32. SMCEU-PTGWO v. Bersamira employment as replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went on leave on 2 vice-versa.
went on leave on 2 vice-versa." Petitioner filed a Complaint before Arbitration Branch No. IV of
Facts: SanMig entered into contracts for merchandising services with
Lipercon and D'Rite, independent contractors duly licensed by DOLE, to
maintain its competitive position and in keeping with the imperatives of
efficiency, business expansion and diversity of its operation. In said
contracts, it was expressly understood and agreed that the workers
employed by the contractors were to be paid by the latter and that none of
them were to be deemed employees or agents of SanMig. There was to be
no employer-employee relation between the contractors and/or its
workers, on the one hand, and SanMig on the other. Petitioner San Miguel
Corporation Employees Union-PTWGO is the duly authorized
representative of the monthly paid rank-and-file employees of SanMig with
whom the latter executed a CBA which provides that "temporary,
probationary, or contract employees and workers are excluded from the
bargaining unit and, therefore, outside the scope of this Agreement." The
Union advised SanMig that some Lipercon and D'Rite workers had signed
up for union membership and sought the regularization of their
employment with SMC because some employees have been continuously
working for SanMig for a period ranging from 6 months to 15 years and that
their work is neither casual nor seasonal as they are performing work or
activities necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of SanMig.
Thus, it was contended that there exists a "labor-only" contracting situation
and wanted to be regularized. The Union filed a notices of strike for unfair
labor practice, CBA violations, and union busting. The two (2) notices of
strike were consolidated and several conciliation conferences were held to
settle the dispute before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB) of DOLE. Series of pickets were staged by Lipercon and D'Rite
workers in various SMC plants and offices.
SMC filed a verified Complaint for Injunction and Damages before
respondent Court to enjoin the Union from their acts. The Court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order and set the application for Injunction for
hearing. The Union filed a Motion to Dismiss which was then opposed by
SanMig. The Motion was denied by the respondent Judge. The Court then
issued the Order granting the application and enjoining the union from the
acts thereof. Court issued the corresponding Writ of Preliminary Injunction
after SanMig had posted the required bond of P100,000.00 to answer for
whatever damages petitioners may sustain by reason thereof. Petitioners
then sought for the nullification of the Writ before the SC while it also went
to strike as some of the contractual workers were laid off. NCMB called the
parties for conciliation.
Issue: Did the respondent Court correctly assumed jurisdiction over the
present controversy and properly issued the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
to the resolution of that question, is the matter of whether, or not the case
at bar involves, or is in connection with, or relates to a labor dispute.
Held: While it is SanMig's submission that no employer-employee
relationship exists between itself, on the one hand, and the contractual
workers of Lipercon and D'Rite on the other, a labor dispute can
nevertheless exist "regardless of whether the disputants stand in the
proximate relationship of employer and employee” provided the
controversy concerns, among others, the terms and conditions of
employment or a "change" or "arrangement" thereof. The existence of a
labor dispute is not negative by the fact that the plaintiffs and defendants
do not stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.
38. PT&T vs. NLRC
FACTS: PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired
Grace de Guzman specifically as “Supernumerary Project Worker”, for a
fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 as reliever for C.F.
Tenorio who went on maternity leave. She was again invited for
periods, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and July 19, 1991 to August 8,
1991. On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a
probationary employee where probationary period will cover 150 days.
She indicated in the portion of the job application form under civil status
that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months
earlier. When petitioner learned later about the marriage, its branch
supervisor, Delia M. Oficial, sent de Guzman a memorandum requiring her
to explain the discrepancy. Included in the memorandum, was a reminder
about the company’s policy of not accepting married women for
employment. She was dismissed from the company effective January 29,
1992. Labor Arbiter handed down decision on November 23, 1993
declaring that petitioner illegally dismissed De Guzman, who had already
gained the status of a regular employee. Furthermore, it was apparent that
she had been discriminated on account of her having contracted marriage
in violation of company policies.
ISSUE: Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to
terminate the services of an employee.
HELD: Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women,
explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a female
employee. It is recognized that company is free to regulate manpower and
employment from hiring to firing, according to their discretion and best
business judgment, except in those cases of unlawful discrimination or
those provided by law. PT&T’s policy of not accepting or disqualifying from
work any woman worker who contracts marriage is afoul of the right
against discrimination provided to all women workers by our labor laws and
by our Constitution. The record discloses clearly that de Guzman’s ties with
PT&T were dissolved principally because of the company’s policy that
married women are not qualified for employment in the company, and not
merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty. The government
abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature adopted by PT&T. As stated
in the labor code:
“ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. — It shall be unlawful for an
employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of
employment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly
or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed
resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or
otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of marriage.”
The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136 of the
Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation
against marriage in connection with her employment and it likewise is
contrary to good morals and public policy, depriving a woman of her
freedom to choose her status, a privilege that is inherent in an individual as
an intangible and inalienable right. The kind of policy followed by PT&T
strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable
social institution and ultimately, family as the foundation of the nation.
Such policy must be prohibited in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled
forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land not only
for order but also imperatively required.
39. Mendoza vs Rural Bank of Lucban
Facts: On April 25, 1999, the Board of Directors of the Rural Bank of Lucban,
Inc., issued Board Resolution Nos. 99-52 and 99-53, “that in line with the
policy of the bank to familiarize bank employees with the various phases of
bank operations and further strengthen the existing internal control
system[,] all officers and employees are subject to reshuffle of assignments.
Moreover, this resolution does not preclude the transfer of assignment of
bank officers and employees from the branch office to the head office and
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The Complaint -- for
illegal dismissal, underpayment, separation pay and damages. Petitioner
argues that he was compelled to file an action for constructive dismissal,
because he had been demoted from appraiser to clerk and not given any
work to do, while his table had been placed near the toilet and eventually
removed. He adds that the reshuffling of employees was done in bad faith,
because it was designed primarily to force him to resign. After the NLRC
denied his Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner brought before the CA a
Petition for Certiorari assailing the foregoing Resolution. The Court of
appeals Find that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the
NLRC. Hence, this Petition.
Issue: Whether the petitioner was constructively dismissed from his
employment?
Held: The Petition has no merit.
Constructive dismissal is defined as an involuntary resignation resorted to
when continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or
unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or a diminution of pay; or when
a clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes
unbearable to the employee. Jurisprudence recognizes the exercise of
management prerogatives. For this reason, courts often decline to interfere
in legitimate business decisions of employers. Indeed, labor laws
discourage interference in employers' judgments concerning the conduct of
their business. The law must protect not only the welfare of employees, but
also the right of employers. In the pursuit of its legitimate business interest,
management has the prerogative to transfer or assign employees from one
office or area of operation to another -- provided there is no demotion in
rank or diminution of salary, benefits, and other privileges; and the action is
not motivated by discrimination, made in bad faith, or effected as a form of
punishment or demotion without sufficient cause. This privilege is inherent
in the right of employers to control and manage their enterprise effectively.
The right of employees to security of tenure does not give them vested
rights to their positions to the extent of depriving management of its
prerogative to change their assignments or to transfer them. The law
protects both the welfare of employees and the prerogatives of
management. Courts will not interfere with business judgments of
employers, provided they do not violate the law, collective bargaining
agreements, and general principles of fair play and justice. The transfer of
personnel from one area of operation to another is inherently a managerial
prerogative that shall be upheld if exercised in good faith -- for the purpose
of advancing business interests, not of defeating or circumventing the
rights of employees. "The reshuffling of its employees was done in good
faith and cannot be made the basis of a finding of constructive dismissal.
WHEREFORE, this Petition is DENIED, and the June 14, 2002 Decision and
the September 25, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
40. Phil. Telegraph and Telephone Corp. vs. Laplana, et al.
Facts: Laplana was a cashier of the Baguio City Branch Office of the
Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (PT & T). PT & T's
treasurer, Mrs. Alicia A. Arogo, directed Laplana to transfer to the
company's branch office at Laoag City. Laplana refused the reassignment
reasoning that: (a) she has already established her permanent residence in
Baguio city and in view of said reassignment, her salary alone will not be
enough; (b) she will be away from my family which will affect her efficiency;
(c) the reassignment would require a long adjustment period which would
affect performance of her job.
PT & T's treasurer reiterated her directive for Laplana's transfer to the
Laoag Branch stating that if she does not report, it shall be considered as
her abandonment of her job. Subsequently, Laplana manifested that she backwages. Petitioner Firestone, in this special civil action for certiorari,
cannot accept the job offer and that she be retrenched instead. Hence, contends that the NLRC erred in not dismissing Lariosa's appeal for being
termination of Laplana's employment on account of retrenchment late, in finding that Lariosa was not accorded due process and in reversing
thereupon followed. Laplana filed with the Labor Arbiters' Office insisting the Labor Arbiter.
that when she refused to be transferred, the Defendants made good its
warning by terminating her services on the ground of "retrenchment," ISSUE: Whether or not NLRC erred in not dismissing Lariosa’s appeal for
although the truth is, she was forced to be terminated and that there was being late.
no ground at all for the retrenchment company's "act of transferring is
baseless and was only meant to harass and force her to resign eventually. RULING: Yes, NLRC erred in not dismissing Lariosa’s appeal for Lariosa only
In response, PT&T alleged that it was exercising management prerogatives filed after the lapse of fourteen days from notice of the decision of the
and their directive to transfer Laplana was in good faith, more so that Labor Arbiter. The court held it is admitted that Lariosa filed his appeal on
Laplana was terminated on her explicit declaration that "she was willing to June 7, 1984 or after the lapse of fourteen days from notice of the decision
be retrenched rather than be assigned. LA ruled in Laplana’s favor stating of the Labor Arbiter. Article 223 of the Labor Code clearly provides for a
that transferring an employee, as practice of management prerogatives, is reglementary period of ten days within which to appeal decision of the
not by itself unlawful. However, such right is not absolute as it must not be Labor Arbiter to the NLRC. The ten-day period has been interpreted by this
motivated by discrimination or in bad faith, or is effected as a form of Court in the case of Vir-jen Shipping and Marine Services, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R.
punishment or demonition without sufficient cause. The LA stated that in No. 58011-12, July 20, 1982, 115 SCRA 347, 361, to mean ten "calendar"
the instant case, the transfer of Laplana is patently a demotion and a form days and not ten "working" days. However, the "Notice of Decision" which
of punishment without just cause and would cause untold suffering on her Lariosa's lawyer received together with a copy of the arbiter's decision
part. NLRC affirmed the LA’s judgment. advised them that an appeal could be taken to the NLRC within ten
"working" days from receipt of the said decision. Mindful of the fact that
Issue: Whether an employee’s reason of personal inconvenience or Lariosa's counsel must have been misled by the implementing rules of the
hardship in opposition to employer's decision to transfer him to another labor commission and considering that the shortened period for appeal is
work place is justified and overrules management prerogative even in the principally intended more for the employees' benefit, rather than that of
absence of bad faith or underhanded motives on the latter’s part. the employer, Court are inclined to overlook this particular procedural
lapse and to proceed with the resolution of the instant case.
Held: There can be no quarrel with the Arbiter's formulation of the general WHEREFORE, the petition is granted.
principle governing an employer's prerogative to transfer his employees
from place to place or from one position to another subject only to the
condition that it be not "motivated by discrimination or (made) in bad faith,
or effected as a form of punishment or demotion without sufficient cause.
The difficulty lies in the situation where no such illicit, improper or
underhanded purpose can be ascribed to the employer, the objection to
the transfer being ground solely upon the, personal inconvenience or
hardship that will be caused to the employee by reason of the transfer.
What then?
In this case, the employee had to all intents and purposes resigned from
her position. She had unequivocally asked that she be considered
dismissed, herself suggesting the reason therefor –– retrenchment. She
accepted separation pay. On the other hand, the employer has not been
shown to be acting otherwise than in good faith, and in the legitimate
pursuit of what it considered its best interests, in deciding to transfer her to
another office. There is no showing whatever that the employer was
transferring Laplana to another work place, not because she would be more
useful there, but merely "as a subterfuge to rid itself of an undesirable
worker," or "to penalize an employee for union activities.
Certainly, the Court cannot accept the proposition that when an employee
opposes his employer's decision to transfer him to another work place,
there being no bad faith or underhanded motives on the part of either
party, it is the employee's wishes that should be made to prevail.

43. Firestone Tire and Rubber Company of the Philippines vs. Lariosa

Facts: Carlos Lariosa, worked in Firestone Tire and Rubber Company for 11
years as a tire builder. On July 27, 1983, on his way out the company
premises, he was frisked by security Lizoand Olvez. They found 16 wool
flannel swabs inside his bag tucked underneath his soiledclothes, all
belonging to the company. He was theb dismissed effective on August 2,
1983 through letter of Ms. Villavicani,company president, based on
“stealing company property and loss of trust”. Lariosa on theotherhand
filed with the Labor and Employment a case for illegal dismissal.
The Labor Arbiter found Laniosa’s dismissal justified but was reversed by
the NLRC on appeal and held that Lianosa be reinstated but without