FIRST DIVISION took place in the month of April, 1904, and that, notwithstanding his efforts, he had
not obtained any reimbursement from the defendants, and that by reason of their
[G.R. No. L-3489. September 7, 1907. ]
VICENTE NAVALES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EULOGIA RIAS, ET
AL., Defendants-Appellants.
Pantaleon E. del Rosario, for Appellants.
F. Sevilla y Macam, for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CONTRACT; DAMAGES. — When there exists no proof that a contract was
entered into between the plaintiff and the defendants, or that the latter performed any
illegal act or omission, or other acts or omissions in which any kind of fault or
negligence occurred from any of which an obligation to indemnify the plaintiff could
have arisen, a claim for damages can not be sustained under any consideration, there
being no right of action.
2. REALTY; JUDGMENT; EJECTMENT; DAMAGES. — When the illegality of
the judgment rendered by a justice of the peace, and of the writ of execution issued
for the enforcement thereof, or of the acts performed by the sheriff in compliance
therewith, has not been proven, it is presumed that the official duty has been
regularly performed, and that from the details of the execution of the aforesaid
judgment, which have not been disputed nor alleged to be null or illegal, it is not
possible to impute liability on the part of the plaintiff who obtained a final decision,
and much less to compel him to indemnify the person who was defeated in the action
and who was sentenced to be ejected form the land he improperly occupied.
DECISION
TORRES, J. :
On the 18th of November, 1904, Vicente Navales filed a complaint with the Court of
First Instance of Cebu against Eulogia Rias and Maximo Requiroso, claiming that
the latter should be sentenced to pay him the sum of 1,200 pesos, Philippine
currency, as damages, together with costs and such other expenses as the court might
consider just and equitable. To this end he alleged that the said defendants, without
due cause, ordered the pulling down and destruction of his house erected in
Daanbuangan, town of Naga, Island of Cebu, which was 6 meters in height with an
area of 8.70 square meters, built of wood with a nipa roof, and worth 1,000 pesos,
which amount he expended in its construction. He further alleged that the destruction
refusal he had been prejudiced to the extent of 200 pesos, Philippine currency.
The defendants, in answer to the foregoing complaint, denied all and each one of the
allegations therein contained, and asked that judgment be entered dismissing the
complaint with costs against the plaintiff.
After considering the proofs submitted by both parties and the proceedings upon the
trial, the judge, on the 17th of January, 1906, rendered judgment declaring that the
decision entered by the justice of the peace of Naga, and the order given by virtue
thereof were illegal, as well as the action of the deputy sheriff Luciano Bacayo, that
the defendant were thereby liable for the damages caused to the plaintiff, which
amounted to 500 pesos, and that the defendants were sentenced to pay the said sum
to the plaintiff, with costs. The defendant upon being informed of this decision,
asked that it be set aside, and also moved for a new trial on the ground that the
decision was not in accordance with the weight of the evidence. The motion was
denied, to which exception was taken, and at the request of the interested party, the
corresponding bill of exceptions was limited.
The aim of this litigation, therefore, is to obtain payment through a judicial decision,
of the damages said to have been caused by the execution of a judgment rendered by
the justice of the peace, in an action for ejectment.
It is undeniable that, in order to remove from the land of Eulogia Rias, situated
within the jurisdiction of the town of Naga, the house which Vicente Navales had
constructed thereon, by virtue of the decision of the justice in the action instituted by
the said Eulogia Rias against the owner of the house, Vicente Navales, the deputy
sheriff who carried the judgment into execution was obliged to destroy the said
house and removed it from the land, according to the usual procedure in the action
for ejectment.
In the order of execution issued to the deputy sheriff, the directive portion of the
judgment of the justice of the peace was inserted, and it contained the essential
statement that the said judgment, by reason of its not having been appealed from, had
become final, and from the contents of the same may be inferred that there had been
an action for ejectment between the above-named parties, and that there was no
reason why it should not be enforced when it had already become final and acquired
the nature of res adjudicata.
Section 72 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Execution. — If no appeal from a judgment of a justice of the peace shall be
perfected as herein provided, the justice of the peace shall, at the request of the
successful party, issue execution for the enforcement of the judgment, and the
expiration of the time limited by law for the perfection of an appeal."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Assuming that the order for execution of final judgment was issued in accordance
with the law, and in view of the fact that it has not been alleged nor proven that the
sheriff when complying with the same had committed trespass or exceeded his
functions, it must be presumed according to section 334 (14) of the said Code of
Procedure, that the official duty was regularly performed. Therefore, it is not
possible to impute liability to the plaintiff who obtained the judgment and the
execution thereof, when the same was not disputed nor alleged to be null or illegal,
and much less to compel the payment of damages to the person who was defeated in
the action and sentenced to be ejected from the land which he improperly occupied
with his house.
No proof has been submitted that a contract had been entered into between the
plaintiff and the defendants, or that the latter had committed illegal acts or omissions
or incurred in any kind of fault or negligence, from any of which an obligation might
have arisen on the part of the defendants to indemnify the plaintiff. For this reason,
the claim for indemnity, on account of acts performed by the sheriff while enforcing
a judgment, can not under any consideration be sustained. (Art. 1089, Civil Code.)
The illegality of the judgment of the justice of the peace, that of the writ of execution
thereunder, or of the acts performed by the sheriff for the enforcement of the
judgment, has not been shown. Therefore, for the reasons hereinbefore set forth, the
judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and the complaint for damages filed by
Vicente Navales against Eulogia Rias and Maximo Requiroso is dismissed without
special ruling as to costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Willard, and Tracey, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-9343. December 29, 1959.]
MANILA SURETY & FIDELITY CO., INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VALENTIN R.
LIM, Defendant-Appellant.
De Santos, Herrera & Delfino for Appellee.
Carlos, Laurea, Fernando & Padilla for Appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. DAMAGES; ISSUANCE OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; BE
ADJUDICATED IN FINAL JUDGMENT. — The settled rule is that damages
caused by the issuances of a preliminary injunction should be adjudicated in the final
judgment rendered in the case in which the injunction was issue. Since in the case at
bar the award of damages in two civil cases was done after the decision on the merit
of said cases became final, said award was illegal, for which no writ of execution
could be validly issued.
2. VENUE; ACTIONS FOR A SUM OF MONEY; ALL PARTIES RESIDE IN
THE SAME PLACE. — AN action for a sum of money where all parties are
residents of the City of Manila may be filed with the court of said city because
section 1 of Rule 5 of the Rules of Court provides that civil actions may be
commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be
found, or where the plaintiff of any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the
plaintiff.
DECISION
ENDENCIA, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila
ordering the defendant Valentin R. Lim to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P1000 with
legal interest from July 26, 1951, with costs. The appeal is predicated on the
proposition that the lower court erred:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. In holding and ordering appellant to return the sum of P1000 to appellee;
2. In ordering reimbursement merely because the order under which appellee made
payment was subsequently set aside and in failing to rule that reasons of equity
entitle appellant to retain the amount delivered; and
3. In assuming jurisdiction of the action that give rise to the present appeal.
The present case is an offshoot of the decision rendered by Us on December 29,
1949 in cases G. R. Nos. L-2717, 2718 and 2767 * , wherein we declared that
damages suffered by reason of the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction must
be claimed, ascertained and awarded in the final judgment, and that the damages
awarded therein in favor of defendant Valentin R. Lim by reason of the issuance of
the preliminary injunctions in civil cases Nos. 487 and 7674 of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, were granted in violation of Section 9 of Rule 60 in connection
with Section 20 of Rule 59 of the Rules of Court, for said damages were not included
in the decision and were awarded long time after it became final and executory.
The factual background of the present case is as follows: On February 26, 1946, in
civil case No. 32 of the Justice of the Peace Court of Pasay, Valentin R. Lim
obtained a judgment against Irineo Facundo, "ordering the latter to vacate the
premises described in the complaint and to pay the plaintiff a monthly rental of P100
from February 18, 1955 until the defendant vacate the premises and to pay the costs."
Irineo Facundo did not appeal from the decision but instead caused the filing of a
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition (Case No. 7674) in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, entitled Irineo Facundo, Petitioner, v. Jose M. Santos, ex-
Justice of the Peace of Pasay, Ricardo C. Robles, as Justice of the Peace of Pasay,
and Valentin R. Lim, Respondents, wherein a writ of preliminary injunction was
issued upon the filing by Facundo of a bond in the sum of P1000, which bond was
posted by the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. On June 21, 1946, this case was
dismissed by the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the dismissal was subsequently
affirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court on December 17, 1946.
On July 29, 1948, Valentin R. Lim filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in
said case No. 7694, a motion for the determination of damages sustained by him for
uncollected rentals due to the issuance of the above-mentioned writ of preliminary
injunction in said case. Despite the fact that the decision in that case — wherein no
damages were awarded to appellant Lim - had already become final two years more
or less from the date of said judgment, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, on
September 30, 1948, allowed appellant Lim to prove said damages, awarded them
and ordered the confiscation of the bond posted by the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.,
Inc. and directed the latter to pay appellant Lim the sum of P1000, which order gave
rise to a petition for certiorari filed and docketed in this Court as G. R. No. L-2718.
On April 9, 1948, Irineo Facundo filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a
special civil action for prohibition against Lucio M. Tiangco as municipal Judge of
Rizal City, and Valentin R. Lim, wherein he prayed that a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued upon filing a bond of P1000 to prevent Judge Tiangco from
issuing an alias writ of execution in civil case No. 32 of his court. Upon Facundo’s
filing of the bond which was posted by the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc., the
court issued the corresponding preliminary injunction. On April 24, 1948, the court
dismissed this case and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction; hence on July
29, 1948, appellant filed a petition with said court asking for damages sustained by
him for failure to collect the rentals because of the issuance of the aforementioned
preliminary injunction; and despite the fact that the decision in said civil case No.
487 — wherein no damages were awarded for the issuance of said preliminary
injunction — had become final on May 9, 1948, the Court of First Instance of Rizal
allowed the damages sought for, ordered the confiscation of the bond posted by the
Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc., and directed the latter to pay to Lim the full value
of said bond. This order gave rise to a petition with this Court, docketed as G. R. No.
L-2717.
Thereafter, or to be more exact, on January 24, 1949, the Court of First Instance of
Rizal issued a writ of execution in the aforementioned cases Nos. 487 and 7674,
directing the Sheriff of Manila to require the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. to
pay to appellant Valentin R. Lim the sum of P1000 in satisfaction of its liability
under the preliminary injunction bond, and in compliance with the writ of execution,
the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc., herein appellee, delivered to the Sheriff of
Manila the sum of P1,015.01 in full satisfaction of the writ of execution and the fees
of the Sheriff, of which amount the sum of P1000 was delivered by the Sheriff to
appellant Valentin R. Lim.
On December 29, 1949, we declared that the writs of execution issued in civil cases
Nos. 487 and 7674 of the Court of First Instance were null and void, and on January
21, 1951, the herein plaintiff-appellee demanded from the defendant-appellant the
immediate reimbursement of the payment it made in compliance with said writs, but
the herein defendant-appellant refused to return the above- mentioned amount of
P1,015.01, hence plaintiff-appellee initiated the present action.
The main contention of defendant-appellant is: that plaintiff- appellee has paid
voluntarily its natural obligation and therefore is precluded from recovering that
which was delivered to defendant- appellant, and that the requisites of solutio
indebiti which is the only basis for the return of the amount paid do not exist in the
present case. Appellant invokes the following provisions of the Civil
Code:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 1423. Natural obligations, not being based on positive law but on equity and
natural law, do not grant a right of action to enforce their performance, but after
voluntary fulfillment by the obligor, they authorize the retention of what has been
delivered or rendered by reason thereof."
"ART. 1424. When a right to sue upon a civil obligation has lapsed by extinctive
prescription, the obligor who voluntarily performs the contract cannot recover what
he has delivered or the value of the service he has rendered."
"ART. 1428. When, after an action to enforce a civil obligations has failed, the
defendant voluntarily performs the obligations, he cannot demand the return of what
he has delivered or the payment of the value of the service he has rendered."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Upon careful examination of the foregoing provisions of law and the undisputed
facts of the case, we find appellant’s contention to be untenable, for the payment
made by the herein plaintiff-appellee to defendant-appellant was not voluntary, it
was thru a coercive process of the writ of execution issued at the instance and
insistence of the defendant-appellant. Certainly, were it not for said writ of
execution, plaintiff-appellee would not have paid to defendant-appellant the amount
in question. It should be noted that at the time the said writ of execution was issued,
the right of defendant-appellant to damages caused unto him by reason of his
inability to collect the rents of the property involved in civil cases Nos. 487 and
7674, was still pending determination by the Supreme Court, and had defendant-
appellant waited for the final decision of the Supreme Court on said damages, surely
he would not have caused the issuance of the writ of execution in said civil cases and
thus compel plaintiff-appellee to pay to him the aforementioned sum of P1,015.01.
It is contented by defendant-appellant that there is no justification for ordering the
return of the amount in question as the court below did, for in the present case, the
requisites of solutio indebiti do not exist. But the instant case does not fall under the
provisions of Article 2154; it is based on the theory that the judgment upon which
the plaintiff-appellee made payment was declared null and void and consequently the
execution of said judgment and the payment made thereunder were also null and
void. It is quite a settled rule that damages caused by the issuance of a preliminary
injunction should be adjudicated in the final judgment rendered in the case in which
the injunction was issued. In civil cases Nos. 487 and 7674 of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, the award of damages was done after the decision on the merit of
said cases became final, so said award was illegal, for which no writ of execution
could be validly issued. Evidently, the order of September 30, 1949 of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal whereby it awarded damages and ordered the forfeiture and
execution of plaintiff’s bond in each of said two cases, is null and void, it having
been issued in violation of the Rules of Court.
Defendant-appellant lastly raises the question of jurisdiction of the court below,
claiming that the present action should have been filed with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal and citing as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A court which takes cognizance of an action over which it has jurisdiction and
power to afford complete relief has the exclusive right to dispose of the controversy
without interference from other courts of concurrent jurisdiction in which similar
actions are subsequently instituted between the same parties seeking similar
remedies and involving the same questions." (21 C.J.S. 745). (Emphasis supplied)
". . . every court has the inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct
errors of its ministerial officers and to control its own process." (Dimayuga v.
Raymundo, Et Al., 76 Phil., 143.)
"Independent of any statutory provision, we assert that every court has inherent
power to do all things reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within
the scope of its jurisdiction." (Shioji v. Harvey, 43 Phil., 333.)
Appellant’s contention is untenable. The present action is for a sum of money and all
the parties involved are residents of the City of Manila as averred in paragraph 1 of
the complaint. Under Sec. 1 of Rule 5 of the Rules of Court, civil actions like the one
in question may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the
defendants resides or may be found or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs
resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
Wherefore, finding no error in the decision appealed from the same is hereby
affirmed, with costs.
Paras, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera and Gutierrez
David, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, J., concurs in the result.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-7089 August 31, 1954
DOMINGO DE LA CRUZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
NORTHERN THEATRICAL ENTERPRISES INC., ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Conrado Rubio for appellant.
Ruiz, Ruiz, Ruiz, Ruiz, and Benjamin Guerrero for appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
The facts in this case based on an agreed statement of facts are simple. In the year
1941 the Northern Theatrical Enterprises Inc., a domestic corporation operated a
movie house in Laoag, Ilocos Norte, and among the persons employed by it was the
plaintiff DOMINGO DE LA CRUZ, hired as a special guard whose duties were to
guard the main entrance of the cine, to maintain peace and order and to report the
commission of disorders within the premises. As such guard he carried a revolver. In
the afternoon of July 4, 1941, one Benjamin Martin wanted to crash the gate or
entrance of the movie house. Infuriated by the refusal of plaintiff De la Cruz to let
him in without first providing himself with a ticket, Martin attacked him with a bolo.
De la Cruz defendant himself as best he could until he was cornered, at which
moment to save himself he shot the gate crasher, resulting in the latter's death.
For the killing, De la Cruz was charged with homicide in Criminal Case No. 8449 of
the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. After a re-investigation conducted by the
Provincial Fiscal the latter filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which was
granted by the court in January 1943. On July 8, 1947, De la Cruz was again accused
of the same crime of homicide, in Criminal Case No. 431 of the same Court. After
trial, he was finally acquitted of the charge on January 31, 1948. In both criminal
cases De la Cruz employed a lawyer to defend him. He demanded from his former
employer reimbursement of his expenses but was refused, after which he filed the
present action against the movie corporation and the three members of its board of
directors, to recover not only the amounts he had paid his lawyers but also moral
damages said to have been suffered, due to his worry, his neglect of his interests and
his family as well in the supervision of the cultivation of his land, a total of P15,000.
On the basis of the complaint and the answer filed by defendants wherein they asked
for the dismissal of the complaint, as well as the agreed statement of facts, the Court
of First Instance of Ilocos Norte after rejecting the theory of the plaintiff that he was
an agent of the defendants and that as such agent he was entitled to reimbursement of
the expenses incurred by him in connection with the agency (Arts. 1709-1729 of the
old Civil Code), found that plaintiff had no cause of action and dismissed the
complaint without costs. De la Cruz appealed directly to this Tribunal for the reason
that only questions of law are involved in the appeal.
We agree with the trial court that the relationship between the movie corporation and
the plaintiff was not that of principal and agent because the principle of
representation was in no way involved. Plaintiff was not employed to represent the
defendant corporation in its dealings with third parties. He was a mere employee
hired to perform a certain specific duty or task, that of acting as special guard and
staying at the main entrance of the movie house to stop gate crashers and to maintain
peace and order within the premises. The question posed by this appeal is whether an
employee or servant who in line of duty and while in the performance of the task
assigned to him, performs an act which eventually results in his incurring in
expenses, caused not directly by his master or employer or his fellow servants or by
reason of his performance of his duty, but rather by a third party or stranger not in
the employ of his employer, may recover said damages against his employer.
The learned trial court in the last paragraph of its decision dismissing the complaint
said that "after studying many laws or provisions of law to find out what law is
applicable to the facts submitted and admitted by the parties, has found none and it
has no other alternative than to dismiss the complaint." The trial court is right. We
confess that we are not aware of any law or judicial authority that is directly
applicable to the present case, and realizing the importance and far-reaching effect of
a ruling on the subject-matter we have searched, though vainly, for judicial
authorities and enlightenment. All the laws and principles of law we have found, as
regards master and servants, or employer and employee, refer to cases of physical
injuries, light or serious, resulting in loss of a member of the body or of any one of
the senses, or permanent physical disability or even death, suffered in line of duty
and in the course of the performance of the duties assigned to the servant or
employee, and these cases are mainly governed by the Employer's Liability Act and
the Workmen's Compensation Act. But a case involving damages caused to an
employee by a stranger or outsider while said employee was in the performance of
his duties, presents a novel question which under present legislation we are neither
able nor prepared to decide in favor of the employee.
In a case like the present or a similar case of say a driver employed by a
transportation company, who while in the course of employment runs over and
inflicts physical injuries on or causes the death of a pedestrian; and such driver is
later charged criminally in court, one can imagine that it would be to the interest of
the employer to give legal help to and defend its employee in order to show that the
latter was not guilty of any crime either deliberately or through negligence, because
should the employee be finally held criminally liable and he is found to be insolvent,
the employer would be subsidiarily liable. That is why, we repeat, it is to the interest
of the employer to render legal assistance to its employee. But we are not prepared to
say and to hold that the giving of said legal assistance to its employees is a legal
obligation. While it might yet and possibly be regarded as a normal obligation, it
does not at present count with the sanction of man-made laws.
If the employer is not legally obliged to give, legal assistance to its employee and
provide him with a lawyer, naturally said employee may not recover the amount he
may have paid a lawyer hired by him.
Viewed from another angle it may be said that the damage suffered by the plaintiff
by reason of the expenses incurred by him in remunerating his lawyer, is not caused
by his act of shooting to death the gate crasher but rather by the filing of the charge
of homicide which made it necessary for him to defend himself with the aid of
counsel. Had no criminal charge been filed against him, there would have been no
expenses incurred or damage suffered. So the damage suffered by plaintiff was
caused rather by the improper filing of the criminal charge, possibly at the instance
of the heirs of the deceased gate crasher and by the State through the Fiscal. We say
improper filing, judging by the results of the court proceedings, namely, acquittal. In
other words, the plaintiff was innocent and blameless. If despite his innocence and
despite the absence of any criminal responsibility on his part he was accused of
homicide, then the responsibility for the improper accusation may be laid at the door
of the heirs of the deceased and the State, and so theoretically, they are the parties
that may be held responsible civilly for damages and if this is so, we fail to see now
this responsibility can be transferred to the employer who in no way intervened,
much less initiated the criminal proceedings and whose only connection or relation
to the whole affairs was that he employed plaintiff to perform a special duty or task,
which task or duty was performed lawfully and without negligence.
Still another point of view is that the damages incurred here consisting of the
payment of the lawyer's fee did not flow directly from the performance of his duties
but only indirectly because there was an efficient, intervening cause, namely, the
filing of the criminal charges. In other words, the shooting to death of the deceased
by the plaintiff was not the proximate cause of the damages suffered but may be
regarded as only a remote cause, because from the shooting to the damages suffered
there was not that natural and continuous sequence required to fix civil
responsibility.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed. No costs.
Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Reyes,
J.B.L., JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13667 April 29, 1960
PRIMITIVO ANSAY, ETC., ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Celso A. Fernandez for appellants.
Juan C. Jimenez, for appellees.
PARAS, C. J.:
On July 25, 1956, appellants filed against appellees in the Court of First Instance of
Manila a complaint praying for a 20% Christmas bonus for the years 1954 and 1955.
The court a quo on appellees' motion to dismiss, issued the following order:
Considering the motion to dismiss filed on 15 August, 1956, set for this
morning; considering that at the hearing thereof, only respondents appeared
thru counsel and there was no appearance for the plaintiffs although the
court waited for sometime for them; considering, however, that petitioners
have submitted an opposition which the court will consider together with
the arguments presented by respondents and the Exhibits marked and
presented, namely, Exhibits 1 to 5, at the hearing of the motion to dismiss;
considering that the action in brief is one to compel respondents to declare a
Christmas bonus for petitioners workers in the National Development
Company; considering that the Court does not see how petitioners may have
a cause of action to secure such bonus because:
(a) A bonus is an act of liberality and the court takes it that it is not within
its judicial powers to command respondents to be liberal;
(b) Petitioners admit that respondents are not under legal duty to give such
bonus but that they had only ask that such bonus be given to them because it
is a moral obligation of respondents to give that but as this Court
understands, it has no power to compel a party to comply with a moral
obligation (Art. 142, New Civil Code.).
IN VIEW WHEREOF, dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs.
A motion for reconsideration of the afore-quoted order was denied. Hence this
appeal.
Appellants contend that there exists a cause of action in their complaint because their
claim rests on moral grounds or what in brief is defined by law as a natural
obligation.
Since appellants admit that appellees are not under legal obligation to give such
claimed bonus; that the grant arises only from a moral obligation or the natural
obligation that they discussed in their brief, this Court feels it urgent to reproduce at
this point, the definition and meaning of natural obligation.
Article 1423 of the New Civil Code classifies obligations into civil or natural. "Civil
obligations are a right of action to compel their performance. Natural obligations, not
being based on positive law but on equity and natural law, do not grant a right of
action to enforce their performance, but after voluntary fulfillment by the obligor,
they authorize the retention of what has been delivered or rendered by reason
thereof".
It is thus readily seen that an element of natural obligation before it can be
cognizable by the court is voluntary fulfillment by the obligor. Certainly retention
can be ordered but only after there has been voluntary performance. But here there
has been no voluntary performance. In fact, the court cannot order the performance.
At this point, we would like to reiterate what we said in the case of Philippine
Education Co. vs. CIR and the Union of Philippine Education Co., Employees
(NUL) (92 Phil., 381; 48 Off. Gaz., 5278) —
xxx xxx xxx
From the legal point of view a bonus is not a demandable and enforceable
obligation. It is so when it is made a part of the wage or salary
compensation.
And while it is true that the subsequent case of H. E. Heacock vs. National Labor
Union, et al., 95 Phil., 553; 50 Off. Gaz., 4253, we stated that:
 Even if a bonus is not demandable for not forming part of the wage, salary
or compensation of an employee, the same may nevertheless, be granted on
equitable consideration as when it was given in the past, though withheld in
succeeding two years from low salaried employees due to salary increases.
still the facts in said Heacock case are not the same as in the instant one, and hence
the ruling applied in said case cannot be considered in the present action.
Premises considered, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, without
pronouncement as to costs.
Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia
Barrera and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5103 December 24, 1952
PHILIPPINE EDUCATION CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and UNION OF PHILIPPINE
EDUCATION EMPLOYEES (NLU), respondents.
Marcial Esposo for petitioner.
Eulogio R. Lerum and M.A. Ferrer for respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
On August 1950 the respondent Union of Philippine Education Employees (NLU)
filed a petition in the Court of Industrial Relations submitting a 17-point demand for
arbitration and adjudication (Case No. 489-V). On 27 November, the respondent
union filed in the same case a motion. (No. 489-V[4]), pleading —
1. That it had been the established policy and practice of the respondent to
consider its employees and laborers as part-owners of its business and to
grant them a share in the profits annually in the form of a bonus:
2. That for the fiscal year ending on March 31, 1950, the respondent made a
net profit of P513,666.39 out of its invested capital of P1,973,300.00;
3. That on September 20, 1950, a demand was made by the petitioner on the
respondent for the payment of the bonus corresponding to the share of the
employees and laborers in the profits made by it, but by reason of the union
activities of the said employees and laborers, the respondent refused to pay
the same;
4. That a profit of twelve percent of the capital invested had been
considered by this court as a fair return on investments.
The motion ends with a prayer that the petitioner "be ordered to pay its employees
and laborers as their share in the profits in the form of a bonus the amount of
P513,666.39 less an amount corresponding the 12 per cent of P1,973,300 as the
profit of the company on its invested capital."
Petitioner's answer denied the allegations of the respondent union that it had
considered its employees and laborers as part owners of its business and that for that
reason granted them a share in the profits annually in the form of bonuses, the truth
being that bonuses have been paid by the company in its discretion, merely as a gift
to deserving employees as it saw fit; admitted that it had realized profits amounting
to P513,666.39 upon its invested capital of P1,973,300.00; that a demand for
payment of bonuses was made but they were not paid not because of union activities
but of losses sustained by reason of the strike and of the damaging effects of the
import and exchange controls; alleged that the court did not have jurisdiction over
the matter of the motion and could not entertain it for the reason that the basic
petition of the respondent union contained no demand for payment of bonus, and that
it would be taking property without due process of law and, therefore,
unconstitutional, if the court would compel the petitioner to pay its employees and
laborers the profits it had realized in excess of 12 per cent of its invested capital.
On 30 July 1951 the Court of Industrial Relations issued an order directing the
petitioner to pay the amount of P90,706.36 set aside as bonus to its officers and
employees who had been in the service during the fiscal year ending 31 March 1950
in proportion to their respective salaries and length of service. This order was
followed by another in banc denying unanimously a motion for reconsideration.
The case is now before us upon a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the order.
It is contented that in accordance with sections 2 and 4 of Rule 2, which discourage
multiplicity of suits or splitting a cause of action, the petition filed on 9 August 1950
which failed to include a demand for the payment of bonus may be pleased in
abatement of the motion praying for such payment. This is true in ordinary civil suits
but not in proceedings in the Court of Industrial Relations. However, the original 17-
demand petition was filed on 9 August 1950, the demand for the payment of bonus
was made on 20 September and the motion to compel the petitioner to pay it was
filed on 27 November after the latter's refusal to pay the same, so that the motion
may be deemed to be a supplemental pleading of a demand which arose subsequent
to the filing of the original petition. The respondent union could not have included
the demand for the payment of bonus in its original 17-demand petition because on
the date of its fling it did not know whether its demand for the payment of bonus was
to be granted.lawphil.net
Petitioner's admission of the facts pleaded in par. 2 of the motion of 27 November
which reads thus —
That for the fiscal year ending on March 31, 1950, the respondent made a
net profit of P513,666.39 out of its invested capital of P1,973,300.00.
despite the objection to the hearing of the motion to compel it to pay bonus upon its
erroneous belief that the Court had no jurisdiction to hear the motion which led it not
to present any evidence, dispenses with the presentation of evidence on the amount
of profit realized out of the capital invested in its business during the fiscal year
ending 31 March 1950. Although there is no express admission by the petitioners as
to the sum of P90,706.36 set aside to pay bonus the evidence shows that such amount
has been set aside for the purpose (Exhibit F). The petitioner does not deny it.
Section 13 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 authorizes and empowers the Court of
Industrial Relations to make awards not only on the specific relief claimed or
demand made by the parties to a dispute, but also on such as it may deem necessary
or expedient to settle or prevent further disputes. One reason for denying the
payment of bonus is the strike by members of the respondent union which caused
losses to the petitioner. The order of the respondent court states that the strike staged
on 20 August 1950 was declared legal in its order of 27 October from which no
appeal was taken. Another is the anticipated adverse effect on its business by the
import and exchange controls.
As a rule, a bonus is an amount granted and paid to an employee for his industry and
loyalty which contributed to the success of the employer's business and made
possible the realization of profits. It is an act of generosity of the employer for which
the employee ought to be thankful and grateful. It is also granted by an enlightened
employer to spur the employee to greater efforts for the success of the business and
realization of bigger profits. And the occasion for its grant and payment is usually
during the time of the year when people are more generous and inclined to give. This
is the Christmas holidays. If by the bookkeeping or accounting system the closing of
the books is not made at the end of the calendar year, bonus is granted at the close of
the fiscal year when the net profits realized in the preceding year are definitely
known. From the legal point of view a bonus is not a demandable and enforceable
obligation. It is so when it is made a part of the wage or salary or compensation. In
such a case the latter would be a fixed amount and the former would be a contingent
one dependent upon the realization of profits. If there be more, there would be no
bonus. In the matter of Sullivan Dry Dock and Repair Corporation and Local 13,
Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America, C.I.O. (Decisions
and Orders of the National Labor Relations Board, Vol. 67, page 627), cited by the
respondent court and the respondent union, the Christmas bonus paid in previous
years and paid in 1944 to other workers was withheld from the timekeepers; the
latter through their representative demanded its payment; the management refused to
pay it but proposed that the payment of bonus for the ensuing year (1945) be made
the subject of bargaining for contract. The company's attorney and labor relations
officer stated that the bonus paid "has been in existence for such a period of time that
it has been, under the interpretation of the Wage Stabilization Act, an integral part of
the wage structure." (p. 632.) The bonus demanded was ordered paid. The case
of Singer Mfg. Co. vs. National Labor Relations Board, 119 F. 2d 131, invoked by
the respondent union on the matter of bonus, has no application to the present case
because what the Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, ruled is that the
petitioner refused to bargain in good faith with its employees and their designated
bargaining agent and among the matters to be threshed out was the payment of bonus
as part of the wage. What would support, though faintly, respondent union's position
is the rule laid down by the Supreme Court of Washington (state) in Powell, et al. vs.
Republic Creosoting Co., 19P. 2d 919, where it was held (one justice dissenting) that
bonus payment made annually for over a period of years (from 1916 to 1929) by the
employer to a branch manager constituted, by implied agreement, part of the
manager's salary.
As heretofore stated the payment of bonus is not from the legal point of view a
contractual and enforceable obligation. But the petitioner is not sued before a court
of justice. It is before the Court of Industrial Relations. And according to the law of
its creation it may make an award for the purpose of settling and preventing further
disputes. And taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case —
that bonuses had been given to the employees at least in three previous years; that the
amount of P90,706.36 has been set aside for payment as bonus to its employees and
laborers and the reason for withholding the payment thereof was the strike staged by
the employees and laborers for more favorable working conditions which was
declared legal by the respondent court — justice and equity demand that bonus
already set aside for its employees and laborers be paid to them. The award would
still be within the ambit of the respondent court's power and function which is
mainly to prevent further disputes and perhaps strikes which is so detrimental to both
labor and management and to the public weal. Whether this petition be deemed an
appeal by certiorari under Rule 44 or one of certiorari under Rule 67, it is clear that
the respondent court had under and pursuant to the law of its creation the power and
authority to make the award complained of. The order appealed from is affirmed,
without costs.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ.,
concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5577 July 31, 1954
H. E. HEACOCK CO., petitioner-appellant,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR UNION, ET AL., respondents-appellees.
Perkins, Ponce Enrile and Contreras for petitioner.
H. A. Ferrer for respondent court.
Eulogio R. Lerum for respondent Union.
PARAS, C.J.:
The National Labor Union, hereinafter to be referred to as the Union, filed a petition
under date of June 26, 1950 in the Court of Industrial Relations against H. E.
Heacock Co., hereinafter to be referred to as the Company, praying that the latter be
ordered to pay to all its low salaried employees their bonus for the years 1948 and
1949, in an amount equivalent to one month salary for each year, it being alleged in
substance that on the occasion of the distribution on April 17, 1948 of the same
bonus for the year 1947, the Company promised that said benefit would be granted
yearly to the employees, provided sufficient profits were made; that in 1948 and
1949 the Company, notwithstanding available profits, distributed bonus only to its
high salaried employees; that upon the Company's failure to accede to the Union's
demand for the payment of the stipulated bonus for the years 1948 and 1949, and
upon its refusal to submit the matter to the labor-management committee in
accordance with the collective bargaining agreement of April 1949, the employees
declared a strike on June 19, 1950.
In its answer, the Company in substance alleged that it had never bound itself to pay
an annual bonus and that granted for the year 1947 was purely an act of grace and
liberality on the part of the Company; that while the Company made some profits
and paid to its executive and chiefs of departments bonuses for the years 1948 and
1949, the same was a voluntary concession of said officials who had received no
increases in pay and were not entitled to and did not actually collect compensation
for overtime work; that the compensation of the employees was never made to
depend wholly or in part upon profits, and all wages to which they are entitled were
set out in the agreement of July 11, 1949, and any other payment or gratuity was
entirely within the Company's discretion; that the illegal strike staged by the Union
led the Company to suffer damages in the sum of P12,000.00.
After hearing, the Court of Industrial Relations, through Judge Jose S. Bautista,
rendered a decision in favor of the employees, ordering the Company to pay them
one months salary as bonus for the year 1948 and another one months salary for the
year 1949. A subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by the Company was
denied by the resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations en banc dated July 16,
1951, by a vote of three to two. The instant petition for certiorari was filed by the
Company, assailing the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations.
The lower court found that on April 17, 1948, the Company distributed to all its
employees a bonus equivalent to their salaries for one month for the year 1947; that
the Company realized profits in 1948 and 1949, and although it paid bonus to its
high officials and executives for said years, it did not extend the same privilege to
any low salaried employee; that the Union duly filed with the Company a protest
against such omission, and demanded the payment of the same bonus to all the low
salaried employees; that in the protest of May 15, 1950, the Union gave notice that,
upon failure of the company to grant the demand, steps would be taken for the
protection of the members of the Union; that upon denial of the Company and its
failure to submit the matter to the labor-management committee, as requested by the
Union, the employees' staged a peaceful strike on June 19, 1950, although they
returned to work in obedience to a directive of the court; that the Company in fact
made a promise to all its low salaried employees on April 17, 1948, that a bonus of
one month salary would be distributed among them yearly, as for the year 1947, as
long as the Company would realize sufficient profits.
The Company, however, contends that it had never assumed the obligation of paying
the bonus claimed by the Union, and that there is no evidence whatsoever tending to
prove such obligation.
It appears that the issues of The Manila Times and The Manila Chronicle of August
22, 1948 featured a "Heacock Supplement" containing the following statements:
The steady growth and enviable reputation of the H. E. Heacock Co., as an
institution well known in the Philippines and in the entire Far East for its
quality merchandise and courteous service exemplify a modern tenet of
progressive employer-employee relationship founded on mutual confidence
and good-will.
The Heacock employees are given all the benefits that can reasonably be
expected from the management, Jose Y. Orosa, the firm's first vice-
president and assistant general manager, declared. "For this reason," he
added, "we have never had the unfortunate experience of seeing our
employees go on strike since the company was organized in 1905. And we
don't expect to have any strikes."
That the sound relationship between the management and the employees
redounds to the good of everybody concerned was also pointed out by Mr.
Orosa. The employer's goodwill is returned with a spontaneous
manifestation of loyalty, cooperation, efficiency and unstinted honesty on
the part of the employees, it was further explained.
The present mutual confidence and good-will of Heacock's personnel is
maintained for the ultimate benefit of the buying public, Mr. Orosa said.
Employees who are treated right have sufficient reasons to give their
employers full cooperation so that in the final analysis, the customers are
the recipients of the rewards of such cooperation.
Since the H. E. Heacock Co. resumed business after the war, 87 of its 200
employees have been given salary increases, Mr. Orosa revealed. There are
other meritorious cases which deserve similar consideration in due time, it
was pointed out.
One of the most helpful and progressive steps ever taken by a firm like
Heacock's is the setting up of a special fund for which the employees may
draw a cash loan equivalent to a half-month salary and payable within 60
days. This privilege, it was explained, is a boon to those employees who
may be forced by circumstances beyond their control to meet emergency
needs.
Another benefit extended to Heacock employees is a 25 per cent over time
pay in addition to their regular pay. In other words, the employees are paid
25 per cent for all hours of work beyond eight-hour limit fixed by law, it
was also stressed. This makes it fair and profitable for the employees of this
firm to render overtime service whenever the need arises, and that generally
is during special sales and the Christmas season.
At the end of every year, Mr. Orosa declared, the Heacock employees enjoy
a profit-sharing privilege when they are given bonuses by the management
the amount depending on the profits realized during that year. This
progressive policy, he pointed out, makes for a genuine interest on the part
of the employees to work honestly and sincerely for the good of the
company-a company which is theirs in a sense.
Every year the employees of Heacock's are given 15 days vacation leave
and 15 days sick leave with pay. They are also entitled to free medical and
dental service rendered by the company physician and dentist.
The management of the H. E. Heacock Co. firmly believes that athletics
fosters fraternity, cooperation and "a sound mind in a sound body." With
this end in view, the firm formed an athletic association whose membership
is open to all employees of the company. Followers of the basketball game
in this country are familiar with the reputation of the Heacock quintet which
has time and again garnered laurels in the local sporting world.
Mr. Orosa revealed that the H. E. Heacock Co. is a bona fide member of the
Manila Industrial and Commercial Association (MICA). Such membership,
he said assures both the management and the employees with a solid
foundation for profitable and sound business relationship. Problems
affecting both parties which may arise are met and solved with open minds
on common grounds. Fortunately for Heacock's, 40 years of public service
have proved that the management and the employees have joined hands in
mutual confidence and good-will.
"Heacock's has a splendid reputation," Mr. Orosa declared, "and this has
been built up by the employees and the management. We have live up to the
expectation of the public. We continue to do so, and to better serve our
customers, we are opening our new air-conditioned store this week."
The same publication was carried in the issue of The Manila Daily Bulletin of
August 23, 1948. The Union presented oral evidence tending to show that the
President and General Manager of the Company, Donal O. Gunn, was the one who
made the promise of April 17, 1948, to pay to all its employees yearly one-month
salary as bonus, provided there were profits. This testimony is controverted by Mr.
Gunn; but the lower court considered, in addition to such oral evidence, the
publication of the "Heacock Supplement" on the occasion of the opening of the new
store of the Company in Dasmariñas Street, Manila, as conclusive proof of its
commitment to pay the bonus in question.
The "Heacock Supplement", in the portion pertinent to the case at bar, contained the
following paragraph: "At the end of every year, Mr. Orosa declared, the Heacock
employees enjoy a profit-sharing privilege when they are given bonuses by the
management, the amount depending on the profits realized during that year. This
progressive policy, he pointed out, makes for a genuine interest on the part of the
employees to work honestly and sincerely for the good of the company — a
company which is theirs in a sense." These statements are denied by Mr. Orosa,
Vice-President and Assistant General Manager of the Company; and attorneys for
the latter argue that Guztavo M. Torres, Assistant Manager of the Personnel Service
Advertising Bureau which was then handling the advertising account of the
Company, prepared the "Heacock Supplement", and, testifying on his interview with
Mr. Orosa, declared that he was not certain as to the nature of the bonus talked about,
and that he thought that it referred to the Christmas bonus which the Company gives
to its employees at the end of every year, and that this was what he had in mind when
he wrote the article in question. The Court of Industrial Relations gave no weight to
the denial of Mr. Orosa, and observed that the latter was aware, or should have read
and known the Supplement in question, and his failure to make any correction or
denial of its contents shortly after its publication, negatives the stand now taken by
him.
The Company also points out that both Mr. Gunn and Mr. Orosa could not legally
bind the Company which can only act through its board of directors, and there is
nothing in the record to show that the board promised to pay any yearly bonus or
ratified the alleged promise made by Mr. Gunn or Mr. Orosa. Counsel for the Union,
however, observes that notwithstanding the publication of the "Heacock
Supplement" which undoubtedly must have been noticed by all the officials of the
Company, no correction or denial ever came from its board of directors which, by
such silence, must be deemed as having ratified the commitment of Mr. Gunn and
the statement of policy featured in the "Heacock Supplement".
The Court of Industrial Relations also invoked, as another circumstance confirming
the promise made by Mr. Gunn to pay an annual bonus to all the low salaried
employees of the Company, the following passage contained in his letter of February
19, 1949, addressed to the Union: "This company desires to call your attention to the
fact that the salaries, bonuses (en plural por referirse al bono de Navidad y al bono
por razon de utilidades) paid vacation leaves, paid sick leave, medical and dental
services, and other privileges and facilities, accorded to its employees are the highest
in the City of Manila for comparable position and, as a consequence, we cannot
consider any general increase in wages at the present time without doing violence to
the stability of the labor situation here, of which you are fully aware."
Attorneys for the Company have exerted great efforts in disputing the findings of the
lower court, but we are not in a position to pass upon, much less alter, said findings
which are conclusive in this instance. Even so, the decision favorable to the Union
may further be predicated upon the case of Philippine Education Company, Inc. vs.
Court of Industrial Relations, et al., 48 Off. Gaz. (13) 5278; 92 Phil., 381, in which
we held that, even if a bonus is not demandable for not forming part of the wage,
salary or compensation of the employee, the same may nevertheless be granted on
equitable considerations. It appears herein that for the year 1947 the Company paid a
bonus of one-month salary to all its employees, and for the years 1948 and 1949,
realizing necessary profits, it also paid a bonus to its executives and heads of
departments, omitting only the low salaried employees. The payment of the bonus in
1947 already generated in the minds of all the employees the fixed hope of receiving
the same concession in subsequent years, and on the ground of equity they deserved
to be paid the bonus for the years 1948 and 1949, when the Company admittedly
realized enough profits. The Company insists that its high officials were given bonus
for 1948 and 1949 because they had never been granted any salary raise or paid for
any overtime work. This is, however, answered by the Union which alleges that no
salary increase or overtime pay was necessary for the high officials of the Company,
since they have already been receiving adequate compensation.
The Company also maintains that no valid obligation to pay the bonus in question
could arise, because there was no consideration therefor. It is sufficient to state that
any extra concession granted by the employer to his employee or laborer is
necessarily premised on the need of improving the latter's working conditions to the
highest possible level, in return only for the efficient service and loyalty expected
from the employee or laborer.
Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations is hereby affirmed, and it
is so ordered with costs against the petitioner, H. E. Heacock Co.
Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista, Angelo, Labrador
and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
[GR No. 47362. December 19, 1940.]
JUAN F. VILLAROEL, appellant-appellant, against BERNARDINO ESTRADA,
recourse-appeal.
Mr. Felipe Agoncillo representing the appellant-appellant.
D. Crispin Oben on behalf of the appeal-appeal.
SYLLABUS
1. CONTRACTS; NEW PROMISE TO PAY A PRESCRIBED DEBT; MORAL
OBLIGATION AS CONSIDERATION OF A CONTRACT. - The present action is
not based on the original obligation entered into by the mother of the defendant, who
has already lent, but on the one contracted by the defendant on August 9, 1930
(Exhibit B) when assuming the fulfillment of that obligation, already prescribed
. The defendant being the only inheritance of the primitive debtor, with the right to
succeed it in his inheritance, that debt incurred by his mother legally, although he
lost its effectiveness by prescription, now it is, however, for him a moral obligation,
which is sufficient consideration to create and make effective and enforceable his
obligation voluntarily contracted on August 9, 1930 in Exhibit B.
2. ID .; ID .; ID. - The rule that a new promise to pay a prescribed debt must be made
by the same obligated person or by another legally authorized by it, does not apply to
the present case in which compliance with the obligation of the originally obligated
is not required, but of the one who later voluntarily wanted to assume this obligation.
present case in which compliance with the obligation of the originally obligated is
not required, but of the one who later voluntarily wanted to assume this obligation.
The sentence appealed is confirmed, with the costs to the appellant. That's how it is
ordered.

DECISION Imperial, Diaz, Laurel and Horrilleno, MM., Are satisfied.

ADVANCE, Pres p: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On May 9, 1912, Alejandra F. Callao, mother of the defendant Juan F. Villarroel,

obtained a loan of Mariano Estrada and Severina from the spouses payable after
seven years (Exhibit A). Alejandra passed away, leaving the defendant as the only
heir. The husbands Mariano Estrada and Severina also died, leaving the plaintiff
Bernardino Estrada as sole heir. On August 9, 1930, the defendant signed a
document (Exhibit B) declaring the amount of P1,000 owed to the plaintiff, with an
interest of 12 percent per year. This action is about the collection of this amount.

The Court of First Instance of Laguna, in which this action was filed, ordered the
defendant to pay the plaintiff the claimed amount of P1,000 with his legal interests of
12 percent a year from August 9, 1930 until his complete payment. He appealed this
sentence.

It will be noted that the parties to the present case are, respectively, the only heirs of
the original creditors and debtor. This action is exercised by virtue of the obligation
that the defendant, as the only son of the debtor primitive, contracted in favor of the
plaintiff, the sole heir of the primitive creditors. It is admitted that the amount of
P1,000 to which this obligation is contracted is the same debt of the defendant's
mother to the plaintiff's parents.

Although the action to recover the original debt has already prescribed when the
lawsuit was filed in this case, the question raised in this appeal is mainly that of
whether, notwithstanding such a prescription, the action filed is
proceeding. However, the present action is not based on the original obligation
contracted by the mother of the defendant, which has already prescribed, but on the
one contracted by the defendant on August 9, 1930 (Exhibit B) when assuming
compliance with that obligation , already prescribed. The defendant being the only
heir of the primitive debtor, with the right to succeed it in his inheritance, that debt
contracted by his mother legally, although he lost its effectiveness by prescription, is
now, however, for him a moral obligation, which is considered sufficient to create
and make effective and enforceable its obligation voluntarily contracted on August 9,
1930 in Exhibit B.

The rule that a new promise to pay a prescribed debt must be made by the same
obligated person or by another legally authorized by it, is not applicable to the