PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – CIVIL LAW (CASE DIGESTS)

CASE TITLE FACTS ISSUE DOCTRINE/RULING

TANADA VS TUVERA Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. WON all laws shall be The court held that all statute including those of local
G.R. No. L-63915 invoked due process in demanding the published in the official application shall be published as condition for their effectivity,
December 29, 1986 disclosure of a number of Presidential gazette. which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different
[Effectivity and Decrees which they claimed had not been effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Application of Laws] published as required by Law. The
government argued that while publication The publication must be full or no publication at all since its
was necessary as a rule, it was not so when purpose is to inform the public of the content of the laws. The
it was otherwise provided, as when the clause “unless otherwise provided” in Article 2 of the new Civil
decrees themselves declared that they Code meant that the publication required therein was not
were to become effective immediately always imperative, that the publication when necessary, did
upon approval. The court decided on April not have to be made in the official gazette.
24, 1985 in affirming the necessity for
publication of some of the decrees. The
court ordered the respondents to publish in
the official gazette all unpublished
Presidential Issuances which are of general
force and effect. The petitioners suggest
that there should be no distinction
between laws of general applicability and
those which are not. The publication means
complete publication, and that publication
must be made in the official gazette.

PEOPLE VS QUE PO LAY 1. Defendant-appellant Que Po Lay was in
G.R. No. L-6791, March possession of foreign exchange
29, 1954 consisting of U.S. dollars, U.S. checks
and U.S. money orders amounting to
about $7,000.
2. He failed to sell the same to the Central
Bank through its agents within one day
following the receipt of such foreign
exchange as required by Circular No. 20.
3. The appeal is based on the claim that
said circular No. 20 was not published in
the Official Gazette prior to the act or
omission imputed to the appellant, and
WON the circular should be
published first to have the
force and effect of law.
YES
Sec 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that
statutes passed by Congress shall, in the absence of special
provision, take effect at the beginning of the 15 day after the
completion of the publication of the statute in the Official
Gazette.
Art 2 of the New Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) equally
provides that laws shall take effect after 15 days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it
is otherwise provided.
It is true that Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a
statute or law but being issued for the implementation of the
 that consequently, said circular had no
force and effect. Defendant-appellant
contended that Commonwealth Act.
No., 638 and Act 2930 both require said
circular to be published in the Official
Gazette, it being an order or notice of
general applicability.
Solicitor General: answering this
contention says that Commonwealth Act.
No. 638 and 2930 do not require the
publication in the Official Gazette of said
circular issued for the implementation of a
law in order to have force and effect.
THE PEOPLE OF THE 1. The case arose from the conviction of
PHILIPPINES VS HON. two individuals by the respondent judge
LORENZO B. VENERACION with the crime of Rape with Homicide of
G.R. Nos. 119987-88 seven (7) year old girl. The accused on
October 12, 1995 the incident also caused fatal injuries to
[Dura Lex Sed Lex] the minor child by slashing her vagina,
hitting her head with a thick piece of
wood and stabling her neck, which were
all the direct cause of her immediate
death. Respondent-judge however,
instead of imposing the corresponding
death penalty, imposed rather the
reclusion perpetua to each accused.
2. The City Prosecutor filed a Motion for
reconsideration praying that the decision
be modified that the penalty be death
instead of reclusion perpetua.
3. Respondent-judge still denied the
WON the respondent-judge
acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when
he failed to attach the
corresponding penalty of the
crime of Rape with Homicide.
law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law
according to settled jurisprudence.
Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations especially like the
Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question which
prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published
before becoming effective, this, on the general principle and
theory that before the public is bound by its contents,
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular
must first be published and the people officially and specifically
informed of said contents and its penalties. (Punitive in
character)
In the present case, although circular No. 20 of the Central
Bank was issued in the year 1949, it was not published until
November 1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's
conviction of its violation. It is clear that said circular,
particularly its penal provision, did not have any legal effect
and bound no one until its publication in the Official Gazette or
after November 1951.
YES
Respondent-judge clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the attaching the
proper corresponding penalty of the crime of Rape with
Homicide. The SC mandates that after an adjudication of guilt,
the judge should impose the proper penalty provided for by
law on the accused regardless of his own religious or moral
beliefs. Respondent-judge is duty bound to emphasize that a
court of law is no place for a protracted debate on the morality
or propriety of the sentence, where the law itself provides for
the sentence of death as penalty in specific and well defined
instances. The discomfort faced by those forced by law to
impose the death penalty is an ancient one, but is a matter
upon which judges have no choice. This is consistent in the rule
laid down in the Civil Code Art 9, that no judge or court shall
decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity,
or insufficiency of the laws.
 motion citing religious convictions.
IN THE MATTER OF THE 1. Honorato Catindig filed a petition to
ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE adopt his minor illegitimate child
NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, prayed that the child's middle name
petitioner. Astorga be changed to Garcia, her
G.R. No. 148311. March mother's surname, and that her surname
31, 2005 Garcia be changed to Catindig, his
[Interpretation/Applicatio surname.
n of Laws] 2. Trial court granted the petition and
declared Stephanie as his legitimate child
and heir, and pursuant to Art. 189 of the
Family Code, she is now known as
Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
3. Honorato filed a motion for clarification
and/or reconsideration that Stephanie
should be allowed to use the surname
Garcia as her middle name.
4. The Republic, through the OSG, agreed
with Honorato for her relationship with
her natural mother should be maintained
and preserved, to prevent any confusion
and hardship in the future, and under
Article 189 she remains to be an intestate
heir of her mother.
A is a citizen and resident of Texas
Has Texan properties and Philippines
properties
Bellis vs. Bellis
WON an illegitimate child,
upon adoption by her natural
father, use the surname of
her natural mother as her
middle name.
Which country would govern
the will
Thus, the petition was granted, the Court remanded the case
back to the respondent-judge for the imposition of death
penalty of the accused.
YES.
There is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her
natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her
mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should not be
allowed to do so.
Art 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
9255, (An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The
Surname Of Their Father) is silent as to what middle name a
child may use. Art 365 of the CC merely provides that “an
adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.” Article
189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of
adoption, is likewise silent on the matter.
Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) an
legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, Stephanie is entitled
to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the
surname of her father and her mother.
The Nationality Rule
 LAW ON HUMAN RELATIONS
Albenson Enterprises 1. Albenson Enterprises Corporation WON there was abuse of NO
Corp vs Court of Appeals delivered to Guaranteed Industries, Inc. rights (Art 19), resulting in Petitioners didn’t abuse their rights. What prompted
GR No. 88694 at Baltao Building mild steel plates which damages under Articles 20 petitioners to file the case for violation of BP 22 against private
January 11, 1993 the latter ordered and as part of the and 21 or other applicable respondent was their failure to collect the amount of
[Elements of Abuse of an payment, a bouncing check was issued provision of law. P2,575.00 due on a bounced check which they honestly
Rights] by one “Eugenio Baltao”. believed was issued to them by private respondent. Petitioners
Art 19, Art 21 had conducted inquiries regarding the origin of the check.
2. Petitioner, in a sincere attempt to collect Private respondent, however, did nothing to clarify the case of
Keywords: the sum of money due them, filed a mistaken identity at first hand. Instead, private respondent
Bouncing Check criminal complaint against private waited in ambush and thereafter pounced on the hapless
respondent Eugenio S. Baltao after the petitioners at a time he thought was propitious by filing an
latter refused to make good the amount action for damages.
of the bouncing check despite demand.
However, there was a mistake of identity There is no proof or showing that petitioners acted maliciously
as there were two “Eugenio Baltaos” or in bad faith in the filing of the case against private
conducting business in the same building respondent. Consequently, in the absence of proof of fraud
– Eugenio S. Baltao and his son, Eugenio and bad faith committed by petitioners, they cannot be held
Baltao III. liable for damages.

3. It was found that the signature of the

check was not of Eugenio S. Baltao and
because of the alleged unjust filing of a
criminal case against him, respondent
Baltao filed a complaint for damages
anchored on Articles 19, 20, and 21 of
the Civil Code against petitioners.
Cebu Country Club, Inc. 1. CCCI, petitioner, is a domestic WON in disapproving YES
vs. Elizagaque corporation operating as a non-profit respondent’s application for In rejecting respondent’s application for proprietary
GR No. 160273 and non-stock private membership club, proprietary membership with membership, we find that petitioners violated the rules
January 18, 2008 having its principal place of business in CCCI, petitioners are liable to governing human relations. The trial court and the Court of
Art 19, Art 21 Banilad, Cebu City. respondent for damages, and Appeals aptly held that petitioners committed fraud and
if so, whether their liability is evident bad faith in disapproving respondent’s applications.
2. Petitioners herein are members of its joint and several. This is contrary to morals, good custom or public policy. Hence,
Keywords: BOD. In 1996, respondent filed with CCCI petitioners are liable for damages pursuant to Article 19 in
Proprietary membership an application for proprietary relation to Article 21 of the same Code.
membership. The application was
indorsed by CCCI’s two (2) proprietary It bears stressing that the amendment to Section 3(c) of CCCI’s
 members, namely: Edmundo T. Misa and
Silvano Ludo.
3. As the price of a proprietary share was
around the P5 million range, Benito
Unchuan, then president of CCCI, offered
to sell respondent a share for only P3.5
million. Respondent, however,
purchased the share of a certain Dr.
Butalid for only P3 million. Consequently,
on September 6, 1996, CCCI issued
Proprietary Ownership Certificate No.
1446 to respondent.
4. During the meetings dated April 4, 1997
and May 30, 1997 of the CCCI Board of
Directors, action on respondent’s
application for proprietary membership
was deferred. In another Board meeting
held on July 30, 1997, respondent’s
application was voted upon. As shown by
the records, the Board adopted a secret
balloting known as the “black ball
system” of voting wherein each member
will drop a ball in the ballot box. A white
ball represents conformity to the
admission of an applicant, while a black
ball means disapproval. Pursuant to
Section 3(c), as amended, cited above, a
unanimous vote of the directors is
required. When respondent’s application
for proprietary membership was voted
upon during the Board meeting on July
30, 1997, the ballot box contained one
(1) black ball. Thus, for lack of unanimity,
his application was disapproved.
5. On August 6, 1997, Edmundo T. Misa, on
Amended By-Laws requiring the unanimous vote of the
directors present at a special or regular meeting was not
printed on the application form respondent filled and
submitted to CCCI. What was printed thereon was the original
provision of Section 3(c) which was silent on the required
number of votes needed for admission of an applicant as a
proprietary member.
Petitioners explained that the amendment was not printed on
the application form due to economic reasons. We find this
excuse flimsy and unconvincing. Such amendment, aside from
being extremely significant, was introduced way back in 1978
or almost twenty (20) years before respondent filed his
application. We cannot fathom why such a prestigious and
exclusive golf country club, like the CCCI, whose members are
all affluent, did not have enough money to cause the printing
of an updated application form.
It is thus clear that respondent was left groping in the dark
wondering why his application was disapproved. He was not
even informed that a unanimous vote of the Board members
was required. When he sent a letter for reconsideration and an
inquiry whether there was an objection to his application,
petitioners apparently ignored him. Certainly, respondent did
not deserve this kind of treatment. Having been designated by
San Miguel Corporation as a special non-proprietary member
of CCCI, he should have been treated by petitioners with
courtesy and civility. At the very least, they should have
informed him why his application was disapproved.
 behalf of respondent, wrote CCCI a letter
of reconsideration. As CCCI did not
answer, respondent, on October 7, 1997,
wrote another letter of reconsideration.
Still, CCCI kept silent. On November 5,
1997, respondent again sent CCCI a
letter inquiring whether any member of
the Board objected to his application.
Again, CCCI did not reply. Consequently,
on December 23, 1998, respondent filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 71, Pasig City a complaint for
damages against petitioners
Gashem Shookat Baksh 1. Ms. Gonzales, a 22 year old Filipino, WON damages may be The Court held that the breach of promise to marry per se is
vs. CA and Marilou single and of good moral character and recovered for a breach of not an actionable wrong. However, the Court rules that no
Gonzales reputation, duly respected in her promise to marry based on foreigner should make a mockery of our laws. It was evident
GR No. 97336, Feb. 19, community filed a complaint on October Article 21 of the Civil Code of from the facts presented to the Court that Gashem Baksh had
1993 27, 1987, against Gashem, an Iranian the Philippines. not intention to marry Marilou Gonzales on the account of her
Art 21 citizen, and an exchange student taking “ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty and,
up a medical course at the Lyceum as perceived by him, dishonorable employment.”
Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City.
Keywords: The complaint for damages is due to In the case presented, Gashem Baksh was not motivated by
Breach of promise to Baksh’s violation of their agreement to good faith and honest motive when he proposed his love and
marry, get married. promised to marry Marilou Gonzales. He was merely
Moral seduction motivated by lust and “clearly violated the Filipino’s concept of
committed by the man 2. Prior to the filing of complaint, Gashem morality and brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos
courted Marilou and proposed to marry have for their women.”
her. She accepted his love on the
condition that they will get married. The Court affirmed the Decisions of the lower court and the
They agreed to get married at the end of Court of Appeals pursuant to Article 21 of the New Civil Code,
the semester, which was October of that not because of the breach of promise to marry, but due the
year. They also visited Marilou’s parents fraud and deceit employed by herein petitioner that willfully
in Pangasinan to secure their approval to caused injury to the honor and reputation of the herein private
the marriage. respondent, which committed contrary to the morals, good
customs or public policy.
3. Shortly thereafter, Gashem forced the
petitioner to live with him in Guilig,
Dagupan City. It should be noted that
 she was a virgin before she lived with
him and not a woman of loose morals. A
few weeks after she begun living with
him, Gashem started to maltreat her,
which result to injuries. A confrontation
with the barangay captain of Guilig
ensued and Gashem repudiated their
marriage agreement and said that he is
already married to a girl in Bacolod City.

4. On October 16, 1989, the lower court

applied Article 21 of the New Civil Code
in its decision favouring Marilou
Gonzales and ordered Gashem Baksh to
pay PhP 20,000 moral damages, PhP
3,000.00 in attorney’s fees and PhP
2,000.00 for the litigation expenses.

5. Hence, Gashem filed an appeal with the

Supreme Court seeking for the review of
the decision of the Regional Trial Court in
Pangasinan and to set aside the said
decision which was also affirmed in toto
by the Court of Appeals.
Globe Mackay Cable and 1. Tobias, a purchasing agent and
Radio Corp. vs Court of administrative assistant to the
Appeals engineering operations manager,
GR No. 81262, August 25, discovered fictitious purchases and other
1989 fraudulent transactions, which caused
GMCRC loss of several thousands of
Keywords: pesos. He reported it to his immediate
Employee dismissal was superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to the
abusive, Executive Vice President and General
Art 19, Art 21 Manager, Herbert Hendry.
2. A day after the report, Hendry told
Tobias that he was number one suspect
and ordered him one week forced leave.
WON petitioners are liable YES.
for damages to private The Court, after examining the record and considering certain
respondent. significant circumstances, finds that all petitioners have indeed
abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to private
respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified:
when Hendry told Tobias to just confess or else the company
would file a hundred more cases against him until he landed in
jail; his (Hendry) scornful remarks about Filipinos (“You
Filipinos cannot be trusted.”) as well as against Tobias (“crook”,
and “swindler”); the writing of a letter to RETELCO stating that
Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty; and
the filing of six criminal cases by petitioners against private
respondent. All these reveal that petitioners are motivated by
malicious and unlawful intent to harass, oppress, and cause
 When Tobias returned to work after said
leave, Hendry called him a “crook” and a
“swindler”, ordered him to take a lie
detector test, and to submit specimen of
his handwriting, signature and initials for
police investigation.
3. Moreover, petitioners hired a private
investigator. Private investigation was
still incomplete; the lie detector tests
yielded negative results; reports from
Manila police investigators and from the
Metro Manila Police Chief Document
Examiner are in favor of Tobias.
Petitioners filed with the Fiscal’s Office
of Manila a total of six (6) criminal cases
against private respondent Tobias but
were dismissed.
damage to private respondent. The imputation of guilt without
basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations
of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth
in Article 19 of the Civil Code.
The Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to
dismiss an employee should not be confused with the way the
right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the
dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable for
damages to the employee. Under the circumstances of the
instant case, the petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a
legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the
latter the right to recover damages under Article 19 in relation
to Article 21 of the Civil Code.

4. Tobias received a notice of termination

of his employment from petitioners in
January 1973, effective December 1972.
He sought employment with the
Republic Telephone Company
(RETELCO); but Hendry wrote a letter to
RETELCO stating that Tobias was
dismissed by Globe Mackay due to
dishonesty.

5. Tobias, then, filed a civil case for

damages anchored on alleged unlawful,
malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts
of petitioners. The Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch IX, through Judge Manuel
T. Reyes rendered judgment in favor of
private respondent, ordering petitioners
to pay him eighty thousand pesos
(P80,000.00) as actual damages, two
 hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00)
as moral damages, twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary
damages, thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00) as attorney’s fees, and
costs; hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.
Bunag, Jr. vs. CA 1. Plaintiff and defendant Bunag, Jr. were WON the failure to comply It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-
GR No. 101749 sweethearts, he invited her to take their with the promise of marriage honored rule that an action for breach of promise to marry has
July 10, 1992 merienda at the Aristocrat Restaurant in of the defendant considered no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover
Manila, to which plaintiff obliged. But contrary to morals, good money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of
Keywords: instead to Aristocrat he brought plaintiff custom or public policy. such promise. Generally, therefore, a breach of promise to
Breach of promise to to a motel or hotel where he raped her. marry per se is not actionable, except where the plaintiff has
marry, Later that evening, defendant brought incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents
Penal cases gives rise to plaintiff to the house of his grandmother thereof.
civil cases, Juana de Leon in Pamplona, Las Piñas,
Art 19, Art 21 Metro Manila, where they lived together
as husband and wife for 21 days.

2. Defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and

plaintiff-appellant filed their respective
applications for a marriage license with
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Bacoor, Cavite.

3. October 1, 1973 Defendant-appellant

Bunag, Jr. filed an affidavit withdrawing
his application for a marriage license.

4. Defendant Bunag, Jr. left and never

returned, humiliating plaintiff and
compelled her to go back to her parents.
Plaintiff was ashamed when she went
home and could not sleep and eat
because of the deception done against
her by defendants-appellants. Petitioner
filed a complaint for damages for alleged
breach of promise to marry.
 5. The trial court ruled in favor of the
plaintiff and against petitioner but
absolved his father.
RCPI vs. CA 1. Loreto Dionela received a telegram via
GR No. L-44748 the Radio Communications of the
143 SCRA 657, 1986 Philippines, Inc. (RCPI). However, at he
end of the telegram were the following:
Keywords: SA IYO WALANG PAKINABANG
Breach of contract by DUMATING KA DIYAN WALA KANG
Negligence PADALA DITO KAHIT BULBUL MO
Art 19, Art 20
2. The said portion of the telegram was not
intended for Loreto. Loreto sued RCPI for
damages based on Art 19 and 20 of the
Civil Code.
3. In its defense, RCPI averred that there
was no interion to malign Loreto and
that the attached message was an
insider joke between RCPI employees
which was not meant to be attached.
RCPI also disclaimed liability as it insisted
it should be held liable for libelous acts
of its employees.
4. Loreto however averred that the aid
message was read by his employees and
it affected greatly his business
reputation. The trial court rules in favor
of Loreto. The Court of Appeal affirmed
the trial court.
Wassmer vs. Velez 1. Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer,
G.R. No. L-20089 following their mutual promise of love
December 26, 1964 decided to get married on September 4,
1954. Wassmer made the necessary
Keywords: preparations for the wedding including
Breach of promise to making and sending wedding invitations,
WON the Court of Appeals
erred in holding that the
liability of RCPI is predicted
under Art 19 and 20 of the
Civil Code.
WON breach of promise to
marry is an actionable wrong
in this case.
NO
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate
court. The cause of action of private responded is based on Art
19 and 20 of the new Civil Code as well as respondents breach
of contract thru negligence of its own employees. RCPI is not
being sued for its subsidiary liability.
RCPI was negligent as it failed to take the necessary or
precautionary steps to avoid the occurrence of the humiliating
incident now complained of. The company had not imposed
any safeguard against such eventualities and this void in its
operating procedure does not speak well of its concern for
their clienteles’ interest. Negligence here is very patent. This
negligence is imputable to appellant and not to its employees.
RCPI should be held liable for the acts of its employees. As a
corporation, RCPI acts conducts its business through its
employees. It cannot now disclaim liability for the acts of its
employees. To hold that the RCPI is not liable directly for the
acts of its employees in the pursuit of its business is to deprive
the general public availing of the services of RCPI of an
effective and adequate remedy.
This is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As
stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable
wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the
preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the
matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is
palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which
marry buying of wedding dress and other defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance
Art 19, Art 21 apparels, and other wedding necessities. with Article 21 which provides in part “any person who wilfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
2. On Sept. 2, 1954, Velez left this note for morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
his bride-to-be advising her that he will latter for the damage.”
not be able to attend the wedding
because his mom was opposed to said And under the law, any violation of Article 21 entitles the
wedding. injured party to receive an award for moral damages as
properly awarded by the lower court in this case. Further, the
3. And one day before the wedding, he sent award of exemplary damages is also proper. Here, the
another message to Wassmer advising circumstances of this case show that Velez, in breaching his
her that nothing has changed and that promise to Wassmer, acted in wanton, reckless, and
he will be returning soon. Therefore, oppressive manner – this warrants the imposition of exemplary
Velez did not appear and was not heard damages against him.
from again.

4. Wassmer sued Velez for damages and he

failed to answer and was declared in
default. On April 29, 1955, judgment was
rendered ordering defendant to pay
plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages;
P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages; P2,500.00 as attorney’s fees;
and the costs.

5. On appeal, Velez argued that his failure

to attend the scheduled wedding was
because of fortuitous events. He further
argued that he cannot be held civilly
liable for breaching his promise to marry
Wassmer because there is no law upon
which such an action may be grounded.
He also contested the award of
exemplary and moral damages against
him.
Rongavilla vs. CA 1. The Dela Cruz sisters were the aunts of Was the deed of sale void? YES
G.R. NO. 83974 Dolores Rongavilla. They borrowed While petitioners claimed they were regularly paying taxes on
294 SCRA 298, 1998 P2,000 from the Rongavillas to have their the land in question, they had no second thoughts stating at
 rooftop repaired.
Keywords:
Courts should protect the 2. Later, petitioners went back to their
underdog aunts to have them sign a contract.
Taking advantage of lack Taking advantage of their lack of
of education education, the sisters were made to
Art 24 believe that such document, typewritten
in English, was just for the
acknowledgment of their debt.
3. After four years, petitioners asked their
aunts to vacate the land subject to
litigation claiming that she and her
husband were the new owners.
the trial and on appeal that they had resorted to doctoring the
price stated in the disputed Deed of Sale, allegedly to save on
taxes. While it is true that public documents are presumed
genuine and regular under the Rules of Court, this presumption
is a rebuttable presumption which may be overcome by clear,
strong and convincing evidence.
Elements of Contract
Consent
Object Consideration

4. After verifying with the Registry of

Deeds, the aunts were surprised that
what they have signed was a deed of
sale. Their land title was cancelled, and
the ownership was transferred to their
nephews. The land was mortgaged with
the Cavite Development Bank.
Aniano Obana vs. CA
GR No. L-36249
Marc 29, 1985

Keywords:
Canvas of rice
Unjust Enrichment
Art 22