thus, even
though the payment was irregularly given, respondent
actually earned more than the agreed upon 20% interest.
Moreover, the amounts of P50,000.00 as well as the name
of the payee in the subject checks were all typewritten18
Commissioner Funa also gave credence to complainant's
claim that it was respondent's modus operandi to demand
a certain amount as "settlement" for the dropping of
estafa complaints against his borrowers. As Commissioner
Funa explains:
[A] complaint for estafa/violation of BP 22 was filed
against [complainant] before the Prosecutor's Office in
Pasig City on June 21, 2000. On August 14, 2000, the
Prosecutor's Office dismissed the complaint. On October 2,
2000, Complainant filed this disbarment case. About one
year later, or on September 5, 2001, Complainant was
surprised to receive a demand letter demanding payment
once again for another P100,000.00 corresponding to
another three checks, Check Nos. 0047263, 0047264 and
0047265.
Furthermore, Respondent filed another criminal complaint
for estafa/violation of BP 22 dated October 17, 2001, this
time before the QC Prosecutor's Office. The prosecutor's
office recommended the filing of the criminal case for one
of the checks.
xxx
Respondent's version, on the other hand, is that Check
Nos. 0047261 and 0047262 were given to him for loans
(rediscounting) contacted on November 15, 1999 and
not for a loan contracted on October 13, 1998. x x x He
claims that the October 13, 1998 transaction is an earlier
and different transaction. x x x On the very next day, or
on November 16, 1999, Complainant again allegedly
contracted another loan for another P100,000.00 for
which Complainant allegedly issued the following Postal
Bank checks [Check No. 0047263 dated May 16, 2001
for P20,000.00; Check No. 0047264 dated May 30, 2001
for P30,000.00 and Check No. 0047265 dated June 15,
2001 for P50,000.00].
xxx
Oddly though, Respondent never narrated that
Complainant obtained a second loan on November 16,
1999 in his Answer [dated January 18, 2000] and in his
Position Paper [dated October 8, 2001]. He did not even
discuss it in his Motion for Reconsideration dated
December 20, 2002, although he attached the Resolution
of the QC Prosecutor's Office. Clearly, the November 16,
1999 transaction was a mere concoction that did not
actually occur. It was a mere afterthought. Respondent
once again filled-up three of the other checks in his
possession (checks dated May 16, 2001, May 30, 2001
and June 15, 2001) so that he can again file another
estafa/BP 22 case against Complainant (October 17,
2001) AFTER the earlier complaint he had filed before the
Pasig City Prosecutor's Office had been dismissed (August
14, 2000) and AFTER herein Complainant had filed this
disbarment case (October 2, 2000).
More telling, and this is where Respondent gets caught,
are the circumstances attending this second loan of
November 16, 1999. In addition to not mentioning it at all
in his Answer, his Position Paper, and his Motion for
Reconsideration, which makes it very strange, is that fact
that he alleges that the loan was contracted on November
16, 1999 for which Complainant supposedly issued checks
dated May 16, 2001, May 30, 2001 and June 15, 2001.
Note that May 16, 2001 is eighteen (18 months), or 1
year and 6 months, from November 16, 1999. This is
strangely a long period for loans of this nature. This loan
was supposedly not made in writing, only verbally. With
no collaterals and no guarantors. Clearly, this is a non-
existent transaction. It was merely concocted
by Respondent.
More importantly, and this is where Respondent
commits his fatal blunder thus exposing his illegal
machinations, Complainant allegedly
received P100,000.00 in cash on November 16, 1999 for
which Complainant gave Respondent, in return, checks
also amounting to P100,000.00. The checks were
supposedly dated May 16, 2001, May 30, 2001 and June
15, 2001 x x x.
Now then, would not Respondent suffer a financial loss if
he gave away P100,000.00 on November 16, 1999 and
then also receive P100,000.00 on May 16, 2001 or 1 year
and 6 months later? A person engaged in lending business
would want to earn interest. The same also with a person
re-discounting checks. In this instance, in his haste to
concoct a story, Respondent forgot to factor in the
interest. At 20% interest, assuming that it is per annum,
for 1' years, Respondent should have collected from
Complainant at least P130,000.00. And yet the checks he
filled up totaled only P100,000.00. The same is true in re-
discounting a check. If Complainant gave
Respondent P100,000.00 in checks, Respondent should be
giving Complainant an amount less
than P100,000.00. This exposes his story as a
fabrication.
The same observations can be made of the first loan
of P100,000.00 secured by Check Nos. 0047261 and
0047262.
More strangely, during the course of the entire
investigation, Respondent never touched on what
transpired on the dates of November 15 and 16, 1999.
Consider that Complainant's position is that no such
transaction took place on November 15 and 16. And yet,
Respondent never made any effort to establish that
Complainant borrowed P100,000.00 on November 15 and
then another P100,000.00 again on November 16.
Respondent merely focused on establishing that
Complainant's checks bounced - - - a fact already
admitted several times by the Complainant - - - and the
reasons for which were already explained by Complainant.
This only shows the lack of candor of Respondent.19
xxx
We take note further that Complainant is a mere mail
sorter earning less than P6,000.00 per month. Who
would lend P200,000.00 to an employee earning such a
salary, nowadays, and not even secure such a loan with a
written document or a collateral? It defies realities of
finance, economy and business. It even defies common
sense.20
Commissioner Funa also took note that the instant case
had practically the same set of facts as in Olbes v.
Deciembre21 and Acosta v. Deciembre.22 In Olbes,
complainants therein, who were also postal employees,
averred that respondent without authority filled up a total
of four checks to represent a total of P200,000.00.
In Acosta, the complainant therein, another postal
employee, averred that respondent filled up two blank
checks for a total of P100,000.00. Acosta, however, was
dismissed by Commissioner Lydia Navarro on the ground
that it did not involve any lawyer-client relationship, which
ground, Commissioner Funa believes, is erroneous.23
On May 31, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors issued a
resolution adopting and approving Commissoner Funa's
Report, but modifying the penalty, as follows:
RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2007-219
Adm. Case No. 5338
Eugenia Mendoza v.
Atty. Victor V. Deciembre
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
Respondent's gross misconduct and for practically found
guilty of committing the same set of facts alleged in AC
5365, Atty. Victor V. Deciembre is hereby SUSPENDED
INDEFINITELY from the practice of law to be served
successively after the lifting of Respondent's Indefinite
Suspension.24
Although no motion for reconsideration was filed before
the IBP Board of Governors, nor a Petition for Review
before this Court as reported by IBP and Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Court considers the IBP Resolution merely
recommendatory and therefore would not attain finality,
pursuant to par. (b), Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules
of Court. The IBP elevated to this Court the entire records
of the case for appropriate action.
The Court agrees with the findings of the IBP, but finds
that disbarment and not just indefinite suspension is in
order.
The practice of law is not a right but merely a privilege
bestowed by the State upon those who show that they
possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications
required by law for the conferment of such privilege.25 A
high sense of morality, honesty and fair dealing is
expected and required of members of the bar.26 They
must conduct themselves with great propriety, and their
behavior must be beyond reproach anywhere and at all
times.27
The fact that there is no attorney-client relationship in this
case and the transactions entered into by respondent
were done in his private capacity cannot shield
respondent, as a lawyer, from liability.
A lawyer may be disciplined for acts committed even in his
private capacity for acts which tend to bring reproach on
the legal profession or to injure it in the favorable opinion
of the public.28 Indeed, there is no distinction as to
whether the transgression is committed in a lawyer's
private life or in his professional capacity, for a lawyer
may not divide his personality as an attorney at one time
and a mere citizen at another.29
In this case, evidence abounds that respondent has failed
to live up to the standards required of members of the
legal profession. Specifically, respondent has transgressed
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to
wit:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey
the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.
Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxx
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession and support the
activities of the integrated bar.
xxx
Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
As correctly observed by IBP Investigating Commissioner
Funa, respondent failed to mention in his Comment dated
January 18, 2000, in his Position Paper dated October 8,
2001 and in his Motion for Reconsideration dated
December 20, 2002, the P100,000.00 loan which
complainant supposedly contracted on November 16,
1999. It is also questionable why the checks dated May
16, 2001, May 30, 2001 and June 15, 2001 which were
supposedly issued to secure a loan contracted about 18
months earlier, i.e. November 16, 1999, were made
without any interest. The same is true with the checks
dated January 15 and 20, 2000 in the total sum
of P100,000.00, which were supposed to secure a loan
contracted on November 15, 1999, for the same amount.
Considering these circumstances and the sequence of
dates when respondent filed his criminal cases against
complainant, and complainant her disbarment case
against respondent, what truly appears more believable is
complainant's claim that respondent was merely utilizing
the blank checks, filling them up, and using them as bases
for criminal cases in order to harass complainant.
The Court also notes that the checks being refuted by
complainant, dated January 15 and 20, 2000, May 16,
2001, May 30, 2001 and June 15, 200130 had its dates,
amounts and payee's name all typewritten, while the
blanks on the check for P16,000.00 dated March 30, 1999
which complainant used to pay part of her original loan,
were all filled up in her handwriting.31
It is also observed that the present case was not the only
instance when respondent committed his wrongful acts.
In Olbes,32 complainants therein contracted a loan from
respondent in the amount of P10,000.00 on July 1, 1999,
for which they issued five blank checks as collateral.
Notwithstanding their full payment of the loan, respondent
filled up four of the blank checks with the amount
of P50,000.00 each with different dates of maturity and
used the same in filing estafa and B.P. Blg. 22 cases
against complainants. The Court, in imposing the penalty
of indefinite suspension on respondent, found his
propensity for employing deceit and misrepresentation as
reprehensible and his misuse of the filled up checks,
loathsome.33
In Acosta,34 complainant therein also averred that on
August 1, 1998, she borrowed P20,000.00 from
respondent with an interest of 20% payable in six months
and guaranteed by twelve blank checks. Although she had
already paid the total amount of P33,300.00, respondent
still demanded payments from her, and for her failure to
comply therewith, respondent filed a case against her
before the City Prosecutor of Marikina City, using two of
her blank checks which respondent filled up with the total
amount of P100,000.00. Unfortunately, the complaint was
dismissed by IBP Investigating Commissioner Navarro on
October 2, 2001 on the ground that the said transaction
did not involve any lawyer-client relationship.35 As
correctly observed by Commissioner Funa, such
conclusion is erroneous, for a lawyer may be disciplined
even for acts not involving any attorney-client
relationship.
As manifested by these cases, respondent's offenses are
manifold. First, he demands excessive payments from his
borrowers; then he fills up his borrowers' blank checks
with fictitious amounts, falsifying commercial documents
for his material gain; and then he uses said checks as
bases for filing unfounded criminal suits against his
borrowers in order to harass them. Such acts manifest
respondent's perversity of character, meriting his
severance from the legal profession.
While the power to disbar is exercised with great caution
and is withheld whenever a lesser penalty could
accomplish the end desired,36 the seriousness of
respondent's offense compels the Court to wield its
supreme power of disbarment. Indeed, the Court will not
hestitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed
brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence calls for
it.37 This is because in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar
to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court,
with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of
justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to
be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining
to the office of an attorney.38
As respondent's misconduct brings intolerable dishonor to
the legal profession, the severance of his privilege to
practice law for life is in order.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Victor V. Deciembre is hereby
found GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT and
VIOLATION of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule
7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name is
ordered stricken off the Roll of Attorneys effective
immediately.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the
Bar Confidant which shall forthwith record it in the
personal files of respondent; all the courts of the
Philippines; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which
shall disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters; and all
administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the Republic
of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.

[B.M. NO. 1370 : May 9, 2005]
LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR.,
REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP
DUES.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a request for exemption from payment of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dues filed by
petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.
In his letter,1 dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought
exemption from payment of IBP dues in the amount of
P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for the years
1977-2005. He alleged that after being admitted to the
Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the Philippine
Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to,
and worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his
retirement in the year 2003. He maintained that he
cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that he was
working in the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil
Service law prohibits the practice of one's profession while
in government service, and neither can he be assessed for
the years when he was working in the USA.
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for
comment.2
On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its
comment3 stating inter alia: that membership in the IBP is
not based on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer
continues to be included in the Roll of Attorneys as long as
he continues to be a member of the IBP; that one of the
obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as
determined by the IBP Board of Governors and duly
approved by the Supreme Court as provided for in
Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that
the validity of imposing dues on the IBP members has
been upheld as necessary to defray the cost of an
Integrated Bar Program; and that the policy of the IBP
Board of Governors of no exemption from payment of
dues is but an implementation of the Court's directives for
all members of the IBP to help in defraying the cost of
integration of the bar. It maintained that there is no rule
allowing the exemption of payment of annual dues as
requested by respondent, that what is allowed is voluntary
termination and reinstatement of membership. It asserted
that what petitioner could have done was to inform the
secretary of the IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so
that his membership in the IBP could have been
terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could have
been stopped. It also alleged that the IBP Board of
Governors is in the process of discussing proposals for the
creation of an inactive status for its members, which if
approved by the Board of Governors and by this Court,
will exempt inactive IBP members from payment of the
annual dues.
In his reply4 dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends
that what he is questioning is the IBP Board of Governor's
Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual
membership dues of lawyers regardless of whether or not
they are engaged in active or inactive practice. He
asseverates that the Policy of Non-Exemption in the
payment of annual membership dues suffers from
constitutional infirmities, such as equal protection clause
and the due process clause. He also posits that
compulsory payment of the IBP annual membership dues
would indubitably be oppressive to him considering that
he has been in an inactive status and is without income
derived from his law practice. He adds that his removal
from nonpayment of annual membership dues would
constitute deprivation of property right without due
process of law. Lastly, he claims that non-practice of law
by a lawyer-member in inactive status is neither injurious
to active law practitioners, to fellow lawyers in inactive
status, nor to the community where the inactive lawyers-
members reside.
Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is
entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the
time that he was inactive in the practice of law that is,
when he was in the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he
was working abroad from 1986-2003? cralawl ibra ry
We rule in the negative.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which
every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar
association organized by individual lawyers themselves,
membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar
is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar
is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in carrying out
the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his
portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the
direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an official
national body of which all lawyers are required to be
members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules
prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the
requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the
effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and
adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional
responsibility, breach of which constitutes sufficient
reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper
cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or
disbarment of the offending member.5
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official
unification of the entire lawyer population. This requires
membership and financial support of every attorney as
condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the
retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the
Supreme Court.6
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate
with anyone. He is free to attend or not to attend the
meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse
to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion
to which he is subjected is the payment of his annual
dues. The Supreme Court, in order to foster the State's
legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional
legal services, may require that the cost of improving the
profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and
beneficiaries of the regulatory program - the lawyers.7
Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that
prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and
duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the
practice of law and in the integration of the Philippine
Bar8 - which power required members of a privileged
class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward
defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to
which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is,
indeed, imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to
raise funds for carrying out the noble objectives and
purposes of integration.
The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in
the Integration of the Philippine Bar,9 thus:
For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members
does not mean that the Court is attempting to levy a tax.
A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for
regulation, while tax purpose of a tax is a revenue. If the
judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows
that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a
membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible
to put on an integrated Bar program without means to
defray the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers
necessarily carries with it the power to impose such
exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the
privilege of law is that the regulation does not impose an
unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by
the integration of the Bar far outweighs the slight
inconvenience to a member resulting from his required
payment of the annual dues.
Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of
membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This
means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues
subsists for as long as one's membership in the IBP
remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type
of practice, the member is engaged in.
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows
exemption from payment of membership dues. At most,
as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed
the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay
abroad before he left. In such case, his membership in the
IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to pay
dues could have been discontinued.
As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that
the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing
the situation of members under inactive status and the
nonpayment of their dues during such inactivity. In the
meantime, petitioner is duty bound to comply with his
obligation to pay membership dues to the IBP.
Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the
penalty of removal would amount to a deprivation of
property without due process and hence infringes on one
of his constitutional rights.
This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty.
Marcial Edillon,10 in this wise:
. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the
sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license
to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider
at length, as it [is] clear that under the police power of
the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the
Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right
to practice law before the courts of this country should be
and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if
the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is
recognize[d], then a penalty designed to enforce its
payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by
payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is
not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such
must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to
exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership
in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions,11 one of
which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to
abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if
the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.
WHEREFORE, petitioner's request for exemption from
payment of IBP dues is DENIED. He is ordered to pay
P12,035.00, the amount assessed by the IBP as
membership fees for the years 1977-2005, within a non-
extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of this
decision, with a warning that failure to do so will merit his
suspension from the practice of law.
SO ORDERED.

A.C No. 4749. January 20, 2000
SOLIMAN M. SANTOS,
JR., complainant, vs. ATTY.
FRANCISCO R.
LLAMAS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for
misrepresentation and non-payment
of bar membership dues filed
against respondent Atty. Francisco
R. Llamas.
In a letter-complaint to this Court
dated February 8, 1997,
complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr.,
himself a member of the bar,
alleged that:
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to
bring to your attention and
appropriate sanction the matter of
Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a
number of years now, has not
indicated the proper PTR and IBP
O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of
issuance) in his pleadings. If at all,
he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060"
but he has been using this for at
least three years already, as shown
by the following attached sample
pleadings in various courts in 1995,
1996 and 1997: (originals available)
Annex A .......- "Ex-Parte Manifes
dated December 1
Q-95-25253, RTC,
Annex B .......- "Urgent Ex-Parte M
dated November 1
95-030, RTC Br. 2
MM
Annex C .......- "An Urgent and Re
extension of Time
and Opposition" d
CA-G.R. SP (not C
6th Div.
This matter is being brought in the
context of Rule 138, Section 1 which
qualifies that only a duly admitted
member of the bar "who is in good
and regular standing, is entitled to
practice law". There is also Rule
139-A, Section 10 which provides
that "default in the payment of
annual dues for six months shall
warrant suspension of membership
in the Integrated Bar, and default in
such payment for one year shall be
a ground for the removal of the
name of the delinquent member
from the Roll of Attorneys."
Among others, I seek clarification
(e.g. a certification) and appropriate
action on the bar standing of Atty.
Francisco R. Llamas both with the
Bar Confidant and with the IBP,
especially its Rizal Chapter of which
Atty. Llamas purports to be a
member.
Please note that while Atty. Llamas
indicates "IBP Rizal 259060"
sometimes, he does not indicate any
PTR for payment of professional tax.
Under the Rules, particularly Rule
138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension
of an attorney may be done not only
by the Supreme Court but also by
the Court of Appeals or a Regional
Trial Court (thus, we are also copy
furnishing some of these courts).
Finally, it is relevant to note the
track record of Atty. Francisco R.
Llamas, as shown by:
1........his dismissal as Pasay City
Judge per Supreme Court Admin.
Matter No. 1037-CJ En
Banc Decision on October 28, 1981 (
in SCRA )
2........his conviction for estafa per
Decision dated June 30, 1994 in
Crim. Case No. 11787, RTC Br. 66,
Makati, MM (see attached copy of
the Order dated February 14, 1995
denying the motion for
reconsideration of the conviction
which is purportedly on appeal in
the Court of Appeals).
Attached to the letter-complaint
were the pleadings dated December
1, 1995, November 13, 1996, and
January 17, 1997 referred to by
complainant, bearing, at the end
thereof, what appears to be
respondents signature above his
name, address and the receipt
number "IBP Rizal 259060."1 Also
attached was a copy of the
order,2 dated February 14, 1995,
issued by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario,
Jr. of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 66, Makati, denying
respondents motion for
reconsideration of his conviction, in
Criminal Case No. 11787, for
violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the
Revised Penal Code.
On April 18, 1997, complainant filed
a certification3 dated March 18,
1997, by the then president of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that
respondents "last payment of his IBP
dues was in 1991. Since then he has
not paid or remitted any amount to
cover his membership fees up to the
present."
On July 7, 1997, respondent was
required to comment on the
complaint within ten days from
receipt of notice, after which the
case was referred to the IBP for
investigation, report and
recommendation. In his comment-
memorandum,4 dated June 3, 1998,
respondent alleged:5
cräläwvi rtua lib räry
3. That with respect to the
complainants absurd claim that for
using in 1995, 1996 and 1997 the
same O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal
IBP, respondent is automatically no
longer a member in good standing.
Precisely, as cited under the context
of Rule 138, only an admitted
member of the bar who is in good
standing is entitled to practice law.
The complainants basis in claiming
that the undersigned was no longer
in good standing, were as above
cited, the October 28, 1981
Supreme Court decision of dismissal
and the February 14, 1995
conviction for Violation of Article 316
RPC, concealment of encumbrances.
As above pointed out also, the
Supreme Court dismissal decision
was set aside and reversed and
respondent was even promoted from
City Judge of Pasay City to Regional
Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.
Also as pointed out, the February
14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No.
11787 was appealed to the Court of
Appeals and is still pending.
Complainant need not even file this
complaint if indeed the decision of
dismissal as a Judge was never set
aside and reversed, and also had the
decision of conviction for a light
felony, been affirmed by the Court
of Appeals. Undersigned himself
would surrender his right or privilege
to practice law.
4. That complainant capitalizes on
the fact that respondent had been
delinquent in his dues.
Undersigned since 1992 have
publicly made it clear per his Income
Tax Return, up to the present, that
he had only a limited practice of law.
In fact, in his Income Tax Return,
his principal occupation is a farmer
of which he is. His 30 hectares
orchard and pineapple farm is
located at Calauan, Laguna.
Moreover, and more than anything
else, respondent being a Senior
Citizen since 1992, is legally exempt
under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432
which took effect in 1992, in the
payment of taxes, income taxes as
an example. Being thus exempt, he
honestly believe in view of his
detachment from a total practice of
law, but only in a limited practice,
the subsequent payment by him of
dues with the Integrated Bar is
covered by such exemption. In fact,
he never exercised his rights as an
IBP member to vote and be voted
upon.
Nonetheless, if despite such honest
belief of being covered by the
exemption and if only to show that
he never in any manner wilfully and
deliberately failed and refused
compliance with such dues, he is
willing at any time to fulfill and pay
all past dues even with interests,
charges and surcharges and
penalties. He is ready to tender such
fulfillment or payment, not for
allegedly saving his skin as again
irrelevantly and frustratingly
insinuated for vindictive purposes by
the complainant, but as an honest
act of accepting reality if indeed it is
reality for him to pay such dues
despite his candor and honest belief
in all food faith, to the contrary.
On December 4, 1998, the IBP
Board of Governors passed a
resolution6 adopting and approving
the report and recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner
which found respondent guilty, and
recommended his suspension from
the practice of law for three months
and until he pays his IBP dues.
Respondent moved for a
reconsideration of the decision, but
this was denied by the IBP in a
resolution,7 dated April 22, 1999.
Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B,
12(b) of the Rules of Court, this
case is here for final action on the
decision of the IBP ordering
respondents suspension for three
months.
The findings of IBP Commissioner
Alfredo Sanz are as follows:
On the first issue, Complainant has
shown "respondents non-indication
of the proper IBP O.R. and PTR
numbers in his pleadings (Annexes
"A", "B" and "C" of the letter
complaint, more particularly his use
of "IBP Rizal 259060 for at least
three years."
The records also show a
"Certification dated March 24, 1997
from IBP Rizal Chapter President Ida
R. Makahinud Javier that
respondents last payment of his IBP
dues was in 1991."
While these allegations are neither
denied nor categorically admitted by
respondent, he has invoked and
cited that "being a Senior Citizen
since 1992, he is legally exempt
under Section 4 of Republic Act No.
7432 which took effect in 1992 in
the payment of taxes, income taxes
as an example."
....
The above cited provision of law is
not applicable in the present case.
In fact, respondent admitted that he
is still in the practice of law when he
alleged that the "undersigned since
1992 have publicly made it clear per
his Income tax Return up to the
present time that he had only a
limited practice of law." (par. 4 of
Respondents Memorandum).
Therefore respondent is not exempt
from paying his yearly dues to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
On the second issue, complainant
claims that respondent has misled
the court about his standing in the
IBP by using the same IBP O.R.
number in his pleadings of at least
six years and therefore liable for his
actions. Respondent in his
memorandum did not discuss this
issue.
First. Indeed, respondent admits
that since 1992, he has engaged in
law practice without having paid his
IBP dues. He likewise admits that,
as appearing in the pleadings
submitted by complainant to this
Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal
259060" in the pleadings he filed in
court, at least for the years 1995,
1996, and 1997, thus
misrepresenting that such was his
IBP chapter membership and receipt
number for the years in which those
pleadings were filed. He claims,
however, that he is only engaged in
a "limited" practice and that he
believes in good faith that he is
exempt from the payment of taxes,
such as income tax, under R.A. No.
7432, 4 as a senior citizen since
1992.
Rule 139-A provides:
Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every
member of the Integrated Bar shall
pay such annual dues as the Board
of Governors shall determine with
the approval of the Supreme Court.
A fixed sum equivalent to ten
percent (10%) of the collections
from each Chapter shall be set aside
as a Welfare Fund for disabled
members of the Chapter and the
compulsory heirs of deceased
members thereof.
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of
dues. - Subject to the provisions of
Section 12 of this Rule, default in
the payment of annual dues for six
months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the Integrated Bar,
and default in such payment for one
year shall be a ground for the
removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys.
In accordance with these provisions,
respondent can engage in the
practice of law only by paying his
dues, and it does not matter that his
practice is "limited." While it is true
that R.A. No. 7432, 4 grants senior
citizens "exemption from the
payment of individual income taxes:
provided, that their annual taxable
income does not exceed the poverty
level as determined by the National
Economic and Development
Authority (NEDA) for that year," the
exemption does not include payment
of membership or association dues.
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal
259060" in his pleadings and
thereby misrepresenting to the
public and the courts that he had
paid his IBP dues to the Rizal
Chapter, respondent is guilty of
violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL
TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED
BAR.
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES
CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD
FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do
any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any court; nor shall he
mislead or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice.
Respondents failure to pay his IBP
dues and his misrepresentation in
the pleadings he filed in court indeed
merit the most severe penalty.
However, in view of respondents
advanced age, his express
willingness to pay his dues and plea
for a more temperate application of
the law,8 we believe the penalty of
one year suspension from the
practice of law or until he has paid
his IBP dues, whichever is later, is
appropriate.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty.

Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for ONE (1)
YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP
dues, whichever is later. Let a copy
of this decision be attached to Atty.
Llamas personal record in the Office
of the Bar Confidant and copies be
furnished to all chapters of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
to all courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. NO. 7054 : December 4,
2009]
CONRADO
QUE, Complainant, v. ATTY.
ANASTACIO REVILLA,
JR. Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
In a complaint for
disbarment,1 Conrado Que
(complainant) accused Atty.
Anastacio Revilla, Jr. (respondent)
before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Committee on Bar
Discipline (IBP Committee on Bar
Discipline or CBD) of committing the
following violations of the provisions
of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court:
(1) The respondent's abuse of court
remedies and processes by filing a
petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals (CA), two petitions
for annulment of title before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), a
petition for annulment of judgment
before the RTC and lastly, a petition
for declaratory relief before the RTC
(collectively, subject cases) to assail
and overturn the final judgments of
the Metropolitan Trial Court2 (MeTC)
and RTC3 in the unlawful detainer
case rendered against the
respondent's clients. The respondent
in this regard, repeatedly raised the
issue of lack of jurisdiction by the
MeTC and RTC knowing fully-well
that these courts have jurisdiction
over the unlawful detainer case. The
respondent also repeatedly attacked
the complainant's and his siblings'
titles over the property subject of
the unlawful detainer case;
(2) The respondent's commission of
forum-shopping by filing the subject
cases in order to impede, obstruct,
and frustrate the efficient
administration of justice for his own
personal gain and to defeat the right
of the complainant and his siblings
to execute the MeTC and RTC
judgments in the unlawful detainer
case;
(3) The respondent's lack of candor
and respect towards his adversary
and the courts by resorting to
falsehood and deception to
misguide, obstruct and impede the
due administration of justice. The
respondent asserted falsehood in the
motion for reconsideration of the
dismissal of the petition for
annulment of judgment by
fabricating an imaginary order
issued by the presiding judge in
open court which allegedly denied
the motion to dismiss filed by the
respondents in the said case. The
complainant alleged that the
respondent did this to cover up his
lack of preparation; the respondent
also deceived his clients (who were
all squatters) in supporting the
above falsehood.4
(4) The respondent's willful and
revolting falsehood that unjustly
maligned and defamed the good
name and reputation of the late
Atty. Alfredo Catolico (Atty.
Catolico), the previous counsel of
the respondent's clients.
(5) The respondent's deliberate,
fraudulent and unauthorized
appearances in court in the petition
for annulment of judgment for 15
litigants, three of whom are already
deceased;
(6) The respondent's willful and
fraudulent appearance in the second
petition for annulment of title as
counsel for the Republic of the
Philippines without being authorized
to do so.
Additionally, the complaint accused
the respondent of representing fifty-
two (52) litigants in Civil Case No.
Q-03-48762 when no such authority
was ever given to him.
The CBD required the respondent to
answer the complaint.
In his Answer,5 the respondent
declared that he is a member of the
Kalayaan Development Cooperative
(KDC) that handles pro bono cases
for the underprivileged, the less
fortunate, the homeless and those in
the marginalized sector in Metro
Manila. He agreed to take over the
cases formerly handled by other
KDC members. One of these cases
was the unlawful detainer case
handled by the late Atty. Catolico
where the complainant and his
siblings were the plaintiffs and the
respondent's present clients were
the defendants.
With respect to paragraph 1 of the
disbarment complaint, the
respondent professed his sincerity,
honesty and good faith in filing the
petitions complained of; he filed
these petitions to protect the
interests of his clients in their
property. The respondent asserted
that these petitions were all based
on valid grounds - the lack of
jurisdiction of the MeTC and the RTC
over the underlying unlawful
detainer case, the extrinsic fraud
committed by the late Atty. Catolico,
and the extrinsic fraud committed by
the complainant and his family
against his clients; he discovered
that the allegedly detained property
did not really belong to the
complainant and his family but is a
forest land. The respondent also
asserted that his resort to a petition
for annulment of judgment and a
petition for declaratory relief to
contest the final judgments of the
MeTC and RTC were all parts of his
legal strategy to protect the
interests of his clients.
On the allegations of falsehood in
the motion for reconsideration of the
order of dismissal of the petition for
annulment of judgment (covered by
paragraph 3 of the disbarment
complaint), the respondent
maintained that his allegations were
based on his observations and the
notes he had taken during the
proceedings on what the presiding
judge dictated in open court.
The respondent denied that he had
made any unauthorized appearance
in court (with respect to paragraphs
5 and 6 of the disbarment
complaint). He claimed that the 52
litigants in Civil Case No. Q-03-
48762 were impleaded by
inadvertence; he immediately
rectified his error by dropping them
from the case. On the petition for
annulment of judgment, the
respondent claimed that a majority
(31 out of 49) of the litigants who
signed the certification constituted
sufficient compliance with the rules
on forum-shopping. The respondent
likewise denied having represented
the Republic of the Philippines in the
second petition for annulment of
title. The respondent pointed out
that there was no allegation
whatsoever that he was the sole
representative of both the
complainants (his clients) and the
Republic of the Philippines. The
respondent pointed out that the
petition embodied a request to the
Office of the Solicitor General to
represent his clients in the case.6
The respondent submitted that he
did not commit any illegal, unlawful,
unjust, wrongful or immoral acts
towards the complainant and his
siblings. He stressed that he acted in
good faith in his dealings with them
and his conduct was consistent with
his sworn duty as a lawyer to uphold
justice and the law and to defend
the interests of his clients. The
respondent additionally claimed that
the disbarment case was filed
because the complainant's counsel,
Atty. Cesar P. Uy (Atty. Uy), had an
axe to grind against him.
Lastly, the respondent posited in his
pleadings7 before the IBP that the
present complaint violated the rule
on forum shopping considering that
the subject cases were also the ones
on which a complaint was filed
against him in CBD Case No. 03-
1099 filed by Atty. Uy before the IBP
Committee on Bar Discipline. The
respondent also posited that the
present complaint was filed to
harass, ridicule and defame his good
name and reputation and, indirectly,
to harass his clients who are
marginalized members of the KDC.
The Findings of the Investigating
Commissioner
Except for the last charge of
unauthorized appearance on behalf
of 52 litigants in Civil Case No. Q-
03-48762, Investigating
Commissioner Renato G.
Cunanan8 (Investigating
Commissioner Cunanan) found all
the charges against the respondent
meritorious. In his Report and
Recommendation, he stated:
While an attorney admittedly has
the solemn duty to defend and
protect the cause and rights of his
client with all the fervor and energy
within his command, yet, it is
equally true that it is the primary
duty of the lawyer to defend the
dignity, authority and majesty of the
law and the courts which enforce it.
A lawyer is not at liberty to maintain
and defend the cause of his clients
thru means, inconsistent with truth
and honor. He may not and must
not encourage multiplicity of suits or
brazenly engage in forum-shopping.9
On the first charge on abuse of court
processes, Investigating
Commissioner Cunanan noted the
unnecessary use by the respondent
of legal remedies to forestall the
execution of the final decisions of
the MTC and the RTC in the unlawful
detainer case against his clients.10
On the second charge, the
Investigating Commissioner ruled
that the act of the respondent in
filing two petitions for annulment of
title, a petition for annulment of
judgment and later on a petition for
declaratory relief were all done to
prevent the execution of the final
judgment in the unlawful detainer
case and constituted prohibited
forum-shopping.11
On the third and fourth charges,
Investigating Commissioner
Cunanan found ample evidence
showing that the respondent was
dishonest in dealing with the court
as shown in his petition for
annulment of judgment; he resorted
to falsities and attributed acts to
Atty. Catolico and to the presiding
judge, all of which were untrue.12
On the fifth and sixth charges, the
Investigating Commissioner
disregarded the respondent's
explanation that he had no intention
to represent without authority 15 of
the litigants (three of whom were
already deceased) in the petition for
annulment of judgment (Civil Case
No. Q-01-45556). To the
Investigating Commissioner, the
respondent merely glossed over the
representation issue by claiming that
the authority given by a majority of
the litigants complied with the
certification of non-forum shopping
requirement. The Investigating
Commissioner likewise brushed
aside the respondent's argument
regarding his misrepresentation in
the second complaint for annulment
of title since he knew very well that
only the Solicitor General can
institute an action for reversion on
behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines. Despite this knowledge,
the respondent solely signed the
amended complaint for and on
behalf of his clients and of the
Republic.
The Board of Governors of the IBP
Committee on Bar Discipline,
through its Resolution No. XVII-
2005-164 on CBD Case No. 03-
1100, adopted and approved the
Report and Recommendation of
Investigating Commissioner
Cunanan and recommended that the
respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for two (2)
years.13 On reconsideration, the
Board of Governors reduced the
respondent's suspension from the
practice of law to one (1) year.14
The Issue
The case poses to us the core issues
of whether the respondent can be
held liable for the imputed unethical
infractions and professional
misconduct, and the penalty these
transgressions should carry.
The Court's Ruling
Except for the penalty, we agree
with the Report and
Recommendation of Investigating
Commissioner Cunanan and the
Board of Governors of the IBP
Committee on Bar Discipline.
We take judicial notice that this
disbarment complaint is not the only
one so far filed involving the
respondent; another complaint
invoking similar grounds has
previously been filed. In Plus
Builders, Inc. and Edgardo C. Garcia
v. Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla,
Jr.,15 we suspended the respondent
from the practice of law for his
willful and intentional falsehood
before the court; for misuse of court
procedures and processes to delay
the execution of a judgment; and for
collaborating with non-lawyers in the
illegal practice of law. We initially
imposed a suspension of two (2)
years, but in an act of leniency
subsequently reduced the
suspension to six (6) months.16
Abuse of court procedures and
processes
The following undisputed facts fully
support the conclusion that the
respondent is guilty of serious
misconduct for abusing court
procedures and processes to shield
his clients from the execution of the
final judgments of the MeTC and
RTC in the unlawful detainer case
against these clients:
First, the respondent filed a petition
for certiorari (docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 53892) with prayer for the
issuance of preliminary injunction
and temporary restraining order to
question the final judgments of the
MeTC and RTC for lack of
jurisdiction. In dismissing the
respondent's petition, the CA held:
Even for the sake of argument
considering that the petition case be
the proper remedy, still it must be
rejected for failure of petitioners to
satisfactorily demonstrate lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City over the ejectment case.17
Second, notwithstanding the CA's
dismissal of the petition
for certiorari, the respondent again
questioned the MeTC's and the
RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the
unlawful detainer case in a petition
for annulment of judgment
(docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-
45556) before the RTC with an
ancillary prayer for the grant of a
temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction. The RTC
dismissed this petition on the basis
of the motion to dismiss filed.18
Third, the respondent successively
filed two petitions (docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-99-38780 and Civil Case
No. Q-02-46885) for annulment of
the complainant's title to the
property involved in the unlawful
detainer case. The records show that
these petitions were both dismissed
"for lack of legal personality on the
part of the plaintiffs" to file the
petition.19
Fourth, after the dismissals of the
petition for annulment of judgment
and the petitions for annulment of
title, the respondent this time filed a
petition for declaratory relief with
prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the complainant
and his siblings from exercising their
rights over the same property
subject of the unlawful detainer
case. The respondent based the
petition on the alleged nullity of the
complainant's title because the
property is a part of forest land.
Fifth, the persistent applications by
the respondent for injunctive relief
in the four petitions he had filed in
several courts - the petition
for certiorari, the petition for
annulment of judgment, the second
petition for annulment of
complainant's title and the petition
for declaratory relief - reveal the
respondent's persistence in
preventing and avoiding the
execution of the final decisions of
the MeTC and RTC against his clients
in the unlawful detainer case.
Under the circumstances, the
respondent's repeated attempts go
beyond the legitimate means
allowed by professional ethical rules
in defending the interests of his
client. These are already uncalled for
measures to avoid the enforcement
of final judgments of the MeTC and
RTC. In these attempts, the
respondent violated Rule 10.03,
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which makes it
obligatory for a lawyer to "observe
the rules of procedure and. . . not
[to] misuse them to defeat the ends
of justice." By his actions, the
respondent used procedural rules to
thwart and obstruct the speedy and
efficient administration of justice,
resulting in prejudice to the winning
parties in that case.20
Filing of multiple actions and forum
shopping
The respondent likewise violated
Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04, Canon
12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility,21 as well as the rule
against forum shopping, both of
which are directed against the filing
of multiple actions to attain the
same objective. Both violations
constitute abuse of court processes;
they tend to degrade the
administration of justice; wreak
havoc on orderly judicial
procedure;22 and add to the
congestion of the heavily burdened
dockets of the courts.23
While the filing of a petition
for certiorari to question the lower
courts' jurisdiction may be a
procedurally legitimate (but
substantively erroneous) move, the
respondent's subsequent petitions
involving the same property and the
same parties not only demonstrate
his attempts to secure favorable
ruling using different fora, but his
obvious objective as well of
preventing the execution of the
MeTC and RTC decisions in the
unlawful detainer case against his
clients. This intent is most obvious
with respect to the petitions for
annulment of judgment and
declaratory relief, both geared
towards preventing the execution of
the unlawful detainer decision, long
after this decision had become final.
Willful, intentional and deliberate
falsehood before the courts
The records also reveal that the
respondent committed willful,
intentional and deliberate falsehood
in the pleadings he filed with the
lower courts.
First, in the petition for annulment
of judgment filed before the RTC,
Branch 101, Quezon City, the
respondent cited extrinsic fraud as
one of the grounds for the
annulment sought. The extrinsic
fraud was alleged in the last
paragraph of the petition, as follows:
In here, counsel for the petitioners
(defendants therein), deliberately
neglected to file the proper remedy
then available after receipt of the
denial of their Motion for
Reconsideration - thus corruptly sold
out the interest of the petitioners
(defendants therein) by keeping
them away to the Court and in
complete ignorance of the suit by a
false pretense of compromise and
fraudulent acts of alleging
representing them when in truth and
in fact, have connived with the
attorney of the prevailing party at
his defeat to the prejudice of the
petitioner (defendants therein) '24
Yet, in paragraph 35 of the same
petition, the respondent alleged that
no second motion for
reconsideration or for new trial, or
no other petition with the CA had
been filed, as he believed "that the
decisions rendered both by the
MeTC and the RTC are null and
void."25 These conflicting claims, no
doubt, involve a fabrication made for
the purpose of supporting the
petition for annulment. Worse, it
involved a direct and
unsubstantiated attack on the
reputation of a law office colleague,
another violation we shall separately
discuss below.
Second, the respondent employed
another obvious subterfuge when he
filed his second petition for
annulment of title, which was an
unsuccessful attempt to circumvent
the rule that only the Solicitor
General may commence reversion
proceedings of public lands26 on
behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines. This second petition,
filed by a private party and not by
the Republic, showed that: (a) the
respondent and his clients requested
that they be represented by the
Solicitor General in the proceedings;
(b) the Republic of the Philippines
was simply impleaded in the
amended petition without its
consent as a plaintiff; and (c) the
respondent signed the amended
petition where he alone stood as
counsel for the "plaintiffs." In this
underhanded manner, the
respondent sought to compel the
Republic to litigate and waste its
resources on an unauthorized and
unwanted suit.
Third, the respondent also
committed falsehood in his motion
for reconsideration of the order
dismissing his petition for annulment
of judgment where he
misrepresented to the court and his
clients what actually transpired in
the hearing of June 28, 2002 in this
wise:
Likewise, the proceedings on said
date of hearing (June 28, 2002)
show, that after both counsel have
argued on the aforesaid pending
incident, the Honorable Presiding
Judge, in open court, and in the
presence and within the hearing
distance of all the plaintiffs and their
counsel as well as the counsel of the
defendants resolved: TO DENY THE
MOTION TO DISMISS FILED AND
DIRECTED DEFENDANTS COUNSEL
TO FILE AN ANSWER TO THE
COMPLAINT WITHIN THE
REMAINING
PERIOD.27 [Underscoring and
emphasis theirs]
The records, however, disclose that
the scheduled hearing for June 28,
2002 was actually for the
respondent's application for
temporary restraining order and was
not a hearing on the adverse party's
motion to dismiss.28 The records
also show that RTC-Branch 101 held
in abeyance the respondent's
application for injunctive relief
pending the resolution of the motion
to dismiss filed by the adverse
party.29 As stated in the order of the
Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 101:
Browsing over the records of this
case specifically the transcripts of
stenographic notes as transcribed by
the Stenographer, the same will
indicate that the allegations in the
Motion for Reconsideration are not
true.
'how can this Court make a ruling on
the matter even without stating the
factual and legal bases as
required/mandated by the Rules.
Moreover, there are no indications
or iota of irregularity in the
preparation by Stenographer of the
transcripts, and by the Court
interpreter of the Minutes of the
open Court session.[Underscoring
theirs]
The records further disclose that
despite knowledge of the falsity of
his allegations, the respondent took
advantage of his position and the
trust reposed in him by his clients
(who are all squatters) to convince
them to support, through their
affidavits, his false claims on what
allegedly transpired in the June 28,
2002 hearing.30
For these acts, we find the
respondent liable under Rule 10.01
of Canon 10 the Code of Professional
Responsibility for violating the
lawyer's duty to observe candor and
fairness in his dealings with the
court. This provision states:
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES
CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD
FAITH TO THE COURT
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do
any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in Court, nor shall he
mislead or allow the Court to be
mislead by an artifice.
Likewise, the respondent violated his
duty as an attorney and his oath as
a lawyer "never to mislead the judge
or any judicial officer by an artifice
or false statement of fact or
law."31 The respondent failed to
remember that his duty as an officer
of the court makes him an
indispensable participant in the
administration of justice,32 and that
he is expected to act candidly, fairly
and truthfully in his work.33 His duty
as a lawyer obligates him not to
conceal the truth from the court, or
to mislead the court in any manner,
no matter how demanding his duties
to his clients may be.34 In case of
conflict, his duties to his client yield
to his duty to deal candidly with the
court.35
In defending his clients' interest, the
respondent also failed to observe
Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which
reads:
CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL
REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL
WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF LAW
Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ
only fair and honest means to attain
the lawful objectives of his clients x
xx
This Canon obligates a lawyer, in
defending his client, to employ only
such means as are consistent with
truth and honor.36 He should not
prosecute patently frivolous and
meritless appeals or institute clearly
groundless actions.37 The recital of
what the respondent did to prevent
the execution of the judgment
against his clients shows that he
actually committed what the above
rule expressly prohibits.
Maligning the name of his fellow
lawyers
To support the charge of extrinsic
fraud in his petition for annulment of
judgment, the respondent attacked
(as quoted above) the name and
reputation of the late Atty. Catolico
and accused him of deliberate
neglect, corrupt motives and
connivance with the counsel for the
adverse party.
We find it significant that the
respondent failed to demonstrate
how he came upon his accusation
against Atty. Catolico. The
respondent, by his own admission,
only participated in the cases
previously assigned to Atty. Catolico
after the latter died. At the same
time, the respondent's petition for
annulment of judgment also
represented that no second motion
for reconsideration or appeal was
filed to contest the MeTC and RTC
decisions in the unlawful detainer
case for the reason that the
respondent believed the said
decisions were null and void ab
initio.
Under these circumstances, we
believe that the respondent has
been less than fair in his
professional relationship with Atty.
Catolico and is thus liable for
violating Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which
obligates a lawyer to "conduct
himself with courtesy, fairness, and
candor toward his professional
colleagues." He was unfair because
he imputed wrongdoing to Atty.
Catolico without showing any factual
basis therefor; he effectively
maligned Atty. Catolico, who is now
dead and unable to defend himself.
Unauthorized appearances
We support Investigating
Commissioner Cunanan's finding
that the respondent twice
represented parties without proper
authorization: first, in the petition
for annulment of judgment; and
second, in the second petition for
annulment of title.38
In the first instance, the records
show that the respondent filed the
petition for annulment of judgment
on behalf of 49 individuals, 31 of
whom gave their consent while the
other 15 individuals did not. We
cannot agree with the respondent's
off-hand explanation that he truly
believed that a majority of the
litigants who signed the certification
of non-forum shopping in the
petition already gave him the
necessary authority to sign for the
others. We find it highly improbable
that this kind of lapse could have
been committed by a seasoned
lawyer like the respondent, who has
been engaged in the practice of law
for more than 30 years and who
received rigid and strict training as
he so proudly declares, from the
University of the Philippines College
of Law and in the two law firms with
which he was previously
associated.39 As Investigating
Commissioner Cunanan found, the
respondent's explanation of
compliance with the rule on the
certification of non-forum shopping
glossed over the real charge of
appearing in court without the
proper authorization of the parties
he allegedly represented.
In the second instance, which
occurred in the second complaint for
annulment of title, the respondent
knew that only the Solicitor General
can legally represent the Republic of
the Philippines in actions for
reversion of land. Nevertheless, he
filed an amended petition where he
impleaded the Republic of the
Philippines as plaintiff without its
authority and consent, as a
surreptitious way of forcing the
Republic to litigate. Notably, he
signed the amended complaint on
behalf of all the plaintiffs - his clients
and the Republic.
In both instances, the respondent
violated Sections 21 and 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court when he
undertook the unauthorized
appearances. The settled rule is that
a lawyer may not represent a
litigant without authority from the
latter or from the latter's
representative or, in the absence
thereof, without leave of
court.40 The willful unauthorized
appearance by a lawyer for a party
in a given case constitutes
contumacious conduct and also
warrants disciplinary measures
against the erring lawyer for
professional misconduct.41
The Respondent's Defenses
We find no merit in the respondent's
defenses.
"Good faith connotes an honest
intention to abstain from taking
unconscientious advantage of
another. Accordingly, in University
of the East v. Jader we said that
"[g]ood faith connotes an honest
intention to abstain from taking
undue advantage of another, even
though the forms and technicalities
of law, together with the absence of
all information or belief of facts,
would render the transaction
unconscientious."42 Bad faith, on the
other hand, is a state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive
design or with some motive of self-
interest, ill will or for an ulterior
purpose.43 As both concepts are
states of mind, they may be
deduced from the attendant
circumstances and, more
particularly, from the acts and
statements of the person whose
state of mind is the subject of
inquiry.
In this case, we find that the
respondent acted in bad faith in
defending the interests of his clients.
We draw this conclusion from the
misrepresentations and the dubious
recourses he made, all obviously
geared towards forestalling the
execution of the final judgments of
the MeTC and RTC. That he took
advantage of his legal knowledge
and experience and misread the
Rules immeasurably strengthen the
presence of bad faith.
We find neither sincerity nor honest
belief on the part of the respondent
in pleading the soundness and merit
of the cases that he filed in court to
prevent the execution of the MeTC
and RTC decisions, considering his
own conduct of presenting
conflicting theories in his petitions.
The succession of cases he filed
shows a desperation that negates
the sincere and honest belief he
claims; these are simply scattershot
means to achieve his objective of
avoiding the execution of the
unlawful detainer judgment against
his clients.
On the respondent's allegations
regarding his discretion to determine
legal strategy, it is not amiss to note
that this was the same defense he
raised in the first disbarment
case.44 As we explained in Plus
Builders, the exercise of a lawyer's
discretion in acting for his client can
never be at the expense of truth and
justice. In the words of this cited
case:
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity
to the cause of his client, full
devotion to his genuine interest, and
warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his rights, as well as the
exertion of his utmost learning and
ability, he must do so only within
the bounds of the law. He must give
a candid and honest opinion on the
merits and probable results of his
client's case with the end in view of
promoting respect for the law and
legal processes, and counsel or
maintain such actions or
proceedings only as appear to him
to be just, and such defenses only
as he believes to be honestly
debatable under the law. He must
always remind himself of the oath
he took upon admission to the Bar
that he 'will not wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless,
false or unlawful suit nor give aid
nor consent to the same'; and that
he 'will conduct [himself] as a
lawyer according to the best of [his]
knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as
to [his] clients.' Needless to state,
the lawyer's fidelity to his client
must not be pursued at the expense
of truth and the administration of
justice, and it must be done within
the bounds of reason and common
sense. A lawyer's responsibility to
protect and advance the interests of
his client does not warrant a course
of action propelled by ill motives and
malicious intentions against the
other party.45
We cannot give credence to the
respondent's claim that the
disbarment case was filed because
the counsel of the complainant, Atty.
Uy, had an axe to grind against him.
We reject this argument, considering
that it was not Atty. Uy who filed the
present disbarment case against
him; Atty. Uy is only the counsel in
this case. In fact, Atty. Uy has filed
his own separate disbarment case
against the respondent.
The sui generis nature of a
disbarment case renders the
underlying motives of the
complainants unimportant and with
very little relevance. The purpose of
a disbarment proceeding is mainly to
determine the fitness of a lawyer to
continue acting as an officer of the
court and a participant in the
dispensation of justice - an issue
where the complainant's personal
motives have little relevance. For
this reason, disbarment proceedings
may be initiated by the Court motu
proprio upon information of an
alleged wrongdoing. As we also
explained in the case In re:
Almacen:
. . .disciplinary proceedings like the
present are sui generis. Neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, this
proceeding is not - and does not
involve - a trial of an action or a
suit, but is rather an investigation by
the Court into the conduct of one of
its officers. Not being intended to
inflict punishment, it is in no sense a
criminal prosecution.
xxx
It may be initiated by the
Court motu proprio. Public interest is
its primary objective, and the real
question for determination is
whether or not the attorney is still a
fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the
exercise of its disciplinary powers,
the Court merely calls upon a
member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of-the Court
with the end in view of preserving
the purity of the legal profession and
the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging
the profession of members who by
their misconduct have proved
themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the
office of an attorney. In such
posture, there can thus be no
occasion to speak of a complainant
or a prosecutor.46 ςηαñrοb lεš νι r† υαl lαω l ιbrαrÿ
Hence, we give little or no weight to
the alleged personal motivation that
drove the complainant Que and his
counsel to file the present
disbarment case.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we conclude
that the respondent committed
various acts of professional
misconduct and thereby failed to live
up to the exacting ethical standards
imposed on members of the Bar. We
cannot agree, however, that only a
penalty of one-year suspension from
the practice of law should be
imposed. Neither should we limit
ourselves to the originally
recommended penalty of suspension
for two (2) years.
Given the respondent's multiple
violations, his past record as
previously discussed, and the nature
of these violations which shows the
readiness to disregard court rules
and to gloss over concerns for the
orderly administration of justice, we
believe and so hold that the
appropriate action of this Court is to
disbar the respondent to keep him
away from the law profession and
from any significant role in the
administration of justice which he
has disgraced. He is a continuing
risk, too, to the public that the legal
profession serves. Not even his
ardor and overzealousness in
defending the interests of his client
can save him. Such traits at the
expense of everything else,
particularly the integrity of the
profession and the orderly
administration of justice, this Court
cannot accept nor tolerate.
Additionally, disbarment is merited
because this is not the respondent's
first ethical infraction of the same
nature. We penalized him in Plus
Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia v.
Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla for his
willful and intentional falsehood
before the court; for misuse of court
procedures and processes to delay
the execution of a judgment; and for
collaborating with non-lawyers in the
illegal practice of law. We showed
leniency then by reducing his
penalty to suspension for six (6)
months. We cannot similarly treat
the respondent this time; it is clear
that he did not learn any lesson
from his past experience and since
then has exhibited traits of
incorrigibility. It is time to put a finis
to the respondent's professional
legal career for the sake of the
public, the profession and the
interest of justice.

WHEREFORE, premises considered,

we hereby AFFIRM Resolution No.
XVII-2005-164 dated December 17,
2005 and Resolution No. XVII-2008-
657 dated December 11, 2008 of
the Board of Governors of the IBP
Committee on Bar Discipline insofar
as respondent Atty. Anastacio
Revilla, Jr. is found liable for
professional misconduct for
violations of the Lawyer's Oath;
Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03,
Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04,
Canon 12; Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of
the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and Sections 20(d),
21 and 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court. However, we modify the
penalty the IBP imposed, and hold
that the respondent should
be DISBARRED from the practice of
law.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 9604 March 20, 2013
RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J.
RUSTIA, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS
T. JARDER, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This administrative case arose from a Complaint tiled
by Rodrigo E. Tapay (Tapay) and Anthony J. Rustia
(Rustia), both employees of the Sugar Regulatory
Administration, against Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo (Atty.
Bancolo) and Atty. Janus T. larder (Atty. Jarder) for
violation of the Canons of Ethics and Professionalism,
Falsification of Public Document, Gross Dishonesty,
and Harassment.
The Facts
Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia
received an Order dated 14 October 2004 from the
Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to
file a counter-affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of
authority, falsification of public document, and graft
and corrupt practices filed against them by Nehimias
Divinagracia, Jr. (Divinagracia), a co-employee in the
Sugar Regulatory Administration. The
Complaint1 dated 31 August 2004 was allegedly
signed on behalf of Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie
L. Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office based in
Bacolod City, Negros Occidental.
When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced
upon each other, the latter informed Atty. Bancolo of
the case filed against them before the Office of the
Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo denied that he
represented Divinagracia since he had yet to meet
Divinagracia in person. When Rustia showed him the
Complaint, Atty. Bancolo declared that the signature
appearing above his name as counsel for
Divinagracia was not his. Thus, Rustia convinced Atty.
Bancolo to sign an affidavit to attest to such fact. On 9
December 2004, Atty. Bancolo signed an affidavit
denying his supposed signature appearing on the
Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and
submitted six specimen signatures for comparison.
Using Atty. Bancolo’s affidavit and other documentary
evidence, Tapay and Rustia filed a counter-affidavit
accusing Divinagracia of falsifying the signature of his
alleged counsel, Atty. Bancolo.
In a Resolution dated 28 March 2005, the Office of the
Ombudsman provisionally dismissed the Complaint
since the falsification of the counsel’s signature posed
a prejudicial question to the Complaint’s validity. Also,
the Office of the Ombudsman ordered that separate
cases for Falsification of Public Document2 and
Dishonesty3 be filed against Divinagracia, with Rustia
and Atty. Bancolo as complainants.
Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit
dated 1 August 2005 denying that he falsified the
signature of his former lawyer, Atty. Bancolo.
Divinagracia presented as evidence an affidavit dated
1 August 2005 by Richard A. Cordero, the legal
assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that the Jarder Bancolo
Law Office accepted Divinagracia’s case and that the
Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman
was signed by the office secretary per Atty. Bancolo’s
instructions. Divinagracia asked that the Office of the
Ombudsman dismiss the cases for falsification of
public document and dishonesty filed against him by
Rustia and Atty. Bancolo and to revive the original
Complaint for various offenses that he filed against
Tapay and Rustia.
In a Resolution dated 19 September 2005, the Office
of the Ombudsman dismissed the criminal case for
falsification of public document (OMB-V-C-05-0207-E)
for insufficiency of evidence. The dispositive portion
states:
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby
DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence, without
prejudice to the re-filing by Divinagracia, Jr. of a
proper complaint for violation of RA 3019 and other
offenses against Rustia and Tapay.
SO ORDERED.4
The administrative case for dishonesty (OMB-V-A-05-
0219-E) was also dismissed for lack of substantial
evidence in a Decision dated 19 September 2005.
On 29 November 2005, Tapay and Rustia filed with
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a
complaint5 to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder,
Atty. Bancolo’s law partner. The complainants alleged
that they were subjected to a harassment Complaint
filed before the Office of the Ombudsman with the
forged signature of Atty. Bancolo. Complainants
stated further that the signature of Atty. Bancolo in the
Complaint was not the only one that was forged.
Complainants attached a Report6 dated 1 July 2005
by the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory 6
which examined three other letter-complaints signed
by Atty. Bancolo for other clients, allegedly close
friends of Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that the
questioned signatures in the letter-complaints and the
submitted standard signatures of Atty. Bancolo were
not written by one and the same person. Thus,
complainants maintained that not only were
respondents engaging in unprofessional and unethical
practices, they were also involved in falsification of
documents used to harass and persecute innocent
people.
On 9 January 2006, complainants filed a Supplement
to the Disbarment Complaint Due to Additional
Information. They alleged that a certain Mary Jane
Gentugao, the secretary of the Jarder Bancolo Law
Office, forged the signature of Atty. Bancolo.
In their Answer dated 26 January 2006 to the
disbarment complaint, respondents admitted that the
criminal and administrative cases filed by Divinagracia
against complainants before the Office of the
Ombudsman were accepted by the Jarder Bancolo
Law Office. The cases were assigned to Atty.
Bancolo. Atty. Bancolo alleged that after being
informed of the assignment of the cases, he ordered
his staff to prepare and draft all the necessary
pleadings and documents. However, due to some
minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the
pleadings and communications be signed in his name
by the secretary of the law office. Respondents added
that complainants filed the disbarment complaint to
retaliate against them since the cases filed before the
Office of the Ombudsman were meritorious and
strongly supported by testimonial and documentary
evidence. Respondents also denied that Mary Jane
Gentugao was employed as secretary of their law
office.
Tapay and Rustia filed a Reply to the Answer dated 2
March 2006. Thereafter, the parties were directed by
the Commission on Bar Discipline to attend a
mandatory conference scheduled on 5 May 2006. The
conference was reset to 10 August 2006. On the said
date, complainants were present but respondents
failed to appear. The conference was reset to 25
September 2006 for the last time. Again, respondents
failed to appear despite receiving notice of the
conference. Complainants manifested that they were
submitting their disbarment complaint based on the
documents submitted to the IBP. Respondents were
also deemed to have waived their right to participate
in the mandatory conference. Further, both parties
were directed to submit their respective position
papers. On 27 October 2006, the IBP received
complainants’ position paper dated 18 October 2006
and respondents’ position paper dated 23 October
2006.
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
On 11 April 2007, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the
Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on
Bar Discipline of the IBP, submitted her Report. Atty.
Quisumbing found that Atty. Bancolo violated Rule
9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility while Atty. Jarder violated Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 of the same Code. The Investigating
Commissioner recommended that Atty. Bancolo be
suspended for two years from the practice of law and
Atty. Jarder be admonished for his failure to exercise
certain responsibilities in their law firm.
In her Report and Recommendation, the Investigating
Commissioner opined:
x x x. In his answer, respondent Atty. Charlie L.
Bancolo admitted that his signature appearing in the
complaint filed against complainants’ Rodrigo E.
Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia with the Ombudsman
were signed by the secretary. He did not refute the
findings that his signatures appearing in the various
documents released from his office were found not to
be his. Such pattern of malpratice by respondent
clearly breached his obligation under Rule 9.01 of
Canon 9, for a lawyer who allows a non-member to
represent him is guilty of violating the aforementioned
Canon. The fact that respondent was busy cannot
serve as an excuse for him from signing personally.
After all respondent is a member of a law firm
composed of not just one (1) lawyer. The Supreme
Court has ruled that this practice constitute
negligence and undersigned finds the act a sign of
indolence and ineptitude. Moreover, respondents
ignored the notices sent by undersigned. That showed
patent lack of respect to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines’ Commission on Bar Discipline and its
proceedings. It betrays lack of courtesy and
irresponsibility as lawyers.
On the other hand, Atty. Janus T. Jarder, a senior
partner of the law firm Jarder Bancolo and Associates
Law Office, failed to exercise certain responsibilities
over matters under the charge of his law firm. As a
senior partner[,] he failed to abide to the principle of
"command responsibility". x x x.
xxxx
Respondent Atty. Janus Jarder after all is a seasoned
practitioner, having passed the bar in 1995 and
practicing law up to the present. He holds himself out
to the public as a law firm designated as Jarder
Bancolo and Associates Law Office. It behooves Atty.
Janus T. Jarder to exert ordinary diligence to find out
what is going on in his law firm, to ensure that all
lawyers in his firm act in conformity to the Code of
Professional Responsibility. As a partner, it is his
responsibility to provide efficacious control of court
pleadings and other documents that carry the name of
the law firm. Had he done that, he could have known
the unethical practice of his law partner Atty. Charlie
L. Bancolo. Respondent Atty. Janus T. Jarder failed to
perform this task and is administratively liable under
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.7
On 19 September 2007, in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-
97, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved with
modification the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner. The Resolution states:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex
"A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and considering Respondent Atty.
Bancolo’s violation of Rule 9.01, Canon 9 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Charlie L.
Bancolo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for one (1) year.
However, with regard to the charge against Atty.
Janus T. Jarder, the Board of Governors RESOLVED
as it is hereby RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby
AMENDED the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the
case for lack of merit.8
Tapay and Rustia filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
Likewise, Atty. Bancolo filed his Motion for
Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007.
Thereafter, Atty. Jarder filed his separate
Consolidated Comment/Reply to Complainants’
Motion for Reconsideration and Comment Filed by
Complainants dated 29 January 2008.
In Resolution No. XX-2012-175 dated 9 June 2012,
the IBP Board of Governors denied both
complainants’ and Atty. Bancolo’s motions for
reconsideration. The IBP Board found no cogent
reason to reverse the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner and affirmed Resolution No. XVIII-
2007-97 dated 19 September 2007.
The Court’s Ruling
After a careful review of the records of the case, we
agree with the findings and recommendation of the
IBP Board and find reasonable grounds to hold
respondent Atty. Bancolo administratively liable.
Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for
a former client before the Office of the Ombudsman
was signed in his name by a secretary of his law
office. Clearly, this is a violation of Rule 9.01 of Canon
9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides:
CANON 9
A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE OF LAW.
Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any
unqualified person the performance of any task which
by law may only be performed by a member of the
Bar in good standing.
This rule was clearly explained in the case of
Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio,9 where we held:
The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not
to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is
founded on public interest and policy. Public policy
requires that the practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in education and
character. The permissive right conferred on the
lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to
withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of
moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to
protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar
from the incompetence or dishonesty of those
unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the
disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a
lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the
canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to
permit his professional services or his name to be
used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized
practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate.
And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part,
subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the
unauthorized practice of law.
In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation,10 we
held that the preparation and signing of a pleading
constitute legal work involving the practice of law
which is reserved exclusively for members of the legal
profession. Atty. Bancolo’s authority and duty to sign
a pleading are personal to him. Although he may
delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer,
he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under
the Rules of Court, counsel’s signature serves as a
certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2) to
the best of his knowledge, information and belief there
is good ground to support it; and (3) it is not
interposed for delay.11 Thus, by affixing one’s
signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has
the responsibility to certify to these matters and give
legal effect to the document. 1âwphi1
In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty. Bancolo
from the practice of law for one year is warranted. We
also find proper the dismissal of the case against Atty.
larder.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against
Atty. Janus T. larder for lack of merit.
We find respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo
administratively liable for violating Rule 9.01 of Canon
9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one
year effective upon finality of this Decision. He is
warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent
Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo's record in this Court as

attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be

furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
In his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed
2007, Atty. Bancolo wants us to believe that he was a to circulate them to all the courts in the country for
victim of circumstances or of manipulated events their information and guidance.
because of his unconditional trust and confidence in
his former law partner, Atty. Jarder. However, Atty. SO ORDERED.
Bancolo did not take any steps to rectify the situation,
save for the affidavit he gave to Rustia denying his
signature to the Complaint filed before the Office of
the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo had an opportunity to
maintain his innocence when he filed with the IBP his
Joint Answer (with Atty. Jarder) dated 26 January
2006. Atty. Bancolo, however, admitted that prior to
the preparation of the Joint Answer, Atty. Jarder
threatened to file a disbarment case against him if he
did not cooperate. Thus, he was constrained to allow
Atty. Jarder to prepare the Joint Answer. Atty.
Bancolo simply signed the verification without seeing
the contents of the Joint Answer.

In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that

because of some minor lapses, the communications
and pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were
signed by his secretary, albeit with his tolerance.
Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility by allowing a non-lawyer
to affix his signature to a pleading. This violation Is an
act of falsehood which IS a ground for disciplinary
action.

The complainants did not present any evidence that

Atty. Jarder was directly involved, had knowledge of,
or even participated in the wrongful practice of Atty.
Bancolo in allowing or tolerating his secretary to sign
pleadings for him. Thus, we agree with the finding of
the IBP Board that Atty. Jarder is not administratively
liable.

G.R. No. 173188 January 15, 2014
THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE
SPOUSES VICENTE CADAVEDO AND BENITA
ARCOY-CADAVEDO (both deceased), substituted
by their heirs, namely: HERMINA, PASTORA,
Heirs of FRUCTUOSA, Heirs of RAQUEL,
EVANGELINE, VICENTE, JR., and ARMANDO, all
surnamed CADAVEDO, Petitioners,
vs.
VICTORINO (VIC) T. LACAYA, married to Rosa
Legados, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We solve in this Rule 45 petition for review on
certiorari1 the challenge to the October 11, 2005
decision2 and the May 9, 2006 resolution3 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) inPetitioners, CA-G.R. CV No. 56948.
The CA reversed and set aside the September 17,
1996 decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 10, of Dipolog City in Civil Case No. 4038,
granting in part the complaint for recovery of
possession of property filed by the petitioners, the
Conjugal Partnership of the Spouses Vicente
Cadavedo and Benita Arcoy-Cadavedo against Atty.
Victorino (Vic) T. Lacaya, married to Rosa Legados
(collectively, the respondents).
The Factual Antecedents
The Spouses Vicente Cadavedo and Benita Arcoy-
Cadavedo (collectively, the spouses Cadavedo)
acquired a homestead grant over a 230,765-square
meter parcel of land known as Lot 5415 (subject lot)
located in Gumay, Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte. They
were issued Homestead Patent No. V-15414 on
March 13, 1953andOriginal Certificate of Title No. P-
376 on July 2, 1953.On April30, 1955, the spouses
Cadavedo sold the subject lot to the spouses Vicente
Ames and Martha Fernandez (the spouses Ames)
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-4792 was
subsequently issued in the name of the spouses
Ames.
The present controversy arose when the spouses
Cadavedo filed an action5 before the RTC(then Court
of First Instance) of Zamboanga City against the
spouses Ames for sum of money and/or voiding of
contract of sale of homestead after the latter failed to
pay the balance of the purchase price. The spouses
Cadavedo initially engaged the services of Atty.
Rosendo Bandal who, for health reasons, later
withdrew from the case; he was substituted by Atty.
Lacaya.
On February 24, 1969, Atty. Lacaya amended the
complaint to assert the nullity of the sale and the
issuance of TCT No. T-4792 in the names of the
spouses Ames as gross violation of the public land
law. The amended complaint stated that the spouses
Cadavedo hired Atty. Lacaya on a contingency fee
basis. The contingency fee stipulation specifically
reads:
10. That due to the above circumstances, the plaintiffs
were forced to hire a lawyer on contingent basis and if
they become the prevailing parties in the case at bar,
they will pay the sum of ₱2,000.00 for attorney’s fees.6
In a decision dated February 1, 1972, the RTC upheld
the sale of the subject lot to the spouses Ames. The
spouses Cadavedo, thru Atty. Lacaya, appealed the
case to the CA.
On September 18, 1975, and while the appeal before
the CAin Civil Case No. 1721was pending, the
spouses Ames sold the subject lot to their children.
The spouses Ames’ TCT No. T-4792 was
subsequently cancelled and TCT No. T-25984was
issued in their children’s names. On October 11,
1976, the spouses Ames mortgaged the subject lot
with the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP)
in the names of their children.
On August 13, 1980, the CA issued itsdecision in Civil
Case No. 1721,reversing the decision of the RTC and
declaring the deed of sale, transfer of rights, claims
and interest to the spouses Ames null and void ab
initio. It directed the spouses Cadavedo to return the
initial payment and ordered the Register of Deeds to
cancel the spouses Ames’ TCT No. T-4792 and to
reissue another title in the name of the spouses
Cadavedo. The case eventually reached this Court via
the spouses Ames’ petition for review on certiorari
which this Court dismissed for lack of merit.
Meanwhile, the spouses Ames defaulted in their
obligation with the DBP. Thus, the DBP caused the
publication of a notice of foreclosure sale of the
subject lot as covered by TCT No. T-25984(under the
name of the spouses Ames’ children). Atty. Lacaya
immediately informed the spouses Cadavedo of the
foreclosure sale and filed an Affidavit of Third Party
Claim with the Office of the Provincial Sheriff on
September 14, 1981.
With the finality of the judgment in Civil Case No.
1721,Atty. Lacaya filed on September 21, 1981 a
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.
On September 23, 1981,and pending the RTC’s
resolution of the motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution, the spouses Ames filed a complaint7 before
the RTC against the spouses Cadavedo for Quieting
of Title or Enforcement of Civil Rights due Planters in
Good Faith with prayer for Preliminary Injunction. The
spouses Cadavedo, thru Atty. Lacaya, filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground of res judicata and to cancel
TCT No. T-25984 (under the name of the spouses
Ames’ children).
On October 16, 1981, the RTC granted the motion for
the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No.
1721,andthe spouses Cadavedo were placed in
possession of the subject lot on October 24, 1981.
Atty. Lacaya asked for one-half of the subject lot as
attorney’s fees. He caused the subdivision of the
subject lot into two equal portions, based on area, and
selected the more valuable and productive half for
himself; and assigned the other half to the spouses
Cadavedo.
Unsatisfied with the division, Vicente and his sons-in-
law entered the portion assigned to the respondents
and ejected them. The latter responded by filing a
counter-suit for forcible entry before the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC); the ejectment case was docketed
as Civil Case No. 215. This incident occurred while
Civil Case No. 3352was pending.
On May 13, 1982, Vicente andAtty. Lacaya entered
into an amicable settlement (compromise
agreement)8 in Civil Case No. 215 (the ejectment
case), re-adjusting the area and portion obtained by
each. Atty. Lacaya acquired 10.5383 hectares
pursuant to the agreement. The MTC approved the
compromise agreementin a decision dated June 10,
1982.
Meanwhile, on May 21, 1982, the spouses Cadavedo
filed before the RTC an action against the DBP for
Injunction; it was docketed as Civil Case No. 3443
(Cadavedo v. DBP).The RTC subsequently denied
the petition, prompting the spouses Cadavedo to
elevate the case to the CAvia a petition for certiorari.
The CA dismissed the petition in its decision of
January 31, 1984.
The records do not clearly disclose the proceedings
subsequent to the CA decision in Civil Case No. 3443.
However, on August 18, 1988, TCT No. 41051was
issued in the name of the spouses Cadavedo
concerning the subject lot.
On August 9, 1988, the spouses Cadavedo filed
before the RTC an action9 against the respondents,
assailing the MTC-approved compromise agreement.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 4038 and is
the root of the present case. The spouses Cadavedo
prayed, among others, that the respondents be
ejected from their one-half portion of the subject lot;
that they be ordered to render an accounting of the
produce of this one-half portion from 1981;and that
the RTC fix the attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit
basis, with due consideration of the expenses that
Atty. Lacaya incurred while handling the civil cases.
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 4038, the
spouses Cadavedo executed a Deed of Partition of
Estate in favor of their eight children. Consequently,
TCT No. 41051 was cancelled and TCT No. 41690
was issued in the names of the latter. The records are
not clear on the proceedings and status of Civil Case
No. 3352.
The Ruling of the RTC
In the September 17, 1996 decision10 in Civil Case No.
4038, the RTC declared the contingent fee of 10.5383
hectares as excessive and unconscionable. The RTC
reduced the land area to 5.2691 hectares and ordered
the respondents to vacate and restore the remaining
5.2692hectares to the spouses Cadavedo.
The RTC noted that, as stated in the amended
complaint filed by Atty. Lacaya, the agreed attorney’s
fee on contingent basis was ₱2,000.00. Nevertheless,
the RTC also pointed out that the parties novated this
agreement when they executed the compromise
agreement in Civil Case No. 215 (ejectment case),
thereby giving Atty. Lacaya one-half of the subject lot.
The RTC added that Vicente’s decision to give Atty.
Lacaya one-half of the subject lot, sans approval of
Benita, was a valid act of administration and binds the
conjugal partnership. The RTC reasoned out that the
disposition redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership as it was done precisely to remunerate
Atty. Lacaya for his services to recover the property
itself.
These considerations notwithstanding, the RTC
considered the one-half portion of the subject lot, as
Atty. Lacaya’s contingent fee,excessive,
unreasonable and unconscionable. The RTC was
convinced that the issues involved in Civil Case No.
1721were not sufficiently difficult and complicated to
command such an excessive award; neither did it
require Atty. Lacaya to devote much of his time or
skill, or to perform extensive research.
Finally, the RTC deemed the respondents’
possession, prior to the judgment, of the excess
portion of their share in the subject lot to be in good
faith. The respondents were thus entitled to receive its
fruits.
On the spouses Cadavedo’s motion for
reconsideration, the RTC modified the decision in its
resolution11 dated December 27, 1996. The RTC
ordered the respondents to account for and deliver
the produce and income, valued at ₱7,500.00 per
annum, of the 5.2692hectares that the RTC ordered
the spouses Amesto restore to the spouses
Cadavedo, from October 10, 1988 until final
restoration of the premises.
The respondents appealed the case before the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
In its decision12 dated October 11, 2005, the CA
reversed and set aside the RTC’s September 17,
1996 decision and maintained the partition and
distribution of the subject lot under the compromise
agreement. In so ruling, the CA noted the following
facts: (1) Atty. Lacaya served as the spouses
Cadavedo’s counsel from 1969 until 1988,when the
latter filed the present case against Atty. Lacaya; (2)
during the nineteen (19) years of their attorney-client
relationship, Atty. Lacaya represented the spouses
Cadavedo in three civil cases –Civil Case No. 1721,
Civil Case No. 3352, and Civil Case No. 3443; (3) the
first civil case lasted for twelve years and even
reached this Court, the second civil case lasted for
seven years, while the third civil case lasted for six
years and went all the way to the CA;(4) the spouses
Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya entered into a
compromise agreement concerning the division of the
subject lot where Atty. Lacaya ultimately agreed to
acquire a smaller portion; (5) the MTC approved the
compromise agreement; (6) Atty. Lacaya defrayed all
of the litigation expenses in Civil Case No. 1721; and
(7) the spouses Cadavedo expressly recognized that
Atty. Lacaya served them in several cases.
Considering these established facts and consistent
with Canon 20.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (enumerating the factors that should
guide the determination of the lawyer’s fees), the CA
ruled that the time spent and the extent of the
services Atty. Lacaya rendered for the spouses
Cadavedo in the three cases, the probability of him
losing other employment resulting from his
engagement, the benefits resulting to the spouses
Cadavedo, and the contingency of his fees justified
the compromise agreement and rendered the agreed
fee under the compromise agreement reasonable.
The Petition
In the present petition, the petitioners essentially
argue that the CA erred in: (1) granting the attorney’s
fee consisting of one-half or 10.5383 hectares of the
subject lot to Atty. Lacaya, instead of confirming the
agreed contingent attorney’s fees of ₱2,000.00; (2)
not holding the respondents accountable for the
produce, harvests and income of the 10.5383-hectare
portion (that they obtained from the spouses
Cadavedo) from 1988 up to the present; and (3)
upholding the validity of the purported oral contract
between the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya
when it was champertous and dealt with property then
still subject of Civil Case No. 1721.13
The petitioners argue that stipulations on a lawyer’s
compensation for professional services, especially
those contained in the pleadings filed in courts,
control the amount of the attorney’s fees to which the
lawyer shall be entitled and should prevail over oral
agreements. In this case, the spouses Cadavedo and
Atty. Lacaya agreed that the latter’s contingent
attorney’s fee was ₱2,000.00 in cash, not one-half of
the subject lot. This agreement was clearly stipulated
in the amended complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1721.
Thus, Atty. Lacaya is bound by the expressly
stipulated fee and cannot insist on unilaterally
changing its terms without violating their contract.
The petitioners add that the one-half portion of the
subject lot as Atty. Lacaya’s contingent attorney’s fee
is excessive and unreasonable. They highlight the
RTC’s observations and argue that the issues
involved in Civil Case No. 1721, pursuant to which the
alleged contingent fee of one-half of the subject lot
was agreed by the parties, were not novel and did not
involve difficult questions of law; neither did the case
require much of Atty. Lacaya’s time, skill and effort in
research. They point out that the two subsequent civil
cases should not be considered in determining the
reasonable contingent fee to which Atty. Lacaya
should be entitled for his services in Civil Case No.
1721,as those cases had not yet been instituted at
that time. Thus, these cases should not be considered
in fixing the attorney’s fees. The petitioners also claim
that the spouses Cadavedo concluded separate
agreements on the expenses and costs for each of
these subsequent cases, and that Atty. Lacaya did not
even record any attorney’s lien in the spouses
Cadavedo’s TCT covering the subject lot.
The petitioners further direct the Court’s attention to
the fact that Atty. Lacaya,in taking over the case from
Atty. Bandal, agreed to defray all of the litigation
expenses in exchange for one-half of the subject lot
should they win the case. They insist that this
agreement is a champertous contract that is contrary
to public policy, prohibited by law for violation of the
fiduciary relationship between a lawyer and a client.
Finally, the petitioners maintain that the compromise
agreement in Civil Case No. 215 (ejectment case) did
not novate their original stipulated agreement on the
attorney’s fees. They reason that Civil Case No. 215
did not decide the issue of attorney’s fees between
the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya for the
latter’s services in Civil Case No. 1721.
The Case for the Respondents
In their defense,14 the respondents counter that the
attorney’s fee stipulated in the amended complaint
was not the agreed fee of Atty. Lacaya for his legal
services. They argue that the questioned stipulation
for attorney’s fees was in the nature of a penalty that,
if granted, would inure to the spouses Cadavedo and
not to Atty. Lacaya.
The respondents point out that: (1) both Vicente and
Atty. Lacaya caused the survey and subdivision of the
subject lot immediately after the spouses Cadavedo
reacquired its possession with the RTC’s approval of
their motion for execution of judgment in Civil Case
No. 1721; (2) Vicente expressly ratified and confirmed
the agreement on the contingent attorney’s fee
consisting of one-half of the subject lot; (3) the MTC in
Civil Case No. 215 (ejectment case) approved the
compromise agreement; (4) Vicente is the legally
designated administrator of the conjugal partnership,
hence the compromise agreement ratifying the
transfer bound the partnership and could not have
been invalidated by the absence of Benita’s
acquiescence; and (5) the compromise agreement
merely inscribed and ratified the earlier oral
agreement between the spouses Cadavedo and Atty.
Lacaya which is not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order and public policy.
While the case is pending before this Court, Atty.
Lacaya died.15 He was substituted by his wife -Rosa -
and their children –Victoriano D.L. Lacaya, Jr.,
Rosevic Lacaya-Ocampo, Reymar L. Lacaya,
Marcelito L. Lacaya, Raymundito L. Lacaya, Laila
Lacaya-Matabalan, Marivic Lacaya-Barba, Rosalie L.
Lacaya and Ma. Vic-Vic Lacaya-Camaongay.16
The Court’s Ruling
We resolve to GRANT the petition.
The subject lot was the core of four successive and
overlapping cases prior to the present controversy. In
three of these cases, Atty. Lacaya stood as the
spouses Cadavedo’s counsel. For ease of discussion,
we summarize these cases (including the dates and
proceedings pertinent to each) as follows:
Civil Case No. 1721 – Cadavedo v. Ames (Sum of
money and/or voiding of contract of sale of
homestead), filed on January 10, 1967. The writ of
execution was granted on October 16, 1981.
Civil Case No. 3352 – Ames v. Cadavedo (Quieting of
Title and/or Enforcement of Civil Rights due Planters
in Good Faith with Application for Preliminary
injunction), filed on September 23, 1981.
Civil Case No. 3443 – Cadavedo v. DBP (Action for
Injunction with Preliminary Injunction), filed on May
21, 1982.
Civil Case No. 215 –Atty. Lacaya v. Vicente
Cadavedo, et. al. (Ejectment Case), filed between the
latter part of 1981 and early part of 1982. The parties
executed the compromise agreement on May 13,
1982.
Civil Case No. 4038 –petitioners v. respondents (the
present case).
The agreement on attorney’s fee
consisting of one-half of the subject
lot is void; the petitioners are entitled
to recover possession
The core issue for our resolution is whether the
attorney’s fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot
is valid and reasonable, and binds the petitioners. We
rule in the NEGATIVE for the reasons discussed
below.
A. The written agreement providing for
a contingent fee of ₱2,000.00 should prevail
over the oral agreement providing for one-
half of the subject lot
The spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya agreed on a
contingent fee of ₱2,000.00 and not, as asserted by
the latter, one-half of the subject lot. The stipulation
contained in the amended complaint filed by Atty.
Lacaya clearly stated that the spouses Cadavedo
hired the former on a contingency basis; the Spouses
Cadavedo undertook to pay their lawyer ₱2,000.00 as
attorney’s fees should the case be decided in their
favor.
Contrary to the respondents’ contention, this
stipulation is not in the nature of a penalty that the
court would award the winning party, to be paid by the
losing party. The stipulation is a representation to the
court concerning the agreement between the spouses
Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya, on the latter’s
compensation for his services in the case; it is not the
attorney’s fees in the nature of damages which the
former prays from the court as an incident to the main
action.
At this point, we highlight that as observed by both the
RTC and the CA and agreed as well by both parties,
the alleged contingent fee agreement consisting of
one-half of the subject lot was not reduced to writing
prior to or, at most, at the start of Atty. Lacaya’s
engagement as the spouses Cadavedo’s counsel in
Civil Case No. 1721.An agreement between the
lawyer and his client, providing for the former’s
compensation, is subject to the ordinary rules
governing contracts in general. As the rules stand,
controversies involving written and oral agreements
on attorney’s fees shall be resolved in favor of the
former.17 Hence, the contingency fee of ₱2,000.00
stipulated in the amended complaint prevails over the
alleged oral contingency fee agreement of one-half of
the subject lot.
B. The contingent fee agreement between
the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya,
awarding the latter one-half of the subject
lot, is champertous
Granting arguendo that the spouses Cadavedo and
Atty. Lacaya indeed entered into an oral contingent
fee agreement securing to the latter one-half of the
subject lot, the agreement is nevertheless void.
In their account, the respondents insist that Atty.
Lacaya agreed to represent the spouses Cadavedo in
Civil Case No. 1721 and assumed the litigation
expenses, without providing for reimbursement, in
exchange for a contingency fee consisting of one-half
of the subject lot. This agreement is champertous and
is contrary to public policy.18
Champerty, along with maintenance (of which
champerty is an aggravated form), is a common law
doctrine that traces its origin to the medieval
period.19 The doctrine of maintenance was directed
"against wanton and in officious intermeddling in the
disputes of others in which the intermeddler has no
interest whatever, and where the assistance rendered
is without justification or excuse."20 Champerty, on the
other hand, is characterized by "the receipt of a share
of the proceeds of the litigation by the
intermeddler."21 Some common law court decisions,
however, add a second factor in determining
champertous contracts, namely, that the lawyer must
also, "at his own expense maintain, and take all the
risks of, the litigation."22
The doctrines of champerty and maintenance were
created in response "to medieval practice of assigning
doubtful or fraudulent claims to persons of wealth and
influence in the expectation that such individuals
would enjoy greater success in prosecuting those
claims in court, in exchange for which they would
receive an entitlement to the spoils of the
litigation."23 "In order to safeguard the administration of
justice, instances of champerty and maintenance
were made subject to criminal and tortuous liability
and a common law rule was developed, striking down
champertous agreements and contracts of
maintenance as being unenforceable on the grounds
of public policy."24
In this jurisdiction, we maintain the rules on
champerty, as adopted from American decisions, for
public policy considerations.25 As matters currently
stand, any agreement by a lawyer to "conduct the
litigation in his own account, to pay the expenses
thereof or to save his client therefrom and to receive
as his fee a portion of the proceeds of the judgment is
obnoxious to the law."26 The rule of the profession that
forbids a lawyer from contracting with his client for
part of the thing in litigation in exchange for
conducting the case at the lawyer’s expense is
designed to prevent the lawyer from acquiring an
interest between him and his client. To permit these
arrangements is to enable the lawyer to "acquire
additional stake in the outcome of the action which
might lead him to consider his own recovery rather
than that of his client or to accept a settlement which
might take care of his interest in the verdict to the
sacrifice of that of his client in violation of his duty of
undivided fidelity to his client’s cause."27
In Bautista v. Atty. Gonzales,28 the Court struck down
the contingent fee agreement between therein
respondent Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales and his client
for being contrary to public policy. There, the Court
held that an reimbursement of litigation expenses paid
by the former is against public policy, especially if the
lawyer has agreed to carry on the action at his
expense in consideration of some bargain to have a
part of the thing in dispute. It violates the fiduciary
relationship between the lawyer and his client.29
In addition to its champertous character, the
contingent fee arrangement in this case expressly
transgresses the Canons of Professional Ethics and,
impliedly, the Code of Professional
Responsibility.30 Under Rule 42 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics, a lawyer may not properly agree
with a client that the lawyer shall pay or beat the
expense of litigation.31 The same reasons discussed
above underlie this rule.
C. The attorney’s fee consisting of
one-half of the subject lot is excessive
and unconscionable
We likewise strike down the questioned attorney’s fee
and declare it void for being excessive and
unconscionable. The contingent fee of one-half of the
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subject lot was allegedly agreed to secure the
services of Atty. Lacaya in Civil Case No.
1721.Plainly, it was intended for only one action as
the two other civil cases had not yet been instituted at
that time. While Civil Case No. 1721 took twelve years
to be finally resolved, that period of time, as matters
then stood, was not a sufficient reason to justify a
large fee in the absence of any showing that special
skills and additional work had been involved. The
issue involved in that case, as observed by the
RTC(and with which we agree), was simple and did
not require of Atty. Lacaya extensive skill, effort and
research. The issue simply dealt with the prohibition
against the sale of a homestead lot within five years
from its acquisition.
That Atty. Lacaya also served as the spouses
Cadavedo’s counsel in the two subsequent cases did
not and could not otherwise justify an attorney’s fee of
one-half of the subject lot. As assertedby the
petitioners, the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya
made separate arrangements for the costs and
expenses foreach of these two cases. Thus, the
expenses for the two subsequent cases had been
considered and taken cared of Based on these
considerations, we therefore find one-half of the
subject lot as attorney’s fee excessive and
unreasonable.
D. Atty. Lacaya’s acquisition of
the one-half portion contravenes
Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code
Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code forbids lawyers from
acquiring, by purchase or assignment, the property
that has been the subject of litigation in which they
have taken part by virtue of their profession.32 The
same proscription is provided under Rule 10 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics.33
A thing is in litigation if there is a contest or litigation
over it in court or when it is subject of the judicial
action.34 Following this definition, we find that the
subject lot was still in litigation when Atty. Lacaya
acquired the disputed one-half portion. We note in this
regard the following established facts:(1)on
September 21, 1981, Atty. Lacaya filed a motion for
the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No.
1721; (2) on September 23, 1981, the spouses Ames
filed Civil Case No. 3352 against the spouses
Cadavedo; (3)on October 16, 1981, the RTC granted
the motion filed for the issuance of a writ of execution
in Civil Case No. 1721 and the spouses Cadavedo
took possession of the subject lot on October 24,
1981; (4) soon after, the subject lot was surveyed and
subdivided into two equal portions, and Atty. Lacaya
took possession of one of the subdivided portions;
and (5) on May 13, 1982, Vicente and Atty. Lacaya
executed the compromise agreement.
From these timelines, whether by virtue of the alleged
oral contingent fee agreement or an agreement
subsequently entered into, Atty. Lacaya acquired the
disputed one-half portion (which was after October 24,
1981) while Civil Case No. 3352 and the motion for
the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No.
1721were already pending before the lower courts.
Similarly, the compromise agreement, including the
subsequent judicial approval, was effected during the
pendency of Civil Case No. 3352. In all of these, the
relationship of a lawyer and a client still existed
between Atty. Lacaya and the spouses Cadavedo.
Thus, whether we consider these transactions –the
transfer of the disputed one-half portion and the
compromise agreement –independently of each other
or resulting from one another, we find them to be
prohibited and void35 by reason of public
policy.36 Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code,
contracts which are contrary to public policy and those
expressly prohibited or declared void by law are
considered in existent and void from the beginning.37
What did not escape this Court’s attention is the CA’s
failure to note that the transfer violated the provisions
of Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, although it
recognized the concurrence of the transfer and the
execution of the compromise agreement with the
pendency of the two civil cases subsequent to Civil
Case No. 1721.38 In reversing the RTC ruling, the CA
gave weight to the compromise agreement and in so
doing, found justification in the unproved oral
contingent fee agreement.
While contingent fee agreements are indeed
recognized in this jurisdiction as a valid exception to
the prohibitions under Article 1491(5) of the Civil
Code,39 contrary to the CA’s position, however, this
recognition does not apply to the present case. A
contingent fee contract is an agreement in writing
where the fee, often a fixed percentage of what may
be recovered in the action, is made to depend upon
the success of the litigation.40 The payment of the
contingent fee is not made during the pendency of the
litigation involving the client’s property but only after
the judgment has been rendered in the case handled
by the lawyer.41
In the present case, we reiterate that the transfer or
assignment of the disputed one-half portion to Atty.
Lacaya took place while the subject lot was still under
litigation and the lawyer-client relationship still existed
between him and the spouses Cadavedo. Thus, the
general prohibition provided under Article 1491 of the
Civil Code, rather than the exception provided in
jurisprudence, applies. The CA seriously erred in
upholding the compromise agreement on the basis of
the unproved oral contingent fee agreement.
Notably, Atty. Lacaya, in undertaking the spouses
Cadavedo’s cause pursuant to the terms of the
alleged oral contingent fee agreement, in effect,
became a co-proprietor having an equal, if not more,
stake as the spouses Cadavedo. Again, this is void by
reason of public policy; it undermines the fiduciary
relationship between him and his clients.42
E.The compromise agreement could not
validate the void oral contingent fee
agreement; neither did it supersede the
written contingent fee agreement
The compromise agreement entered into between
Vicente and Atty. Lacaya in Civil Case No. 215
(ejectment case) was intended to ratify and confirm
Atty. Lacaya’s acquisition and possession of the
disputed one-half portion which were made in
violation of Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code. As
earlier discussed, such acquisition is void; the
compromise agreement, which had for its object a
void transaction, should be void.
A contract whose cause, object or purpose is contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy is in existent and void from the beginning.43 It
can never be ratified44 nor the action or defense for the
declaration of the in existence of the contract
prescribe;45 and any contract directly resulting from
such illegal contract is likewise void and in existent.46
Consequently, the compromise agreement did not
supersede the written contingent fee agreement
providing for attorney’s fee of ₱2,000.00; neither did it
preclude the petitioners from questioning its validity
even though Vicente might have knowingly and
voluntarily acquiesced thereto and although the MTC
approved it in its June 10, 1982 decision in the
ejectment case. The MTC could not have acquired
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the void
compromise agreement; its judgment in the ejectment
case could not have attained finality and can thus be
attacked at any time. Moreover, an ejectment case
concerns itself only with the issue of possession de
facto; it will not preclude the filing of a separate action
for recovery of possession founded on ownership.
Hence, contrary to the CA’s position, the petitioners–
in filing the present action and praying for, among
others, the recovery of possession of the disputed
one-half portion and for judicial determination of the
reasonable fees due Atty. Lacaya for his services –
were not barred by the compromise agreement.
Atty. Lacaya is entitled to receive attorney’s fees on a
quantum meruit basis
In view of their respective assertions and defenses,
the parties, in effect, impliedly set aside any express
stipulation on the attorney’s fees, and the petitioners,
by express contention, submit the reasonableness of
such fees to the court’s discretion. We thus have to fix
the attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis.
"Quantum meruit—meaning ‘as much as he
deserves’—is used as basis for determining a
lawyer’s professional fees in the absence of a contract
x x x taking into account certain factors in fixing the
amount of legal fees."47 "Its essential requisite is the
acceptance of the benefits by one sought to be
charged for the services rendered under
circumstances as reasonably to notify him that the
lawyer performing the task was expecting to be paid
compensation"48 for it. The doctrine of quantum meruit
is a device to prevent undue enrichment based on the
equitable postulate that it is unjust for a person to
retain benefit without paying for it.49
Under Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court50 and Canon 20 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility,51 factors such as the importance of the
subject matter of the controversy, the time spent and
the extent of the services rendered, the customary
charges for similar services, the amount involved in
the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client
from the service, to name a few, are considered in
determining the reasonableness of the fees to which a
lawyer is entitled.
In the present case, the following considerations
guide this Court in considering and setting Atty.
Lacaya’s fees based on quantum meruit: (1) the
questions involved in these civil cases were not novel
and did not require of Atty. Lacaya considerable effort
in terms of time, skill or the performance of extensive
research; (2) Atty. Lacaya rendered legal services for
the Spouses Cadavedo in three civil cases beginning
in 1969 until 1988 when the petitioners filed the
instant case; (3) the first of these civil cases
(Cadavedo v. Ames) lasted for twelve years and
reaching up to this Court; the second (Ames v.
Cadavedo) lasted for seven years; and the third
(Cadavedo and Lacaya v. DBP) lasted for six years,
reaching up to the CA; and (4) the property subject of
these civil cases is of a considerable size of 230,765
square meters or 23.0765 hectares.

All things considered, we hold as fair and equitable

the RTC’s considerations in appreciating the
character of the services that Atty. Lacaya rendered in
the three cases, subject to modification on valuation.
We believe and so hold that the respondents are
entitled to two (2) hectares (or approximately one-
tenth [1/10] of the subject lot), with the fruits
previously received from the disputed one-half
portion, as attorney’s fees. They shall return to the
petitioners the remainder of the disputed one-half
portion.

The allotted portion of the subject lot properly

recognizes that litigation should be for the benefit of
the client, not the lawyer, particularly in a legal
situation when the law itself holds clear and express
protection to the rights of the client to the disputed
property (a homestead lot). Premium consideration, in
other words, is on the rights of the owner, not on the
lawyer who only helped the owner protect his rights.
Matters cannot be the other way around; otherwise,
the lawyer does indeed effectively acquire a property
right over the disputed property. If at all, due
recognition of parity between a lawyer and a client
should be on the fruits of the disputed property, which
in this case, the Court properly accords.

WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we

hereby GRANT the petition. We AFFIRM the decision
dated September 17, 1996 and the resolution dated
December 27, 1996of the Regional Trial Court of
Dipolog City, Branch 10,in Civil Case No. 4038, with
the MODIFICATION that the respondents, the
spouses Victorino (Vic) T. Lacaya and Rosa Legados,
are entitled to two (2) hectares (or approximately one-
tenth [1/10] of the subject lot) as attorney’s fees. The
fruits that the respondents previously received from
the disputed one-half portion shall also form part of
the attorney’s fees. We hereby ORDER the
respondents to return to the petitioners the remainder
of the 10.5383-hectare portion of the subject lot that
Atty. Vicente Lacaya acquired pursuant to the
compromise agreement.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6116 August 1, 2012
ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint for
disbarment filed by complainant Engr. Gilbert
Tumbokon against respondent Atty. Mariano R.
Pefianco for grave dishonesty, gross misconduct
constituting deceit and grossly immoral conduct.
In his Complaint,1 complainant narrated that
respondent undertook to give him 20% commission,
later reduced to 10%, of the attorney's fees the latter
would receive in representing Spouses Amable and
Rosalinda Yap (Sps. Yap), whom he referred, in an
action for partition of the estate of the late Benjamin
Yap (Civil Case No. 4986 before the Regional Trial
Court of Aklan). Their agreement was reflected in a
letter2 dated August 11, 1995. However, respondent
failed to pay him the agreed commission
notwithstanding receipt of attorney's fees amounting
to 17% of the total estate or about ₱ 40 million.
Instead, he was informed through a letter3 dated July
16, 1997 that Sps. Yap assumed to pay the same
after respondent had agreed to reduce his attorney's
fees from 25% to 17%. He then demanded the
payment of his commission4 which respondent
ignored.
Complainant further alleged that respondent has not
lived up to the high moral standards required of his
profession for having abandoned his legal wife,
Milagros Hilado, with whom he has two children, and
cohabited with Mae FlorGalido, with whom he has
four children. He also accused respondent of
engaging in money-lending business5 without the
required authorization from the
BangkoSentralngPilipinas.
In his defense, respondent explained that he accepted
Sps. Yap's case on a 25% contingent fee basis, and
advanced all the expenses. He disputed the August
11, 1995 letter for being a forgery and claimed that
Sps. Yap assumed to pay complainant's commission
which he clarified in his July 16, 1997 letter. He, thus,
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and for the
corresponding sanction against complainant's
counsel, Atty. Florencio B. Gonzales, for filing a
baseless complaint.6
In the Resolution7 dated February 16, 2004, the Court
resolved to refer this administrative case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. In his
Report and Recommendation8 dated October 10,
2008, the Investigating IBP Commissioner
recommended that respondent be suspended for one
(1) year from the active practice of law, for violation of
the Lawyer's Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1; Rule 7.03,
Canon 7 and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (Code). The IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the same in its
Resolution No. XIX-2010-4539 dated August
28, 2010. Respondent moved for
reconsideration10 which was denied in Resolution No.
XIX-2011-141 dated October 28, 2011.
After due consideration, We adopt the findings and
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed
by the State on those who show that they possess
and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the
profession. As such, lawyers are expected to maintain
at all times a high standard of legal proficiency,
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must
perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal
profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance
with the values and norms embodied in the
Code.11 Lawyers may, thus, be disciplined for any
conduct that is wanting of the above standards
whether in their professional or in their private
capacity.
In the present case, respondent's defense that forgery
had attended the execution of the August 11, 1995
letter was belied by his July 16, 1997 letter admitting
to have undertaken the payment of complainant's
commission but passing on the responsibility to Sps.
Yap. Clearly, respondent has violated Rule
9.02,12 Canon 9 of the Code which prohibits a lawyer
from dividing or stipulating to divide a fee for legal
services with persons not licensed to practice law,
except in certain cases which do not obtain in the
case at bar.
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to
all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

Furthermore, respondent did not deny the accusation

that he abandoned his legal family to cohabit with his
mistress with whom he begot four children
notwithstanding that his moral character as well as his
moral fitness to be retained in the Roll of Attorneys
has been assailed. The settled rule is that betrayal of
the marital vow of fidelity or sexual relations outside
marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it
manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of
marriage and the marital vows protected by the
Constitution and affirmed by our laws.13 Consequently,
We find no reason to disturb the IBP's finding that
respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath14 and Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code which proscribes a lawyer
from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct."

However, We find the charge of engaging in illegal

money lending not to have been sufficiently
established. A "business" requires some form of
1âwphi1

investment and a sufficient number of customers to

whom its output can be sold at profit on a consistent
basis.15 The lending of money to a single person
without showing that such service is made available to
other persons on a consistent basis cannot be
construed asindicia that respondent is engaged in the
business of lending.

Nonetheless, while We rule that respondent should be

sanctioned for his actions, We are minded that the
power to disbar should be exercised with great
caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that
seriously affect the standing and character of the
lawyer as an officer of the court and as member of the
bar,16 or the misconduct borders on the criminal, or
committed under scandalous circumstance,17 which do
not obtain here. Considering the circumstances of the
case, We deem it appropriate that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one
(1) year as recommended.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. MARIANO R.

PEFIANCO is found GUILTY of violation of the
Lawyer’s Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of
the same Code and SUSPENDED from the active
practice of law ONE (1) YEAR effective upon notice
hereof.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the

personal record of respondent as a member of the
Philippine Bar and furnished the Office of the Bar