Respondent Memo

TEAM CODE: NMCC 2019-07-R
2ND NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

DEPARTMENT OF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH BENGAL
BEFORE THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF METROPOLIS
MS. RIYA (PETITIONER)
VERSUS
1. MR. RAMAKANT SHUKLA (RESPONDENT NO. 1)

2. MR. RAHUL (RSPONDENT NO. 2)
UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF

METROPOLIS, INDICA
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

2ND NATONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019
[TABLE OF CONTENTS]
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................... iv
JUDICIAL DECISIONS ................................................................................................ iii
BOOKS .......................................................................................................................... iv
ONLINE RESOURCES ................................................................................................. iv
STATUTES ....................................................................................................................v
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION .................................................................................. vi
STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................................................vii
STATEMENT OF ISSUES .................................................................................................ix
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS .........................................................................................x
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ..............................................................................................1
I. WHTHERE THE PRESENT SUIT IS MAINTIANBLE BOTH IN LAW AND IN FACT

.................................................................................................................................... 1
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[MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS]
[TABLE OF CONTENTS]
II. WHETHER THERE IS LANDLORD AND TENANT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MS.
RIYA AND MR. RAMAKANT SHUKLA UNDER THE TOP ACT ..................... 8
III. WHETHER CONCEALMENT OF FACT OF UNEMPLOYMENT IS JUST AND

REASONABLE GROUND FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM CONJUGAL SOCIETY
.................................................................................................................................... 10
IV. WHETHER THE HIGH COURT OF METROPOLIS,INDICA HAS THE POWER TO

TAKE UP ANY CASE FROM A SUBORDINATE COURT UNDER ARTICLE 227
.................................................................................................................................... 12
A. SOURCE OF THE POWER OF SUPERVISION CONFERRED TO THE HIGH

COURT ................................................................................................................ 13
B. OBJECTIVE OF FURTHERANCE OF JUSTICE ............................................. 14
PRAYER ............................................................................................................................... 17
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[INDEX OF AUTHORITIES]
INDEX OF AUTHORIES
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Marwa Manghari v. Sanghram Sampar AIR 1960 PUNJAB 35
L.Chandra Kumar v. Union of India &Ors (1997) 3 SCC 261
Gujarat v.Vakhatsinghji Vajesinghji Vaghela AIR 1968 SC 1481
State through Special Cell, New Delhi v. Navjot Sandhu (2003) 6 SCC 641
State Of U.P. v. District Judge, Unnao And Ors. AIR 1984 SC 1401 K.Dhanapal v. The
Superintendent Of Police H.C.P.No.2525 of 2018
Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey ,AIR 2002 SC 291 : (2002) 2 SCC 765
Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli (2006) 4 SCC 558 ;
Parveen Mehta v. Inderjit Mehta (2002) 5 SCC 706
A.Jayachandra v. Aneel Kumar (2005) 2 SCC 22
Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh (2007) 4 SCC 511
Suman Singh v. Sanjay Singh (2017) 4 SCC 85
Parsun Chakraborty v. Smt. Indira Jaiswal (2016) 4 Cal LT 420
Bokaro And Ramgur Ltd. v. State Of Bihar AIR 1966 Pat 154
Bharat Nidhi Ltd., v. Shital Prasad AIR 1981 Delhi 251
Nalamati Latchanna v. Masina Sriramulu 1993 (1) ALT 26
Syeda Rahimunnisa v. Malan Bi (Dead) By Lrs. &Anr.Etc AIR 2016 SC 4653

Anil Malhotra v.ChanderMalhota And Ors RSA No. 1658 of 2010
M/S Vasanth Colour Laboratories Private Limited v. SmtDivya W.P. No. 46319/2015
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BOOKS
DR. J. N. Pandey, Constitutional Law of India (Central Law Agency ,Allahabad ,55st edn., 2018)
Sir Dinshaw Fardunji Mulla,The Transfer Of Propert Act (Lexis Nexis, Haryana, 12th edn., 2015)
DR. S.R. Myneni , Code Of Civil Procedure & Limitation Act (Asia Law House, Hyderabad ,3rd
edn,. 2016)
DR. Paras Diwan, Family Law (Narender Gogia & Company , Hyderabad , 10th edn., 2018)
S.N. Misra, The Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 (Central Law Publication, Uttar Pradesh, 20th
edn., 2016)
DR. Durga Das Basu, Shorter Constitution of India (Wadhwa And Company, Nagput 13th edn.,
2001)
ONLINE RESOURCES
www.indiankannon.org
www.scconline.com
www.manupatra.com
www.lesixnesix.co.in
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STATUTES
LIMITATION ACT, 1963
HINDU MARRIAGE ACT, 1955
TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, 1882
WEST BENGAL PREMISES TENANCY ACT, 1997
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA,1950
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973
v|Page
[STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION]
STATEMENT OF JUSRISDICTION
Petitioner has filed a writ petition under Article 226 of this Hon’ble Court. Respondent No.1
humbly submits to this jurisdiction.
Respondent No. 2 humbly submits to the suo motu jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court under
Article 227 of The Constitution of Indica. This Article mentions the Power of Superintendence
over all Courts by the High Court.
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[STATEMENT OF ISSUES]
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I. Ambridge is a town in the state of Metropolis located in the country of Indica. Jamalpur is
another city of Metropolis state, Indica. Both Mr.Rahul and Ms. Riya are residents of
Ambridge and are Hindus who got married under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 in
February of 2011. After marriage they moved to Jamalpur where Mr.Rahul had been
working since 2009 and earning a salary of Rs 20,000/- per month.
II. The couple rented a flat from Mr.Ramakant Shukla (landlord) who made an agreement for
11 months with Mr.Rahul and Ms. Riya and fixed the rent at Rs.10, 000/- per month. Soon,
Ms. Riya started working in a KidZee in Jamalpur and was paid Rs.5000/- per month. In
the last week of May, 2011, Mr.Rahul lost his job due to which the rent of the property
remained due for 6 months consecutively. His spouse was unaware of the reason for delay
in the payment of rent.
III. In November, 2011 the landlord sent a notice expressing his desire to not continue the
agreement with the couple and requested the couple to vacate the premises within one
month. Following this, the unemployed status of Mr.Rahul was revealed to Ms. Riya. She
left the shared flat on 01st December, 2011. Several futile attempts were made by her spouse
to talk to her. During the absence of Ms. Riya, repeated requests were made to Mr.Rahul
to pay the rent, but the payment remained irregular in nature.
IV. On 22nd April, 2015, Ms. Riya came back to the shared flat and expressed her desire to
divorce Mr.Rahul. Further, she asked Mr.Rahul to leave the flat and informed the landlord
that from then onwards she would be staying in the flat and paying the rent. The landlord
refused and issued a notice for eviction to the couple in May,2015.
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V. When the couple did not vacate, the landlord filed a suit for eviction against the couple
before the Controller in June 2015 contending that he needed the suit property for his
personal use. Simultaneously, a suit for Restitution of Conjugal Rights was filed by
Mr.Rahul before the District Court. The Controller in the suit for eviction decided in
favor of the landlord following which Mr.Rahul left the suit property. However, Ms.
Riya continued to stay on and filed an appeal before the Tribunal where the Controller’s
decision was upheld. The Tribunal asked .Ms. Riya to vacate the suit property.
Aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal Ms. Riya is on appeal before this Hon’ble
Court.
Aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal Ms. Riya is on appeal before this Hon’ble Court.
The High Court has also suo motu taken up the Restitution of Conjugal Rights suit under
Article 227 for adjudication.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
ISSUE I: WHETHER THE PRESENT SUIT IS MAINTAINABLE BOTH IN LAW AND IN

FACT
ISSUE II: WHTHER THERE IS LANDLORD AND TENANT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN

MS. RIYA AND MR.RAMAKANT SHUKLA UNDER THE TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
ISSUE III: WHETHER CONCEALMENT OF THE FACT OF UNEMPLOYMENT OF

MR.RAHUL IS JUST AND REASONABLE GROUND FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM THE
CONJUGAL RELATIONSHIP BY MS. RIYA
ISSUE IV: WHETHER THE HIGH COURT OF METROPOLIS, INDICA HAS THE POWER
TO TAKE UP ANY CASE FROM A SUBORDINATE COURT UNDER ARTICLE 227 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDICA
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[SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I. THE PRESENT SUIT IS NOT MAINTAINABLE BOTH IN LAW AND IN FACT
It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble High Court of Metropolis, Indica that the
present suit, Riya V. Ramakant Shukla and Rahul is not maintainable both in law and in fact as
this Hon’ble High Court has erred in Suo motto clubbing two suits of different nature, having no
common remedy.
II. THERE NO LONGER IS A LANDLORD TENANT RELATIONSHIP

BETWEEN MS. RIYA AND MR. RAMAKANT SHUKLA UNDER TOP
It is humbly submitted on behalf of the respondent that initially there was a landlord tenant
relationship between Ms. Riya and the respondent but such relationship is no longer existent
since under section 2 (g) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act states, “tenant…shall not
include any person against whom any decree or order for eviction has been made by a Court of
competent jurisdiction”
III. CONCEALMENT OF FACT OF UNEMPLOYMENT IS NOT REASONABLE

GROUND FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM CONJUGAL RELATIONSHIP BY MS.
RIYA
It is humbly submitted that the concealment of the fact of unemployment of Mr. Rahul
(hereinafter referred as "Respondent”) is not a just and reasonable ground for withdrawal from
the conjugal relationship by Ms. Riya (hereinafter referred as "Petitioner”) It is contended on
behalf of the respondent that the concealment of unemployment is a frivolous matter and does
not constitute mental trauma as claimed by the Petitioner.
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[SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS]
IV. HIGH COURT HAS POWER UNDER ARTICLE 227 TO TAKE UP ANY
CASE FROM A SUBORDINATE COURT
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that High Court of Metropolis, Indica is
conferred with the power of supervision under Article 227 of the Constitution of Indica which
involves a duty on the High Court to keep the inferior Courts and tribunals ‘within the bounds of
their authority and to see that they do what their duty requires and that they do it in a legal
manner’ and to that effect, the High Court can take up a case from the Subordinate Court under
Article 227 of the Constitution of Indica.
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[ARGUMENTS ADVANCED]
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
I. WHETHER THE PRESENT SUIT IS MAINTAINABLE BOTH IN LAW AND IN

FACT?
(¶1.) It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble High Court of Metropolis, Indica that the
present suit, Riya V. Ramakant Shukla and Rahul is not maintainable both in law and in
fact as this Hon’ble High Court has erred in Suo motto clubbing two suits of different
nature, having no common remedy.
(¶2.) In the case of Syeda Rahimunnisa vs Malan Bi (Dead) By Lrs. &Anr. Etc1, it was held
that Since all the aforementioned five suits were in relation to one suit- land and were
between the same parties pending in different Courts, all the five civil suits were clubbed
together for disposal in accordance with law. Parties adduced common evidence in all the
five civil suits’’
(¶3.) Further it is mentioned that since the five suits filed were in relation to one suit – land and
were between the same parties pending in different Courts it was clubbed together. On the
other hand in our present case of Riya V. Ramakant Shukla and Rahul the two suits namely
the one filed by Rahul for Restitution of conjugal rights and the other appeal being the one
filed by Riya before the High Court of Metropolis, Indica against the landlord Ramakant
Shukla aggrieved by the decision of the tribunal. Hence in this instance both these suits
have no common relation and hence no common remedy as well. Hence it is contended
before this Hon’ble High Court that clubbing of these two suits are not at all relevant and
hence this clubbing is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed in limine.
1
Syeda Rahimunnisa v. Malan Bi (Dead) By Lrs. &Anr.Etc AIR 2016 SC 4653
1|Page
(¶4.) In the case of Anil Malhotra vs Chander Malhota And Ors2, the Hon’ble High Court of
Punjab and Haryana, Chandigarh held that , “This judgment will dispose of two appeals bearing
RSA Nos. 1658 and 1795 of 2010, as common questions of law and facts are involved. Both the
suits were clubbed and were decided by a common judgment by the trial Court and even the appeals
were also consolidated and decided by a common judgment, as the suit property is same. Both the
appeals have been preferred by Anil Malhotra, as the suit filed by him seeking partition of the
property was dismissed and the suit filed against him for mandatory injunction and possession was
decreed. The submission is that the primary question in the present litigation is as to whether the
Will projected by the brothers of the Petitioner is a valid document and in case it is not, the property
will have to be shared amongst all the legal heirs, Vidya Rani having died intestate. If the Petitioner
succeeds, then automatically the second suit filed by the brothers of the Petitioner will have to be
dismissed as the Petitioner will not remain in possession of the property merely as a licensee,
rather, in his own right. Even if for arguments' sake, the Will is upheld, still the Petitioner, being
in possession of part of the suit property since long and having made substantial improvements by
spending huge amount, even if he is a licensee, the same cannot be revoked”
(¶5.) Reliance has been placed on this case as in this case it has been explicitly stated that both
the suits were clubbed and were decided by a common judgment by the trial Court and
even the appeals were also consolidated and decided by a common judgment, as the suit
property is same. But in our present case the nature of both the suits being entirely different,
(Suit for matrimonial relief and an Appeal for Rent control) cannot be clubbed and is liable
to be dismissed in limine.
(¶6.) Reliance is also placed on the decision of the High Court of Karnata in the case of M/S
Vasanth Colour Laboratories Private Limited vs Smt. Divya3, where the Court held
that the , “Decree holder is the owner of the suit schedule property and same was taken on lease
by the judgment debtor. On expiry of lease period, decree holder filed a suit O.S.NO.836/1981
against the judgment debtor for ejectment from suit schedule property. Judgment debtor also filed
a suit in O.S.No.3396/1996 seeking specific performance of the contract, contending inter alia that
under the lease deed there is a specific clause for extension to be given for another 14 years after
the expiry of stipulated period and same was not extended. Judgment debtor also filed another suit
2 Anil Malhotra v.Chander Malhota And Ors RSA No. 1658 of 2010
3
M/S Vasanth Colour Laboratories Private Limited v. Smt. Divya W.P. No. 46319/2015
2|Page
O.S.No.62/2006 seeking for extension of the period of lease of the suit schedule property. Since
above referred three suits were pending in different Courts of City Civil Court, Bengaluru,
judgment debtor filed a Civil Petition No.60/2011 under Section 24 CPC for
clubbing/connecting/consolidating all the suits to be tried in one Court. While examining said
prayer for clubbing/consolidating the suits, a compromise came to be entered into between the
parties, which was placed on record and all the suits were ordered to be placed before City Civil
Court, CCH-9, Bengaluru and directed the said Court to receive the compromise petition and pass
the decree accordingly. In that view of the matter, trial Court adjudicating O.S.No.836/1981 heard
the Advocates, recorded presence of the parties and accepted compromise petition and pursuant to
the same, decree has been drawn in O.S.No.836/1981 in terms of the compromise. On account of
judgment debtor not vacating suit schedule property as agreed to in the compromise petition,
decree holder filed Execution Petition No.1094/2015 and after issuing cause notice to judgment
debtor and holding service sufficient, by impugned order dated 15.10.2015 has ordered for
issuance of delivery warrant. Same is questioned in the present writ petition.’’
(¶7.) In the above mentioned case, since all the three suits were interconnected and revolving
around the same subject matter they were decided to be clubbed together. On the other
hand in our present case the two suits mentioned therein are distinct and unique. They are
not inter-related in any way and hence it is humbly submitted that the Hon’ble High Court
of Metropolis Indica has erred in clubbing both the suits.
(¶8.) Additionally, reliance is placed on the case of Nalamati Latchanna vs Masina Sriramulu
(Andhra High Court):
(¶9.) Brief Facts: Respondent herein is the Plaintiff is O.S.Nos. 464/83 and 372/88 on the file
of the Principal Subordinate Judge's Court, Kakinada. Originally, the respondent filed
O.S.No. 178/83 on the file of the I Additional District Munsiff Court, Kakinada for
declaration of his fishing rights in Chintalacheruvu and consequently to restrain the
defendants therein from interfering with the said rights. A temporary injunction was also
obtained by the respondent-plaintiff restraining the defendants therein from obstructing
him from catching fish. It is under the background that the defendants therein have
obstructed the plaintiff from catching fish and thereby caused damages to the tune of Rs.
60,000/-, the respondent-Plaintiff filed O.S.No. 464/83 before the Principal Subordinate
Judge's Court, Kakinada against the defendants therein for recovery of the said damages.
Later on, he filed O.P.No. 174/88 before the III Additional District Judge, Kakinada for
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transferring O.S.No. 178 /83 to the Court of Principal Subordinate Judge, Kakinada where
O.S.No. 464/83 was pending and sought indulgence of the Court for trying the suits
together. Pursuant to the transfer order, the suit was re-numbered as O.S.No. 372/88.
(¶10.) Judgement Briefing - It is seen that the learned III Additional District Judge while passing
order in O.P.No. 174/88 observed that the matters could be tried together by one and the
same Court in order to avoid conflicting judgments. The learned District Judge further
observed that whether all the matters will be clubbed together or may be tried separately
and simultaneously, is the matter to be decided by the Principal Subordinate Judge,
Kakinada. Under this background, the respondentplaintiff filed I.A.No. 3341/89 in O.S.No.
464/83 praying for clubbing both the suits, recording common evidence and pronouncing
common judgment. The learned Principal Subordinate Judge by order dated 14-2-1990 has
allowed I.A.No. 3341/89 and directed clubbing of the suits together, recording common
evidence and passing common judgment in both the suits. As against this order, the present
revision petition is filed by defendant No. 14 in O.S.No. 464/83. 83.
(¶11.) Sri P. VenkataramanaSarma, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent-plaintiff, has
contended that in order to avoid multiplicity of litigation and conflicting decisions, it is
better the suits could be clubbed together, common evidence could be recorded and
common judgment could be pronounced and, therefore, he justified the order passed by the
learned Subordinate Judge in I.A.No. 3341/89. Sri C. Subba Rao, learned Counsel
appearing for the Petitioner, who is defendant No. 14 in O.S.No. 464/83, has, on the
contrary, contended that these suits cannot be tried together inasmuch as the first suit -
O.S.No. 372/88 - is filed by the respondent herein for declaration of his fishing rights in
Chintalacheruvu and for a consequential relief of restraining the defendants therein from
interfering with the said rights, whereas O.S.No. 464/83 is filed for recovery of damages
said to have been caused by the defendants therein. He further contended that the first suit
is for a different relief, that is to say, for a declaration and the second suit is for damages,
it is admitted that the plaintiff and some of the defendants in both the suits are common
and some of the defendants are strangers. It is under this background, Sri Subba Rao
contended that the respondent herein has to first establish his rights in O.S.No. 372/88 and
secondly the extent of damages said to have been caused by each of the defendants in
O.S.No. 464/83 has to be separately assessed. He has further contended that some of the
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defendants are admittedly different and, therefore, the two suits cannot be clubbed and tried
together and common judgment cannot be passed.
(¶12.) No doubt, in cases where parties are common and matter is absolutely similar, to avoid
multiplicity of suits and to eliminate chances of conflicting decisions on the same point,
consolidation of two or more suits can be ordered. Where, however, suits brought by the
same plaintiff are prima facie based on different and independent transactions, the
consolidation cannot be ordered, as there cannot be conflicting decisions.
(¶13.) It is seen that the Trial Court admits that issues are though different and yet, felt that the
subject-matter as well as the oral and documentary evidence that could be let in would
probably be same and, therefore, directed that the above suits should be clubbed and tried
together.
(¶14.) Relying upon the decision of the Delhi High Court in Bharat Nidhi Ltd., v. Shital
Prasad, 4 AIR 1981 Delhi 251 Sri Subba Rao contended that there will not be any
conflicting decisions as far as these cases are concerned and as is observed by the trial
Court, the issues are different and, therefore, the suits cannot be clubbed together. As
observed by the Delhi High Court in the above decision, no doubt, in order to avoid
multiplicity of suits, the clubbing of suits together is welcome. But the question is whether
the chances of conflicting decisions would arise in the event of the suit not clubbed
together. In the present case, He contended that he does not find that there would be
conflicting decisions if the suits are not tried together, as the first suit is for declaration of
rights and the second suit is for recovery of damages and when the issues are not similar.
(¶15.) In yet another decision in Bokaro&Ramgur Ltd. v. State 5 the Patna High Court, held
that it has to be seen whether or not the non-consolidation of two or mere suits is likely to
lead, apart from multiplicity of suits, to leaving the door open for conflicting decisions on
the same issue, which may be common to the two or more suits sought to be consolidated.
It also held that the convenience of the parties and the expenses in the suits are subsidiary
to the more important consideration viz., whether it would lead to rendering conflicting
4
Bharat Nidhi Ltd., v. Shital Prasad AIR 1981 Delhi 251
5
Bokaro And Ramgur Ltd. v. State Of Bihar AIR 1966 Pat 154
5|Page
decisions on the same point if the suits are not clubbed together. As observed by the Patna
High Court, it is to be seen that the convenience of the parties and the expenses involved
are to be subsidiary factors to avoid multiplicity of suits where the chances of avoiding
conflicting decisions on the same point are to be taken into consideration. In the context of
the decision of the Patna High Court, it is to be seen whether there could be conflicting
decisions if the suits are not clubbed and tried together.
(¶16.) As discussed by the counsel above, when the issues and nature of the suits are different, It
is difficult to accept the contention of Sri Venkataraman Sarma, learned Counsel for the
respondent-plaintiff that if the suits are not clubbed and tried together, it would lead to
rendering of conflicting decisions. In the present case, the first suit is for declaration of
fishing rights and the second suit is for recovery of damages and tine question of rendering
conflicting decisions, in my opinion, would not arise at all, as the issues are different and
some of the defendants figured are also different in the two suits. Under these
circumstances, the order dated 14-2-90 in I.A.No. 3341/89 in O.S.No. 464/83 was set aside
on the file of tine Principal Subordinate Judge, Kakinada.
(¶17.) Thus from the above judgements it is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble High
Court of Metropolis, Indica that two or more suits can be clubbed together only when the
following conditions are satisfied:
1) Having Parties in Common.

2) Ability to record common evidence and deliver common judgement, being the cases of
similar nature.
3) The primary matter or the subject matter around which the suits (mentioned to be
clubbed) revolve must be common. As in, if suit 1 is regarding a land dispute then suit
2 must also be in relation with the same land for the two suits to be clubbed together.
4) If the suits proposed to be clubbed are not clubbed then there must be no conflicting
decisions arising from the different Courts in which they are being tried.
(¶18.) In the case of Riya v. Ramakant Shukla and Rahul none of the above conditions comes into
play and moreover there cannot be any conflicting decisions arising if they are not being
clubbed as both the suits are of entirely different nature.
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(¶19.) Thus it is contended that Clubbing of these two cases cannot be done and hence they are to
be dismissed in limine.
The present Suit, Riya V. Ramakant Shukla and Rahul is not maintainable both in law
and in fact
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II. WHETHER THERE IS LANDLORD AND TENANT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN

MS. RIYA AND MR. RAMAKANT SHUKLA UNDER THE TRANSFER OF
PROPERTY ACT?
(¶20.) It is humbly submitted on behalf of the respondent that initially there was a landlord tenant
relationship between Ms.Riya and the respondent but such relationship is no longer
existent.
(¶21.) Firstly, it is clarified that the rental agreement in the present case denotes a lease falling
under the definition of lease under section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act. Along with
lease, section 105 also defines Lessor, lessee , premium and rent. It is as follows:
(¶22.) SECTION 105. Lease defined. A lease of immovable property is a transfer of a right to
enjoy such property, made for a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity, in
consideration of a price paid or promised, or of money, a share of crops, service or any
other thing of value, to be rendered, periodically or on specified occasions to the transferor
by the transferee, who accepts the transfer on such terms.
(¶23.) Lessor, lessee, premium and rent defined. The transferor is called the lessor, the
transferee is called the lessee, the price is called the premium, and the money, service or
other thing to be so rendered is called the rent
(¶24.) In the present case, Mr. Ramakant Shukla is the lessor who transfers his property to the
couple who are named as lessees in the agreement. The agreement made by Mr.Ramakant
Shukla with the couple mentioned that both Ms.Riya and Mr. Rahul would be staying in
the suit premise and to that effect both their ID proofs were taken 6. Further, when the
landlord issued an eviction notice against the couple (and not just one of the spouses) in
May 2015, he has impliedly recognized Ms.Riya as a tenant. Such implied recognition
6
Common Clarification as to the Moot Proposition – Question 2
8|Page
through an eviction notice was held to be sufficient to consider a person as a tenant in the
Parsun Chakraborty7 case.
(¶25.) It is further argued that the above mentioned relationship came to an end in June 2015,
when the Rent Controller of Metropolis in the suit for eviction, filed by Mr.Ramakant
against Ms.Riya, ruled in favor of Mr.Ramakant Shukla and ordered Ms.Riya to vacate the
suit property. The same is substantiated by Section 2(g) of The West Bengal Premises
Tenancy Act, which defines a tenant and states that:
(¶26.) ““tenant" means any person by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent of any
premises is or, but for a special contract, would be payable, and includes any person
continuing in possession after termination of his tenancy, …. but shall not include any
person against whom any decree or order for eviction has been made by a Court of
competent jurisdiction”
(¶27.) According to the facts of the present case, an eviction order was made against the couple
by the Controller in June, 2015 and the same was upheld by the Tribunal as well. This
clearly indicates that the landlord and tenant relationship between Mr.Ramakant Shukla
and Ms.Riya came to an end in June of 2015.
(¶28.) Therefore it is most humbly submitted that there had been a landlord tenant relationship
between Mr.Ramakant Shukla and Ms.Riya up until June, 2015 but no such relationship
exists at present.
There is no longer a landlord and tenant relationship between Ms. Riya and
Mr. Ramakant Shukla under the Transfer of Property Act.
7
Parsun Chakraborty v. Smt. Indira Jaiswal (2016) 4 Cal LT 420
9|Page
III. WHETHER THE CONCEALMENT OF THE FACT OF UNEMPLOYMENT OF

MR. RAHUL IS JUST AND REASONABLE GROUND FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM
THE CONJUGAL RELATIONSHIP BY MS. RIYA?
(¶29.) It is humbly submitted that the concealment of the fact of unemployment of Mr.Rahul
(hereinafter referred as "Respondent”) is not a just and reasonable ground for withdrawal
from the conjugal relationship by Ms.Riya (hereinafter referred as "Petitioner”) It is
contended on behalf of the respondent that the concealment of unemployment is a frivolous
matter and does not constitute mental trauma as claimed by the Petitioner.
(¶30.) Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Savitri
Pandey8 , where the Court held that, “Cruelty may be physical or mental. Mental cruelty
is the conduct of the other spouse which causes mental suffering or fear to the matrimonial
life of the other. “Cruelty”, therefore, postulates a treatment of the Petitioner with such
cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in his or her mind that it would be harmful
or injurious for the Petitioner to live with the other party. Cruelty, however, has to be
distinguished from the ordinary wear and tear of family life”
(¶31.) Therefore, it can be said that an essential requirement for cruelty would be a reasonable
apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious for a spouse to live with the other9
(¶32.) It is staunchly contended that, in the present case, the concealment of unemployment is not
sufficient to cause a reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful for the Petitioner to
continue living with the respondent. Mere suppression of a fact falls under the ambit of
“ordinary wear and tear of family life”. In the present case, the respondent’s actions are so
inconsequential that they neither threaten the Petitioner’s state of mind nor induce a fear of
8
Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey ,AIR 2002 SC 291 : (2002) 2 SCC 765
9
Dastane v. Dastane, AIR 1970 Bom.312 ; Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli (2006) 4 SCC 558 ;
Parveen Mehta v. Inderjit Mehta (2002) 5 SCC 706 ; A.Jayachandra v. Aneel Kumar (2005) 2
SCC 22
10 | P a g e
injury. Such trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and tear of the married life which
happens in day to day life would not be adequate10 to establish mental trauma.
(¶33.) Moreover, it is a well established principle of law that mental cruelty should not be judged
from a solitary event.11 In the present case, the Petitioner left the conjugal society of the
respondent solely because he did not reveal the fact of his unemployment. Such an isolated
event of unpleasantness or annoyance cannot be attributed as mental cruelty. This stance
was fortified by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Parveen Mehta 12, where the
Court held that, “In case of mental cruelty it will not be a correct approach to take an
instance of misbehavior in isolation and then pose the question whether such behavior is
sufficient by itself to cause mental cruelty. The approach should be to take the cumulative
effect of the facts and circumstances...”
(¶34.) This view is further substantiated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Samar
Ghosh13, where the Court has held that, “The married life should be reviewed as a whole
and a few isolated instances over a period of years will not amount to cruelty. The ill-
conduct must be persistent for a fairly lengthy period, where the relationship has
deteriorated to an extent that because of the acts and behavior of a spouse, the wronged
party finds it extremely difficult to live with the other party any longer…” It is submitted
that the Petitioner has wrongly withdrawn from the conjugal society of the respondent since
the isolated act of not revealing the fact of unemployment does not amount to cruelty.
(¶35.) Therefore, it is most humbly submitted that the concealment of the fact of unemployment
by the respondent is not just and reasonable ground for withdrawal from conjugal
relationship by the Petitioner.
Concealment of fact of unemployment is not just and reasonable ground for withdrawal
from conjugal relationship by Ms. Riya
10
11
Suman Singh v. Sanjay Singh (2017) 4 SCC 85
12
Parveen Mehta v. Inderjit Mehta (2002) 5 SCC 706
13
11 | P a g e
IV. WHTHER THE HIGH COURT OF METROPOLIS, INDICA HAS THE POWER
TO TAKE UP ANY CASE FROM A SUBORDINATE COURT UNDER ARTICLE
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDICA?
(¶36.) It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that High Court of Metropolis, Indica is
conferred with the power of supervision under Article 227 of the Constitution of Indica
which involves a duty on the High Court to keep the inferior Courts and tribunals ‘within
the bounds of their authority and to see that they do what their duty requires and that they
do it in a legal manner’14 and to that effect, the High Court can take up a case from the
Subordinate Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of Indica.
(¶37.) Article 227 of the Constitution of Indica, 1950 reads as follows:
227. Power of superintendence over all Courts by the High Court: (1) Every High Court
shall have superintendence over all Courts and tribunals throughout the territories
interrelation to which it exercises jurisdiction.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, the High Court may
(a) call for returns from such Courts;
(b) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and
proceedings of such Courts; and
(c) prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by the officers of any
such Courts.
(3) The High Court may also settle tables of fees to be allowed to the sheriff and all clerks and
officers of such Courts and to attorneys, advocates and pleaders practicing therein: Provided
that any rules made, forms prescribed or tables settled under clause (2) or clause (3) shall not
14
Banerjee, D.N. v. P.R. Mukherjee, (1953) SCR 302 : AIR 1953 SC 58
12 | P a g e
be inconsistent with the provision of any law for the time being in force, and shall require the
previous approval of the Governor.
(4) Nothing in this article shall be deemed to confer on a High Court powers of
superintendence over any Court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the
Armed Forces.
1.1 SOURCE OF THE POWER OF SUPERVISION CONFERRED TO THE

HIGH COURT
(¶38.) In Marwa Manghari v. Sanghram Sampar15 It was held that the constitution had sought
to secure justice to the citizens on a top priority and for that purpose vested in High Courts
very wide power of judicial supervision and superintendence which enabled that Court to
act suo motu in the interest of justice. Because the power is derived directly from the
Constitution which is the fountain source and parent of all laws and statute in the Republic
, the power imposed on the High Court grave and sacred responsibilities for the
administration of justice and the Court is invested in with unlimited and unfathomable
reserve of judicial power of supervision under art 227 of the constitution.
(¶39.) In Surya Dev Rai vs Ram Chander Rai &Ors on 7 August, 16 : the Supreme Court,
referred to the case L.Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India &Ors., 17 where the
Constitution Bench, dealt with the nature of power of judicial review conferred by Article
226 of the Constitution and the power of superintendence conferred by Article 227. It was
held that the jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the
Constitution and on the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is part
of the basic structure of the Constitution, forming its integral and essential feature,
which cannot be tampered with much less taken away even by constitutional amendment,
not to speak of a parliamentary legislation.
15.
Marwa Manghari v. Sanghram Sampar AIR 1960 PUNJAB 35
16.
Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai &Ors AIR 2003 SC 3044
17.
L.Chandra Kumar v. Union of India &Ors (1997) 3 SCC 261
13 | P a g e
(¶40.) In the case of Gujarat vs. Vakhatsinghji Vajesinghji Vaghela, 18 the Court held
that Article 227 of the Constitution of India gives the High Court the power of
superintendence over all Courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in relation to
which it exercises jurisdiction. It is held that this jurisdiction cannot be limited or fettered
by any act of the State Legislature. It is held that the supervisory jurisdiction extends to
keeping the subordinate Tribunals within the limits of the authority and to seeking that they
obey the law.
(¶41.) Thus, it is submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Constitution, being the supreme
law confers the power of supervision to the High Court and hence can expedite the process
in order to advance justice. This power cannot be fettered by a constitutional amendment,
let alone a parliamentary or state legislation.
1.2 OBJECTIVE OF FURTHERANCE OF JUSTICE
(¶42.) In the case of State through Special Cell, New Delhi v. Navjot Sandhu,19 it was held
that Article 227 of the Constitution of India gives the High Court the power of
superintendence over all Courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in relation to
which it exercise jurisdiction. The powers under Article 227 are wide and can be used, to
meet the ends of justice.
(¶43.) In the case of State Of U.P. v. District Judge, Unnao And Ors. 20 The Petitioner
approached the High Court in Writ Petition No. 610 of 1974 under Article 227 of the
Constitution. The High Court declined to interfere with the order of the learned District
Judge even though it was satisfied that the Petitioner had established that it was prevented
by a sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time. This is frankly un-understandable
and exhibits a rigid and inflexible view of jurisdiction under Article 227 ultimately leading
to injustice. This is what the High Court says: “May be, if I had considered the matter as the
Court of first instance I might have taken a different view, but unless it can be held that the view
5.
Gujarat v.Vakhatsinghji Vajesinghji Vaghela AIR 1968 SC 1481
19. State through Special Cell, New Delhi v. Navjot Sandhu (2003) 6 SCC 641
20. State Of U.P. v. District Judge, Unnao And Ors. AIR 1984 SC 1401
14 | P a g e
taken by the learned District Judge was not a plausible view that cannot be reversed in exercise of
the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution.”
(¶44.) The Supreme also held that the Article 227 or Article 226 were devised to advance justice
and not to thwart it. Therefore, accepting the finding of the High Court that sitting as trial
Court, it was satisfied that the Petitioner had made out sufficient cause for condoning the
delay; we must interfere in this appeal so as to advance justice.
(¶45.) It is submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the power under Article 227 is a discretionary
power, wide enough to meet the ends of justice as and when required. Hence, it would be
inappropriate for the High Court not to interfere and take up a case from subordinate Court
when the whole motive is furtherance or advancement of justice. Also, the Section 24 of
Code of Civil Procedure,1908 vests the High Court with the power of withdrawal of any
suit pending before any Court subordinate to it.
1.3 ASSUMPTION OF ORIGINAL JURISDICTION UNDER ARTICLE 227
(¶46.) Further, in the case of K. Dhanapal v. The Superintendent Of Police21, the Court held
that since, the Petitioner and the 4th respondent agreed to get separated, it is appropriate to
grant divorce by invoking Article 227 of the Constitution of India and Section 13 (b)
of Hindu Marriage Act by mutual consent. The categorical statements made by the
Petitioner, 3rd respondent as well as 4th respondent would make it clear that the 4th
respondent is not interested in going along with her husband and she is interested only in
living with the 3rd respondent. A memo of compromise would also show that there is no
possibility of reunion. Under these circumstances, this Court, suo motu invokes Article
227 of the Constitution of India and Section 13 (b) of Hindu Marriage Act and grants
divorce to the Petitioner and the 4th respondent dissolving the marriage celebrated on
02.11.2014 between them.
(¶47.) In the above case, the Madras High Court have assumed original jurisdiction and awarded
the divorce under Section 13 (b) of the Hindu Marriage Act. Hence, relying upon this
21
K.Dhanapal v. The Superintendent Of Police H.C.P.No.2525 of 2018
15 | P a g e
decision, it is humbly stated that the High Court can assume original jurisdiction and try
and dispose off the proceeding in appropriate cases in order to render justice.
(¶48.) Hence, it is contended before this Hon’ble Court that the High Court, under Article 227 of
the Constitution of Indica, is vested with the power of supervision to keep the Subordinate
Court within the bounds of their authority. The High Court can take up cases from
subordinate Courts when necessary and it is a wide discretionary power that the High Court
can invoke for expeditious adjudication. The High Court has inherent powers to do what is
required to advance justice.
The High Court of Metropolis, Indica has the power to take up any case from a
subordinate Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of Indica.
16 | P a g e
[PRAYER}
PRAYER
Wherefore in the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, the counsel
for the Respondent humbly prays that the Hon’ble Court be pleased:
1. To declare that the present suit is not maintainable both in law and in fact,
2. To uphold the order of the Rent Control Tribunal,
3. To pass the decree for restitution of conjugal rights,
And pass any order that this Hon’ble Court may deem fit in the interest of equity, justice and
good conscience.
And for this act of kindness, the counsel for the Respondent shall be duty bound and forever
pray.
Sd/-
(Counsel for the Respondents)
17 | P a g e

Respondent Memo

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TEAM CODE: NMCC 2019-07-R

2ND NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

BEFORE THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF METROPOLIS

MS. RIYA (PETITIONER)

1. MR. RAMAKANT SHUKLA (RESPONDENT NO. 1)

UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................... iv

JUDICIAL DECISIONS ................................................................................................ iii

ONLINE RESOURCES ................................................................................................. iv

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION .................................................................................. vi

STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................................................vii

STATEMENT OF ISSUES .................................................................................................ix

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS .........................................................................................x

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ..............................................................................................1

I. WHTHERE THE PRESENT SUIT IS MAINTIANBLE BOTH IN LAW AND IN FACT

III. WHETHER CONCEALMENT OF FACT OF UNEMPLOYMENT IS JUST AND

IV. WHETHER THE HIGH COURT OF METROPOLIS,INDICA HAS THE POWER TO

A. SOURCE OF THE POWER OF SUPERVISION CONFERRED TO THE HIGH

B. OBJECTIVE OF FURTHERANCE OF JUSTICE ............................................. 14

Marwa Manghari v. Sanghram Sampar AIR 1960 PUNJAB 35

L.Chandra Kumar v. Union of India &Ors (1997) 3 SCC 261

Gujarat v.Vakhatsinghji Vajesinghji Vaghela AIR 1968 SC 1481

Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli (2006) 4 SCC 558 ;

Parveen Mehta v. Inderjit Mehta (2002) 5 SCC 706

A.Jayachandra v. Aneel Kumar (2005) 2 SCC 22

Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh (2007) 4 SCC 511

Suman Singh v. Sanjay Singh (2017) 4 SCC 85

Parsun Chakraborty v. Smt. Indira Jaiswal (2016) 4 Cal LT 420

Bharat Nidhi Ltd., v. Shital Prasad AIR 1981 Delhi 251

Nalamati Latchanna v. Masina Sriramulu 1993 (1) ALT 26

Syeda Rahimunnisa v. Malan Bi (Dead) By Lrs. &Anr.Etc AIR 2016 SC 4653

LIMITATION ACT, 1963

HINDU MARRIAGE ACT, 1955

TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, 1882

WEST BENGAL PREMISES TENANCY ACT, 1997

THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA,1950

CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908

CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973

ISSUE I: WHETHER THE PRESENT SUIT IS MAINTAINABLE BOTH IN LAW AND IN

ISSUE II: WHTHER THERE IS LANDLORD AND TENANT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN

ISSUE III: WHETHER CONCEALMENT OF THE FACT OF UNEMPLOYMENT OF

I. THE PRESENT SUIT IS NOT MAINTAINABLE BOTH IN LAW AND IN FACT

II. THERE NO LONGER IS A LANDLORD TENANT RELATIONSHIP

III. CONCEALMENT OF FACT OF UNEMPLOYMENT IS NOT REASONABLE

I. WHETHER THE PRESENT SUIT IS MAINTAINABLE BOTH IN LAW AND IN

1) Having Parties in Common.

II. WHETHER THERE IS LANDLORD AND TENANT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN

III. WHETHER THE CONCEALMENT OF THE FACT OF UNEMPLOYMENT OF

(a) call for returns from such Courts;

1.1 SOURCE OF THE POWER OF SUPERVISION CONFERRED TO THE

1.2 OBJECTIVE OF FURTHERANCE OF JUSTICE

1.3 ASSUMPTION OF ORIGINAL JURISDICTION UNDER ARTICLE 227

(Counsel for the Respondents)

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