[A.C. NO.

6252 : October 5, 2004] He opined that the notation of residence certificates applied only to documents
acknowledged by a notary public and was not mandatory for affidavits related to
JONAR SANTIAGO, Complainant, cases pending before courts and other government offices. He pointed out that in
vs. the latter, the affidavits, which were sworn to before government prosecutors, did
not have to indicate the residence certificates of the affiants. Neither did other
Atty. EDISON V. RAFANAN, Respondent.
notaries public in Nueva Ecija - - some of whom were older practitioners - - indicate
the affiants' residence certificates on the documents they notarized, or have entries
DECISION
in their notarial register for these documents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
As to his alleged failure to comply with the certification required by Section 3 of Rule
Notaries public are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties,
1129 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, respondent explained that as counsel of
which are impressed with public interest. They are enjoined to comply faithfully with
the affiants, he had the option to comply or not with the certification. To nullify the
the solemnities and requirements of the Notarial Law. This Court will not hesitate to
Affidavits, it was complainant who was duty-bound to bring the said noncompliance
mete out appropriate sanctions to those who violate it or neglect observance thereof.
to the attention of the prosecutor conducting the preliminary investigation.
The Case and the Facts
As to his alleged violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR, respondent argued that lawyers
Before us is a verified Complaint1 filed by Jonar Santiago, an employee of the
could testify on behalf of their clients "on substantial matters, in cases where [their]
Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), for the disbarment of Atty.
testimony is essential to the ends of justice." Complainant charged respondent's
Edison V. Rafanan. The Complaint was filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline
clients with attempted murder. Respondent averred that since they were in his house
(CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on January 16, 2001. It charged
when the alleged crime occurred, "his testimony is very essential to the ends of
Atty. Rafanan with deceit; malpractice or other gross misconduct in office under
justice."
Section 27 of Rule 1382 of the Rules of Court; and violation of Canons 1.01, 1.02
and 1.033, Canon 54, and Canons 12.075 and 12.08 of the Code of Professional
Respondent alleged that it was complainant who had threatened and harassed his
Responsibility (CPR).
clients after the hearing of their case by the provincial prosecutor on January 4,
2001. Respondent requested the assistance of the Cabanatuan City Police the
In his Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid Jr. summarized
following day, January 5, 2001, which was the next scheduled hearing, to avoid a
the allegations of the complainant in this wise:
repetition of the incident and to allay the fears of his clients. In support of his
"x x x. In his Letter-Complaint, Complainant alleged, among others, that
allegations, he submitted Certifications10 from the Cabanatuan City Police and the
Respondent in notarizing several documents on different dates failed and/or refused
Joint Affidavit11 of the two police officers who had assisted them.
to: a)make the proper notation regarding the cedula or community tax certificate of
the affiants; b) enter the details of the notarized documents in the notarial register;
Lastly, he contended that the case had been initiated for no other purpose than to
and c) make and execute the certification and enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the
harass him, because he was the counsel of Barangay Captain Ernesto Ramos in
documents he had notarized, all in violation of the notarial provisions of the Revised
the cases filed by the latter before the ombudsman and the BJMP against
Administrative Code.
complainant.
"Complainant likewise alleged that Respondent executed an Affidavit in
favor of his client and offered the same as evidence in the case wherein he was
After receipt of respondent's Answer, the CBD, through Commissioner Tyrone R.
actively representing his client. Finally, Complainant alleges that on a certain date,
Cimafranca, set the case for hearing on June 5, 2001, at two o'clock in the afternoon.
Respondent accompanied by several persons waited for Complainant after the
Notices12 of the hearing were sent to the parties by registered mail. On the
hearing and after confronting the latter disarmed him of his sidearm and thereafter
scheduled date and time of the hearing, only complainant appeared. Respondent
uttered insulting words and veiled threats."
was unable to do so, apparently because he had received the Notice only on June
On March 23, 2001, pursuant to the January 19, 2001 Order of the CBD,7
8, 2001.13 The hearing was reset to July 3, 2001 at two o'clock in the afternoon.
Atty. Rafanan filed his verified Answer.8 He admitted having administered the oath
to the affiants whose Affidavits were attached to the verified Complaint. He believed,
On the same day, June 5, 2001, complainant filed his Reply14 to the verified Answer
however, that the non-notation of their Residence Certificates in the Affidavits and
of respondent. The latter's Rejoinder was received by the CBD on July 13, 2001.15
the Counter-affidavits was allowed.
It also received complainant's Letter-Request16 to dispense with the hearings.
Accordingly, it granted that request in its Order17 dated July 24, 2001, issued
through Commissioner Cimafranca. It thereby directed the parties to submit their
respective memoranda within fifteen days from receipt of the Order, after which the
case was to be deemed submitted for resolution.
The CBD received complainant's Memorandum18 on September 26, 2001.
Respondent did not file any.
The IBP's Recommendation
On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-
2003-17219 approving and adopting the Investigating Commissioner's Report that
respondent had violated specific requirements of the Notarial Law on the execution
of a certification, the entry of such certification in the notarial register, and the
indication of the affiant's residence certificate. The IBP Board of Governors found
his excuse for the violations unacceptable. It modified, however, the
recommendation20 of the investigating commissioner by increasing the fine to
"P3,000 with a warning that any repetition of the violation will be dealt with a heavier
penalty."
The other charges - - violation of Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; and
Canons 1.01 to 1.03, 12.07 and 12.08 of the CPR - - were dismissed for insufficiency
of evidence.
The Court's Ruling
We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.
Respondent's Administrative Liability
Violation of the Notarial Law
The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are
required to certify that the party to every document acknowledged before them has
presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax);
and to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of such certification.21 They
are also required to maintain and keep a notarial register; to enter therein all
instruments notarized by them; and to "give to each instrument executed, sworn to,
or acknowledged before [them] a number corresponding to the one in [their] register
[and to state therein] the page or pages of [their] register, on which the same is
recorded."22 Failure to perform these duties would result in the revocation of their
commission as notaries public.23
These formalities are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected, considering the
degree of importance and evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents.
Notaries public entering into their commissions are presumed to be aware of these
elementary requirements.
In Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,24 the Court explained the value and meaning of
notarization as follows:
"The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be
overemphasized. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is
invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into
a public document thus making that document admissible in evidence without further
proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit
upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able
to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a
private instrument."
For this reason, notaries public should not take for granted the solemn duties
pertaining to their office. Slipshod methods in their performance of the notarial act
are never to be countenanced. They are expected to exert utmost care in the
performance of their duties,25 which are dictated by public policy and are impressed
with public interest.
It is clear from the pleadings before us - - and respondent has readily admitted - -
that he violated the Notarial Law by failing to enter in the documents notations of the
residence certificate, as well as the entry number and the pages of the notarial
registry.
Respondent believes, however, that noncompliance with those requirements is not
mandatory for affidavits relative to cases pending before the courts and government
agencies. He points to similar practices of older notaries in Nueva Ecija.
We cannot give credence to, much less honor, his claim. His belief that the
requirements do not apply to affidavits is patently irrelevant. No law dispenses with
these formalities. Au contraire, the Notarial Law makes no qualification or exception.
It is appalling and inexcusable that he did away with the basics of notarial procedure
allegedly because others were doing so. Being swayed by the bad example of others
is not an acceptable justification for breaking the law.
We note further that the documents attached to the verified Complaint are the Joint
Counter-Affidavit of respondent's clients Ernesto Ramos and Rey Geronimo, as well
as their witnesses' Affidavits relative to Criminal Case No. 69-2000 for attempted
murder, filed by complainant's brother against the aforementioned clients. These
documents became the basis of the present Complaint.
As correctly pointed out by the investigating commissioner, Section 3 of Rule 112 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly requires respondent as notary - - in the
absence of any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized to
administer the oath - - to "certify that he has personally examined the affiants and
that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits."
Respondent failed to do so with respect to the subject Affidavits and Counter-
Affidavits in the belief that - - as counsel for the affiants - - he was not required to
comply with the certification requirement.
It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for the law and legal processes.26 They are expected to
be in the forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty
carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep
abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence.27 It is
imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully
comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently
their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to
committing mistakes.
Where notaries public are lawyers, a graver responsibility is placed upon them by
reason of their solemn oath to obey the laws.28 No custom or age-old practice
provides sufficient excuse or justification for their failure to adhere to the provisions
of the law. In this case, the excuse given by respondent exhibited his clear ignorance
of the Notarial Law, the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the importance of his office
as a notary public.
Nonetheless, we do not agree with complainant's plea to disbar respondent from the
practice of law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution.29
Disbarment will be imposed as a penalty only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and the character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court and a member of the bar. Where any lesser penalty can accomplish the end
desired, disbarment should not be decreed.30 Considering the nature of the
infraction and the absence of deceit on the part of respondent, we believe that the
penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors is a sufficient disciplinary
measure in this case.
Lawyer as Witness for Client
Complainant further faults respondent for executing before Prosecutor Leonardo
Padolina an affidavit corroborating the defense of alibi proffered by respondent's
clients, allegedly in violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR: "A lawyer shall avoid
testifying in behalf of his client."
Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the CPR states:
"Rule 12.08 - A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client, except:
a) on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an instrument
and the like;
b) on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of
justice, in which event he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to
another counsel."
Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer is not disqualified from being a witness,31
except only in certain cases pertaining to privileged communication arising from an
attorney-client relationship.32
The reason behind such rule is the difficulty posed upon lawyers by the task of
dissociating their relation to their clients as witnesses from that as advocates.
Witnesses are expected to tell the facts as they recall them. In contradistinction,
advocates are partisans - - those who actively plead and defend the cause of others.
It is difficult to distinguish the fairness and impartiality of a disinterested witness from
the zeal of an advocate. The question is one of propriety rather than of competency
of the lawyers who testify for their clients.
"Acting or appearing to act in the double capacity of lawyer and witness for the client
will provoke unkind criticism and leave many people to suspect the truthfulness of
the lawyer because they cannot believe the lawyer as disinterested. The people will
have a plausible reason for thinking, and if their sympathies are against the lawyer's
client, they will have an opportunity, not likely to be neglected, for charging, that as
a witness he fortified it with his own testimony. The testimony of the lawyer becomes
doubted and is looked upon as partial and untruthful."33
Thus, although the law does not forbid lawyers from being witnesses and at the
same time counsels for a cause, the preference is for them to refrain from testifying
as witnesses, unless they absolutely have to; and should they do so, to withdraw
from active management of the case.34
Notwithstanding this guideline and the existence of the Affidavit executed by Atty.
Rafanan in favor of his clients, we cannot hastily make him administratively liable for
the following reasons:
First, we consider it the duty of a lawyer to assert every remedy and defense that is
authorized by law for the benefit of the client, especially in a criminal action in which
the latter's life and liberty are at stake.35 It is the fundamental right of the accused
to be afforded full opportunity to rebut the charges against them. They are entitled
to suggest all those reasonable doubts that may arise from the evidence as to their
guilt; and to ensure that if they are convicted, such conviction is according to law.
Having undertaken the defense of the accused, respondent, as defense counsel,
was thus expected to spare no effort to save his clients from a wrong conviction. He
had the duty to present - - by all fair and honorable means - - every defense and
mitigating circumstance that the law permitted, to the end that his clients would not
be deprived of life, liberty or property, except by due process of law.36

The Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan was clearly necessary for the defense of his
clients, since it pointed out the fact that on the alleged date and time of the incident,
his clients were at his residence and could not have possibly committed the crime
charged against them. Notably, in his Affidavit, complainant does not dispute the
statements of respondent or suggest the falsity of its contents.
Second, paragraph (b) of Rule 12.08 contemplates a situation in which lawyers give
their testimonies during the trial. In this instance, the Affidavit was submitted during
the preliminary investigation which, as such, was merely inquisitorial.37 Not being a
trial of the case on the merits, a preliminary investigation has the oft-repeated
purposes of securing innocent persons against hasty, malicious and oppressive
prosecutions; protecting them from open and public accusations of crime and from
the trouble as well as expense and anxiety of a public trial; and protecting the State
from useless and expensive prosecutions.38 The investigation is advisedly called
preliminary, as it is yet to be followed by the trial proper.
Nonetheless, we deem it important to stress and remind respondent to refrain from
accepting employment in any matter in which he knows or has reason to believe that
he may be an essential witness for the prospective client. Furthermore, in future
cases in which his testimony may become essential to serve the "ends of justice,"
the canons of the profession require him to withdraw from the active prosecution of
these cases.
No Proof of Harassment
The charge that respondent harassed complainant and uttered insulting words and
veiled threats is not supported by evidence. Allegation is never equivalent to proof,
and a bare charge cannot be equated with liability.39 It is not the self-serving claim
of complainant but the version of respondent that is more credible, considering that
the latter's allegations are corroborated by the Affidavits of the police officers and
the Certifications of the Cabanatuan City Police.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edison V. Rafanan is found guilty of violating the Notarial Law
and Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby FINED P3,000
with a warning that similar infractions in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio Morales*, JJ., concur.
A.C. No. 5299 August 19, 2003
ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public
Information Office, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 157053 August 19, 2003
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in
his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information
Office, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the
July 5, 2000 issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads:
"ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-2667."1
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the
Supreme Court, called up the published telephone number and pretended to be an
interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty.
Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a
court decree within four to six months, provided the case will not involve separation
of property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges
a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time of filing of the case and the
other half after a decision thereon has been rendered.
Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information
Office revealed that similar advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6,
2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star.2
On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court
Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an administrative
complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation
of his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.3
In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that
advertising and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to
change our views about the prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that the
interest of the public is not served by the absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising;
that the Court can lift the ban on lawyer advertising; and that the rationale behind
the decades-old prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be
exonerated from all the charges against him and that the Court promulgate a ruling
that advertisement of legal services offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public
policy and public order as long as it is dignified.4
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation,
report and recommendation.5 On June 29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline passed Resolution No. XV-2002-306,6 finding respondent guilty of
violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule
138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, and suspended him from the practice of law
for one (1) year with the warning that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with
more severely. The IBP Resolution was noted by this Court on November 11, 2002.7
In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,8 which
was denied by the IBP in Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 20029
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053
entitled, "Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court Administrator and Chief, Public
Information Office, Respondents." This petition was consolidated with A.C. No. 5299
per the Court’s Resolution dated March 4, 2003.
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest whether
or not they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings.10 Complainant filed his Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating that he
is not submitting any additional pleading or evidence and is submitting the case for
its early resolution on the basis of pleadings and records thereof. 11 Respondent,
on the other hand, filed a Supplemental Memorandum on June 20, 2003.
We agree with the IBP’s Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. – A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily
to solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01. – A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefor. – A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney
for a party without authority to do so.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business.12 It is a
profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration.
Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy
is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.13 The gaining of a livelihood should
be a secondary consideration.14 The duty to public service and to the administration
of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their
personal interests or what they owe to themselves.15 The following elements
distinguish the legal profession from a business:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which
one may attain the highest eminence without making much money;
2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the administration of justice involving
thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability;
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and
unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and
encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.16
There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself
admits that he caused the publication of the advertisements. While he professes
repentance and begs for the Court’s indulgence, his contrition rings hollow
considering the fact that he advertised his legal services again after he pleaded for
compassion and after claiming that he had no intention to violate the rules. Eight
months after filing his answer, he again advertised his legal services in the August
14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper.17 Ten months later, he
caused the same advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy
& Sell.18 Such acts of respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the
Court’s authority.
What adds to the gravity of respondent’s acts is that in advertising himself as a self-
styled "Annulment of Marriage Specialist," he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and
undermines not only the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still considered
sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society.
Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained in four to
six months from the time of the filing of the case,19 he in fact encourages people,
who might have otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving
their marriage bonds, to do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However,
for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal
profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury
to the lawyer and to the bar.20 Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or
names of the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of practice, as
well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are
permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now acceptable.21 Publication in
reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed
by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is likewise allowable. As
explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:22
Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer’s
name and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers,
cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission
to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational
distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal
teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees
thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in
other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their
written consent, the names of clients regularly represented.
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot
be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical
which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not
properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper,
magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to
be published in a law list the conduct, management, or contents of which are
calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower dignity or
standing of the profession.
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may
contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected
with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The
publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in
the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience
of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a
telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. (emphasis
and italics supplied)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is
found GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this Resolution.
He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense
will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information
and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, (Acting Chairman),Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman ), abroad, on official business.
A.C. No. 6672 September 4, 2009
PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment1 filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan
Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation
of clients and encroachment of professional services.
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano,
convinced his clients2 to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them
financial assistance3 and expeditious collection on their claims.4 To induce them to
hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages.
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit5 of James
Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client
relations with complainant and utilize respondent’s services instead, in exchange for
a loan of ₱50,000. Complainant also attached "respondent’s" calling card:
Hence, this complaint.
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing
and circulation of the said calling card.7

The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.8
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and
recommendation,9 found that respondent had encroached on the professional
practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.0210 and other canons11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against
soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in
Section 27, Rule 13812 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that
respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition would merit a
heavier penalty.
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we
modify the recommended penalty.
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into
complainant’s professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the
means employed by respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves
constituted distinct violations of ethical rules.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the
manner by which a lawyer’s services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the
CPR provides:
CANON 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest,
fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession
and not a business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants
advertise their wares.13 To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to
commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in the public’s estimation
and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character of service to which every
member of the bar is called.14
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
RULE 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to
solicit legal business.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers.15 Such actuation constitutes
malpractice, a ground for disbarment.16
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:
RULE 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit
or proceeding or delay any man’s cause.
This rule proscribes "ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal
business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain
employment)17 as a measure to protect the community from barratry and
champerty.18
Complainant presented substantial evidence19 (consisting of the sworn statements
of the very same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondent’s office) to
prove that respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from
referrals’ suits.
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later
admitted it during the mandatory hearing.
Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s law practice was benefited. Hapless
seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labiano’s word
that respondent could produce a more favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule
2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court.1avvphi1
With regard to respondent’s violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that
a lawyer should not steal another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain him
by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services.20 Again
the Court notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list
nor receiving benefits from Labiano’s "referrals." Furthermore, he never denied
Labiano’s connection to his office.21 Respondent committed an unethical, predatory
overstep into another’s legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of
the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers,
respondent violated Rule 16.04:
Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s
interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.
Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice,
he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is,
when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing
fees, stenographer’s fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium
for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of mind so that the free
exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected.22 It seeks to ensure his
undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and
fidelity to the client’s cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with
the client’s case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the
case or an additional stake in its outcome.23 Either of these circumstances may lead
the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a
settlement which may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the
client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the client’s cause.24
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice25 which calls
for the exercise of the Court’s disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation
statutes warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for
the purpose of obtaining employment.26 Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the
rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous
lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal profession.
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the
prohibition on lending money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a
mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly
incommensurate to its findings.
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A
lawyer’s best advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity
and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct.27 For this reason, lawyers
are only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or
use of simple professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a) lawyer’s name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.28
Labiano’s calling card contained the phrase "with financial assistance." The phrase
was clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change
counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled
to lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their
financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded
the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal profession. However, in
the absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not
prepared to rule that respondent was personally and directly responsible for the
printing and distribution of Labiano’s calling cards.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03,
8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of one year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall
be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar
Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all
courts.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-41862 February 7, 1992
B. R. SEBASTIAN ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, EULOGIO B. REYES, NICANOR G. SALAYSAY, in
his capacity as Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, and ANTONIO MARINAS, in his
capacity as Deputy Sheriff, respondents.
Benito P. Fabie for petitioner.
Ildefonso de Guzman-Mendiola for private respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is a petition for prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary
injunction, to review the Resolution dated 10 November 1975 of respondent Court
of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. No. 53546-R denying petitioner's motion to reinstate its
appeal, earlier dismissed for failure to file the Appellant's Brief.
The material operative facts of this case, as gathered from the pleadings of the
parties, are not disputed.
Eulogio B. Reyes, now deceased, filed an action for damages with the then Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, against the
Director of Public Works, the Republic of the Philippines and petitioner herein, B. R.
Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 757-R. 1
On 7 May 1973, the trial court rendered a decision finding petitioner liable for
damages but absolving the other defendants. 2
Petitioner, thru its counsel, the law firm of Baizas, Alberto and Associates, timely
appealed the adverse decision to the respondent Court of Appeals, which docketed
the case as C.A.-G.R. No. 53546-R. 3
During the pendency of the appeal, the plaintiff-appellee therein, Eulogio B. Reyes,
died. Upon prior leave of the respondent Court, he was substituted by his heirs —
Enrique N. Reyes, Felicisima R. Natividad, Donna Marie N. Reyes and Renne Marie
N. Ryes — who are now the private respondents in this present petition.
On 19 February 1974, petitioner, thru its then counsel of record, received notice to
file Appellant's Brief within 45 days from receipt thereof. It had, therefore, until 5 April
1974 within which to comply.
Counsel for petitioner failed to file the Brief; thus, on 9 July 1974, respondent Court
issued a Resolution requiring said counsel to show cause why the appeal should not
be dismissed for failure to file the Appellant's Brief within the reglementary period. 4
A copy of this Resolution was received by counsel for petitioner on 17 July 1974. 5
As the latter failed to comply with the above Resolution, respondent Court, on 9
September 1974, issued another Resolution this time dismissing petitioner's appeal:
It appearing that counsel for defendant-appellant failed to show cause why the
appeal should not be dismissed (for failure to file the appellant's brief within the
reglementary period which expired on April 5, 1974) within the period of 10 days
fixed in the resolution of July 9, 1974, copy of which was received by said counsel
on July 17, 1974; . . . 6
On 28 September 1974, petitioner, this time thru the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE, filed a
motion for reconsideration 7 of the resolution dismissing its appeal alleging that as
a result of the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas, senior partner in the law firm of BAIZAS,
ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES, the affairs of the said firm are still being settled between
Atty. Jose Baizas (son of Crispin Baizas) and Atty. Ruby Alberto, the latter having
established her own law office; furthermore, Atty. Rodolfo Espiritu, the lawyer who
handled this case in the trial court and who is believed to have also attended to the
preparation of the Appellant's Brief but failed to submit it through oversight and
inadvertence, had also left the firm.
In its Resolution of 9 October 1974, respondent Court denied the motion for
reconsideration, stating that:
Upon consideration of the motion of counsel for defendant-appellant, praying, on the
grounds therein stated, that the resolution of September 9, 1974, dismissing the
appeal, be set aside, and that appellant be granted a reasonable period of time
within which to file its brief: considering that six (6) months had elapsed since the
expiration of the original period and more than two and one-half (2-½) months since
counsel received copy of the resolution requiring him to show cause why the appeal
should not be dismissed for failure to file brief; Motion Denied. 8
No action having been taken by petitioner from the above Resolution within the
period to file a petition for review, the same became final and executory, and the
records of the case were remanded to the court of origin for execution.
The trial court issued a writ of execution on 21 October 1975. 9 Pursuant thereto,
respondent Provincial Sheriff and Deputy Sheriff attached petitioner's Hough Pay
Loader with Hercules Diesel Engine and issued on 5 November 1975 a Notice of
Sheriff's Sale, scheduling for Friday, 14 November 1975 at 10:00 o'clock in the
morning, the auction sale thereof. 10
On 6 November 1975, petitioner filed with respondent Court a Motion to Reinstate
Appeal with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction 11 dated 5
November 1975, and containing the following allegations:
1. That late as it may be, this Honorable Court has the inherent power to modify and
set aside its processes, in the interest of justice, especially so in this case when the
case was dismissed on account of the untimely death of Atty. Crispin D. Baizas,
counsel of BRSEI (B.R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc.).
2. That to dismiss the case for failure to file the appellant's brief owing to the untimely
death of the late Atty. Crispin D. Baizas would be tantamount to denying BRSEI its
(sic) day in court, and is, therefore, a clear and unmistakable denial of due process
on the part of BRSEI.
3. That to reinstate BRSEI's appeal would not impair the rights of the parties, since
all that BRSEI is asking for, is a day in court to be heard on appeal in order to have
the unfair, unjust and unlawful decision, set aside and reversed.
The respondent Court denied the said motion in its Resolution of 10 November 1975:
12
. . . it appearing that appellant was represented by the law firm of Baizas, Alberto &
Associates, and while Atty. Baizas died on January 16, 1974, his law firm was not
dissolved since it received the notice to file brief on February 19, 1974, and the copy
of the Resolution of July 9, 1974, requiring appellant to show cause why the appeal
should not be dismissed was received by the law firm on July 17, 1974 and no cause
was shown; . . .
Hence, on 13 November 1975, petitioner filed the original petition 13 in this case
against the Court of Appeals, Eulogio B. Reyes, Nicanor G. Salaysay, as Provincial
Sheriff of Rizal, and Antonio Marinas, as Deputy Sheriff. The petition likewise prayed
for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.
In the Resolution of 13 November 1975, this Court required respondents to comment
on the petition within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, and issued a Temporary
Restraining Order. 14
On 12 January 1976, respondents filed a Partial Comment on the Petition with a
Motion to Suspend the Proceedings 15 on the ground that respondent Eulogio B.
Reyes is already dead and his lawful heirs had already been ordered substituted for
him during the pendency of the appeal before the respondent Court of Appeals.
In the Resolution of 21 January 1976, this Court ordered petitioner to amend its
petition within then (10) days from receipt of notice, and suspended the filing of
respondents' Comment until after the amendment is presented and admitted. 16
In compliance therewith, petitioner filed on 9 February 1976 a Motion for Leave to
Admit Amended Petition to which it attached the said Amended Petition. 17 The
amendment consists in the substitution of Eulogio B. Reyes with his heirs.
This Court admitted the Amended Petition 18 and required the respondents to file
their Comment within ten (10) days from notice thereof, which they complied with on
5 April 1976. 19 Petitioner filed its Reply to the Comment on 29 April 1976. 20
In the Resolution of 12 May 1976, this Court denied the petition for lack of merit: 21
L-41862 (B.R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.). —
Considering the allegations, issues and arguments adduced in the amended petition
for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals, respondents'
comment thereon, as well as petitioner's reply to said comment, the Court Resolved
to DENY the petition for lack of merit.
However, on 31 May 1976, petitioner filed a motion for its reconsideration 22
claiming that since it was deprived of the right to appeal without fault on its part, the
petition should be given due course.
Respondents submitted on 22 July 1976 their Comment 23 to said Motion for
Reconsideration.
On 10 September 1976, this Court resolved to reconsider 24 its Resolution of 12
May 1976 and required both parties to submit simultaneously their respective
Memoranda within thirty (30) days from notice thereof.
Petitioner submitted its Memorandum on 5 November 1976 25 while respondents
submitted theirs on 22 November 1976. 26 On 29 November 1976, this Court
deemed the present case submitted for decision. 27
The sole issue to be addressed is whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals
gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner's motion to reinstate its appeal,
previously dismissed for failure to file the Appellant's Brief.
Petitioner, in its Memorandum, extensively expounds on respondent Court's
authority to reinstate dismissed appeals and cites as basis thereof the decision of
this Court in Heirs of Clemente Celestino vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 28 Indeed, in
said case, this Court affirmed the resolution of the Court of Appeals — reinstating
an appeal after being dismissed for failure by the appellants therein to file their brief,
and after entry of judgment and remand of the records to the lower court — and
cancelled the entry of judgment, requiring the lower court to return the records to the
Court of Appeals and admit appellant's brief. Said case, however, had a peculiar or
singular factual situation" which prompted the Court of Appeals to grant the relief
and which this Court found sufficient to justify such action. As this Court, through
Associate Justice Ramon Aquino, said:
We are of the opinion that under the peculiar or singular factual situation in this case
and to forestall a miscarriage of justice the resolution of the Court of Appeals
reinstating the appeal should be upheld.
That Court dismissed the appeal of the Pagtakhans in the mistaken belief that they
had abandoned it because they allegedly failed to give to their counsel the money
needed for paying the cost of printing their brief.
But presumably the Appellate Court realized later that fraud might have been
practised on appellants Pagtakhans since their oppositions were not included in the
record on appeal. In (sic) sensed that there was some irregularity in the actuations
of their lawyer and that Court (sic) itself had been misled into dismissing the appeal.
Counsel for the Pagtakhans could have furnished them with copies of his motions
for extension of time to file brief so that they would have known that the Court of
Appeals had been apprised of their alleged failure to defray the cost of printing their
brief and they could have articulated their reaction directly to the Court. Counsel
could have moved in the Appellate Court that he be allowed to withdraw from the
case or that the Pagtakhans be required to manifest whether they were still desirous
of prosecuting their appeal or wanted a mimeographed brief to be filed for them (See
People vs. Cawili, L-30543, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 728). Since counsel did none
of those things, his representation that the appellants had evinced lack of interest in
pursuing their appeal is difficult to believe.
If the appellate court has not yet lost its jurisdiction, it may exercise its discretion in
reinstating an appeal, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case and
the demands of substantial justice (Alquiza vs. Alquiza, L-23342, February 10, 1968,
22 SCRA 494, 66 O.G. 276; C. Vda. de Ordoveza vs. Raymundo, 62 Phil. 275;
Chavez vs. Ganzon, 108 Phil. 6).
But even if it has already lost jurisdiction over the appeal by reason of the remand
of the record to the lower court, it, nevertheless, has the inherent right to recall the
remittitur or the remand of the record to the lower court if it had rendered a decision
or issued a resolution which was induced by fraud practised upon it. Such a right is
not affected by the statutory provision that after the record has been remanded, the
appellate court has no further jurisdiction over the appeal (5 Am Jur. 2nd 433 citing
Lovett vs. State, 29 Fla. 384, 11 So. 176; 84 ALR 595; State vs. Ramirez, 34 Idaho
623, 203 Pac. 279).
In the instant case, no fraud is involved; what obtain is simple negligence on the part
of petitioner's counsel, which is neither excusable nor unavoidable. Petitioner thus
failed to demonstrate sufficient cause to warrant a favorable action on its plea.
As held in Chavez, et al. vs. Ganzon, et al., 29 and reiterated in Negros Stevedoring
Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 30 We said:
Granting that the power or discretion to reinstate an appeal that had been dismissed
is included in or implied from the power or discretion to dismiss an appeal, still such
power or discretion must be exercised upon a showing of good and sufficient cause,
in like manner as the power or discretion vested in the appellate court to allow
extensions of time for the filing of briefs. There must be such a showing which would
call for, prompt and justify its exercise (sic). Otherwise, it cannot and must not be
upheld.
To justify its failure to file the Appellant's Brief, petitioner relies mainly on the death
of Atty. Crispin Baizas and the supposed confusion it brought to the firm of BAIZAS,
ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES. It says: 31
Petitioner, thru its president Bernardo R. Sebastian, engaged the services of Atty.
Crispin D. Baizas to handle its defense in Civil Case No. 757-R; however, it appears
that Atty. Baizas entered petitioner's case as a case to be handled by his law firm
operating under the name and style "Crispin D. Baizas & Associates." Hence, the
Answer to the complaint, Answer to Cross-Claim, and Answer to Fourth-party
Complaint filed for petitioner in said case, evince that the law firm "Crispin D. Baizas
& Associates" represents petitioner in the action.
After rendition of the assailed Decision of the trial court, petitioner's counsel appears
to have changed its firm name to "Baizas, Alberto & Associates." The appeal was
thus pursued for petitioner by the law firm "Baizas, Alberto & Associates."
On January 16, 1974, Atty. Crispin D. Baizas died as a result of a brief heart attack.
In consequence (sic) of his death, the law firm "Baizas, Alberto & Associates" was
in a terribly confused state of affairs. In effect, said law firm was dissolved. Atty.
Ruby Alberto formed her own law office and other associates left the dissolved law
firms (sic) joining other offices or putting up their own. Atty. Jose Baizas, son of
deceased Crispin D. Baizas, took over the management of why may have been left
of his father's office, it appearing that some, if not many, cases of the defunct office
were taken over by the associates who left the firm upon its dissolution.
But, none of the former partners and associates/assistants of the dissolved law firm
filed the required appellant's brief for herein petitioner in its appealed case before
the respondent Court of Appeals. No notice was served upon petitioner by any of
the surviving associates of the defunct law firm that its appellant's brief was due for
filing or that the law office had been dissolved and that the law office had been
dissolved and that none of the lawyers herein formerly connected desired to handle
the appealed case of petitioner. . . .
The circumstances that the law firm "Baizas, Alberto & Associates" was dissolved
and that none of the associates took over petitioner's case, and no notice of such
state of affairs was given to petitioner who could have engaged the services of
another lawyer to prosecute its appeal before respondent Court, constitutes (sic) an
UNAVOIDABLE CASUALTY that entitles petitioner to the relief prayed for. On the
other hand, the non-dissolution of said law firm "Baizas, Alberto & Associates" will
not defeat petitioner's claim for relief since, in such event, the said firm had
ABANDONED petitioner's cause, which act constitutes fraud and/or reckless
inattention the result of which is deprivation of petitioner's day in court. In the
abovementioned Yuseco case, this Honorable Court had emphatically and forcefully
declared that it will always be disposed to grant relief to parties aggrieved by perfidy,
fraud, reckless inattention and downright incompetence of lawyers, which has the
consequence of depriving their day (sic) in court.
We find no merit in petitioner's contentions. Petitioner's counsel was the law firm of
BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES and not merely Atty. Crispin Baizas. Hence,
the death of the latter did not extinguish the lawyer-client relationship between said
firm and petitioner.
In Gutierrez & Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 32 the appeal filed by the law firm of
BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES on behalf of respondent therein was dismissed
for failure to comply with the requisites enumerated in the Rules of Court; the excuse
presented by said counsel was also the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas. This Court
held therein that:
The death of Attorney Baizas was not a valid excuse on the part of his associates
for not attending to Alvendia's appeal, supposing arguendo that his office was solely
entrusted with the task of representing Alvendia in the Court of Appeals. Attorney
Espiritu (not Attorney Baizas) was the one actually collaborating with Viola in
handling Alvendia's case. He did not file a formal appearance in the Court of
Appeals.
Undoubtedly, there was inexcusable negligence on the part of petitioner's counsel
in failing to file the Appellant's Brief. As revealed by the records, petitioner's counsel,
the BAIZAS ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES law firm, received the notice to file Brief on
19 February 1974. It failed to do so within the 45 days granted to it. Said law firm
also received a copy of the respondent Court's Resolution of 9 July 1974 requiring
it to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the Brief
within the reglementary period. Petitioner chose not to comply with it, thus
compelling the respondent Court to issue on 9 September 1974 a Resolution
dismissing the appeal, a copy of which the former also received. Then, on 28
September 1974, the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE moved for reconsideration of the said
Resolution which respondent Court denied in its Resolution of 9 October 1974.
Nothing more was heard from petitioner until after a year when, on 6 November
1975, it filed the instant petition in reaction to the issuance of a writ of execution by
the trial court following receipt of the records for the respondent Court.
The "confusion" in the office of the law firm following the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas
is not a valid justification for its failure to file the Brief. With Baizas' death, the
responsibility of Atty. Alberto and his Associates to the petitioner as counsel
remained until withdrawal by the former of their appearance in the manner provided
by the Rules of Court. This is so because it was the law firm which handled the case
for petitioner before both the trial and appellate courts. That Atty. Espiritu, an
associate who was designated to handle the case, later left the office after the death
of Atty. Baizas is of no moment since others in the firm could have replaced him..
Upon receipt of the notice to file Brief, the law firm should have re-assigned the case
to another associate or, it could have withdrawn as counsel in the manner provided
by the Rules of Court so that the petitioner could contract the services of a new
lawyer.
In the Negros Stevedoring case, supra., this Court held:
The negligence committed in the case at bar cannot be considered excusable, nor
(sic) is it unavoidable. Time and again the Court has admonished law firms to adopt
a system of distributing pleadings and notices, whereby lawyers working therein
receive promptly notices and pleadings intended for them, so that they will always
be informed of the status of their cases. Their Court has also often repeated that the
negligence of clerks which adversely affect the cases handled by lawyers, is binding
upon the latter.
Compounding such negligence is the failure of the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE, which
filed on 28 September 1974 the motion for reconsider the Resolution of 9 September
1974, to take any further appropriate action after the respondent Court denied said
motion on 9 October 1974. The appearance of said counsel is presumed to be duly
authorized by petitioner. The latter has neither assailed nor questioned such
appearance.
The rule is settled that negligence of counsel binds the client. 33
Moreover, petitioner itself was guilty of negligence when it failed to make inquiries
from counsel regarding its case. As pointed out by respondents, the president of
petitioner corporation claims to be the intimate friend of Atty. Crispin Baizas; hence,
the death of the latter must have been known to the former. 34 This fact should have
made petitioner more vigilant with respect to the case at bar. Petitioner failed to act
with prudence and diligence, thus, its plea that they were not accorded the right to
procedural due process cannot elicit either approval or sympathy. 35
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that there was failure to show a good and sufficient
cause which would justify the reinstatement of petitioner's appeal. Respondent Court
of Appeals did not them commit any grave abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioner's motion to reinstate its appeal.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the temporary restraining
order issued in this case is lifted.
Costs against petitioner.
IT SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Romero, JJ., concur.
RATIO:
Petitioner’s counsel was the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES and not merely
Atty. Crispin Baizas. Hence, the death of the latter did not extinguish the lawyer-client
relationship between said firm and petitioner. With Baizas’ death, the responsibility of Atty.
Alberto and his Associates to the petitioner as counsel remained until withdrawal by the former
of their appearance in the manner provided by the Rules of Court. This is so because it was
the law firm which handled the case for petitioner before both the trial and appellate courts.
That Atty. Espiritu, an associate who was designated to handle the case, later left the office
after the death of Atty. Baizas is of no moment since others in the firm could have replaced
him. Upon receipt of the notice to file Brief, the law firm should have re-assigned the case to
another associate or, it could have withdrawn as counsel in the manner provided by the Rules
of Court so that the petitioner could contract the services of a new lawyer.
Moreover, petitioner itself was guilty of negligence when it failed to make inquiries from
counsel regarding its case. As pointed out by respondents, the president of petitioner
corporation claims to be the intimate friend of Atty. Crispin Baizas; hence, the death of the
latter must have been known to the former. This fact should have made petitioner more
vigilant with respect to the case at bar. Petitioner failed to act with prudence and diligence,
thus, its plea that they were not accorded the right to procedural due process cannot elicit
either approval or sympathy.