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The University of Leeds

Institute of Communications Studies

The role of mass media in shaping identity


construction
among British Muslim Diasporas after 9/11

By

Mohamed Ben Moussa

Supervisor:
Dr. Myria Georgiou

MA Dissertation
submitted in accordance with the requirements for the
degree of MA in Communications Studies
September 2004
To my mother and my wife… two great women in my life

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Acknowledgements

A number of people contributed to the completion of this work. I would like to thank above

all Dr. Myria Georgiou who supervised this research and patiently followed it up from

conception to the final draft. I would like to thank also my wife who provided me with

invaluable remarks and proofread this research with her habitual care and patience. I also owe

acknowledgement to all those who were kind enough to sacrifice part of their time to sit to

long interviews and share with me some of their most intimate experiences and memories.

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TABLE OF CONTENT

Introduction...............................................................................................................................5

1- Literature Review ................................................................................................................8

2.1 Muslim identity: a background.......................................................................................9


2.2 Muslim identity and mass media..................................................................................10
2.3. Understanding identity................................................................................................12
2.4 Mass media and identity construction..........................................................................13
2.5 Investigating Audiences ..............................................................................................15

2- Methodology........................................................................................................................17

3- Discussion & Analysis .......................................................................................................20

............................................................................................................................20
3.1 Muslim Diasporas and media consumption ................................................................21
3.2 Mass media consumption and identity construction ...................................................25
3.3 The role of religious and community institutions in identity construction: the mosque
as an example ...................................................................................................................27
3.4 The Representation of Muslims and its impact on diasporic Muslim’s identity
construction........................................................................................................................28

Conclusion ..............................................................................................................................35

References:.........................................................................................................................38

Appendices...............................................................................................................................43

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Introduction

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The 9/11 terrorist attacks were undoubtedly one of the most mediated events in history. They
targeted the heart of a major western megalopolis that is a global economic, cultural and
media centre. Images of destruction, shock and suffering were displayed on TV screens and
newspapers’ front pages for a very long time. One of the major consequences of this media
coverage is that it brought Muslims and Islam to the fore in western societies. Akbar (2001)
aptly maintains that ‘the terrible and tragic events of September 11 have opened a Pandora’s
box of questions about Islam’. In Britain, for instance, many issues such as religious
fundamentalism, ‘Islamic’ terrorism and the assimilation of Muslim minorities in society have
gained unprecedented attention in mass media after these attacks.

Mercer (cited in Hall, 1992: 275) argues that ‘identity only becomes an issue when it is in
crisis’. Indeed, as the media and popular attention to Muslims and Islam- related issues raised
dramatically in western countries, in general, diasporic Muslims have started to feel
increasingly caught between their allegiance to their cultural and ethnic background and
origins, on the one hand, and the need to dissociate themselves from fundamentalist groups
that invoke a radical religious discourse to justify terrorist acts, on the other. Paradoxically,
this situation has also pushed many members of the Muslim diasporas in the West to react
defensively as well as defiantly by proclaiming in various forms their adherence to their
religious background. This situation begs a couple of questions mainly with regard to the way
British Muslims regard themselves as a minority and perceive their identity in the light of the
media coverage after 9/11.

This dissertation will attempt to investigate the following question: what role do mass media
play in shaping identity construction among British Muslims after 9/11? For the purpose of
this research work, two hypotheses are put forward. Firstly, mass media, both local and
transnational, play a prominent part in diasporic Muslims’ daily life and, thus, affect
somehow the way the latter construct their identity. Secondly, despite their importance, mass
media do not determine the way diasporic Muslims perceive their identity since the
relationship between the media and audiences/readers is dynamic and interactive rather than
one of cause and effect.

The paper is divided into three main parts, namely literature review, methodology and
discussion and analysis. The literature review part will try to explore key issues underpinning

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the question of identity construction among British Muslims, mainly by reviewing and
discussing some of the main writings on the subject. In addition, it will try to shed light on the
primary communication forms that shape diasporic Muslim’s experience and the best way to
approach the interaction between audiences and the media. The methodology part will present
the method adopted to generate data for the research, namely in–depth interviewing, and the
rationale behind the choice of the method and the category of informants. As to the third part,
it will attempt to present and discuss the main findings generated by the research data. It will
analyse them in the light of the main concepts and theories discussed in the literature review
part in order to answer the research question.

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1- Literature Review

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2.1 Muslim identity: a background
2.1.1. The emergence of the concept of the ‘Muslim identity’ in Britain

The notion of a ‘Muslim identity’ is relatively recent as its emergence dates back only to the
late 80s and early 90’s of the last century. Before that, Muslims were usually perceived within
ethnic categories inasmuch as ‘ethnic identifications […] rather than religion were recognised
in society as the key signifiers of individual and collective difference’ (Ansari, 2003: 9). The
rise of populist English nationalism and the New Right movement with its ‘exclusionary and
cultural essentialist agenda’ (ibid: 9) led more diasporic Muslims to invoke religion as a basis
of identification, and to use a religious discourse to address social problems (ibid: 9). It was
the Rushdie affair, however, that witnessed the real emergence of the notions of Muslim
‘identity’ and ‘community’. Modood (2000:48) argues that ‘within a very short period, the
label ‘Muslim’ became a principal element of identification on the political scene, and was
adopted […] by the media and by the government’ (my translation). In fact, the feeling of
being attacked and beleaguered by a ‘hostile’ majority led a great number of diasporic
Muslims, ‘even those not practicing for whom their Muslim origins was not very important, to
rediscover a new solidarity with their community’ (ibid: 48) (my translation). Accordingly,
the notion of ‘Muslim identity’ in Britain was born within an atmosphere of crisis and
polarised political positions on very sensitive issues.

2.1.2 - Muslim communities: diversity and multiple identities

Despite its widespread use, the notion of ‘Muslim identity’, however, remains problematic
since it obscures the cultural and ethnic diversity that divides British Muslim diasporas.
Indeed, Muslim diasporas in Western countries come from diverse ethnic origins, cultural
backgrounds and have had different historical experiences that shape their existence as
minority groups. Consequently, ‘values, symbols and aspirations, approaches to issues of
identity, strength of adherence to ritual and loyalty to kin networks […] are likely to be
extremely varied, making Muslims in Britain a very heterogeneous population’ (Ansari, 2003:
3). This diversity is bound to affect the way different Muslim groups interpret, practice and
link religion to their daily life. Mandeville (2003: 135) maintains that ‘different
understandings and interpretations of the religion map onto particular ethnic and communal
affiliations’. Moreover, heterogeneity characterizes single diasporic groups, as well. Although

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they share many aspects, Arab Muslims, for instance, come from diverse backgrounds that
run across regional, social and ideological differences. The label ‘Arab’ is also problematic
since it may engulf ethnic and linguistic diversity, as is the case in North African countries
where a considerable part of populations is from Berber origins.

Indeed, in most cases, ethnic, national, regional and class variables may strongly compete
with religious identity and sometimes eclipse it among British Muslims. Halliday (cited in
Ansari, 2003: 12) points out that ‘Islam may, in some contexts, be the prime form of political
and social identity, but it is never the sole form and is often not the primary one within
Muslim societies and “communities”’. Lending credence to Halliday, Dassetto (cited in
Mandeville, 2001: 111) argues that the majority of people designated as ‘Muslims’ and who
live in Western countries do not practice regularly their religion. These arguments provide an
insight into the ‘Muslim’ identity and bring out its heterogeneous nature. However, they seem
to ignore the influence of religion itself on the other variables of identity. Actually, because
Muslims around the world try to adapt Islam to their own social and cultural experience,
religion has become tightly interwoven into social traditions. It is not always possible, then, to
disassociate the religious from the non-religious aspects of culture. This may explain why
some non-practicing Muslims still invoke religion as an important factor underpinning their
choices or perception of the worldas the research data reveal.

2.2 Muslim identity and mass media


2.2.1. Representation of Muslim before and after 9/11

The emergence of a ‘Muslim’ community proclaiming a shared identity has been generally
opposed from the start by both the liberal and conservative media in Britain (Richardson,
2002). Muslim identity has been perceived as a threat to the multicultural society system on
the ground that Muslim identity is a ‘politicised religious identity’ (Modood, 2000: 51) that
contradicts the foundations of a laic and modern society. In fact, compared with other ethnic
minorities in Britain, Muslims are considered as an ‘alien minority, with social and cultural
values and beliefs systems diametrically opposed to those of the west’ (Khan, 2000: 31).

Actually, a research study that surveyed the British newspapers between 1993 and 1997,
found that these newspapers predominantly ignored covering British Muslims’ life and

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culture, and that when they did, the coverage was predominantly negative (Richardson, 2002:
228). The representation of Muslims by the British media is based on two types of discourses:
one that highlights the white British people’s difference from Muslims and another that
stresses the alien nature of Muslims’ culture. Richardson (2002: 226) notes that Muslims are
excluded, first, from ‘the position of “Britishness” they are perceived to lack; and second,
Muslims are excluded from the position of “Britishness” by virtue of the “Islamicness” that
they are perceived to have’.

It may be argued that Richardson’s assessment of the British media’s performance may
obscure the great diversity that informs the way this media in general portray Muslims.
Moreover, assuming that the British media are unfavourable to Muslim minorities, it is not
evident that this fact has an impact on diasporic Muslims since ‘media effects’ is a very
controversial and problematic issue in media studies. Nonetheless, what is more relevant to
this research is the way diasporic Muslims themselves perceive how the British media
represent them and affect the way other people see them.

In fact, as was the case during the Rushdie affair and the second Gulf war, British Muslims
found themselves once again under heavy media spotlights after the events of 9/11. A
research study spanning a period of one year from 9/11 found that references to Muslims by
British broadsheet newspapers increased by 250 to 280 %, and, in some papers like the Sun,
by 658% (Whitaker, 2002). Moreover, recurrent stereotypes, mainly negative ones, inform
Muslims’ representation in the media (ibid). Though reference to British Muslims was kept
low as most coverage concerned Muslims outside Britain, (see Whitaker, 2002 & Werbner,
2002), research studies conducted among British Muslims have revealed that the majority
regard news media with great mistrust and suspicion (www.AfterSptember11-TV). Those
findings testify to the fact that minorities, in general, and diasporic Muslims, in particular, are
sensitive to the way mainstream media portray them. They seem also to confirm that identity
construction is contingent as much upon the way people represent themselves as on how they
perceive the ‘Other’ portray them (Hall, 1996: 8).

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2.3. Understanding identity
2.3.1. Identity as a discourse

Before investigating further identity construction among diasporic Muslims, it is primordial


to explore the concept of identity itself. It is commonly assumed that identity is a unified
essence made of a set of clear and stable characteristics that give a human being his/her
uniqueness. Yet, as Gidens (1991: 53) asserts, ‘self-identity is not a distinctive trait or even a
collection of traits, possessed by the individual. It is the self as reflexively understood by the
person in terms of her or his biography’. In this sense, identity can be understood as
discursive constructions made by individuals about themselves since ‘there can be no identity
experience or social practice which is not discursively constructed’ (Barker, 1999: 23). It is
via various forms of expressions, either linguistic, visual or others, that meaning can be
produced and identities can be constructed (Hall, 1997:3). It is noteworthy that considering
identity to be discursively produced can be very productive for the purpose of this research, as
it allows for investigating identity construction empirically through the study of the discourse
diasporic Muslims produce.

Furthermore, while viewing identity as constantly changing is important, this definition does
not account, however, for how people can still identify with particular forms of individual and
collective identities. This fact can be more relevant to certain communities where
identification with traditional forms of affiliations run across tribal, sectarian and regional
divisions, as is the case with many Muslim diasporas. Accordingly, it is possible to argue that
identity is neither wholly fluid nor open to endless reconstructions, for ‘we can alter it, but
only within the constraints imposed by our inherited constitution’ (Parekh, 2000b: 5). The
latter view of identity can be more appropriate to investigate the way many first generation
British Muslims hold to traditional forms of affiliations, such as tribalism, while at the same
time engage actively in modernistic forms of allegiance, such as citizenship in the British
society.

Furthermore, since identity is discursively constructed, it is built around and within the notion
of difference inherent in all forms of expressions and languages. It is therefore ‘continually
being produced within the vectors of a similarity and difference’ (Barker, 1999: 28). Because
of that, identities can incorporate discourses of inclusion as well as exclusion. In fact, if the

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notion of difference has a positive function that allows the production of culture and identity,
it can also be ‘a site of danger, of negative feelings, of splitting, hostility and aggression
towards the ‘Other’ (Hall, 1997: 238). This sheds light on the way diasporic Muslims
construct their identity within a context in which they feel beleaguered and rejected by the
dominant ‘Other’. It can also highlight the way the ‘other’ is constructed within diasporic
Muslims’ discourse about identity.

2.3.2. Diasporic experience and identity

Terms and concepts such as ‘minority’, ‘ethnicity’ and ‘diaspora’ are often used
interchangeably to refer to immigrants who have settled down in a second country. Sreberny
(2000: 182) maintains that the term diaspora is more appropriate to study migrants’
communities. Unlike the term ‘ethnicity’, which implies ‘a group looking inward to its new
national host context’, the concept of diaspora offers more than the others ‘a critique of
discourses of fixed origins, while taking account of a homing desire which is not the same
thing as desires for ‘homeland’’ (Brah, 1996: 182). Because this research concentrates on the
first generations of British Muslims, the term ‘diaspora’ offers an adequate conceptual
framework from which to investigate people who are still closely attached to the cultures of
their countries of origin while at the same time trying to adapt to that of their host society. It
equally provides a framework within which it is possible to investigate identity construction
within power relations between different ethnic groups. Thus, studying identity construction
among diasporic Muslims can reveal how diasporic experience is tightly interwoven into
discursive patterns that represent the self, the other and power relations between the two.

2.4 Mass media and identity construction

Mass media play a central role in the formation of communities by creating an imagined unity
among people and a sense of belonging to a community among them (Anderson, 1991). This
role has become even more pervasive in late modern society where people rely vastly on mass
media to stay connected together and to share with other people their experiences and ideas.
In fact, ‘the information, images and ideas made available by the media may for most people,
be the main source of an awareness of a shared past time (history) and of a present social
location’ (McQuail, 2002: 64). As far as diasporic people are concerned, the need for mass
media is even more urgent. They rely widely on transnational media to stay connected with

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their countries of origin, and, at the same time, they need the local media to gain access to and
acquire the necessary information about their host countries and societies.

2.4.1. The role of transnational media

While many types of media have developed in recent years, transnational television channels
remain the most important ones that play a prominent part in the life of diasporic
communities. Diasporic people living in western countries were generally ‘among the earliest
adopters of DBS for cross-border transmissions - with its pizza-sized receiving dish installed
on homes becoming the symbol of community self-assertion’ (Karim, 1998: 1). As far as
Arab Muslims are concerned, transnational news channels like Al-Jazeera have become the
main source of news for many Arabs living in many western countries (El-Nawawy and
Iskandar 2002: 65-6). By allowing them to view events and issues through similar
perspectives as do people in their countries of origin, transnational media reinforce among
diasporic people the sense of belonging to these communities. Besides, because diasporic
people are able to follow news on both transnational and local media, they are in a better
position to compare and contrast the way both types of media cover various issues and events.
Indeed, transnational television news channels offer diasporic Muslims different perspectives
on events that meet their own concerns and expectations. Consequently, most diasporic
Muslims in Britain may not trust mainstream western media, which incites them to search for
alternative news sources (Michalski et al, 2002). This reveals that the consumption of media
is an intertextual act in which various texts refer to one another, on the one hand, and an
interaction between texts, readers and the latter’s everyday experience, on the other.

2.4.2. Mass media and alternative forms of communication

Despite their pervasive presence, mass media ‘do not monopolize the flow of information we
receive, nor do they intervene in all our wider social relations’ (McQuail, 2002:65). Other
forms of communicative systems are also very influential in channelling people’s experiences
and bringing them together. Various commentators have, thus, tried to define different media
forms that compete with mass media, such as ‘small media’, ‘community media’ and ‘radical
media’ (Sreberny & Mohammadi, 1994: 20). Concerning diasporas, Dayan (1998:181)
proposes a more inclusive definition of the communication networks that play an important
part in the experience of diasporic people. He maintains that it might be unproductive to limit

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the concept of diasporic media to conventional media such as the radio, television and
journalism. According to him, it is more useful to include the ‘“smaller” media and to focus
on the various practices, institutions and organizations […] that link the different segments of
diasporic ensembles each other’ (ibid).

As far as diasporic Muslims are concerned, various communication systems shape their life
apart from the mass media, such as community societies and religious institutions. Rawan
(2001: 179) advances that the Mosque, for instance, is among ‘the most important pillars of
traditional and interpersonal communication throughout traditional Islamic society’. Diasporic
Muslims bring with them these traditional communication systems and try to adapt them to
their experiences in various social and cultural contexts. It can, thus, be argued that mass
media and ‘small’ media as systems of communication, though operating at different levels,
interact dynamically with the daily experience of diasporic Muslims, and contribute to
shaping the way latter perceive themselves. This begs the question as to how the interaction
between audiences and various communication systems can be best investigated.

2.5 Investigating Audiences


2.5.1. The notion of the active reader

Recent media studies have deeply challenged the linear model of media effect as a process
involving sender/message/receiver. Among the most influential of these are the ones that
draw on Hall’s encoding/decoding model. Hall advances three decoding positions, namely
those of a dominant hegemonic, a negotiated, and an oppositional decoding ‘in which people
may understand the preferred encoding but reject it and decode in contrary ways’ (cited in
Barker, 1997: 117). Though this model restores the balance between text and audience, the
role of the latter remains restricted by the boundaries set by the text. Ang (1996: 20) contends
that the notion of the active audience in this context is ‘limited to negotiations open to viewers
within the given range of significations made possible by a text or genre texts’.

2.5.2. Audience and daily life experience

Actually, the concept of the active reader should not be limited to a relation between reader
and text but should also include ‘the relationship between the textual and extra-textual
resources drawn upon during making sense of television’ (Livingston, 1998: 189). Indeed, the

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act of decoding cannot be separated from the wider social and cultural context within which it
takes place, neither from other activities accompanying the act of viewing television. Besides
being part of a wider context, audiences are not fixed entities inasmuch as they are unstable
and rather fluid. Ang (cited in Morley, 1992: 195) suggests that ‘people constantly move in
and out of “the TV audience” as they integrate viewing behaviour with a multitude of other
concerns and activities in radically contingent ways’.

In this light, investigating the way audiences bring their daily life experiences to bear on the
acts of consuming various media texts can provide a valuable insight into the way diasporic
Muslims draw upon media texts to reinvent their identities. It can also reveal how the
consumption of media texts is far from being an interaction between readers and isolated
media texts. As audiences, diasporic Muslims consume various and related texts that are
constantly cross-referring to, enhancing or negating one another. It can also reveal how the act
of consuming media texts is more a collective than an individual act in which interpersonal
communication between the members of the family or community strongly influence how
British Muslims make sense of media texts and their daily life experiences. In order to explore
this category of audiences, i.e. diasporic Muslims, within their contexts, an ethnographic
method, namely in-depth interviewing, is applied to generate the appropriate data for this
research.

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2- Methodology

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Since the question put forward in this research paper, i.e. the role mass media play in shaping
identity among British Muslim diasporas, attempts to uncover the way diasporic Muslims
understand their experiences as community members and audiences, an ethnographic method
is more suitable for the research. Morley (1992: 183) asserts that the ‘ethnographic approach
for studying communication rests on an ability to understand how social actors themselves
define and understand their own communication practices’. As for in-depth interviewing, it is
appropriate for the type of issues in which the research has to dig under the surface of social
and cultural manifestations to discover ‘what is usually hidden from ordinary view or
reflection or to penetrate to more reflective understandings about the nature of that
experience’ (Johnson, 2002: 107).

Accordingly, I conducted interviews with eight Arab Muslims, seven males and one female,
who have all been living in Britain for periods between 10 and 25 years their ages vary from
37 to 65 years. Three are Iraqis, Two are Moroccans, one Algerian, one Libyan, and one
Egyptian. Though the interviews covered the same issues, they were semi-structured as the
questions were not structured nor worded in an identical way. This gave informants a great
deal of freedom to engage in a conversation-like form of speaking, and allowed the adaptation
of questions to the different informants who come from diverse backgrounds. The interviews
took 60 to 90 minutes, were tape-recorded and conducted in diverse locations in the city of
Leeds.

A number of reasons informed the choice of this particular category of British Muslims.
Firstly, I concentrated on the members of the first generation of diasporic Muslims in order to
narrow down the number of variables for which the research has to account, such as the age
category, level of exposure to the local culture and command of English as a first or second
language. The choice of Arab diasporic Muslims equally limited the number of variables the
research has to deal with, such as the type of transnational media that the informants
consume.

In addition, while these people belong to the first generation of immigrants whose culture and
identity are deeply rooted in their countries of origin, they stayed in Britain long enough to
become familiar with the host country’s social and cultural norms and traditions. Indeed,
though their experience may not be informed by intense forms of hybrid identities, as would

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be the case of the members of the second generation, they are more representative of diasporic
experience characterised by living a continuing journey while paradoxically trying to settle
down somewhere away from ‘home’.

What’s more, since effective in-depth interviewing seeks to build intimacy between the
interviewer and informants (Johnson, 2002: 104), concentrating on Arab Muslims was very
helpful. The fact that I share with informants the same cultural and linguistic background
encouraged the informants to share with me their deep feelings and opinions about their
experiences. It also enabled the informants to use both Arabic and English interchangeably to
express their feelings, and to make diverse cultural references to illustrate their viewpoints.

It is noteworthy that one of the biggest obstacles I encountered in conducting the interviews
was to find suitable informants who were ready to participate in such forms of research. A
large number of the people I contacted were very reluctant to sit for an interview, and I was
able to convince some of them only through community leaders. Two reasons account for
their fear of and scepticism about all forms of field research. Many people among diasporic
Arabs came to Britain in the last 20 or 30 years to flee political persecutions in their home
countries (Ermes, 2002). Besides, most of them have a feeling of being targeted after 9/11.
These two reasons arguably make them very cautious in what they say to strangers.

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3- Discussion & Analysis

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3.1 Muslim Diasporas and media consumption

Like it is the case with most of the British people who ‘spend, on average, 25 hours per week
watching television’ (Livingstone, 1996: 305), mass media, and particularly television, play
an important role in the life of diasporic Muslims, in terms of both the time spent watching
television and the centrality of the latter in their activities at home. Indeed, all informants
confirmed that television holds a central position at home since watching it is the main
activity they perform with their families when they gather in evenings or at weekends. They
all indicated that the coming of transnational channels transformed their viewing habits and
the way they interact with media in general.

Actually, before the advent of transnational channels, diasporic Arab Muslims could only
watch local channels, relying on the radio to get news about their countries of origin. Raed, a
British Iraqi, says about his experience at that time:

We used to watch only BBC TV channels. There was a scarcity in news. We got news about
the Arab World by listening to Arab radio stations on short waves, [which] did not have a
good reputation, except the Arabic service in the BBC World service. We used to stay late in
the night to listen to this channel.

Thanks to the revolution in communications technologies, Arab satellite channels using DBS
and, later on, digital technologies mushroomed after the second Gulf war in 1991 (see Ayish,
2001). This provided a wide range of choices to Arab Muslims living in Britain. Thus, there
are more than 24 free channels received by diasporic Arabs in Britain, the most popular of
which are news channels like Al-Jazeera, and Al-Arabia, in addition to a large number of paid
channels that can be accessed through subscription. While the informants displayed a wide
range of program preferences, they all agreed on the fact that news programs interest them
most. Thus, Yones indicates,

I follow the news at every hour. [we watch] mainly Arab channels. I don’t mind watching
English ones, but they cover events like [those of] Palestine only briefly. Arab channels
transmit the conflict in live and a vivid way… you see events before your eyes. Sometimes, I
watch English ones, but you can’t cover events in five minutes.

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Television news programs provide diasporic people with more than information. For them,
‘news viewing is ritualistic, symbolic and a matter of feeling as much as information’ (Barker,
1997: 131). Watching news, mainly on Arab transnational Arab channels, helps diasporic
Muslims to feel connected to their native countries and communities. It helps them also to feel
they belong to a local community with whom they share common preferences and point of
view on issues that interest them most. Georgiou (2004: 54) rightly notes that, ‘media
reinforce a sense of belonging in a community that can exist even if its members are dispersed
across different countries, even if they are otherwise very different in terms of generation,
age, class, gender and sexuality’. For Muslim Arab audiences, news about the Islamic World,
in general, and the Arab World, in particular hold priority over other types of news. Since
most of the times local channels allocate a short time for news about the Arab world, they do
not attract the attention of Arab audiences. .

However, despite the fact they share many common traits, diasporic Arab Muslims do not
constitute a homogeneous audience or media consumers, in general. In fact, a wide range of
factors that run across diverse modalities of gender, class, generations and education underpin
their experience as consumers of media texts. The data generated by the informants’
testimonies showed that there is a wide spectrum of diversity at the level of media choices and
television consumption habits. At the far end of the spectrum, some respondents indicated that
they hardly watched local channels due to moral reasons. Speaking about his preferences,
Hisham points out:

At home we watch only Arab channels. … We watch mainly news programs on Al-Jazeera,
and religious programs on Al-Manar and Eqra’a channels1. We don’t watch English channels.
Their channels are immoral. They show immoral things even in ads to promote goods. It is
acceptable for them, but not for us. I fear about our children, and so we don’t switch to [these
channels].

It is evident, then, that mass media, mainly local television channels, are considered by some
diasporic Muslims as a threat to their identity and that of their children’s. It is also clear that
religion is an important factor both behind the choice of programs to watch or those to avoid.
While at the other end of the spectrum, another informant declared that he watched Arab
channels only for a very short time each day. Because he is married to a British woman of
Pakistani origin, and his children have grown up in Britain, Raed says:
1
The two channels broadcast mainly religious programs.

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I am the only person at home who knows Arabic very well, and I don’t want to impose my
choices on the other members of the family…so normally I contend by watching only one
news hour on Al-Jazeera. The remaining time we watch English channels…I like to watch
comedies, because when you start to understand the culture you enjoy them more.

The last two examples demonstrate clearly that watching television is an act that is tightly
interwoven in the fabric of everyday life at home and the particularity of that experience.
They also show that the act of watching television is more a collective activity than individual
one, which reflects power relations between the members of the family as well as the cultural
norms that govern their life (see Morley, 1986). In the former example, on the one hand, the
act of watching television is strictly monitored by the head of the family and subjected to
guidelines governing the home, where many diasporic Muslims try to live in accordance to
the cultural norms of their native countries. Zokaie and Philips (2000: 49) note that the
‘interaction between western values and Islamic values is often seen [by British Muslims] as
potentially disruptive and as something which requires constant vigilance by the parents to
keep their children in control’.

In the latter example, on the other hand, the act of watching television is governed more by
the experience of members of the family in the local society where they live. In fact, Raed’s
case is a an illustration of diasporic experience where members of a diaspora have to find a
compromise between choosing to live according to the cultural norms of their native countries
and adapting to those of the dominant culture in their host society.

Furthermore, some informants declared that, though they prefer to watch Arab channels, they
like also to watch local ones because the latter provide them with programs that most benefit
them in their daily life. Thus, Anas, a Moroccan restaurant-owner, indicated that he followed
regularly ‘Ramsey’ Kitchen nightmares’ program on channel 4 because he learns from it how
to enhance the profile of his restaurant. Accordingly, though they are widely watched and in
most cases preferred over other media outlets, transnational channels do not negate the
importance of local media in the daily life of diasporic Muslims, as the latter help them to get
integrated into the society where they live.

Besides, while they differ in terms of the type of the channels they watch, diasporic Muslims
differ also in how they consume media messages. Some of the respondents showed they were

23
active readers who process media messages critically and sceptically. Hisham, for instance,
stated that he did not trust all that Arab channels said about Iraq. According to him, Arab
channels sometimes,

practice propaganda and look for sensationalism when they report news about bombings in
Baghdad […]. They seek to attract audiences and I don’t like it. I call my relatives there and
they are not even aware of those bombings.

As Hisham discovered, transnational channels, like all media, do not reflect reality but
construct it according to a particular discursive structure and ideological point of view. More
importantly, he uses one medium, namely the telephone, to check the validity of messages he
receives via a different medium, namely television. This shows that media do not function in
isolation, but can negate, refer to or complement one another. The ability of respondents to
deal critically with the media differs widely according to their level of education and social
status. The notion of the active audience, however, should not be understood only in the sense
of resistant readers who are able to counter-interpret media messages. As Livingston (1998:
189) notes, ‘the question of resistance […] hangs not so much on the interpretative process
but on the relation between the textual and extra-textual resources drawn upon during making
sense of television’ or any other mass medium. Commenting on the way she interprets both
local and transnational media, Rajaa, an Egyptian and medical consultant, says:

When I want to know about something, I check the Guardian, the BBC and of course Al-
Jazeera. But I trust more Al-Jazeera. I think they give complementary view… but when I read
in the Guardian about Palestine I can’t help reading it critically and see how they present
news, how they present agency, but when I see Al-Jazeera, it’s not the same. It’s not a thing I
do consciously, but when I think of it now, I realize it. I cannot help analysing why [English
media] say this or that.

The latter example demonstrates clearly that reading a text critically does not involve only the
reader and media texts. As a Muslim woman living in Britain, her reading of different media
text is tightly linked to her experience as a diaspora member. While she suspects the
intentions of local media when they covers events and issues related to Muslims, she
identifies more readily with transnational media’s point of view and stance on the same
issues.

24
3.2 Mass media consumption and identity construction

While the samples used to generate the data for the current research cannot be claimed to be
representative of the Arab Muslim diaspora in Britain, they yielded, nonetheless, some
interesting correlations between respondents’ media consumption habits and the way they
perceive their own identity. Those respondents who watch only Arab transnational channels
are the ones who emphasized most their religious identity and its prominence over other types
of affiliations and belonging. In addition, they insisted on the fact that the Muslim identity is
totally different from other forms of identity, namely that of the ‘British’ one. Commenting on
what it means to him to be a Muslim living in Britain for the last 20 years, Rashid says,

I’m a Muslim, I’m an Iraqi, too… Iraq was the place where I grew up […] but I feel I’m more
a Muslim. Islam sets us a clear path to follow. It protects us from being totally dissolved
within the British society… you know the pressure of their language and culture is
immense… only by sticking to the moral and ethical teaching of Islam was I able to stay a
Muslim.

Other informants affirmed they viewed the Muslim identity as categorically opposed to the
‘British’ one, on moral grounds. Arguing about the dangers of living within a different
cultural and social context compared to the one of his native country, Saeed points out:

It’d better if you want to keep your identity and origins not to integrate too much with [the
English], because you will lose then your religion […] They believe in individual freedom. A
man from us cannot do whatever he likes except according to the precepts of God. You
should not have sex with a girl without marriage. They consider it as a normal thing […] you
see how they became so immoral.

Saeed’s last statement reflects a clear essentialist view of religion, identity and the other. It
reduces the ‘Muslim identity’ to purely moral guidelines, while it views the ‘English’ identity
as diametrically opposed to and uncompromisingly different from the ‘Muslim’ one. Ansari
(2003:8) rightly argues that interpretations of Islam that portray it as ‘immune to processes of
economic, social, ideological and political change, have long obscured the complexities of the
historical experience of Muslims in different societies’.

In contrast to the previous stance, other respondents, mainly those who stated that they
preferred to watch both transnational and local television channels, and are open to Western

25
media, in general, revealed a less essentialist view of how they regard their identity. Anas, for
instance, says that although he is a Muslim, he feels his Moroccan identity takes precedence
over any other form of identity:

I’m Moroccan first. Moroccan culture is deeply rooted in me. When I meet other Muslims I
feel they look at me first as a Moroccan. It’s in their subconscious, and mine. My first
adherence is to Morocco.

Indeed, despite the importance of religion, it is far from being the sole variable shaping
British Muslims identity. Though they may identify with Asian Muslims on religious grounds,
Arab Muslims, for instance, may view them to be different culturally. Describing how she
perceives non-Arab Muslims, mainly Asian Muslims, Rajaa points out:

When I see a Pakistani woman, I think this is a Muslim woman. I don’t think I share with her
many cultural aspects, though I share with her religion. There is something that unites us, but
it’s different when I think of somebody of Iraq, or Saudi Arabia. I feel closer to them.

Indeed, the boundaries of an ethnic community are neither clearly marked nor complete, since
they are constantly changing and reconstructed within the diasporic experience. Commenting
on how he rediscovered his affiliation to a Pan-Arab cultural background, Anas says:

When I came to Britain, I had a different perception of Arabs from the Middle East and the
Gulf […] I felt I had no connection with them. I didn’t even want to know them. I used to go
out with the Spanish, the French and the Italians. I felt closer to them. It is only later that I
started to know that I share also with [Arab from the Middle east] many things.

Ana’s identity as a Moroccan is a complex articulations of Arab, Islamic, African and Berber
origins, on the one hand, and Mediterranean one, on the other. His journey away from his
country set him off on another journey in which he rediscovered the complexity of his cultural
roots and identity affiliations. His experience reveals clearly how an ethnic group is never a
closed community since it is a circle endlessly crossed by other circles that defy any attempt
at imposing clear boundaries on it. His experience also indicates how diasporic experience is
a constant search for stability both in the real sense and in terms of cultural affiliations. As
Hall (1993:402) states, ‘diaspora identities are those which are constantly producing
themselves anew, through transformation and difference’.

26
While the above findings may suggest the existence of dynamic relation between the way
people consume and interact with mass media and how they construct their own identity, this
does not mean that mass media determine how people perceive identity. What the findings
may confirm is that there is a sort of an active interaction between the media and the way
diasporic Muslims try to cope with their life as members of a minority estranged from their
native homes and cultures. Indeed, because members of any ethnic group bring their
experiences to the act of consuming media, ‘the functions and values of media and identities
meet dynamically in everyday life, and although (or perhaps because) conflicts and
inconsistencies exist, they achieve their compatibility’ (Georgiou, 2004: 59).

3.3 The role of religious and community institutions in identity


construction: the mosque as an example

While the mass media, both the local and transnational ones, play an important role in the way
British Muslims construct their identity, they are not the only institutions or systems that have
that role. In this sense, there are a number of institutions that contribute enormously to the
way many British Muslims construct their identity, such as Islamic societies, community
groups and associations. A number of respondents declared they were members of such
institutions where they share with other Muslims their experiences, organize common
activities, or perform religious and cultural ceremonies. As Ansari (2003: 11-12) notes, in the
experience of Muslim diasporas in Britain, ‘the institutionalisation of Islam contributed to the
formation and shaping of Muslim identities, and they in turn sustained the institutions’.

The mosque remains the most important among all these forms of organized communal life.
Unlike in Islamic countries where the majority of mosques are used mainly for prayer, in
Britain, mosques act as cultural and social centres that provide many services such as
language teaching, social help and moral guidance for local communities, among others.
Commenting on the role of the Mosque for him as a Muslim, Raed notes:

For me, [the mosque] was the place that helped me to bear the feeling of estrangement, and
where to meet other [Muslim] people. The mosque organizes activities during religious feasts
and vacations. In addition, it is where we pray daily and can meet each other. When I came
here, I did not know many things, and I met people [in the mosque] who guided me.

27
Most respondents also noted that the role of the mosque has been enhanced by the religious
freedom enjoyed by Muslims in Britain. Contrary to most Islamic countries also, mosques in
Britain remain open all day and not only at prayer times. Moreover, British Muslims can
organise various activities in the mosque that enable them to rediscover their religion and
question it, as well. Anas, for instance, claimed that he was not a practicing Muslim when he
first came to Britain, but that he rediscovered many new things about Islamic culture and
religion that attracted him to the religion,

In the Mosque here, you have on Monday a religious sermon by Sheikh Judea. Tuesday, you
can have a lecture, the next day another activity… you see… you sit with an Imam […] who
allows you to ask any question in your mind and he encourages you to think and gives you
freedom… this doesn’t existent at home. They used to teach us only ablutions and inheritance.

Indeed, religious identity for diasporic Muslim is not something they bring with them from
their home countries and live by rigidly. As they discover new ways to define religion itself,
they start to contest ‘what it means to be a Muslim, what Islam means and how it should be
constructed and reproduced both in the West and in the rest of the world’ (Werbner, 2000:
315). In this light, it is possible to argue that mass media and ‘small’ media as systems of
communication, though operating at different levels, interact dynamically with the daily
experience of Muslim diasporas, and contribute to shape the latter’s way of viewing
themselves as an ethnic minority.

3.4 The Representation of Muslims and its impact on diasporic Muslim’s


identity construction

The data yielded rich and diverse information on how different respondents interact with
various media, and the manner in which they perceive their identity. Paradoxically though, it
revealed that, however problematic it is, the notion of the existence of a unified Muslim
identity is shared by most respondents. In other words, if identity is discursively constructed,
it is composed of complex and sometimes opposed discourses about the self, the other and the
community. The data equally revealed the complexity and, perhaps, particularity of the
experience of diasporic Muslims in Britain.

Indeed, while some respondents did not consider their religious background as the prime
constituent of their identity, they indicated that the ‘Other’, namely the white British people

28
regard them mainly as Muslims. Moreover, most respondents claimed that they have become
more aware of the importance of their Islamic affiliations because of what they regard as a
hostile attitude towards Muslim minority, either in the way the local media represent them or
within society at large. Thus, Raed thinks that though Muslim Arabs differ from Asian
Muslims at many levels,

It doesn’t matter for [for the British] really if you were an Arab, a Hindu, or an African. It is
enough that you are different and that you are in an inferior position, and that’s the end of it.
The relationship that binds you is that between an aboriginal citizen and an alien.

Despite the cultural, ethnic and even sectarian differences that divide them, many diasporic
Muslims members see that what unifies them all really is the feeling of being beleaguered not
only within Britain, but all over the world, as well. As discussed above, the notion of the
existence of unified Muslim identity and community in Britain emerged with the Rushdie
affair and the second Gulf war. In fact, whenever British Muslims feel they are targeted
because of their religion, they become more sensitive to their religious identity, and, thus,
start invoking it more as a reaction and in defiance also to the ‘Other’. As Ansari (2004:4-5)
argues, ‘there have been occasions in Britain’s recent past, rare though they might be, when
‘Islam’ has become the main or even the sole identity for many Muslims, particularly when
they have been criticised or attacked by others on the basis of their religion’. The events of
9/11 and the ‘war on terrorism’ are one of these occasions, with the exception that this war
has lasted for a relatively long time.

3.4.1 Representation of Muslims after 9/11 and identity construction

Most respondents agreed that the events of 9/11 marked a turning point in the history of
Muslims around the world, in general, and those living in Western countries, in particular.
Most informants who have been living in Britain for more than 20 years, however, asserted
that though the representation of Muslims by the British media deteriorated after 9/11, it had
already become noticeably negative after the Rushdie affair. According to them, the current
situation is a continuation of the past treatment of Muslims by the media. Azzam, for instance,
notes:

29
Certainly things nose-dived in the last 3 or 4 years and the media have exploited the events of
9/11 to stigmatise Muslims. [But] it started with the Rushdie affair, which cast a very black
shadow on Muslims’ image […], it is as if it happened again and again.

If the Rushdie affair and the second Gulf war propelled for the first time British Muslim
diasporas to the front scene, the events of 9/11 further set them in the centre of media
attention and public opinion concern. While the coverage of Muslims-related issues by the
British media has increased dramatically after that date, the concern of Muslims over being
constantly pointed at has equally increased. Thus, all informants expressed that while the fear
of being physically targeted in public places lasted only a few months after the events, the
concern over the fact that they are singled out as Muslims and associated with terrorism has
persisted. One of the respondents said that he was physically attacked in the market, while
another was verbally abused in the street shortly after 9/11. Most of them expressed their fear
for their safety, but especially of being spotted out as Muslims in the street. Yones, for
example, says:

I tried to change so as not to appear as a Muslim. Before, I let my beard grows sometimes and
I wore the traditional Moroccan dress… I used to walk in the city centre and people came and
asked me about the dress. After 9/11 I started to fear to go out with my wife as she wears the
veil. We feared reaction from people who do not know Islam.

Though the fear of being physically or verbally attacked in public places receded quickly, the
life of British Muslims as a diasporic community has changed forever. The post-9/11 events,
namely the war in Afghanistan, the invasion of Iraq, terrorist threats and anti-terrorism
measures taken by the British government, have contributed decisively to keep various media
focused on issues related to Muslims in general. Most informants expressed their concern
about the fact that British media cover news and issues about Muslims in a way that associate
between Islam as a religion and terrorism. Indeed, some informants expressed doubts about
the practices of some media for their constant coverage radical Islamic figures, such as Abu
Hamza Al-Masri. Saeed, for instance, states that:

The British media rely on unqualified people to speak about Islam, like some religious imams.
[The media] don’t care about making people know Islam, but to stigmatise it. [You] see how
they make interviews with Abu- Hamza Al-Masri. It’s a waste of time. It doesn’t benefit
neither Muslims nor the British.

30
Indeed, with his radical discourse and provocative messages, Al Masri is recurrently
interviewed or quoted by the British Media. Most informants insisted on the fact that the
media are giving undue attention to that cleric and presenting him as a representative of
Muslims in Britain. Actually, Raed asserts that the current war on terrorism has created a
favourable atmosphere for programs about Islam to mushroom quickly in recent years:

9/11 was a golden opportunity for all those who wanted to harm Islam. Before, if they wanted
to talk about it endlessly, a lot of people will be tired of it. Now, the constant mentioning of
terrorism makes people keen at understanding more about those who threaten their life. There
is more consumption of these programs.

The possibility for Muslim diasporas to compare both British and Arab transnational media
coverage of the war on terrorism, increases Muslims’ mistrust of British media’s intentions
and overall performance. Comparing between the British media coverage of the 9/11 terrorist
attacks and their coverage of the events in Palestine and Iraq, Yones says:

The world knew about September 11 because it was covered around the clock. You watched
buildings falling, people dying, people crying. They made interviews with people who lost
their loved ones. For that reason people were affected. In Palestine or Iraq they don’t talk to
those who lost their relatives […], even when Al-Jazeera or Al-Arabia show pictures, they say
the pictures are fake.

Actually, while some informants declared they are not practicing Muslims, they indicated that
they can identify with other British Muslims on the ground that they were all treated in the
same way by the ‘Other’ and by the media, especially in recent years. Commenting on the
way she thinks British media portray Muslims, Rajaa affirms:

I see there is a world of differences between us […]. When I read newspapers, I feel closer to
my people, I feel the differences, I feel they don’t understand us, and I see that, for them, we
will always remain these inferior people with problems, just causing problems. I don’t think
they all think the same way, at least consciously, but subconsciously most think in this way.

Despite being a non practicing Muslim, Rajaa’s feeling of bitterness about the way Muslims
are perceived is clearly worded in a discourse that sets up clear boundaries between ‘us’
Muslims, and ‘they’ the media and white majority, as a whole. It is also evident that the media
are perceived to represent the dominating ethnic group and the opinions of its members.

31
Furthermore, a number of respondents expressed that the media have played a big role in
magnifying the danger of Islamic fundamentalism in Britain. Khan (2000: 36) argues that
‘the ‘spectre’ of ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ has come to be seen in Britain as a particularly
sinister new sect of Islam totally committed to the destabilization and destruction of
everything western’. This fact, many Muslims believe, have contributed to the enactment of
the anti-terrorism law in Britain. While all Muslims may feel targeted by this law, it is
particularly Arab Muslims who feel victimised most by it, since the majority of those who
have been arrested by virtue of this law are from Arab origins (Green, 2003). Commenting on
the aftermath of 9/11 and its impact on his life and that of his family, Azzam states:

Now we think that one day will come and we will have to go out from this country. It is not a
problem for me, for I have my roots, the idea is not so fearful to me. After all, when I came
here, I didn’t have the intention of staying forever. But my children don’t know any other
country. They consider England their home. It’s something fearful that a day will come and
they will say to them you are not British, and they will have to search for another identity.

It is evident that for many diasporic Muslims, the Muslim identity is not taken as an entity
that can be clearly defined by itself. It is more a discourse about being rejected and denied to
be ‘British’, and about resisting that other by bringing one’s difference to the fore. Ansari
(2003:9) rightly notes that the Muslim identity in Britain is being constructed ‘very much
against a background of negative perceptions about who and what Muslims are. It is evolving
as an identity of ‘unbelonging’ in a ‘cultural of resistance’ and in contest with hegemonic
British identity’. Indeed, though they may not all identify entirely with their community,
British Muslims are unified by and within the Other’s discourse, and also through their own
experience and attempt to negate or transcend that discourse.

Yet, even if the data generated by informants reflects a predominant negative view of the role
of local media, some informants, nonetheless, pointed out that some media and especially
television programs try to be balanced and give a fair view about Muslims. But these
programs remain insufficient and inadequate to redress the predominant negative image the
media give about Islam. Commenting on this issue, Anas notes:

Channels 4 and 5 for instance show some programs that give a fair image on Muslims. But the
English [audience] may retain one good image only to be destroyed in another program. They
need to give more balanced programs.

32
Moreover, while some respondents may feel bitter at the way British media represent or
exclude them, they believe at the same time that these media do not determine their fate,
neither the way other British people may perceive them. Indeed, Respondents also indicated
that because of the unprecedented media attention Muslims got after 9/11, some English
people started to show more interest in Muslims and their religion. Rashid, for instance, says:

The media may not be showing reality about us. Some people might have negative
impressions about Muslims. But when I invite some [colleagues] to my house, they see our
hospitality, our life at home with our families. It changes the images they have in mind.

Equally important, all respondents indicated that British Muslims themselves share a
considerable part of responsibility about the way the media represent them. As Azzam notes:

We are giving a negative image about ourselves. We are giving them the chance to do it. The
media are double edged and we can use them also for our advantage. You see younger
generations who speak beautiful English, and attend TV programmes and discuss in full
confidence and authority.

Azzam’s comparison between the performance of the first and second generations of
diasporic Muslim shows that people believe in the importance of human action and their own
ability both to construct their identity and to influence the way the media represent them. It
also indicates that while the first generation of British Muslims may have faced enormous
difficulties to integrate into society and proclaim their identity in a positive way, the second
generation may be more able to address this situation.

To sum up, mass media play, indeed, an important role, both as agents of inclusion and
exclusion, in the way British Muslims construct their identity. Arab transnational media
contribute decisively to reinforcing the sense of belonging to the local Arab and Muslim
community and to the larger communities within the Arab and Islamic Worlds. At the same
time, they act also as a background against which local media are compared and judged. On
the other hand, the local media predominately reinforce among diasporic Muslims the sense
of being different from and rejected by the other, namely the dominant ethnic group. This
contributes decisively to reinforce religious affiliation as a reaction and contestation among
them.

33
The relationship between mass media and identity construction, however, is far from being
that of a cause/ consequence one. Diasporic Muslims interact actively with both transnational
and local media, mix them creatively, and try to submit them to the modalities of their
particular experiences. Indeed, if identity is discursively constructed, it refers less to a pre-
existing cultural or ethnic essence and, as far as British Muslims are concerned, more to the
way British Muslims actively interact with the modalities that shape their daily life and
existence.

34
Conclusion

35
The data analysis seems to broadly confirm the two hypotheses put forward at the beginning
of this paper. Mass media do play a sensitive and influential role in the way members of
Muslim diasporas in Britain construct their identity. The pervasiveness of mass media and
their centrality in both the public and private spheres entitle them to influence the symbolic
space within which diasporic Muslims make sense of their existence and the world.
Furthermore, the fact that diasporic Muslims consume both local and transnational media
simultaneously reinforces the role mass media play in shaping the way British Muslims
construct their identity. The presence of different and even opposed media discourses on
highly sensitive issues makes these discourses more salient and highlights their difference and
polemic structures. This fact is bound to shape not only the way diasporic Muslims consume
various media texts, but also their perception of themselves as a ‘beleaguered’ minority, and
their sense of ‘Otherness’.

The research also confirmed that the events of 9/11 and their consequences had a considerable
impact on the way media cover Muslims and Islam as well as on the way members of Muslim
diasporas construct their identity. It further revealed that diasporic Muslims view the local
media’s performance after 9/11 as a continuation of past treatment of Muslim minority
whenever a major crisis surges that involves Muslims within Britain or outside it.

Nevertheless, the research has demonstrated that mass media do not determine the way
diasporic Muslims construct their identity, nor do they monopolise all the spaces and channels
through which these people perceive the world and organise their daily life experience.
Diasporic Muslims do not consume media texts passively or in one similar way. Rather, the
interaction between these people and the media is dynamic. It is one where the shared and
personal experiences, and the particularity of individual traits are brought to bear on the act of
producing meaning from media texts. More importantly, mass media are not the only forms of
institutional communication that have a bearing on the way diasporic Muslims construct their
identity. Other institutions, such as mosques or community societies, have largely contributed
to the strengthening of diasporic Muslims’ identification with an imagined ‘Muslim
community’ that transcends divisions and differences between the various Muslim ethnic
groups.

36
It should be noted that one of the most important findings of the research is that the notion of
‘Muslim identity’ is perceived by most diasporic Muslims more as a form of identification
with a rejected minority than as a cultural or ethnic unity. In this light, I would side with Hall
(1996: 8) who claims that when identities ‘emerge within the play of specific modalities of
power’, they are more ‘the product of the marking of difference and exclusion, than they are
the sign of […] unity’. This fact begs another important question related to the concept of
multiculturalism, namely the possibility of diasporic Muslims’ assimilation into the British
society. Indeed, because it is believed to be in opposition with the basic foundations of the
British society, ‘Muslim identity is regarded as the illegitimate child of the British
multiculturalism’ (Modood 2000:51) (my translation). The future of the ‘Muslim identity’ and
that of the ‘Muslim community’ in Britain in the context of a multicultural society, is an
important issue that requires further research beyond the scope of this dissertation.

37
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Appendices

43
APPENDIX I

44
Interview Questions

This list of questions was used only as a guide during the interviews. The latter were semi-
structured and did not include all the questions. They did not follow the order below, either.

1. General and ‘warm –up’ questions


1.1 How long you have been living in Britain?
1.2 Do you like life here?
1.3 Tell me how you came to Britain and how you managed to settle
down when you first came?

2. Identity
2.1 Religious and national identity
2.1.1 Are you a practicing Muslim?
2.1.2 If yes, how often do you go to the mosque?
2.1.3 How important is the mosque to you as a Muslim living in a Western country?
2.1.3 Do you follow Sharia (Traditional Islamic law) strictly in your life?
2.1.4 Is it always possible for you to follow Sharia in Britain? Give me examples.
2.1.5 Do you consider yourself a British? Or, are you looking forward to become a
British national?
2.1.6 What does British nationality mean to you?
2.1.7 Do you think being British contradicts that of being a Muslim?

2.2 Community and identity


2.2.1 What are the ethnic backgrounds of your friends?
2.2.2 How often do you meet? How important they are to you? What do you do when
you meet? Issues you discuss?
2.2.3 Do you have relatives in Britain? Do you meet them often?
2.2.4 Do you speak Arabic at home, or with friends?
2.2.5 Do you have social contacts with people from non-Muslims and non-Arab
origins? Give me examples.
2.2.6 Do you feel discriminated against for being a Muslim or an Arab?
2.2.7 Do you have personal experience of discrimination? Where?
2.2.9 How do you think the majority of white British people view British Muslims?

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3. Mass media reception and consumption
3.1 Media preferences
3.1.1 Do you read newspapers?
3.1.2 Which ones you like most? Why?
3.1.3 What do you read exactly? What news interests you most?
3.1.4 What are the TV channels you watch regularly?
3.1.5 What programs do you watch regularly? Give me examples?
3.1.6 Why do you prefer those particular programs?
3.1.7 What did you watch last night/week for example? How did you find it?
3.1.8 How many hours per day you spend normally watching TV?
3.1.9 With whom do you watch TV normally at home?
3.1.10 Do you plan what you are going to watch?
3.1.11 Who decides about the programs to watch at home?
3.2 Evaluation of mass media performance in general
3.2.1 Do you read/watch any articles/ programs about Muslims in the local media?
Give me examples.
3.2.2 What do you think about the news the local media publish/broadcast about
Muslims? Give me examples.
3.2.3 Have you heard lately of the news reported by some media about the fact that
some ‘Islamic’ terrorists who intended to attack Manchester United Stadium?
3.2.4 How do you find the way the local media cover news about terrorism and
Islamic fundamentalism within Britain and in the world at large?
3.2.5 How do you deal with such news? Don’t you feel concerned as a Muslim?
3.2.6 Are you satisfied with the way the Local Media portray Muslims? Why?
3.2.7 What are the things you don’t like in the way mass media cover Muslims? Tell
me of an example.
3.2.8 Do you feel there is a difference in the way transnational and local media cover
the war in Iraq or the situation in Palestine?
3.2.9 If yes, how do you explain such difference?
3.3 Evaluation of mass media performance after 9/11
3.3.1 Do you think that your life as a Muslim has been affected after 9/11? If yes, in
what ways?
3.3.2 Do you think that the way local media represent Muslims has become worse
after 9/11?

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3.3.3 Do you think Muslims now are represented as before/ worse, better?
3.3.4 what do you think about the repeated media coverage of news and events related
to some ‘Islamic’ figures as Abu Hamza Al Masri?
3.3.5 Do you think the media exaggerate about the fear from terrorism?
3.3.6 Do you think the media influence the way ‘English’ people perceive Muslims in
Britain?

47
APPENDIX II

48
LIST OF RESPONDENTS

1. Anas: British Moroccan, 38 years old. He has a BA and is self-employed. He has been
living in Britain for 12 years.

2. Yones: British Moroccan, 40 years old. He has a BA and works as a civil servant. He
has been living in Britain for 10 years.

3. Rashid: British Iraqi, 52 years old. He has a PhD and he is self-employed. He has
been living in Britain for 20 years.

4. Rajaa: British Egyptian, 37 years old. She has a PhD and works in a company. She
has been living in Britain for 11 years.

5. Azzam: British Libyan, 62 years old. He has an MA and he is retired. He has been
living in Britain for 26 years.

6. Saeed: British Algerian, 42 years old. He has an undergraduate diploma and he is self-
employed. He has been living in Britain for 13 years.

7. Hisham: British Iraqi, 50 years old. He has a BA and works as a teacher in private
schools. He has been living in Britain for 18 years.

8. Raed: British Iraqi, 48 years old. He has an MSc and he is self-employed. He has been
living in Britain for 18 years.

49
APPENDIX III

50
Interview sample
This interview was conducted in Arabic, with Anas on May 23, 2004 in Leeds, UK. The
following transcript is my translation:

Q- How long you have been living in Britain and how did you settle down?

A- I came to Britain 12 years ago to do graduate studies at a University in London.


Unfortunately I encountered some problems at home and I could not finish my studies. I
decided to stay here for a while, but I did not have the intention to stay for a long time.

Q- So how do you qualify in general your experience here, was it hard, easy to live here?

A- It was a rich experience. You live in a repeated pattern at home, but when you immigrate
you live new things everyday. But it was very hard for me during the first years. I had
nightmares, sometimes I cried. Everybody go through these experiences. But afterwards
things go more smoothly and quickly.

Q- What type of difficulties did you encounter before you got used to life here?

A- The most difficult thing is to get used to the culture and system here. In many other
European countries they have a more flexible system, but her things are different, and the law
is rigid. Moreover, it was difficult to understand people when you don’t know well the
language and the culture. For us, there is no problem in living in France as we have a
background about the Francophone culture. But the British culture is different.

Q- Is the fact that you are a Muslim Arab had made it more difficult for you to get to
know the local culture and people? For example, if a Muslim cannot go to the pub, it will
be difficult for him to socialize with the local people, isn’t it?

A- As a Muslim just a little. As a Moroccan, I don’t think so. When I came in 92, few people
knew something about Morocco. You know though I come from a traditional family in
Morocco, going to pubs and drinking alcohols was not unfamiliar to me at home. You know

51
these things are normal in Morocco. Moreover, it is not a condition that you should go to a
pub to get familiar with local people. If you are educated, you speak good English you can
discuss with them. If you know how to communicate your point of view they will understand
you. It’s not those things that will affect your integration at all.

A-

Q- So, you had no experience of discrimination against you as a Muslim?

A- There are some people whose behavior towards you changes when they know you are a
Muslim. But I try not to show that I’m sensitive to it or that they talk to a recluse or a
fundamentalist person. I believe in interaction and that’s why I allow people to ask me any
question. After 9/11 many people came to me to ask me if those who were behind the terrorist
attacks were connected to Islam. I confess I found it difficult to convince them. Although
similar things were perpetrated by Christians and Jews, but we never say they are Christian
terrorists for example. In any case we must understand first why they did those things.

Q- Was your life affected after 9/11? Did you feel any difference before and after that
date?

A- Personally no, not very much. I have had personally no experience of racism against me
after that date. I heard of certain things of this sort but they were not that serious, despite the
fact that perception towards Muslims became more suspicious. Before you could wear the
Palestinian scarf, for example, without being noticed. Now you are spotted out, but it all
depends on where you are. I saw recently a policewoman wearing a scarf in London. You can
see there are more tolerance here than at home. Maybe the perception of Muslims was largely
negative even before 9/11. Those events only put Muslims at the center of media attention,
and the media were waiting for such an opportunity. I tried to participate in many associations
to try to make people more aware of what’s going on, but [Muslims] lack the will and
sometimes sincerity to do it. We should try to be ambassadors to maintain our own reputation.

Q- Don’t you think that by covering constantly figures like Abu Hamza Al Masri the
mass media do more harm than good to British Muslims?

A- But the problem is that fundamentalist people like Abu Hamza Al Masri take money from
English taxpayers and take social money over their children and after that they say they don’t
accept the laws of this country. I participated in a number of manifestations in London and in
one of them, which was against the war in Iraq, I was so angry about the behavior of the

52
members of the Islamic Liberation party. We were more than 500,000 people, half of them
were [white] English. We were heading towards Hyde Park where speeches were going to be
delivered, and there the members of that Islamic party were holding a huge placard over
which was written ‘Reject Western values’. But the people who were participating with them
in the demonstration were doing so out of their ‘western’ values. This type of behavior of
some Muslims is doing more harm to many other Muslims. But of course there are some
people who want to combat Islam. They want to banish it whenever they have an opportunity.
They might be a minority but they are powerful because they have their hands everywhere.

Q- What are your main sources of news? I mean what newspapers do you read, what
TV channels do you watch normally?

A- I consume a lot of TV. It might be a passive way to learn but it is very useful. I like to
watch Arab channels such as Abu Dhabi and Al-Jazeera. They have very useful programs. I
watch also BBC. You find in it things you cannot find in other channels or even newspapers. I
read sometimes newspapers, but I have not developed the habit of reading them each
morning… I read them only when I have time. I like to watch some programs such as
Panorama and Ramsey’ Kitchen nightmares on channel 4. In this program this chief enter an
unsuccessful restaurant and within two weeks he turns it into a new one. I also started to
watch programs on the renovation of houses because I intend to invest in the real-estate
business. [These programs] teach you such useful things.

Q- Do you watch these programs at home with your family?

A- Not all the time. My wife prefers some channels and I prefer others. I prefer news and
documentaries while she prefers mainly fiction. But we manage to share each other programs.

Q- What about news, what channels you watch most when you want to learn about such
events as the war in Iraq or Palestine?

A- There are many channels, but Al-Jazeera remains certainly for me the best one, at least in
the Arab World. It has gained a wide reputation of fairness. You feel it has more
independence. They have a great freedom. It has unified the Arab public opinion on many
issues. Because my wife knows also English, so we don’t have a problem with watching
English channels as well. We watch both and sometimes we do balance between the two. But
I prefer Arab channels more.

53
Q- What about the local channels?

A- It’s sad to say that the BBC took side with the government in the last war against Iraq.
Before, it tried to be more or less objective by giving space to other voices. During the last
war it was not like the Independence or The Guardian. I like also to follow Channels 4 and 5
also because they show some programs that give a fair image on Muslims. But the English
[audience] may retain one good image only to be destroyed in another program. They need to
give more balanced programs.

Q- Are you satisfied then with the way the local media portray Muslims?

A- In the domain of the media good news is no news. Programs about religion and prayer are
broadcast in early morning because it does not concern people. But in the case of a crime
about ‘honor’ they gave it more attention. But you heard about the case of that journalist in
the BBC [Robert Kilroy] who denigrated the Arabs but was sacked from his job because of it.
Such people hate Arabs and Muslims. We should not lie to ourselves. But they are not the
majority. They are so powerful because we are weak. Some Islamic associations try to make
people here more aware about our culture but the problems are that [Muslims] themselves are
not very disciplined. Sometimes the media avoid covering some sensitive issues, but when
something happens such as when a girl is compelled into marriage by her family, journalists
like Roy exploit it to attack Islam.

Q- Do you think that the local media have a great influence on the way people perceive
Muslims?

A- [The media] are powerful. Most people here rely on such newspapers such as the Sun to
know about the world. [I think] 80% of people read the Sun. [those newspapers] don’t say the
truth and they know how to attract people, and people don’t bother much to learn about
things. Most people I talk to say that their government sent troops to Iraq to liberate it from
Saddam Hussein. When I told them it’s not true they just don’t like to listen to you or believe
you. But it is the responsibility of Muslims also. For example we can win the battle of the
public opinion over issues of Palestine and Iraq because they concern ending colonization of
people. If there were a consistent and sincere effort from us we can influence the public
opinion in Britain, but many associations that try to do that are either ineffective because of
internal divisions or their members are too radical. We should try to build a consensus over
laic grounds and try to build alliances with other movements such as the Left and Green
movements. Here people have the predisposition to believe both parties because they are

54
ignorant about such issues. But we should not consider them as enemies. When I explain to
them about what happen in Palestine, they show they are surprised. They don’t know that all
that happen there.

Q- You spoke about laicism, do you think it is easy to live as a Muslim in country such as
Britain?

A- Islam is a very flexible religion. Consider prayer, you can do it even with your eyelashes if
you are disabled. It allows you to do compromises when you need to. The system here also
allows you to pray at work even if you are going to pray five times a day as long as you don’t
take half an hour each time and you don’t abuse the system. Mosques are open here and you
can stay all day there and this is not possible even in some Arab and Islamic countries. They
are not totally secular here, but because of tolerance they accept others.

Q- Where are your friends from? How is your relationship with them?

A- They are from various origins but mainly Arab and Muslims. When I came to Britain, I
had a different perception of Arabs from the Middle East and the Gulf and they also. For me
they looked dull and I felt I had no connection with them. I didn’t even want to know them. I
used to go out with the Spanish, the French and the Italians. I felt closer to them. It is only
later that I started to know that I share also with [Arab from the Middle east] many things.
When I got to know some Palestinians, I started to feel more at ease with them more than the
Europeans. When we met, [instead of drinks], there was a lot of food which I like and there
was a lot of fun. I married then a woman from the Gulf. So I discovered they are not that
different from us.

Q- What about religion are you a practicing Muslim?

A- When I came here I was not. But here I started to practice. When I met those Arabs [from
the Middle East], I started to attend with them some ceremonies like in Eid Al–Fet’r and
Ramadan. I experienced things I never knew back at home. Here there is a religious freedom
more than in our countries. In the Mosque here, you have on Monday a religious sermon by
Sheikh Judea. Tuesday, you can have a lecture, the next day an exposition, every day a new
activity… you see… you sit with an Imam who was sentenced to eight years of prison in his
country and he allows you to ask any question in your mind and he encourages you to think
and gives you freedom to think. This doesn’t exist at home. They used to teach us only
ablutions and inheritance.

55
Q- So can we say now that you feel you are a Muslim first as you discovered that you are
close to other Muslims here?

A- No, I feel more as a Moroccan. I’m first Moroccan. Moroccan culture is deeply rooted in
me. The other Muslims look at me as a Moroccan too and it is in the subconscious.

Q- But you are also a British national?

A- Yes, but there is no contradiction in it. You have Jews, Sheikh and others, so why not
Muslims or Moroccans. It’s not a problem. They don’t require from you anything beyond
your capacity [in Britain]. So my first and most allegiance is to Morocco. But I swore that I
won’t do anything that can harm Britain. I may not like the policy of the British government,
but I’m a British too. I may participate in rallies, contribute money to lobby the government,
but we should as Muslims respect the law of this country with whom we have a pact of
allegiance and trust.

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