July 1, 2015 G.R. No.
200558 property was properly transferred to Conrado under TCT
CONSUELO V. PANGASINAN and ANNABELLA V.
BORROMEO, Petitioners,
vs.
CRISTINA DISONGLOALMAZORA, RENILDA
ALMAZORA-CASUBUAN, RODOLFO CASUBUAN,
SUSANA ALMAZORAMENDIOLA, CARLOS
MENDIOLA, CECILIO ALMAZORA and NENITA
ALMAZORA, Respondents.
DECISION MENDOZA, J.:
The present case demonstrates the legal principle that the
law aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.
Vigilantibus, sed non dormientibus Jura subverniunt.
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse
and set aside the July 28, 2011 Decision1 and the February
3, 2012 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R.
CV 84529, which affirmed the June 29, 2004 Decision3 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 259, Parañaque City
(RTC) in Civil Case No. 96-0206, a case for damages.
The Facts
The subject property is a parcel of land with an area of 572
square meters located in Brgy. Sto. Domingo, Biñan,
Laguna. It was registered in the name of Aquilina Martinez
(Aquilina) under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
18729 by the Register of Deeds of Laguna on July 29, 1939.4
After the liberation of Manila from the Japanese military
occupation in 1945, Aquilina and her maternal
grandmother, Leoncia Almendral (Leoncia), learned that
their house on Zabala Street, Tondo, Manila, was ruined by
the war. To rebuild their house, they borrowed money from
their relative, Conrado Almazora (Conrado). Thus, their
house was reconstructed. In return, Leoncia entrusted to
Contrado the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. T-18729
covering the subject property in Biñan, Laguna.
Consequently, Conrado and his family remained in the said
property.
Following the death of Aquilina on July 19, 1949, the title of
the subject property was transferred to Aurora Morales-
Vivar (Aurora), as her sole heir. Accordingly, TCT No. T-
35280 was issued in the name of Aurora5 after TCT No. T-
18729 was cancelled. On February 7, 1972, Conrado passed
away.
Sometime in 1994, Aurora learned from Cristina Almazora
(Cristina), the widowed spouse of Conrado, that the title of
the subject property had long been transferred in the name
of Conrado and that the subject property had been sold to
Fullway Development Corporation (Fullway) by the heirs of
Conrado in consideration of P4,000,000.00.6
Aurora was shocked to learn that the subject property was
already transferred to Conrado and sold for a meager
amount. On October 30, 1995, she sent a letter to the heirs
of Conrado demanding the delivery of the payment they
received for the sale of the subject property; but it was
unheeded.
On May 9, 1996, Aurora together with her husband, Arturo,
filed a complaint for damages7 against Cristina and the
other heirs of Conrado (respondents) before the RTC. They
contended that the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. T-
18729 was only given to Conrado for safekeeping. The
complaint, however, admitted that the family of Conrado
had been staying on, and using, the subject property since
1912 with the permission and generosity of Aquilina and
Leoncia.8
Aurora asserted that, through the years, she repeatedly
asked Conrado to return the owner’s copy of the title but the
latter procrastinated, giving all kinds of excuses, until he
died in 1972; that thereafter, Aurora asked Cristina for the
copy of the title but the latter also ignored her request; that
the subsequent sale of the subject property to Fullway was
without Aurora’s authorization, and, thus, the payment
received by respondents for the sale of the subject property
should be turned over to her; and that she prayed for moral
and exemplary damages.9
On June 24, 1996, respondents filed their answer with
compulsory counterclaim. They countered that the subject
No. 35282, and, thereafter, in the names of the heirs of
Conrado under TCT No. T-114352. Respondents averred
that the imputation of fraud on the part of Conrado in the
registration of the subject property was baseless and this
assertion of fraud was not transmissible from Conrado to his
heirs, who merely acquired the property through
succession.10
Respondents raised some special and affirmatives defenses,
among others, that the complaint stated no cause of action
and was barred by prescription. A preliminary hearing for
the said defenses was set by the RTC.11 In the Order,12
dated May 27, 1999, the RTC ruled that the complaint
stated a cause of action.
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari 13 to assail the
said interlocutory order of the RTC before the CA. In its
Decision,14 dated February 24, 1999, the CA denied the
same and held that the complaint stated a cause of action,
which was an action for damages arising from fraud
committed by Conrado, as trustee, against Aurora, as cestui
que trust. The CA further held that the complaint, on its
face, did not show that the action had prescribed.
Meanwhile, the RTC continued the proceedings and set the
case for trial on the merits. After the parties adduced their
respective pieces of evidence, the RTC required them to
submit their memoranda. Only respondents filed a
memorandum.15
The RTC Ruling
In its Decision, dated June 29, 2004, the RTC dismissed the
complaint. The trial court held that, after a thorough
evaluation of the records, Aurora miserably failed to prove
her right to the subject property. It explained that even if
Aurora had a claim on the subject property, she was guilty
of laches. For many years, Aurora slept on her right over the
questioned property and failed to exhaust all means, legal or
administrative, to retrieve what was rightfully hers at the
earliest possible time.
The RTC determined that Conrado was able to transfer the
title of the subject property in his name on June 17, 1965 by
virtue of a document denominated as "Adjudication and
Absolute Sale of a Parcel of Registered Land,"16 dated
January 9, 1949, signed by Aurora and her husband. The
signatures of Aurora and her husband, affixed on the deed
of sale, were not properly controverted by her. The trial
court found that her allegations of repeated pleas to
Conrado to return the copy of the title deserved scant
consideration. It concluded that Aurora was not entitled to
damages because there were no clear and cogent grounds to
award the same. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, plaintiffs having failed
to prove its case for damages, the same is hereby ordered
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.17
Aggrieved, Aurora appealed to the CA. On June 4, 2009, the
children of Aurora, namely, Consuelo V. Pangasinan, Lucio
M. Vivar and Annabella V. Borromeo (petitioners), filed a
motion for substitution of party18 after her death on March
26, 2008. In its Resolution,19 dated July 15, 2010, the CA
granted the motion.
The CA Ruling
In the assailed Decision, dated July 28, 2011, the CA denied
the appeal of petitioners. It held that it took Aurora more
than 50 years to act on Conrado’s withholding of the title
covering the subject property. As early as 1945, the title was
already in the possession of Conrado. The CA ruled that
petitioners were barred by laches as Aurora should have
been impervious in asserting her ownership and made
judicial demands to return the title and the property.
The appellate court added that even on the aspect of
prescription of actions, the case would not prosper either. It
explained that the prescriptive period to recover property
obtained through fraud or mistake giving rise to an implied
trust under Article 1456 of the Civil Code was 10 years,
pursuant to Article 1144. This 10-year prescriptive period
began from the time the land was registered on June 17,
1965. Accordingly, Aurora had only until June 17, 1975
within which to file her action. Evidently, the suit was
commenced only on May 12, 1996, beyond its prescription
period. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
DENIED and the Decision dated June 29, 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 259 in Civil
Case No. 96-0206 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.20
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but their motion was
denied by the CA in the assailed Resolution, dated February
3, 2012.
Hence, this petition, raising the following
ISSUES
I THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE LOWER
COURT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FOR
DAMAGES FILED BY AURORA MORALESVIVAR,
WHICH DECISIONS ARE ALL CONTRARY TO LAW;
II THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE ACQUISITION
OF CONRADO ALMAZORA, RESPONDENTS’
PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST, OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY, IS INVALID AND PRODUCED NO
EFFECT WHATSOEVER BECAUSE NOT ALL THE
ELEMENTS OF LACHES, AS TO DEPRIVE AURORA
MORALES-VIVAR OF HER OWNERSHIP, ARE
PRESENT IN THE CASE AT BAR.21
Petitioners assert that they are not guilty of laches. When
Aurora was told that the subject property was already in the
name of Conrado in April 1994, she immediately filed a
complaint for damages on May 2, 1996. Petitioners also
claim that prescription is not a valid defense to defeat the
title of Aurora. Section 47 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1529 states that no title to registered land in derogation of
the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession.
On September 24, 2012, respondents filed their Comment,22
arguing that petitioners’ assertions were tenuous. Aurora
slept on her rights for more than 50 years, impervious in
asserting her ownership of the subject property, thereby
losing the same by laches.
On December 11, 2012, petitioners filed their Reply,23
claiming that the CA observed that respondents might have
manipulated the said title to their benefit and advantage.
Respondents’ hands were unclean because of their bad faith
and misrepresentation.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
The petition raises
questions of fact
As a general rule, the Court’s jurisdiction in a Rule 45
petition is limited to the review of pure questions of law. A
question of law arises when the doubt or difference exists as
to what the law is on a certain state of facts. Negatively put,
Rule 45 does not allow the review of questions of fact. A
question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as
to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.24
Petitioners challenge the findings of laches, prescription and
lack of bad faith by the CA. To answer these questions, the
Court must review the records to determine whether the
lower courts properly appreciated the evidence in concluding
its findings. Clearly, the questions raised are factual. On
this ground alone, the present petition under Rule 45 is
dismissible. In the interest of substantial justice, however,
the Court deems it proper to reevaluate the records.
Petitioners are barred by
laches
Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it
or declined to assert it.25
The principle of laches is a creation of equity which, as such,
is applied not really to penalize neglect or sleeping upon
one's right, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to
do so would result in a clearly inequitable situation.26 The
time-honored rule anchored on public policy is that relief
will be denied to a litigant whose claim or demand has
become "stale," or who has acquiesced for an unreasonable
length of time, or who has not been vigilant or who has slept
on his rights either by negligence, folly or inattention. In
other words, public policy requires, for peace of society, the
discouragement of claims grown stale for non-assertion;
thus laches is an impediment to the assertion or
enforcement of a right which has become, under the
circumstances, inequitable or unfair to permit.27
The four (4) elements of laches, as first prescribed by this
Court in Go Chi Gun v. Co Cho28 are as follows:
(1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under
whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which
complaint is made for which the complaint seeks a remedy;
(2) delay in asserting the complainant’s rights, the
complainant having had knowledge or notice, of the
defendant’s conduct and having been afforded an
opportunity to institute a suit;
(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant
that the complainant would assert the right on which he
bases his suit; and
(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is
accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be
barred.29
In the case at bench, the CA correctly held that all the
elements of laches were present. First, Aurora and her
family entrusted to Conrado the owner’s duplicate of the
certificate of title of the subject property in 1945. In their
complaint, petitioners even admitted that Conrado’s family
had been staying in the subject property since 1912.30
Second, it took five decades, from 1945 to 1996, before
Aurora and petitioners decided to enforce their right
thereon. Third, respondents who lived all their lives in the
disputed property apparently were not aware that Aurora
would one day come out and claim ownership thereon.
Fourth, there was no question that respondents would be
prejudiced in the event that the suit would be allowed to
prosper.1avvphi1
The contention of petitioners that they were not in delay in
claiming their rights over the subject property is specious.
For 50 years, Aurora and her heirs did not take any legal
step to uphold their claim over the subject property, despite
being fully aware that Conrado and his family were
occupying the same for a very long time. Even petitioner
Consuelo Vivar- Pangasinan testified that Conrado had
been using the property for 30 years31 and that Aurora had
never shown her any evidence of ownership of the
property.32
In their complaint, Aurora claimed that she repeatedly
reminded Conrado to return the copy of the title. This,
however, is a self-serving allegation without any evidentiary
substantiation. The two belated demand letters, dated
October 30, 1995 and March 5, 1996, sent by Aurora’s
lawyer before the institution of the present action, are the
only tangible assertions of their claim to the property.33
Indeed, not a scintilla of proof was presented by Aurora and
her heirs to establish that, for 50 years, they actively
manifested to reclaim the title and possession of the subject
property.
A person, endowed with properties and entitlements, but
chose to lie quietly as decades passed by, watching his
property wither away, allowing innocent bystanders to pick
the fruits of his unguarded trees, instead of safeguarding his
rights through the accessibly and necessary legal means,
does not deserve the protection of equity. The law aids the
vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.
The action has prescribed
On the basis of prescription of actions, the pending petition convincing proof is more than mere preponderance, but not
must also be denied. Petitioners argue that prescription to extent of such certainty as is required beyond reasonable
shall not lie against their action because a registered land doubt as in criminal cases.47 The imputation of fraud in a
under Section 47 of P.D. No. 1529 cannot be acquired civil case requires the presentation of clear and convincing
through prescription.34 The argument is patently evidence. Mere allegations will not suffice to sustain the
erroneous. existence of fraud. The burden of evidence rests on the part
There are two kinds of prescription provided in the Civil of the plaintiff or the party alleging fraud.48
Code. One is acquisitive, that is, the acquisition of a right by Here, the Adjudication and Absolute Sale of a Parcel of
the lapse of time as expounded in paragraph 1, Article Registered Land, which was signed by Aurora and her
1106.35 Acquisitive prescription is also known as adverse husband, transferred the ownership of the subject property
possession and usucapcion. The other kind is extinctive from Aurora to Conrado. Petitioners, however, failed to
prescription whereby rights and actions are lost by the lapse assail the validity of such deed. As written by the RTC,
of time as defined in paragraph 2, Article 1106 and Article petitioners could have questioned the authenticity of the
1139.36 Another name for extinctive prescription is document and submitted the same to the National Bureau
litigation of action. These two kinds of prescription should of Investigation for comparison of the signatures. This, they
not be interchanged.37 failed to do.49
In a plethora of cases,38 the Court has held that Section 47 In fine, the Adjudication and Absolute Sale of a Parcel of
of P.D. No. 1529 covers acquisitive prescription. A registered Registered Land, being a notarized document, enjoys the
land therein can never be acquired by adverse possession. In presumption of regularity. Even assuming that Conrado
the case at bench, however, it was extinctive prescription, truly employed fraud, no proof was presented that
and not acquisitive prescription, which barred the action of respondents, as heirs of Conrado, were in privy and had
petitioners. As the CA correctly held, the action must fail, knowledge of the misrepresentations. In the absence of
not because respondents adversely occupied the property, evidence of fraud, the transfer to Conrado of the title of the
but because petitioners failed to institute their suit within subject property, and the subsequent transfer to
the prescriptive period under Article 1144 of the Civil Code. respondents by virtue of succession,50 must be upheld.
To determine the applicable period of extinctive Even on the subject of ownership, petitioners failed to
prescription, the nature and circumstances of the case substantiate their claim. Petitioners had nothing, other
should be considered. According to petitioners, the owner’s than their bare allegations, that they continuously owned
duplicate certificate of title was given to Conrado for the subject property. For decades, petitioners lacked the
safekeeping in 1945. Allegedly, Conrado employed fraud and possession and interest to 'recover the subject property. The
bad faith when he drafted the Adjudication and Absolute trial court even noted that petitioners could not present a
Sale of a Parcel of Registered Land39 on January 9, 1949, single tax declaration receipt as an indicia of their
and transferred the title of the land to his name with the ownership. Based on the foregoing, petitioners are certainly
issuance of TCT No. 3528240 on June 17, 1965; and because not entitled to damages on the basis of their misplaced
of the purported fraud committed by Conrado against claim of ownership over the subject property.
petitioners, an implied constructive trust was created by WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The July 28, 2011
operation of law, with Conrado as trustee and Aurora as Decision and the February 3, 2012 Resolution of the Court
cestui que trust. of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 122153 are AFFIRMED in
Constructive trusts are created by the construction of equity toto.
in order to satisfy the demands of justice and prevent unjust SO ORDERED.
enrichment.41 Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides that a
person acquiring property through fraud becomes, by
operation of law, a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit
of the real owner of the property.42 It is now well-settled
that the prescriptive period to recover property obtained by
fraud or mistake, giving rise to an implied trust under
Article 1456 of the Civil Code, is 10 years pursuant to
Article 1144.43 The prescriptive period to enforce the
constructive trust shall be counted from the alleged
fraudulent registration or date of issuance of the certificate
of title over the property.44 The ten-year prescriptive period
applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the
property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the
property.45
In this case, the ten-year prescriptive period is squarely
applicable because Conrado and his family, not petitioners,
were in possession of the property. The subject property was
registered in the name of Conrado on June 17, 1965, and
this should be the starting point of the ten-year period.
Petitioners, thus, had until June 17, 1975 to enforce the
implied trust and assert their claim over the land. As
properly held by the CA, petitioners belatedly instituted
their judicial claim over the land on May 9, 1996. Indeed,
with the lapse of the prescriptive period to file an action,
petitioners could no longer seek relief from the courts.
Fraud was not proven
Granting, for the sake of argument, that the present case
was not barred by laches and had not prescribed, it must
still fail on its merits. The basis of the action for damages of
petitioners would be the fraud, bad faith and
misrepresentation allegedly committed by Conrado in
transferring the title of the subject property to his name.
Petitioners, however, drastically failed to prove the fact of
fraud with clear and convincing evidence.
Fraud must be proven by clear and convincing evidence and
not merely by a preponderance thereof.46 Clear and
G.R. Nos. 170746-47, March 07, 2016
CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., CALTEX
PHILIPPINES PETROLEUM, CO., INC., CALTEX
SERVICES (PHILIPPINES), INC., CALTEX OCEANIC
LIMITED, CALTEX INVESTMENT AND TRADING
LIMITED, CALTEX PETROLEUM CORPORATION,
CALTRAPORT (FAR EAST) COMPANY, CALTEX
TRADING AND TRANSPORT CORPORATION,
CALTEX SERVICES CORPORATION, AMERICAN
OVERSEAS PETROLEUM LIMITED, P.T. CALTEX
PACIFIC INDONESIA, CALTEX PETROLEUM INC.,
CALTEX ASIA, LIMITED, CALIFORNIA TEXAS OIL
CORPORATION, CALTEX INTERNATIONAL
SERVICES LIMITED, CALTEX OIL CORPORATION,
CALTEX OIL CORPORATION (DELAWARE), CALTEX
OIL CORPORATION (NEW YORK), CALTEX OIL
PRODUCT COMPANY, CALTEX (OVERSEAS)
LIMITED, CALTEX INTERNATIONAL LIMITED,
CALTEX OIL CORP., Petitioners, v. MA. FLOR A.
SINGZON AGUIRRE, ERNEST SINGZON, CESAR
SINGZON AND ALL THE OTHER PLAINTIFFS-
INTERVENORS IN CIVIL CASES NOS. 91-59592,91-
59658, AND 92-61026 PENDING BEFORE THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 39,
Respondents.
DECISION REYES, J.:
Facts
Dubbed as the Asia's Titanic,1 the M/V Dona Paz was an
inter-island passenger vessel owned and operated by
Sulpicio Lines, Inc. (Sulpicio) traversing its Leyte to Manila
route on the night of December 20, 1987, when it collided
with M/T Vector, a commercial tanker owned and operated
by Vector Shipping Corporation, Inc., (Vector Shipping). On
that particular voyage, M/T Vector was chartered by Caltex
(Philippines) Inc., et al.2 (petitioners) to transport petroleum
products. The collision brought forth an inferno at sea with
an estimate of about 4,000 casualties, and was described as
the "world's worst peace time maritime disaster."3 It
precipitated the filing of numerous lawsuits, the instant
case included.
In December 1988, the heirs of the victims of the tragedy
(respondents), instituted a class action with the Civil
District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana,
United States of America (Louisiana Court), docketed as
Civil Case No. 88-24481 entitled "Sivirino Carreon, et al. v.
Caltex (Philippines), Inc., et al."4 On November 30, 2000, the
Louisiana Court entered a conditional judgment dismissing
the said case on the ground of forum non-conveniens.5 This
led the respondents, composed of 1,689 claimants, to file on
March 6, 2001 a civil action for damages for breach of
contract of carriage and quasi-delict with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 28 (RTC of
Catbalogan), against the herein petitioners, Sulpicio, Vector
Shipping, and Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association,
Bermuda Limited (Steamship). This was docketed as Civil
Case No. 7277 entitled "Ma. Flor Singzon-Aguirre, et al. v.
Sulpicio Lines, Inc., et al."6
In its Order7 dated March 28, 2001, the RTC of Catbalogan,
motu proprio dismissed the complaint pursuant to Section 1,
Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as the
respondents' cause of action had already prescribed. In an
unusual turn of events however, the petitioners as
defendants therein, who were not served with summons,
filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that they are
waiving their defense of prescription, among others. The
RTC of Catbalogan, however, merely noted the petitioners'
motion.8
The dismissal of the complaint prompted the respondents to
have the case reinstated with the Louisiana Court. The
petitioners, as defendants, however argued against it and
contended that the Philippines offered a more convenient
forum for the parties, specifically the RTC of Manila,
Branch 39 (RTC of Manila), where three consolidated cases9
concerning the M/V Dona Paz collision were pending.10
In its Judgment11 dated March 27, 2002, the Louisiana
Court once again conditionally dismissed the respondents'
action, ordering the latter to bring their claims to the RTC
of Manila by intervening in the consolidated cases filed
before the latter court. It was also stated in the judgment
that the Louisiana Court will allow the reinstatement of the
case if the Philippine court "is unable to assume jurisdiction
over the parties or does not recognize such cause of action or
any cause of action arising out of the same transaction or
occurrence."12
Following the Louisiana Court's order, the respondents filed
a motion for intervention on May 6, 2002, and a complaint
in intervention on May 13, 2002 with the pending
consolidated cases before the RTC of Manila. Also, co-
defendants in the consolidated cases, Sulpicio and
Steamship were furnished with a copy of the respondents'
motion to intervene.
In their Manifestation13 dated April 24, 2002, the
petitioners unconditionally waived the defense of
prescription of the respondents' cause of action. The
petitioners also reiterated a similar position in their
Comment/Consent to Intervention14 dated May 16, 2002.
Likewise, Sulpicio and Steamship filed their Manifestation
of No Objection dated May 30, 2002 and Manifestation
dated June 20, 2002 with the RTC of Manila, expressing
concurrence with the petitioners.15
On July 2, 2002, the RTC of Manila issued its Order16
denying the respondents' motion to intervene for lack of
merit. The RTC of Manila ruled that the RTC of Catbalogan
had already dismissed the case with finality; that a final
and executory prior judgment is a bar to the filing of the
complaint in intervention of the respondents; and that the
waivers of the defense of prescription made by the
petitioners, Sulpicio and Steamship are of no moment.17 The
motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners, Sulpicio
and Steamship was denied as well on August 30, 2002.18
On September 25, 2002, the petitioners instituted a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 72994. On November 12, 2002, Sulpicio and
Steamship also filed a separate petition docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 73793. These petitions were consolidated in an
order of the CA dated March 31, 2004.19
On April 27, 2005, the CA dismissed20 the consolidated
petitions in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the consolidated
petitions under consideration are hereby DISMISSED.
Accordingly, the assailed orders of the [RTC of Manila]
dated July 2, 2002 and August 30, 2002 are AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.21ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The CA concurred with the RTC of Manila that the finality
of the Order dated March 28, 2001 issued by the RTC of
Catbalogan has the effect of res judicata, which barred the
respondents' motion to intervene and complaint-in-
intervention with the RTC of Manila.22 The CA also
considered the filing of motion for reconsideration by the
petitioners before the RTC of Catbalogan as tantamount to
voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the said court
over their person.23 The CA rationalized that "[i]t is basic
that as long as the party is given the opportunity to defend
his interests in due course, he would have no reason to
complain, for it is this opportunity to be heard that makes
up the essence of due process."24
The motions for reconsideration having been denied by the
CA in its Order25 dated December 8, 2005, only the
petitioners elevated the matter before this Court by way of
petition for review on certiorari26 under Rule 45.
The Parties' Arguments

The petitioners contended that not all the elements of res
judicata are present in this case which would warrant its
application as the RTC of Catbalogan did not acquire
jurisdiction over their persons and that the judgment
therein is not one on the merits.27 It was also adduced that
only the respondents were heard in the RTC of Catbalogan
because when the petitioners filed their motion for
reconsideration, the order of dismissal was already final and
executory.28 The petitioners also bewailed that other
complaints were accepted by the RTC of Manila in the
consolidated cases despite prescription of the cause of
action29 and that the real issue of merit is whether the
defense of prescription that has matured can be waived.30
They explained that they were not able to file for the
annulment of judgment or order of the RTC of Catbalogan
since the respondents precluded them from seeking such
remedy by filing a motion for intervention in the
consolidated cases before the RTC of Manila.31
On the other side, the respondents maintained that the
waiver on prescription is not the issue but bar by prior
judgment is, because when they filed their motion for
intervention, the dismissal meted out by the RTC of
Catbalogan was already final.32 According to the
respondents, if the petitioners intended to have the
dismissal reversed, the latter should have appealed from the
order of the RTC of Catbalogan or filed a petition for
certiorari against the said order or an action to nullify the
same.33 The respondents also elucidated that they could not
have precluded the petitioners from assailing the RTC of
Catbalogan's orders because it was not until May 6, 2002
when the respondents filed a motion for intervention with
the consolidated cases before the RTC of Manila34 and only
in deference to the 2nd order of dismissal of the Louisiana
Court.35 Finally, for the respondents, the CA correctly held
that the petitioners cannot collaterally attack the final order
of the RTC of Catbalogan, the reason being that a situation
wherein there could be two conflicting rulings between two
co-equal courts must be avoided.36
Essentially, the issues can be summed up as follows:
I. WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN RULING THAT
THE ORDERS OF THE RTC OF CATBALOGAN
BARRED THE FILING OF THE MOTION AND
COMPLAINT FOR INTERVENTION BEFORE
THE RTC OF MANILA; and
II. WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THE RTC OF MANILA'S DISREGARD OF THE
PETITIONERS' WAIVER OF PRESCRIPTION ON
THE GROUND OF BAR BY PRIOR JUDGMENT.37
Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
The petitioners cannot be permitted to assert their right to
waive the defense of prescription when they had foregone
the same through their own omission, as will be discussed
below.
The Court shall first discuss the prescription of the
respondents' cause of action against the petitioners. Article
1106 of the Civil Code provides that "[b]y prescription, one
acquires ownership and other real rights through the lapse
of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down by
law. In the same way, rights and conditions are lost by
prescription." The first sentence refers to acquisitive
prescription, which is a mode of "acquisition of ownership
and other real rights through the lapse of time in the
manner and under the conditions provided by law." The
second sentence pertains to extinctive prescription "whereby
rights and actions are lost by the lapse of time."38 It is also
called limitation of action.39
This case involves the latter type of prescription, the
purpose of which is to protect the diligent and vigilant, not
the person who sleeps on his rights, forgetting them and
taking no trouble of exercising them one way or another to
show that he truly has such rights.40 The rationale behind
the prescription of actions is to suppress fraudulent and
stale claims from springing up at great distances of time
when all the proper vouchers and evidence are lost or the
facts have become obscure from the lapse of time or
defective memory or death or removal of witnesses.41
There is no dispute that the respondents' cause of action
against the petitioners has prescribed under the Civil
Code.42 In fact, the same is evident on the complaint itself.
The respondents brought their claim before a Philippine
court only on March 6, 2001, more than 13 years after the
collision occurred.43 Article 1139 of the Civil Code states
that actions prescribe by the mere lapse of time fixed by
law. Accordingly, the RTC of Catbalogan cannot be faulted
for the motu proprio dismissal of the complaint filed before
it. It is settled that prescription may be considered by the
courts motu proprio if the facts supporting the ground are
apparent from the pleadings or the evidence on record.44
The peculiarity in this case is that the petitioners, who were
the defendants in the antecedent cases before the RTCs of
Catbalogan and Manila, are most adamant in invoking their
waiver of the defense of prescription while the respondents,
to whom the cause of action belong, have acceded to the
dismissal of their complaint. The petitioners posit that there
is a conflict between a substantive law and procedural law
in as much as waiver of prescription is allowed under Article
1112 of the Civil Code, a substantive law even though the
motu proprio dismissal of a claim that has prescribed is
mandated under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.45
The Court has previously held that the right to prescription
may be waived or renounced pursuant to Article 1112 of the
Civil Code:46
Art. 1112. Persons with capacity to alienate property may
renounce prescription already obtained, but not the right to
prescribe in the future.
Prescription is deemed to have been tacitly renounced when
the renunciation results from acts which imply the
abandonment of the right acquired.
In the instant case, not only once did the petitioners
expressly renounce their defense of prescription.
Nonetheless, the Court cannot consider such waiver as basis
in order to reverse the rulings of the courts below as the
dismissal of the complaint had become final and binding on
both the petitioners and the respondents.
It is not contested that the petitioners were not served with
summons by the RTC of Catbalogan prior to the motu
proprio dismissal of the respondents' complaint. It is basic
that courts acquire jurisdiction over the persons of
defendants or respondents, by a valid service of summons or
through their voluntary submission.47 Not having been
served with summons, the petitioners were not initially
considered as under the jurisdiction of the court. However,
the petitioners voluntarily submitted themselves under the
jurisdiction of the RTC of Catbalogan by filing their motion
for reconsideration.
Section 20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Court states:
Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. - The defendant's voluntary
appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of
summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other
grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
In Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy
Hong Pi, et al.,48 the Court explained the following:
(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the
general rule on voluntary appearance;
(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court
over the person of the defendant must be explicitly made,
i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances where a
pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and
submitted to the court for resolution.49
Previous to the petitioners' filing of their motion for
reconsideration, the RTC of Catbalogan issued an Entry of
Final Judgment50 stating that its Order dated March 28,
2001 became final and executory on April 13, 2001. The
petitioners claimed that for this reason, they could not have
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the RTC of
Catbalogan by filing such a belated motion.51
But the petitioners cannot capitalize on the supposed
finality of the Order dated March 28, 2001 to repudiate
their submission to the jurisdiction of the RTC of
Catbalogan. It must be emphasized that before the filing of
their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners were not
under the RTC of Catbalogan's jurisdiction. Thus, although
the order was already final and executory with regard to the
respondents; it was not yet, on the part of the petitioners. As
opposed to the conclusion reached by the CA, the Order
dated March 28, 2001 cannot be considered as final and
executory with respect to the petitioners. It was only on July
2, 2001, when the petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration seeking to overturn the aforementioned
order, that they voluntarily submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the court. On September 4, 2001, the RTC of
Catbalogan noted the petitioners' motion for reconsideration
on the flawed impression that the defense of prescription
cannot be waived.52
Consequently, it was only after the petitioners' failure to
appeal or seek any other legal remedy to challenge the
subsequent Order dated September 4, 2001, that the
dismissal became final on their part. It was from the date of
the petitioners' receipt of this particular order that the
reglementary period under the Rules of Court to assail it
commenced to run for the petitioners. But neither the
petitioners nor the respondents resorted to any action to
overturn the orders of the RTC of Catbalogan, which
ultimately led to their finality. While the RTC of Catbalogan
merely noted the motion for reconsideration in its Order
dated September 4, 2001, the effect is the same as a denial
thereof, for the intended purpose of the motion, which is to
have the complaint reinstated, was not realized. This should
have prompted the petitioners to explore and pursue other
legal measures to have the dismissal reversed. Instead,
nothing more was heard from the parties until a motion for
intervention was filed by the respondents before the RTC of
Manila, in conformity with the order of the Louisiana Court.
As the CA espoused in its decision:
We concur with the observation of the [RTC of Manila] that
the petitioners' predicament was of their own making. The
petitioners should have exhausted the other available legal
remedies under the law after the [RTC of Catbalogan]
denied their motion for reconsideration. Under Section 9,
Rule 37 of the [Rules of Court], the remedy against an order
denying a motion for reconsideration is not to appeal the
said order of denial but to appeal from the judgment or final
order of the court. Moreover, the petitioners could have
availed of an action for annulment of judgment for the very
purpose of having the final and executory judgment be set
aside so that there will be a renewal of litigation. An action
for annulment of judgment is grounded only on two
justifications: (1) extrinsic fraud; and (2) lack of jurisdiction
or denial of due process. All that herein petitioners have to
prove was that the trial court had no jurisdiction; that they
were prevented from having a trial or presenting their case
to the trial court by some act or conduct of the private
respondents; or that they have been denied due process of
law. Seasonably, the petitioners could have also interposed
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules [of Court]
imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court judge in issuing the said order of dismissal. For
reasons undisclosed in the records, the petitioners did not
bother to mull over and consider the said legal avenues,
which they could have readily availed of during that time.53
The RTC of Manila denied the respondents' motion for
intervention on the ground of the finality of the order of the
RTC of Catbalogan, there being no appeal or any other legal
remedy perfected in due time by either the petitioners or the
respondents. Since the dismissal of the complaint was
already final and executory, the RTC of Manila can no
longer entertain a similar action from the same parties. The
bone of contention is not regarding the petitioners' execution
of waivers of the defense of prescription, but the effect of
finality of an order or judgment on both parties.
"Settled is the rule that a party is barred from assailing the
correctness of a judgment not appealed from by him"
because the "presumption [is] that a party who did not
interject an appeal is satisfied with the adjudication made
by the lower court."54 Whether the dismissal was based on
the merits or technicality is beside the point. "[A] dismissal
on a technicality is no different in effect and consequences
from a dismissal on the merits."55
The petitioners attempted to justify their failure to file an
action to have the orders of the RTC of Catbalogan annulled
by ratiocinating that the respondents precluded them from
doing so when the latter filed their complaint anew with the
RTC of Manila. This is untenable, as it is clear that the
respondents filed the said complaint-in-intervention with
the RTC of Manila more than a year after the case was
ordered dismissed by the RTC of Catbalogan.56 Aside from
this, the petitioners offered no other acceptable excuse on
why they did not raise their oppositions against the orders
of the RTC of Catbalogan when they had the opportunity to
do so. Thus, the only logical conclusion is that the
petitioners abandoned their right to waive the defense of
prescription.
Lastly, the Court takes judicial notice of its ruling in Vector
Shipping Corporation, et al. v. Macasa, et al.57 and Caltex
(Philippines) Inc., v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc.58 wherein the
petitioners, as a mere voyage charterer, were exonerated
from third party liability in the M/V Doña Paz collision.
Should this Court allow the reinstatement of the complaint
against the petitioners, let the trial proceedings take its
course, and decide the same on the merits in favor of the
respondents, then it would have led to the promulgation of
conflicting decisions. On the other hand, if this Court were
to decide this matter on the merits in favor of the
petitioners, then the same result would be obtained as with
a dismissal now.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 171514 July 18, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
DOMINGO ESPINOSA, Respondent.
DECISION REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari from the Decision1 dated
November 11, 2004 and Resolution2 dated February 13, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72456.
On March 3, 1999, respondent Domingo Espinosa (Espinosa) tiled with
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Consolacion, Cebu an application3
for land registration covering a parcel of land with an area of 5,525
square meters and situated in Barangay Cabangahan, Consolacion,
Cebu. In support of his application, which was docketed as LRC Case
No. N-81, Espinosa alleged that: (a) the property, which is more
particularly known as Lot No. 8499 of Cad. 545-D (New), is alienable
and disposable; (b) he purchased the property from his mother, Isabel
Espinosa (Isabel), on July 4, 1970 and the latter’s other heirs had
waived their rights thereto; and (c) he and his predecessor-in-interest
had been in possession of the property in the concept of an owner for
more than thirty (30) years.
Espinosa submitted the blueprint of Advanced Survey Plan 07-0008934
to prove the identity of the land. As proof that the property is alienable
and disposable, he marked as evidence the annotation on the advance
survey plan made by Cynthia L. Ibañez, Chief of the Map Projection
Section, stating that "CONFORMED PER L.C. MAP NOTATION L.C.
Map No. 2545 Project No. 28 certified on June 25, 1963, verified to be
within Alienable & Disposable Area".5 Espinosa also presented two (2)
tax declarations for the years 1965 and 1974 in Isabel’s name – Tax
Declaration Nos. 013516 and 06137 – to prove that she had been in
possession of the property since 1965. To support his claim that he had
been religiously paying the taxes due on the property, Espinosa
presented a Certification6 dated December 1, 1998 issued by the Office
of the Treasurer of Consolacion, Cebu and three (3) tax declarations for
the years 1978, 1980 and 1985 – Tax Declaration Nos. 14010, 17681 and
010717 .8
Petitioner opposed Espinosa’s application, claiming that: (a) Section
48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 otherwise known as the "Public
Land Act" (PLA) had not been complied with as Espinosa’s predecessor-
in-interest possessed the property only after June 12, 1945; and (b) the
tax declarations do not prove that his possession and that of his
predecessor-in-interest are in the character and for the length of time
required by law.
On August 18, 2000, the MTC rendered a Judgment9 granting
Espinosa’s petition for registration, the dispositive portion of which
states:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered ordering for the registration and the confirmation of title of
Espinosa over Lot No. 8499, Cad 545-D (New), situated at Barangay
Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu, Philippines, containing an area of
5,525 square meters and that upon the finality of this decision, let a
corresponding decree of registration be issued in favor of the herein
applicant in accordance with Section 39, P.D. 1529.
SO ORDERED.10
According to the MTC, Espinosa was able to prove that the property is
alienable and disposable and that he complied with the requirements of
Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. Specifically:
After a careful consideration of the evidence presented in the above-
entitled case, the Court is convinced, and so holds, that Espinosa was
able to establish his ownership and possession over the subject lot which
is within the area considered by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain.
The Court is likewise convinced that the applicant and that of
predecessor-in-interest have been in open, actual, public, continuous,
adverse and under claim of title thereto within the time prescribed by
law (Sec. 14, sub-par. 1, P.D. 1529) and/or in accordance with the Land
Registration Act.11
Petitioner appealed to the CA and pointed Espinosa’s failure to prove
that his possession and that of his predecessor-in-interest were for the
period required by law. As shown by Tax Declaration No. 013516,
Isabel’s possession commenced only in 1965 and not on June 12, 1945 or
earlier as required by Section 48(b) of the PLA. On the other hand,
Espinosa came into possession of the property only in 1970 following the
sale that transpired between him and his mother and the earliest tax
declaration in his name was for the year 1978. According to petitioner,
that Espinosa and his predecessor-in-interest were supposedly in
possession for more than thirty (30) years is inconsequential absent
proof that such possession began on June 12, 1945 or earlier.12
Petitioner also claimed that Espinosa’s failure to present the original
tracing cloth of the survey plan or a sepia copy thereof is fatal to his
application. Citing Del Rosario v. Republic of the Philippines13 and
Director of Lands v. Judge Reyes,14 petitioner argued that the
submission of the original tracing cloth is mandatory in establishing the
identity of the land subject of the application.15
Further, petitioner claimed that the annotation on the advance survey
plan is not the evidence admissible to prove that the subject land is
alienable and disposable.16
By way of the assailed decision, the CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal
and affirmed the MTC Decision dated August 18, 2000. The CA ruled
that possession for at least thirty (30) years, despite the fact that it
commenced after June 12, 1945, sufficed to convert the property to
private. Thus:
The contention of petitioner is not meritorious on the following grounds:
a) The record of the case will show that Espinosa has successfully
established valid title over the subject land and that he and his
predecessor-in-interest have been in continuous, adverse, public and
undisturbed possession of said land in the concept of an owner for more
than 30 years before the filing of the application. Established
jurisprudence has consistently pronounced that "open, continuous and
exclusive possession for at least 30 years of alienable public land ipso
jure converts the same into private property (Director of Lands vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 214 SCRA 604). This means that
occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years by applicant and his
predecessor-in-interest vests title on such applicant so as to segregate
the land from the mass of public land (National Power Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals, 218 SCRA 41); and
b) It is true that the requirement of possession since June 12, 1945 is
the latest amendment of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act (C.A. No.
141), but a strict implementation of the law would in certain cases result
in inequity and unfairness to Espinosa. As wisely stated by the Supreme
Court in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 567:
"Following the logic of the petitioner, any transferee is thus foreclosed to
apply for registration of title over a parcel of land notwithstanding the
fact that the transferor, or his predecessor-in-interest has been in open,
notorious and exclusive possession thereof for thirty (30) years or
more."17
The CA also ruled that registration can be based on other documentary
evidence, not necessarily the original tracing cloth plan, as the identity
and location of the property can be established by other competent
evidence.
Again, the aforesaid contention of [the petitioner] is without merit.
While the best evidence to identify a piece of land for registration
purposes may be the original tracing cloth plan from the Land
Registration Commission, the court may sufficiently order the issuance
of a decree of registration on the basis of the blue print copies and other
evidence (Republic of the Philippines vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
G.R. No. L-70594, October 10, 1986). The said case provides further:
"The fact that the lower court finds the evidence of the applicant
sufficient to justify the registration and confirmation of her titles and
did not find it necessary to avail of the original tracing cloth plan from
the Land Registration Commission for purposes of comparison, should
not militate against the rights of the applicant. Such is especially true in
this case where no clear, strong, convincing and more preponderant
proof has been shown by the oppositor to overcome the correctness of
said plans which were found both by the lower court and the Court of
Appeals as conclusive proofs of the description and identities of the
parcels of land contained therein."
There is no dispute that, in case of Del Rosario vs. Republic, supra¸ the
Supreme Court pronounced that the submission in evidence of the
original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands, in
cases for application of original registration of land is a mandatory
requirement, and that failure to comply with such requirement is fatal
to one’s application for registration. However, such pronouncement need
not be taken as an iron clad rule nor to be applied strictly in all cases
without due regard to the rationale behind the submission of the tracing
cloth plan.
x x x:
xxxx
As long as the identity of and location of the lot can be established by
other competent evidence like a duly approved blueprint copy of the
advance survey plan of Lot 8499 and technical description of Lot 8499,
containing and identifying the boundaries, actual area and location of
the lot, the presentation of the original tracing cloth plan may be
excused.18
Moreover, the CA ruled that Espinosa had duly proven that the property
is alienable and disposable:
Espinosa has established that Lot 8499 is alienable and disposable. In
the duly approved Advance Survey Plan As-07-0000893 (sic) duly
approved by the Land Management Services, DENR, Region 7, Cebu
City, it is certified/verified that the subject lot is inside the alienable and
disposable area of the disposable and alienable land of the public
domain.19
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the CA in
its Resolution20 dated February 13, 2006.
Petitioner’s Case
Petitioner entreats this Court to reverse and set aside the CA’s assailed
decision and attributes the following errors: (a) Espinosa failed to prove
by competent evidence that the subject property is alienable and
disposable; (b) jurisprudence dictates that a survey plan identifies the
property in preparation for a judicial proceeding but does not convert
the property into alienable, much less, private; (c) under Section 17 of
P.D. No. 1529, the submission of the original tracing cloth plan is
mandatory to determine the exact metes and bounds of the property;
and (d) a blueprint copy of the survey plan may be admitted as evidence
of the identity and location of the property only if it bears the approval
of the Director of Lands.
Issues
The resolution of the primordial question of whether Espinosa has
acquired an imperfect title over the subject property that is worthy of
confirmation and registration is hinged on the determination of the
following issues:
a. whether the blueprint of the advanced survey plan substantially
complies with Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529; and
b. whether the notation on the blueprint copy of the plan made by the
geodetic engineer who conducted the survey sufficed to prove that the
land applied for is alienable and disposable.
Our Ruling
The lower courts were unanimous in holding that Espinosa’s application
is anchored on Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 in relation to Section 48(b)
of the PLA and the grant thereof is warranted in view of evidence
supposedly showing his compliance with the requirements thereof.
This Court is of a different view.
Based on Espinosa’s allegations and his supporting documents, it is
patent that his claim of an imperfect title over the property in question
is based on Section 14(2) and not Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 in
relation to Section 48(b) of the PLA. Espinosa did not allege that his
possession and that of his predecessor-in-interest commenced on June
12, 1945 or earlier as prescribed under the two (2) latter provisions. On
the contrary, Espinosa repeatedly alleged that he acquired title thru his
possession and that of his predecessor-in-interest, Isabel, of the subject
property for thirty (30) years, or through prescription. Therefore, the
rule that should have been applied is Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529,
which states:
Sec. 14. Who may apply. – The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
xxxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription
under the provision of existing laws.
Obviously, the confusion that attended the lower courts’ disposition of
this case stemmed from their failure to apprise themselves of the
changes that Section 48(b) of the PLA underwent over the years. Section
48(b) of the PLA originally states:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership, except as against the
Government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four,
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to
a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter.
Thus, the required possession and occupation for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title was since July 26, 1894 or earlier.
On June 22, 1957, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1942 amended Section 48(b)
of the PLA by providing a thirty (30)-year prescriptive period for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. Thus:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to
a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter.
On January 25, 1977, P.D. No. 1073 was issued, changing the
requirement for possession and occupation for a period of thirty (30)
years to possession and occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1073 states:
Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of
the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these
provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his
predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945.
On June 11, 1978, P.D. No. 1529 was enacted. Notably, the requirement
for possession and occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier was adopted
under Section 14(1) thereof.
P.D. No. 1073, in effect, repealed R.A. No. 1942 such that applications
under Section 48(b) of the PLA filed after the promulgation of P.D. No.
1073 should allege and prove possession and occupation that dated back
to June 12, 1945 or earlier. However, vested rights may have been
acquired under Section 48(b) prior to its amendment by P.D. No. 1073.
That is, should petitions for registration filed by those who had already
been in possession of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain for thirty (30) years at the time P.D. No. 1073 was promulgated
be denied because their possession commenced after June 12, 1945? In
Abejaron v. Nabasa,21 this Court resolved this legal predicament as
follows:
However, as petitioner Abejaron’s 30-year period of possession and
occupation required by the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. 1942
ran from 1945 to 1975, prior to the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073 in 1977,
the requirement of said P.D. that occupation and possession should have
started on June 12, 1945 or earlier, does not apply to him. As the Susi
doctrine holds that the grant of title by virtue of Sec. 48(b) takes place
by operation of law, then upon Abejaron’s satisfaction of the
requirements of this law, he would have already gained title over the
disputed land in 1975. This follows the doctrine laid down in Director of
Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., that the law cannot
impair vested rights such as a land grant. More clearly stated, "Filipino
citizens who by themselves or their predecessors-in-interest have been,
prior to the effectivity of P.D. 1073 on January 25, 1977, in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since January
24, 1947" may apply for judicial confirmation of their imperfect or
incomplete title under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act.22 (Citations
omitted)
Consequently, for one to invoke Section 48(b) and claim an imperfect
title over an alienable and disposable land of the public domain on the
basis of a thirty (30)-year possession and occupation, it must be
demonstrated that such possession and occupation commenced on
January 24, 1947 and the thirty (30)-year period was completed prior to
the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073.
There is nothing in Section 48(b) that would suggest that it provides for
two (2) modes of acquisition. It is not the case that there is an option
between possession and occupation for thirty (30) years and possession
and occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier. It is neither contemplated
under Section 48(b) that if possession and occupation of an alienable and
disposable public land started after June 12, 1945, it is still possible to
acquire an imperfect title if such possession and occupation spanned for
thirty (30) years at the time of the filing of the application.
In this case, the lower courts concluded that Espinosa complied with the
requirements of Section 48(b) of the PLA in relation to Section 14(1) of
P.D. No. 1529 based on supposed evidence that he and his predecessor-
in-interest had been in possession of the property for at least thirty (30)
years prior to the time he filed his application. However, there is
nothing on record showing that as of January 25, 1977 or prior to the
effectivity of P.D. No. 1073, he or Isabel had already acquired title by
means of possession and occupation of the property for thirty (30) years.
On the contrary, the earliest tax declaration in Isabel’s name was for the
year 1965 indicating that as of January 25, 1977, only twelve (12) years
had lapsed from the time she first came supposedly into possession.
The CA’s reliance on Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate
Court23 is misplaced considering that the application therein was filed
on October 20, 1975 or before the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073. The same
can be said with respect to National Power Corporation v. Court of
Appeals.24 The petition for registration therein was filed on August 21,
1968 and at that time, the prevailing rule was that provided under
Section 48(b) as amended by R.A. No. 1942.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,25 the applicants therein entered into
possession of the property on June 17, 1978 and filed their application
on February 5, 1987. Nonetheless, there is evidence that the individuals
from whom the applicant purchased the property, or their predecessors-
in-interest, had been in possession since 1937. Thus, during the
effectivity of Section 48(b) as amended by R.A. No. 1942, or while the
prevailing rule was possession and occupation for thirty (30) years, or
prior to the issuance of P.D. No. 1073, the thirty (30)-year prescriptive
period was already completed.
Thus, assuming that it is Section 48(b) of the PLA in relation to Section
14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 that should apply in this case, as the lower courts
held, it was incumbent upon Espinosa to prove, among other things,
that Isabel’s possession of the property dated back at least to June 12,
1945. That in view of the established fact that Isabel’s alleged
possession and occupation started much later, the lower courts should
have dismissed Espinosa’s application outright.
In sum, the CA, as well as the MTC, erred in not applying the present
text of Section 48(b) of the PLA. That there were instances wherein
applications were granted on the basis of possession and occupation for
thirty (30) years was for the sole reason discussed above. Regrettably,
such reason does not obtain in this case.
Being clear that it is Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 that should apply, it
follows that the subject property being supposedly alienable and
disposable will not suffice. As Section 14(2) categorically provides, only
private properties may be acquired thru prescription and under Articles
420 and 421 of the Civil Code, only those properties, which are not for
public use, public service or intended for the development of national
wealth, are considered private. In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v.
Republic,26 this Court held that there must be an official declaration to
that effect before the property may be rendered susceptible to
prescription:
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "property of public
dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service,
shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State." It is this
provision that controls how public dominion property may be converted
into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription.
After all, Article 420(2) makes clear that those property "which belong to
the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth" are public
dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the State,
although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains
property of the public dominion if when it is "intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth." (Emphasis
supplied)
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the
public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the
property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property
of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of
acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and
disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer
intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth
that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such
declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly
authorized by law.27
Thus, granting that Isabel and, later, Espinosa possessed and occupied
the property for an aggregate period of thirty (30) years, this does not
operate to divest the State of its ownership. The property, albeit
allegedly alienable and disposable, is not patrimonial. As the property is
not held by the State in its private capacity, acquisition of title thereto
necessitates observance of the provisions of Section 48(b) of the PLA in
relation to Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 or possession and occupation
since June 12, 1945. For prescription to run against the State, there
must be proof that there was an official declaration that the subject
property is no longer earmarked for public service or the development of
national wealth. Moreover, such official declaration should have been
issued at least ten (10) or thirty (30) years, as the case may be, prior to
the filing of the application for registration. The period of possession and
occupation prior to the conversion of the property to private or
patrimonial shall not be considered in determining completion of the
prescriptive period. Indeed, while a piece of land is still reserved for
public service or the development of national wealth, even if the same is
alienable and disposable, possession and occupation no matter how
lengthy will not ripen to ownership or give rise to any title that would
defeat that of the State’s if such did not commence on June 12, 1945 or
earlier.
At any rate, as petitioner correctly pointed out, the notation on the
survey plan does not constitute incontrovertible evidence that would
overcome the presumption that the property belongs to the inalienable
public domain.
All lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of
any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to
be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released
as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the
State, remain part of the inalienable public domain. The burden of proof
in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the
public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming
ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or
claim) is alienable or disposable.28
In Republic v. Sarmiento,29 this Court reiterated the earlier ruling in
Menguito v. Republic30 that the notation made by a surveyor-geodetic
engineer that the property surveyed is alienable and disposable is not
the positive government act that would remove the property from the
inalienable domain. Neither it is the evidence accepted as sufficient to
controvert the presumption that the property is inalienable:
To discharge the onus, respondent relies on the blue print copy of the
conversion and subdivision plan approved by the DENR Center which
bears the notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer that "this survey is
inside the alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No.
2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry."
Menguito v. Republic teaches, however, that reliance on such a notation
to prove that the lot is alienable is insufficient and does not constitute
incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that it remains
part of the inalienable public domain.
"To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, petitioners relied on the printed
words which read: "This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable
Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the
Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968," appearing on Exhibit "E"
(Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, provides: "All lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State. . . ."
For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this
case) must overcome the presumption that the land sought to be
registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is shown
to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it
remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation
thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such
evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable.
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor geodetic engineer’s
notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that the survey was inside alienable
and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive
government act validly changing the classification of the land in
question.
Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public
domain. By relying solely on the said surveyor’s assertion, petitioners
have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared
alienable."31 (Citations omitted and underscoring supplied)
Therefore, even if Espinosa’s application may not be dismissed due to
his failure to present the original tracing cloth of the survey plan, there
are numerous grounds for its denial. The blueprint copy of the advanced
survey plan may be admitted as evidence of the identity and location of
the subject property if: (a) it was duly executed by a licensed geodetic
engineer; (b) it proceeded officially from the Land Management Services
(LMS) of the DENR; and (c) it is accompanied by a technical description
of the property which is certified as correct by the geodetic surveyor who
conducted the survey and the LMS of the DENR. As ruled in Republic v.
Guinto-Aldana,32 the identity of the land, its boundaries and location
can be established by other competent evidence apart from the original
tracing cloth such as a duly executed blueprint of the survey plan and
technical description:
Yet if the reason for requiring an applicant to adduce in evidence the
original tracing cloth plan is merely to provide a convenient and
necessary means to afford certainty as to the exact identity of the
property applied for registration and to ensure that the same does not
overlap with the boundaries of the adjoining lots, there stands to be no
reason why a registration application must be denied for failure to
present the original tracing cloth plan, especially where it is
accompanied by pieces of evidence—such as a duly executed blueprint of
the survey plan and a duly executed technical description of the
property—which may likewise substantially and with as much certainty
prove the limits and extent of the property sought to be registered.33
However, while such blueprint copy of the survey plan may be offered as
evidence of the identity, location and the boundaries of the property
applied for, the notation therein may not be admitted as evidence of
alienability and disposability. In Republic v. Heirs of Juan Fabio,34 this
Court enumerated the documents that are deemed relevant and
sufficient to prove that the property is already outside the inalienable
public domain as follows:
In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., we ruled that it is not enough for
the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) or
CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant
for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved
the land classification and released the land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for
registration falls within the approved area per verification through
survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant must
present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable and
disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary, or as proclaimed by the
President. Such copy of the DENR Secretary’s declaration or the
President’s proclamation must be certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of such official record.1âwphi1 These facts must be
established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.35
(Citation omitted)
Based on the foregoing, it appears that Espinosa cannot avail the
benefits of either Section 14(1) of P.O. No. 1529 in relation to Section
48(b) of the PLA or Section 14(2) of P.O. No. 1529. Applying Section
14(1) of P.O. No. 1529 and Section 48(b) of the PLA, albeit improper,
Espinosa failed to prove that: (a) Isabel's possession of the property
dated back to June 12, 1945 or earlier; and (b) the property is alienable
and disposable. On the other hand, applying Section 14(2) of P.O. No.
1529, Espinosa failed to prove that the property is patrimonial. As to
whether Espinosa was able to prove that his possession and occupation
and that of Isabel were of the character prescribed by law, the resolution
of this issue has been rendered unnecessary by the foregoing
considerations.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GIVEN DUE
COURSE and GRANTED. The Decision dated November 11, 2004 and
Resolution dated February 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 72456 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and Domingo Espinosa's
application for registration of title over Lot No. 8499 of Cad. 545-D
(New) located at Barangay Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 193618, November 28, 2016
HEIRS OF LEOPOLDO DELFIN AND SOLEDAD DELFIN,
NAMELY EMELITA D. FABRIGAR AND LEONILO C. DELFIN,
Petitioners, v. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Under Commonwealth Act No. 141, a claimant may acquire alienable
and disposable public land upon evidence of exclusive and notorious
possession of the land since June 12, 1945. The period to acquire public
land by acquisitive prescription under Presidential Decree No. 1529
begins to run only after the promulgation of a law or a proclamation by
the President stating that the land is no longer intended for public use
or the development of national wealth.
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure praying that the assailed February 26,
2010 Decision2 and July 2, 2010 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 80017 be reversed, and that the May 20, 2002 Decision4
of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. II-1801 be reinstated.
The Regional Trial Court's May 20, 2002 Decision awarded
compensation to Leopoldo and Soledad Delfin (Delfin Spouses) for an
Iligan City property subsequently occupied by respondent National
Housing Authority.
The assailed Court of Appeals Decision reversed the Regional Trial
Court's May 20, 2002 Decision and dismissed the Delfin Spouses'
complaint seeking compensation. The assailed Court of Appeals
Resolution denied their Motion for Reconsideration.
In a Complaint for "Payment of Parcel(s) of Land and Improvements and
Damages"5 the Delfin Spouses claimed that they were the owners of a
28,800 square meter parcel of land in Townsite, Suarez, Iligan City (the
"Iligan Property").6 They allegedly bought the property in 1951 from
Felix Natingo and Carlos Carbonay, who, allegedly, had been in actual
possession of the property since time immemorial.7 The Delfin Spouses
had been declaring the Iligan Property in their names for tax purposes
since 1952,8 and had been planting it with mangoes, coconuts, corn,
seasonal crops, and vegetables.9
They farther alleged that, sometime in 1982, respondent National
Housing Authority forcibly took possession of a 10,798 square meter
portion of the property.10 Despite their repeated demands for
compensation, the National Housing Authority failed to pay the value of
the property.11 The Delfin Spouses thus, filed their Complaint.12
They asserted that the property's reasonable market value was not less
than P40 per square meter13 and that its improvements consisting of
fruit-bearing trees should be valued at P13,360.00 at the time of
taking.14 They similarly claimed that because the National Housing
Authority occupied the property, they were deprived of an average net
yearly income of P10,000.00.15
In its Answer,16 the National Housing Authority alleged that the Delfin
Spouses' property was part of a military reservation area. 17 It cited
Proclamation No. 2151 (actually, Proclamation No. 2143, the National
Housing Authority made an erroneous citation) as having supposedly
reserved the area in which property is situated for Iligan City's slum
improvement and resettlement program, and the relocation of families
who were dislocated by the National Steel Corporation's five-year
expansion program.18
According to the National Housing Authority, Proclamation No. 2151
also mandated it to determine the improvements' valuation.19 Based on
the study of the committee it created, the value of the property was
supposedly only P4.00 per square meter, regardless of the nature of the
improvements on it.20
It emphasized that among all claimants, only the Delfin Spouses and
two others remained unpaid because of their disagreement on the
property's valuation.21
The National Housing Authority failed to appear during the pre-trial
conference.22 Upon the Delfin Spouses' motion, the Regional Trial Court
declared the National Housing Authority in default.23 The case was set
for the ex-parte reception of the Delfin Spouses' evidence.24
On May 20, 2002, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision in favor
of the Delfin Spouses.25cralawred The dispositive portion of the Decision
read:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and by virtue of the existence of
preponderance of evidence, the Court hereby enters a judgment in favor
of spouses-plaintiffs Leopoldo Delfin and Soledad Delfin against
defendant National Housing Authority, its agents or representative/s
ordering to pay the former the following, to wit:
1) P400,000.00 representing the reasonable market value of a
portion of the land taken by the defendant containing an area
of 10,000 square meters at the rate of P40.00 per square
meters plus legal interest per annum from the filing in Court
of the complaint until fully paid;
2) P13,360.00 representing the value of the permanent
improvements that were damaged and destroyed plus legal
interest per annum from the time of the filing of this case
until fully paid;
3) P10,000.00, representing attorney's fees;
4) The costs of this suit.26
The Regional Trial Court stated that it had no reason to doubt the
evidence presented by the Delfin Spouses:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On this regards (sic), the Court finds no reason to doubt the veracity of
the plaintiff['s evidence], there being none to controvert the same. If
said. evidence did not ring true, the defendant should have and could
have easily destroyed their probatory value. Such indifference can only
mean that defendant had not (sic) equitable rights to protect or assert
over the disputed property together with all the improvements existing
thereon. This, the defendant did not do so and the Court finds no cogent
reasons to disbelieve or reject the plaintiffs categorical declarations on
the witness stand under a solemn oath, for the same are entitled to full
faith and credence. Indeed, if the defendant National Housing Authority
have been blinded with the consequence of their neglect and apathy,
then defendant have no right to pass on to the spouses-plaintiffs of their
negligence and expect the Court to come to their rescue. For it is now
much too late in the day to assail the decision which has become final
and executory.27ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The National Housing Authority filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but
this was denied in the Regional trial Court's September 10, 2002
Resolution.28
On the National Housing Authority's appeal, the Court of Appeals
rendered the assailed February 26, 2010 Decision reversing the
Regional Trial Court:29
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, appellees' complaint for
compensation is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The property taken by
appellant NHA and for which compensation is sought by appellees is
hereby DECLARED land of the public
domain.30ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Court of Appeals ruled that the characterization of the property is
no longer an issue because the National Housing Authority already
conceded that the property is disposable public land by citing
Proclamation No. 2151, which characterized the property as "a certain
disposable parcel of public land."31 However, the Delfin Spouses
supposedly failed to establish their possession of the property since June
12, 1945, as required in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.32
During the pendency of their petition before the Court of Appeals. Both
Leopoldo and Soledad Delfin both passed away. Lepoldo passed away on
February 3, 2005 and Soledad on June 22, 2004. Their surviving heirs,
Emelita D. Fabrigar and Leonilo C. Delfin filed a Motion for
Substitution before the Court of Appeals, which was not acted upon.33
In its assailed July 2, 2010 Resolution,34 the Court of Appeals denied the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the heirs of the Delfin Spouses.
Hence, this petition which was filed by the surviving heirs of the Delfin
Spouses, Emelita D. Fabrigar and Leonilo C. Delfin (petitioners).35
For resolution is the issue of whether petitioners are entitled to just
compensation for the Iligan City property occupied by respondent
National Housing Authority.
I
The right to be justly compensated whenever private property is taken
for public use cannot be disputed. Article III, Section 9 of the 1987
Constitution states that
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The case now hinges on whether the petitioners and their predecessors-
in-interests have been in possession of the Iligan Property for such
duration and under such circumstances as will enable them to claim
ownership.
Petitioners argue that they and their predecessors-in-interests' open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the Iligan Property
for more than 30 years converted the property from public to private.36
They then posit that they acquired ownership of the property through
acquisitive prescription under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No.
1529.37
Petitioners also assert that the Court of Appeals disregarded
certifications and letters from government agencies, which support their
claims, particularly, their and their predecessors-in-interest's possession
since June 12, 1945.38
Respondent counters, citing the Court of Appeals Decision, that
petitioners cannot rely on'Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529
because the property was not yet declared private land when they filed
their Complaint.39chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
II
Petitioners are erroneously claiming title based on acquisitive
prescription under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
Section 14 reads in full:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provision of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or
abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion under
the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other
manner provided for by law.
Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file the
application jointly.
Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor a retro
may file an application for the original registration of the land, provided,
however, that should the period for redemption expire during the
pendency of the registration proceedings and ownership to the property
consolidated in the vendee a retro, the latter shall be substituted for the
applicant and may continue the proceedings.
A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original registration of
any land held in trust by him, unless prohibited by the instrument
creating the trust. [Emphasis supplied]ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
For acquisitive prescription to set in pursuant to Section 14(2) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, two (2) requirements must be satisifled:
first, the property is established to be private in character; and second
the applicable prescriptive period under existing laws had passed.
Property - such as land - is either of public dominion or private
ownership.40
"Land is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for
public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and
is intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth."41 Land that belongs to the state but which is not or is no longer
intended for public use, for some public service or for the development of
the national wealth, is patrimonial property;42 it is property owned by
the State in its private capacity. Provinces, cities, and municipalities
may also hold patrimonial lands.43
Private property "consists of all property belonging to private persons,
either individually or collectively,"44 as well as "the patrimonial property
of the State, provinces, cities, and municipalities."45
Accordingly, only publicly owned lands which are patrimonial in
character are susceptible to prescription under Section 14(2) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529. Consistent with this, Article 1113 of Civil
Code demarcates properties of the state, which are not patrimonial in
character, as being not susceptible to prescription:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 1113. All things which are within the commerce of men are
susceptible of prescription, unless provided. Property of the State or any
of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Contrary to petitioners' theory then, for prescription to be viable, the
publicly-owned land must be patrimonial or private in character at the
onset. Possession for thirty (30) years does not convert it into
patrimonial property.
For land of the public domain to be converted into patrimonial property,
there must be an express declaration - "in the form of a law duly enacted
by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President
is duly authorized by law"46 - that "the public dominion property is no
longer intended for public service or the development of the national
wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial." 47
This Court's 2009 Decision in Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic48
explains:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of
public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public
service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State". It is
this provision that controls how public dominion property may be
converted into patrimonial properly susceptible to acquisition by
prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property
"which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth" are public dominion property. For as long as the property
belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or
disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if when * it is
"intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth".
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the
public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the
property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property
of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420 (2), and thus incapable of
acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and
disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer
intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth
that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such
declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly
authorized by law.49ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This was reiterated in this Court's 2013 Resolution in Heirs of
Malabanan v. Republic:50
[W]hen public land is no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth, thereby effectively removing the
land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such conversion
must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a
Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is duly
authorized by law to that effect.51ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Attached to the present Petition was a copy of a May 18, 1988
supplemental letter to the Director of the Land Management Bureau.52
This referred to an executive order, which stated that petitioners'
property was no longer needed for any public or quasi-public purposes:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That it is very clear in the 4th Indorsement of the Executive Secretary
dated April 24, 1954 the portion thereof that will not be needed for any
public or quasi-public purposes, be disposed in favor of the actual
occupants under the administration of the Bureau of Lands (copy of the
Executive Order is herewith attached for ready
reference)53ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
However, a mere indorsement of the executive secretary is not the law
or presidential proclamation required for converting land of the public
domain into patrimonial property and rendering it susceptible to
prescription. There then was no viable declaration rendering the Iligan
property to have been patrimonial property at the onset. Accordingly,
regardless of the length of petitioners' possession, no title could vest on
them by way of prescription.
III
While petitioners may not claim title by prescription, they may,
nevertheless, claim title pursuant to Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth
Act No. 141 (the Public Land Act).
Section 48 enabled the confirmation of claims and issuance of titles in
favor of citizens occupying or claiming to own lands of the public domain
or an interest therein. Section 48 (b) specifically pertained to those who
"have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and,
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945":
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and, occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership,
since June 12, 1945, immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a government

grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. (As amended by PD 1073.)
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act therefore requires that two (2)
requisites be satisfied before claims of title to public domain lands may
be confirmed: first, that the land subject of the claim is agricultural
land; and second, open, continuous, notorious, and exclusive possession
of the land since June 12, 1945.
The need for the land subject of the claim to have been classified as
agricultural is in conformity with the constitutional precept that
"[a]lienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural
lands."54 As explained in this Court's 2013 Resolution in Heirs of
Malabanan v. Republic:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable
primarily rests on the classification of public lands made under the
Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution, lands of the public domain
were classified into three, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral.
Section 10, Article XTV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of the
public domain into seven, specifically, agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and
grazing land, with the reservation that the law might provide other
classifications. The 1987 Constitution adopted the classification under
the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral,
but added national parks. Agricultural lands may be further classified
by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted. The
identification of lands according to their legal classification is done
exclusively by and through a positive act of the Executive Department.
Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of
public land that may be alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain may be
alienated; all other natural resources may not be.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to
wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as lands of
private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code, without
limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as
provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands
must only be agricultural. Consequently, lands classified as forest or
timber, mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of alienation or
disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural. A positive act of
the Government is necessary to enable such reclassification, and the
exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is
vested in the Executive Department, not in the
courts.55ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
As the Court of Appeals emphasized, respondent has conceded that the
Iligan property was alienable and disposable land:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As to the first requirement: There was no need for appellees to establish
that the property involved was alienable and disposable public land.
This characterization of the property is conceded by [respondent] who
cites Proclamation No. 2151 as declaring that the disputed property was
a certain disposable parcel of public land.56ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
That the Iligan property was alienable and disposable, agricultural
land, has been admitted. What is claimed instead is that petitioners'
possession is debunked by how the Iligan Property was supposedly part
of a military reservation area57 which was subsequently reserved for
Iligan City's slum improvement and resettlement program, and the
relocation of families who were dislocated by the National Steel
Corporation's five-year expansion program.58
Indeed, by virtue of Proclamation No. 2143 (erroneously referred to by
respondent as Proclamation No. 2151) certain parcels of land in Barrio
Suarez, Iligan City were reserved for slum-improvement and
resettlement program purposes.59 The proclamation characterized the
covered area as "disposable parcel of public land":
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREAS, a certain disposable parcel of public land situated at Barrio
Suarez, Iligan City consisting of one million one hundred seventy-four
thousand eight hundred fifty-three (1,174,853) square meters, more or
less, has been chosen by National Steel Corporation and the City
Government of Iligan with the conformity of the National
Housing/Authority, as the most suitable site for the relocation of the
families to be affected/dislocated as a result of National Steel
Corporation's program and for the establishment of a slum improvement
and resettlement project in the City of
Iligan;60ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
However, even if the Iligan Property was subsumed by Proclamation No.
2143, the same proclamation recognized private rights, which may have
already attached, and the rights of qualified free patent applicants:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby
reserve for relocation of the families to be affected/dislocated by the 5-
year expansion program of the National Steel Corporation and for the
slum improvement and resettlement project of the City of Iligan under
the administration and disposition of the National Housing Authority,
subject to private rights, if any there be, Lot 5258 (portion) of the Iligan
Cadastre, which parcel of land is of the public domain, situated in
Barrio Suarez, City of Iligan and more particularly described as follows:
....
This Proclamation is subject to the condition that the qualified free
patent applicants occupying portions of the aforedescribed parcel of land,
if any, may be compensated for the value of their respective portions and
existing improvements thereon, as may be determined by the National
Housing Authority.61ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Whatever rights petitioners (and their predecessors-in-interest) may
have had over the Iligan property was, thus, not obliterated by
Proclamation No. 2143. On the contrary, the Proclamation itself
facilitated compensation.
More importantly, there is documentary evidence to the effect that the
Iligan Property was not even within the area claimed by respondent. In
a letter62 to the Director of Lands, dated December 22, 1987, Deputy
Public Land Inspector Pio Lucero, Jr. noted that:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That this land known as Lot No. 5258, Cad. 292, Iligan Cadastre which
portion was claimed also by the Human Settlement and/or National
Housing Authority; but the area applied for by Leopoldo Delfin is
outside the claim of the said agency as per certification issued dated
June 10, 1988; copy of which is herewith attached for ready
reference;63ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The same letter likewise indicated that the Iligan Property was already
occupied by June 1945 and that it had even been released for
agricultural purposes in favor of its occupants.64 Accordingly, the
Deputy Public Land Inspector recommended the issuance of a patent in
favor of petitioner Leopoldo Delfin:65
Upon investigation conducted by the undersigned in the premises of the
land, it was found and ascertained that the land applied for by Leopoldo
Delfrn was first entered, occupied, possessed and cultivated by him
since the year June, 1945 up to the present; he have already well
improved the land and introduced some considerable improvements
such as coconut trees and different kinds of fruit trees which are
presently all fruit bearing trees; declared the same for taxation purposes
and taxes have been paid every year; and that there is no other person
or persons who bothered him in his peaceful occupation and cultivation
thereof;chanrobleslaw
Records of this Office show that said land was surveyed and claimed by
the Military Reservation, but the portion of which has been released in
favor of the actual occupants and the area of Leopoldo Delfin is one of
the portions released for agricultural purposes;chanrobleslaw
....
That the applicant caused the survey of the land under Sgs-12-000099,
approved by the Regional Land Director, Region XII, Bureau of Lands,
Cotabato City on April 3, 1979 (see approved plan attached
hereof);chanrobleslaw
In view hereof, it is therefore respectfully recommended that the entry
of the application be now confirmed and that patent be yes issued in
favor of Leopoldo Delfin.66ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A May 18, 1988 supplemental letter to the Director of the Land
Management Bureau further stated:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That the land applied for by Leopoldo Delfin is a portion of Lot No. 5258,
Cad. 292, Iligan Cadastre which was entered, occupied and possessed by
the said applicant since the year June 1945 up to the present; well
improved the same and introduced some considerable improvements
such as different kinds of fruit trees, coconut trees and other permanent
improvements thereon;chanrobleslaw
....
That is very clear in the 4th Indorsement of the Executive Secretary
dated April 24, 1954 the portion thereof that will not be needed for any
public or quasi-public purposes, be disposed in favor of the actual
occupants under the administration of the Bureau of
Lands[.]67ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Clearly then, petitioners acquired title over the Iligan Property
pursuant to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
First, there is no issue that the Iligan Property had already been
declared to be alienable and disposable land. Respondent has admitted
this and Deputy Public Land Inspector Pio Lucero, Jr.'s letters to the
Director of Land attest to this.
Second, although the Delfin Spouses' testimonial evidence and tax
declarations showed that their possession went only as far back as 1952,
Deputy Public Land Inspector Pio Lucero, Jr.'s letters to the Director of
Land nevertheless attest to a previous finding that the property had
already been occupied as early as June 1945.
Having shown that the requisites of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
have been satisfied and having established their rights to the Iligan
Property, it follows that petitioners must be compensated for its taking.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Court of
Appeals Decision dated February 26, 2010 and Resolution dated July 2,
2010 in CA-G.R. CV No. 80017 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Regional Trial Court's Decision dated May 20, 2002 in Civil Case No. II-
1801 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED
April 13, 2016 G.R. No. 194260
HEIRS OF FELICIANO YAMBAO, namely: CHONA YAMBAO,
JOEL YAMBAO, WILLY YAMBAO, LENNIE YAMBAO and
RICHARD YAMBAO, and all other persons acting under
their authority, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF HERMOGENES YAMBAO, namely: ELEANOR
YAMBAO, ALBERTO YAMBAO, DOMINIC YAMBAO,
ASESCLO YAMBAO, GERALD DANTIC and MARIA PILAR
YAMBAO, who are all represented by their Attorney-in-Fact,
MARIA PILAR YAMBAO, Respondents.
RESOLUTION REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the Decision2 dated
October 22, 2010 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 92755, which reversed and set aside the Decision dated
December 23, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iba,
Zambales, Branch 69, in SP. Civil Case No. RTC-88-I.
Facts
The subject of this case is a parcel of land located in Barangay
Bangan, Botolan, Zambales, which was originally possessed by
Macaria De Ocampo (Macaria). Macaria's nephew, Hermogenes
Yambao (Hermogenes ), acted as the administrator of the property
and paid realty taxes therefor. Hermogenes has eight children,
namely: Ulpiano, Dominic, Teofilo, Feliciano, Asesclo, Delia,
Amelia, and Melinda, all surnamed Yambao.3
After Hermogenes died, it was claimed that all of his heirs were free
to pick and harvest from the fruit-bearing trees planted on the
subject property. Eleanor Yambao (Eleanor), Ulpiano's daughter,
even constructed a house on the subject property. However,
sometime in 2005, the communal and mutual use of the subject
property by the heirs of Hermogenes ceased when the heirs of
Feliciano, herein petitioners, prohibited them from entering the
property. The heirs of Feliciano even ejected Eleanor from the
subject property.4
This prompted the heirs of Hermogenes, herein respondents, to file
with the RTC a complaint for partition, declaration of nullity of
title/documents, and damages against the heirs of Feliciano. The
heirs of Hermogenes alleged that they and the heirs of Feliciano are
co-owners of the subject property, having inherited the right thereto
from Hermogenes.5
The heirs of Feliciano denied the allegations of the heirs of
Hermogenes and claimed that their father, Feliciano, was in
possession of the subject property in the concept of owner since time
immemorial. Accordingly, Feliciano was awarded a free patent
thereon for which Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-10737
was issued. They also averred that the cause of action in the
complaint filed by the heirs of Hermogenes, which questioned the
validity of OCT No. P-10737, prescribed after the lapse of one year
from its issuance on November 29, 1989.6
Ruling of the RTC
On December 23, 2008, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the
complaint filed by the heirs of Hermogenes. The RTC opined that
the heirs of Hermogenes failed to show that the subject property is
owned by Macaria, stating that tax declarations and receipts in
Macaria's name are not conclusive evidence of ownership. The RTC
further held that even if Macaria owned the subject property, the
heirs of Hermogenes failed to show that Hermogenes had the right
to succeed over the estate of Macaria.
Ruling of the CA
On appeal,. the CA, in its Decision 7 dated October 22, 2010,
reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision dated December 23, 2008.
The CA found that the RTC, in hastily dismissing the complaint for
partition, failed to determine first whether the subject property is
indeed co-owned by the heirs of Hermogenes and the heirs of
Feliciano. The CA pointed out that:
[A] review of the records of the case shows that in Feliciano's
application for free patent, he acknowledged that the source of his
claim of possession over the subject property was Hermogenes's
possession of the real property in peaceful, open, continuous, and
adverse manner and more importantly, in the concept of an owner,
since 1944. Feliciano's claim of sole possession in his application for
free patent did not therefore extinguish the fact of co-ownership as
claimed by the children of Hermogenes. 8 (Citation omitted and
emphasis deleted)
Accordingly, the CA, considering that the parties are co-owners of
the subject property, ruled that the RTC should have conducted the
appropriate proceedings for partition. 9
Aggrieved, the heirs of Feliciano filed with the Court this petition
for review alleging that the CA erred in ruling that there is co-
ownership between them and the heirs of Hermogenes. The heirs of
Feliciano likewise averred that the CA also erred in ordering the
partition of the subject property since it amounts to a collateral
attack on the validity of OCT No. P-10737. 10
Ruling of the Court
The petition is denied.
As pointed out by the CA, the R TC overlooked the fact that the
subject property is co-owned by the parties herein, having inherited
the same from Hermogenes. Feliciano's free patent application
indicated that he merely tacked his possession of the subject
property from Hermogenes, his father, who held the property in
peaceful, open, continuous, and adverse manner in the concept of an
owner since 1944. This is an implicit recognition of the fact that
Feliciano merely co-owns the subject property with the other heirs
of Hermogenes. Indeed, the heirs of Feliciano have not presented
any evidence that would show that Hermogenes bequeathed the
subject property solely to Feliciano.
A co-ownership is a form of trust, with each owner being a trustee
for each other. Mere actual possession by one will not give rise to
the inference that the possession was adverse because a co-owner
is, after all, entitled to possession of the property. Thus, as a rule,
prescription does not run in favor of a co-heir or co-owner as long as
he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership; and he
cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners,
absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership. An action to demand
partition among co-owners is imprescriptible, and each co-owner
may demand at any time the partition of the common property.11
Prescription may nevertheless run against a co-owner if there is
adverse, open, continuous and exclusive possession of the co-owned
property by the other co-owner/s.1âwphi1 In order that a co-owners
possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or other
co-owners, the following requisites must concur: (1) that he has
performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster
of the cestui que trust or other co-owners; (2) that such positive acts
of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or
other co-owners; and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear
and convincing. 12
The issuance of the certificate of title would constitute an open and
clear repudiation of any trust. 13 In such a case, an action to
demand partition among co-owners prescribes in 10 years, the point
of reference being the date of the issuance of certificate of title over
the property. But this rule applies only when the plaintiff is not in
possession of the property, since if a person claiming to be the
owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, the right to
demand partition does not prescribe. 14
Although OCT No. P-10737 was registered in the name of Feliciano
on November 29, 1989, the prescriptive period within which to
demand partition of the subject property, contrary to the claim of
the heirs of Feliciano, did not begin to run. At that time, the heirs of
Hermogenes were still in possession of the property. It was only in
2005 that the heirs of Feliciano expressly prohibited the heirs of
Hermogenes from entering the property. Thus, as aptly ruled by the
CA, the right of the heirs of Hermogenes to demand the partition of
the property had not yet prescribed. Accordingly, the RTC
committed a reversible error when it dismissed the complaint for
partition that was filed by the heirs of Hermogenes.
There is likewise no merit to the claim that the action for partition
filed by the heirs of Hermogenes amounted to a collateral attack on
the validity of OCT No. P-10737. The complaint for partition filed
by the heirs of Hermogenes seeks first, a declaration that they are a
co-owners of the subject property, and second, the conveyance of
their lawful shares. The heirs of Hermogenes do not attack the title
of Feliciano; they alleged no fraud, mistake, or any other
irregularity that would justify a review of the registration decree in
their favor. Their theory is that although the subject property was
registered solely in Feliciano's name, they are co-owners of the
property and as such is entitled to the conveyance of their shares.
On the premise that they are co-owners, they can validly seek the
partition of the property in co-ownership and the conveyance to
them of their respective shares. 15
Moreover, when Feliciano registered the subject property in his
name, to the exclusion of the other heirs of Hermogenes, an implied
trust was created by force of law and he was considered a trustee of
the undivided shares of the other heirs of Hermogenes in the
property. As trustees, the heirs of Feliciano cannot be permitted to
repudiate the trust by relying on the registration. 16 "A trustee who
obtains a Torrens title over a property held in trust for him by
another cannot repudiate the trust by relying on the registration."
17
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition
is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated October 22, 2010 issued by
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 92755 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175444 December 14, 2011
JAIME ABALOS and SPOUSES FELIX SALAZAR and
CONSUELO SALAZAR, GLICERIO ABALOS, HEIRS
OF AQUILINO ABALOS, namely: SEGUNDA
BAUTISTA, ROGELIO ABALOS, DOLORES A.
ROSARIO, FELICIDAD ABALOS, ROBERTO ABALOS,
JUANITO ABALOS, TITA ABALOS, LITA A. DELA
CRUZ AND HEIRS OF AQUILINA ABALOS, namely:
ARTURO BRAVO, PURITA B. MENDOZA, LOURDES
B. AGANON, CONSUELO B. SALAZAR, PRIMA B.
DELOS SANTOS, THELMA APOSTOL and GLECERIO
ABALOS, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF VICENTE TORIO, namely: PUBLIO
TORIO, LIBORIO TORIO, VICTORINA TORIO,
ANGEL TORIO, LADISLAO TORIO, PRIMO TORIO
and NORBERTO TORIO, Respondents.
DECISION PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari
seeking to set aside the Decision1 dated June 30, 2006 and
Resolution2 dated November 13, 2006 by the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 91887. The assailed
Decision reversed and set aside the Decision3 dated June 14,
2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, Branch 69, while the questioned Resolution
denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as
follows:
On July 24, 1996, herein respondents filed a Complaint for
Recovery of Possession and Damages with the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Binmaley, Pangasinan against Jaime
Abalos (Jaime) and the spouses Felix and Consuelo Salazar.
Respondents contended that: they are the children and heirs
of one Vicente Torio (Vicente) who died intestate on
September 11, 1973; at the time of the death of Vicente, he
left behind a parcel of land measuring 2,950 square meters,
more or less, which is located at San Isidro Norte, Binmaley,
Pangasinan; during the lifetime of Vicente and through his
tolerance, Jaime and the Spouses Salazar were allowed to
stay and build their respective houses on the subject parcel
of land; even after the death of Vicente, herein respondents
allowed Jaime and the Spouses Salazar to remain on the
disputed lot; however, in 1985, respondents asked Jaime
and the Spouses Salazar to vacate the subject lot, but they
refused to heed the demand of respondents forcing
respondents to file the complaint.4
Jaime and the Spouses Salazar filed their Answer with
Counterclaim, denying the material allegations in the
Complaint and asserting in their Special and Affirmative
Defenses that: respondents' cause of action is barred by
acquisitive prescription; the court a quo has no jurisdiction
over the nature of the action and the persons of the
defendants; the absolute and exclusive owners and
possessors of the disputed lot are the deceased predecessors
of defendants; defendants and their predecessors-in-interest
had been in actual, continuous and peaceful possession of
the subject lot as owners since time immemorial; defendants
are faithfully and religiously paying real property taxes on
the disputed lot as evidenced by Real Property Tax Receipts;
they have continuously introduced improvements on the
said land, such as houses, trees and other kinds of
ornamental plants which are in existence up to the time of
the filing of their Answer.5
On the same date as the filing of defendants' Answer with
Counterclaim, herein petitioners filed their Answer in
Intervention with Counterclaim. Like the defendants,
herein petitioners claimed that their predecessors-in-
interest were the absolute and exclusive owners of the land
in question; that petitioners and their predecessors had
been in possession of the subject lot since time immemorial
up to the present; they have paid real property taxes and
introduced improvements thereon.6
After the issues were joined, trial ensued.
On December 10, 2003, the MTC issued a Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration[s], the
Court adjudged the case in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendants and defendants-intervenors are
ordered to turn over the land in question to the plaintiffs
(Lot Nos. 869 and 870, Cad. 467-D. Binmaley Cadastre
located in Brgy. San Isidro Norte, Binmaley, Pangasinan
with an area of 2,950 sq. m., more or less, bounded and
described in paragraph 3 of the Complaint[)]; ordering the
defendants and defendants-intervenors to remove their
respective houses standing on the land in dispute; further
ordering the defendants and defendants-intervenors, either
singly or jointly to pay the plaintiffs land rent in the amount
of ₱12,000.00 per year to be reckoned starting the year 1996
until defendants and defendants-intervenors will finally
vacate the premises; furthermore, defendants and
defendants-intervenors are also ordered to pay, either singly
or jointly, the amount of ₱10,000.00 as and by way of
attorney's fees and costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.7
Jaime and the Spouses Salazar appealed the Decision of the
MTC with the RTC of Lingayen, Pangasinan.8 Herein
petitioners, who were intervenors, did not file an appeal.
In its Decision dated June 14, 2005, the RTC ruled in favor
of Jaime and the Spouses Salazar, holding that they have
acquired the subject property through prescription.
Accordingly, the RTC dismissed herein respondents'
complaint.
Aggrieved, herein respondents filed a petition for review
with the CA assailing the Decision of the RTC.
On June 30, 2006, the CA promulgated its questioned
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision
dated June 14, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 69,
Lingayen, Pangasinan is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. In its stead, a new one is entered reinstating the
Decision dated December 10, 2003 of the Municipal Trial
Court of Binmaley, Pangasinan.
SO ORDERED.9
Jaime and the Spouses Salazar filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA in its
Resolution dated November 13, 2006.
Hence, the instant petition based on a sole assignment of
error, to wit:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
APPRECIATING THAT THE PETITIONERS HEREIN
ARE NOW THE ABSOLUTE AND EXCLUSIVE OWNERS
OF THE LAND IN QUESTION BY VIRTUE OF
ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION.10
The main issue raised by petitioners is whether they and
their predecessors-in-interest possessed the disputed lot in
the concept of an owner, or whether their possession is by
mere tolerance of respondents and their predecessors-in-
interest. Corollarily, petitioners claim that the due
execution and authenticity of the deed of sale upon which
respondents' predecessors-in-interest derived their
ownership were not proven during trial.
The petition lacks merit.
Preliminarily, the Court agrees with the observation of
respondents that some of the petitioners in the instant
petition were the intervenors11 when the case was filed with
the MTC. Records would show that they did not appeal the
Decision of the MTC.12 The settled rule is that failure to
perfect an appeal renders the judgment final and
executory.13 Hence, insofar as the intervenors in the MTC
are concerned, the judgment of the MTC had already
become final and executory.
It also bears to point out that the main issue raised in the
instant petition, which is the character or nature of
petitioners' possession of the subject parcel of land, is
factual in nature.
Settled is the rule that questions of fact are not reviewable
in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.14 Section 1 of Rule 45 states that petitions
for review on certiorari "shall raise only questions of law
which must be distinctly set forth."
Doubtless, the issue of whether petitioners possess the
subject property as owners, or whether they occupy the
same by mere tolerance of respondents, is a question of fact.
Thus, it is not reviewable.
Nonetheless, the Court has, at times, allowed exceptions
from the abovementioned restriction. Among the recognized
exceptions are the following:
(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises, or conjectures;
(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd, or impossible;
(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;
(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts;
(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;
(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the
issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(g) When the CA’s findings are contrary to those by the trial
court;
(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based;
(i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent;
(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record; or
(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.15
In the present case, the findings of fact of the MTC and the
CA are in conflict with those of the RTC.
After a review of the records, however, the Court finds that
the petition must fail as it finds no error in the findings of
fact and conclusions of law of the CA and the MTC.
Petitioners claim that they have acquired ownership over
the disputed lot through ordinary acquisitive prescription.
Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights
may be ordinary or extraordinary.16 Ordinary acquisitive
prescription requires possession in good faith and with just
title for ten (10) years.17 Without good faith and just title,
acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in
character which requires uninterrupted adverse possession
for thirty (30) years.18
Possession "in good faith" consists in the reasonable belief
that the person from whom the thing is received has been
the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership.19
There is "just title" when the adverse claimant came into
possession of the property through one of the modes
recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other
real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not
transmit any right.20
In the instant case, it is clear that during their possession of
the property in question, petitioners acknowledged
ownership thereof by the immediate predecessor-in-interest
of respondents. This is clearly shown by the Tax Declaration
in the name of Jaime for the year 1984 wherein it contains a
statement admitting that Jaime's house was built on the
land of Vicente, respondents' immediate predecessor-in-
interest.21 Petitioners never disputed such an
acknowledgment. Thus, having knowledge that they nor
their predecessors-in-interest are not the owners of the
disputed lot, petitioners' possession could not be deemed as
possession in good faith as to enable them to acquire the
subject land by ordinary prescription. In this respect, the
Court agrees with the CA that petitioners' possession of the
lot in question was by mere tolerance of respondents and
their predecessors-in-interest. Acts of possessory character
executed due to license or by mere tolerance of the owner
are inadequate for purposes of acquisitive prescription. 22
Possession, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive
right, must be en concepto de dueño, or, to use the common
law equivalent of the term, that possession should be
adverse, if not, such possessory acts, no matter how long, do
not start the running of the period of prescription.23
Moreover, the CA correctly held that even if the character of
petitioners' possession of the subject property had become
adverse, as evidenced by their declaration of the same for
tax purposes under the names of their predecessors-in-
interest, their possession still falls short of the required
period of thirty (30) years in cases of extraordinary
acquisitive prescription. Records show that the earliest Tax
Declaration in the name of petitioners was in 1974.
Reckoned from such date, the thirty-year period was
completed in 2004. However, herein respondents' complaint
was filed in 1996, effectively interrupting petitioners'
possession upon service of summons on them.24 Thus,
petitioners’ possession also did not ripen into ownership,
because they failed to meet the required statutory period of
extraordinary prescription.
This Court has held that the evidence relative to the
possession upon which the alleged prescription is based,
must be clear, complete and conclusive in order to establish
the prescription.25 In the present case, the Court finds no
error on the part of the CA in holding that petitioners failed
to present competent evidence to prove their alleged good
faith in neither possessing the subject lot nor their adverse
claim thereon. Instead, the records would show that
petitioners' possession was by mere tolerance of respondents
and their predecessors-in-interest.1avvphi1
Finally, as to the issue of whether the due execution and
authenticity of the deed of sale upon which respondents
anchor their ownership were not proven, the Court notes
that petitioners did not raise this matter in their Answer as
well as in their Pre-Trial Brief. It was only in their
Comment to respondents' Petition for Review filed with the
CA that they raised this issue. Settled is the rule that points
of law, theories, issues, and arguments not adequately
brought to the attention of the trial court need not be, and
ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court.26
They cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. To allow
this would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice
and due process.27
Even granting that the issue of due execution and
authenticity was properly raised, the Court finds no cogent
reason to depart from the findings of the CA, to wit:
xxxx
Based on the foregoing, respondents [Jaime Abalos and the
Spouses Felix and Consuelo Salazar] have not inherited the
disputed land because the same was shown to have already
been validly sold to Marcos Torio, who, thereupon, assigned
the same to his son Vicente, the father of petitioners [herein
respondents]. A valid sale was amply established and the
said validity subsists because the deed evidencing the same
was duly notarized.
There is no doubt that the deed of sale was duly
acknowledged before a notary public. As a notarized
document, it has in its favor the presumption of regularity
and it carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with
respect to its due execution. It is admissible in evidence
without further proof of its authenticity and is entitled to
full faith and credit upon its face.28
Indeed, settled is the rule in our jurisdiction that a
notarized document has in its favor the presumption of
regularity, and to overcome the same, there must be
evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant; otherwise, the document should be upheld.29
In the instant case, petitioners' bare denials will not suffice
to overcome the presumption of regularity of the assailed
deed of sale.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 91887 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 198356, April 20, 2015
ESPERANZA SUPAPO AND THE HEIRS OF ROMEO SUPAPO,
NAMELY: ESPERANZA, REX EDWARD, RONALD TROY,
ROMEO, JR., SHEILA LORENCE, ALL SURNAMED SUPAPO,
AND SHERYL FORTUNE SUPAPO-SANDIGAN, Petitioners, v.
SPOUSES ROBERTO AND SUSAN DE JESUS, MACARIO
BERNARDO, AND THOSE PERSONS CLAIMING RIGHTS
UNDER THEM, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1
filed by petitioners
Esperanza Supapo and Romeo Supapo2 (Spouses Supapo) to assail the
February 25, 2011 decision3 and August 25, 2011 resolution4 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 111674.
Factual Antecedents
The Spouses Supapo filed a complaint5 for accion publiciana against
Roberto and Susan de Jesus (Spouses de Jesus), Macario Bernardo
(Macario), and persons claiming rights under them (collectively, the
respondents), with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Caloocan
City.
The complaint sought to compel the respondents to vacate a piece of
land located in Novaliches, Quezon City, described as Lot 40, Block 5
(subject lot). The subject lot is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. C-284416 registered and titled under the Spouses Supapo's
names. The land has an assessed value of thirty-nine thousand nine
hundred eighty pesos (39,980.00) as shown in the Declaration of Real
Property Value (tax declaration) issued by the Office of the City
Assessor of Caloocan.7
The Spouses Supapo did not reside on the subject lot. They also did not
employ an overseer but they made sure to visit at least twice a year.8
During one of their visits in 1992, they saw two (2) houses built on the
subject lot. The houses were built without their knowledge and
permission. They later learned that the Spouses de Jesus occupied one
house while Macario occupied the other one.9
The Spouses Supapo demanded from the respondents the immediate
surrender of the subject lot by bringing the dispute before the
appropriate Lupong Tagapamayapa. The Lupon issued a Katibayan
Upang Makadulog sa Hukuman (certificate to file action) for failure of
the parties to settle amicably.10
The Spouses Supapo then filed a criminal case11 against the respondents
for violation of Presidential Decree No. 772 or the Anti-Squatting Law.12
The trial court convicted the respondents. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds accused
ROBERTO DE JESUS, SUSAN DE JESUS and MACARIO
BERNARDO, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of
Presidential Decree No. 772, and each accused is hereby ordered to pay
a fine of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00), and to vacate the
subject premises.
SO ORDERED.13 (Emphasis supplied.)
The respondents appealed their conviction to the CA.14 While the appeal
was pending, Congress enacted Republic Act (RA) No. 8368, otherwise
known as "An Act Repealing Presidential Decree No. 772," which
resulted to the dismissal of the criminal case.15
On April 30, 1999, the CA's dismissal of the criminal case became
final.16
Notwithstanding the dismissal, the Spouses Supapo moved for the
execution of the respondents' civil liability, praying that the latter
vacate the subject lot. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the
motion and issued the writ of execution. The respondents moved for the
quashal of the writ but the RTC denied the same. The RTC also denied
the respondents' motion for reconsideration.
The respondents thus filed with the CA a petition for certiorari to
challenge the RTC's orders denying the quashal of the writ and the
respondent's motion for reconsideration.17 The CA granted the petition
and held that with the repeal of the Anti-Squatting Law, the
respondents' criminal and civil liabilities were extinguished.18 The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari with
prayer for injunction is GRANTED. The orders dated June 5, 2003 and
July 24, 2003 of Branch 131 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City
in Criminal Case No. C-45610 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Said
court is hereby permanently ENJOINED from further executing or
implementing its decision dated March 18, 1996.
SO ORDERED.
The CA, however, underscored that the repeal of the Anti-Squatting
Law does not mean that people now have unbridled license to illegally
occupy lands they do not own, and that it was not intended to
compromise the property rights of legitimate landowners.19 In cases of
violation of their property rights, the CA noted that recourse may be had
in court by filing the proper action for recovery of possession.
The Spouses Supapo thus filed the complaint for action publiciana.20
After filing their Answer,21 the respondents moved to set their
affirmative defenses for preliminary hearing22 and argued that: (1) there
is another action pending between the same parties; (2) the complaint
for accion publiciana is barred by statute of limitations; and (3) the
Spouses Supapo's cause of action is barred by prior judgment.
The MeTC Ruling23
The MeTC denied the motion to set the affirmative defenses for
preliminary hearing. It ruled that the arguments advanced by the
respondents are evidentiary in nature, which at best can be utilized in
the course of the trial. The MeTC likewise denied the respondents'
motion for reconsideration.
From the MeTC's ruling, the respondents filed a petition for certiorari
with the RTC.24
The RTC Ruling25
The RTC granted the petition for certiorari on two grounds, viz.: (i) the
action has prescribed; and (ii) accion publiciana falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.
It held that in cases where the only issue involved is possession, the
MeTC has jurisdiction if the action for forcible entry or unlawful
detainer is filed within one (1) year from the time to demand to vacate
was made. Otherwise, the complaint for recovery of possession should be
filed before the RTC.
The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED.
The Orders dated October 24, 2008 and February 23, 2009 are hereby
declared NULL and VOID.
The Public Respondent is hereby directed to DISMISS Civil Case No.
08-29245 for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.26
In their motion for reconsideration,27 the Spouses Supapo emphasized
that the court's jurisdiction over an action involving title to or
possession of land is determined by its assessed value; that the RTC
does not have an exclusive jurisdiction on all complaints for accion
publiciana; and that the assessed value of the subject lot falls within
MeTC's jurisdiction.
The RTC denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
It held that although the MeTC had jurisdiction based on the assessed
value of the subject lot, the Spouses Supapos' cause of action had
already prescribed, the action having been filed beyond the ten (l0)-year
prescriptive period under Article 555 of the Civil Code.28 As it was not
proven when the actual demand to vacate was made, the RTC ruled that
the reckoning period by which the ejectment suit should have been filed
is counted from the time the certificate to file action was issued. The
certificate to file action was issued on November 25, 1992, while the
complaint for accion publiciana was filed only on March 7, 2008, or more
than ten (10) years thereafter.
Dissatisfied with the RTC ruling, the Spouses Supapo appealed to the
CA.29
The CA Ruling30
The CA dismissed the appeal and held that the complaint for accion
publiciana should have been lodged before the RTC and that the period
to file the action had prescribed.
The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated June 30,
2009 and Order dated October 19, 2009 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED
The Spouses Supapo moved31 but failed32 to secure a reconsideration of
the CA decision; hence, they came to us through the present petition.
The Petition
In seeking reversal of the CA's ruling, the Spouses Supapo essentially
argue that:
(1) the MeTC exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over accion
publiciana where the assessed value of the property does not
exceed P20,000.00, or P50,000.00 if the property is located in
Metro Manila; and that
(2) prescription had not yet set in because their cause of action is
imprescriptible under the Torrens system.
The Respondents' Case33
The respondents argue that the complaint for accion publiciana was (1)
filed in the wrong court; (2) barred by prescription; and (3) barred by res
judicata.
Issues
The issues for resolution are:
I. Whether the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction;
II. Whether the cause of action has prescribed; and
III. Whether the complaint for accion publiciana is barred by res
judicata.
Our Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
We hold that: (1) the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction; (2) the cause
of action has not prescribed; and (3) the complaint is not barred by res
judicata.
Accion Publiciana and
the Jurisdiction of the
MeTC
Accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better
right of possession of realty independent of title. It refers to an
ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of
the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the
realty.34
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo filed an action for the recovery
of possession of the subject lot but they based their better right of
possession on a claim of ownership.
This Court has held that the objective of the plaintiffs in accion
publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership. However, where
the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the
issue to determine who between the parties has the right to possess the
property.35
This adjudication is not a final determination of the issue of ownership;
it is only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the
issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The
adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to
an action between the same parties involving title to the property. The
adjudication, in short, is not conclusive on the issue of ownership.36
Thus, while we will dissect the Spouses Supapo's claim of ownership
over the subject property, we will only do so to determine if they or the
respondents should have the right of possession.
Having thus determined that the dispute involves possession over a real
property, we now resolve which court has the jurisdiction to hear the
case.
Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129,37 the jurisdiction of the RTC over
actions involving title to or possession of real property is plenary.38
RA No. 7691,39 however, divested the RTC of a portion of its jurisdiction
and granted the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts the exclusive and original jurisdiction to
hear actions where the assessed value of the property does not exceed
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), or Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00), if the property is located in Metro Manila.
Section 1 of RA No. 7691 states:
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as
the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," is hereby amended to read
as follows:
Section. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the
property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00)
or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds
Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 3 of the same law provides:
Section. 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. -
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title
to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the
assessed value of the property or interest therein does not
exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in
Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs x x x.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In view of these amendments, jurisdiction over actions involving title to
or possession of real property is now determined by its assessed
value.40 The assessed value of real property is its fair market value
multiplied by the assessment level. It is synonymous to taxable value.41
In Quinagoran v. Court of Appeals,42 we explained:
[D]oes the RTC have jurisdiction over all cases of recovery of possession
regardless of the value of the property involved?
The answer is no. The doctrine on which the RTC anchored its denial of
petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, as affirmed by the CA — that all cases of
recovery of possession or accion publiciana lies with the regional trial
courts regardless of the value of the property — no longer holds true. As
tilings now stand, a distinction must be made between those
properties the assessed value of which is below P20,000.00, if
outside Metro Manila; and P50,000.00, if within.43 (Emphasis
supplied.)
In this regard, the complaint must allege the assessed value of the real
property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to determine
which court has jurisdiction over the action. This is required because the
nature of the action and the court with original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the same is determined by the material allegations of
the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff, and the law
in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs
are entitled to some or all of the claims asserted therein.44
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo alleged that the assessed value
of the subject lot, located in Metro Manila, is P39,980.00. This is proven
by the tax declaration45 issued by the Office of the City Assessor of
Caloocan. The respondents do not deny the genuineness and
authenticity of this tax declaration.
Given that the Spouses Supapo duly complied with the jurisdictional
requirements, we hold that the MeTC of Caloocan properly acquired
jurisdiction over the complaint for accion publiciana.
The cause of action
has not prescribed
The respondents argue that the complaint for accion publiciana is
dismissible for being filed out of time.
They invoke Article 555 of the Civil Code, which states: Art. 555. A
possessor may lose his possession:
xxxx
(4) By the possession of another, subject to the provisions of Article 537,
if the new possession has lasted longer than one year. But the
real right of possession is not lost till after the lapse of ten years.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The respondents point out that the Spouses Supapo filed the complaint
for accion publiciana on March 7, 2008 or more than ten (10) years after
the certificate to file action was issued on November 25, 1992. The
respondents contend that the Spouses Supapo may no longer recover
possession of the subject property, the complaint having been filed
beyond the period provided by law.
Further, while the respondents concede that the Spouses Supapo hold a
TCT over the subject property, and assuming a Torrens title is
imprescriptible and indefeasible, they posit that the latter have lost
their right to recover possession because of laches.
On their part, the Spouses Supapo admit that they filed the complaint
for accion publiciana more than ten (10) years after the certificate to file
action was issued. Nonetheless, they argue that their cause of action is
imprescriptible since the subject property is registered and titled under
the Torrens system.
We rule that the Spouses Supapo's position is legally correct.
At the core of this controversy is a parcel of land registered under the
Torrens system. The Spouses Supapo acquired the TCT on the subject
lot in 1979.46 Interestingly, the respondents do not challenge the
existence, authenticity and genuineness of the Supapo's TCT.47
In defense, the respondents rest their entire case on the fact that they
have allegedly been in actual, public, peaceful and uninterrupted
possession of the subject property in the concept of an owner since 1992.
The respondents contend that they built their houses on the subject lot
in good faith. Having possessed the subject lot for more than ten (10)
years, they claim that they can no longer be disturbed in their
possession.48
Under the undisputed facts of this case, we find that the respondents'
contentions have no legal basis.
In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that lands covered
by a title cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession. We have also held that a claim of acquisitive prescription is
baseless when the land involved is a registered land because of Article
112649 of the Civil Code in relation to Act 496 [now, Section 47 of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 152950].51
The Spouses Supapo (as holders of the TCT) enjoy a panoply of benefits
under the Torrens system. The most essential insofar as the present
case is concerned is Section 47 of PD No. 1529 which states:
Section 47. Registered land not subject to prescriptions. No title to
registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
In addition to the imprescriptibility, the person who holds a Torrens
Title over a land is also entitled to the possession thereof.52 The right to
possess and occupy the land is an attribute and a logical consequence of
ownership.53 Corollary to this rule is the right of the holder of the
Torrens Title to eject any person illegally occupying their property.
Again, this right is imprescriptible.54
In Bishop v. CA,55 we held that even if it be supposed that the holders of
the Torrens Title were aware of the other persons' occupation of the
property, regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful
owners have a right to demand the return of their property at any time
as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at
all.56
Even if the defendant attacks the Torrens Title because of a purported
sale or transfer of the property, we still rule in favor of the holder of the
Torrens Title if the defendant cannot adduce, in addition to the deed of
sale, a duly-registered certificate of title proving the alleged transfer or
sale.
A case in point is Umpoc v. Mercado57 in which we gave greater
probative weight to the plaintiffs TCT vis-a-vis the contested
unregistered deed of sale of the defendants. Unlike the defendants in
Umpoc, however, the respondents did not adduce a single evidence to
refute the Spouses Supapo's TCT. With more reason therefore that we
uphold the indefeasibility and imprescriptibility of the Spouses Supapo's
title.
By respecting the imprescriptibility and indefeasibility of the Spouses
Supapo's TCT, this Court merely recognizes the value of the Torrens
System in ensuring the stability of real estate transactions and integrity
of land registration.
We reiterate for the record the policy behind the Torrens System, viz.:
The Government has adopted the Torrens system due to its being the
most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to
protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established
and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance
that the seller's title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being
told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all, which will not
only be unfair to him as the purchaser, but will also erode public
confidence in the system and will force land transactions to be attended
by complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof
of ownership. The further consequence will be that land conflicts can be
even more abrasive, if not even violent.58
With respect to the respondents' defense59 of laches, suffice it to say that
the same is evidentiary in nature and cannot be established by mere
allegations in the pleadings.60 In other words, the party alleging laches
must adduce in court evidence proving such allegation. This Court not
being a trier of facts cannot rule on this issue; especially so since the
lower courts did not pass upon the same.
Thus, without solid evidentiary basis, laches cannot be a valid ground to
deny the Spouses Supapo's petition.61 On the contrary, the facts as
culled from the records show the clear intent of the Spouses Supapo to
exercise their right over and recover possession of the subject lot, viz.:
(1) they brought the dispute to the appropriate Lupon; (2) they initiated
the criminal complaint for squatting; and (3) finally, they filed the action
publiciana. To our mind, these acts negate the allegation of laches.
With these as premises, we cannot but rule that the Spouses Supapo's
right to recover possession of the subject lot is not barred by
prescription.
The action is not barred
by prior judgment
As a last-ditch effort to save their case, the respondents invoke res
judicata. They contend that the decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No.
78649 barred the filing of the action publiciana.
To recall, CA-G.R. SP No. 78649 is the petition for certiorari filed by the
respondents to challenge the RTC's issuance of the writ enforcing their
civil liability (i.e., to vacate the subject property) arising from their
conviction under the Anti-Squatting Law. The CA granted the petition
and permanently enjoined the execution of the respondents' conviction
because their criminal liability had been extinguished by the repeal of
the law under which they were tried and convicted. It follows that their
civil liability arising from the crime had also been erased.
The respondents' reliance on the principle of res judicata is misplaced.
Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as
enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and
(2) conclusiveness of judgment in Rule 39, Section 47(c).62
"Bar by prior judgment" means that when a right or fact had already
been judicially tried on the merits and determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction, the final judgment or order shall be conclusive
upon the parties and those in privity with them and constitutes an
absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand or
cause of action.63
The requisites64 for res judicata under the concept of bar by prior
judgment are:
(1) The former judgment or order must be final;
(2) It must be a judgment on the merits;
(3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; and
(4) There must be between the first and second actions, identity
of parties, subject matter, and cause of action.
Res judicata is not present in this case.
While requisites one to three may be present, it is obvious that the there
is no identity of subject matter, parties and causes of action between the
criminal case prosecuted under the Anti-Squatting Law and the civil
action for the recovery of the subject property.
First, there is no identity of parties. The criminal complaint,
although initiated by the Spouses Supapo, was prosecuted in the name
of the people of the Philippines. The accion publiciana, on the other
hand, was filed by and in the name of the Spouses Supapo.
Second, there is no identity of subject matter. The criminal case
involves the prosecution of a crime under the Anti-Squatting Law while
the accion publiciana is an action to recover possession of the subject
property.
And third, there is no identity of causes of action. The people of the
Philippines filed the criminal case to protect and preserve governmental
interests by prosecuting persons who violated the statute. The Spouses
Supapo filed the accion publiciana to protect their proprietary interests
over the subject property and recover its possession.
Even casting aside the requirement of identity of causes of action, the
defense of res judicata has still no basis.
The concept of "conclusiveness of judgment" does not require that there
is identity of causes of action provided that there is identity of issue and
identity of parties.65
Under this particular concept of res judicata, any right, fact, or matter
in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the
determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment
is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein
and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies,
whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two
actions is the same.66
As already explained, there is no identity of parties between the
criminal complaint under the Anti-Squatting law and the civil action for
accion publiciana. For this reason alone, "collusiveness of judgment"
does not apply.
Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that there is identity of
parties, "conclusiveness of judgment" still does not apply because there
is no identity of issues. The issue in the criminal case is whether the
respondents (accused therein) committed the crime alleged in the
information, while the only issue in accion publiciana is whether the
Spouses Supapo have a better right than the respondents to possess and
occupy the subject property.
For all these reasons, the defense of res judicata is baseless.
Final Note
As a final note, we stress that our ruling in this case is limited only to
the issue of determining who between the parties has a better right to
possession. This adjudication is not a final and binding determination of
the issue of ownership. As such, this is not a bar for the parties or even
third persons to file an action for the determination of the issue of
ownership.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition, and
consequently REVERSE and SET ASIDE the February 25, 2011
decision and August 25, 2011 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 111674.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 170671, August 19, 2015
FILADELFA T. LAUSA, LORETA T. TORRES,
PRIMITIVO TUGOT AND ANACLETO T. CADUHAY,
Petitioners, v. MAURICIA QUILATON, RODRIGO Q.
TUGOT, PURIFICACION T. CODILLA, TEOFRA T.
SADAYA, ESTRELLITA T. GALEOS AND ROSITA T.
LOPEZ, Respondents.
DECISION BRION, J.:
Before us is a Petition for review on certiorari assailing the
Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 63248. The
CA reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cebu City, Branch 15 in Civil Case No. CEB - 17857, and.
upheld the validity of Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No. 571.
The RTC found TCT No. 571 to be a forgery, and declared it and
all titles originating from it to be null and void ab initio. The
RTC gave the following reasons as basis for this
conclusion:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
First, the RTC noted several discrepancies in TCT No. 571
indicating that it is a forgery, viz.:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(i) The TCTs issued before and after TCT No. 571, that is, TCT
No. 570 and TCT No. 572, both use a different and more
recent form than TCT No. 571. TCT Nos. 570 and 572 use
Judicial Form No. 109, which was issued in June 1945,
while TCT No. 571 uses Judicial Form No. 140-D, which was
issued in April 1936.

Factual Antecedents
The main issue in the present case involves the title to Lot No. (ii) TCT Nos. 570 and 572 was signed by Martina L. Arnoco as
557, a parcel of land situated in V. Ranudo and D. Jakosalem Register of Deeds, while TCT No. 571 was signed by
Streets, Cogon Central, Cebu City. Gervasio Lavilles as Acting Register of Deeds.

The petitioners and the respondents are relatives residing in

Lot No. 557. (iii)There are distinct differences in Lavilles' signature as it
appears in TCT No. 571 from his signatures in other TCTs,
Petitioners Filadelfa T. Lausa, Loreta T. Torres, Primitivo such as TCT Nos. 525 and 526.
Tugot, and Anacleto T. Caduhay are the cousins of respondents
Rodrigo Tugot, Purificacion Codilla, Teofra Sadaya, and Second, Mauricia's previous acts show that she acknowledged
Estrellita Galeos; while Mauricia Quilaton is the respondents' Alejandro's ownership over Lot No. 557. Prior to instituting a
mother and the petitioners' aunt-in-law. petition for issuance of a new owner's duplicate in 1993,
Mauricia had been paying Alejandro (and subsequently Aurea)
The respondent Rosita T. Lopez, on the other hand, acquired contributions for the real estate taxes due on Lot No. 557.
the rights of Rodrigo when he mortgaged Lot No. 557-A, a
portion of Lot No. 557, to her. Rodrigo subsequently defaulted Third, Mauricia exercised acts of full ownership over Lot No.
on his loan. 557 only in 1994, after she had filed a petition for the issuance
of a new owner's duplicate, even as she claimed to have owned
The petitioners and respondents, with the exception of Mauricia the lot since 1946.
and Rosita, are all grandchildren of Alejandro Tugot. Alejandro
had possessed Lot No. 557 since September 13, 1915, after it
Fourth, Mauricia failed to present evidence showing how she
was assigned to him by Martin Antonio.
acquired title to Lot No. 557. If indeed the land was purchased
from Martin Antonio, she could have secured a copy of its
Lot No. 557 formed part of the Banilad Friar Estate Lands,
document of sale from the Archives Office, Manila.
which had been bought by the government through Act No.
1120 for distribution to its occupants. Antonio had initially been
Additionally, the RTC held that the petitioners had better title
Lot No. 557's beneficiary, but subsequently assigned his rights
to Lot No. 557 than the respondents. The RTC found that Lot
over Lot No. 557 to Alejandro.
No. 557 had been in the possession of Alejandro since
September 13, 1915, when the lot's owner, Martin Antonio,
Since then, Alejandro possessed Lot No. 557 until his death;
executed a Deed of Assignment in favor of Alejandro. This
thereafter, his children and grandchildren continued to reside
conveyance, together with Alejandro and his heirs' continuous
in the lot. The present controversy arose when the respondents,
payment of Lot No. 557's real estate taxes since 1928, amounts
claiming to be its registered owners, attempted to eject the
to more than thirty years of adverse possession, so that
petitioners from Lot No. 557.
ownership over the lot vested in him.
On January 1993, Mauricia filed before the RTC of Cebu City
As Alejandro's heirs, both the petitioners and respondents are
Branch 17 a petition for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate
entitled to a share in Lot No. 557.
of TCT No. 571, which purportedly covers Lot No. 557. Mauricia
claimed to own TCT No. 571, but lost her owner's duplicate
Lastly, the RTC declared Lopez's TCT No. 143511, which she
during a strong typhoon sometime in 1946. The RTC, after due
acquired when she purchased TCT No. 130517, to be null and
hearing, granted Quilaton's petition and directed the issuance
void. TCT No. 130517 covers Lot No. 557-A, and had been
of a new owner's duplicate of TCT No. 571.
annotated with a Notice of Lis Pendens at the time Lopez
purchased it. Thus, Lopez had knowledge of the dispute over
On September 27, 1994, Mauricia donated Lot No. 557 to her
the ownership of the lot she bought, and could not claim the
children Rodrigo, Purificacion, Teofra and Estrellita. Thus, TCT
defense of a purchaser in good faith. She acquired no greater
No. 571 was cancelled, and re-issued as TCT Nos. 130517,
title to the lot than Rodrigo, who mortgaged TCT No. 130517.
130518, 130519, 130520 and 130521 in the names of Mauricia's
children.1cralawrednad
The respondents filed a motion for reconsideration contesting
the RTC's decision. After the RTC denial of the motion, the
Mauricia's children subsequently performed several acts of
respondents appealed to the CA.
ownership over Lot 571: first, Rodrigo, on March 23, 1995,
mortgaged TCT No. 130517 to Lopez as security for a loan he
The Court of Appeals' ruling
obtained from the latter. Rodrigo subsequently defaulted on his
The CA reversed the RTC's decision, and upheld the validity of
loan, prompting the foreclosure of TCT No. 130517. The land
TCT No. 571 and all the titles originating from it.
covered by TCT No. 130517 was thereafter sold by public
auction to Lopez, for which she was issued TCT No. 143511 on
In upholding the validity of TCT No. 571 (and all the titles
March 31, 1997.
originating from it), the CA emphasized the existence of a copy
of TCT No. 571 in the custody of the Office of the Register of
Second, Mauricia's children filed a complaint for ejectment
Deeds of Cebu City, and noted that it is presumed by law to
against the petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. R-35137, on
have been issued in a regular manner. The application of this
August 4, 1995.
presumption is called for by the purpose of the Torrens system,
which is to promote the stability and integrity of land titles.
In response, the petitioners filed Civil Case No. CEB-17857 for
the annulment of TCT No. 571 and the subsequent titles that
According to the CA, the petitioners have failed to disprove this
originate from TCT No. 571, as well as criminal complaints2 for
presumption of regularity. The pieces of evidence that the
falsification and perjury against the respondents.
petitioners presented (i.e., the tax receipts and Antonio's Deed
of Assignment of Lot No. 557 to Alejandro) do not prove with
The Regional Trial Court's ruling
clear, positive, and convincing evidence that TCT No. 571 had
been fraudulently issued. The payment of real estate taxes over
Lot No. 557 does not prove ownership. The Deed of Assignment,
on the other hand, had been subsequently cancelled, as shown
by the Friar Lands Sale Certificate Register on file with the
DENR. It proves that the lot had been earlier assigned to
Alejandro, but because the assignment was canceled, the
ownership of Lot No. 557 remained with Antonio.
The CA also noted that the lot that Alejandro appears to have
owned was not Lot No. 557 but Lot No. 357. The description of
Lot No. 557 - as set forth by the petitioners in their original
complaint - substantially varies from the actual and precise
technical description of Lot No. 557. Additionally, some of the
documentary evidence in the case (such as tax declarations, tax
receipts and notices of tax delinquency) show that what
Alejandro owned was Lot No. 357, not Lot No. 557.
The CA also pointed out that Alejandro could not have acquired
Lot 557 through acquisitive prescription for two reasons: first,
Mauricia had been in possession of the property since 1946; and
second, a lot registered under the Torrens system cannot be
acquired through acquisitive prescription. Records show that
the lands comprising the Banilad Friar Lands Estate, of which
Lot No. 557 was a part, had been brought under the operation
of the Torrens system on September 23, 1913.
The CA found Lopez to be an innocent purchaser for value.
Applying the Court's ruling in Bank of the Philippine Islands v.
Noblejas, the CA held that Lopez's good faith as a mortgagee
extends to her eventual purchase of the lot during its
foreclosure. Since TCT No. 130517 had no notice of any adverse
claim at the time it was mortgaged to Lopez, then the
subsequent annotation of Notice of Lis Pendens prior to TCT
No. 130517's foreclosure should not affect her status as a
mortgagee-in-good-faith. The clean title presented to Lopez at
the time TCT No. 130517 was mortgaged to her maintains this
status at the time of its foreclosure, and cannot be prejudiced by
the subsequent annotation of a claim to it before the lot is
foreclosed.
Lastly, the CA found that the RTC erred when it did not
immediately dismiss the petitioners' complaint, as their cause
of action had been barred by prescription and laches. An action
for the annulment of title to land prescribes in ten years. The
petitioners filed their complaint only on September 20, 1995,
almost fifty years after Mauricia had been issued TCT No. 571
on July 16, 1946. Thus, the petitioners had slept on their
claimed right over Lot 557; consequently, they are now barred
by laches from seeking redress before the courts.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration assailing the
CA's decision, which motion the CA denied. The denial opened
the way for the present petition for review on certiorari before
this Court.
The present petition
In their present petition, the petitioners seek the reversal of the
CA's decision through their assertion that they have acquired
ownership over Lot No. 557 by acquisitive prescription.
The petitioners claim that the CA committed the following
errors:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
First, the CA erred in upholding the validity of TCT No. 571,
which is a fake and fabricated title;
Second, the CA erred in finding that Mauricia owned and
possessed Lot No. 557, as it was Alejandro who exercised acts of
exclusive ownership and possession over the lot since it was
assigned to him in 1915. The lot Antonio assigned to Alejandro
covered Lot No. 557, although earlier tax declarations indicated
the areas of the lot to be Lot No. 357. This error was corrected
in subsequent tax declarations by the City of Cebu Assessor's
Office in 1997.
Third, the CA erred in holding that Lopez is an innocent
purchaser in good faith, as she knew that the portion of Lot No.
557 being mortgaged to her was in the possession of Filadelfa,
and not Rodrigo. She knew of this possession before she
executed the real estate mortgage contract over the property
with Rodrigo.
Fourth, the CA erred in finding the petitioners' cause of action
barred by prescription and laches, as they discovered the
existence of TCT No. 571 only in August 1995, when Mauricia
and her children instituted ejectment proceedings against them.
In response, the respondents argue that the petitioners have no
cause of action against them because Alejandro's tax
declarations cover Lot No. 357, and not Lot No. 557, which is
covered by their TCTs. They also cited the CA's decision, and
argued that the CA committed no error of law in upholding the
validity of their TCTs.
Lopez, on the other hand, asserted that her status as an
innocent purchaser or mortgagor in good faith had not been
included in the petitioners' amended complaint including her as
an indispensible party, and should thus not have been
considered as an issue in the case. In any case, Lopez asserts
that her title to Lot No. 557-A is valid because she is an
innocent purchaser in good faith.
Issues:
The issues, having been properly joined, present to us the
following questions:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1)Whether the CA erred in finding that the lot that the
petitioners claim to own covers Lot No. 357, and not Lot No.
557;
(2)Whether the CA erred in finding that the respondents, and
not the petitioners, are the owners and possessors of Lot No.
557;
(3)Whether the CA erred in finding Lopez an innocent
purchaser in good faith; and
(4)Whether the CA erred in finding the petitioners' cause of
action to have been barred by prescription and laches.
The Court's Ruling
We find the petition meritorious.
We note at the outset that the Court is not a trier of facts, and
our jurisdiction in cases brought before us from the appellate
court is limited to the review of errors of law.
We have, however, recognized several exceptional situations
that call for a re-evaluation of the CA's factual conclusions,
among them, the situation when the CA's findings are contrary
to that of the trial court, and when the CA manifestly overlooks
relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly
considered, would lead to a different conclusion.3cralawrednad
We find these circumstances in the present case, prompting us
to re-examine the records of the case and to reverse the CA's
decision after due consideration of the records.
The CA erred in finding that the lot that the petitioners
claim to own is Lot No. 357, and not Lot No. 557
The CA, in upholding the validity of Mauricia's title and
ownership over Lot No. 557, pointed out that the lot that
Alejandro claimed to own was not Lot No. 557, but Lot No. 357.
The CA based this conclusion on several tax documents in the
name of Alejandro Tugot, which indicate that the lot covered is
Lot No. 357, and not Lot No. 557.
In so doing, the CA overlooked several key pieces of evidence
presented before the RTC, which had led the latter to conclude
that the designation of Lot No. 357 in Alejandro's tax
declarations actually pertained to Lot No. 557. These pieces of
evidence are as follows:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
First, the testimony of Mr. Antonio Abellana of the City of
Cebu Assessor's Office established that he issued a Certification
of Correction to change Alejandro's tax declarations, which
initially covered Lot No. 357, to Lot No. 557.
According to Abellana, Lot No. 357 is located in a barangay
different from the address found in Alejandro's tax declaration.
The base map of Cebu locates Lot No. 357 to be in Barangay
Day-as, almost five meters from Sikatuna Street, while the
address in Alejandro's erroneous tax declaration indicates that
Lot No. 357 is located in Jakosalem Street.
Second, records of the Cebu City Assessor's Office show that
Lot No. 357 is covered by another tax declaration with an
address corresponding to the city's base map. In this tax
declaration, Lot No. 357 is owned by a certain Antonio Yap.
Third, the deed of donation4 of Lot No. 558, which adjoins Lot
Nos. 557 and 559, recognized Alejandro Tugot as the owner of
Lot No. 557.
We find that these pieces of evidence sufficiently explain that
the lot in Alejandro and Aurea's tax declarations actually
covered Lot No. 557, and its initial designation as Lot No. 357
was an error. The Assessor's Office of Cebu City, which had the
responsibility of classifying, appraising, and assessing real
property in Cebu, had acknowledged this designation to be
erroneous, and subsequently made rectification. This
acknowledgment is not only entitled to the presumption of
regularity; it is also corroborated by the Deed of Donation of an
adjoining lot.
Additionally, we also found other pieces of evidence supporting
the conclusion of the Cebu City Assessor's Office. The tax
declarations in Alejandro and (subsequently) Aurea's names
indicate that they covered the same address as the Lot No. 557
described in the Deed of Assignment that Antonio executed in
Alejandro's favor in 1915. The identity of the addresses in these
two documents show that what the petitioners intended to pay
real property tax for, was the lot covered in the Deed of
Assignment, which was Lot No. 557. Thus, the tax declarations
that placed Lot No. 357 under Alejandro's name actually
pertained to the lot covered by Lot No. 557; its designation as
covered by Lot No. 357 was an error that the Cebu City
Assessor's Office eventually discovered and corrected.
In the same vein, the court-approved subdivision plan for Lot
No. 557 indicated it to be found along Jakosalem Street, the
address of the lot covered by Alejandro and Aurea's tax
declarations. The plan was commissioned for Alejandro and his
children, including Romualdo (Mauricia's husband and the
father of her children), in 1960. That the address of Lot No. 557
in the subdivision plan is identical to the address in Alejandro
and Aurea's tax declarations establishes that what they
actually claim to own is Lot No. 557, and not Lot No. 357.
With this foundation established, we now resolve the issue of
who among them have the better right over Lot No. 557.
The CA erred in finding that the petitioners failed to
prove that TCT No. 571 is a fabricated title
In upholding the validity of Mauricia's TCT No. 571, the CA
held that the petitioners failed to overcome the presumption of
regularity that attended its issuance. The CA emphasized that
a copy of TCT No. 571 is currently with the Register of Deeds,
and that the documents that the petitioners presented do not
prove their ownership over the lot.
The CA's conclusion, however, overlooked the evidence that the
petitioners presented before the RTC to prove that TCT No. 571
is a fabricated title. These pieces of evidence include the TCTs
issued immediately before and after TCT No. 571; TCT No.
16534 (the TCT from which TCT No. 571 allegedly originated);
and several TCTs that contain the signature of the Acting
Register of Deeds who signed TCT No. 571. Taken together, all
these pieces of evidence sufficiently prove, by preponderance of
evidence, that TCT No. 571 is a fabricated title.
We cite with approval the RTC's factual observations and
conclusions, viz:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
First, the text of TCT No. 571 contains glaring discrepancies
with TCT No. 16534, the title indicated in TCT No. 571 as its
precursor.
TCT No. 16534 covered a different area from TCT No. 571. TCT
No. 16534 covered Lot 7005-E-2, which has an area of 3,311
square meters, while TCT No. 571 covers Lot No. 557 with an
area of 525 square meters. Too, TCT No. 16534 was issued in
September 1957, or almost ten years after the title it
supposedly gave rise to was issued in 1946.
Second, TCT No. 571 contains discrepancies when compared
with TCT Nos. 570 and 572, the TCTs that were supposedly
issued before and after TCT No. 571. These discrepancies are as
follows:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(i) TCT Nos. 570 and 572 had both been issued on February 26,
1947, almost a year after TCT No. 571 was issued on July
16, 1946. Since TCT No. 571 was an intervening title
between TCT No. 570 and 572, then it should have also been
issued on February 26, 1947.
(ii) TCT No. 571 used an old form, Judicial Form No. 140-D,
which was revised in June 1945 by Judicial Form No. 109.
Since TCT No. 571 shows that it was issued in 1946, then it
should have used Judicial Form No. 109. Notably, both TCT
Nos. 570 and 572 used the updated Judicial Form No. 109,
as they were issued in 1947.
(iv)TCT Nos. 570 and 572 were signed by Martina L. Arnoco as
Register of Deeds, while TCT No. 571 was signed by
Gervasio Lavilles as Acting Register of Deeds.
(v) There are distinct differences in Lavilles' signature as it
appears in TCT No. 571, compared with his signatures in
other TCTs, such as TCT Nos. 525 and 526.
Additionally, we note that Mauricia's claim that she bought Lot
No. 557 from Antonio is contradicted by the contents of TCT No.
16534.
For a new TCT to be issued, the owner's duplicate of the seller
should have been surrendered to the Registry of Deeds, along
with a copy of the TCT's Deed of Sale. Thus, the seller's TCT
would be cancelled, and the new TCT of the buyer would
indicate the seller's TCT as its TCT of origin.
The text of TCT No. 571 shows that it originated from TCT No.
16534. If indeed TCT No. 571 was issued to Mauricia because
the latter bought Lot No. 557 from Antonio, then TCT No.
16534 should have reflected this transaction.
However, instead of reflecting Antonio's title to Lot No. 557,
TCT No. 16534 shows that it pertained to a different lot, and
had been issued ten years after the issuance of TCT No.
571 to a certain Crispina Lopez.
The original certificate of title from which TCT No. 571 and
TCT No. 16534 originated are also different: TCT No. 571
originated from Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 251-253,
while TCT No. 16534 originated fromOCTNo. 11375.
These discrepancies, taken together with its variations from the
other titles issued around the same time and Mauricia's failure
to present proof of how she acquired the lot from Antonio,
reasonably establish that TCT No. 571 is a fabricated title.
We now proceed to determine whether Alejandro was Lot No.
557's rightful owner.
The CA erred in relying on a fabricated title as basis to
deny Alejandro's claim to acquisitive prescription
The CA, in reversing the RTC's decision recognizing Alejandro's
ownership over Lot No. 571, held that Lot No. 557 could no
longer be acquired through prescription because it had already
been brought under the Torrens system, in Registry Book No.
A-3.
Registry Book No. A-3 refers to the registry book where OCT
No. 251-253 is registered, as indicated in TCT No. 571. Thus,
the CA concluded that Lot No. 557 has been brought under the
Torrens system because TCT No. 571 is already covered by the
system. But as TCT No. 571 is a fabricated title, the CA erred
in relying on its contents to conclude that Lot No. 557 has
already been brought under the Torrens system.
Alejandro Tugot did not acquire Lot No. 557 through
acquisitive prescription
We agree with the CA's conclusion that Lot No. 557 cannot be
acquired through prescription, but for a different reason.
In the present case, the Deed of Assignment between Antonio
and Alejandro was cancelled three months after it was
executed. The Deed, executed on September 13, 1915, was
inscribed with the phrase: "Cancelled December 21, 1915. See
letter # 12332."
Both the trial court and the CA found this inscription to be
sufficient proof that the Deed of Assignment had been cancelled
three months after its execution. As a consequence, the Deed of
Assignment could not have vested Antonio's rights over Lot No.
557 to Alejandro.
Thus, Lot No. 557 reverted to its original status after the Deed
of Assignment was cancelled. It remained subject to the
conditional sale5 between the government and Antonio; under
the Certificate of Sale between the Bureau of Lands and
Antonio, the government should transfer title to Lot No. 557 to
Antonio upon full payment of the lot's purchase price.
The nature of the contract of sale between Antonio and the
government is in line with Section 15 of Act No. 1120, which
provides for the administration, temporary lease, and sale of
friar lands that the government bought through sections 63 to
65 of "An Act temporarily to provide for the administration of
the affairs of civil government in the Philippine Islands, and for
other purposes." These friar lands included the Banilad Estate
Friar Lands, from where Lot No. 557 originated.
Section 15 of Act No. 1120 that applied to Lot No. 557
provides:cralawlawlibrary
Sec. 15. The Government hereby reserves the title to each
and every parcel of land sold under the provisions of this
Act until the full payment of all installments or purchase
money and interest by the purchaser has been made, and
any sale or encumbrance made by him shall be invalid as
against the Government of the Philippine Islands and shall be
in all respects subordinate to its prior claim.
xxxx
According to jurisprudence, Section 15 of Act No. 1120 reserves
to the government the naked title to the friar lands, until its
beneficiaries have fully paid their purchase price. Since the
intent of Act No. 1120 was to transfer ownership of the friar
lands to its actual occupants, the equitable and beneficial title
to the land passes to them the moment the first installment is
paid and a certificate of sale is issued. This right is subject to
the resolutory condition that the sale may be rescinded if the
agreed price shall not be paid in full.
When the Certificate of Sale was executed, Antonio obligated
himself to pay P9.00 as the final installment to purchase Lot
No. 557. His previous lease payments to the lot were applied as
initial installments for the payment of the lot's purchase price
of PI5.16. Upon full payment of the installment and its annual
4% interest, the government was bound to transfer full
ownership of Lot No. 557 to Antonio under Section 122 of Act
No. 496.
While the records of the case do not show any documents or
paper trail showing the actions of the parties to the Certificate
of Sale after the Deed of Assignment was cancelled, we can,
with certainty, rule out the possibility that Alejandro acquired
title to it through prescription.
Three scenarios could have happened after the Deed of
Assignment was cancelled - all of which forego the possibility of
acquisitive prescription.
First, Antonio could have completed payment of the purchase
price of Lot No. 557. Upon full payment, the lot would have
then been registered in Antonio's name.
The Certificate of Sale between Antonio and the government
requires registration under Section 122 of Act No. 496, or the
Land Registration Act of 1902, for the ownership over Lot No.
557 to be transferred to Antonio. Section 122 of Act No. 496
provides:cralawlawlibrary
Section 122. Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands
belonging to the Government of the United States or to the
Government of the Philippine Islands are alienated, granted, or
conveyed to persons or to public or private corporations, the
same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act
and shall become registered lands. It shall be the duty of the
official issuing the instrument of alienation, grant, or
conveyance in behalf of the Government to cause such
instrument, before its delivery to the grantee, to be filed with
the register of deeds for the province where the land lies and to
be there registered like other deeds and conveyances,
whereupon a certificate shall be entered as in other cases of
registered land, and an owner's duplicate certificate issued to
the grantee. The deed, grant, or instrument of conveyance
from the Government to the grantee shall not take effect
as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate as a
contract between the Government and the grantee and as
evidence of authority to the clerk or register of deeds to
make registration. The act of registration shall be the
operative act to convey and affect the lands, and in all
cases under this Act registration shall be made in the
office of the register of deeds for the province where the
land lies. The fees for registration shall be paid by the grantee.
After due registration and issue of the certificate and owner's
duplicate such land shall be registered land for all purposes
under this Act.
Thus, the government could have registered the title to Lot No.
557 in Antonio's name only after he had paid the purchase price
in full. Had Antonio eventually completed the payment of Lot
No. 557's purchase price, it would have been registered under
the Torrens system, through Section 122 of Act No. 496.
Land registered under the Torrens system cannot be acquired
through prescription. As early as 1902, Section 46 of Act No.
496 categorically declared that lands registered under the
Torrens system cannot be acquired by prescription,
viz:cralawlawlibrary
Section 46. No title to registered land in derogation to that of
the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession.
Second, Antonio could have failed to complete payment of Lot
No. 557's purchase price; thus, the naked title to Lot No. 557
remains with the government.
Under Act No. 1120, the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands is
required to register title to the friar lands acquired by the
government through Act No. 496. Section 6 of Act No. 1120, in
particular, provides:cralawlawlibrary
SECTION 6. The title, deeds and instruments of conveyance
pertaining to the lands in each province, when executed and
delivered by said grantors to the Government and placed in the
keeping of the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands, as above
provided, shall be by him transmitted to the register of deeds of
each province in which any part of said lands lies, for
registration in accordance with law. But before transmitting the
title, deeds, and instruments of conveyance in this section
mentioned to the register of deeds of each province for
registration, the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall
record all such deeds and instruments at length in one or more
books to be provided by him for that purpose and retained in
the Bureau of Public Lands, when duly certified by him shall be
received in all courts of the Philippine Islands as sufficient
evidence of the contents of the instrument so recorded
whenever it is not practicable to produce the originals in court.
The law on land registration at that time was Act No. 496,
which established the Torrens system in the Philippines. As
earlier pointed out, a piece of land, once registered under the
Torrens system, can no longer be the subject of acquisitive
prescription.
No certificate of title pertaining to the government's transfer of
ownership of Lot No. 557 was ever presented in evidence.
Assuming, however, that the Chief of the Bureau of Public
Lands failed to register Lot No. 557, the lot could not have been
acquired by Alejandro through prescription, under the rule that
prescription does not lie against the government.
Third, Antonio could have sold his rights to Lot No. 557 to
another person. Assuming he did, only that person could have
stepped into his shoes, and could have either completed
payment of the purchase price of Lot No. 557 and had it
registered in his name; or, he could have failed to pay the
purchase price in full, in which case the naked title to the lot
remains government property.
In all three scenarios, Alejandro could not have acquired
ownership over Lot No. 557 through prescription.
Republic Act No. 9443 and the friar lands
The Court is not unaware of the enactment of Republic Act No.
9443, which confirms the validity of titles covering any portion
of the Banilad Friar Lands with Certificates of Sale and
Assignment of Sale that do not contain the signature of the
then Secretary of the Interior and/or Chief of the Bureau of
Public Lands. It does not apply to TCTs that have been
fraudulently issued and registered.
Republic Act No. 9443, however, does not validate any of the
parties' claims of ownership over Lot No. 557.
Mauricia's title, as earlier established, is fabricated; thus, her
situation falls within the exception expressed under Section 1 of
RA No. 9443, viz:cralawlawlibrary
This confirmation and declaration of validity shall in all
respects be entitled to like effect and credit as a decree of
registration, binding the land and quieting the title thereto and
shall be' conclusive upon and against all persons, including the
national government and all branches thereof; except when, in
a given case involving a certificate of title or a
reconstituted certificate of title, there is a clear evidence
that such certificate of title or reconstituted certificate of
title was obtained through fraud, in which case the solicitor
general or his duly designated representative shall institute the
necessary judicial proceeding to cancel the certificate of title or
reconstituted certificate of title as the case may be, obtained
through such fraud.
With respect to Alejandro, his claim to Lot No. 557 rests on the
Deed of Assignment executed between him and Antonio, which
had been cancelled; hence, it cannot be confirmed through
Republic Act No. 9443.
Effects of the nullity of TCT No. 571
After establishing that neither Mauricia nor Alejandro has title
over Lot No. 557, we now resolve the validity of the TCTs that
originated from TCTNo. 571.
As a general rule, a person transmits only the rights that he
possesses. When innocent third persons, however, purchase or
acquire rights over the property relying on the correctness of its
certificate of title, courts cannot disregard the rights they
acquired and order the cancellation of the certificate. As the
third paragraph of section 53 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree,
provides:cralawlawlibrary
Section 53. xxx
xxxx
In all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may
pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties
to such fraud without prejudice, however, to the rights of
any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title. After
the entry of the decree of registration on the original petition or
application, any subsequent registration procured by the
presentation of a forged duplicate certificate of title, or a forged
deed or other instrument, shall be null and void.
Thus, innocent purchasers in good faith may safely rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor, and neither
the law nor the courts can oblige them to go behind the
certificate and investigate again the true condition of the
property. They are only charged with notice of the liens and
encumbrances on the property that are noted on the certificate.
Jurisprudence defines innocent purchaser for value as "one who
buys the property of another, without notice that some other
person has a right or interest in such property and pays a
full price for the same, at the time of such purchase or
before he has notice of the claims or interest of some other
person in the property."
PD 1529 has expanded the definition of an innocent purchaser
for value to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other
encumbrancer for value.
Neither PD 1529 nor jurisprudence, however, has included an
innocent donee to the definition, and for good reason. An
innocent purchaser for value pays for the full price of the
property, while a donee receives the property out of the donor's
liberality. Additionally, what the law does not include, it
excludes, and a donee is not included in the expansion of the
term innocent purchaser for value.
Applying these principles of law in the case at hand, we hold
that the Deed of Donation Mauricia issued in favor of her
children immediately after getting a copy of TCT No. 571 could
not have transferred ownership over Lot No. 557 to her
children. Since TCT No. 571 is a fabricated title, it does not
indicate ownership over Lot No. 557; thus, the Deed of Donation
involving TCT No. 571 could not have conveyed the ownership
of Lot No. 557 to Mauricia's children.
Neither could her children claim the status of an innocent
purchaser in good faith, as they received the property through
donation.
The TCTs issued to Mauricia's children pursuant to the
donation should thus be cancelled, as they do not signify
ownership over Lot No. 557.
We also note several circumstances that cast doubt over the
ignorance of Mauricia's children regarding the fabricated
nature of TCT No. 571, viz: (1) the petitioners are their close
relatives, who have been residing in Lot No. 557 as early as
1928; (2) their father, Romualdo, signed and recognized a
subdivision plan of Lot No. 557 that would divide the lot among
all of Alejandro's heirs, including the petitioners; (3) their
mother executed the deed of donation as soon as she acquired a
copy of TCT No. 571; (4) their mother's nonpayment of taxes
due Lot No. 557 since 1946; and (5) the payment of real
property taxes only to facilitate the subdivision of Lot No. 557
among them.
Lopez is not an innocent purchaser for value of Lot 5 57-A
We now determine Lopez's claim that she is an innocent
purchaser for value of Lot No. 557-A, and should thus be
allowed to keep her title over it.
The CA, in affirming Lopez's title over Lot No. 557-A, held that
she was an innocent mortgagee for value. According to the CA,
TCT No. 130517 had no encumbrances and liens at the time it
was mortgaged to Lopez, and this status extended to the time
that TCT No. 130517 was foreclosed to answer for Rodrigo's
loan.
We cannot agree with the CA's conclusion.
As a general rule, a person dealing with registered land has a
right to rely on the Torrens certificate of title and to dispense
with the need of further inquiring over the status of the lot.
Jurisprudence has established exceptions to the protection
granted to an innocent purchaser for value, such as when the
purchaser has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that
would compel a reasonably cautious man to inquire into the
status of the lot; or of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor;
or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to
inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation.
The presence of anything that excites or arouses suspicion
should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the certificate
and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of
the certificate. One who falls within the exception can neither
be denominated as innocent purchaser for value nor a
purchaser in good faith, and hence does not merit the protection
of the law.
In particular, the Court has consistently held that that a buyer
of a piece of land that is in the actual possession of persons
other than the seller must be wary and should investigate the
rights of those in possession. Without such inquiry, the buyer
can hardly be regarded as a buyer in good faith.
We find that Lopez knew of circumstances that should have
prodded her to further investigate the Lot No. 557-A's status
before she executed a mortgage contract over it with Rodrigo.
In the pre-trial brief she submitted before the trial court, Lopez
made the following admissions:cralawlawlibrary
xxx Only after these checking did an actual inspection of the
properties took (sic) place, but on this occasion, unfortunately,
none of the plaintiffs, especially plaintiff Filadelfa T. Lausa,
who is found lately to be residing nearby, furnished her the
information of the present claims.
She likewise made the same admission in an affidavit,
viz:cralawlawlibrary
6. The properties which were mortgaged were checked and no
one at that time, even plaintiff Filadelfa T. Lausa who is just
residing nearby, disputed that the absolute owners thereof were
the spouses Rodrigo and Ligaya Tugot.
While these admissions pertain to the petitioners' act of not
telling Lopez of the status of Lot No. 557-A, it implies that she
had inspected the property, and accordingly found that Rodrigo
did not reside in Lot No. 557-A.
Records of the case show that Filadelfa resided in Lot No. 557-A
at the time Lopez executed the real estate mortgage with
Rodrigo. In August 1995, Rodrigo and his siblings filed an
ejectment case against the petitioners Filadelfa Lausa and
Anacleto Caduhay - Filadelfa resides in Lot No. 557-A while
Anacleto's in Lot 557-B. Notably, this ejectment case was filed
five months after Lopez had entered into the real estate
mortgage contract. Thus, at the time Lopez inspected Lot No.
557, she would have found Filadelfa residing in it, and not
Rodrigo.
That Filadelfa - and not Rodrigo - resided in Lot No. 557-A
should have prompted Lopez to make further inquiries over its
status. Further inquiries with the lot owners of surrounding
property could have informed her of its actual status. Instead,
she contented herself with checking the copy of the title to Lot
No. 557-A against the copy in the Registry of Deeds of Cebu,
which she had done prior to the actual inspection of Lot No.
557-A. The law cannot protect Lopez's rights to Lot 557-A given
her complacency.
Further, the status of an innocent-purchaser for value or
innocent mortgagor for value is established by the person
claiming it, an onus probandi that Lopez failed to meet.
In her memorandum, Lopez urged the Court to acknowledge
her rights over Lot No. 557-A, arguing that the declaration of
her status as an innocent-purchaser and innocent mortgagor is
a non-issue because it was never pleaded in her co-respondents'
amended complaint. She also pointed out that a valid title can
emerge from a fabricated title, and essentially invoked the
innocent purchaser for value doctrine.
The amended complaint alleges that Lopez's status as current
owner of Lot 557-A prejudices the rights of the petitioners, who
are its true owners. The circumstances regarding how Lopez
acquired ownership over Lot No. 557-A had also been pleaded
therein.
Verily, the amended complaint does not need to allege Lopez's
status as an innocent purchaser or mortgagor in good faith
precisely because it was incumbent upon her to allege and prove
this to defend her title to Lot No. 557-A. It merely needed to
allege a cause of action against Lopez, (which it did by alleging
the circumstances surrounding Lopez's ownership of Lot No.
557-A) and that it prejudices the petitioners' rights as its true
owners.
Further, Lopez chose to ignore in her Memorandum the
petitioners' contention that she knew that Filadelfa Lausa, and
not Rodrigo, resided in Lot No. 557-A. To reiterate, Lopez has
the burden of proving her status as an innocent purchaser for
value in order to invoke its application. Failing in this, she
cannot avail of the protection the law grants to innocent
purchasers for value.
The CA erred in finding that the petitioners' claim of
ownership over Lot No. 557 had been barred by
prescription and laches
The outcome of the present case dispenses with the need for a
discussion regarding extinctive prescription and laches.
We note, however, that the CA erred in applying the principle of
prescription and laches to the petitioners' cause of action
involving Lot No. 557.
An action for annulment of title or reconveyance based on fraud
is imprescriptible where the plaintiff is in possession of the
property subject of the fraudulent acts. One who is in actual
possession of a piece of land on a claim of ownership thereof
may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is
attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right.
The records of the case show that the petitioners resided in the
property at the time they learned about TCT No. 571. Being in
possession of Lot No. 557, their claim for annulment of title had
not expired. Their ownership of Lot No. 571, however, is a
different matter.
Effects of the Court's decision
Our decision in the present case does not settle the ownership
of Lot No. 557. To recapitulate, our examination of the records
and the evidence presented by the petitioners and the
respondents lead us to conclude that neither of them own Lot
No. 557.
Despite the intent of Act No. 1120 and Republic Act No. 9443 to
transfer ownership of the Banilad Friar Estate Lands to its
occupants, we cannot settle the ownership of Lot No. 557 in the
present case.
Indeed, the petitioners and the respondents are the actual
occupants of Lot No. 557, and they and their families (with the
exception of Rosita Lopez) have resided in the lot since 1915.
However, as we have discussed above, neither party had been
able to establish their right of ownership, much less possession,
of Lot No. 557. The petitioners anchor their claim on acquisitive
prescription, which does not lie against registered land or the
government. The respondents, on the other hand, presented
spurious TCTs. Thus, no amount of liberal interpretation of Act
No. 1120 or Republic Act No. 9443 could give either party the
right over the lot.
Neither can we ignore the evidence showing that none of them
could rightfully own Lot No. 557. The petitioners' cancelled
deed of assignment and tax declarations cannot establish their
ownership over Lot No. 557; especially since the operation of
pertinent laws prevented the possibility of acquisitive
prescription. The respondents' TCT No. 571, on the other hand,
had several discrepancies indicating that it was a fake.
The exercise of the Court's judicial power settles actual
controversies between parties, through which the Court
establishes their legally enforceable and demandable rights. We
determine the parties' rights based on the application of the law
to the facts established through the pieces of evidence
submitted by the parties. The application of the law on the facts
of the present case establishes that neither party has a legally
enforceable right over Lot No. 557.
Given this situation, we direct that the records of the case be
transmitted to the Land Management Bureau6 for further
investigation and appropriate action over Lot No. 557 of the
Banilad Friar Estate Lands.
Additionally, we direct that a copy of the records of the case be
transmitted to the Ombudsman, for further investigation
regarding how the fake TCTs covering Lot No. 557 ended up in
the Registry of Deeds of Cebu City, and for the criminal and
administrative investigation of government officials liable for
them.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for
Review on Certiorari is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court of
Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 63248 is MODIFIED, and
the following titles are declared null and void: (1) TCT No. 571
issued to Mauricia Quilaton; (2) TCT No. 130517 issued to
Rodrigo Tugot; (3) TCT No. 130518 issued to Purificacion
Codilla; (4) TCT No. 130519 issued to Teofra Sadaya; (5) TCT
No. 130520 issued to Estrellita Galeos; (5) TCT No. 130521
issued to Rodrigo Tugot; and (6) TCT No. 143511 issued to
Rosita Lopez.
The claim of the petitioners Filadelfa T. Lausa, Loreta T.
Torres, Primitivo Tugot and Anacleto T. ]Caduhay for
recognition of their ownership over Lot No. 557 is DENIED.
We DIRECT that a copy of the records of the case be
transmitted to the Land Management Bureau and the
Ombudsman for further investigation and appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-31303-04 May 31, 1978
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ALFREDO V. DE
OCAMPO, and OSCAR ANGLO, respondents.
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio and Assistant Solicitor General
Dominador L. Quiroz for petitioner.
Eusebio V. Navarro, Eugenio G. Gemarino and Eusebio P. Navarro
for respondent Alfredo V. de Ocampo.
Vicente F. Delfin and V. del Rosario & Associates for respondent
Oscar Anglo.
SANTOS, J.:
An appeal by certiorari filed on December 5, 1969 by petitioner,
Republic of the Philippines (Republic, for short), from the resolution
of the Court of Appeals dated August 21, 1969 1 dismissing
petitioner's appeal in CA-G. R. Nos. 40683-84-R, as well as from the
resolution of the said Court dated November 14, 1969 2 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof
The relevant and essential factual and procedural — antecedents
follow. Both Republic and respondents Alfredo V. de Ocampo and
Oscar Anglo claim ownership over the same lots, i.e,, Nos. 817 and
2509 of the Sagay-Escalante Cadastre, Negros Occidental, subject
matter of this litigation. The basis of Republic's claim is that said
lots were bequeathed to the Bureau of Education (now Bureau of
Public Schools) on September 21, 1926 by the late Esteban
Jalandoni through his will. 3 Republic further alleged that the said
parcels of land were already registered under the Torrens System
"before 1919 in a cadastral case in the name of Meerkamp and
Company" in whose favor Original Certificate of Title (OCT, for
short) No. 370 was issued, that said company sold the lots to
Esteban Jalandoni who was issued Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT, for short) No. 1251: that TCT No. 6014 was issued to the
Bureau of Education when the subject property was bequeathed to
it; and that as a matter of fact, a sugar quota (Plantation Audit No.
24-10) was issued for the lots under the name of the Bureau of
Education. 4 The lots have a total area of 289.47 hectares. 5
Respondent de Ocampo, upon the other hand, predicates his claim
on an application for registration of the same Lots Nos. 817 and
2509 in Land Registration Case No. N-4, LRC Rec. No. N-19196,
wherein a decree of registration No. 105538 was issued over the
lots, followed by the issuance in his name of OCT No. 576, on
October 1, 1965. 6 He averred that the lots were unregistered lands
belonging to and possessed by him, by virtue of a donation dated
November 10, 1911 from one Luis Mosquera. 7
Respondent Anglo intervened in the case on February 21, 1966,
having allegedly bought the same lots from respondent de Ocampo
on January 6, 1966. TCT No. 42217 was issued to him (Anglo) on
January 12, 1966. 8
Procedurally, the records show that the Bureau of Public Schools,
then represented by the Provincial Fiscal of Negros Occidental
initiated on December 24, 1958, a forcible entry and detainer case
against de Ocampo over Lots Nos. 817 and 2509. On appeal, the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental dismissed the
complaint (Civil Case No. 5353).9
Then on June 29, 1960, de Ocampo filed an application for
registration of the same two parcels of land in Land Registration
Case No. N-4 LRC Rec. No. N-19196, entitled "Alfredo V. de
Ocampo, Applicant, v. Republic of the Philippines, Oppositor
Republic filed its opposition; in due time. 10
On May 2, 1961, Republic, represented by the Solicitor General,
filed a complaint against de Ocampo with the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental (Branch VII) for the recovery of
possession of the subject lots, with prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction, docketed therein as Civil Case
No, 264 (6154), entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Alfredo v. de
Ocampo, Defendant, " 11 De Ocampo averred in his answer that the
properties alleged to have been donated by Esteban Jalandoni to
the then Bureau of Education were different from the properties
involved in this case, the former being titled lands (TCT No. 1251)
containing two million nine hundred and twelve thousand four
hundred and seventy four square meters (2,912,474), while Lots
Nos. 817 and 2509 applied for by de Ocampo and which Republic
sought to recover were unregistered lands, and that granting,
without admitting, that they are the same lands, the court no
longer had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action since
the issue of possession over said lots was already decided by the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. 12
On May 26, 1961, a preliminary hearing was held before Branch IV
of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental where the land
registration case was pending, but inasmuch as the issues involved
in both Civil Case No. 264 (6154) for recovery of possession and the
land registration case were Identical, the parties agreed to a joint
trial, this time before Branch VI I, Judge Jose D. Divinagracia,
presiding, where the civil case was pending. 13
After a joint trial of the above-mentioned two (2) cases, the Court of
First Instance rendered judgment on August 3, 1965, dismissing the
complaint in Civil Case No. 264 (6154) and adjudging the
registration of the subject two lots in the name of the then applicant
de Ocampo. On October 1, 1966, OCT No. 576 was issued in his
name. 14
It is admitted by Republic that it received a copy of the decision on
August 13, 1965 15 but no appeal was taken therefrom. However,
Republic later filed with the trial court on December 28, 1965, a
"Petition for Relief from Judgment with Preliminary Injunction
Pending Proceeding 16 (petition, for short) praying, among other
things, that de Ocampo be restrained from enforcing the decision
dated 3 August 1965, and that after the hearing, an order be issued
declaring the decision to be not yet final add executory, and
granting Republic the right to file a motion for reconsideration
and/or appeal within the period granted, to commence upon receipt
of the order.
The petition alleged inter alia that the Republic's failure to appeal
was due to accident, mistake and/or excusable negligence,
specifically, stating that its docket clerk, Cesar Salud, merely
committed excusable negligence when he inadvertently attached
the copy of the decision to the file of another case; that it was only
on November 5, 1965, that Cesar Salud found the copy of the same;
and that petitioner has a substantial cause of action in Civil Case
No. 264 (6154) and a good and substantial defense in Land
Registration Case No. N-4 Rec. No. N-19196.
An opposition to the petition was filed by respondent de Ocampo on
February 5, 1966 17 on the ground that the same was filed beyond
the reglementary period. The petition was, however, given due
course on January 11, 1966. 18 On February 21, 1966, respondent
Oscar Anglo filed a motion for intervention alleging that he bought
the subject two (2) Lots Nos. 817 and 1509 from respondent de
Ocampo on January 6, 1966 and that TCT No. 42217 of the Register
of Deeds for Negros Occidental was issued to him (Anglo) on
January 12, 1966. 19 He also filed an answer in opposition to
Republic's petition for relief from judgment 20 on the grounds,
among others, that the decree of registration and certificate of title
had already been issued and that a writ of preliminary injunction
will not lie to restrain enforcement of the decision of the trial court.
On June 6, 1966, after respondents filed their respective
memoranda, the trial court dismissed the Republic's petition for
lack of competent proof, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 38, of the Rules
of Court which the court said required a hearing. 21
On July 25, 1966, petitioner Republic filed a motion for
reconsideration of the aforesaid order dismissing its petition; 22 and
on August 4, 1966, it filed a manifestation averring additional
grounds in support of the motion for reconsideration. 23 Respondent
Anglo and de Ocampo opposed the same. 24
On September 28, 1966, Republic filed an "Amended Petition for
Relief from Judgment and/or Review of Decree with Preliminary
Injunction 25 (Amended Petition, for short). In specific regard to the
petition for review of the decree, Republic contended, inter alia, that
actual fraud had been perpetrated by respondent de Ocampo in
securing the lower court's decision ordering the registration of the
lots in his name, as well as the issuance of the decree of registration
and the corresponding certificate of title, on the grounds which,
briefly restated. advert to respondent de Ocampo's alleged
misrepresentations that the two parcels of land applied for by him
in the land registration case were "different from the two parcels of
land of the same lot numbers, technical descriptions and areas
belonging to the Government, knowing such allegations to be false,
the truth of the matter being that said parcels of land are the same
property owned by the Government"; 26 that there was previous
registration of the same parcels of land, Lots Nos. 817 and 2509,
under the Torrens System in favor of Meerkamp and Company
which later sold the same to Jalandoni who, in turn, gave the lots to
the Bureau of Education as a legacy and that the Court of First
Instance no longer had jurisdiction to decree again the registration
of Lots Nos. 817 and 2509, in favor of respondent de Ocampo, in
view of the earlier registration of the same lands in favor of
Meerkamp and Company.
Additionally, Republic claimed that its counsel was not given notice
of de Ocampo's motion and the corresponding order dated
September 16, 1965, for the issuance of the decree of registration
and the issuance of the decree itself by the Land Registration
Commission, in violation of its constitutional rights to due process",
27 that it has also been "in continuous peaceful, adverse, open and
public owner and possessor, in good faith and with just title" of the
lots "deriving the fruits and products of said properties and
appropriating them to the purpose and purposes they were intended
for"; 28 that they were in fact declared for tax purposes;29 that on
April 11, 1927, the lands were leased for ten (10) years but the lease
was amended several times to extend the same; 30 that on
September 17, 1964, Republic's counsel filed a "Petition for an
Order to Produce the Original Documentary Exhibits and Submit
Same to the NBI for Examination, 31 Which petition was
communicated to de Ocampo's lawyers, Atty. Gemarino and
Garingalao, earlier on September 7, 1964; that they did not object
or state that the originals were burned or lost; that it was only on
September 28, 1964 that de Ocampo's lawyers revealed for the first
time in their "Manifestation and Reply" that the purported originals
were burned in the house of Atty. Gemarino on May 16, 1963; 32
and that the "supposed originals were fake and their alleged
burning was false and these pretenses were intentionally resorted
to only to evade the examination of the spurious documents by the
NBI and as camouflage to hide their fraudulent character. 33
On October 4, 1966, the trial court set, aside its order of June 6,
1966, dismissing the petition for relief, 34 having found Republic's
motion for reconsideration well-founded, and scheduled December 1
and 2, 1966, for Republic's witnesses to testify, and likewise gave
respondents, a chance to oppose the amended petition. Respondents
and Republic filed their opposition 35 and reply; 36 respectively.
Republic alleged in the said reply that "(T)he lands in question and
their incomes are used exclusively for a public purpose: public
education. 37
In a subsequent hearing on June 6, 1967, the trial court ordered
Republic to present its evidence in the absence of respondents, who
objected thereto for lack of jurisdiction, the parcels of land having
been already registered in the name of respondent de Ocampo and
in fact transferred to an alleged buyer in good faith, the other
private respondent, Anglo.
On August 30, 1967, the trial court rendered its decision on the
Amended Petition 38 against Republic, upon resolution of what it
considered the "decisive" issue, i.e., that the allegations in the said
petition did not constitute actual and extrinsic fraud which is the
only ground available to review or reopen a decree in cadastral
cases pursuant to Section 38 of Act 496. 39
On the other issues, the trial court found that it was through
mistake, accident and excusable negligence that the decision of
August 3, 1965 was not brought to the attention of Solicitor Emerito
Salva "as it was inadvertently clipped to the record of another case".
40 However, while the petition for relief itself another case was
filed within the reglementary period prescribed in Section 3, Rule
38, of the Rules of Court 41 the remedy of relief from judgment was
no longer available since the decree, and later the title, were
already issued in the name of respondent de Ocampo. 42 It also
held that the amended petition was still legally available as it was
filed within one (1) year after the issuance of the decree, pursuant
to Section 38 of Act No. 496, "in case of actual fraud" and that it had
jurisdiction to entertain the amended petition and to receive
evidence in support thereof, 43 but it had to deny the relief prayed
for on grounds already adverted to. In regard to respondent Anglo's
claim that the petition for review was no longer tenable as against
him because he was a purchaser in good faith, the trial court ruled
that competent evidence to that effect should be submitted
considering, among other things, that the case was pending when
he acquired his interest. 44 Finally, it held that the fact that the
Republic was not notified of the motion and the corresponding
issuance of the decree and title was immaterial since petitions for
issuance of decrees in cadastral cases are analogous to petitions for
execution in ordinary cases and parties are not entitled to notice
thereof as a matter of right. 45 Thus —
In the light of the decision of this Court dated August 3. 1965,
Section 39 of Act No. 496 and the authorities cited ... this court is
persuaded to conclude as it hereby holds, that the evidence adduced
by the petitioner in this incident does not establish actual and
constructive fraud which is the only kind of fraud that is considered
a legal ground to review, reopen or set aside the decree which has
already been issued in the name of Alfredo V. de Ocampo.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition for Relief from Judgment
and/or Review of Decree is hereby dismissed without
pronouncement as to costs. 46
From the said decision, Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals,
docketed therein as CA-G.R. Nos. 4083-84-R. Private respondents
de Ocampo and Anglo moved to dismiss the appeal which was
opposed by petitioner, Republic. 47 A supplemental motion to the
same effect was later filed by respondent de Ocampo for failure of
the record on appeal to show on its face that it was filed on time, 48
followed by an ex parte motion to consider the Solicitor General to
have waived his right to oppose the said supplemental motion to
dismiss and that the case be submitted for resolution. 49 A new
party, Salvacion Marañon, sought to intervene in the case and also
filed a motion to dismiss the appeal before respondent appellate
court.
In its minute resolution of August 21, 1969, 50 the Court of Appeals
resolved —
(1) To DISMISS ... the appeal ... for failure of the record on appeal
to show on its face that the record on appeal was filed within the
period fixed by the Rules (Secs. 3 & 6, Rule 41, Sec. 1[a] & [b), Rule
50, Rules of Court), it appearing that appellant's motion for
extension of 20 days from October 14, 1967 to file the record on
appeal was never granted by the lower court (there being no
showing to that effect in the record on appeal); and even if there
was such an order granting it, the extension asked for would have
expired on November 3, 1967 and, therefore, the record on appeal
filed on November 9,1967 was filed six days late ...; and
(2) to DENY the motion to intervene of intervenor Salvacion
Maranon following the doctrine enunciated in Hant, et al. vs.
O'Leary, et al., page 993. At any rate, the purpose of intervening;
which is to join the appellees in their motion to dismiss the appeal
of the appellant, has already been served by the dismissal of the
instant appeal.
On September 11, 1969, Republic filed a motion for reconsideration
51 but on November 14, 1969, the Court of Appeals —
RESOLVED TO DENY the said motion for reconsideration. Killings
in the pertinent cases are equally applicable to the Republic of the
Philippines where the latter is the appellant that recourse to 'the
original records is immaterial because it is what appears in the
record on appeal that is essential. 52
Hence, this appeal by certiorari on the following assignment of
errors, i.e., that the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that — (1)
prescription, the statute of limitations and laches do not lie against
the Republic, as a sovereign state, and that, it is not bound or
prejudiced by the faults or mistakes of its officers and employees,
(2) the dismissal of Republic's appeal is not in accordance with the
liberal construction of the Rules of Court and the promotion of its
object to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of actions and proceedings; (3) the trial court has no
jurisdiction to entertain the application for land registration of
Alfredo V. de Ocampo on the ground that Lots Nos. 817 and 2509
were already registered under the Torrens System before 1919; (4)
the dismissal of Republic's appeal placed technicality over,
substance; and (5) the dismissal of Republic's appeal will abet and
promote land grabbing. 53
Private respondents in turn stress in their respective briefs, inter
alia, (1) that Republic shed its immunity and sovereignty and
assumed the garb of an ordinary private litigant when it initiated
an action for forcible entry and detainer case over Lots Nos. 817 and
2509 against respondent de Ocampo. filed I s opposition in the land
registration case, and instituted Civil Case No. 264 (6154); 54 (2)
that Republic should comply with the mandatory and jurisdictional
requirements of the rules on perfection of appeals, citing cases; 55
that there cannot be one set of Rules for ordinary private litigants,
and another set for the State otherwise the set-up will result in the
denial of due process and equal protection of law to private litigants
as well as chaos in the administration of justice; 56 and (4) that
public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of
occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some
definite date fixed by the, law. 57
The threshold and, in the ultimate analysis, the decisive issue
raised by this petition is whether the dismissal by respondent.
Court of Appeals of Republic's appeal from the decision of the trial
court denying its Amended Petition, is not proper and should be set
aside as contended by Republic, or correct and should be
maintained, as argued by respondents. The issue — framed in the
context of the suit's true significance to the parties involved in this
protracted proceeding and in the light of the value the protagonists
attach to the outcome of the litigation — may be stated thus-Should
the government, represented by petitioner Republic not be
permitted by respondent Court of Appeals to show that it stands Lo
lose thru fraudulent machinations close to three hundred (300)
hectares of prime sugar land to the private respondents who have
allegedly secured their titles to these holdings long after the same
parcels of land were already titled in the name of the original
owner, Meerkamp and Company and, therefore, the trial court's
action in directing the issuance of the title in the name of
respondent de Ocampo is null and void ab initio and of no legal
effect, simply because petitioner Republic failed to show in its
record on appeal that it was perfected on time and that it actually
filed its record on appeal six (6) days late?
Respondent Court of Appeals, in a very simplistic approach, which
disregards the substantive merits of the appeal dismissed, the same
on the grounds that the record on appeal did not show on its face
that it was perfected on time, and, additionally, that even if it were
to be assumed that the motion for extension of 20 days to file the
record on appeal was indeed granted, the appeal was still not
perfected on time because the record on appeal was filed November
9, six (6) days after November 3, 1967, when petitioner's requested
extension expired.
If respondents' line of reasoning were to be upheld, the dismissal of
the appeal may be sustained. For, as stated, in its notice of appeal
filed on October 12, 1967, petitioner Republic received a copy of the
decision of the trial court on September 14, 1967. 58 Therefore, it
had until October 14, 1967 within which to file its record on appeal.
The record on appeal does not show that the extension prayed for
was granted, but the lower court in its order of December 4, 1967
approved the same, as there was no opposition to its approval.
There is also no mention in the order approving the record on
appeal as to whether or not it was filed on time. The record on
appeal is, however, dated November 9,1967. Assuming then that
this was also the actual filing date, and on the further assumption
that the 20day extension was impliedly granted with its approval, it
was still filed six (6) days late, after the requested extension expired
on November 3, 1967. 59 And, as to the legal ground for the
dismissal on the foregoing bases, this Court has repeatedly
construed Section 6, Rule 41, of the Rules of Court 60 as mandatory
and jurisdictional in nature, non-compliance with which justifies
the dismissal of the appeal. 61
However, a consideration in depth of the unique and peculiar facts
attendant to this case and the procedural and substantive
implications of the dismissal of the appeal now sought to be
reviewed and reconsidered; and a due and proper regard to the
merits of the case rather than a fascile reliance on procedural rules,
compel this Court to reverse and set aside the dismissal of
Republic's appeal by respondent Court of Appeals for the following
reasons, viz: (1) Should Republic prove that the subject Lots Nos.
817 and 2509 were registered in favor of Meerkamp and Company
before 1919, the trial court's decision decreeing again the same lots
in the name of respondent de Ocampo in 1965 is null and void ab
initio for lack of jurisdiction and a fatal infirmity necessarily
attaches to the said decision; (2) There are strong and substantial
allegations of fraudulent misrepresentations and machinations
employed by respondent de Ocampo in securing his title Relevant to
this is The express finding of the trial court that The Petition for
Relief was filed within the reglementary period prescribed in
Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, and the Amended Petition
was filed within one year from issuance of the decree. If the appeal
is dismissed without considering its merits, the above periods will
resumed to run and will lapse, and the reliefs sought herein will be
forever foreclosed to Republic; (3) Assuming that respondents can
invoke, the material data rule, and/or the fact that Republic's
appeal was filed out of time because the record On appeal was
submitted to the Court six (6) days beyond the requested extension
of 20 days, it always in the power of this Court to suspend its rules
or to except certain cases therefrom whenever courtervailing
considerations so warrant; and (4) This Court, is not powerless to
prevent gross miscarriage of Justice, which would follow if
Republic's appeal is dismissed — since it stands to lose close to 300
hectares of prime sugar land already titled in its name and devoted
to educational purposes — if it is true that the land registration
court was without jurisdiction to issue a Second decree of
registration in favor of respondent de Ocampo and, if it is also true
that fraudulent misrepresentations and machinations attended
respondent de Ocampo's application for registration and likewise
prevented Republic from exposing the fake exhibits, on the basis of
which he secured his title. 62
1. Specifically both Republic and respondents claim ownership over
the same Lots Nos. 811 and 2509, hence, this controversy. If
Republic's contentions are true that the said lots had been
registered twice, with OCT No. 370 issued in favor of Meerkamp
and Company before 1919 and another, OCT No. 576, issued in the
name of respondent de Ocampo in 1965 — or some forty-six (46)
years later — then the decision of the trial court, sitting as land
registration court, is null and void ab initio and suffers from a fatal
infirmity, which is also a ground for the review of a decree of
registration. provided no innocent purchaser for value will be
prejudiced. 63
It is very significant in this connection that respondent de Ocampo
admitted the donation of Jalandoni in favor of the Bureau of
Education, but averred that the lots so donated were titled (TCT
No. 1251), 64 while Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 applied for by him in
the land registration case were "unregistered. 65 Yet, both parties
claim to be the owners of the same Lots Nos. 817 and 2509.
Respondent de Ocampo also gave the area of the lots covered by
TCT No. 1251, in the name of Jalandoni, as two million nine
hundred and twelve thousand four hundred and seventy four
(2,912,474) square meters, or 291 hectares plus. 66 Coincidentally,
Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 claimed by Republic have a total area of
289.47 hectares, 67 or only about two (2) hectares less. These
factors, brought to light by respondent de Ocampo himself, cannot
simply be ignored in reaching the conclusion that the disputed
resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals be reversed.
It is also important to advert to the documentary exhibits adduced
by Republic in the hearing of the Amended Petition below, one of
which was a certification dated November 8, 1952 signed by the
Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental, stating that on May 13,
1919, there was registered a sale executed by Meerkamp and
Company in favor of Esteban Jalandoni and as a result OCT No,
370 in the name of the Company was cancelled and TCT No. 1251
was issued to Jalandoni; that TCT No. 1251 was later cancelled by
virtue of the will of Jalandoni leaving the parcel of land to the then
Bureau of Education; that TCT No. 6014 was correspondingly
issued to the Bureau of Education; and that lease contracts were
annotated in TCT No. 6014 in favor of Francisco Copper, executed
by the Division Superintendent of Schools. 68 However, the above
certification does not mention the lot numbers, and no certificates of
title were exhibited in court, the incumbent Register of Deeds
having declared that the titles could not be found in his office. 69
The trial court also made the express finding that the alleged deed
of donation by Luis Mosquera in favor of respondent de Ocampo,
dated November 10, 1911, acknowledged before one Notary Public
John Boardman does not appear in his notarial book which is on file
in the Bureau of Record Management, Manila, from October 16, 191
1 to May, 1913. 70
The Provincial Assessor of Negros Occidental likewise issued a
certification, dated November 29, 1966, stating that Lots Nos. 817
and 2509 were never declared in the name of Mosquera. 71 His
later certification states that the said lots were assessed in the
name of the Bureau of Education, and that the technical
descriptions in the Bureau of Lands records show that the same lots
were in the name of Meerkamp and Company. 72
Authorities are in agreement that a land registration court is
without jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already
registered in an earlier registration case, and that the second
decree entered for the same land is null and void. 73 If there is no
valid and final judgment by the land registration court to speak of,
then the filing of an admittedly late appeal from the decision
denying the Amended Petition would be immaterial and of no
moment, in so far as these proceedings are concerned in view of the
congenitally fatal infirmity that attaches to the main decision.
decreeing for the second time the registration of the same Lots Nos.
817 and 2509 in favor of respondent de Ocampo, despite an earlier
registration in the name of Meerkamp and Company.
Jurisprudence holds that the appellant's failure to perfect an appeal
on time, "although ordinarily decisive, carries no persuasive force"
and may be completely disregarded if the trial court acted without
jurisdiction. 74 As held in United States v. Jayme, 75 lack of
jurisdiction. la jurisdiction over the subject matter is fatal and may
be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Jurisdiction is conferred
by the sovereign authority which organizes the court; it is given
only by law, and in the manner prescribed by law and an objection
on the lack of such jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties. The
infirmity cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by
express consent, 76 or by win of the parties. 77
In the interest of justice, which is the paramount consideration in
all litigations, and especially considering the cloud surrounding the
decision of the land registration court, as aforesaid, the more
judicious course to follow is for respondent Court of Appeals to
entertain Republic's appeal, not to dismiss it, so that if it finds the
same to be meritorious, and the decision appealed from is reversed,
the correct Identity of the lots that were donated to the then Bureau
of Education (admitted by respondent de Ocampo), as well as those
parcels of land applied for by said respondent in the land
registration case, may already be ascertained once and for all, in
the trial court below, and in this same proceeding, without Republic
having to resort to relitigation to prove its claim. Further
proceedings will not prejudice respondents. On the contrary, the
cloud over their titles, OCT No. 576 and TCT No. 42217. issued in
favor of respondents de Ocampo and Anglo, respectively, will be
removed if Republic's claim is not true.
2. There is a serious charge, which is also crucial to the issue
between the parties, that respondent de Ocampo used fraudulent
misrepresentations and machinations in securing his title, Firstly,
there was the averment in his Answer in Civil case No, 264 (6154)
for recovery of possession of the subject lots by Republic, which case
was jointly tried with the land registration case,, that the properties
alleged to have been donated by Jalandoni to the then Bureau of
Education were "different" from Lots Nos. 817 and 2509, applied for
by him, the Jalandoni holdings being "titled" lands, while Lots Nos.
817 and 2509 were "unregistered" lands. The then applicant de
Ocampo even cited TCT No. 1251 of the Register of Deeds of Negros
Occidental as the title covering the lots in the name of Jalandoni,
further stating that the lands donated by him to the Bureau of
Education had an area of 2,912,474 square meters, 78 or 291
hectares plus. Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 have a total area of 289.47
hectares 79 or a difference of only 2 hectares, more or less. The
coincidence in area is highly significant since both claim to be the
owners of the same lots. Secondly, certain documents which were
presented as exhibits by respondent de Ocampo, on the basis of
which he secured OCT 576 in his name, were withdrawn from the
files of the trial court, and, thereafter were allegedly lost by fire. As
a result, Republic's pending motion to have the said exhibits
produced for examination of their genuineness by the NBI could not
be made. Unless successfully traversed, the inference is strong that
respondents did not want a full disclosure of the true nature of the
same by the NBI and that the truth had been suppressed. The
inference is also buttressed by the Republic's claim that despite
their counsel's knowledge of Republic's intention to file the said
motion which was orally communicated to them earlier, the alleged
loss was not revealed to Republic's counsel.80
If the charge is true, there is the element of wilfull intent to deprive the constitutional as well as codal and statutory mandates, there
Republic of just rights which constitutes the essential being an explicit command of protection to labor as well as the
characteristics of actual — as distinguished from legal — fraud. 81 promotion of social justice," 95 the motion to dismiss the late appeal
As Justice Fernando stressed, "Nicolas v. Director of Lands 82 which was "filed much too late" hardly deserved sympathy or
should erase any doubt as to the extreme judicial displeasure at consideration. 96 In the Carillo case, no question whatsoever as to
this species of fraud of an applicant seeking to include as a part of the late appeal was raised, hence, "it would seem that whatever
the property to which title is sought land actually in possession of right to contest the jurisdiction could have been availed of is by now
another. 83 This is very relevant in view of the denial of the no longer in existence. 97 Continuing, Justice Fernando stated that
Amended Petition which was premised on the conclusion that "Social justice would be a meaningless term if in a situation like the
allegations in the said petition did not constitute actual and present, an element of rigidity would be affixed to procedural
extrinsic fraud and which, according to the trial court, is "the only precepts and made to recover the matter. Flexibility should not be
ground" available to review or reopen the decree. Of related ruled out. Precisely, what is sought to be accomplished by such a
significance is the express finding of the trial court that the original fundamental principle expressly so declared by the Constitution is
Petition for Relief was filed within the reglementary period the effectiveness of the community's effort to assist the economically
pursuant to Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, and the underprivileged." The responsibility to protect labor is incumbent
Amended Petition was filed within one year from issuance of the "not only on the legislative and executive branches but also on the
decree. For, if the appeal is dismissed — notwithstanding judiciary, to translate this pledge into a living reality. 98
allegations of fraud which appear to be supported by the evidence
While the above exceptions are predicated on different grounds,
adduced during the hearing of the Amended Petition below — the they nevertheless support the view that the rigid adherence to the
appealed decision will become final and executory, and the rules on perfection of appeals may and should be relaxed where
aforesaid periods will lapse, foreclosing forever to Republic the compelling reasons so warrant. The grounds invoked in this case —
reliefs prayed for in the Amended Petition. Although Republic may not only lack of jurisdiction but gross injustice itself — more than
seek to recover the lots in a different action that may still be legally
justify the exception — considering further that the delay in the
available to it after the appeal is dismissed, that recourse will
perfection of the appeal involved six (6) days only.
involve not only a re- litigation and, therefore. multiplicity of suits,
but will also entail the risk that subject lots may be disposed of to 4. Finally, enshrined in our legal and judicial annals is the
innocent purchasers for value to put them beyond recovery. As it is, maximum Chat no person should enrich himself at the expense or
the other respondent, Anglo, has already intervened. alleging that prejudice of others. 99 Courts should not be used as instruments Lo
he bought the same lots from respondent de Ocampo on January 6, disregard this elemental and basic norm — which is the essence of
1966, and that TCT No. 42217 was in fact issued to him. 84 A new justice and fair play. The whole trust of our laws on civil relations
party, Salvacion Marañon, also sought to intervene in the case and enjoins all those who come before the courts of justice to observe
filed in respondent Court of Appeals a motion to dismiss Republic's true faith and candor in their dealings with one another — the
appeal before the said Court. 85 government included. 100 The commendable and determined efforts
on the part of the citizenry to fashion a New Society rid of graft,
Finally, We held in Reyes, et al. v. Borbon, et al. 86 "(W)hen the corruption and the persistent malaise of land grabbing, will be set
attention of the Court of Land Registration is called to the fact that
back, if the subject lots — consisting of close to 300 hectares which
the same land has been registered in the name of two different
are devoted to educational purposes — have indeed been wrongfully
persons, it is the duty of said court to order an investigation of that titled to respondent de Ocampo, Happily, We can at this stage still
fact and that should be done even without requiring the parties to prevent this, if true, by setting aside the dismissal of Republic's
show that a fraud has been committed in during the double appeal and according the parties the opportunity in this proceeding,
registration. When it is established that the same has been and without further need to re-litigate, to terminate this litigation,
registered in the name of two different person the titile should which has been pending for close to twenty (20) long years — in
remain in the name of the person securing the first registration."
fairness to both parties.
This Court further held that " (T)he very purpose of the Torrens
System would be destroyed if the same land may be subsequently PREMISES CONSIDERED, the resolution of the Court of Appeals,
brought under a second action for registration. 87 dated August 21, 1969, dismissing the appeal, as well as its
resolution of November 14, 1969, denying petitioner Republic's
3. The foregoing overriding considerations then — the alleged lack motion for reconsideration in CA G.R. Nos. 40683-84 are hereby
of jurisdiction and the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations and
SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the said Court to give due
machinations, which, buttressed by strong evidence, can nullity the
course to and consider on its merits Republic's appeal. No costs.
second registration and/or set aside OCT No. 576 issued to
respondent de Ocampo — taken in relation with the procedural and
substantive implications which could and would arise if the appeal
were dismissed, namely, the risk that the holdings may be
transacted to third parties and the fact that Republic's action to
recover tile holdings would give rise to multiplicity of suits —
compel Us to conclude that the only recourse — in the interest of
just and expeditious proceedings. considering that these have been
pending for close to twenty (20) years now — is to suspend Our
rules and/or to except this case from their operation. For when the
operation of the Rules of will lead to an injustice We have, in
justifiable instances, resorted to this extraordinary remedy to
prevent it. 88 The Rules have been drafted with the primary
objective of enhancing fair trials and expediting justice. 89 As a
corollary, if their application and operation tend to subvert and
defeat instead of promote and enhance it, their suspension is
justified. In the words of Justice Antonio P. Barredo in his
concurring opinion in Estrada v. Sto. Domingo, "(T)his Court,
through the revered and eminent Mr. Justice Abad Santos, found
occasion in the case of C Viuda de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, to lay
down for recognition in this jurisdiction the sound rule in the
administration of justice holding that 'it is always in the power of
the court (Supreme Court) to suspend its own rules or to except a
particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice
required it ... 90
Exceptions to the operation of the mandatory and jurisdictional
character of the rules on perfection of appeals are to be noted in
Sarmiento v. Salud, et al., 91 penned by Justice J.B. Reyes, Dequito
v. Lopez 92 and Carillo v. Allied Workers Association of the
Philippines 93 both written for the Court by Justice E. M.
Fernando, decided years after the Revised Rules of Court took effect
in January, 1964. In the Sarmiento case, the late appeal was
allowed on the ground of laches on the part of the appellees, the
filing of the motion to dismiss having taken place six (6) years after
the brief for appellees was filed, and after the case was submitted
for decision. This, according to the Court, "constitutes a unique
instance of laches without comparable precedent in the records of
the Court. 94 The Dequito and Carillo cases, upon the other hand,
took into account the fact that labor cases were involved. Justice
Fernando expressly noted in the Dequito case that "in the light of
G.R. No. 194516 June 17, 2015
BALDOMERA FOCULAN-FUDALAN, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES DANILO OCIAL and DAVIDICA
BONGCARASOCIAL, EVAGRIA F. BAGCAT, CRISTINA G.
DOLLISEN, EULALIA F. VILLACORA, TEOFREDO
FUDERANAN, JAIME FUDERANAN, MARIANO
FUDERANAN, FILADELFO FUDERANAN, MUSTIOLA F.
MONTEJO, CORAZON LOGMAO, DIONESIO FUDERANAN,
EUTIQUIA FUDERANAN, ASTERIA FUDERANAN,
ANTONIO FUDERANAN, ROMEO FUDERANAN,
FLORENTINO FUDERANAN, DOMECIANO FUDERANAN,
ERLINDA SOMONTAN, FELICIANA FUDERANAN,
BONIFACIO FUDERANAN, QUIRINO FUDERANAN, MA.
ASUNCION FUDERANAN, MARCELINA ARBUTANTE,
SALOME GUTUAL, LEONARDO LUCILLA, IMELDA L.
ESTOQUE, CIRILA OLANDRIA, TITA G. BONGAY and
MUNICIPAL ASSESSOR OF PANGLAO, BOHOL,
Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court assailing the November 5, 2009 Resolution1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 01733, which granted the
respondents" 'Urgent Motion to Dismiss Appeal,"2 dated September
23, 2009, on the ground that petitioner Baldomera Foculan-Fudalan
(Baldomera) failed to file her appellant's brief within the non-
ex.tendible period of forty-five (45) days; and the October 26, 2010
Resolution3 which denied her "Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration
of the Resolution dated November 5, 2009, with Leave of Court to
Admit Appellant's Brief for the Intervenor-Third Party Plaintiff."4
The Antecedents
The present controversy began when the spouses Danilo Ocial and
Davidica Bongcaras-Ocial (Spouses Ocial), represented by their
Attomey-in-Fact, Marcelino Bongcaras, filed an action for the
declaration of validity of partition and sale, recovery of ownership
and possession and damages against Flavio Fudalan (Flavia) and
Cristobal Fudalan (Cristobal) before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 3, Tagbilaran City (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 6672.
Later, Baldomera, the wife of Flavio and mother of Cristobal,
intervened as 3rd party plaintiff against third-party defendants,
Heirs of Pedro and Ulpiano Fuderanan (the Fuderanans), the
predecessors-in-interest of Spouses Ocial.
The subject of the said action was a parcel of land designated as
Cad. Lot No. 56-A located at Tangnan, Panglao, Bohol, which was a
portion of Lot No. 56, Cad 705-D, Panglao Cadastre, in the name of
Juana Fuderanan (Juana).
Spouses Ocial alleged in their complaint5 that on March 13, 2001,
the heirs of Juana executed the Extrajudicial Settlement Among
Heirs with Simultaneous Deed of Absolute Sale over Lot 56-A
including two (2) fruit bearing mango trees in their favor as lawful
vendees; that as the new owners of the subject land, they caused
the planting of thirty (30) gemelina seedlings, twenty (20)
mahogany seedlings, and two (2) mango seedlings, and in October
2001, they claimed the landowner’s share of the mango produce
from Maximo Bolongaita who had been taking care of the two (2)
fruit-bearing mango trees; that in October 2001, they caused the
placement of a "no-trespassing" sign on one of the mango trees; that
they also caused the processing of the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement Among Heirs with Simultaneous Sale for the
cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 93-009-00247 and the issuance
of a new tax declaration in their favor; that in June 2001, the
Fudalans, without any lawful right or authorization, surreptitiously
planted "ubi" on a portion of Lot No. 56-A and they also claimed the
landowner’s share of the mango produce from Maximo Bolongaita
who refused to give the same and instead deposited the amount in a
bank in Tagbilaran City; that in November 2001, the Fudalans
illegally placed two "no-trespassing" signs inside the questioned
property; that for this reason, they complained to the barangay
captain of Tangnan, Panglao, Bohol, who conducted conciliation
proceedings on November 14 and 29, 2001; that no settlement was
reached between the parties; that the Office of the Lupong
Tagapamayapa later on issued the Certification to File Action; and
that they learned that on December 14 and 15, 2001, while the
Lupong Tagapamayapa had not yet issued the required
Certification to File Action, the Fudalans unjustifiably caused the
installation of a fence consisting of barbed wires with cemented
posts around Lot No. 56-A, without the necessary permit from the
barangay captain of Tangnan and the municipal officials of
Panglao, Bohol.6
The Fudalans, on the other hand, claimed that they were the
rightful owners of the subject land having purchased the same from
the Fuderanans on November 4, 1983; that the sale was evidenced
by a private document printed in a blue paper; that as owners, they
planted "ubi," posted two "no-trespassing" signs and installed a
barb wire fence around the land; that since their purchase, they had
been in possession of the land in the concept of owners and had
been paying the real property taxes religiously; and that it was for
this reason that they insisted that if there was any deed of
extrajudicial settlement of estate and simultaneous sale of the land
by the the Fuderanans, the same was null and void for being
without legal basis.7
On May 6, 2002, Baldomera filed, with leave of court, an Answer in
Intervention with Third-Party Complaint against the Fuderanans
for specific performance, quieting of title and nullification of the
deed of extra-judicial settlement with simultaneous sale in favor of
Spouses Ocial. She alleged therein that, although still declared in
the name of the late Juana Fuderanan, the property was absolutely
owned by her parents, the late Spouses Eusebio Fucolan and
Catalina Bolias,8 who acquired the property in 1935 and thereafter
took actual possession of the land. She averred that the possession
was continuous, peaceful, open, public, adverse, and in the concept
of an owner which was never disturbed by any person until Spouses
Ocial, through their Attorney-in-Fact, informed the Fudalans and
Baldomera that they had already bought the land from the
Fuderanans.9
Baldomera also claimed that sometime in 1983, two of the
Fuderanans, Teofredo and Eutiquia, approached her and her
husband. They represented themselves as the duly authorized
representatives of their coheirs and agreed to settle their claims
over the subject lot in their favor for the amount of 1,000.00. This
agreement was evidenced by a memorandum, dated November 4,
1983.10
Baldomera further claimed that in the year 2000, a certain Salome
Getual, supposedly another heir of Juana, told her that all the heirs
of Juana were claiming their rights of inheritance over the land but
were willing to enter into a settlement if the price would be
acceptable. Unfortunately, no agreement was reached which
prompted Spouses Ocial to file an action before the barangay
chairman of the place where the property was situated. A mediation
proceeding was conducted between the parties where an amicable
settlement was reached. Baldomera agreed to pay the Fuderanans
the amount of ₱50,000.00 as purchase price of the lot. The latter,
however, did not comply with their obligation in the agreed
settlement. Instead, they sold the land to Spouses Ocial for
20,000.00.11
The RTC Decision
On August 22, 2006, the RTC rendered a Decision,12 confirming the
validity of the extrajudicial settlement with simultaneous sale,
thus, recognizing the right of the third-party defendants, the
Fuderanans, to sell the land in question to the Spouses Ocial. The
trial court explained its conclusion in this wise:
After a perusal of the evidence, the Court acknowledges the right of
third party defendants Heirs of Pedro and Ulpiano Fuderanan to
sell the land in question to plaintiffs Ocial spouses and upholds the
validity of the sale. The claim of intervenor Baldomera Fucolan-
Fudalan that the land was purchased by her parents from Juana
Fuderanan in 1935 is not only doubtful being oral but more than
that, it is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds as provided in
Art. 1403 (e) of the Civil Code, as follows:
"Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they
are ratified:
xxxx
(e) An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year,
or for the sale of real property or of an interest therein;
No efforts were exerted by the intervenor and her predecessor
parents for the ratification of the sale despite the lapse of
considerable time so that their failure and neglect to do it amounts
to laches and equitable estoppel on their part to lay claim of
ownership of the land. Furthermore, upon a perusal of the tax
declarations of the land from 1940 to 1985 the administrators
mentioned therein were Modesta Bongcaras, Ulpiano Fuderanan
and Leoncia Estoreras, who took turn in its administration. There
was no mention of the predecessor parents of Baldomera as one of
the administrators which would only fairly suggest that they were
never in possession of the land. It was only in 1994 when Flavio
Fudalan came to be named as its administrator per TD-93-009-
00247 evidently after the execution of the blue paper receipt of
₱1,000.00 by Teofredo and Teofista Fuderanan in their favor. And it
was also only then that the Fudalans started paying taxes thereto,
as shown by the numerous receipts submitted. Thus, the parents of
Baldomera could not have paid taxes to the land before that period
for being not in actual possession of the land contrary to their claim.
It could be for this reason that defendants and intervenor agreed to
buy the land from the heirs of Pedro and Ulpiano Fuderanan to
whom the land was adjudicated which act was tantamount to an
abandonment of their claim.
xxx Besides, it is to be noted from the testimony of Baldomera
Fucolan-Fudalan in her direct examination on July 13, 2005 when
she acknowledged that the amount of ₱1,000.00 as mentioned in the
blue paper receipt was not actually a payment of the land but was
given to Toribio and Juana Fuderanan as a consideration for them
to prepare the deed of sale for the land in their favor but to which
the latter did not comply. Instead, they filed a complaint along with
the other heirs before the barangay captain of Tangnan, Paglao,
Bohol for the repossession and partition of the property among the
heirs. This admission of Baldomera Fucolan-Fudalan is credible for
the amount of ₱1,000.00 is grossly inadequate to be a consideration
for the sale of the whole lot of 7,334 sq. m. or even for the combined
shares of Teofredo and Teofista of their common property 1,018 sq.
m. Furthermore, the alleged agreement was not signed by the
parties as required by the Local Government Code for its validity
and no time or period was set for its compliance, thus, leaving it to
the Fudalans the choice as to when they would pay the purchase
price of the land which is against the provision of Art. 1308 of the
Civil Code on the qualifications of a valid contract.
On the alleged promise of the heirs of Pedro and Ulpiano
Fuderanan to sell the property to defendants Fudalan for
₱50,000.00 as shown in the minutes of the mediation proceedings
before the barangay captain of Tangnan, Panglao, Bohol of which
they did not comply, there is no evidence of tender of payment made
by the defendants. In fact, in the testimony of Maria Salome Gutual
in the witness stand during her cross-examination on March 10,
2003 which was not refuted by defendants, the Fudalans did not
allegedly comply with their promise to buy the land, and instead,
they even signified refusal to pay it claiming that they had already
bought it from Teofredo and Teofista Fuderanan so that the heirs of
Pedro and Ulpiano Fuderanan were forced to sell the land to herein
plaintiffs Ocial spouses. Their act of selling the land to the plaintiffs
was therefore justified as it was the defendants who first reneged
from their agreement. Moreover, as there was no tender of payment
or earnest money given by defendants as a consideration therefor,
no contract to sell was perfected that would bind the parties to it
(Art. 1479, par. 2, Civil Code) nor is there any basis for an action of
specific performance which defendants only initiated lately upon
the filing of the third-party complaint.13
[Emphasis Supplied]
Consequently, the Fudalans and Baldomera were ordered to vacate
the subject land. Thus, the decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby
confirms the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement with Simultaneous
Sale executed by the Heirs of Pedro Fuderanan and Ulpiano
Fuderanan of Lot 56-A to herein plaintiffs Danilo Ocial and
Davidica Bongcaras-Ocial as one valid and enforceable.
Consequently, herein defendants Flavio Fudalan, Cristobal
Fudalan and Intervenor Baldomera Fucolan-Fudalan are hereby
ordered to vacate from the premises of Lot 56-A CAD 705-D of
Panglao Cadastre which is located at barangay Tangnan, Panglao,
Bohol having an area of 6,316 sq. m. Furthermore, defendants and
intervenor are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally
reasonable attorney’s fee in the amount of ₱30,000.00 and the costs
of the proceedings which shall earn legal interest from the filing of
the complaint until the same shall have been fully paid. The
landowner shares of the fruits of the two mango trees which are
deposited in the bank are hereby adjudicated to plaintiffs if the
same are found to be within Lot 56-A.
SO ORDERED.14
Not in conformity, the Fudalans and Baldomera filed their
respective notices of appeal with the trial court.
The CA Decision
On March 18, 2009, upon receipt of the records, the CA issued a
Resolution,15 requiring the Fudalans and Baldomera, as well as
Spouses Ocial; and Evagra F. Bacat, as third-party defendants, to
file their respective briefs within the non-extendible period of forty-
five (45) days. In their Urgent Motion to Dismiss Appeal, dated
September 23, 2009, Spouses Ocial prayed for the dismissal of the
appeal for failure of the appellants to file the required appellants’
brief within the prescribed non-extendible period of 45 days.
Acting thereon, the CA granted the motion and dismissed the
appeal in its November 5, 2009 Resolution, which in its entirety
reads:
Finding merit in appellee’s Urgent Motion to Dismiss Appeal dated
September 23, 2009, citing as ground therein appellants’ failure to
file their respective appeal briefs within the non-extendible period
required under Resolution, dated March 18, 2009, the court resolves
to grant the same. Accordingly, the case is considered closed and
terminated.
SO ORDERED.16
Baldomera filed her Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution dated November 5, 2009 with Leave of Court to Admit
Appellant’s Brief for the Intervenor-Third Party Plaintiff. On
October 26, 2010, however, the CA issued another resolution
denying her motion, to wit: WHEREFORE, the Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated November 5, 2009 with
Leave of Court to Admit Appellant’s Brief for the Intervenor-Third
Party Plaintiff is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.17
According to the CA, "[b]laming the failure to file the required brief
on counsel’s heavy workload, on the mistake or ignorance of his
client, and excusable neglect on his part is not acceptable."18 What
happened was simply the negligence of the counsel in the
monitoring of notices and resolutions from the courts. The
attendant circumstances did not make a case of gross negligence
that would fall under the exception to the rule that the
inadvertence of counsel could be considered as an adequate excuse
to call for the court’s leniency. The CA further stated that "the delay
in the filing of the brief, 206 days after the last day to file the same
which is May 22, 2009, is unreasonably long."19
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner Baldomera states, among others, that the main reason
for the late filing of the appellant’s brief was both her mistake and
simple negligence and that of her counsel; and that the CA should
have been lenient in the application of technical rules in resolving
the appeal considering their peculiar situation.
Spouses Ocial, on the other hand, counter that the CA was correct
in denying the omnibus motion for reconsideration because the
records were bereft of any factual justification for Baldomera’s
failure to file the required appellant’s brief. Furthermore, even
granting arguendo, that the CA gravely abused its discretion in
promulgating the November 5, 2009 and October 26, 2010
Resolutions, still the subject petition must be dismissed because
abuse of discretion is not among the allowable grounds for a
petition for review under Rule 45 to prosper.
The Court's Ruling
The Court finds the petitioner’s contention wanting in merit.
There was inexcusable
negligence where a brief
was filed 206 days late
It appears from the record that the counsel for Baldomera received
a copy of the March 18, 2009 CA Resolution on April 7, 2009, thus,
giving him until May 22, 2009 to file the appellant’s brief; that he
did not file any motion for extension of the period to file the brief;
that he did not file either a comment or opposition to the Urgent
Motion to Dismiss Appeal, filed by Spouses Ocial on September 24,
2009, a copy of which he was furnished by mail; and that he filed
the brief for his client only at the time he filed the omnibus motion
for reconsideration on December 14, 2009, or 206 days late.20
In this regard, Section 1 (e), Rule50 of the Rules of Court succinctly
provides that:
Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. – An appeal may be
dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of
the appellee, on the following grounds:
xxxx
(e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of
copies of his brief or memorandum within the time provided by
these Rules; x x x
Baldomera posits that it was erroneous for the CA to dismiss her
appeal on the ground that she failed to file her appellant’s brief on
time. She cited the case of Sebastian v. Morales21 where it was
written that liberal construction of the rules is the controlling
principle to effect substantial justice.
Nevertheless, the Court in the same case made qualifications with
respect to the application of the said principle.1âwphi1 It was held
therein,
Litigation is not a game of technicalities, but every case must be
prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure so that
issues may be properly presented and justly resolved. Hence, rules
of procedure must be faithfully followed except only when for
persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an
injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure. Concomitant to a liberal application of the
rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party
invoking liberality to explain his failure to abide by the rules.22
[Emphases and Underscoring Supplied]
In other words, procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed
simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice
to a party’s substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to
be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when
they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
complying with the procedure prescribed.23 Besides, as the oft
quoted quip would put it, the bare invocation of "in the interest of
substantial justice" is not a magic wand that will automatically
compel this Court to suspend procedural rules.24
Although the authority of the CA to dismiss an appeal for failure to
file the appellant’s brief is a matter of judicial discretion, a
dismissal based on this ground is neither mandatory nor
ministerial; the fundamentals of justice and fairness must be
observed, bearing in mind the background and web of
circumstances surrounding the case.25
Petitioner’s assertion that her counsel is partly to be blamed for her
legal predicament is not persuasive. Indeed, there have been
myriad of instances when the Court has relaxed the rule on the
binding effect of counsel’s negligence and allowed a litigant another
chance to present his case, to wit: (1) where the reckless or gross
negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (2)
when application of the rule will result in outright deprivation of
the client’s liberty or property; or (3) where the interests of justice
so require. Unfortunately, none of these exceptions obtain here.26
For a claim of counsel’s gross negligence to prosper, nothing short of
clear abandonment of the client’s cause must be shown. Here,
petitioner’s counsel failed to file the appellant’s brief. While this
omission can plausibly qualify as simple negligence, it does not
amount to gross negligence to justify the annulment of the
proceeding.27
Baldomera herself should have exerted some efforts to inquire as to
the status of her appeal. She should not have been complacent.
"While this Court has recognized that a non-lawyer litigant is not
expected to be familiar with the intricacies of the legal procedures,
a layman nonetheless must not be allowed to conveniently profit
from his improvident mistakes. Thus, it has been equally stressed
that litigants represented by counsel should not expect that all they
need to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of the case;
instead, they should give the necessary assistance to their counsel
for what is at stake is ultimately their interest."28
Even on the merits, the
petition must fail
Even on the merits, the petitioner’s quest must fail.
In essence, Baldomera claims that because they have been in
adverse possession for the requisite period, their possession has
now ripened into ownership through acquisitive prescription.
Baldomera’s argument fails to convince the Court.
Prescription, as a mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights
over immovable property, is concerned with lapse of time in the
manner and under conditions laid down bylaw, namely, that the
possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful,
uninterrupted, and adverse. Acquisitive prescription of real rights
may be ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription
requires possession in good faith and with just title for 10 years.29
When the Court speaks of possession in "good faith," it consists in
the reasonable belief that the person from whom the thing is
received has been the owner thereof, and can transmit his
ownership. There is "just title," on the other hand, when the
adverse claimant comes into possession of the property through one
of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or
other real rights, but the grantor is not the owner or cannot
transmit any right.30 In the present controversy, aside from
Baldomera’s bare allegation that her family had been in possession
of the subject property since it was sold to her parents, no other
evidence, documentary or otherwise, showing that the title to the
subject property was indeed transferred from Juana to her parents
was presented. In fact, she never denied that the tax declaration of
the property was still in the name of Juana Fuderanan. As such, for
lack of "just title," she could not have acquired the disputed
property by ordinary prescription through possession of ten (10)
years. Occupation or use alone, no matter how long, cannot confer
title by prescription or adverse possession unless coupled with the
element of hostility towards the true owner, that is, possession
under the claim of title.31
Even the allegation that sometime on November 4, 1983, a blue
paper was executed wherein Teofredo and Eutiquia, allegedly the
duly authorized representatives of the heirs of Juana to settle their
claims over the land, acknowledged to have received the sum of
1,000.00,32 cannot be considered a valid basis for a possession in
good faith and just title. The alleged agreement which is, at best, a
compromise agreement cannot be made as the foundation of a
conclusion that Baldomera is a possessor in good faith and with just
title who acquired the property through ordinary acquisitive
prescription. By the nature of a compromise agreement, which
brings the parties to agree to something that neither of them may
actually want, but for the peace it will bring them without a
protracted litigation, no right can arise therefrom because the
parties executed the same only to buy peace and to write finis to the
controversy. It did not create or transmit ownership rights over the
subject property.33
That being settled, the next question now is: Can Baldomera
acquire the property through extraordinary acquisitive
prescription?
The Court is still constrained to rule in the negative.
In extraordinary prescription, ownership and other real rights over
immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted adverse
possession for 30 years even without need of title or of good faith.34
As observed by the trial court,
here was no mention of the predecessor parents of Baldomera as
one of the administrators which would only fairly suggest that they
were never in possession of the land. It was only in 1994 when
Flavio Fudalan came to be named as its administrator per TD-93-
009-00247 evidently after the execution of the blue paper receipt of
₱1,000.00 by Teofredo and Teofista Fuderanan in their favor. And it
was only then that the Fudalans started paying taxes thereto, as
shown by the numerous receipts submitted. Thus, the parents of
Baldomera could not have paid taxes to the land before that period
for being not in actual possession of the land contrary to their claim.
It could be for this reason that defendants and intervenor agreed to
buy the land from the heirs of Pedro and Ulpiano Fuderanan to
whom the land was adjudicated which act was tantamount to an
abandonment of their claim.35
Taking cue from the foregoing, Baldomera’s alleged possession
could not have amounted to an ownership by way of extraordinary
acquisitive prescription. According to the factual findings of the
trial court, it was only in 1994 that her husband, Flavio was named
administrator; that it was also then that they started paying taxes;
and that it was also then that they started occupying the subject
property. This observation of the trial court was contrary to her
assertion that they had been paying taxes and had been in
possession of the land even before the said period. On this note, the
thirty– year period would only be completed in the year 2024. Also,
the records would reveal that as early as November 2001, her
possession was effectively interrupted when Spouses Ocial filed a
complaint before the barangay captain of Tangnan, Panglao, Bohol,
where conciliation proceedings were held although no settlement
was reached.36
Finally, Baldomera also assails the jurisdiction of the RTC over the
case. According to her, since the action involves ownership and
possession of real property, jurisdiction is determined by the
assessed value of the property in contention. Considering that the
assessed value of Lot 56-A was only 1,930.00 as indicated in Tax
Declaration No. 93-009-00247, it should have been the first level
court, and not the RTC, which should have exercised jurisdiction to
hear actions involving title to, or possession of real property or any
interest in it, as provided in Sections 19 and 33 of Batas Pambansa
(B.P.) 129, as amended.37
This argument cannot be sustained.
Even if the Court would treat the complaint filed by Spouses Ocial
as falling under the jurisdiction of the first level court under Sec. 33
of B.P. 129, as the assessed value was way below the ₱20,000.00
threshold, still Baldomera's postulation that it is the first level
court, and not the RTC, which has jurisdiction, would not hold
water. As observed, Baldomera had voluntarily participated in the
proceedings before the RTC and aggressively defended her position.
Although she questioned the jurisdiction of the trial court as early
as in the trial level, she actively participated in the proceeding
when she filed an ANSWER IN INTERVENTION WITH THIRD-
PARTY COMPLAINT38 where she interposed counterclaims, and
asked for affirmative reliefs. Simply put, considering the extent of
her participation in the case, she is estopped from invoking lack of
jurisdiction as a ground for the dismissal of the action.39
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed November 5,
2009 and October 26, 2010 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 01733 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 201405, August 24, 2015 and later, in the name of Juanito15 Blanco, et al. (the
LIWAYWAY ANDRES, RONNIE ANDRES, AND Blancos).
PABLO B. FRANCISCO, Petitioners, v. STA. LUCIA
REALTY & DEVELOPMENT, INCORPORATED, Liwayway testified next. According to her, she and her
Respondent. children Ronnie and Liza are the surviving heirs of the late
Carlos who owned the subject property.16 Carlos acquired
DECISION ownership over the same after he had been in continuous,
DEL CASTILLO, J.: public and peaceful possession thereof for 50 years,17 the
circumstances of which he narrated in a Sinumpaang
Not all may demand for an easement of right-of-way. Under
Salaysay18 that he executed while he was still alive. Carlos
the law, an easement of right-of-way may only be demanded
stated therein that even before he was born in 1939, his
by the owner of an immovable property or by any person
father was already in possession and working on the subject
who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use the same.
property; that in 1948, he started to help his father in tilling
the land; that when his father became weak and eventually
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the November
died, he took over the land; and, that he already sought to
17, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
register his ownership of the property with the Department
No. 87715, which reversed and set aside the May 22, 2006
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and to
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Binangonan,
declare the same for taxation purposes.
Rizal, Branch 68 granting petitioners Pablo B. Francisco
(Pablo), Liwayway Andres (Liwayway), Ronnie Andres
For its part, respondent presented as a lone witness the
(Ronnie) and their co-plaintiff Liza Andres (Liza) a 50-
then Municipal Assessor of Binangonan, Virgilio Flordeliza
square meter right-of-way within the subdivision of
(Flordeliza). Flordeliza confirmed that Carlos wrote him a
respondent Sta. Lucia Realty and Development,
letter-request for the issuance of a tax declaration.19 He,
Incorporated (respondent).
however, referred the matter to the Provincial Assessor of
Rizal since the property for which the tax declaration was
Likewise assailed is the March 27, 2012 CA Resolution3
being applied for was already declared for taxation purposes
which denied petitioners and Liza's Motion for
in the name of one Juan Diaz.20 Later, the tax declaration of
Reconsideration thereto.
Juan Diaz was cancelled and in lieu thereof, a tax
declaration in the name of the Blancos was issued.21 For this
Factual Antecedents
reason, the Provincial Assessor of Rizal denied Carlos'
application for issuance of tax declaration.22cralawrednad
Petitioners and Liza filed a Complaint4 for Easement of
Right-of-Way against respondent before the RTC on
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
November 28,2000. They alleged that they are co-owners
and possessors for more than 50 years of three parcels of
The RTC rendered its Decision23 on May 22, 2006. It
unregistered agricultural land in Pag-asa, Binangonan,
observed that petitioners and Liza's allegation in their
Rizal with a total area of more or less 10,500 square meters
Complaint that they were in possession of the subject
(subject property). A few years back, however, respondent
property for more than 50 years was not denied by
acquired the lands surrounding the subject property,
respondent in its Answer. Thus, the same is deemed to have
developed the same into a residential subdivision known as
been impliedly admitted by the latter. It then ratiocinated
the Binangonan Metropolis East, and built a concrete
that based on Article 113724 of the Civil Code, petitioners
perimeter fence around it such that petitioners and Liza
and Liza are considered owners of the subject property
were denied access from subject property to the nearest
through extraordinary prescription. Having real right over
public road and vice versa. They thus prayed for a right-of-
the same, therefore, they are entitled to demand an
way within Binangonan Metropolis East in order for them to
easement of right-of-way under Article 64925cralawred of
have access to Col. Guido Street, a public road.
the Civil Code.
In its Answer,5 respondent denied knowledge of any
The RTC further held that Pablo's testimony sufficiently
property adjoining its subdivision owned by petitioners and
established: (1) that the subject property was surrounded by
Liza. At any rate, it pointed out that petitioners and Liza
respondent's property; (2) the area and location of the right-
failed to sufficiently allege in their complaint the existence
of-way sought; (3) the value of the land on which the right-
of the requisites for the grant of an easement of right-of-
of-way is to be constituted which was P600.00 per square
way.
meter; and (4) petitioners and Liza's possession of the
subject property up to the present time.
During trial, Pablo testified that he bought a 4,000-square
meter-portion of the subject property from Carlos Andres
In the ultimate, said court concluded that petitioners and
(Carlos), the husband of Liwayway and father of Ronnie and
Liza are entitled to an easement of right-of-way,
Liza.6 According to Pablo, he and his co-plaintiffs are still in
thus:cralawlawlibrary
possession of the subject property as evidenced by an April
13, 1998 Certification7 issued by the Barangay Chairman of WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered giving the
Pag-asa.8 Further, Pablo clarified that the easement of plaintiffs a right of way of 50 square meters to reach
right-of-way that they are asking from respondent would Victoria Village towards Col. Guido Street. Defendant Sta.
traverse the latter's subdivision for about 50 meters from Lucia is hereby ordered to grant the right of way to the
the subject property all the way to another subdivision that plaintiffs as previously described upon payment of an
he co-owns, Victoria Village, which in turn, leads to Col. indemnity equivalent to the market value of the [50-square
Guido Street.9 He claimed that the prevailing market value meter right of way].
of lands in the area is about P600.00 per square meter.
Pablo also explained that the subject property is still not SO ORDERED.26
registered under the Land Registration Act since no tax Respondent filed a Notice of Appeal27 which was given due
declaration over the same has been issued to them despite course by the RTC in an Order28 dated June 27, 2006.
application with the Municipal Assessor of Binangonan. 10
When required by the court to submit documents regarding Ruling of the Court of Appeals
the said application,11 Pablo attached in his Compliance,12
among others, Carlos' letter13 of Maty 18, 1998 to the On appeal, respondent argued mat petitioners and Liza
Municipal Assessor of Binangonan requesting for the were neither able to prove that they were owners nor that
issuance of a tax declaration and the reply thereto dated they have any real right over the subject property intended
August 5, 199814 of the Provincial Assessor of Rizal. In the to be the dominant estate. Hence, they are not entitled to
aforesaid reply, the Provincial Assessor denied the request demand an easement of right-of-way. At any rate, they
on the ground that the subject property was already likewise failed to establish that the only route available
declared for taxation purposes under the name of Juan Diaz from their property to Col. Guido Street is through
respondent's subdivision.
In a Decision29 dated November 17, 2011, the CA held that
the evidence adduced by petitioners and Liza failed to
sufficiently establish their asserted ownership and
possession of the subject property. Moreover, it held that
contrary to the RTC's observation, respondent in fact denied
in its Answer the allegation of petitioners and Liza that
they have been in possession of subject property for more
than 50 years. In view of these, the CA concluded that
petitioners and Liza have no right to demand an easement
of right-of-way from respondent, thus:cralawlawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is
hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the May 22, 2006 Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 68
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 00-037-B is
ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.30
Petitioners and Liza's Motion for Reconsideration31 was
denied in the CA Resolution32 dated March 27, 2012.
Hence, petitioners seek recourse to this Court through this
Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Issue
Whether petitioners are entitled to demand an easement of
right-of-way from respondent.
Our Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Under Article 649 of the Civil Code, an easement of right-of-
way may be demanded by the owner of an immovable or by
any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use
the same.
Here, petitioners argue that they are entitled to demand an
easement of right-of-way from respondent because they are
the owners of the subject property intended to be the
dominant estate. They contend that they have already
acquired ownership of the subject property through ordinary
acquisitive prescription.33 This is considering that their
possession became adverse as against the Blancos (under
whose names the subject property is declared for taxation)
when Carlos formally registered his claim of ownership with
the DENR and sought to declare the subject property for
taxation purposes in 1998. And since more than 10 years34
had lapsed from that time without the Blancos doing
anything to contest their continued possession of the subject
property, petitioners aver that ordinary acquisitive
prescription had already set in their favor and against the
Blancos.
In the alternative, petitioners assert that they have already
become owners of the subject property through
extraordinary acquisitive prescription since (1) they have
been in open, continuous and peaceful possession thereof for
more than 50 years; (2) the subject property, as depicted in
the Survey Plan they caused to be prepared is alienable and
disposable; (3) Carlos filed a claim of ownership over the
property with the DENR, the agency charged with the
administration of alienable public land; and (4) Carlos'
manifestation of willingness to declare the property for
taxation purposes not only had the effect of giving notice of
his adverse claim on the property but also strengthened his
bona fide claim of ownership over the same.
It must be stressed at the outset that contrary to
petitioners' allegations, there is no showing that Carlos filed
a claim of ownership over the subject property with the
DENR. His April 13, 1998 letter35 to the said office which
petitioners assert to be an application for the registration of
such claim is actually just a request for the issuance of
certain documents and nothing more. Moreover, while
Carlos indeed attempted to declare the subject property for
taxation purposes, his application, as previously mentioned,
was denied because a tax declaration was already issued to
the Blancos.
Anent petitioners' invocation of ordinary acquisitive
prescription, the Court notes that the same was raised for
the first time on appeal. Before the RTC, petitioners based
their claim of ownership on extraordinary acquisitive
prescription under Article 1137 of the Civil Code36 such that
the said court declared them owners of the subject property
by virtue thereof in its May 22, 2006 Decision.37 Also with
the CA, petitioners initially asserted ownership through
extraordinary acquisitive prescription.38 It was only later in
their Motion for Reconsideration39 therein that they averred
that their ownership could also be based on ordinary
acquisitive prescription.40 "Settled is the rule that points of
law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the
attention of the lower court need not be considered by a
reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time
at that late stage. Basic considerations of fairness and due
process impel this rule."41cralawrednad
Even if timely raised, such argument of petitioners, as well
as with respect to extraordinary acquisitive prescription,
fails. "Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring
ownership under the Civil Code."42 There are two modes of
prescription through which immovables may be acquired -
ordinary acquisitive prescription which requires possession
in good faith and just title for 10 years and, extraordinary
prescription wherein ownership and other real rights over
immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted
adverse possession for 30 years without need of title or of
good faith.43 However, it was clarified in the Heirs of Mario
Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines,44 that only lands
of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as
no longer intended for public use or for the development of
national wealth, or removed from the sphere of public
dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial
lands or lands of private ownership, may be alienated or
disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership
under the Civil Code.45 And if the mode of acquisition is
prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, it must
first be shown that the land has already been converted to
private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive
prescriptive period. Otherwise, Article 1113 of the Civil
Code, which provides that property of the State not
patrimonial in character shall not be the subject of
prescription, applies.46cralawrednad
Sifting through petitioners' allegations, it appears that the
subject property is an unregistered public agricultural land.
Thus, being a land of the public domain, petitioners, in
order to validly claim acquisition thereof through
prescription, must first be able to show that the State has -
expressly declared through either a law enacted by Congress
or a proclamation issued by the President that the subject
[property] is no longer retained for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has
been converted into patrimonial. Consequently, without an
express declaration by the State, the land remains to be a
property of public dominion and hence, not susceptible to
acquisition by virtue of prescription.47
In the absence of such proof of declaration in this case,
petitioners' claim of ownership over the subject property
based on prescription necessarily crumbles. Conversely,
they cannot demand an easement of right-of-way from
respondent for lack of personality.
All told, the Court finds no error on the part of the CA in
reversing and setting aside the May 22, 2006 Decision of the
RTC and in ordering the dismissal of petitioners' Complaint
for Easement of Right-of-Way against respondent.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The November
17, 2011 Decision and March 27, 2014 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87715 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
October 14, 2015 G.R. No. 213014
MAYBANK PHILIPPINES, INC. (Formerly PNB-Republic
Bank1), Petitioner
vs.
SPOUSES OSCAR and NENITA TARROSA, Respondents
DECISION PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari2 are the Decision3
dated November 29, 2013 and the Resolution4 dated May 13, 2014
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 02211, which
affirmed the Decision5 dated June 16, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court of Bacolod City, Branch 41 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 98-10451
declaring the extra judicial foreclosure sale of the property covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-5649 as null and void
for being barred by prescription.
The Facts
On December 15, 1980, respondents-spouses Oscar and Nenita
Tarrosa (Sps. Tarrosa) obtained from then PNB-Republic Bank,
now petitioner Maybank Philippines, Inc. (Maybank), a loan in the
amount of ₱91,000.00. The loan was secured by a Real Estate
Mortgage6 dated January 5, 1981 (real estate mortgage) over a 500-
square meter parcel of land situated in San Carlos City, Negros
Occidental (subject property), covered by TCT No. T-5649,7 and the
improvements thereon.8
After paying the said loan, or sometime in March 1983, Sps.
Tarrosa obtained another loan from Maybank in the amount of
₱60,000.00 (second loan),9 payable on March 11, 1984.10 However,
Sps. Tarrosa failed to settle the second loan upon maturity.11
Sometime in April 1998, Sps. Tarrosa received a Final Demand
Letter12 dated March 4, 1998 (final demand letter) from Maybank
requiring them to settle their outstanding loan in the aggregate
amount of ₱564,579.91, inclusive of principal, interests, and penalty
charges.13 They offered to pay a lesser amount, which Maybank
refused.14 Thereafter, or on June 25, 1998, Maybank commenced
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings15 before the office of Ex-
Officio Provincial Sheriff Ildefonso Villanueva, Jr. (Sheriff
Villanueva). The subject property was eventually sold in a public
auction sale held on July 29, 199816 for a total bid price of
₱600,000.00, to the highest bidder, Philmay Property, Inc. (PPI),
which was thereafter issued a Certificate of Sale17 dated July 30,
1998.18
On September 7, 1998, Sps. Tarrosa filed a complaint19 for
declaration of nullity and invalidity of the foreclosure of real estate
and of public auction sale proceedings and damages with prayer for
preliminary injunction against Maybank, PPI, Sheriff Villanueva,
and the Registry of Deeds of San Carlos City, Negros Occidental
(RD-San Carlos), before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-
10451. They averred, inter alia, that: (a) the second loan was a
clean or unsecured loan; (b) after receiving the final demand letter,
they tried to pay the second loan, including the agreed interests and
charges, but Maybank unjustly refused their offers of payment; and
(c) Maybank’s right to foreclose had prescribed or is barred by
laches.20
On the other hand, Maybank and PPI countered21 that: (a) the
second loan was secured by the same real estate mortgage under a
continuing security provision therein; (b) when the loan became
past due, Sps. Tarrosa promised to pay and negotiated for a
restructuring of their loan, but failed to pay despite demands; and
(c) Sps. Tarrosa’s positive acknowledgment and admission of their
indebtedness controverts the defense of prescription.22
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision23 dated June 16, 2005, the RTC held that the second
loan was subject to the continuing security provision in the real
estate mortgage.24 However, it ruled that Maybank’s right to
foreclose, reckoned from the time the mortgage indebtedness
became due and payable on March 11, 1984, had already
prescribed, considering the lack of any timely judicial action,
written extrajudicial demand or written acknowledgment by the
debtor of his debt that could interrupt the prescriptive period.25
Accordingly, it declared the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings
affecting the subject property as null and void, and ordered
Maybank to pay Sps. Tarrosa moral and exemplary damages, as
well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.26 Maybank filed a
motion for reconsideration27 which was, however, denied in an
Order28 dated December 9, 2005, prompting it to appeal29 to the
CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision30 dated November 29, 2013, the CA affirmed the RTC
ruling that Maybank’s right to foreclose the real estate mortgage
over the subject property is already barred by prescription. It held
that the prescriptive period should be reckoned from March 11,
1984 when the second loan had become past due and remained
unpaid since demand was not a condition sine qua non for the
accrual of the latter’s right to foreclose under paragraph 5 of the
real estate mortgage. It observed that Maybank failed to present
evidence of any timely written extrajudicial demand or written
acknowledgment by the debtors of their debt that could have
effectively interrupted the running of the prescriptive period.31
Undaunted, Maybank moved for reconsideration,32 which was
denied in a Resolution33 dated May 13, 2014; hence this petition.
The Issues Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the
CA committed reversible error in finding that Maybank’s right to
foreclose the real estate mortgage over the subject property was
barred by prescription.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
An action to enforce a right arising from a mortgage should
be enforced within ten (10) years from the time the right of
action accrues, i.e., when the mortgagor defaults in the
payment of his obligation to the mortgagee; otherwise, it
will be barred by prescription and the mortgagee will lose
his rights under the mortgage.34 However, mere delinquency in
payment does not necessarily mean delay in the legal concept. To be
in default is different from mere delay in the grammatical sense,
because it involves the beginning of a special condition or status
which has its own peculiar effects or results.35
In order that the debtor may be in default, it is necessary that: (a)
the obligation be demandable and already liquidated; (b) the debtor
delays performance; and (c) the creditor requires the performance
judicially or extrajudicially,36 unless demand is not necessary – i.e.,
when there is an express stipulation to that effect; where the law so
provides; when the period is the controlling motive or the principal
inducement for the creation of the obligation; and where demand
would be useless. Moreover, it is not sufficient that the law or
obligation fixes a date for performance; it must further state
expressly that after the period lapses, default will commence.37
Thus, it is only when demand to pay is unnecessary in case
of the aforementioned circumstances, or when required,
such demand is made and subsequently refused that the
mortgagor can be considered in default and the mortgagee
obtains the right to file an action to collect the debt or
foreclose the mortgage.38
In the present case, both the CA and the RTC reckoned the accrual
of Maybank’s cause of action to foreclose the real estate mortgage
over the subject property from the maturity of the second loan on
May 11, 1984.1âwphi1 The CA further held that demand was
unnecessary for the accrual of the cause of action in light of
paragraph 5 of the real estate mortgage, which pertinently
provides:
5. In the event that the Mortgagor herein should fail or refuse to
pay any of the sums of money secured by this mortgage, or any part
thereof, in accordance with the terms and conditions herein set
forth, or should he/it fail to perform any of the conditions stipulated
herein, then and in any such case, the Mortgagee shall have the
right, at its election to foreclose this mortgage, [x x x].39
However, this provision merely articulated Maybank’s right to elect
foreclosure upon Sps. Tarrosa’s failure or refusal to comply with the
obligation secured, which is one of the rights duly accorded to
mortgagees in a similar situation.40 In no way did it affect the
general parameters of default, particularly the need of prior
demand under Article 116941 of the Civil Code, considering that it
did not expressly declare: (a) that demand shall not be necessary in
order that the mortgagor may be in default; or (b) that default shall
commence upon mere failure to pay on the maturity date of the
loan. Hence, the CA erred in construing the above provision as one
through which the parties had dispensed with demand as a
condition sine qua non for the accrual of Maybank's right to
foreclose the real estate mortgage over the subject property, and
thereby, mistakenly reckoned such right from the maturity date of
the loan on March 11, 1984. In the absence of showing that demand
is unnecessary for the loan obligation to become due and
demandable, Maybank's right to foreclose the real estate mortgage
accrued only after the lapse of the period indicated in its final
demand letter for Sps. Tarrosa to pay, i.e., after the lapse of five (5)
days from receipt of the final demand letter dated March 4, 1998.42
Consequently, both the CA and the RTC committed reversible error
in declaring that Maybank's right to foreclose the real estate
mortgage had already prescribed.
Thus, considering that the existence of the loan had been admitted,
the default on the part of the debtors-mortgagors had been duly
established, and the foreclosure proceedings had been initiated
within the prescriptive period as afore-discussed, the Court finds no
reason to nullify the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the subject
property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November
29, 2013 and the Resolution dated May 13, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 02211 are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The
complaint in Civil Case No. 98-10451 is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 128991 April 12, 2000
YOLANDA ROSELLO-BENTIR, SAMUEL PORMIDA and
CHARITO PORMIDA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE MATEO M. LEANDA, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of RTC, Tacloban City, Branch 8, and
LEYTE GULF TRADERS, INC., respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Reformation. of an instrument is that remedy in equity by means of
which a written instrument is made or construed so as to express or
conform to the real intention of the parties when some error or
mistake has been committed. 1 It is predicated on the equitable
maxim that equity treats as done that which ought to be done. 2
The rationale of the doctrine is that it would be unjust and
unequitable to allow the enforcement of a written instrument which
does not reflect or disclose the real meeting of the minds of the
parties. 3 However, an action for reformation must be brought
within the period prescribed by law, otherwise, it will be barred by
the mere lapse of time. The issue in this case is whether or not the
complaint for reformation filed by respondent Leyte Gulf Traders,
Inc. has prescribed and in the negative, whether or not it is entitled
to the remedy of reformation sought.
On May 15, 1992, respondent Leyte Gulf Traders, Inc. (herein
referred to as respondent corporation) filed a complaint for
reformation of instrument, specific performance, annulment of
conditional sale and damages with prayer for writ of injunction
against petitioners Yolanda Rosello-Bentir and the spouses Samuel
and Charito Pormida. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 92-
05-88 and raffled to Judge Pedro S. Espina, RTC, Tacloban City,
Branch 7. Respondent corporation alleged that it entered into a
contract of lease of a parcel of land with petitioner Bentir for a
period of twenty (20) years starting May 5, 1968. According to
respondent corporation, the lease was extended for another four (4)
years or until May 31, 1992. On May 5, 1989, petitioner Bentir sold
the leased premises to petitioner spouses Samuel Pormada and
Charito Pormada. Respondent corporation questioned the sale
alleging that it had a right of first refusal. Rebuffed, it filed Civil
Case No. 92-05-88 seeking the reformation of the expired contract of
lease on the ground that its lawyer inadvertently omitted to
incorporate in the contract of lease executed in 1968, the verbal
agreement or understanding between the parties that in the event
petitioner Bentir leases or sells the lot after the expiration of the
lease, respondent corporation has the right to equal the highest
offer.
In due time, petitioners filed their answer alleging that the
inadvertence of the lawyer who prepared the lease contract is not a
ground for reformation. They further contended that respondent
corporation is guilty of laches for not bringing the case for
reformation of the lease contract within the prescriptive period of
ten (10) years from its execution.
Respondent corporation then filed its reply and on November 18,
1992, filed a motion to admit amended complaint. Said motion was
granted by the lower court. 4
Thereafter, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss reiterating that the
complaint should be dismissed on the ground of prescription.
On December 15, 1995, the trial court through Judge Pedro S.
Espina issued an order dismissing the complaint premised on its
finding that the action for reformation had already prescribed. The
order reads:
ORDER
Resolved here is the defendants' MOTION TO DISMISS
PLAINTIFF'S complaint on ground of prescription of action.
It is claimed by plaintiff that he and defendant Bentir entered into
a contract of lease of a parcel of land on May 5, 1968 for a period of
20 years (and renewed for an additional 4 years thereafter) with the
verbal agreement that in case the lessor decides to sell the property
after the lease, she shall give the plaintiff the right to equal the
offers of other prospective buyers. It was claimed that the lessor
violated this tight of first refusal of the plaintiff when she
sureptitiously (sic) sold the land to co-defendant Pormida on May 5,
1989 under a Deed of Conditional Sale. Plaintiffs right was further
violated when after discovery of the final sale, plaintiff ordered to
equal the price of co-defendant Pormida was refused and again
defendant Bentir surreptitiously executed a final deed of sale in
favor of co-defendant Pormida in December 11, 1991.
The defendant Bentir denies that she bound herself to give the
plaintiff the right of first refusal in case she sells the property. But
assuming for the sake of argument that such right of first refusal
was made, it is now contended that plaintiffs cause of action to
reform the contract to reflect such right of first refusal, has already
prescribed after 10 years, counted from May 5, 1988 when the
contract of lease incepted. Counsel for defendant cited Conde vs.
Malaga, L-9405 July 31, 1956 and Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, 180
SCRA 635, where the Supreme Court held that the prescriptive
period for reformation of a written contract is ten (10) years under
Article 1144 of the Civil Code.
This Court sustains the position of the defendants that this action
for reformation of contract has prescribed and hereby orders the
dismissal of the case.
SO ORDERED. 5
On December 29, 1995, respondent corporation filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order dismissing the complaint.
On January 11, 1996, respondent corporation filed an urgent ex-
parte motion for issuance of an order directing the petitioners, or
their representatives or agents to refrain from taking possession of
the land in question.
Considering that Judge Pedro S. Espina, to whom the case was
raffled for resolution, was assigned to the RTC, Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 19, Judge Roberto A. Navidad was designated in his place.
On March 28, 1996, upon motion of herein petitioners, Judge
Navidad inhibited himself from hearing the case. Consequently, the
case was re-raffled and assigned to RTC, Tacloban City, Branch 8,
presided by herein respondent judge Mateo M. Leanda.
On May 10, 1996, respondent judge issued an order reversing the
order of dismissal on the grounds that the action for reformation
had not yet prescribed and the dismissal was "premature and
precipitate", denying respondent corporation of its right to
procedural due process. The order reads:
ORDER
Stated briefly, the principal objectives of the twin motions
submitted by the plaintiffs, for resolution are:
(1) for the reconsideration of the Order of 15 December 1995 of the
Court (RTC, Br. 7), dismissing this case, on the sole ground of
prescription of one (1) of the five (5) causes of action of plaintiff in
its complaint for "reformation" of a contract of lease; and,
(2) for issuance by this Court of an Order prohibiting the
defendants and their privies-in-interest, from taking possession of
the leased premises, until a final court order issues for their
exercise of dominical or possessory right thereto.
The records of this case reveal that co-defendant BENTER
(Yolanda) and plaintiff Leyte Gulf Traders Incorporation,
represented by Chairman Benito Ang, entered into a contract of
lease of a parcel of land, denominated as Lot No. 878-D, located at
Sagkahan District, Tacloban City, on 05 May 1968, for a period of
twenty (20) years, (later renewed for an additional two (2) years).
Included in said covenant of lease is the verbal understanding and
agreement between the contracting parties, that when the
defendant (as lessor) will sell the subject property, the plaintiff as
(lessee) has the "right of first refusal", that is, the right to equal the
offer of any other prospective third-party buyer. This agreement
(sic) is made apparent by paragraph 4 of the lease agreement
stating:
4. IMPROVEMENT. The lessee shall have the right to erect on the
leased premises any building or structure that it may desire
without the consent or approval of the Lessor . . . provided that any
improvements existing at the termination of the lease shall remain
as the property of the Lessor without right to reimbursement to the
Lessee of the cost or value thereof.
That the foregoing provision has been included in the lease
agreement if only to convince the defendant-lessor that plaintiff
desired a priority right to acquire the property (ibid) by purchase,
upon expiration of the effectivity of the deed of lease.
In the course of the interplay of several procedural moves of the
parties herein, the defendants filed their motion to admit their
amended answer to plaintiff's amended complaint. Correspondingly,
the plaintiff filed its opposition to said motion. The former court
branch admitted the amended answer, to which order of admission,
the plaintiff seasonably filed its motion for reconsideration. But,
before the said motion for reconsideration was acted upon by the
court, the latter issued an Order on 15 December 1995,
DISMISSING this case on the lone ground of prescription of the
cause of action of plaintiff's complaint on "reformation" of the lease
contract, without anymore considering the remaining cause of
action, viz.: (a) on Specific Performance; (b) an Annulment of Sale
and Title; (c) on Issuance of a Writ of Injunction, and (d) on
Damages.
With due respect to the judicial opinion of the Honorable Presiding
Judge of Branch 7 of this Court, the undersigned, to whom this case
was raffled to after the inhibition of Judge Roberto Navidad, as
acting magistrate of Branch 7, feels not necessary any more to
discuss at length that even the cause of action for "reformation" has
not, as yet, prescribed.
To the mind of this Court, the dismissal order adverted to above,
was obviously premature and precipitate, thus resulting denial
upon the right of plaintiff that procedural due process. The other
remaining four (4) causes of action of the complaint must have been alleged 4-year extension of the lease contract after it expired in
deliberated upon before that court acted hastily in dismissing this 1988. Consequently, when the action for reformation of instrument
case. was filed in 1992 it was within ten (10) years from the extended
period of the lease. Private respondent theorized, and the Court of
WHEREFORE, in the interest of substantial justice, the Order of
the court, (Branch 7, RTC) dismissing this case, is hereby ordered Appeals agreed, that the extended period of lease was an "implied
RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. new lease" within the contemplation of Article 1670 of the Civil
Code, 14 under which provision, the other terms of the original
Let, therefore, the motion of plaintiff to reconsider the Order contract were deemed revived in the implied new lease.
admitting the amended answer and the Motion to Dismiss this case
We do not agree. First, if, according to respondent corporation,
(ibid), be set for hearing on May 24, 1996, at 8:30 o'clock in the
morning. Service of notices must be effected upon parties and there was an agreement between the parties to extend the lease
counsel as early as possible before said scheduled date. contract for four (4) years after the original contract expired in
1988, then Art. 1670 would not apply as this provision speaks of an
Concomitantly, the defendants and their privies-in-interest or implied new lease (tacita reconduccion) where at the end of the
agents, are hereby STERNLY WARNED not to enter, in the contract, the lessee continues to enjoy the thing leased "with the
meantime, the litigated premises, before a final court order issues acquiescence of the lessor", so that the duration of the lease is "not
granting them dominical as well as possessory right thereto. for the period of the original contract, but for the time established
To the motion or petition for contempt, filed by plaintiff, thru Atty. in Article 1682 and 1687." In other words, if the extended period of
Bartolome C. Lawsin, the defendants may, if they so desire, file lease was expressly agreed upon by the parties, then the term
their answer or rejoinder thereto, before the said petition will be set should be exactly what the parties stipulated, not more, not less.
for hearing. The latter are given ten (10) days to do so, from the Second, even if the supposed 4-year extended lease be considered as
date of their receipt of a copy of this Order. an implied new lease under Art. 1670, "the other terms of the
original contract" contemplated in said provision are only those
SO ORDERED. 6 terms which are germane to the lessee's right of continued enjoyment
On June 10, 1996, respondent judge issued an order for status quo of the property leased. 15 The prescriptive period of ten (10) years
ante, enjoining petitioners to desist from occupying the property. 7 provided for in Art. 1144 16 applies by operation of law, not by the
will of the parties. Therefore, the right of action for reformation
Aggrieved, petitioners herein filed a petition for certiorari to the
accrued from the date of execution of the contract of lease in 1968.
Court of Appeals seeking the annulment of the order of respondent
court with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction Even if we were to assume for the sake of argument that the instant
and temporary restraining order to restrain respondent judge from action for reformation is not time-barred, respondent corporation's
further hearing the case and to direct respondent corporation to action will still not prosper. Under Section 1, Rule 64 of the New
desist from further possessing the litigated premises and to turn Rules of Court, 17 an action for the reformation of an instrument is
over possession to petitioners. instituted as a special civil action for declaratory relief. Since the
purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure an
On January 17, 1997, the Court of Appeals, after finding no error in
authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties
the questioned order nor grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance
trial court that would amount to lack, or in excess of jurisdiction,
therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach
denied the petition and affirmed the questioned order. 8 A
thereof, it may be entertained only before the breach or violation of
reconsideration of said decision was, likewise, denied on April 16,
the law or contract to which it refers. 18 Here, respondent
1997. 9
corporation brought the present action for reformation after an
Thus, the instant petition for review based on the following alleged breach or violation of the contract was already committed by
assigned errors, viz: petitioner Bentir. Consequently, the remedy of reformation no
6:01 THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT AN longer lies.
ACTION FOR REFORMATION IS PROPER AND JUSTIFIED We no longer find it necessary to discuss the other issues raised
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE PRESENT CASE; considering that the same are predicated upon our affirmative
6.02 THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT resolution on the issue of the prescription of the action for
THE ACTION FOR REFORMATION HAS NOT YET reformation.
PRESCRIBED; WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of
6.03 THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT AN the Court of Appeals dated January 17, 1997 is REVERSED and
OPTION TO BUY IN A CONTRACT OF LEASE IS REVIVED SET ASIDE. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban
FROM THE IMPLIED RENEWAL OF SUCH LEASE; AND, City, Branch 7, dated December 15, 1995 dismissing the action for
reformation is REINSTATED.1âwphi1.nêt
6.04 THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A
STATUS QUO ANTE ORDER IS NOT AN INJUNCTIVE RELIEF SO ORDERED.
THAT SHOULD COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 58
OF THE RULES OF COURT. 10
The petition has merit.
The core issue that merits our consideration is whether the
complaint for reformation of instrument has prescribed.1awp++i1
The remedy of reformation of an instrument is grounded on the
principle of equity where, in order to express the true intention of
the contracting parties, an instrument already executed is allowed
by law to be reformed. The right of reformation is necessarily an
invasion or limitation of the parol evidence rule since, when a
writing is reformed, the result is that an oral agreement is by court
decree made legally effective. 11 Consequently, the courts, as the
agencies authorized by law to exercise the power to reform an
instrument, must necessarily exercise that power sparingly and
with great caution and zealous care. Moreover, the remedy, being
an extraordinary one, must be subject to limitations as may be
provided by law. Our law and jurisprudence set such limitations,
among which is laches. A suit for reformation of an instrument may
be barred by lapse of time. The prescriptive period for actions based
upon a written contract and for reformation of an instrument is ten
(10) years under Article 1144 of the Civil Code. 12 Prescription is
intended to suppress stale and fraudulent claims arising from
transactions like the one at bar which facts had become so obscure
from the lapse of time or defective memory. 13 In the case at bar,
respondent corporation had ten (10) years from 1968, the time when
the contract of lease was executed, to file an action for reformation.
Sadly, it did so only on May 15, 1992 or twenty-four (24) years after
the cause of action accrued, hence, its cause of action has become
stale, hence, time-barred.
In holding that the action for reformation has not prescribed, the
Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the Regional Trial Court that
the 10-year prescriptive period should be reckoned not from the
execution of the contract of lease in 1968, but from the date of the
October 14, 2015
G.R. No. 169442
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
PRIVATIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OFFICE (PMO),
Petitioner
vs.
ANTONIO V. BANEZ, LUISITA BANEZ VALERA, NENA
BANEZ HOJILLA, and EDGARDO B. HOJILLA, JR.,
Respondents
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Assailed and sought to be annulled in this Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 23 August 2005 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 70137, entitled "Cellophil Resources Corporation v. Antonio
V. Banez, Luisita Banez Valera, Nena Banez Hojilla and Edgardo
B. Hojilla, Jr.," which affirmed the Order2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 1, Bangued, Abra, dated 16 August 2000, that
dismissed the complaint of petitioner Republic of the Philippines,
represented by Privatization and Management Office (PMO), for
specific performance, recovery of possession, and damages against
respondents Antonio V. Banez, Luisita Bañez Valera, Nena Bañez
Hojilla and Edgardo B. Hojilla, Jr., docketed as Civil Case No. 1853.
The facts as culled from the records are as follows:
In 1976, Antonio V. Bañez, Luisita Bañez Valera, and Nena Bañez
Hojilla (collectively, respondents) offered for sale a parcel of land
(subject property), with an area of 20,000 sq m in Barangay Calaba,
Bangued, Abra to Cellophil Resources Corporation (CRC). Pursuant
to the offer to sell on 7 December 1981, respondents executed a
Letter Agreement irrevocably giving CRC the option to purchase
the subject property, which CRC accepted. The pertinent portion of
the Letter Agreement (hereinafter referred to as Contract), to wit:
1. The purchase price shall be Twenty Pesos xxx per square meter
or a total amount of Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱400,000.00).
2. The co-owners shall take all necessary steps to cause the
CRC Portion to be brought under the operation of Republic
Act No. 496, as amended, and to cause the issuance in their
name of the corresponding original certificate of title, all of
the foregoing to be accomplished within a reasonable time
from date hereof. xxx
xxxx
7. The co-owners hereby confirm their agreement and permission to
CRC’s entry into, construction of building[s] and improvements, and
occupancy of, any portion of the Property, and xxx waive any right
of action they may have against CRC respecting such entry,
construction, or occupancy by the latter of any Portion of the
Property.
8. An absolute deed of sale containing the above provisions
and standard warranties on conveyances of real property
shall be executed by the co-owners in favor of CRC or its
assignee/s and the same delivered to the latter together with the
original certificate of title upon payment of the purchase price less
the advances made by CRC in accordance with Paragraphs 2 and 3
above; provided, that payment shall be made by CRC only
upon presentation by the co-owners to CRC of certificate/s
and/or clearances, with corresponding receipts, issued by
the appropriate government office/s or agency/ies to the
effect that capital gains tax, real estate taxes on the
Property and local transfer tax and other taxes, fees or
charges due on the transaction and/or on the Property have
been paid.
9. This option shall be effective from [the] date of your acceptance
as indicated by your conformity below and for a period of one (1)
month from and after CRC shall have been notified in writing by
the co-owners that an original certificate of title has been issued in
their names and that they are ready to execute the xxx deed of
sale.3 (Emphasis and underscoring ours)
Respondents asked for several cash advances which reached the
total amount of, more or less, Two Hundred Seventeen Thousand
Pesos (P217,000.00), to be deducted from the purchase price of Four
Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱400,000.00). After paying cash
advances to respondents, CRC constructed staff houses and
introduced improvements on the subject property. As respondents
would be staying abroad for a time, they executed a Special Power
of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Edgardo B. Hojilla (Hojilla). The SPA
authorized Hojilla to perform the following:
1. To take all steps necessary to cause a portion of the lot covered by
Tax Declaration No. 40185 in the name of Urbano Bañez which is
the subject of our "Offer to Sell" to Cellophil Resources Corporation
containing an area xxx to be brought under the operation of
Republic Act No. 496, as amended, and to cause the issuance in our
name of the corresponding original certificate of title.
2. To do all acts and things and to execute all papers and documents
of whatever nature or kind required for the accomplishments of the
aforesaid purpose.
HEREBY GRANTING AND GIVING unto our said attorney full
power and authority whatsoever requisite or necessary or proper to
be done in or about the premises as fully to all intents and purposes
as we might or could lawfully do if personally present (with power
of substitution and revocation), and hereby ratifying and confirming
all that our said attorney shall do or cause to be done under and by
virtue of these presents.4
However, CRC stopped its operation. The Development Bank of the
Philippines and National Development Company took over CRC’s
operation and turned over CRC’s equity to Asset Privatization
Trust (APT), which is a government agency created by virtue of
Proclamation No. 50, as amended. The APT’s function is to take
title to and possession of, provisionally manage and dispose of
nonperforming assets of government financial institutions. Upon
the expiration of APT’s term on 31 December 2000, the government
issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 323, which created the
Privatization and Management Office (PMO). By virtue of E.O. No.
323, the powers, functions, and duties of APT were transferred to
the PMO. Thus, the original party, CRC, is now represented by the
Republic of the Philippines through the PMO (hereinafter referred
to as petitioner), the successor of the defunct APT.
As alleged by petitioner, respondents declared afterwards the
subject property as Urbano Bañez property, rented out to third
parties the staff houses petitioner constructed, and ordered its
guards to prohibit the petitioner from entering the compound,
which impelled petitioner to file a complaint for specific
performance, recovery of possession, and damages against
respondents, including Hojilla, on 10 April 2000. Among others, the
complaint prayed for respondents to surrender and deliver the title
of the subject property, and execute a deed of absolute sale in favor
of petitioner upon full payment. It mentioned three letters sent to
respondents on 29 May 1991, 24 October 1991, and 6 July 1999.
In the Complaint, it was alleged that:
"[t]here is no justification, legal or otherwise for the [respondents]
to dispossess (sic) the [petitioner] from the subject property.
[Petitioner] is more than willing and able to pay the [respondents]
the balance of the purchase price of the subject parcel of land but its
inability to do so was due to the [respondents’] failure to produce
the original certificate of title of the subject parcel of land and to
execute the pertinent deed of sale, as well as the unjustified
occupation by the [respondents] of the property and [of] the staff
houses built by [petitioner and that] such actions of the
[respondents] are contrary to their undertaking under condition no.
7 of the subject letter agreement, that is, for [respondents] to permit
[petitioner’s] entry into and occupancy of any portion of the subject
property and their waiver of any right of action they may have
against [petitioner] respecting such entry and occupancy of any
portion of the property. And despite repeated demands made by
[petitioner] upon the [respondents] for them to vacate and turnover
the subject parcel of land and the staff houses to [petitioner], the
last of which was in a letter dated July 6, 1999, the said
[respondents] have failed and neglected and still fail and neglect to
do so up to the present time."5
Ruling of the RTC
On 23 June 2000, Hojilla filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds
that he was not a real party-in-interest and that the action was
barred by the Statute of Limitations, which Motion the RTC
granted in an Order dated 16 August 2000 based on Article 1144(1)
of the Civil Code, which bars actions filed beyond ten (10) years
upon the execution of the written contract. According to the RTC,
the letters petitioner sent to respondents were not demands for
respondents to comply with their obligation to deliver the title as to
interrupt the running of the prescriptive period. The pertinent
portion of the RTC Order reads:
In the instant case, the defendants were given [enough] time from
December 7, 1981 to comply with their obligation, hence, after a
reasonable period of time, the plaintiff should have demanded
compliance of defendants’ undertakings or initiated any other
action to protect its interest without waiting for the statute of
limitations to bar their claim.6
The RTC resolved that because the written contract was executed
on 7 December 1981, then the complaint that was filed more than
eighteen (18) years since the contract was executed was beyond the
10-year prescriptive period. Within that 18-year period, there was
no act on the part of petitioner, whether judicial or extrajudicial, to
interrupt prescription.
While petitioner paid cash advances to respondents for the
processing of the registration of the title, "which totaled to more or
less ₱217,000.00 as of September 7, 1984 xxx to the filing of this
suit, [petitioner] has not demanded compliance by [respondents] of
their obligation, that is, the execution of the absolute deed of sale
and the delivery of the Original Certificate of Title to the property
to [petitioner] upon payment of the purchase price stipulated. There
were letters addressed to [respondents] but these were not demands
for compliance of [respondents’] obligation and which is not
sufficient under the law to interrupt the prescriptive period."7
The RTC further stated that:
"[t]he parties could not have contemplated that the delivery of the
property and the payment thereof could be made indefinitely and
render uncertain the status of the land. The failure of either [of the]
parties to demand performance of the obligation of the other for an
unreasonable length of time renders the contract ineffective."8
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in an Order
dated 5 January 2001.
On appeal, petitioner argued that the RTC erred when it dismissed
the complaint. Petitioner averred that: (1) its claim was not yet
barred by prescription; (2) the period of prescription had been
interrupted by extrajudicial demand; (3) the Statute of Limitation
did not run against the State; (4) petitioner’s claim not having
prescribed, laches could not have set in; (5) the laches of one
nullified the laches of the other; and (6) laches cannot be used to
defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud and injustice.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the RTC in a Decision
dated 23 August 2005 on the ground that the complaint was barred
by the Statute of Limitations. Contrary to petitioner’s arguments,
the Court of Appeals found that the extrajudicial demand to
respondents did not serve to toll the running of the prescriptive
period. The Court of Appeals ruled that the record is bereft of
evidence that would attest that written extrajudicial demands were
sent to respondents. While petitioner sent demand letters dated 29
May 1991 and 24 October 1991, these demand letters were not
considered as demand letters because the letters simply called the
attention of Hojilla to return the properties and unlock the gates.
As regards the letter dated 6 July 1999, the Court of Appeals ruled
that because the letter was addressed to Hojilla, who was only an
attorney-in-fact authorized to register the property, it was not
binding upon the respondents. The Court of Appeals also gave no
probative value to the 6 July 1999 letter for having no proof of
service.
With regard to the issue of running of prescriptive period against
the State, the Court of Appeals opined that because the subject
property is a patrimonial property of the State when APT became
the controlling stockholder of CRC, prescription may run against
the State. Thus, the reasonable period within which to register the
property is three (3) years. According to the Court of Appeals, the
cause of action of petitioner accrued three (3) years from the time
the Contract was executed on 7 December 1981 or, to say the least,
on 15 August 1984 when Hojilla sent the acknowledgment letter
dated 15 August 1984, at which time it became clear that
respondents could no longer fulfill their obligation.
Hence, petitioner is before us raising the following arguments:
A. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the running of the
prescriptive period was not interrupted when respondents
acknowledged their still unfulfilled obligation to initiate
proceedings for the registration of title of the subject property and
at the same time committed that they will only claim the full
payment of the property upon presentation of a clean title and
execution of a Deed of Sale signed by the heirs as stated in the
letter dated August 15, 1984.
B. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the outright dismissal of
petitioner’s suit for specific performance, recovery of possession and
damages on the basis of prescription even as it is evident that there
is a need to fix a period considering that the performance of the
condition or obligation is dependent upon the will of respondents.
C. The Court of Appeals erred in ignoring certain manifest
equitable considerations which militate against a resort to a purely
mathematical computation of the prescriptive period and in
disregarding the provision of the irrevocable offer that the option
remains effective for a period of one month from and after notice
that a certificate of title has been issued.9
The main issue is whether or not the complaint for specific
performance was filed beyond the prescriptive period.
Petitioner’s Arguments
The petitioner argues that although there is a 10-year limitation
within which to file a case based on a written contract, the period
was interrupted due to a written acknowledgment of respondents’
obligation and demand by petitioner. The argument is based on
Article 1155 of the Civil Code, which provides that the running of
the prescriptive period is interrupted when there is a written
extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any
written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.
The petitioner referred to the letter sent by Hojilla to the former
dated 15 August 1984, and letters given by petitioner to Hojilla
dated 29 May 1991, 24 October 1991, and 6 July 1999. In the letter
dated 15 August 1984, respondents affirmed their undertaking that
they will claim full payment of the property upon presentation of a
clean title and the execution of the Absolute Deed of Sale, which
reads, "[t]he Bañez heirs will only claim for the full payment of the
property upon presentation of a clean title and execution of a Deed
of Sale signed by the heirs."10
Based on Hojilla’s representation as stated in the letter dated 15
August 1984, petitioner argues that Hojilla is estopped by his own
acts and for misleading petitioner because "respondents not only
failed to comply with their commitment to deliver a certificate of
title but where [sic] they also [misled] petitioner into believing that
they were working on the title of the subject property even as they
had[,] at the back of their mind[s], the running of the statute of
limitations as an arsenal once petitioner demands the fulfillment of
their obligation."11
The petitioner further added that because there was no period fixed
for the fulfillment or performance of the obligation to deliver the
title, the least the court should have done was to fix the period
pursuant to Article 1197 of the Civil Code.
Finally, the petitioner posits that pursuant to paragraph 9 of the
Contract, its obligation is conditioned upon respondents’ obligation,
which is to deliver the title. Thus, because the respondents failed to
deliver such, the obligation of petitioner never ripened.
Respondents’ Arguments
The arguments of respondents, which are aligned with the reasons
of the lower courts, rely on Article 1144 of the Civil Code, which
provides that actions upon a written contract must be brought
within ten (10) years from execution. Because the complaint was
filed beyond the 10-year prescriptive period, the action was already
barred by the Statute of Limitations. Further, during such period,
petitioner failed to act either judicially or extrajudicially to
effectively interrupt the running of the prescriptive period. Thus,
the complaint must be dismissed for having been extinguished by
the Statute of Limitations.
Our Ruling
We rule in favor of the petitioner.
We deem material, for the resolution of the issues in this case, the
letters that were exchanged by the parties.
We shall discuss each letter in seriatim.
Hojilla’s letter dated 15 August 1984
In Hojilla’s letter to petitioner dated 15 August 1984, Hojilla
updated petitioner of the status of the subject property’s title, in
this wise:
The preparation of the advance survey plan, technical description
and Engineer’s Certificate pursuant to Land Administrative Order
No. 10- 4 has been submitted to the Regional Land Office, and
approved by the Regional Director.
Atty. Valera is now in the process of preparing the petition papers
of the Calaba property for submission to the local court.12
There is no other logical conclusion but that the 15 August 1984
letter is an acknowledgment of respondents’ commitment under the
Contract. The letter served to update petitioner of the status of the
subject property’s title, an obligation agreed upon by the parties in
the Contract. It would be specious to argue that respondents did not
acknowledge the existence of the Contract and yet, send
correspondence to petitioner updating it of the status of the
application for title on the subject property. Therefore, the letter
dated 15 August 1984 served as a written acknowledgment of debt
or obligation of respondents.
In Philippine National Railways v. NLRC,13 it was stated that a
written acknowledgment of debt or obligation effectively interrupts
the running of the prescriptive period and sets the same running
anew.14 Hence, because Hojilla’s letter dated 15 August 1984
served as a written acknowledgement of the respondents’ debt or
obligation, it interrupted the running of the prescriptive period and
set the same running anew with a new expiry period of 15 August
1994.
Petitioner’s letters dated 29 May
1991 and 24 October 1991
With regard to the letters petitioner sent to Hojilla dated 29 May
1991 and 24 October 1991, the RTC ruled that these letters were
insufficient under the law to interrupt the prescriptive period
because these were not demand letters. We lift the pertinent
portion from the letter dated 29 May 1991, which demanded
respondents to return the properties and to unlock the gates:
Under the agreement to purchase the lot, APT-CRC shall pay the
whole of the purchase price thereof when the certificate of title and
other documents enumerated therein are presented to it. Clearly,
the consummation of the sale is within your control. x x x
In view of the foregoing, demand is hereby made upon you
and your principals, the heirs of Urbano Bañez, to return
the properties withdrawn and to unlock the gates leading to
the staffhouses (sic), within fifteen (15) days from receipt
thereof, otherwise we will be constrained to institute the
necessary action to protect the interest of APT-CRC.15
(Emphasis and underscoring ours)
In the same vein, the letter dated 24 October 1991 demanded
respondents to discontinue the construction, repair, demolition, and
occupancy of several staff houses. A pertinent portion of the 24
October 1991 letter reads:
Considering that these action (sic) are unauthorized, they
constitute violations of the irrevocable option to purchase dated
December 7, 1981, which remains valid, binding and effective to
this day. Demand is hereby made upon you to discontinue
such unauthorized acts and vacate the premises within
fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof.16 x x x (Emphasis and
underscoring ours)
We do not agree with the lower courts. Clearly, the 29 May 1991
and 24 October 1991 letters demanded respondents to return the
properties, discontinue the construction, repair, demolition and
occupancy of several staff houses, and unlock the gates, which is to
enforce respondents’ obligations pursuant to paragraph 7 of the
Contract which reads:
7. The co-owners hereby confirm their agreement and permission to
CRC’s entry into, construction of building and improvements, and
occupancy of, any portion of the Property, and hereby accordingly
waive any right of action they may have against CRC respecting
such entry, construction, or occupancy by the latter of any Portion
of the Property.17
The letters dated 29 May 1991 and 24 October 1991 are deemed
demand letters as contemplated under Article 1155. They are
demand letters to enforce respondents’ obligation under the
Contract, which is to cede possession to petitioner. The letters
interrupted the running of the prescriptive period which
commenced to run anew.
Petitioner’s letter dated 6 July 1999
Compared to the letters dated 29 May and 24 October 1991, which
demanded Hojilla to surrender possession of the subject property,
this time, in petitioner’s letter to Hojilla dated 6 July 1999,
petitioner demanded Hojilla to produce the title of the subject
property. However, despite the fact that the letter was a clear
demand of the nature contemplated by law that would interrupt the
prescriptive period, the Court of Appeals found that (1) the letter
did not effectively interrupt the prescriptive period because the
complaint had long prescribed; (2) the letter was addressed to the
wrong party; and, finally, (3) the letter did not bear any proof of
service or receipt.
We do not agree.
Hojilla’s SPA
We refer to the SPA, which granted the authority of Hojilla.
When respondents went abroad pending the performance of their
obligations in the Contract, they authorized Hojilla to register the
subject property— a single obligation in the whole range of
obligations in the Contract. The SPA appeared to have left no
representative to fulfill respondents’ obligations in the Contract on
their behalf except for Hojilla’s authority to register the subject
property. The pertinent portion of the SPA reads:
1. To take all steps necessary to cause a portion of the lot
covered by Tax Declaration No. 40185 in the name of Urbano
Bañez which is the subject of our "Offer to Sell" to Cellophil
Resources Corporation containing an area xxx to be brought
under the operation of Republic Act No. 496, as amended,
and to cause the issuance in our name of the corresponding
original certificate of title.
2. To do all acts and things and to execute all papers and documents
of whatever nature or kind required for the accomplishments of the
aforesaid purpose.
HEREBY GRANTING AND GIVING unto our said attorney full
power and authority whatsoever requisite or necessary or proper to
be done in or about the premises as fully to all intents and purposes
as we might or could lawfully do if personally present (with power
of substitution and revocation), and hereby ratifying and confirming
all that our said attorney shall do or cause to be done under and by
virtue of these presents.18 (Emphasis and underscoring ours)
This was read simply by the lower courts as limiting Hojilla’s
authority to the registration of the subject property under the name
of his principal, and all the necessary acts for such purpose. It
observed that nowhere in the SPA was Hojilla authorized as
administrator or agent of respondents with respect to the execution
of the Contract.
In the case at bar, the reliefs prayed for by petitioner include the
execution of the Contract such as delivery of the subject title,
recovery of possession of the subject property, execution of the deed
of sale or transfer of absolute ownership upon full payment of the
balance, and damages for alleged violation of respondents of the
Contract for non-delivery of the title and refusal to vacate the
subject property. Indeed, following the reading of the lower courts of
the scope of Hojilla’s authority, Hojilla is neither the proper party to
execute the Contract nor the proper party to receive the demand
letters on behalf of respondents.
This strict construction of the tenor of the SPA will render the
obligatory force of the Contract ineffective. Construction is not a
tool to prejudice or commit fraud or to obstruct, but to attain justice.
Ea Est Accipienda Interpretatio Quae Vitio Caret. To favor the lower
court’s interpretation of the scope of Hojilla’s power is to defeat the
juridical tie of the Contract—the vinculum juris of the parties. As
no one was authorized to represent respondents in the Contract,
then petitioner cannot enforce the Contract, as it were. This is an
absurd interpretation of the SPA. It renders the Contract ineffective
for lack of a party to execute the Contract.
Contrary to the findings of the lower court, the present case is a
case of an express agency, where, Hojilla, the agent, binds himself
to represent another, the principal, who are herein respondents,
with the latter’s express consent or authority.19 In a contract of
agency, the agent acts for and in behalf of the principal on matters
within the scope of the authority conferred upon him, such that, the
acts of the agent have the same legal effect as if they were
personally done by the principal.20 Because there is an express
authority granted upon Hojilla to represent the respondents as
evidenced by the SPA, Hojilla’s actions bind the respondents.
As agent, the representations and guarantees of Hojilla are
considered representations and guarantees of the principal. This is
the principle of agency by promissory estoppel. We refer to the
evidence on record. It was Hojilla who administered and/or
managed the subject property.21 Based on Hojilla’s letter dated 15
August 1984 to petitioner, Hojilla made the representation that
besides being the attorney-in-fact of the respondents with limited
authority to register the property, he was also their agent with
regard to respondents’ other obligations related to the Contract.
The pertinent portion of the 15 August 1984 letter of Hojilla to
petitioner reads:
Regarding our loan with the National Electrification
Administration (NEA), Hon. Mel Mathay who is helping the Bañez
heirs has initiated negotiations with NEA for Abreco to purchase
our lot in front of the Provincial Jail to offset our loan with NEA.22
Also, one glaring fact that cannot escape us is Hojilla’s
representation and guarantee that petitioner’s obligation will only
arise upon presentation of a clean title and execution of a Deed of
Sale signed by the respondents’ heirs, which reads, "[t]he Bañez
heirs will only claim for the full payment of the property
upon presentation of a clean title and execution of a Deed of
Sale signed by the heirs."23
If Hojilla knew that he had no authority to execute the Contract
and receive the letters on behalf of respondents, he should have
opposed petitioner’s demand letters. However, having received the
several demand letters from petitioner, Hojilla continuously
represented himself as the duly authorized agent of respondents,
authorized not only to administer and/or manage the subject
property, but also authorized to register the subject property and
represent the respondents with regard to the latter’s obligations in
the Contract. Hojilla also assured petitioner that petitioner’s
obligation to pay will arise only upon presentation of the title.
Clearly, the respondents are estopped by the acts and
representations of their agent. Falling squarely in the case at bar is
our pronouncement in Philippine National Bank v. IAC (First Civil
Cases Div.),24 "[h]aving given that assurance, [Hojilla] may not
turn around and do the exact opposite of what [he] said [he] would
do. One may not take inconsistent positions. A party may not go
back on his own acts and representations to the prejudice of the
other party who relied upon them."25
Assuming further that Hojilla exceeded his authority, the
respondents are still solidarily liable because they allowed Hojilla to
act as though he had full powers by impliedly ratifying Hojilla’s
actions—through action by omission.26 This is the import of the
principle of agency by estoppel or the doctrine of apparent
authority.
In an agency by estoppel or apparent authority, "[t]he principal is
bound by the acts of his agent with the apparent authority which he
knowingly permits the agent to assume, or which he holds the agent
out to the public as possessing."27
The respondents’ acquiescence of Hojilla’s acts was made when they
failed to repudiate the latter’s acts. They knowingly permitted
Hojilla to represent them and petitioners were clearly misled into
believing Hojilla’s authority. Thus, the respondents are now
estopped from repudiating Hojilla’s authority, and Hojilla’s actions
are binding upon the respondents.
Receipt of the Letters
Time and time again, this Court has reiterated it is not a trier of consequence is stated in Article 1155 of the Civil Code. It states,
facts and parties may raise only questions of law.1âwphi1 The "[t]he prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed
jurisdiction of the Court is limited to reviewing errors of law and before the court, when there is a written extrajudicial demand by
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive because it is the creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgment of the
not the Court’s function to review, examine, and evaluate or weigh debt by the debtor." Following the law, the new ten-year period for
the evidence all over again.28 The rule, however, is not without the filing of a case by the petitioner should be counted from 29 May
exceptions, viz.: 1991, ending on 29 May 2001. The complaint at bar was filed on 10
(1) [W]hen the [conclusion is a finding] grounded entirely on April 2000, well within the required period.
speculations, surmises [and] conjectures; Notably, before the expiration of the new prescriptive period, the
(2) [W]hen the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or petitioner again sent a new demand letter on 6 July 1999, which
impossible; again caused the same to run anew, which will expire on 6 July
2009. The complaint filed on 10 April 2000 was timely.
(3) [W]hen there is grave abuse of discretion;
The Contract and True Intent of the Parties
(4) [W]hen the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
Based on the stipulation in the Contract, the parties agreed that
(5) [W]hen the findings of fact are conflicting; payment shall be made only upon presentation of the title and other
(6) [W]hen xxx the Court of Appeals[, in making its findings,] went documents of the subject property to petitioner. Paragraph 8 of the
beyond the issues of the case [and the same is] contrary to the Contract reads:
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; 8. An absolute deed of sale containing the above provisions and
(7) [W]hen the findings are contrary to [those] of the trial court; standard warranties on conveyances of real property shall be
executed by the co-owners in favor of CRC or its assignee/s and the
(8) [W]hen the findings [of fact] are conclusions without citation of same delivered to the latter together with the original certificate of
specific evidence on which they are based; title upon payment of the purchase price less the advances made by
(9) [W]hen the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the CRC in accordance with Paragraphs 2 and 3 above; provided, that
petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the payment shall be made by CRC only upon presentation by
respondents; the co-owners to CRC of certificate/s and/or clearances, with
corresponding receipts, issued by the appropriate
(10) [W]hen the findings of fact [of the Court of Appeals] are
government office/s or agency/ies to the effect that capital
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by
gains tax, real estate taxes on the Property and local
the evidence on record and
transfer tax and other taxes, fees or charges due on the
(11) [When] the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain transaction and/or on the Property have been paid.38
irrelevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly (Emphasis and underscoring ours)
considered, would justify a different conclusion.29
The true intent of the parties is further enunciated in Hojilla's
In the case at bar, the findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals letter to petitioner dated 15 August 1984, which stated, "[t]he
are contradictory: the RTC did not make any finding on the receipt Baiiez heirs will only claim for the full payment of the property
of the demand letters by Hojilla, while the Court of Appeals upon presentation of a clean title and execution of a Deed of Sale
resolved that assuming arguendo that the letters were demand signed by the heirs."39
letters contemplated under Article 1155 of the Civil Code, the same
To rule in favor of respondents despite their failure to perform their
are unavailing because the letters do not bear any proof of service of
obligations is the height of injustice. Respondents cannot benefit
receipt by respondents.
from their own inaction and failure to comply with their obligations
A perusal of the records reveals that only the 24 October 1991 letter in the Contract and let the petitioner suffer from respondents' own
has no proof of receipt.30 The demand letters dated 29 May 199131 default.
and 6 July 199932 contain proofs of receipt.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Thus, the core issue of whether or not the action has prescribed. Court of Appeals dated 23 August 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 70137,
An action based on a written contract must be brought within ten affirming the Order of the Regional Trial Court, which ruled that
(10) years from the time the right of action accrued. Accordingly, a the action has prescribed, is reversed and set aside. Let the records
cause of action on a written contract accrues only when an actual of this case be REMANDED to the court of origin, which is
breach or violation thereof occurs.33 A cause of action has three DIRECTED to admit the Answer with Counterclaim of the
elements, to wit: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever petitioner for further trial on the merits. The respondents are
means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an further ordered to return possession of the subject property to
obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to petitioner. No pronouncement as to costs.
violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such SO ORDERED.
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a
breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff.34
By the contract between the herein parties, the cause of action
accrued at the point when the reasonable time within which to
present the title lapsed. The parties did not determine the date
when the respondents must present the title and other documents
to the petitioner. The parties only agreed that the respondents must
present the same within a "reasonable time." Reasonable time
means "so much time as is necessary under the circumstances for a
reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the
contract or duty requires that should be done, having a regard for
the rights and possibility of loss, if any, to the other party."35 Such
reasonable time was determined by the respondents through the
letter dated 15 August 1984. The respondents acknowledged their
obligation to deliver the title and asked for a new period to do so. It
states:
The preparation of the advance survey plan, technical description
and Engineer’s Certificate pursuant to Land Administrative Order
No. 10-4 has been submitted to the Regional Land Office, and
approved by the Regional Director.
Atty. Valera is now in the process of preparing the petition papers
of the Calaba property for submission to the local court.
xxxx
The Bañez heirs will only claim for the full payment of the property
upon presentation of a clean title and execution of a Deed of Sale
signed by the heirs.36
The accrual of the cause of action to demand the titling of the land
cannot be earlier than 15 August 1984. So that, the petitioner can
sue on the contract until 15 August 1994. Prior to the expiration of
the aforesaid period, the petitioner sent a demand letter to Hojilla
dated 29 May 1991. A few months thereafter, petitioner sent
another demand letter to Hojilla dated 24 October 1991.37 The
prescriptive period was interrupted on 29 May 1991.The
G.R. No. 165420 June 30, 2005
CONCEPCION R. AINZA, substituted by her legal
heirs, DR. NATIVIDAD A. TULIAO, CORAZON A.
JALECO and LILIA A. OLAYON, petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES ANTONIO PADUA and EUGENIA PADUA,
respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the February
24, 2004 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
70239,1 and its September 28, 2004 resolution, denying
reconsideration thereof.2
In her complaint for partition of real property, annulment of
titles with damages,3 Concepcion Ainza (Concepcion) alleged
that respondent-spouses Eugenia (Eugenia) and Antonio
Padua (Antonio) owned a 216.40 sq. m. lot with an
unfinished residential house located at No. 85-A Durian
corner Pajo Sts., Barangay Quirino 2-C, Project 2, Quezon
City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 271935.
Sometime in April 1987, she bought one-half of an
undivided portion of the property from her daughter,
Eugenia and the latter’s husband, Antonio, for One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).
No Deed of Absolute Sale was executed to evidence the
transaction, but cash payment was received by the
respondents, and ownership was transferred to Concepcion
through physical delivery to her attorney-in-fact and
daughter, Natividad Tuliao (Natividad). Concepcion
authorized Natividad and the latter’s husband, Ceferino
Tuliao (Ceferino) to occupy the premises, and make
improvements on the unfinished building.
Thereafter, Concepcion alleged that without her consent,
respondents caused the subdivision of the property into
three portions and registered it in their names under TCT
Nos. N-155122, N-155123 and N-155124 in violation of the
restrictions annotated at the back of the title.
On the other hand, Antonio averred that he bought the
property in 1980 and introduced improvements thereon.
Between 1989 and 1990, he and his wife, Eugenia, allowed
Natividad and Ceferino to occupy the premises temporarily.
In 1994, they caused the subdivision of the property and
three (3) separate titles were issued.
Thereafter, Antonio requested Natividad to vacate the
premises but the latter refused and claimed that Concepcion
owned the property. Antonio thus filed an ejectment suit on
April 1, 1999. Concepcion, represented by Natividad, also
filed on May 4, 1999 a civil case for partition of real property
and annulment of titles with damages.
Antonio claimed that his wife, Eugenia, admitted that
Concepcion offered to buy one third (1/3) of the property who
gave her small amounts over several years which totaled
P100,000.00 by 1987 and for which she signed a receipt.
On January 9, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 85, rendered judgment4 in favor of Concepcion,
the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants
and ordering:
1. the subdivision of the subject property between the said
plaintiff and defendants in equal shares with one-half of the
property, including the portion occupied by the spouses
Severino and Natividad Tuliao to be awarded to the
plaintiff;
2. the cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. N-
155122, N-155123, N-155124 of the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City;
3. the defendants to pay to the plaintiff P50,000.00 as
attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.5
The trial court upheld the sale between Eugenia and
Concepcion. It ruled that the sale was consummated when
both contracting parties complied with their respective
obligations. Eugenia transferred possession by delivering
the property to Concepcion who in turn paid the purchase
price. It also declared that the transfer of the property did
not violate the Statute of Frauds because a fully executed
contract does not fall within its coverage.
On appeal by the respondents, the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the trial court, and declared the sale
null and void. Applying Article 124 of the Family Code, the
Court of Appeals ruled that since the subject property is
conjugal, the written consent of Antonio must be obtained
for the sale to be valid. It also ordered the spouses Padua to
return the amount of P100,000.00 to petitioners plus
interest.6
The sole issue for resolution in this petition for review is
whether there was a valid contract of sale between Eugenia
and Concepcion.
A contract of sale is perfected by mere consent, upon a
meeting of the minds on the offer and the acceptance thereof
based on subject matter, price and terms of payment.7
In this case, there was a perfected contract of sale between
Eugenia and Concepcion. The records show that Eugenia
offered to sell a portion of the property to Concepcion, who
accepted the offer and agreed to pay P100,000.00 as
consideration. The contract of sale was consummated when
both parties fully complied with their respective obligations.
Eugenia delivered the property to Concepcion, who in turn,
paid Eugenia the price of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00), as evidenced by the receipt which reads:
RECEIPT
Received the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P100,000.00) as payment for the lot on 85-A Durian
St., Project 2, Quezon City, from Mrs. Concepcion R. Ainza,
on April, 1987.
_______(Sgd.)______
Mrs.. Eugenia A. Padua8
The verbal contract of sale between Eugenia and Concepcion
did not violate the provisions of the Statute of Frauds that a
contract for the sale of real property shall be unenforceable
unless the contract or some note or memorandum of the sale
is in writing and subscribed by the party charged or his
agent.9 When a verbal contract has been completed,
executed or partially consummated, as in this case, its
enforceability will not be barred by the Statute of Frauds,
which applies only to an executory agreement.10 Thus,
where one party has performed his obligation, oral evidence
will be admitted to prove the agreement.11
In the instant case, the oral contract of sale between
Eugenia and Concepcion was evidenced by a receipt signed
by Eugenia. Antonio also stated that his wife admitted to
him that she sold the property to Concepcion.
It is undisputed that the subject property was conjugal and
sold by Eugenia in April 1987 or prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code on August 3, 1988, Article 254 of which
repealed Title V, Book I of the Civil Code provisions on the
property relations between husband and wife. However,
Article 256 thereof limited its retroactive effect only to cases
where it would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. In
the case at bar, vested rights of Concepcion will be impaired
or prejudiced by the application of the Family Code; hence,
the provisions of the Civil Code should be applied.
In Felipe v. Heirs of Aldon, et al.,12 the legal effect of a sale
of conjugal properties by the wife without the consent of the
husband was clarified, to wit:
The legal ground which deserves attention is the legal effect
of a sale of lands belonging to the conjugal partnership
made by the wife without the consent of the husband.
It is useful at this point to re-state some elementary rules:
The husband is the administrator of the conjugal
partnership. (Art. 165, Civil Code) Subject to certain
exceptions, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any
real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife’s
consent. (Art. 166, Idem.) And the wife cannot bind the
conjugal partnership without the husband’s consent, except January 9, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
in cases provided by law. (Art. 172, Idem.). Branch 85, in Civil Case No. Q-99-37529, is REINSTATED.
In the instant case, Gimena, the wife, sold lands belonging SO ORDERED.
to the conjugal partnership without the consent of the
husband and the sale is not covered by the phrase "except in
cases provided by law." The Court of Appeals described the
sale as "invalid" – a term which is imprecise when used in
relation to contracts because the Civil Code uses specific
names in designating defective contracts, namely: rescissible
(Arts. 1380 et seq.), voidable (Arts. 1390 et seq.),
unenforceable (Arts. 1403, et seq.), and void or inexistent
(Arts. 1409 et seq.).1awphi1.zw+
The sale made by Gimena is certainly a defective
contract but of what category? The answer: it is a
voidable contract.
According to Art. 1390 of the Civil Code, among the voidable
contracts are "[T]hose where one of the parties is incapable
of giving consent to the contract." (Par. 1.) In the instant
case Gimena had no capacity to give consent to the contract
of sale. The capacity to give consent belonged not even to the
husband alone but to both spouses.
The view that the contract made by Gimena is a
voidable contract is supported by the legal provision
that contracts entered by the husband without the
consent of the wife when such consent is required,
are annullable at her instance during the marriage
and within ten years from the transaction
questioned. (Art. 173, Civil Code).
Gimena’s contract is not rescissible for in such a contract all
the essential elements are untainted but Gimena’s consent
was tainted. Neither can the contract be classified as
unenforceable because it does not fit any of those described
in Art. 1403 of the Civil Code. And finally, the contract
cannot be void or inexistent because it is not one of those
mentioned in Art. 1409 of the Civil Code. By process of
elimination, it must perforce be a voidable contract.
The voidable contract of Gimena was subject to annulment
by her husband only during the marriage because he was
the victim who had an interest in the contract. Gimena, who
was the party responsible for the defect, could not ask for its
annulment. Their children could not likewise seek the
annulment of the contract while the marriage subsisted
because they merely had an inchoate right to the lands sold.
(Emphasis supplied)
The consent of both Eugenia and Antonio is necessary for
the sale of the conjugal property to be valid. Antonio’s
consent cannot be presumed.13 Except for the self-serving
testimony of petitioner Natividad, there is no evidence that
Antonio participated or consented to the sale of the conjugal
property. Eugenia alone is incapable of giving consent to the
contract. Therefore, in the absence of Antonio’s consent, the
disposition made by Eugenia is voidable.14
The contract of sale between Eugenia and Concepcion being
an oral contract, the action to annul the same must be
commenced within six years from the time the right of
action accrued.15 Eugenia sold the property in April 1987
hence Antonio should have asked the courts to annul the
sale on or before April 1993. No action was commenced by
Antonio to annul the sale, hence his right to seek its
annulment was extinguished by prescription.
Even assuming that the ten (10)-year prescriptive period
under Art. 173 should apply, Antonio is still barred from
instituting an action to annul the sale because since April
1987, more than ten (10) years had already lapsed without
any such action being filed.
In sum, the sale of the conjugal property by Eugenia
without the consent of her husband is voidable. It is binding
unless annulled. Antonio failed to exercise his right to ask
for the annulment within the prescribed period, hence, he is
now barred from questioning the validity of the sale
between his wife and Concepcion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision
dated February 24, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 70239 and its resolution dated September 28, 2004
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision dated
March 16, 2015 G.R. No. 190828
ONOFRE V. MONTERO,EDGARDO N.
ESTRANERO,RENING P. PADRE, GABRIEL A. MADERA,
HERMINIO T. TACLA, NELSON C. VILORIA, DEMETRIO Q.
PAJARILLO, ALFREDO R. AGANON,REYNALDO AVILA,
ALBERT T. RUIZ, NESTOR Y. YAGO,HARTY M. TUPASI,
AGUSTIN R. AVILA, JR or MARCOS R. AVILA, BONIFACIO
B. GAANO, JOSELITO D. CUENTA,JONAS P. ESTILONG,
DOMINADOR C. CANARIA,GENARO C.
RONDARIS,HERARDO M. DULAY, FRANKLIN A. RAVINA,
JR., and RUBEN C. CABELLO, Petitioners,
vs.
TIMES TRANSPORTATION CO.,INC., and SANTIAGO
RONDARIS, MENCORP TRANSPORT SYSTEMS, INC.,
VIRGINIA R. MENDOZA,REYNALDO MENDOZA,
Respondents.
DECISION REYES, J.:
This appeal by petition for review1 seeks to annul and set aside the
Decision2 dated August 28, 2009 and Resolution3 dated December
11, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 106260,
which affirmed the Decision4 dated March 31, 2008 of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC CA No. 046325-05
(08), and its Resolution5 dated September 5, 2008, denying the
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The NLRC decision vacated
and set aside the Decision6 dated June 29, 2005 of the Labor
Arbiter (LA) on the ground that the consolidated complaints for
illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice and money claims have
already prescribed.
The Facts
Respondent Times Transportation Co., Inc., (TTCI) is a company
engaged in the business of land transportation for passengers and
goods serving the Ilocos Region to Metro Manila route. TTCI
employed the herein 21 petitioners as bus drivers, conductors,
mechanics, welders, security guards and utility personnel, namely:
Onofre V. Montero (Montero), Edgardo N. Estrañero (Estrañero),
Rening P. Padre (Padre), Gabriel A. Madera (Madera), Herminio T.
Tacla, Nelson C. Viloria, Demetrio Q. Pajarillo (Pajarillo), Alfredo
R. Aganon (Aganon), Reynaldo Avila (Avila), Albert T. Ruiz, Nestor
Y. Yago (Yago), Harty M. Tupasi (Tupasi), Agustin R. Avila, Jr.
(Avila, Jr.), Bonifacio B. Gaano (Gaano), Joselito D. Cuenta
(Cuenta), Jonas P. Estilong (Estilong), Dominador C. Canaria
(Canaria), Genaro C. Rondaris (Genaro), Herardo M. Dulay (Dulay),
Franklin A. Ravina, Jr. (Ravina), and Ruben C. Cabello (Cabello)
(petitioners).7
Sometime in 1995, the rank-and-file employees of TTCI formed a
union named as Times Employees Union (TEU) which was later
certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining unit within TTCI.8
In March 1997, members of TEU went on strike; but when former
Labor Secretary Leonardo A. Quisimbing assumed jurisdiction over
the labor dispute and certified the same for compulsory arbitration,
a return-to-work Order dated March 10, 1997 was issued which
ended the strike and enjoined the parties from committing any
other act that may intensify the situation.9
On August 23, 1997, TTCI Board of Directors approved a resolution
confirming the authority given to respondent Santiago Rondaris
(Santiago), TTCI President and Chairman of the Board of Directors,
to gradually dispose the assets of the TTCI as a result of its
unabated increase of the cost of operations and losses for the last
two years. TTCI also adopted a company-wide retrenchment
program, which will take effect on October 1, 1997, where Santiago
was given the authority to determine the number of excess
employees who would be the subject of retrenchment.10
The sale of 25 buses of TTCI, as well as the Certificates of Public
Convenience for the operation of the buses, were likewise approved
and subsequently transferred to respondent Mencorp Transport
Systems, Inc., (MENCORP) by virtue of a Deed of Sale dated
December 12, 1997. Thereafter, several union members received
notices that they were being retrenched effective 30 days from
September 16, 1997.11
For a second time, on October 17, 1997, TEU declared a strike
against TTCI, but the latter merely reiterated the earlier return-to-
work order of the Labor Secretary. For disregarding the said
return-to-work order, Santiago issued two notices of termination
dated October 26, 199712 terminating some 106 workers and a
revised list dated November 24, 199713 increasing the number of
dismissed employees to 119, for participating in the illegal strike.14
On December 4, 1997, Santiago served to the Department of Labor
and Employment Regional Office I a notice that TTCI would be
closing its operations due to heavy business losses.15
On May 14, 1998, petitioners Estrañero, Pajarillo, Padre, Avila,
Avila, Jr., Tupasi, Cuenta, Dulay, Yago, and Aganon filed several
complaints against TTCI and MENCORP before the NLRC. The
complaints were thereafter consolidated under the case entitled
"Malana v. TTCI" docketed as NLRC RAB-I-01-1007.16 However,
this case was withdrawn on March 4, 1999 upon motion by the
TEU’s counsel which was given due course on March 22, 1999.17
Four years later, several complaints for unfair labor practice, illegal
dismissal with money claims, damages and attorney’s fees were
filed against TTCI, Santiago, MENCORP and its General Manager
Virginia Mendoza, including the latter’s husband Reynaldo
Mendoza (collectively called the respondents), before the LA from
June to July 2002.18 Accordingly, these complaints were
consolidated.
In response, TTCI asserted that the petitioners’ cause of action had
already been barred by prescription because the complaints were
filed only in June 2002 or after almost five years from the date of
their dismissal. MENCORP, on the other hand, raised the defense
of lack of employer-employee relationship since it never engaged the
services of the petitioners when TTCI sold to them its buses and the
Certificates of Public Convenience.19
On June 9, 2005, the LA rendered a Decision dismissing the
petitioners’ claim for unfair labor practice and money claims on the
ground of prescription. However, with regard to the issue of illegal
dismissal, only the complaints of Montero, Ravina, Cabello, Genaro,
Madera, Gaano, Arsenio Donato and Estilong were dismissed for
having been barred by prescription.20
The LA found that petitioners Estrañero, Pajarillo, Aganon, Padre,
Dulay, Cuenta, Canaria, Yago, Avila and Avila, Jr. were illegally
dismissed and were awarded their separation pay and backwages.
According to the LA, the complaints of these 10 petitioners were
timely filed in June 2002 because the eight-month period during
which their cases were pending should be excluded from the four-
year prescriptive period.21
Disagreeing with the LA decision, all parties interposed an appeal
before the NLRC. However, said appeals have both been denied for
non-perfection, particularly for failure of the petitioners to verify
their appeal, and for failure of the respondent to post the required
cash or surety bond. In a Decision22 dated March 31, 2008, the
NLRC vacated and set aside the findings of the LA, upon finding
that the petitioners’ complaints had already been barred by
prescription. The dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision
appealed from is hereby VACATED and SET ASIDE, and the
complaints dismissed on ground of prescription.1âwphi1
SO ORDERED.23
The NLRC observed that the LA had ignored the rule on
prescription, and chose to be selective in awarding relief to the 10
complainants by stating in his decision that the period during
which the labor cases were pending should be deducted from the
period of prescription. According to the NLRC:
We have thoroughly examined the records and find no justification
for the [LA] to rule that the pendency of the cases has worked in
favor of the complainants to whom he awarded separation pay and
backwages. The [LA] has not at all indicated in his decision when
the eight (8)[-]month period of pendency he alluded to commenced
and when it ended. As a matter of fact, these cases took almost
three (3) years from filing of the complaints to the rendition of the
appealed decision.24
The NLRC added that the application of the principle of
prescription should not be done on a selective basis, especially when
the dates of accrual of the causes of action and the filing of the
complaints readily show that prescription has set in.25
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration26 dated May 16,
2008, but it was denied.27 Hence, they filed a petition for
certiorari28 before the CA.
On August 28, 2009, the CA Decision dismissed the petition.29 In
sustaining the NLRC decision, the appellate court ratiocinated:
Here, the illegal dismissal case was filed only in June 2002 or for
more than four (4) years and seven (7) months from the time
petitioners received the notices of their dismissal in November and
October 1997. Clearly, the four-year prescriptive period has already
elapsed.
Moreover, there is likewise no merit in petitioners’ contention that
the period when they filed a complaint on May 14, 1998 but
withdrawn on March 30, 1998 should be excluded from the
computation of the four-year prescriptive [period] for illegal
dismissal cases. The prescriptive period continues even after the
withdrawal of the case as though no action has been filed at all.
This was clarified in the case of Intercontinental Broadcasting
Corporation vs. Panganiban, where the Supreme Court held that
although the commencement of an action stops the running of the
statute of prescription or limitations, its dismissal or voluntary
abandonment by plaintiff leaves the parties in exactly the same
position as though no action had been commenced at all. x x x.30
Aggrieved by the foregoing disquisition, the petitioners moved for
reconsideration31 but it was denied by the CA.32 Hence, the
present petition for review on certiorari.33
The Issue the Court to the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving,
The main issue in this case is whether or not the petitioners’ to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and applicable
law and doctrine.42
complaints for illegal dismissal have already prescribed.
Ruling of the Court WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 28, 2009 and Resolution
dated December 11, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
The petition is bereft of merit. 106260 are AFFIRMED.
"It should be emphasized at the outset that as a rule, this Court is SO ORDERED.
not a trier of facts and this applies with greater force in labor cases.
Hence, factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC,
particularly when they coincide with those of the [LA] and if
supported by substantial evidence, are accorded respect and even
finality by this Court. But where the findings of the NLRC and the
[LA] are contradictory, as in the present case, this Court may delve
into the records and examine for itself the questioned findings."34
Nevertheless, the Court has thoroughly reviewed the records in this
case and finds that the NLRC did not commit any grave abuse of its
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering
its decision in favor of the respondents. The CA acted in accord with
the evidence on record and case law when it dismissed the petition
and affirmed the assailed decision and resolution of the NLRC.
In the case at bar, October 26, 1997 and November 24, 1997 appear
on record to be the dates when the petitioners’ employment were
terminated by TTCI. The antecedent facts that gave rise to the
petitioners’ dismissal from employment are not disputed in this
case. There is no question about the fact that the petitioners’
complaints for unfair labor practice and money claims have already
prescribed. The petitioners however argue that their complaints for
illegal dismissal were duly filed within the four-year prescriptive
period since the period during which their cases were pending
should be deducted from the period of prescription. On the other
hand, the respondents insist that said complaints have already
prescribed. Hence, the pivotal question in resolving the issues
hinges on the resolution of whether the period during which the
petitioners’ cases were pending should be excluded from the period
of prescription.
Settled is the rule that when one is arbitrarily and unjustly
deprived of his job or means of livelihood, the action instituted to
contest the legality of one’s dismissal from employment constitutes,
in essence, an action predicated upon an injury to the rights of the
plaintiff, as contemplated under Article 114635 of the New Civil
Code, which must be brought within four years.36
The petitioners contend that the period when they filed a labor case
on May 14, 1998 but withdrawn on March 22, 1999 should be
excluded from the computation of the four-year prescriptive period
for illegal dismissal cases. However, the Court had already ruled
that the prescriptive period continues even after the withdrawal of
the case as though no action has been filed at all. The applicability
of Article 115537 of the Civil Code in labor cases was upheld in the
case of Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation v. Panganiban38
where the Court held that "although the commencement of a civil
action stops the running of the statute of prescription or limitations,
its dismissal or voluntary abandonment by plaintiff leaves the
parties in exactly the same position as though no action had been
commenced at all."39
In like manner, while the filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal
before the LA interrupted the running of the prescriptive period, its
voluntary withdrawal left the petitioners in exactly the same
position as though no complaint had been filed at all. The
withdrawal of their complaint effectively erased the tolling of the
reglementary period.
A prudent review of the antecedents of the claim reveals that it has
in fact prescribed due to the petitioners’ withdrawal of their labor
case docketed as NLRC RAB-I-01-1007.40 Hence, while the filing of
the said case could have interrupted the running of the four-year
prescriptive period, the voluntary withdrawal of the petitioners
effectively cancelled the tolling of the prescriptive period within
which to file their illegal dismissal case, leaving them in exactly the
same position as though no labor case had been filed at all. The
running of the four-year prescriptive period not having been
interrupted by the filing of NLRC RAB-I-01-1007, the petitioners’
cause of action had already prescribed in four years after their
cessation of employment on October 26, 1997 and November 24,
1997. Consequently, when the petitioners filed their complaint for
illegal dismissal, separation pay, retirement benefits, and damages
in 2002, their claim, clearly, had already been barred by
prescription.41
Sadly, the petitioners have no one but themselves to blame for their
own predicament. By their own allegations in their respective
complaints, they have barred their remedy and extinguished their
right of action. Although the Constitution is committed to the policy
of social justice and the protection of the working class, it does not
necessary follow that every labor dispute will be automatically
decided in favor of labor. The management also has its own rights.
Out of concern for the less privileged in life, this Court, has more
often than not inclined, to uphold the cause of the worker in his
conflict with the employer. Such leaning, however, does not blind
G.R. No. 187451 August 29, 2012
JESUS VIRTUCIO, represented by ABDON VIRTUCIO,
Petitioner, vs. JOSE ALEGARBES, Respondent.
PERALTA, J., Acting Chairperson,* VILLARAMA, JR.,**
PEREZ,***
DECISION MENDOZA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeks to reverse
and set aside the February 25, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 72613, reversing and setting aside
the February 19, 2001 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 1, Isabela, Basi Ian (RTC), in Civil Case No. 685-627, an
action for "Recovery of Possession and Ownership with Preliminary
Injunction."
The Facts
Respondent Jose Alegarbes (Alegarbes) filed Homestead Application
No. V-33203 (E-V-49150) for a 24-hectare tract of unsurveyed land
situated in Bañas, Lantawan, Basilan in 1949. His application was
approved on January 23, 1952.3 In 1955, however, the land was
subdivided into three (3) lots – Lot Nos. 138,139 and 140, Pls-19 - as
a consequence of a public land subdivision. Lot 139 was allocated to
Ulpiano Custodio (Custodio), who filed Homestead Application No.
18-4493 (E-18-2958). Lot 140 was allocated to petitioner Jesus
Virtucio (Virtucio), who filed Homestead Application No. 18-4421
(E-18-2924).4
Alegarbes opposed the homestead applications filed by Custodio and
Virtucio, claiming that his approved application covered the whole
area, including Lot Nos. 139 and 140.5
On October 30, 1961, the Director of Lands rendered a decision
denying Alegarbes' protest and amending the latter's application to
exclude Lots 139 and 140. Only Lot 138 was given due course. The
applications of Custodio and Virtucio for Lots 139 and 140,
respectively, were likewise given due course.6
Alegarbes then appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, who dismissed his appeal on July 28, 1967. He
then sought relief from the Office of the President (OP), which,
however, affirmed the dismissal order of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources in a decision, dated October 25,
1974. Alegarbes moved for a reconsideration, but the motion was
subsequently denied.7
On May 11, 1989, an order of execution8 was issued by the Lands
Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources to enforce the decision of the OP. It ordered
Alegarbes and all those acting in his behalf to vacate the subject lot,
but he refused.
On September 26, 1997, Virtucio then filed a complaint9 for
"Recovery of Possession and Ownership with Preliminary
Injunction" before the RTC.
In his Answer,10 Alegarbes claimed that the decision of the Bureau
of Lands was void ab initio considering that the Acting Director of
Lands acted without jurisdiction and in violation of the provisions
of the Public Land Act. Alegarbes argued that the said decision
conferred no rights and imposed no duties and left the parties in the
same position as they were before its issuance. He further alleged
that the patent issued in favor of Virtucio was procured through
fraud and deceit, thus, void ab initio.
Alegarbes further argued, by way of special and/or affirmative
defenses, that the approval of his homestead application on
January 23, 1952 by the Bureau of Lands had already attained
finality and could not be reversed, modified or set aside. His
possession of Lot Nos. 138, 139 and 140 had been open, continuous,
peaceful and uninterrupted in the concept of an owner for more
than 30 years and had acquired such lots by acquisitive
prescription.
In his Amended and Supplemental Answer,11 Alegarbes also
averred that his now deceased brother, Alejandro Alegarbes, and
the latter's family helped him develop Lot 140 in 1955. Alejandro
and his family, as well as Alegarbes' wife and children, had been
permanently occupying the said lot and, introducing permanent
improvements thereon since 1960.
The RTC Ruling
The RTC rendered its decision on February 19, 2001, favoring
Virtucio. The decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, upon the merit of this case, this court finds for the
plaintiff and against the defendant by:
1. Ordering the defendant and all those acting in his behalf to
vacate Lot No. 140, Pls-19, located at Lower Bañas, Lantawan,
Basilan and surrender the possession and ownership thereof to
plaintiff;
2. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount of Fifteen
Thousand Pesos (₱ 15,000.00) as attorney's fees and another Ten
Thousand Pesos (₱ 10,000.00) as expenses for litigation; and
3. To pay the cost of the suit in the amount of Five Hundred Pesos
(₱500.00).
SO ORDERED.12
Not in conformity, Alegarbes appealed his case before the CA.
The CA Ruling
On February 25, 2009, the CA promulgated its decision declaring
Alegarbes as the owner of Lot No. 140, Pls-19, thereby reversing
and setting aside the decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that
Alegarbes became ipso jure owner of Lot 140 and, therefore, entitled
to retain possession of it.
Consequently, the awards of attorney's fees, litigation expenses and
costs of suit were deleted.
In so ruling, the CA explained that even if the decision to approve
Virtucio's homestead application over Lot 140 had become final,
Alegarbes could still acquire the said lot by acquisitive prescription.
The decisions on the issues of the approval of Virtucio's homestead
application and its validity were impertinent as Alegarbes had
earlier put in issue the matter of ownership of Lot 140 which he
claimed by virtue of adverse possession.
The CA also found reversible error on the part of the RTC in
disregarding the evidence before it and relying entirely upon the
decisions of the administrative bodies, none of which touched upon
the issue of Alegarbes' open, continuous and exclusive possession of
over thirty (30) years of an alienable land. The CA held that the
Director of Lands, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the OP did not determine whether Alegarbes'
possession of the subject property had ipso jure segregated Lot 140
from the mass of public land and, thus, was beyond their
jurisdiction.
Aggrieved, Virtucio filed this petition.
ISSUES
Virtucio assigned the following errors in seeking the reversal of the
assailed decision of the CA, to wit:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the judgment
of the trial court, which awarded the lot in question to the
respondent by virtue of acquisitive prescription and
ordered herein petitioner to surrender the ownership and
possession of the same to them.13
2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in disregarding the
decision in CA-G.R. CV-26286 for Recovery of Possession and
Ownership, Custodio vs. Alegarbes which contains same
factual circumstances as in this case and ruled against
JOSE ALEGARBES.14
3. The Court of Appeals erred in deleting the award of
attorney's fees to the petitioner.15
The lone issue in this case is whether or not Alegarbes acquired
ownership over the subject property by acquisitive prescription.
Ruling of the Court
The petition must fail.
Indeed, it is fundamental that questions of fact are not reviewable
in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. Only questions of law distinctly set forth shall be raised in
the petition.16
Here, the main issue is the alleged acquisition of ownership by
Alegarbes through acquisitive prescription and the character and
length of possession of a party over a parcel of land subject of
controversy is a factual issue.17 The Court, however, is not
precluded from reviewing facts when the case falls within the
recognized exceptions, to wit:
(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises, or conjectures;
(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible;
(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;
(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;
(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of
the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee;
(g) When the CA’s findings are contrary to those by the trial court;
(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based;
(i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent;
(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence
of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or
(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify
a different conclusion.18 [Emphasis supplied]
In the case at bench, the findings and conclusions of the CA are
apparently contrary to those of the RTC, hence, the need to review
the facts in order to arrive at the proper conclusion.
On Acquisitive Prescription
Virtucio insists that the period of acquisitive prescription was
interrupted on October 30, 1961 (or in 1954 when Alegarbes filed
the protest) when the Director of Lands rendered a decision giving
due course to his homestead application and that of Ulpiano
Custodio. Virtucio further claims that since 1954, several
extrajudicial demands were also made upon Alegarbes demanding
that he vacate said lot. Those demands constitute the "extrajudicial
demand" contemplated in Article 1155, thus, tolling the period of
acquisitive prescription.19
Article 1106 of the New Civil Code, in relation to its Article 712,
provides that prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership through
the lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down
by law. Under the same law, it states that acquisitive prescription
may either be ordinary or extraordinary.20 Ordinary acquisitive
prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with
just title for a period of ten years,21 while extraordinary acquisitive
prescription requires uninterrupted adverse possession of thirty
years, without need of title or of good faith.22
There are two kinds of prescription provided in the Civil Code. One
is acquisitive, that is, the acquisition of a right by the lapse of time
as expounded in par. 1, Article 1106. Other names for acquisitive
prescription are adverse possession and usucapcion. The other kind
is extinctive prescription whereby rights and actions are lost by the
lapse of time as defined in Article 1106 and par. 2, Article 1139.
Another name for extinctive prescription is litigation of action.23
These two kinds of prescription should not be interchanged.
Article 1155 of the New Civil Code refers to the interruption of
prescription of actions. Interruption of acquisitive prescription, on
the other hand, is found in Articles 1120-1125 of the same Code.
Thus, Virtucio’s reliance on Article 1155 for purposes of tolling the
period of acquisitive prescription is misplaced. The only kinds of
interruption that effectively toll the period of acquisitive
prescription are natural and civil interruption.24
Civil interruption takes place with the service of judicial summons
to the possessor.25 When no action is filed, then there is no occasion
to issue a judicial summons against the respondents. The period of
acquisitive prescription continues to run.
In this case, Virtucio claims that the protest filed by Alegarbes
against his homestead application interrupted the thirty (30)-year
period of acquisitive prescription. The law, as well as jurisprudence,
however, dictates that only a judicial summons can effectively toll
the said period.
In the case of Heirs of Marcelina Azardon-Crisologo v. Rañon,26 the
Court ruled that a mere Notice of Adverse Claim did not constitute
an effective interruption of possession. In the case of Heirs of
Bienvenido and Araceli Tanyag v. Gabriel,27 which also cited the
Rañon Case, the Court stated that the acts of declaring again the
property for tax purposes and obtaining a Torrens certificate of title
in one's name cannot defeat another's right of ownership acquired
through acquisitive prescription.28
In the same vein, a protest filed before an administrative agency
and even the decision resulting from it cannot effectively toll the
running of the period of acquisitive prescription. In such an
instance, no civil interruption can take place. Only in cases filed
before the courts may judicial summons be issued and, thus,
interrupt possession. Records show that it was only in 1997 when
Virtucio filed a case before the RTC. The CA was, therefore, correct
in ruling that Alegarbesbecame ipso jure owner of Lot 140 entitling
him to retain possession of it because he was in open, continuous
and exclusive possession for over thirty (30) years of alienable
public land.Virtucio emphasizes that the CA erred in disregarding
the decisions of the administrative agencies which amended
Alegarbes' homestead application excluding Lot 140 and gave due
course to his own application for the said lot, which decisions were
affirmed by the RTC.
Well-settled is the rule that factual findings of the lower courts are
entitled to great weight and respect on appeal and, in fact, are
accorded finality when supported by substantial evidence on the
record.29 It appears, however, that the conclusion made by the RTC
was not substantially supported. Even the RTC itself noted in its
decision:
The approval of a Homestead Application merely authorizes the
applicant to take possession of the land so that he could comply
with the requirements prescribed by law before a final patent could
be issued in his favor – what divests the government of title to the
land is the issuance of a patent and its subsequent registration with
the Register of Deeds.30
A perusal of the records would reveal that there was no issuance of
any patent in favor of either parties. This simply means that the
land subject of the controversy remains to be in the name of the
State. Hence, neither Virtucio nor Alegarbes can claim ownership.
There was, therefore, no substantial and legal basis for the RTC to
declare that Virtucio was entitled to possession and ownership of
Lot 140.
It can be argued that the lower court had the decisions of the
administrative agencies, which ultimately attained finality, as legal
bases in ruling that Virtucio had the right of possession and
ownership. In fact, the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) even issued the Order of Execution31 on May
11, 1989 ordering Alegarbes to vacate Lot 140 and place Virtucio in
peaceful possession of it. The CA, however, was correct in finding
that:
But appellant had earlier put in issue the matter of ownership of
Lot 140 which he claims by virtue of adverse possession. On this
issue, the cited decisions are impertinent. Even if the decision to
approve appellee's homestead application over Lot 140 had become
final, appellant could still acquire the said lot by acquisitive
prescription.32
In the case of Heirs of Gamos v. Heirs of Frando,33 the Court ruled
that the mere application for a patent, coupled with the fact of
exclusive, open, continuous and notorious possession for the
required period, is sufficient to vest in the applicant the grant
applied for.34 It likewise cited the cases of Susi v. Razon35 and
Pineda v. CA,36 where the Court ruled that the possession of a
parcel of agricultural land of the public domain for the prescribed
period of 30 years ipso jure converts the lot into private property.37
In this case, Alegarbes had applied for homestead patent as early as
1949. He had been in exclusive, open, continuous and notorious
possession of Lot 140 for at least 30 years. By the time the DENR
issued its order of execution in 1989, Alegarbes had Lot 140 in his
possession for more than 30 years. Even more so when Virtucio filed
the complaint before the RTC in 1997, Alegarbes was already in
possession of the subject property for forty-eight (48) years.
The CA correctly observed that the RTC erred in disregarding the
evidence before it and relying entirely upon the decisions of the
Director of Lands, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the OP, which never touched the issue of whether
Alegarbes’ open, continuous and exclusive possession of over thirty
(30) years of alienable land had ipso jure segregated Lot 140 from
the mass of public land and beyond the jurisdiction of these
agencies.38
When the CA ruled that the RTC was correct in relying on the
abovementioned decisions, it merely recognized the primary
jurisdiction of these administrative agencies. It was of the view that
the RTC was not correct in the other aspects of the case. Thus, it
declared Alegarbes as owner ipso jure of Lot 140 and entitled to
retain possession of it. There is no reason for the Court to disturb
these findings of the CA as they were supported by substantial
evidence, hence, are conclusive and binding upon this Court.39
On the CA Decision involving a similar case
Virtucio insists that the CA gravely erred in disregarding its
decision in Custodio v. Alegarbes, CA-G.R. CV 26286, for Recovery
of Possession and Ownership, which involved the same factual
circumstances and ruled against Alegarbes.
It must be noted that the subject property in the said case was Lot
139 allocated to Custodio and that Virtucio was not a party to that
case. The latter cannot enjoy whatever benefits said favorable
judgment may have had just because it involved similar factual
circumstances. The Court also found from the records that the
period of acquisitive prescription in that case was effectively
interrupted by Custodio's filing of a complaint, which is wanting in
this case.
Moreover, it is settled that a decision of the CA does not establish
judicial precedent.40 "The principle of stare decisis enjoins
adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this
Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a
question of law has been examined and decided, it should be
deemed settled and closed to further argument. "41
The Court agrees with the position of Alegarbes that by Virtucio's
insistence that it was erroneous for the CA to disregard its earlier
decision in CA-G.R. CV 26286, he, in effect, calls upon this Court to
adhere to that decision by invoking the stare decisis principle,
which is not legally possible because only final decisions of this
Court are considered precedents.42
In view of the foregoing, the Court need not dwell on the complaint
of Virtucio with regard to the deletion of the award of attorney's
fees in his favor. It is ludicrous for the CA to order Alegarbes to pay
attorney's fees, as a measure of damages, and costs, after finding
him to have acquired ownership over the property by acquisitive
prescription.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED.