SAN SEBASTIAN

COLLEGE-RECOLETOS
COLLEGE OF LAW

CASE DIGEST:
CIVIL LAW REVIEW
ROSILANDA KEUPPERS vs. JUDGE VIRGILIO MURCIA
A.M. NO. MTJ-15-1860 | APRIL 3, 2018
JUSTICE LUCAS BERSAMIN
EN BANC

FACTS: On 2008 petitioner Rosilanda Keupper and her husband, Pater Keupper,
wanted to celebrate their marriage before the latter’s departure abroad.
Respondent Judge Virgilio Murica solemnized the marriage on May 19, 2008 in
the premises of the DSL Travel and Tours in Davao City. On May 20, 2008, upon
inspection there were erroneous entries in the marriage certificate as well as on
the application for marriage license, specifically the certificate stating “Office of
the MTCC Judge, Island Garden City of Samal” as the place of solemnization of
the marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Judge in the act of solemnizing a marriage

outside of his jurisdictional authority constitutes a grave misconduct that would
warrant sanctions under the law.

HELD: The court ruled that respondent Judge was guilty of grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for solemnizing the marriage
of the complainant and her husband outside his territorial jurisdiction, and in the
office premises of the DSL Travel and Tour in Davao City. Such place of
solemnization was a blatant violation of Article 7 of the Family Code.1
In solemnizing the marriage in the office premises of DSL Travel and Tour in
Davao City, despite the foregoing provision of the Family Code, respondent Judge
blatantly violated the spirit of the law. By agreeing to solemnize the marriage
outside of his territorial jurisdiction and at a place which had nothing to do with
the performance of his duties as a Municipal Trial Judge, he demeaned and
cheapened the inviolable social institution of marriage. Article 82 of the Family
Code contains the limiting phrase and not elsewhere, which emphasized that the
place of the solemnization of the marriage by a judge like him should only be in
his office or courtroom. The only exceptions to the limitation are when the

1
Article 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
1. Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
2. Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly authorized by his church or religious sect and
registered with the civil registrar general, acting within the limits of the written authority granted by his church or religious sect and
provided that at least one of the contracting parties belongs to the solemnizing officer's church or religious sect;
3. Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the case mentioned in Article 31;
4. Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is assigned, in the absence of the latter, during a military operation,
likewise only in the cases mentioned in Article 32;
5. Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the case provided in Article 10
2
Article 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple,
or in the office the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages
contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both of the parties request
the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn
statement to that effect.
marriage was contracted on the pont of death of one or both of the contracting
parties, or in a remote place in accordance with the code, or where both of the
parties request the solemnizing officer in writing to solemnize the marriage at
place designated by them in their sworn statement to that effect.
It is relevant to observe that his act of grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service seriously undermined the faith and
confidence of the people in the Judiciary. His act, although not criminal,
constituted grave misconduct considering that crimes involving moral turpitude
are treated as separate grounds for dismissal under the Administrative Code.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARELYN MANALO
G.R. NO. 221029 | APRIL 24, 2018
JUSTICE DIOSDADO PERALTA
EN BANC

FACTS: On January 10, 2012, Marelyn Manalo filed a petition for cancellation of
entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a
judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese court. Manalo moved to admit an
Amended Petition, for the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment,
alleged therein: she was previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese
national named Yoshino Minoro; a case for divorce was filed by herein Manalo in
Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011 was
rendered by the Japanese Court. The RTC denied, CA reversed.

ISSUE: Whether or not a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under
Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a
favorable judgment against his/her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry.

HELD: The court ruled in the affirmative. Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful
union for a cause arising after marriage, are of two types: (1) absolute divorce ,
which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce, which suspends it and
leaves the bond in full force.
In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist: Philippine law does not provide
for absolute divorce; an absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are
both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with
their respective national laws; Consistent with Articles 153 and 174 of the New
Civil Code, the marital bond between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an
absolute divorce obtained abroad; In mixed marriage involving Filipino and
foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him/her to remarry.

3
Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or the status, condition and legal capacity of the persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
4Article 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country

in which they are executed.

When the acts to referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a
foreign country, the solemnities established by the Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy
and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determination or conventions agreed
upon in a foreign country.
 Paragraph 2 of Article 265 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend
the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial
to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. It authorizes the
courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the
Philippines does not allow divorce. Under the principle of comity, our jurisdiction
recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality, but the
legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children or property
relations between spouses, must still be determined by our courts.
According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, the idea of the amendment is to avoid
the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his/her alien spouse,
although the latter is no longer married to the former because he/she had
obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his/her national law. Paragraph 2
of Article 26 speaks of a “divorce validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him/her to remarry.” Based on the clear and plain reading of the
provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The
letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who
initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not
diminish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the
foreign divorce proceeding. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word
“obtained” should be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be
actually initiated by the alien spouse, still the Court will not follow the letter of the
stature when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or
would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the
act. Law have ends to achieve, and statues should be construed as not to defeat
but to carry out such ends and purposes. The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26
is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country
where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. Whether the
Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree
dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his/her alien spouse to remarry will
have the same results: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a
husband/wife. A Filipino who initiated the divorce proceedings is in the same
place and in like circumstances as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien
initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make any
distinctions. In both instances, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual
effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to other alien
souses are severed by operation of the latter’s national law.

5
Article 26. All marriages solemnized outside of the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force of the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Article 35(1),(4),(5) and (6),36,
37 & 38.
Where the marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him/her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have the capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.
 Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle,
found under Article 15 of the Civil Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. In
fact, the mere existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that the State
may provide for an exception thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the
nationality principle must be disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination
and oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected
by law. Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same
principle applied with respect to the acts of the President, which have a force and
effect of law unless declared otherwise by the court. In this case, the court finds
that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the essential requisites of the equal
protection clause, particularly the limitation of the provision only to a foreign
divorce decree initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on
superficial, arbitrary and whimsical classification. There is no real and substantial
difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceedings and a
Filipino who obtained the divorce decree upon the instance of his/her alien
spouse. In the eye of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as
Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in an alien land. Hence to
make a distinction between them based merely on the superficial difference of
whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed. The
treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.
The foregoing, this court cannot yet write to grant Manalo’s petition to
recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court and to
cancel the entry of the marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice. The fact of divorce must
still be proved. Since the divorce was raised be Manalo, the burden of proving the
pertinent Japanese law validating it, as well as her former husband’s capacity to
remarry, fall squarely upon her. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari is
denied. The case is remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings and
reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.
REDANTE SARTO MISALUCHA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 206284 | FEBRUARY 28, 2018
JUSTICE SAMUEL MARTIRES
THIRD DIVISION

FACTS: On 2007, Redante was charged with the crime of bigamy for allegedly
contracting two marriages. The first, with Maria Socorro Negrete and the second,
without having the first one legally terminated, with complainant Fe R. Aguila. The
charge stemmed from a criminal complaint filed by Fe Aguila against Redante.
During his arraignment, Redante entered a plea of "not guilty." In the pre-trial
Redante admitted that contracted two marriages but interposed the defense that
his first marriage had been legally dissolved by divorce obtained in a foreign
country. The RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
bigamy. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether of not divorce decree was validly obtained from a foreign country
and duly proved allowing the petitioner to possess the capacity to enter into a
valid subsequent marriage, thus absolving him of the crime of bigamy.

HELD: The court ruled in the negative. For a person to be convicted of bigamy, the
following elements must concur: (1) that the offender has been legally married; (2)
that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case of an absentee
spouse, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the
provisions of the Civil Code; (3) that the offender contracts a second or
subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity. Redante admitted that he had contracted two
marriages. He, however, put forth the defense of the termination of his first
marriage as a result of the divorce obtained abroad by his alien spouse. Since the
divorce was a defense raised by Redante, it is incumbent upon him to show that it
was validly obtained in accordance with Maria Socorro's country's national law.
Stated differently, Redante has the burden of proving the termination of the first
marriage prior to the celebration of the second. Redante failed to prove his
capacity to contract a subsequent marriage
A divorce decree obtained abroad by an alien spouse is a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage. As in any other foreign judgment, a divorce
decree does not have an automatic effect in the Philippines. Consequently,
recognition by Philippine courts may be required before the effects of a divorce
decree could be extended in this jurisdiction. Recognition of the divorce decree,
however, need not be obtained in a separate petition filed solely for that purpose.
Philippine courts may recognize the foreign divorce decree when such was
invoked by a party as an integral aspect of his claim or defense. Before the divorce
decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove it as a
fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Proving the
foreign law under which the divorce was secured is mandatory considering that
Philippine courts cannot and could not be expected to take judicial notice of
foreign laws. For the purpose of establishing divorce as a fact, a copy of the
divorce decree itself must be presented and admitted in evidence. This is in
consonance with the rule that a foreign judgment may be given presumptive
evidentiary value only after it is presented and admitted in evidence.
Pursuant to these rules, the divorce decree and foreign law may be proven
through (1) an official publication or (2) or copies thereof attested to by the officer
having legal custody of said documents. If the office which has custody is in a
foreign country, the copies of said documents must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept; and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office. Applying the foregoing, the Court is
convinced that Redante failed to prove the existence of the divorce as a fact or
that it was validly obtained prior to the celebration of his subsequent marriage to
Fe. Aside from the testimonies of Redante and Maria Socorro, the only piece of
evidence presented by the defense to prove the divorce, is the certificate of
divorce allegedly issued by the registrar of the Supreme Court of British Columbia
on January 14, 2008. This certificate of divorce, however, is utterly insufficient to
rebut the charge against Redante. First, the certificate of divorce is not the divorce
decree required by the rules and jurisprudence. As discussed previously, the
divorce decree required to prove the fact of divorce is the judgment itself as
rendered by the foreign court and not a mere certification. Second, assuming the
certificate of divorce may be considered as the divorce decree, it was not
accompanied by a certification issued by the proper Philippine diplomatic or
consular officer stationed in Canada, as required under Section 24 of Rule132.
Lastly, no copy of the alleged Canadian law was presented by the defense. Thus, it
could not be reasonably determined whether the subject divorce decree was in
accord with Maria Socorro's national law. Further, since neither the divorce decree
nor the alleged Canadian law was satisfactorily demonstrated, the type of divorce
supposedly secured by Maria Socorro - whether an absolute divorce which
terminates the marriage or a limited divorce which merely suspends it - and
whether such divorce capacitated her to remarry could not also be ascertained. As
such, Redante failed to prove his defense that he had the capacity to remarry
when he contracted a subsequent marriage to Fe. The fact that Redante failed to
prove the existence of the divorce and that it was validly acquired prior to the
celebration of the second marriage still subsists.
MARIA CONCEPCION SINGSON vs. BENJAMIN SINGSON
G.R. NO. 210766 | JANUARY 8, 2018
JUSTICE MARIANO DEL CASTILLO
FIRST DIVISION

FACTS: Maria Singson filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. Petitioner alleged that after their
marriage on July 6, 1974, she noticed that respondent was dishonest,
unreasonably extravagant at the expense of the family’s welfare, extremely vain
physically and spiritually; a compulsive gambler; respondent was immature, and
was unable to perform his paternal duties; that respondent was irresponsible, an
easy-going man, and guilty of infidelity; that respondent’s abnormal behaviour
made him completely unable to render any help, support or assistance to her.
Respondent was confined at Metro Psych Facility, under attending physician Dr.
Benita Sta. Ana-Ponio, who diagnosed respondent to be suffering from
Pathological Gambling. The RTC declared the marriage void ab initio. The CA
reversed.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s psychological incapacity renders him

unable to comply with the essential marital obligations to declare the marriage
between the parties as void ab initio.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The validity of marriage and the
unity of the family and enshrined in our Constitution and statutory laws, hence
any doubts attending the same are to be resolved in favor of the continuance and
validity of the marriage and that the burden of proving the nullity of the same
rests at all times upon the partitioner.
In this case, petitioner impugns the inviolability of the social institution by
suing out pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. That psychological incapacity
as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer
to no less thana mental - not merely a physical- incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed in
Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, includes their mutual obligations to
live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative
of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. Court in a case declared that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by: gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; it further held
more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the
Family Code, known as the Molina guidelines to incorporate the basic
requirements. The Court agrees with the CA that the evidence on record does not
establish that respondent’s psychological incapacity was grave and serious as
defined by jurisprudential parameters. Petitioner failed to prove that respondent
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
because she failed to establish that such incapacity was grave and serious, and
that it existed at the time of the marriage, and that it is incurable.
Habitual drunkenness, gambling and failure to find a job, while undoubtedly
negative traits, are nowhere nearly the equivalent of psychological incapacity, in
the absent of incontrovertible proof that these manifestations of an incapacity
rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness. Petitioner did not
proffer any convincing proof that respondent’s mere confinement at the
rehabilitation center confirmed the gravity of the latter’s psychological
incapacity. Neither does her bare claim that respondent is a pathological gambler,
is irresponsible, and is unable to keep a job, necessarily translate into unassailable
proof that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
marital obligations. Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio did not make a specific finding or point to
a definite or a definitive cause of the origin of respondent’s alleged inability to
appreciate marital obligations. Hence, petition denied.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. KATRINA TOBORA-TIONGLICO
G.R. NO. 218630 | JANUARY 11, 2018
JUSTICE NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM
FIRST DIVISION

FACTS: Katrina Tobora-Tionlico filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Lawrence Tionglico. Parties got married on July 22, 2000. During the
early stages of their marriage, constant bickering and quarrels happened.
Lawrence was distant and did not help in rearing their child; spent almost every
night out for late dinner, parties and drinking sprees; was alarmingly dependent
on his mother and suffered from a very high degree of immaturity. In 2003, due to
their incessant fighting, Lawrence asked Katrina to leave his parents’ home and
never come back.
Dr. Juan Arellano, diagnosed Lawrence based on the her narrations with
Narcissistic Personality Disorder, he determined that his personality disorder is
permanent, incurable and was present but repressed at the time of the celebration
of the marriage. Lawrence’s maladaptive and irresponsible behaviors interfered
in his capacity to provide mutual love, fidelity, respect, mutual help and support to
his wife. The RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage void ab initio.
The CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether or not based on the totality of evidence presented by Katrina

supports the findings of the RTC and the CA that Lawrence is psychologically
incapacitated to perform his essential marital obligations, meriting the dissolution
of the marriage between the parties.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. It has been held that
"psychological incapacity" has been intended by law to be confined to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, it must be grave
and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in a marriage, (b) juridical antecedence, it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations
may emerge only after the marriage, and (c) incurability, it must be incurable, or
even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved. The case of Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals has set out
the guidelines that has been the core of discussion of practically all declaration of
nullity of marriage on the basis of psychological incapacity cases that The court
rules that: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity; (2) The root
cause of the psychological incapacity must be: medically or clinically identified,
alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in
the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage; (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable; (5) Such illness must be grave
enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage; (6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents
and their children; (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts; (8) The trial court must order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
Using the standards on the case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of
Appeals guidelines in the declaration of nullity of marriage on the basis of
psychological incapacity, the court finds that Katrine failed to sufficiently prove
that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated to discharge the duties expected of
a husband. The court reiterated that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they
try, must always base their judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented
by the parties but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the
proceedings. Here, the court finds the totality of evidence clearly wanting.
First, Dr. Arellano’s findings that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated
were based solely on Katrina’s statements. It bears to stress that Lawrence,
despite the notice, did not participate in the proceedings, nor was he personally
interviewed by Dr. Arellano. Where the various test conducted by Dr. Arellano can
most certainly be conclusive of the psychological disposition of Katrina, but
cannot be said to be indicative of the psychological condition of Lawrence. There
was simply no other basis for Dr. Arellano to conclude that Lawrence was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his essential marital obligations apart
from Katrina’s self-serving statements. To make conclusions and generalization
on a spouse’s psychological condition based on the information fed by only one
side, as in the case at bar, to the court’s mind, is no different from admitting
hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.
Second, the testimony of Katrina as regards to the behavior of Lawrence
hardly depicts the picture of an incapacitated husband. Their frequent fights, his
insensitivity, immaturity and frequent night-outs can hardly be said to be
psychological illness. These acts, do not rise to the level of psychological
incapacity that the law required and should be distinguished from the difficulty, if
not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations that
characterize some marriages. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to
meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be
shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness. The
psychological illness that must afflict a party at the inception of the marriage
should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive the party of his or her
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she
was then about to assume.
The court reiterated that apart from the psychiatrist, Katrina did not present
any other witnesses to substantiate her allegations on Lawrence’s psychological
incapacity. Her testimony, is considered self-serving and had no serious
evidentiary value. Petition of certiorari is hereby granted.
ABIGAEL AN ESPINA-DAN vs. MARCO DAN
G.R. NO. 209031 | APRIL 16, 2018
JUSTICE MARIANO DEL CASTILLO
FIRST DIVISON

FACTS: Petitioner Abigael An Espina-Dan and respondent Marco Dan, an Italian

national, met in a chat-room on the internet. In November 2005, Marco proposed
marriage. The following year, he flew from Italy and married the Abigael on
January 23, 2006. After the wedding, Marco returned to Italy, Abigael followed
thereafter and the couple lived together in Italy. After a few days of their
cohabitation, respondent started displaying traits, character and attitude
differently. He was immature, childish, irresponsible and dependent, wherein he
depended on his mother to do things for him; he was also addicted to video
games and drugs; respondent was extremely lazy and had a poor hygiene.
Abigael left Marco and filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with the RTC of Las Pinas. Petitioner presented Nedy Tayag, a clinical
psychologist, who subjected the former to a series of psychological tests and
testified she found no sign or symptom of major psychological incapacity of that
petitioner, while respondent is suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder
with Underlying Anti-Social Trait. Dr. Tayag was able to arrive at these findings on
respondent through the clinical assessments and information supplied by the
petitioner, and the description of petitioner’s mother. The RTC dismissed the
petition. The CA affirmed..

ISSUE: Whether or not the totality of petitioner’s evidence established the

psychological incapacity of respondent and satisfied the standards set forth by
jurisprudence.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. This court agrees with the ruling
of the lower courts. Petitioner’s evidence consist mainly of her judicial affidavit
and testimony; the judicial affidavits and testimonies of her mother and Dr. Tayag;
and Dr. Tayag’s psychological evaluation report on the psychological condition
of both petitioner and respondent. At some point in her accounts, petitioner
admitted that before and during their marriage, respondent was working and
giving money to her; that respondent was romantic, sweet, thoughtful,
responsible and caring; and that she enjoyed a harmonious relationship. This
belies her claim that petitioner was psychologically unfit for marriage. As correctly
observed by the trial and appellate courts, the couple simply drifted apart as a
result of irreconcilable difference and basic incompatibility owing to differences in
culture and upbringing, and the very short period that they spent together prior
to tying the knot. As for respondent’s addiction to video games and cannabis,
the trial and appellate courts are correct in their rulings that these are no an
incurable condition, and petitioner has not shown that she helped her husband
overcome them as part of her marital obligation to render support and aid to
respondent.
With the declared insufficiency of the testimonies of both petitioner and her
witness, the weight of proving psychological incapacity shifts to Dr. Tayag’s
expert finding. However, the determination were not based on actual test or
interviews conducted on respondent himself, but on personal account of
petitioner. This will not do as well. To make conclusions and generalization on the
respondent’s psychological condition based on the information fed by only one
side is no different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of
the content of such evidence. For petitioner’s failure to prove her case, her
petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage was correctly dismissed by the
court below.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARTIN NIKOLAI JAVIER
G.R. NO. 210518 | APRIL 18, 2018
JUSTICE ANDRES REYES JR.
SECOND DIVISION

FACTS: Martin Javier and Michelle Javier were married on February 8, 2002. On
November 20, 2008, Martin filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
and Joint Custody of their common minor child under Article 36 of the Civil Code.
Martin alleged that both he and Michelle were psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. In order to support the
allegations in his petition, Martin testified on his own behalf and presented the
psychological findings of Dr. Elias Adamos. Dr. Adamos diagnosed Martin with
Narcissistic Personality Disorder. He was unable to evaluate Michelle personally.
The RTC dismissed the petition. The CA reversed.

ISSUE: Whether or not psychological incapacity of both parties incapacitated

them to perform the essential obligation of marriage to render their marriage void
ab initio.

HELD: The Supreme Court finds the petition partially unmetitorious. The totality
of evidence supports the finding that Martin is psychologically incapacitated to
perform the essential obligation of marriage. The psychological incapacity of a
spouse must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c)
incurability. Martin as petitioner in this case, submitted several pieces of evidence
to support his petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, he testified as to his
own psychological incapacity and that of his spouse, Michelle. The psychological
findings of Dr. Adamos were also presented, according to him, Michelle suffered
from Narcissistic Personality Disorder as a result of a child-hood trauma and
defective child-rearing practices, the basis of this was the information provided by
Martin and Jose Vicente. While it is true that Michelle was not personally
examined, the Trial Court was incorrect in ruling that Dr. Adamos’ findings were
based solely on the interview with Martin. Even if that were the case, the findings
of the psychologist are not immediately invalidated for this reason alone. Court in
its decision in the case of Marcos vs. Marcos clarified that for the purposes of
establishing the psychological incapacity of a spouse, it is not required that a
physician conduct an actual medical examination of the persons concerned. It is
enough that the totality of the evidence is strong enough to sustain the finding of
psychological incapacity. While the court has consistently followed the parameters
in Republic vs. Molina, these guidelines are not meant to straight-jacket all
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage.
This notwithstanding, the Court disagrees with the CA’s findings that
Michelle was psychologically incapacitated. There were no other independent
evidence establishing the root cause or juridical antecedence of Michelle’s
alleged psychological incapacity. Without credible source of her supposed
childhood trauma, Dr. Adamos was not equipped with enough information from
which he may reasonably conclude that Michelle is suffering from a chronic and
persistent disorder that is grave and incurrable.
It does not escape the court’s attention that Martin was also subjected to
several psychological test, as a result of which, Dr. Adamos diagnosed him with
Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Diagnosis was based on Dr, Adamos’ personal
interviews, he explained that Martin lacked empathy, leading him to disregard and
ignore the feelings of Michelle; he concluded that the disorder was rooted in the
traumatic experiences he experience during childhood, having grown up around a
violent father who was abusive of his mother. This affected Martin adversely in
such a manner that he formed unrealistic values and standards on his own
marriage, and proposed unconventional sexual practices, when Michelle disagrees,
Martin would not only quarrel with her, but would also inflict harm on her . Other
manifestations include excessive love for himself, self-entitlement, immaturity, and
self-centeredness. These circumstances, taken together, prove the three essential
characteristics of psychological incapacity on the part of Martin. The petition for
review on certiorari is partially granted insofar as the psychological incapacity of
respondent Michelle Javier is concerned. Marriage is declared null and void ab
initio due to the psychological incapacity of respondent Martin Javier, pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GINA P. TECAG
G.R. No. 229272 | NOVEMBER 19, 2018
JUSTICE PERLAS-BERNABE
SECOND DIVISION

FACTS: Gina filed a petition to declare her marriage with Marjune null and void on
the basis of the latter's psychological incapacity. During trial, Gina presented the
findings of Professor Emma Sanchez , the psychologist who conducted a
psychological examination of the parties. In her Case Analysis Report she stated
that Gina was suffering from "Anxious and Fearful Personality Disorder" where
traces of "Dependent Personality Disorder" rendering her psychologically
incapacitated as a spouse to Marjune, with respect to Marjune, Prof. Sanchez
found that his behavior was suggestive of an "Avoidant Personality Disorder,"
even though she was unable to interview him. RTC found that Gina and Marjune
were both psychologically incapacitated to perform their marital obligations and
declared their marriage null and void ab initio. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid dissolution of the marriage between the
parties on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD: The court ruled against the decision of the lower court. Under Article 36 of
the Family Code, as amended, psychological incapacity is a valid ground to nullify
a marriage. Based on jurisprudence, psychological incapacity has a specific and
peculiar denotation. It ought to pertain to only the most serious cases of
personality disorders that clearly demonstrate the party's/parties' utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It should
refer to no less than a mental- not merely physical­ incapacity that causes a party
to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage, which, as provided under
the Family Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity, and render help and support. In a long line of
cases, the Court emphasized that "psychological incapacity must be characterized
by: gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability.
In this case, the courts a quo resolved to grant the petition for nullity of
marriage on the basis of the evidence presented showing that both Gina and
Marjune are psychologically incapacitated to fulfill their respective marital
obligations. As it may be readily observed, the courts' conclusion was mainly
grounded on the expert opinion of Prof. Sanchez whose findings are embodied in
a Case Analysis Report. This report, which was borne out of Prof. Sanchez's
interviews with Gina, the latter's sister, and brother-in-law, concludes that Gina is
suffering from Anxious and Fearful Personality Disorder with traces of Dependent
Personality Disorder. As petitioner aptly pointed out, the said report failed to show
that these traits existed prior to Gina's marriage and that her alleged personality
disorder is incurable or that the cure is beyond her means. There was simply no
discernible explanation on the juridical antecedence or incurability of Gina's
supposed condition. More significantly, the relation of such condition to Gina's
inability to perform her essential marital obligations was not sufficiently shown. To
reiterate, the psychological condition ought to pertain to personality disorders
that are grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out
the ordinary duties required in a marriage. Unfortunately, the Case Analysis Report
fails to demonstrate this crucial point. In determining the existence of
psychological incapacity, a clear and understandable causation between the
party's condition and the party's inability to perform the essential marital
covenants must be shown. A psychological report that is essentially comprised of
mere platitudes, however speckled with technical jargon, would not cut the
marriage tie.
In this case, there is no other evidence offered apart from Prof. Sanchez's
report to substantiate Gina's allegation of psychological incapacity. The said
report leaves much to be desired since it does not adequately demonstrate the
gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability of Gina's purported personality
disorder. To recount, Prof. Sanchez arrived at her diagnosis without having
examined or, at the very least, spoken to Marjune, even once; all the information
that she utilized in reaching her conclusions were merely supplied by Gina, whose
bias against him is reasonably apparent. Thus, although there is no requirement
that a party to be declared psychologically incapacitated should be personally
examined by a physician or a psychologist, there is nevertheless still a need to
prove the psychological incapacity through independent evidence adduced by the
person alleging said disorder, which Gina simply failed to do.
The assessment of Marjune's supposed psychological incapacity mainly
centers on his alleged irresponsible and philandering ways that were attendant
only during the marriage. This Court has already settled that sexual infidelity, by
itself, is not sufficient proof that one is suffering from psychological incapacity. It
must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered
personality which makes him/her completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of marriage. The foregoing findings are quite telling as they actually
depict the true situation between the parties - that they had simply and
consciously chosen to give up on their marriage and go their separate ways. Gina
herself admitted that she wanted to preserve their marriage, but because she
distrusted Marjune owing to his alleged illicit affairs, she has simply become
unwilling to work out a solution to keep their marriage and, as a result, has
refused to comply with her essential marital obligations. As has oft been reiterated
in jurisprudence, psychological incapacity is more than just a "difficulty," "refusal,"
or "neglect" in the performance of marital obligations. Instead, it is a serious,
deep-rooted, and incurable psychological condition that renders the party
incapable of complying with - as they are basically incognitive - of these marital
obligations. Truth be told, the peculiar nature of this incapability does not equate
to mere difficulty, refusal or neglect to perform. Hence, the petition is granted.
The decision of the lower court is reversed and set aside.
ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 230751 | APRIL 25, 2018
JUDGE PRESBITERO VELASCO, JR
THIRD DIVISION

FACTS: Wilfredo Matias is a member of the Philippines Constabulary and was

assigned in Arayat Pampanga since August 24, 1967. During his service, he never
came back from his tour of duty in Arayat, Pampanga since 1979 nor made
contact or communicated with the petitioner or any of his relatives. Failure of her
husband to return after a considerable amount of time, Estrellita Matias filed
before the RTC of Tarlac for a declaration of presumptive death of her husband,
Wilfredo Matias to claim for death benefits under the law. RTC declared Wilfredo
Matias absent or presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code. CA
granted the petition of the Republic. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the declaration of presumptive death of Wilfredo Matias is

anchored on Article 41 of the Family Code.

HELD: The court denied the appeal. The petition for the declaration of
presumptive death filed by the petitioner is not an authorized suit and should
have been dismissed by the RTC. The RTC erred in declaring the presumptive
death of Wilfredo Matias under Article 416 of the Family Code. The petition for
the declaration of presumptive death filed by the petitioner is not an action that
would have warranted the application of Article 41 because the petitioner was not
seeking to remarry, a reading of the article shows that the presumption of death
established therein is only applicable for the purpose of contracting a valid
subsequent marriage.
Given that her petition for the declaration of presumptive death was not filed
for the purpose of remarriage, petitioner was clearly relying on the presumption
of death under the Civil Code as the basis of her petition. since the petition filed
by the petitioner merely seeks the declaration of presumptive death of Wilfredo
under the Civil Code, the RTC should have dismissed the petition outright,
because in our jurisdiction, a petition whose sole objective is to have a person
declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code is not regarded as a valid suit
and no court has any authority to take cognizance of the dame. A rule creating a
presumption of death is merely one of the evidence that - while may be invoked
in any action of proceeding - cannot be the lone subject of an independent action
or proceeding.

6
Article 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and voice, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse has been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse
present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. in case of disappearance where there is a danger of
death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of two years shall be sufficient.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LUDYSON CATUBAG
G.R. NO. 210580 | APRIL 18, 2018
JUSTICE ANDRES REYES, JR.
SECOND DIVISION

FACTS: Ludyson Catubag and Shanaviv Catubag married on June 26, 2003. While
respondent was working abroad, he was informed by his relatives that his wife left
heir house and never returned, he took an emergency vacation and flew back to
the Philippines. He looked for his wife in Cagayan; inquired about Shanaviv’s
whereabouts from close friends and relatives; he traveled to Bicol, where Shanaviv
was born and raised; sought the help of Bombo Radio Philippines; he searched
various hospitals and funeral parlors in Tuguegarao and Bicol, with no avail. After
almost seven (7) yeas of waiting, respondent filed with the RTC a petition to have
his wife declared presumptively dead. The RTC ganted the petition. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent has complied with the essential requisites of a
petition of declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code.

HELD: The court ruled in the negative. The four requisites under Article 41 of the
Family code that must be complied with for the declaration of presumptive death
to prosper: (1) the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or
two consecutive years of the disappearance occurred where there is a danger of
death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code; (2) the
present spouse wishers to remarry; (3) the present spouse has a well founded
belief that the absentee is dead; and (4) the present spouse filed for a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.
In seeking a declaration of presumptive death, it is the present spouse who
has the burden of proving that all the requisites under Article 41 of the Family
Code are present. In the instant case, since it is private respondent who asserts the
affirmative of the issue, then it is his duty to substantiate the same. The records
reveal that private respondent has complied with the first, second and fourth
requisites. Thus, what remains to be resolved is whether or not private respondent
successfully discharged the burden of establish a well-founded belief that his wife,
Shanaviv is dead. Well-founded belief has no exact definition under the law, the
court notes that such belief depends on the circumstances of each particular case.
As such, each petition must be judged on a case-to-case basis.
In the case at bar, private respondent first took a leave of absence from his
work in the United Arab Emirate and returned to the Philippines to search for
Shanaviv. He then proceeded to inquire about his wife’s whereabouts from their
friends and relatives in Cagayan and Bicol. Next, private respondent aired over
Bombo Radio Philippines, a known radio station, regarding the fact of
disappearance of his wife. Finally, he claims to have visited various hospitals and
funeral parlors in Tuguegarao City and nearby municipalities. Applying the
foregoing standards, the court finds that private respondent’s efforts fall short of
the degree of diligence required by jurisprudence for the following reasons: First,
private respondent claims to have inquired about his missing wife’s
whereabouts from both friends and relatives. However, respondent failed to
present any of these alleged friends or relative to corroborate these inquiries,
moreover no explanation for such omission was given. Second, private
respondent did not seek the help of other concerned government agencies,
namely, the local police authorities and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Absent such efforts to employ the help of local authorities, the present spouse
cannot be said to have actively and diligently searched for the absentee spouse.
Lastly, aside from the certification from Bombo Radio’s manager, private
respondent bases his “well-founded belief” on bare assertions that he exercised
earnest efforts in looking for his wife. Again, the present spouse’s bare
assertions, uncorroborated by any kind of evidence, falls short on the diligence
required to engender a well-founded belief that the absentee spouse is dead.
Private respondent could have easily convinced the Court otherwise by
providing evidence which corroborated his "earnest-efforts." Yet, no explanation
or justification was given for these glaring omissions. Again, he who alleges a fact
has the burden of proving it by some other means than mere allegations. Stripped
of private respondent's mere allegations, only the act of broadcasting his wife's
alleged disappearance through a known radio station was corroborated. This act
comes nowhere close to establishing a wellfounded belief that Shanaviv has
already passed away. At most, it just reaffirms the unfortunate theory that she
abandoned the family.
To accept private respondent's bare allegations would be to apply a liberal
approach in complying with the requisite of establishing a wellfounded belief that
the missing spouse is dead. It opined that to do so would allow easy
circumvention and undermining of the Family Code. spouses may easily
circumvent the policy of the laws on marriage by simply agreeing that one of
them leave the conjugal abode and never return again. A lenient approach in
applying the standards of diligence required in establishing a "well-founded
belief' would defeat the State's policy in protecting and strengthening the
institution of marriage. Taken together, the court is of the view that private
respondent’s efforts in searching for his missing wife, are merely passive. On this
basis, it is clear that private respondent failed to fulfill the requisites of
establishing a well-founded belief that the absentee spouse is dead.
JACINTO BAGAPORO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 211829 | JANUARY 30, 2019
JUSTICE ANDRES REYES JR.
SECOND DIVISION

FACTS: Jacinto Bagaporo was indicted for bigamy, being then legally married to
Dennia Dumlao in a marriage ceremony solemnized on March 10, 1986, without
said marriage having been legally dissolved or annulled, petitioner contracted a
second and subsequent marriage with Milagros Lumas.RTC found petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy.

ISSUE: Whether or not the action of contracting a subsequent marriage by the

petitioner without securing a judicial declaration of presumptive death of spouse
form the prior marriage constitutes bigamy.

HELD: The court ruled in the affirmative. There can be no quibbling over whether
or not the elements of bigamy were successfully proven by the prosecution.
Petitioner does not deny that he contracted a second marriage without a judicial
declaration that his absent spouse from a prior marriage may be legally presumed
dead. The gist of petitioner's claim is alleged good faith and that there is no need
for a judicial declaration of a disputable presumption of death of the absent
spouse that has already been provided by law.
According to petitioner, it was the prosecution's burden to prove that his
absent wife was still alive when he contracted his second marriage. It is argued
that there is no substantial distinction between such a situation and that of a
present spouse who contracts a subsequent marriage with the knowledge that the
absent spouse is already dead. The requirement for a judgment of the
presumptive death of the absent spouse is for the benefit of the spouse present,
as protection from the pains and the consequences of a second marriage,
precisely because he/she could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the
defense of good faith based on mere testimony is found incredible.
The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State.
Under Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, "the State shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution." Marriage is a
social institution of the highest importance. Public policy, good morals and the
interest of society require that the marital relation should be surrounded with
every safeguard and its severance only in the manner prescribed and the causes
specified by law. The laws regulating civil marriages are necessary to serve the
interest, safety, good order, comfort or general welfare of the community and the
parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings. A civil
marriage anchors an ordered society by encouraging stable relationships over
transient ones; it enhances the welfare of the community.
 In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing
spouses and an approving State. On marriage, the parties assume new relations to
each other and the State touching nearly on every aspect of life and death. The
consequences of an invalid marriage to the parties, to innocent parties and to
society, are so serious that the law may well take means calculated to ensure the
procurement of the most positive evidence of death of the first spouse or of the
presumptive death of the absent spouse after the lapse of the period provided for
under the law. One such means is the requirement of the declaration by a
competent court of the presumptive death of an absent spouse as proof that the
present spouse contracts a subsequent marriage on a well-grounded belief of the
death of the first spouse. To sustain a second marriage and to vacate a first
because one of the parties believed the other to be dead would make the
existence of the marital relation determinable, not by certain extrinsic facts, easily
capable of forensic ascertainment and proof, but by the subjective condition of
individuals. Only with such proof can marriage be treated as so dissolved as to
permit second marriages. Thus, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code has made
the dissolution of marriage dependent not only upon the personal belief of
parties, but upon certain objective facts easily capable of accurate judicial
cognizance, namely, a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse.
The assailed Resolutions of the CA must be upheld. Hence, the petition is denied
for lack of merit.
FELICITAS SALAZAR vs. REMEDIOS FELIAS
G.R. NO. 213971 | FEBRUARY 5, 2018
JUSTICE ANDRES REYES, JR.
SECOND DIVISION

FACTS: On February 28, 1990, respondent Remedios Felias, representing the heirs
of Catalino Nivera filed a complaint for Recovery of Ownership, Possession and
Damages against the spouses Romualdo Lastimosa and Felisa Lastimosa. During
the trial, Romualdo Lastimosa died and a Motion for Substitution was filed by
Felisa Lastimosa and their children.
The RTC rendered a decision declaring the Heirs of Nivera as the absolute
owners of the parcels of land. Meanwhile, Felicitas Salazar, daughter of Romualdo
Lastimosa, along with her siblings filed a Petition for the Annulment of Judgment
with the CA, they sought the nullification of the RTC decision and the
corresponding Writs of Execution and Demolition. The CA affirmed the decision of
the RTC and denied the petition. Felicitas filed the instant petition for review
seeking the reversal of the assailed CA decision and resolution, contending that
the execution of judgment cannot continue as it is being enforced against a
property that is exempt from execution, as what is sought to be demolished is her
family home.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property is considered a family home under the
Family Code allowing its exemption against the writ of execution.

HELD: The court ruled in the negative. There is no dispute that the ruling of the
RTC had become final and executory, pursuant thereto, the lower court issued a
Writ of Execution and Demolition. This notwithstanding, petitioner seeks to
prevent the execution by arguing that the property sought to be executed is
exempt from execution. This court is not persuaded.
Indeed, the family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free
from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is
situated. It confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties. It
cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases. However, the claim
that the property is exempt from execution for being the movant’s family home
is not a magic wand that will freeze the court’s hand and forestall the execution
of a final and executory ruling. It must be noted that it is not sufficient for the
claimant to merely allege that such property is a family home. Whether the claim
is premised under the Old Civil Code of the Family Code, the claim for exemption
must be set up and proved. In addition, residence in the family home must be
actual. The law explicitly mandates that the occupancy of the family home,
wither by the owner thereof, or by any of its beneficiaries must be actual. This
occupancy must be real, and actually existing, as opposed to something merely
possible or that which is merely presumptive or constructive. Petitioner cannot
conveniently claim that the subject property is her family home, sans sufficient
evidence proving her allegations.
It bears emphasis that it is imperative that petitioner’s claim must be backed
with evidence showing that the home was indeed: (1) duly constituted as a family
home; (2) constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried
head of a family; (3) resided by the family or any of the family home’s
beneficiaries; (4) forms part of the properties of the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership of gains, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with
the latter’s consent, or property of the unmarried head of the family; and (5) has
an actual value of Php 300,000 in urban areas, and Php 200,000 in rural areas. A
perusal of the petition, however, shows that aside from her bare allegations,
petitioner adduced no proof to substantiate her claim that the property sought to
be executed is indeed her family home.
The court takes judicial notice of the final ruling of the RTC in the case of
recovery of ownership, that the subject property has belonged to the Heirs of
Nivera since 1950s. This automatically negates petitioner’s claim that the
property is her family home. Undoubtedly, petitioner;s argument that the property
subject of the writ of execution is a family home, is an unsubstantiated allegation
that cannot defeat the binding nature of a final and executory judgment. Thus, the
Writ of Execution and Demolition issued by the RTC must be given effect. Hence,
petition denied for lack of merit.
SPOUSES CARLOS vs. JUAN CRUZ TOLENTINO
G.R. NO. 234533 | JUNE 27, 2018
JUSTICE PRESBITERO VELASCO, JR.
THIRD DIVISION

FACTS: Mercedes, wife of herein respondent without his knowledge, with their
grandson, Kristoff, allegedly forged a Deed of Donation, making it appear that the
spouses donated the subject property their grandson. Kristoff offered the sale of
the subject property to petitioners. Respondent filed a case for complaint for
annulment of title against petitioners. RTC dismissed the complaint. CA ruled that
petitioner has a better right over the subject property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Donation was valid.

HELD: The Court partially agrees. Spouses Tolentino appeared to have been
married before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1998. There being
no indication that they have adopted a different property regime, the
presumption is that their property relations is governed by the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains under Article 1197 of the Civil Code. Since the subject
property was acquired during the marriage of Juan and Mercedes, it formed part
of their conjugal partnership. It follows then that Juan and Mercedes are the
absolute owners of their undivided one-half interest, respectively, over the subject
property.
Likewise, the Family Code contains terms governing conjugal partnership of
gains that supersede the terms of the conjugal partnership of gains under the Civil
Code. The provision on Article 1058 of the Family Code shall also apply to
conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the
effectivity the Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256.
In respondent Juan's Comment filed before the Court, stated that he is already
a widower. Hence, the Court takes due notice of the fact of Mercedes' death which
inevitably results in the dissolution of the conjugal partnership. As absolute
owners of the subject property, Juan and Mercedes may validly exercise rights of
ownership by executing deeds which transfer title, in this case, the Deed of
Donation in favor of their grandson, Kristoff. In the present case, while it has been
settled that the congruence of the wills of the spouses is essential for the valid

7
Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon
complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the
system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in established in this Code, shall govern the property
relations between husband and wife.

8Art.105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that the regime of conjugal partnership of gains shall
govern their property relations during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be of supplementary application.
disposition of conjugal property, it cannot be ignored that Mercedes' consent to
the disposition of her one-half interest in the subject property remained
undisputed. Mercedes, during her lifetime, relinquished all her rights thereon in
favor of her grandson, Kristoff.
The court deemed it proper to uphold the validity of the Deed of Donation
but only to the extent of Mercedes' 1/2 share in the subject property. Accordingly,
the right of Kristoff, as donee, is limited only to the 1/2 undivided portion that
Mercedes owned. The Deed of Donation insofar as it covered the remaining
one-half undivided portion of the subject property is null and void, Juan not
having consented to the donation of his undivided half. Upon the foregoing
perspective, Spouses Carlos' right, as vendees in the subsequent sale of the
subject property, is confined only to the one-half undivided portion thereof. The
other undivided half still belongs to Juan. As owners pro indiviso of a portion of
the lot in question, either Spouses Carlos or Juan may ask for the partition of the
lot and their property rights shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted
to them in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
MARGIE SANTOS MITRA vs. PERPETUA L. SABLANGUEV ARRA
G.R. NO. 213994 | APRIL 18, 2018
JUSTICE ANDRES REYES, JR.
SECOND DIVISION

FACTS: The probate of the notarial will of Remedios Legaspi, filed by the
petitioner was questioned by herein respondents, opposing the petition claiming
to be the deceased’s legal heirs. They aver that the will was not executed in
accordance with the formalities required by law; that since the last page of the will,
which contained the Acknowledgment, was not signed by Remedios and her
instrumental witnesses; that the attestation clause failed to state the number of
pages upon which the will was written; and that the will was executed under
undue and improper pressure, thus, Legaspi could not have intended the
document to be her last will and testament. RTC admitted the will for probate. CA
reversed the decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a substantial compliance on the formalities of a

will to render it valid under Article 8059 of the Civil Code.

HELD: The court ruled in the affirmative. There is no doubt that the requirement
under the Article 805 of the Civil Code, which calls for the signature of the testator
and of the instrumental witnesses on each and every page of the will on the left
margin, except the last, was complied with. Readily gleaned that the instrumental
witnesses signed on each and every page of the will, except the last page. Such
being the case, the CA erred in concluding otherwise. When Article 805 of the Civil
Code requires the testator to subscribe at the end of the will, it necessarily refers
to the logical end thereof, which is where the last testamentary disposition ends.
As the probate court correctly appreciated, the last page of the will does not
contain any testamentary disposition; it is but a mere continuation of the
Acknowledgment. What is imperative for the allowance of a will despite the
existence of omissions is that such omissions must be supplied by an examination
of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence. "However,
those omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would
result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will
9
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's
name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as
aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in
letters placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the
will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the
instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator
and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it
shall be interpreted to them.
itself.”
In sum, Legaspi's last will and testament has substantially complied with all
the formalities required of a notarial will. With regard to the omission of the
number of pages in the attestation clause, this was supplied by the
Acknowledgment portion of the will itself without the need to resort to extrinsic
evidence. Contrary to the CA conclusion, such omission does not in any way serve
as hindrance to probate.
ARCELI MAYUGA vs. ANTONIO ATIENZA
G.R. NO. 208197 | JANUARY 10, 2018
JUSTICE ALFREDO BENJAMIN CAGUIOA
SECOND DIVISION

FACTS: Arceli Mayuga, as one the surviving legitimate heirs of the late Perfecto
Atienza, instituted a petition for cancellation of free patent and reconveyance
against Antonio Atienza. She alleged that through manipulation and
misrepresentation with intent to defraud, the latter was able to secure free patent
in the properties left by the decedent. The court ruled that the application for free
patent was through the Confirmatory affidavit of Distribution of Real Estate
executed by their father, Perfecto Atienza during his lifetime.

ISSUE: Whether or not partition made by the decedent Perfecto Atienza valid,
thus entitling the application for the free patent over the subject properties.

HELD: The court ruled in the affirmative. As correctly observed by the CA

petitioner failed to prove that she was entitled to the lots in dispute by succession.
Apparently, Araceli had taken the position that being one of the surviving
compulsory heirs of their late father, Perfecto, she was entitled to the disputed lots
on the assumption that the decedent left only three legal heirs and that the
disputed lots were part of the inheritance left by their father when he died in 1978.
Araceli, however, overlooked the fact that Perfecto executed the Confirmation
Affidavit dated June 22, 1973 almost five years prior to his death on June 1, 1978.
The Confirmation Affidavit the legal presumption of validity, being a duly
notarized document, where its validity could not be impugned by mere
self-serving allegations.
Assuming that Perfecto owned the disputed lots and the Confirmation
Affidavit was a deed of partition, Perfecto could have legally partitioned his estate
during his lifetime under Article 108010 of the Civil Code. Unlike in the old Civil
Code, partition inter vivos is expressly allowed in the present Civil Code. Any act
inter vivos which will designate under this theory a partition of the property will be
valid disposition even though it is not a will. The disposition of property must be
made in the manner allowed by law, namely, by will. After the designation in the
will, then comes the second part, the division in conformity with that disposition
and the testator may make this division in the same will or another will or by an
act inter vivos. Since the Civil Code allows partition inter vivos, it is incumbent
upon the compulsory heir questioning its validity to show that his legitime is
impaired. Unfortunately, Araceli has not shown to what extent the Confirmation
Affidavit prejudiced her legitime. Hence the petition is denied.

10
Art. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar
as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.
HEIRS OF ERNESTO MORALES vs. ASTRID MORALES AGUSTIN
G.R. NO. 224849 | JUNE 6, 2018
JUSTICE ANDRES REYES, JR.
SECOND DIVISION

FACTS: The respondent initiated an instant complaint for the partition of Jayme
Morales’ properties. Respondent herein asserts her right as a co-owner of the
subject property by virtue of her successional rights. Petitioners asserts that an
administration proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
condition precedent before any partition or distribution thereof could be effected.
The RTC rendered its decision via a summary judgment in favor of herein
respondent. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of the deceased who died intestate may be
partitioned without the need of any settlement or administration proceeding.

HELD: Generally, an action for partition may be seen to simultaneously present

two issues: (1) whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to
be partitioned; and (2) how the property is to be divided between the plaintiff and
defendants. The Court does not agree with this assertion by the petitioners,
nonetheless, it agrees that the trial court should have collated Jayme Morales’
other properties, if any, prior to the promulgation of any judgment of partition in
accordance with the laws on Succession.
To begin with, the laws governing the partition of inheritance draws basis
from Article 77711 of the Civil Code. As such, from that moment, the heirs,
legatees, and devisees' successional rights are vested, and they are considered to
own in common the inheritance left by the decedent. Under the law, partition of
the inheritance may only be effected by (1) the heirs themselves extrajudicially, (2)
by the court in an ordinary action for partition, or in the course of administration
proceedings, (3) by the testator himself, and (4) by the third person designated by
the testator. A reading of the enumeration set above would reveal instances when
the appointment of an executor or administrator is dispensed with. One is through
the execution of a public instrument by the heirs in an extrajudicial settlement of
the estate. Another, which is the focal point of this case, is through the ordinary
action of partition.
According to Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the heirs may resort to an ordinary
action of partition of the estate of the deceased if they disagree as to the exact
division of the estate, and only "if the decedent left no will and no debts and the
heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal
representatives duly authorized for the purpose." The ordinary action for partition

11
Art. 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.
therefore is meant to take the place of the special proceeding on the settlement
of the estate.
Particularly, according to Article 1078 of the Civil Code, where there are two or
more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is owned in common by such heirs,
subject to the payment of debts of the deceased. Partition, the Civil Code adds, is
the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those
to whom it may belong. Thus, every act which is intended to put an end to
indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition,
although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other
transaction. In addition, and on account of this partition, Article 106112 of the Civil
Code requires the parties to collate the properties of the decedent which they
may have received by way of gratuitous title prior to the former' s death. Once
legally partitioned, each heir is conferred with the exclusive ownership of the
property, which was adjudicated to him/her.
In the case at hand, the parties are the heirs of the late Jayme Morales. The
land being sought to be divided was a property duly registered under Jayme's
name. Necessarily, therefore, the partition invoked by the respondents is the
partition of the estate of the deceased Jayme. As such, when the petitioners
alleged in their answer that there is yet another property that needs to be
partitioned among the parties, they were actually invoking the Civil Code
provisions, not on Co-ownership, but on Succession, which necessarily includes
Article 1061 of the Civil Code-the provision on collation. It is therefore proper for
the trial court to have delved into this issue presented by the petitioner instead of
disregarding the same and limiting itself only to that singular property submitted
by the respondent for partition. Nonetheless, lest it be misunderstood, the law
does not prohibit partial partition. In fact, the Court, in administration proceedings,
have allowed partition for special instances. But the Court should caution that this
power should be exercised sparingly. This is because a partial partition and
distribution of the estate does not put to rest the question of the division of the
entire estate.
In this case, the Court is of the opinion that there is no cogent reason to
render the partition of one of Jayme's properties and totally ignore the others, if
any. Absent any circumstance that would warrant the partial partition and
distribution of Jayme's estate, the pn1dent remedy is to settle the entirety of the
estate in the partition proceedings in the court a quo. In the end, only a full-blown
trial on the merits of each of the parties' claims-and not a mere summary
judgment-could write finis on this family drama. The case is ordered remanded to
the RTC.

12Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property
or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous
title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir on the account of partition.
HEIRS OF ALFONSO YUSINGCO vs. AMELITA BUSILAK AND ET. AL.
G.R. NO. 210504 | JANUARY 24, 2018
JUDGE DIOSDADO PERALTA
SECOND DIVISION

FACTS: Petitioners filed five separate complaints for accion publiciana and/or
recovery of possession against herein respondents and a certain Reynaldo Peralta.
Petitioners uniformly alleged they are owners of three (3) parcels of land, which
are all located at Barangay Taft, Surigao City and they inherited the lots from their
predecessor-in-interest, Alfonso Yusingco. MTCC issued a judgment in favor of
petitioners. RTC affirmed. CA reversed, and granted the petition of herein
respondents.

ISSUE: Whether or not the final and executory decisions rendered in a previous
accion reivindicatoria, finding petitioners to be the lawful owners of the subject
properties, are binding upon respondents.

HELD: The Court ruled in the affirmative. The Court finds it proper to look into the
nature of the actions filed by petitioners against respondents. A perusal of the
complaints filed by petitioners shows that the actions were captioned as "Accion
Publiciana and/or Recovery of Possession." However, the Court agrees with the
ruling of the lower courts that the complaints filed were actually Accion
Reivindicatoria. In a number of cases, this Court had occasion to discuss the three
kinds of actions available to recover possession of real property, to wit: (a) accion
interdictal; (b) accion publiciana; and (a) accion reivindicatoria.
Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible
entry and unlawful detainer. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical
possession of real property by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or
stealth; whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds possession after the
expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract,
express or implied. The two are distinguished from each other in that in forcible
entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the
issue is which party has prior de facto possession while in unlawful detainer,
possession of the defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the
expiration or termination of the right to possess. The jurisdiction of these two
actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper municipal trial court or
metropolitan trial court. Both actions must be brought within one year from the
date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last
demand, in case of unlawful detainer. The issue in said cases is the right to
physical possession.
Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession
which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has
lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the
better right of possession of realty independently of title. In other words, if at the
time of the filing of the complaint more than one year had elapsed since
defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant's possession had
become illegal, the action will be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer,
but an accion publiciana. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an action to
recover ownership also brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary
civil proceeding.
Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion is, thus, an action whereby
the plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full
possession. It is a suit to recover possession of a parcel of land as an element of
ownership. The judgment in such a case determines the ownership of the property
and awards the possession of the property to the lawful owner. It is different from
accion interdictal or accion publiciana where plaintiff merely alleges proof of a
better right to possess without claim of title.
On the basis of the above discussions, it is clear that the lower courts did not
err in ruling that the suits filed by petitioners are accion reivindicatoria, not accion
publiciana, as petitioners seek to recover possession of the subject lots on the
basis of their ownership thereof. There is no dispute that the lower court’s
decision in the present case bases in holding that herein petitioners are owners of
the subject properties and are, thus, entitled to legal possession thereof, are
judgments on a previous case for accion reivindicatoria, which was filed by
petitioners against persons other than herein respondents. It is settled that a
judgment directing a party to deliver possession of a property to another is in
personam. It is conclusive, not against the whole world, but only "between the
parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement
of the action." An action to recover a parcel of land is a real action but it is an
action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns
the right to a tangible thing. Any judgment therein is binding only upon the
parties properly impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard.
However, this rule admits of the exception that even a non-party may be bound
by the judgment in an ejectment suit where he is any of the following: (a)
trespasser, squatter or agent of the defendant fraudulently occupying the
property to frustrate the judgment; (b) guest or occupant of the premises with the
permission of the defendant; ( c) transferee pendente lite; ( d) sublessee; ( e)
co-lessee; or (f) member of the family, relative or privy of the defendant.
In the instant case, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the
findings and conclusions of the MTCC, as affirmed by the RTC, that respondents
are mere intruders or trespassers who do not have a right to possess the subject
lots. The Court adopts the discussion of the MTCC on the matter, to wit: On the
other hand, the evidence for the defendants showed that they are mere intruders
on the lots in question. They are occupying their respective portions simply as
places to stay with intention of acquiring the said properties in the event that they
are public lands and not owned by any private person. On the basis of the
foregoing, the CA erred in ruling on the suit for accion reivindicatoria filed by
petitioners against persons other than herein respondents are not binding upon
the latter. Respondents, being trespassers on the subject lots are bound by the
said judgments, which find petitioners to be entitled to the possession of the
subject lots as owners thereof.
LEVISTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, INC. vs. LEGASPI TOWERS 200, INC. AND
VIVIAN LOCSIN AND PITONG MARCORDE
G.R. NO. 199353 | APRIL 4, 2018
JUSTICE LEONARDO DE CASTRO
FIRST DIVISION

LEGASPI TOWERS INC., vs. ENG, NELSON IRASGA

G.R. NO. 199389 | APRIL 4, 2018
JUSTICE LEONARDO DE CASTRO
FIRST DIVISION

The Civil Code provisions on builders in good faith presupposes that the owner of
the land and the builder are two distinct persons who are not bound either by
specific legislation on the subject property or by contract. Properties recorded on
accordance with Section 4 of Republic Act No. 4726 (otherwise known as the
Condominium Act) are governed by said Act; while the Master Deed and the By
Laws of the condominium corporation establish the contractual relations between
said condominium corporation and the unit owners.

FACTS: A part of Legaspi Towers is owned by LEMANS (Leviste Management

System, Inc.), it decided to build Concession 4 on the roof deck of the Concession
3, hence construction commenced on October 1990. Despite Legaspi
Corporation”s notice that the construction was illegal, LEMANS refused to stop.
Engr. Irasga, denied the request of cancellation by Legaspi Corporation, stating
that LEMANS complied with the requirements for a building permit and that it was
signed by the president of Legaspi Corporation.

ISSUE: Whether or not LEMANS owns the air space above its condominium unit,
and if in the affirmative, whether it can be considered as a builder in good faith in
the exercise of its rights upon its construction of Concession 4.

HELD: The Court ruled in the negative. The Court finds no cogent reason to
disturb the findings of the lower courts that it is Legaspi Towers which own the air
space above the condominium as the same in keeping with the facts and the
applicable law. The principal bone of contention here are the legal consequences
of such ownership and the applicability of Article 44813 of the Civil code and our
ruling in the case of Depra vs. Dumlao on the factual antecedents of these cases.

13Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to
appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after the payment of the indemnity provided for in Article 546 and 548, or to
oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sower, the proper rent. However, the builder or
planter cannot be obligated to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall
pay the reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The
parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
The ruling of this court in Depra vs. Dumlao extensively cited by both parties
pertains to the application of Articles 448 and Article 54614 of the Civil Code.
The Master Deed of Legaspi Towers state that the number of stories and
basements, and the number of units and accessories, and contains as an
attachment a diagrammatic floor plan as required by Section 4(b) of the
Condominium Act. Section2 of the Master Deeds states that: The building
included in the condominium projects is a commercial building constructed of
reinforced concrete and consisting of seven storeys with a basement, a ground
floor, a deck roof, and two levels above the deck roof. The construction by
LEMANS of Concession 4 contravenes the Master Deed by adding a third level
above the roof deck, as pointed out by Legaspi Towers and shown in the records,
the Master Deed was never amended to reflect the building of Concession 4.
Furthermore, LEMANS failed to procure the consent of the registered owners of
the condominium projects as required in the last paragraph of Section 4 of the
Condominium Act. The By- Laws of Legaspi Towers specifically provides that
extraordinary improvements or additions must be approved by the members in a
regular or special meeting called for the purpose prior to the construction. Instead
of procuring the required consent by the registered owners of the condominium
project pursuant to the Condominium Act, or having Concession 4 approved by
the members in a regular or special meeting called for the purpose pursuant to
the By-Laws, LEMANS merely had an internal agreement with then president of
Legaspi Towers. The same, however, cannot bind corporations, which includes
condominium corporations such as Legaspi Towers, as they can act only through
their Board of Directors.
It is recognized in jurisprudence that, as a general rule, Article 448 on builders
in good faith does not apply where there is a contractual relation between the
parties. Court explained in several cases that the raison d’etre for Article 448 of
the Civil Code is to prevent the impracticability of creating a state of forced
co-ownership: The rule is that the choice under Article 448 of the Civil Code
belongs to the owner of the land is in accord with the principle of accession, i.e.,
that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way around. Even as the
option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. The
landowner cannot refuse to exercise either the option and compel instead the
owner of the building to remove it from the land.
In the case at bar, however the land belongs to the condominium corporation,
where the builder, as a unit owner, is considered a stockholder or member. The
builder is therefore already in a co-ownership with other unit owners as members

14
Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain the things
until he has been reimbursed thereof.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention, the person who has
defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of expenses or of paying the increase in valid which the
thing may have acquired by reason thereof.
or stockholders of the condominium corporation, whose legal relationship is
governed by a special law, the Condominium Act. Special laws cover distinct
situations, such as the necessary co-ownership between unit owners in
condominiums and the need to preserve the structural integrity of the
condominium buildings; and these special situations deserve, for practicality, a
separate set of rules.
Article 448 and 546 of the Civil Code on builders in good faith are therefore
inapplicable in cases covered by the Condominium Act where the owner of the
land and the builder are already bound by a specific legislation on the subject
property (the Condominium Act), and by contract (the Master Deed and by the
By-Laws of the Corporation). This Court has ruled that upon the acquisition of a
condominium unit, the purchaser not only affixes his conformity tot the sale; he
also binds himself to a contract with other unit owners.
Legaspi Towers is correct that is has the right to demolish Concession 4 at the
expense of LEMANS. Indeed the application of Article 448 to the present situation
is highly iniquitous, in that an owner, also found to be in good faith, will be forced
to either appropriate the illegal structure (and impliedly be burdened with the cost
of its demolition) or to allow the continuance of such illegal structure that violates
the law, and threatens the structural integrity of the condominium building upon
the payment of the rent. The Court cannot countenance such a unjust result from
an erroneous application of the law and jurisprudence.
JOSEPHINE DELOS REYES, ET. AL. vs. MUNICIPALITY OF KALIBO, AKLAN
G.R. NO. 214587 | FEBRUARY 26, 2018
JUSTICE DIOSDADO PERALTA
SECOND DIVISION

FACTS: The Municipality of Kalibo, sought to convert the area of accretion into a
garbage dumpsite. Despite herein petitioner’s opposition, the Municipality of
Kalibo continued the project under the justification that the contested property is
actually part of the public domain. The petitioner’s filed a complaint for quieting
of title over the two (2) portions of accretion declared in their names for taxation
purposes. The RTC ruled in their favor, CA reversed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject parcel of lands form part of accretion and not
that of public domain.

HELD: The Court rules in the negative. An accretion does not automatically
become registered land just because the lot that receives such accretion is
covered by a Torrens Title. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing; registration
under the Torrens system of that ownership is another. Ownership over the
accretion received by the land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code;
imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration law. Registration
under the Land Registration and Cadastral Act does not vest or give title to the
land, but merely confirms and, thereafter, protects the title already possessed by
the owner, making it imperscriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain
this protection, the land must be placed under the operation of the registration
laws, wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided.
There is no concrete evidence showing any right of title petitioner’s part to
be able to legally and validly cede the property. What the quitclaim merely proves
is that petitioner had forfeited any claim or interest over the accretion in favor of
his heirs. It is settled that equitable title is defined as a title derived through a valid
contract or relation, and based on recognized equitable principles, or the right in
the party, to whom it belongs, to have the legal title transferred to him. In order
that a plaintiff may draw to himself an equitable title, he must show that the one
from whom he derives his right had himself a right to transfer. Considering the
aforementioned facts, the plaintiffs have neither legal nor equitable title over the
contested property.
Under Article 457 of the Civil Code, under which the claim of ownership is
anchored provides that: To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers
belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current
of the waters. Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the
banks of rivers. The deposit of soil, to be considered accretion, must be: (a)
gradual and imperceptible; (b) made through the effects of the current of the
water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers.
The Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of the Bureau of
Lands, found upon inspection in 1987 that the subject area was predominantly
composed of sand rather than soil. Hence, the questionable character of the land,
which could most probably be part of the public domain, indeed bars Jose from
validly transferring the increment to any of his successors.
Indubitably, the petitioners are merely successors who derived their alleged
right of ownership from tax declarations. But neither can they validly rely on said
tax declarations and the supposed actual, open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession of the property by their predecessors-in-interest. Any
person who claims ownership by virtue of tax declarations must also prove that he
has been in actual possession of the property. Thus, proof that the property
involved had been declared for taxation purposes for a certain period of time,
does not constitute proof of possession, nor is it proof of ownership, in the
absence of the claimant's actual possession of said property. In the case at bar, the
petitioners failed to adequately prove their possession and that of their
predecessors-in-interest.
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF REYNALDO GUZMAN
RODRIGUEZ; ANITA ONG TAN vs. RONALDO RODRIGUEZ and et. al.
G.R. NO. 230404 | JANUARY 31, 2018
JUSTICE NOEL JIMENEZ TIJAM
FIRST DIVISION

FACTS: Anita Ong Tan and Reynaldo Guzman Rodriguez are a co-depositors in a
Joint Account with the Bank of the Philippines Island (BPI). Reynaldo passed away
on August 27, 2008, hence his heirs, herein respondents executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement of the Estate of their parent. Anita Tan failed to withdraw her funds
from the bank because BPI required her to submit the extrajudicial settlement of
Reynaldo, to comply with the same, she approached respondents and asked them
to sign a waiver of rights to the said joint account. Respondents refused to sign
the waiver as they believed that the funds in the said joint account belonged to
their father. RTC ruled in favor of Anita. CA reversed the decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not there existed a co-ownership between the late Reynaldo
and Anita over the BPI bank account.

HELD: The court ruled in the negative. A joint account is one that is held jointly by
two or more natural persons, or by two or more juridical persons or entities. Under
such setup, the depositors are joint owners or co-owners of the said account, and
their share in the deposits shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proved.
The nature of joint accounts is governed by the rule on co-ownership embodied in
Article 48515 of the Civil Code. While the rule is that the shares of the owners of
the joint account holders are equal, the same may be overturned by evidence to
the contrary. Hence, the mere fact that an account is joint is not conclusive of the
fact that the owners thereof have equal claims over the funds in question.
The Court agrees with the findings of the lower court that Anita sufficiently
proved that she owns the funds in the BPI joint account exclusively. The records
showed that the money in the BPI joint came from Anita's personal account with
East West, where Anita opened a Trust Placement in August 2007. The exact
amount which was first withdrawn from the East West was the exact amount used
to open the BPI joint account, these transactions occurred within the same day on
November 14, 2007. It is also significant to consider that no further transaction in
said joint account was made after the same was opened until the death of
Reynaldo. With all these, it is apparent that Anita owned the funds exclusively as
she sufficiently overturned the presumption under the law.
Their failure to include said joint account in the list of the items owned by
15
Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the charges, shall be proportional to their respective interests.
Any stipulation in a contract to the contrary shall be void. The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall be
presumed equal, unless the contrary is proved.
Reynaldo for the purposes of determining his estate obviously refutes the
respondent’s claim that Reynaldo was the sole owner of the funds in said joint
account. Taken together, the Court finds the ruling of the trial court that Anita is
the sole owner of the funds in question proper.
JOSE GAMBITO vs. ADRIAN OSCAR BASENA
G.R. NO. 225929 | JANUARY 24, 2018
JUSTICE ANDRES REYES, JR.
SECOND DIVISION

FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for quieting of title and declaration of nullity
thereof over the subject land against respondent. Petitioner alleged that he is the
true and registered owner thereof, that land was acquired by him through a Deed
of Donation executed on by his mother, Luz Gambito. He further claimed that
through his efforts, he discovered that respondent surreptitiously secured a
patent over some part of the subject land. MTC ruled in favor of petitioner. RTC
granted appeal of respondent. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the validity of the title, whether fraudulently issued, can be
raised in an action to quiet title over the subject property.

HELD: The court ruled that in an action for quieting of title, it is an indispensable
requisite that the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or
interest in the real property subject of the action, which is however wanting at the
time petitioner filed his verified Complaint. It can also be noted that petitioner’s
title was derived through a certificate of title which was based on a falsified Deed
of Sale which was made to appear to have been signed by the parties who were
long dead at the time of its execution, wherein it is an established fact that the
fraud referred to by the CA is the fraud on the transfer of the property on the basis
of fake signatures considering that the vendor signatories therein are all dead.
Under Section 53 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, known as the Property
Registration Decree, in all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may
pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud
without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder for value of a
certificate of title. After the entry of the decree of registration on the original
petition or application, any subsequent registration procured by the presentation
of a forged duplicate certificate of title, or a forged deed or other instrument, shall
be null and void. The deed is considered a forged deed and hence null and void.
The CA found that respondent has no reason to doubt his own ownership and
possession the subject land as established in this case obtained through the right
of Castriciones. Moreover, it was petitioner who disturbed that open, continuous,
peaceful, adverse and notorious possession of respondent and his
predecessors-in-interest. Thus, petitioner is not expected to assert his right for
having possession and title to the land in dispute. Private ownership of land-as
when there is prima facie proof of ownership like a duly registered possessory
information or a clear showing of open continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession, by present or previous occupants-is not affected by the issuance of a
free patent over the same land. Thus, the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) should
not have included the subject land in this case, as there was already a supervening
event that transpired from the time it was applied for until the title was issued.
Moreover, here it established that Castriciones is the previous occupant with
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession as above contemplated. Hence,
OCT issued as a free patent, by application, cannot affect Castriciones' previous
occupation with open continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession.
DESIDERIO DALISAY INVESTMENT, INC vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
G.R. NO. 231053 | APRIL 4, 2018
JUSTICE PRESBITERO VELASCO, JR.
THIRD DIVISION

FACTS: SSS filed a case against Dalisay Group of Companies (DGC) for the
collection of unpaid premium contributions. The Special Board of Directors issued
a Resolution stating that the subject land and building with all improvements
thereon be sold to SSS in order to settle the liabilities and penalty obligations of
DDII. SSS accepted the proposal, including its specified terms and conditions.
Despite repeated written and verbal demands made by SSS for DDII to deliver the
titles of the subject property, free from all liens and encumbrances, DDII still failed
to comply. DDII filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and Recovery of Possession
against SSS over the subject property. RTC resolved in favor of DDII, CA reversed.

ISSUE: Whether or not there SSS’ claim over the subject property cast a cloud on
DDII’s title, entitling the latter’s petition for quieting of title to prosper.

HELD: The court ruled in the affirmative. Article 476 of the Civil Code provides that
“Whenever there is cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by
reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is
apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable,
or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to
remove such cloud or to quiet the title. An action may also be brought to prevent
a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein.”
For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requirement must
concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title to or
interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim,
encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be
shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prime facie appearance of
validity or legal efficacy.
Hence, presence or absence of these two requisites is hinged on the question
of whether or not the proposed dacion en pago was indeed perfected, thereby
vesting unto SSS a legitimate title and interest over the properties in question. The
aforementioned events that transpired convince the court that contrary to
petitioner’s claim, the turnover of the properties to SSS was tantamount to
delivery or “tradition” which effectively transferred the real right of ownership
over the properties from DDII to SSS. Even after review of the records of the case,
the court was unable to find any indication that when they turned over the
properties to SSS, the company reserved its ownership over the property and only
transferred the jus possidendi thereon to SSS. We find that SSS has validly and in
good faith acquired title to the property subject of the dispute, making the action
to quiet title filed by DDII improper. Additional, it is well to emphasize that in
order an action for quieting of title may prosper, it is essential that the plaintiff
must have legal or equitable title to, or interest herein, the property which is the
subject-matter of the action. Legal title denotes ownership, while equitable title
means beneficial ownership. In the absence of such legal or equitable title, or
interest, there is no cloud to be prevented or removed. Here, DDII having divested
itself of any claim over the property in favor of SSS by means of sale via dacion en
pago, petitioner has lost its title over the property which would give it legal
personality to file said action.
At this point, it is well to remind DDII that is cannot escape its liability from
SSS by giving the latter possession over the property with the representation that
it is doing so as partial settlement of its unremitted SSS premiums and penalties
due only to take the property back decades thereafter, seek condonation of its
obligations, and to make matters worse, claim payment of rental from SSS. While
it is true that the value of the property has significantly increased over the years
compared to the 2 million amount for which it was offered to SSS, such is not
sufficient justification for DDII to turn its back on its obligations under the dacion
en pago agreement. Granting the reliefs prayed for by DDII will result in an
injustice to SSS, which relied in good faith upon the company’s representation.
This court finds it proper to remind DDII that it would not have lost ownership
over the property if, in the first place, it diligently paid the SSS premiums due.
SPOUSES BASA, ET. AL. vs. ANGELINE LOY, ET. AL.
G.R. NO. 204131 | JUNE 4, 2018
JUSTICE MARIANO DEL CASTILLO
FIRST DIVISION

FACTS: Herein respondent Robert Carantes, a predecessor-in-interest of the

subject lot was mortgaged to respondents Angeline Loy and her husband in 1994.
They foreclosed the mortgaged and in the auction sale emerged as the highest
bidder. Petitioners claimed that the portions of the subject property had already
been sold to them in 1992 and 1993 by respondent Robert Carantes by virtue of a
Deed of Sale executed in their favor, that the titles issued in favor of Angeline Loy
created a cloud upon their title and are prejudicial to their claim of ownership. The
RTC denied the petition. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether or not by preponderance evidence, the grounds for quieting of

title shall prosper.

HELD: Petition lacks merit, hence denied. In order that an action for quieting of
title may prosper, it is essential that the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title
to, or interest in, the property which is the subject-matter of the action. Legal title
denotes registered ownership, while equitable title means beneficial ownership. In
the absence of such legal or equitable title, or interest, there is no cloud to be
prevented or removed. Petitioners' case for quieting of title was dismissed by the
trial court for the reason that they failed to present the originals of the purported
deeds of sale executed by respondent Robe11 Carantes in their favor. In other
words, petitioners failed to prove the first element in a suit for quieting of title -
the existence of a legal or equitable title - the trial court simply held that they
failed to discharge the burden of proof required in such case. Petitioners then
attempted to obtain a reversal by attaching the supposed originals of the deeds of
sale to their motion for reconsideration, but the trial court did not reconsider as
they failed to show that the reason for their failure to present the original copies
of the deeds fell within the exceptions under the best evidence rule, or Section 3,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
The CA correctly found that petitioners' failure to append the original copies
of the deeds of sale was inexcusable; that the document that was appended to
their motion for reconsideration was different from what was presented and
marked during the ex-parte hearing; and that the testimonies of petitioners
contradicted the affidavit of Roberto Carantes, their supposed seller, with regard
to the price and lot area of the subject properties. Moreover, the un-notarized
"Deed of Absolute Sale of a Portion of a Registered Parcel of a Residential Land"
between respondent Robert Carantes and petitioner-spouses Jaime and Catherine
Basa cannot stand without the corroboration or affirmation of Robell Carantes,
un-notarized dead, on its own is self-serving. Since Robert Carantes' affidavit was
rendered inadmissible by his failure to appear and testify thereon, then the
supposed un-notarized deed of sale executed by him in favor of the Basa spouses
cannot sufficiently be proved.
To repeat, "for an action to quiet title to prosper, two (2) indispensable
requisites must concur, namely: (I) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an
equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the
deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title
must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie
appearance of validity or legal efficacy.""Legal title denotes registered ownership,
while equitable title means beneficial ownership."
Even if petitioners are in possession of the disputed property, this does not
necessarily prove their supposed title. It may be that their possession of the
disputed prope1ty is by lease or any other agreement or arrangement with the
owner - or simply by mere tolerance. Without adequately proving their title or
tight to the disputed portions of the property, their case for quieting of title
simply cannot prosper.
ESMERALDO GATCHALIAN vs. CESAR FLORES AND ET. AL.
G.R. NO. 225176 | JANUARY 19, 2018
JUSTICE NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM
FIRST DIVISION

FACTS: Petitioner filed a Complaint for Ejectment with Damages against

respondents due to the encroachment on a portion of road. After several years,
the lot of Segundo Mendoza was sold and subdivided among the new owners
including herein respondents. When the latter demonstrated acts of gross
ingratitude to the Gatchalian family, they were constrained to withdraw their
tolerated possession, use and occupation of the portion of land. Verbal and
written demands to vacate were then served upon them but remained unheeded.
MeTC rendered a decision ordering the respondents to vacate. RTC and CA
retained the decision.

ISSUE: Who between the parties are rightfully entitled to the physical and material
possession of the subject property.

HELD: Petition is granted. It is undisputed that the road lot is registered under the
name of petitioner's parents. Even the respondents did not dispute this fact. It is
also undisputed that the municipal government has not undertaken any
expropriation proceedings to acquire the subject property neither did the
petitioner donate or sell the same to the municipal government. Therefore, absent
any expropriation proceedings and without any evidence that the petitioner
donated or sold the subject property to the municipal government, the same is
still private property.
Since the local government of Parañaque has not purchased nor undertaken
any expropriation proceedings, neither did the petitioner and his siblings donate
the subject property, the latter is still a private property and Ordinance No. 88-04
did not convert the same to public property
It is well-settled that an "owner of a registered land does not lose his rights
over a property on the ground of laches as long as the opposing claimant's
possession was merely tolerated by the owner." A torrens title is irrevocable and
its validity can only be challenged in a direct proceeding. A torrens title is an
indefeasible and imperscriptible title a property in favor of the person in whose
name the title appears. The owner is entitled to all the attributes of ownership of
the property, including possession. The person who has a torrens title over a land
is entitled to possession thereof. As such, petitioner can file an ejectrnent case
against herein respondents who encroached upon a portion of petitioner's
property.