CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
G.R. No. 135080 November 28, 2007
ORLANDO L. SALVADOR, for and in behalf of the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans, Petitioner,
vs.
PLACIDO L. MAPA, JR., RAFAEL A. SISON, ROLANDO M. ZOSA, CESAR C. ZALAMEA,
BENJAMIN BAROT, CASIMIRO TANEDO, J.V. DE OCAMPO, ALICIA L. REYES,
BIENVENIDO R. TANTOCO, JR., BIENVENIDO R. TANTOCO, SR., FRANCIS B. BANES,
ERNESTO M. CARINGAL, ROMEO V. JACINTO, and MANUEL D. TANGLAO,
Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, (the Committee),
through Atty. Orlando L. Salvador (Atty. Salvador), filed this Petition for Review on
Certiorari seeking to nullify the October 9, 1997 Resolution1 of the Office of the
Ombudsman in OMB-0-96-2428, dismissing the criminal complaint against respondents
on ground of prescription, and the July 27, 1998 Order2 denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
On October 8, 1992 then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13
creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, which reads:
WHEREAS, Sec. 28, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that "Subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest";
WHEREAS, Sec. 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that "The right of the state
to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or
from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or
estoppel";
WHEREAS, there have been allegations of loans, guarantees, and other forms of financial
accommodations granted, directly or indirectly, by government-owned and controlled
bank or financial institutions, at the behest, command, or urging by previous government
officials to the disadvantage and detriment of the Philippines government and the Filipino
people;
ACCORDINGLY, an "Ad-Hoc FACT FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS" is hereby
created to be composed of the following:
Chairman of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government - Chairman
1| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Constitutional Law, Atty. Carlomagno Calingin
XU – College of Law
OF CASES BATCH 8
The Solicitor General - Vice-Chairman
Representative from the Office of the Executive Secretary - Member
Representative from the Department of Finance - Member
Representative from the Department of Justice - Member
Representative from the Development Bank of the Philippines - Member
Representative from the Philippine National Bank - Member
Representative from the Asset Privatization Trust - Member
Government Corporate Counsel – Member
Representative from the Philippine Export and Foreign
Loan Guarantee Corporation - Member
The Ad Hoc Committee shall perform the following functions:
1. Inventory all behest loans; identify the lenders and borrowers, including the
principal officers and stockholders of the borrowing firms, as well as the persons
responsible for granting the loans or who influenced the grant thereof;
2. Identify the borrowers who were granted "friendly waivers," as well as the
government officials who granted these waivers; determine the validity of these
waivers;
3. Determine the courses of action that the government should take to recover
those loans, and to recommend appropriate actions to the Office of the President
within sixty (60) days from the date hereof.
The Committee is hereby empowered to call upon any department, bureau, office, agency,
instrumentality or corporation of the government, or any officer or employee thereof, for
such assistance as it may need in the discharge of its functions.3
By Memorandum Order No. 61 dated November 9, 1992, the functions of the Committee
were subsequently expanded, viz.:
WHEREAS, among the underlying purposes for the creation of the Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans is to facilitate the collection and recovery of defaulted loans
owing government-owned and controlled banking and/or financing institutions;
WHEREAS, this end may be better served by broadening the scope of the fact-finding
mission of the Committee to include all non-performing loans which shall embrace behest
and non-behest loans;
NOW THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by
virtue of the power vested in me by law, do hereby order:
Sec. 1. The Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans shall include in its
investigation, inventory, and study, all non-performing loans which shall embrace both
behest and non-behest loans:
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
The following criteria may be utilized as a frame of reference in determining a behest loan:
1. It is under-collateralized;
2. The borrower corporation is undercapitalized;
3. Direct or indirect endorsement by high government officials like presence of
marginal notes;
4. Stockholders, officers or agents of the borrower corporation are identified as
cronies;
5. Deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose intended;
6. Use of corporate layering;
7. Non-feasibility of the project for which financing is being sought; and
8. Extraordinary speed in which the loan release was made.
Moreover, a behest loan may be distinguished from a non-behest loan in that while both
may involve civil liability for non-payment or non-recovery, the former may likewise entail
criminal liability.4
Several loan accounts were referred to the Committee for investigation, including the loan
transactions between Metals Exploration Asia, Inc. (MEA), now Philippine Eagle Mines,
Inc. (PEMI) and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP).
After examining and studying the documents relative to the loan transactions, the
Committee determined that they bore the characteristics of behest loans, as defined under
Memorandum Order No. 61 because the stockholders and officers of PEMI were known
cronies of then President Ferdinand Marcos; the loan was under-collateralized; and PEMI
was undercapitalized at the time the loan was granted.
Specifically, the investigation revealed that in 1978, PEMI applied for a foreign currency
loan and bank investment on its preferred shares with DBP. The loan application was
approved on April 25, 1979 per Board Resolution (B/R) No. 1297, but the loan was never
released because PEMI failed to comply with the conditions imposed by DBP. To
accommodate PEMI, DBP subsequently adopted B/R No. 2315 dated June 1980, amending
B/R No. 1297, authorizing the release of PEMI’s foreign currency loan proceeds, and even
increasing the same. Per B/R No. 95 dated October 16, 1980, PEMI was granted a foreign
currency loan of $19,680,267.00 or ₱146,601,979.00, and it was released despite non-
compliance with the conditions imposed by DBP. The Committee claimed that the loan had
no sufficient collaterals and PEMI had no sufficient capital at that time because its acquired
assets were only valued at ₱72,045,700.00, and its paid up capital was only
₱46,488,834.00.
Consequently, Atty. Orlando L. Salvador, Consultant of the Fact-Finding Committee, and
representing the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) a sworn complaint for violation of Sections 3(e)
and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against the
respondents Placido I. Mapa, Jr., Rafael A. Sison; Rolando M. Zosa; Cesar C. Zalamea;
2| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Constitutional Law, Atty. Carlomagno Calingin
XU – College of Law
OF CASES BATCH 8
Benjamin Barot, Casimiro Tanedo, J.V. de Ocampo, Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr., Francis B.
Banes, Ernesto M. Caringal, Romeo V. Jacinto, Manuel D. Tanglao and Alicia Ll. Reyes.5
After considering the Committee’s allegation, the Ombudsman handed down the assailed
Resolution,6 dismissing the complaint. The Ombudsman conceded that there was ground
to proceed with the conduct of preliminary investigation. Nonetheless, it dismissed the
complaint holding that the offenses charged had already prescribed, viz.:
[W]hile apparently, PEMI was undercapitalized at the time the subject loans were entered
into; the financial accommodations were undercollateralized at the time they were
granted; the stockholders and officers of the borrower corporation are identified cronies
of then President Marcos; and the release of the said loans was made despite non-
compliance by PEMI of the conditions attached therewith, which consequently give a
semblance that the subject Foreign Currency Loans are indeed Behest Loans, the
prosecution of the offenses charged cannot, at this point, prosper on grounds of
prescription.
It bears to stress that Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 as originally enacted, provides that the
prescriptive period for violations of the said Act (R.A. 3019) is ten (10) years.
Subsequently, BP 195, enacted on March 16, 1982, amended the period of prescription
from ten (10) years to fifteen (15) years
Moreover as enunciated in [the] case of People vs. Sandiganbayan, 211 SCRA 241, the
computation of the prescriptive period of a crime violating a special law like R.A. 3019 is
governed by Act No. 3326 which provides, thus:
xxxx
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation
of law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of the judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when the proceedings are instituted against the
guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.
Corollary thereto, the Supreme Court in the case of People vs. Dinsay, C.A. 40 O.G. 12th
Supp., 50, ruled that when there is nothing which was concealed or needed to be
discovered because the entire series of transactions were by public instruments, the
period of prescription commenced to run from the date the said instrument were
executed.
The aforesaid principle was further elucidated in the cases of People vs. Sandiganbayan,
211 SCRA 241, 1992, and People vs. Villalon, 192 SCRA 521, 1990, where the Supreme
Court pronounced that when the transactions are contained in public documents and the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
execution thereof gave rise to unlawful acts, the violation of the law commences
therefrom. Thus, the reckoning period for purposes of prescription shall begin to run from
the time the public instruments came into existence.
In the case at bar, the subject financial accommodations were entered into by virtue of
public documents (e.g., notarized contracts, board resolutions, approved letter-request)
during the period of 1978 to 1981 and for purposes of computing the prescriptive period,
the aforementioned principles in the Dinsay, Villalon and Sandiganbayan cases will apply.
Records show that the complaint was referred and filed with this Office on October 4, 1996
or after the lapse of more than fifteen (15) years from the violation of the law. [Deductibly]
therefore, the offenses charged had already prescribed or forever barred by Statute of
Limitations.
It bears mention that the acts complained of were committed before the issuance of BP
195 on March 2, 1982. Hence, the prescriptive period in the instant case is ten (10) years
as provided in the (sic) Section 11 of R.A. 3019, as originally enacted.
Equally important to stress is that the subject financial transactions between 1978 and
1981 transpired at the time when there was yet no Presidential Order or Directive naming,
classifying or categorizing them as Behest or Non-Behest Loans.
To reiterate, the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans was created on October
8, 1992 under Administrative Order No. 13. Subsequently, Memorandum Order No. 61,
dated November 9, 1992, was issued defining the criteria to be utilized as a frame of
reference in determining behest loans. Accordingly, if these Orders are to be considered
the bases of charging respondents for alleged offenses committed, they become ex-post
facto laws which are proscribed by the Constitution. The Supreme Court in the case of
People v. Sandiganbayan, supra, citing Wilensky V. Fields, Fla, 267 So 2dl, 5, held that "an
ex-post facto law is defined as a law which provides for infliction of punishment upon a
person for an act done which when it was committed, was innocent."7
Thus, the Ombudsman disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby respectfully recommended that the
instant case be DISMISSED.
SO RESOLVED.8
The Committee filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the Ombudsman denied it on July
27, 1998.
Hence, this petition positing these issues:
3| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Constitutional Law, Atty. Carlomagno Calingin
XU – College of Law
OF CASES BATCH 8
A. WHETHER OR NOT THE CRIME DEFINED BY SEC. 3(e) AND (g) OF R.A. 3019
HAS ALREADY PRESCRIBED AT THE TIME THE PETITIONER FILED ITS
COMPLAINT.
B. WHETHER OR NOT ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 13 AND MEMORANDUM
ORDER NO. 61 ARE EX-POST FACTO LAW[S].9
The Court shall deal first with the procedural issue.
Commenting on the petition, Tantoco, Reyes, Mapa, Zalamea and Caringal argued that the
petition suffers from a procedural infirmity which warrants its dismissal. They claimed
that the PCGG availed of the wrong remedy in elevating the case to this Court.
Indeed, what was filed before this Court is a petition captioned as Petition for Review on
Certiorari. We have ruled, time and again, that a petition for review on certiorari is not the
proper mode by which resolutions of the Ombudsman in preliminary investigations of
criminal cases are reviewed by this Court. The remedy from the adverse resolution of the
Ombudsman is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,10 not a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45.
However, though captioned as a Petition for Review on Certiorari, we will treat this petition
as one filed under Rule 65 since a reading of its contents reveals that petitioner imputes
grave abuse of discretion to the Ombudsman for dismissing the complaint. The averments
in the complaint, not the nomenclature given by the parties, determine the nature of the
action.11 In previous rulings, we have treated differently labeled actions as special civil
actions for certiorari under Rule 65 for reasons such as justice, equity, and fair play. 12
Having resolved the procedural issue, we proceed to the merits of the case.
As the Committee puts it, the issues to be resolved are: (i) whether or not the offenses
subject of its criminal complaint have prescribed, and (ii) whether Administrative Order
No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 are ex post facto laws.
The issue of prescription has long been settled by this Court in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-
Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,13 thus:
[I]t is well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the violations
of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made because, as alleged,
the public officials concerned connived or conspired with the "beneficiaries of the loans."
Thus, we agree with the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period for the offenses with
which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be computed from the
discovery of the commission thereof and not from the day of such commission.14
The ruling was reiterated in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans
v. Ombudsman Desierto,15 wherein the Court explained:
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the February 1986 EDSA
Revolution that ousted President Ferdinand E. Marcos, we ruled that the government as
the aggrieved party could not have known of the violations at the time the questioned
transactions were made. Moreover, no person would have dared to question the legality
of those transactions. Thus, the counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the
date of discovery of the offense in 1992 after an exhaustive investigation by the
Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans.16
This is now a well-settled doctrine which the Court has applied in subsequent cases
involving the PCGG and the Ombudsman.17
Since the prescriptive period commenced to run on the date of the discovery of the
offenses, and since discovery could not have been made earlier than October 8, 1992, the
date when the Committee was created, the criminal offenses allegedly committed by the
respondents had not yet prescribed when the complaint was filed on October 4, 1996.
Even the Ombudsman, in its Manifestation & Motion (In Lieu of Comment), 18 conceded
that the prescriptive period commenced from the date the Committee discovered the
crime, and not from the date the loan documents were registered with the Register of
Deeds. As a matter of fact, it requested that the record of the case be referred back to the
Ombudsman for a proper evaluation of its merit.
Likewise, we cannot sustain the Ombudsman’s declaration that Administrative Order No.
13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws for
ostensibly inflicting punishment upon a person for an act done prior to their issuance and
which was innocent when done.
The constitutionality of laws is presumed. To justify nullification of a law, there must be a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful or arguable implication; a
law shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond
reasonable doubt. The presumption is always in favor of constitutionality. To doubt is to
sustain.19 Even this Court does not decide a question of constitutional dimension, unless
that question is properly raised and presented in an appropriate case and is necessary to
a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota
presented.201âwphi1
Furthermore, in Estarija v. Ranada,21 where the petitioner raised the issue of
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 6770 in his motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsman’s decision, we had occasion to state that the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction
to entertain questions on the constitutionality of a law. The Ombudsman, therefore, acted
in excess of its jurisdiction in declaring unconstitutional the subject administrative and
memorandum orders.
In any event, we hold that Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61
are not ex post facto laws.
4| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Constitutional Law, Atty. Carlomagno Calingin
XU – College of Law
OF CASES BATCH 8
An ex post facto law has been defined as one — (a) which makes an action done before the
passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action;
or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed; or (c)
which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to
the crime when it was committed; or (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and
receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of
the offense in order to convict the defendant.22 This Court added two (2) more to the list,
namely: (e) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect
imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful; or (f) that which
deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of
amnesty.23
The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto law generally prohibits the
retrospectivity of penal laws. Penal laws are those acts of the legislature which prohibit
certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat
of their nature, and provide for their punishment.24 The subject administrative and
memorandum orders clearly do not come within the shadow of this definition.
Administrative Order No. 13 creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans, and provides for its composition and functions. It does not mete out penalty
for the act of granting behest loans. Memorandum Order No. 61 merely provides a frame
of reference for determining behest loans. Not being penal laws, Administrative Order No.
13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be characterized as ex post facto laws. There is,
therefore, no basis for the Ombudsman to rule that the subject administrative and
memorandum orders are ex post facto.
One final note. Respondents Mapa and Zalamea, in their respective comments, moved for
the dismissal of the case against them. Mapa claims that he was granted transactional
immunity from all PCGG-initiated cases,25 while Zalamea denied participation in the
approval of the subject loans.26 The arguments advanced by Mapa and Zalamea are
matters of defense which should be raised in their respective counter-affidavits. Since the
Ombudsman erroneously dismissed the complaint on ground of prescription,
respondents’ respective defenses were never passed upon during the preliminary
investigation. Thus, the complaint should be referred back to the Ombudsman for proper
evaluation of its merit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Office of
Ombudsman in OMB-0-96-2428, are SET ASIDE. The Office of the Ombudsman is directed
to conduct with dispatch an evaluation of the merits of the complaint against the herein
respondents.
SO ORDERED.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
G.R. No. 176169 November 14, 2008
ROSARIO NASI-VILLAR, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner
Rosario Nasi-Villar assailing the Decision2 dated 27 June 2005 and Resolution3 dated
28 November 2006 of the Court of Appeals. This case originated from an Information 4
for Illegal Recruitment as defined under Sections 6 and 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
80425 filed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Davao del Sur on 5 October
1998 for acts committed by petitioner and one Dolores Placa in or about January
1993. The Information reads:
That on [sic] or about the month of [January 1993], in the Municipality of Sta.
Cruz, Province of Davao del Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, conspiring together, confederating
with and mutually helping one another through fraudulent representation and
deceitful machination, did then and there [willfully], unlawfully and feloniously
recruit Nila Panilag for employment abroad[,] demand and receive the amount
of P6,500.00 Philippine Currency [sic] as placement fee[,] the said accused being
a non-licensee or non-holder of authority to engage in the recruitment of
workers abroad to the damage and prejudice of the herein offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
On 3 July 2002, after due trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Br. 18, Digos City, Davao
del Sur found the evidence presented by the prosecution to be more credible than that
presented by the defense and thus held petitioner liable for the offense of illegal
recruitment under the Labor Code, as amended.7 The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby finds accused ROSARIO
NASI-VILLAR GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of Illegal Recruitment
and, in accordance with the penalty set forth under the Labor Code, as amended,
said accused is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from
FOUR YEARS as minimum to FIVE YEARS as maximum.
5| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Constitutional Law, Atty. Carlomagno Calingin
XU – College of Law
OF CASES BATCH 8
On the civil aspect of the case, there being no substantial proof presented to
justify a grant of civil damages, this Court makes no pronouncement thereon.
With respect to accused Ma. Dolores Placa, who is still at large, the records of
this case are hereby sent to the archives to be retrieved in the event that said
accused would be apprehended. Issue an alias warrant of arrest for the
apprehension of said accused.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals raising as sole issue the alleged error by
the trial court in finding her guilty of illegal recruitment on the basis of the trial court's
appreciation of the evidence presented by the prosecution.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 June 2005,9 following the principle that
an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case wide open for review, noted that
the criminal acts alleged to have been committed happened sometime in 1993.
However, R.A. No. 8042, under which petitioner was charged, was approved only on
7 June 1995 and took effect on 15 July 1995. Thus, the Court of Appeals declared that
petitioner should have been charged under the Labor Code, in particular Art. 13(b)
thereof, and not under R.A. No. 8042. Accordingly, it made its findings on the basis of
the provisions of the Labor Code and found petitioner liable under Art. 38, in relation
to Art. 13(b), and Art. 39 of the Labor Code. The appellate court affirmed with
modification the decision of the RTC, decreeing in the dispositive portion, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, 11th Judicial Region, Br. 18, City of Digos, Province of Davao del Sur,
finding Rosario Nasi-Villar guilty beyond reasonable doubt o the crime of Illegal
Recruitment is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that Rosario Nasi-Villar is
ORDERED to pay Nila Panilag the sum of P10,000.00 as temperate damages.
SO ORDERED.10
On 28 November 2006, the appellate court denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.11
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition for review.
Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to consider that R.A. No.
8042 cannot be given retroactive effect and that the decision of the RTC constitutes a
violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto law. Since R.A. No.
8042 did not yet exist in January 1993 when the crime was allegedly committed,
petitioner argues that law cannot be used as the basis of filing a criminal action for
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
illegal recruitment. What was applicable in 1993 is the Labor Code, where under Art.
38, in relation to Art. 39, the violation of the Code is penalized with imprisonment of
not less than four (4) years nor more than eight (8) years or a fine of not less than
P20,000.00 and not more than P100,000.00 or both. On the other hand, Sec. 7(c) of
R.A. No. 8042 penalizes illegal recruitment with a penalty of imprisonment of not less
than six (6) years and one (1) day but not more than twelve (12) years and a fine not
less than P200,000.00 nor more than P500,000.00. Thus, the penalty of imprisonment
provided in the Labor Code was raised or increased by R.A. No. 8042. Petitioner
concludes that the charge and conviction of an offense carrying a penalty higher than
that provided by the law at the time of its commission constitutes a violation of the
prohibition against ex post facto law and the retroactive application of R.A. No. 8042.
In its Comment12 dated 7 September 2007, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
argues that the Court of Appeals' conviction of petitioner under the Labor Code is
correct. While conceding that there was an erroneous designation of the law violated
by petitioner, the OSG stresses that the designation of the offense in the Information
is not determinative of the nature and character of the crime charged against her but
the acts alleged in the Information. The allegations in the Information clearly charge
petitioner with illegal recruitment as defined in Art. 38, in relation to Art. 13(b) of the
Labor Code, and penalized under Art. 39(c) of the same Code. The evidence on record
substantiates the charge to a moral certainty. Thus, while there was an erroneous
specification of the law violated by petitioner in the Information, the CA was correct
in affirming the RTC's imposition of the penalty for simple illegal recruitment under
the Labor Code, the OSG concludes.
The petition is denied. We find no reversible error in the decision arrived at by the
Court of Appeals.
In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals,13 we held that the real nature of the crime charged is
determined, not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the
specification of the law alleged to have been violated–these being conclusions of law–
but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. What controls is not
the designation but the description of the offense charged. From a legal point of view,
and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what the technical name of
the crime of which he stands charged is. If the accused performed the acts alleged in
the body of the information, in the manner stated, then he ought to be punished and
punished adequately, whatever may be the name of the crime which those acts
constitute.14
In the case at bar, the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that
petitioner had performed the acts constituting the offense defined in Art. 38, in
relation to Art. 13(b) and punished by Art. 39 of the Labor Code, as alleged in the body
of the Information. To prove illegal recruitment, two elements must be shown,
namely: (1) the person charged with the crime must have undertaken recruitment
6| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Constitutional Law, Atty. Carlomagno Calingin
XU – College of Law
OF CASES BATCH 8
activities, or any of the activities enumerated in Article 34 of the Labor Code, as
amended; and (2) said person does not have a license or authority to do so. 15 Art.
13(b) defines "recruitment and placement" as "any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising, or advertising for employment, locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not; Provided that any person or entity which, in any
manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons, is
considered engaged in recruitment and placement." The trial court found these two
elements had been proven in the case at bar. Petitioner has not offered any argument
or proof that countervails such findings.
The basic rule is that a criminal act is punishable under the law in force at the time of
its commission. Thus, petitioner can only be charged and found guilty under the Labor
Code which was in force in 1993 when the acts attributed to her were committed.
Petitioner was charged in 1998 under an Information that erroneously designated the
offense as covered by R.A. No. 8042, but alleged in its body acts which are punishable
under the Labor Code. As it was proven that petitioner had committed the acts she
was charged with, she was properly convicted under the Labor Code, and not under
R.A. No. 8042.
There is no violation of the prohibition against ex post facto law nor a retroactive
application of R.A. No. 8042, as alleged by petitioner. An ex post facto law is one which,
among others, aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed or
changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to
the crime when committed.16 Penal laws and laws which, while not penal in nature,
nonetheless have provisions defining offenses and prescribing penalties for their
violation operate prospectively. Penal laws cannot be given retroactive effect, except
when they are favorable to the accused.17
R.A. No. 8042 amended pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and gave a new
definition of the crime of illegal recruitment and provided for its higher penalty. There
is no indication in R.A. No. 8042 that said law, including the penalties provided
therein, would take effect retroactively. A law can never be considered ex post facto
as long as it operates prospectively since its strictures would cover only offenses
committed after and not before its enactment.18 Neither did the trial court nor the
appellate court give R.A. No. 8042 a retroactive application since both courts passed
upon petitioner's case only under the aegis of the Labor Code. The proceedings before
the trial court and the appellate court did not violate the prohibition against ex post
facto law nor involved a retroactive application of R.A. No. 8042 in any way.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated 27 June 2005 and
Resolution dated 28 November 2006 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
G.R. No. 195540 March 13, 2013
GOLDENWAY MERCHANDISING CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
EQUITABLE PCI BANK, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set
aside the Decision1 dated November 19, 2010 and Resolution2 dated January 31, 2011
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 91120. The CA affirmed the Decision3
dated January 8, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of- Valenzuela City, Branch
171 dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 295-V -01.
The facts are undisputed.
On November 29, 1985, Goldenway Merchandising Corporation (petitioner) executed
a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Equitable PCI Bank (respondent) over its real
properties situated in Valenzuela, Bulacan (now Valenzuela City) and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-152630, T-151655 and T-214528 of the
Registry of Deeds for the Province of Bulacan. The mortgage secured the Two Million
Pesos (₱2,000,000.00) loan granted by respondent to petitioner and was duly
registered.4
As petitioner failed to settle its loan obligation, respondent extrajudicially foreclosed
the mortgage on December 13, 2000. During the public auction, the mortgaged
properties were sold for ₱3,500,000.00 to respondent. Accordingly, a Certificate of
Sale was issued to respondent on January 26, 2001. On February 16, 2001, the
Certificate of Sale was registered and inscribed on TCT Nos. T-152630, T-151655 and
T-214528.5
In a letter dated March 8, 2001, petitioner’s counsel offered to redeem the foreclosed
properties by tendering a check in the amount of ₱3,500,000.00. On March 12, 2001,
petitioner’s counsel met with respondent’s counsel reiterating petitioner’s intention
to exercise the right of redemption.6 However, petitioner was told that such
redemption is no longer possible because the certificate of sale had already been
registered. Petitioner also verified with the Registry of Deeds that title to the
foreclosed properties had already been consolidated in favor of respondent and that
new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondent on March 9, 2001.
7| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Constitutional Law, Atty. Carlomagno Calingin
XU – College of Law
OF CASES BATCH 8
On December 7, 2001, petitioner filed a complaint 7 for specific performance and
damages against the respondent, asserting that it is the one-year period of
redemption under Act No. 3135 which should apply and not the shorter redemption
period provided in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8791. Petitioner argued that applying
Section 47 of R.A. 8791 to the real estate mortgage executed in 1985 would result in
the impairment of obligation of contracts and violation of the equal protection clause
under the Constitution. Additionally, petitioner faulted the respondent for allegedly
failing to furnish it and the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC of Valenzuela City with a
Statement of Account as directed in the Certificate of Sale, due to which petitioner was
not apprised of the assessment and fees incurred by respondent, thus depriving
petitioner of the opportunity to exercise its right of redemption prior to the
registration of the certificate of sale.
In its Answer with Counterclaim,8 respondent pointed out that petitioner cannot
claim that it was unaware of the redemption price which is clearly provided in Section
47 of R.A. No. 8791, and that petitioner had all the opportune time to redeem the
foreclosed properties from the time it received the letter of demand and the notice of
sale before the registration of the certificate of sale. As to the check payment tendered
by petitioner, respondent said that even assuming arguendo such redemption was
timely made, it was not for the amount as required by law.
On January 8, 2007, the trial court rendered its decision dismissing the complaint as
well as the counterclaim. It noted that the issue of constitutionality of Sec. 47 of R.A.
No. 8791 was never raised by the petitioner during the pre-trial and the trial. Aside
from the fact that petitioner’s attempt to redeem was already late, there was no valid
redemption made because Atty. Judy Ann Abat-Vera who talked to Atty. Joseph E.
Mabilog of the Legal Division of respondent bank, was not properly authorized by
petitioner’s Board of Directors to transact for and in its behalf; it was only a certain
Chan Guan Pue, the alleged President of petitioner corporation, who gave instruction
to Atty. Abat-Vera to redeem the foreclosed properties.9
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA which affirmed the trial court’s decision.
According to the CA, petitioner failed to justify why Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791 should
be declared unconstitutional. Furthermore, the appellate court concluded that a
reading of Section 47 plainly reveals the intention to shorten the period of
redemption for juridical persons and that the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties
in this case when R.A. No. 8791 was already in effect clearly falls within the purview
of the said provision.10
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA.
In the present petition, it is contended that Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791 is inapplicable
considering that the contracting parties expressly and categorically agreed that the
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage shall be in accordance with Act No. 3135. Citing Co
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
v. Philippine National Bank11 petitioner contended that the right of redemption is part and
parcel of the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage itself and attaches thereto upon its execution,
a vested right flowing out of and made dependent upon the law governing the contract of
mortgage and not on the mortgagee’s act of extrajudicially foreclosing the mortgaged
properties. This Court thus held in said case that "Under the terms of the mortgage
contract, the terms and conditions under which redemption may be exercised are deemed
part and parcel thereof whether the same be merely conventional or imposed by law."
Petitioner then argues that applying Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791 to the present case would
be a substantial impairment of its vested right of redemption under the real estate
mortgage contract. Such impairment would be violative of the constitutional proscription
against impairment of obligations of contract, a patent derogation of petitioner’s vested
right and clearly changes the intention of the contracting parties. Moreover, citing this
Court’s ruling in Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. v. Court of Appeals12 where it was held that
"Section 119 prevails over statutes which provide for a shorter period of redemption in
extrajudicial foreclosure sales", and in Sulit v. Court of Appeals,13 petitioner stresses that
it has always been the policy of this Court to aid rather than defeat the mortgagor’s right
to redeem his property.
Petitioner further argues that since R.A. No. 8791 does not provide for its retroactive
application, courts therefore cannot retroactively apply its provisions to contracts
executed and consummated before its effectivity. Also, since R.A. 8791 is a general law
pertaining to the banking industry while Act No. 3135 is a special law specifically
governing real estate mortgage and foreclosure, under the rules of statutory construction
that in case of conflict a special law prevails over a general law regardless of the dates of
enactment of both laws, Act No. 3135 clearly should prevail on the redemption period to
be applied in this case.
The constitutional issue having been squarely raised in the pleadings filed in the trial and
appellate courts, we shall proceed to resolve the same.
The law governing cases of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage is Act No. 3135, 14 as
amended by Act No. 4118. Section 6 thereof provides:
SEC. 6. In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power
hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his successors-in-interest or any judicial creditor or
judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person having a lien on the property subsequent
to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold, may redeem the same
at any time within the term of one year from and after the date of the sale; and such
redemption shall be governed by the provisions of sections four hundred and sixty-four to
four hundred and sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure,15 in so far as these are
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.
The one-year period of redemption is counted from the date of the registration of the
certificate of sale. In this case, the parties provided in their real estate mortgage contract
that upon petitioner’s default and the latter’s entire loan obligation becoming due,
8| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Constitutional Law, Atty. Carlomagno Calingin
XU – College of Law
OF CASES BATCH 8
respondent may immediately foreclose the mortgage judicially in accordance with the
Rules of Court, or extrajudicially in accordance with Act No. 3135, as amended.
However, Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791 otherwise known as "The General Banking Law of
2000" which took effect on June 13, 2000, amended Act No. 3135. Said provision reads:
SECTION 47. Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage. — In the event of foreclosure, whether
judicially or extrajudicially, of any mortgage on real estate which is security for any loan
or other credit accommodation granted, the mortgagor or debtor whose real property has
been sold for the full or partial payment of his obligation shall have the right within one
year after the sale of the real estate, to redeem the property by paying the amount due
under the mortgage deed, with interest thereon at the rate specified in the mortgage, and
all the costs and expenses incurred by the bank or institution from the sale and custody of
said property less the income derived therefrom. However, the purchaser at the auction
sale concerned whether in a judicial or extrajudicial foreclosure shall have the right to
enter upon and take possession of such property immediately after the date of the
confirmation of the auction sale and administer the same in accordance with law. Any
petition in court to enjoin or restrain the conduct of foreclosure proceedings instituted
pursuant to this provision shall be given due course only upon the filing by the petitioner
of a bond in an amount fixed by the court conditioned that he will pay all the damages
which the bank may suffer by the enjoining or the restraint of the foreclosure proceeding.
Notwithstanding Act 3135, juridical persons whose property is being sold pursuant to an
extrajudicial foreclosure, shall have the right to redeem the property in accordance with
this provision until, but not after, the registration of the certificate of foreclosure sale with
the applicable Register of Deeds which in no case shall be more than three (3) months after
foreclosure, whichever is earlier. Owners of property that has been sold in a foreclosure
sale prior to the effectivity of this Act shall retain their redemption rights until their
expiration. (Emphasis supplied.)
Under the new law, an exception is thus made in the case of juridical persons which are
allowed to exercise the right of redemption only "until, but not after, the registration of the
certificate of foreclosure sale" and in no case more than three (3) months after foreclosure,
whichever comes first.16
May the foregoing amendment be validly applied in this case when the real estate
mortgage contract was executed in 1985 and the mortgage foreclosed when R.A. No. 8791
was already in effect?
We answer in the affirmative.
When confronted with a constitutional question, it is elementary that every court must
approach it with grave care and considerable caution bearing in mind that every statute is
presumed valid and every reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor of its
constitutionality.17 For a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond
reasonable doubt.18 Indeed, those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof,
unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis therefor. Otherwise, the petition must
fail.19
Petitioner’s contention that Section 47 of R.A. 8791 violates the constitutional proscription
against impairment of the obligation of contract has no basis.
The purpose of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution20 is to safeguard the
integrity of contracts against unwarranted interference by the State. As a rule, contracts
should not be tampered with by subsequent laws that would change or modify the rights
and obligations of the parties.21 Impairment is anything that diminishes the efficacy of the
contract. There is an impairment if a subsequent law changes the terms of a contract
between the parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or
withdraws remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties.22
Section 47 did not divest juridical persons of the right to redeem their foreclosed
properties but only modified the time for the exercise of such right by reducing the one-
year period originally provided in Act No. 3135. The new redemption period commences
from the date of foreclosure sale, and expires upon registration of the certificate of sale or
three months after foreclosure, whichever is earlier. There is likewise no retroactive
application of the new redemption period because Section 47 exempts from its operation
those properties foreclosed prior to its effectivity and whose owners shall retain their
redemption rights under Act No. 3135.
Petitioner’s claim that Section 47 infringes the equal protection clause as it discriminates
mortgagors/property owners who are juridical persons is equally bereft of merit.
The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or
class privilege.1âwphi1 It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited to the
object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. It does not require
absolute equality, but merely that all persons be treated alike under like conditions both
as to privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.23 Equal protection permits of reasonable
classification.24 We have ruled that one class may be treated differently from another
where the groupings are based on reasonable and real distinctions.25 If classification is
germane to the purpose of the law, concerns all members of the class, and applies equally
to present and future conditions, the classification does not violate the equal protection
guarantee.26
We agree with the CA that the legislature clearly intended to shorten the period of
redemption for juridical persons whose properties were foreclosed and sold in accordance
with the provisions of Act No. 3135.27
The difference in the treatment of juridical persons and natural persons was based on the
nature of the properties foreclosed – whether these are used as residence, for which the
9| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Constitutional Law, Atty. Carlomagno Calingin
XU – College of Law
OF CASES BATCH 8
more liberal one-year redemption period is retained, or used for industrial or commercial
purposes, in which case a shorter term is deemed necessary to reduce the period of
uncertainty in the ownership of property and enable mortgagee-banks to dispose sooner
of these acquired assets. It must be underscored that the General Banking Law of 2000,
crafted in the aftermath of the 1997 Southeast Asian financial crisis, sought to reform the
General Banking Act of 1949 by fashioning a legal framework for maintaining a safe and
sound banking system.28 In this context, the amendment introduced by Section 47
embodied one of such safe and sound practices aimed at ensuring the solvency and
liquidity of our banks.1âwphi1 It cannot therefore be disputed that the said provision
amending the redemption period in Act 3135 was based on a reasonable classification and
germane to the purpose of the law.
This legitimate public interest pursued by the legislature further enfeebles petitioner’s
impairment of contract theory.
The right of redemption being statutory, it must be exercised in the manner prescribed by
the statute,29 and within the prescribed time limit, to make it effective. Furthermore, as
with other individual rights to contract and to property, it has to give way to police power
exercised for public welfare.30 The concept of police power is well-established in this
jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." Its
scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future
where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to
conditions and circumstances thus assuming the greatest benefits.31
The freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police
power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the
State, but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general
well-being of the community may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as
experience may demonstrate the necessity.32 Settled is the rule that the non-impairment
clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the Government.
The right granted by this provision must submit to the demands and necessities of the
State’s power of regulation.33 Such authority to regulate businesses extends to the banking
industry which, as this Court has time and again emphasized, is undeniably imbued with
public interest.34
Having ruled that the assailed Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791 is constitutional, we find no
reversible error committed by the CA in holding that petitioner can no longer exercise the
right of redemption over its foreclosed properties after the certificate of sale in favor of
respondent had been registered.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Decision dated November 19, 2010 and Resolution dated January 31, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 91120 are hereby AFFIRMED.
With costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
G.R. No. 133036 January 22, 2003
JOY LEE RECUERDO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
Before us for review is the July 16, 1997 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. 20577 affirming that rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 150,
Makati City which in turn affirmed that of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Makati City, Branch 67 convicting Joy Lee Recuerdo (petitioner) for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 (The Bouncing Checks Law) on 5 counts.
From the evidence of the prosecution, the following facts are established:
Sometime in the first week of December 1993, Yolanda Floro (Yolanda) who is
engaged in jewelry business sold a 3-karat loose diamond stone valued at
P420,000.00 to petitioner who gave a downpayment of P40,000.00. In settlement of
the balance of the purchase price, petitioner issued 9 postdated checks, 8 of which in
the amount of P40,000.00, and 1 in the amount of P20,000.00, all drawn against her
account at the Prudential Bank.1
When Yolanda deposited 8 of the 10 checks to her depository bank, Liberty Savings
and Loan Association, only 3, those dated December 25, 1993, January 25, 1994, and
February 25, 1994, were cleared. The remaining 5 were dishonored due to the closure
of petitioner’s account.2
Yolanda thus went to petitioner’s dental clinic and advised her to change the
dishonored checks to cash. Petitioner promised alright but she welshed on it.3
A demand letter4 was thereupon sent to petitioner for her to settle her obligation but
she failed to heed the same,5 hence, the filing of 5 informations6 against her for
violation of B. P. 22 at the Makati MeTC, the accusatory portion of the first of which
reads:
That sometime in the first week of December, 1993, in the Municipality of Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
make out, drawn (sic) and issue to YOLANDA G. FLORO to apply on account or for
value the check described below:
Check No. - 008789
Drawn Against - Prudential Bank
In the Amount of - P40,000.00
10 | E l i x i r C . L a n g a n l a n g a n
Constitutional Law, Atty. Carlomagno Calingin
XU – College of Law
OF CASES BATCH 8
Postdated/dated - July 25, 1994
Payable to - Cash
said accused well knowing that at the time of issue thereof, said account did not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of
the face amount of such check upon its presentment, which check when presented
for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "ACCOUNT CLOSED" and despite
receipt of notice of such dishonor, the accused failed to pay said payee the face
amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment within five (5)
banking days after receiving said notice."
Except for the check numbers and dates of maturity, the four other informations are
similarly worded.
After trial, Branch 67 of the Makati MeTC convicted petitioner in a Joint Decision7 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the court finds the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 on five (5) counts and
therefore sentences the accused to suffer an imprisonment of 30 days for each
count and to restitute the amount of P 200,000.00 to Miss Yolanda G. Floro, which
is the total amount of the five (5) checks, and to pay her also the amount of
P20,000.00 as damages to compensate the payment of attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.8
As stated early on, the RTC, on appeal, affirmed the decision of the MeTC. 9 And the
Court of Appeals10 affirmed that of the RTC.
In the petition for review on certiorari at bar, petitioner proffers as follows:
1. Petitioner was convicted by an invalid law which is Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for
being an unconstitutional law.
2. Petitioner was denied her constitutional right to due process for failure of the
courts a quo to uphold her presumption of innocence and for convicting her
even if the prosecution evidence does not prove her guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
3. The findings of fact of the courts a quo, primarily the Court of Appeals, are
based on surmises, conjectures and speculations.
4. The Court of Appeals was biased against petitioner when it denied the petition
moto propio (sic) without the comment of the Office of the Solicitor General."11
Petitioner contends that since banks are not damaged by the presentment of
dishonored checks as they impose a penalty for each, only creditors/payees are
unduly favored by the law; that the law "is in essence a resurrected form of 19th
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
century ‘imprisonment for debt’" since the drawer is coerced to pay his debt on threat
of imprisonment even if his failure to pay does not arise from malice or fraud or from
any criminal intent to cause damage;12 and that the law is a bill of attainder13 as it does
not leave much room for judicial determination, the guilt of the accused having
already been decided by the legislature.14
These matters subject of petitioner’s contention have long been settled in the
landmark case of Lozano v. Martinez15 where this Court upheld the constitutionality
of B. P. 22:
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing
a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes.
The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust
of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless
checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the
public interest, the practice is proscribed by law. The law punishes the act not
as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.16
(Emphasis supplied)
The contention that B. P. 22 is a bill of attainder, one which inflicts punishment
without trial and the essence of which is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial
determination of guilt,17 fails. For under B. P. 22, every element of the crime is still to
be proven before the trial court to warrant a conviction for violation thereof.
Reinforcing her thesis, petitioner cites the speech made by now Vice-President
Teofisto Guingona delivered before the Philippine Bar Association wherein he
stressed the need to review the law since it has not prevented the proliferation of
bouncing checks.18
As correctly argued by the Solicitor General, however, while due deference is given to
the opinion of the Vice-President, the same should properly be addressed to the
legislature which is in a better position to review the effectiveness and usefulness of
the law.19 As held in the case of Lozano,20 it is not for the Court to question the wisdom
or policy of the statute. It is sufficient that a reasonable nexus exists between the
means and the end.
Petitioner further claims that the dishonored checks were not issued for deposit and
encashment,21 nor was there consideration therefor, in support of which she cites her
alleged agreement with Yolanda – that she could have the stone appraised to
determine the purchase price,22 and since she found out that it is only worth
P160,000.00,23 there was no longer any need to fund the remaining checks which
should be returned to her.24 Yolanda, however, so petitioner adds, could no longer be
reached.25 Petitioner thus concludes that she had already paid in full the purchase
price of the stone, she having paid P40,000.00 cash plus the P120,000.00 proceeds of
the three cleared checks.26
11 | E l i x i r C . L a n g a n l a n g a n
Constitutional Law, Atty. Carlomagno Calingin
XU – College of Law
OF CASES BATCH 8
Petitioner’s submission does not lie. Such alleged agreement does not inspire belief.
The terms and conditions surrounding the issuance of the checks are irrelevant. 27
"A check issued as an evidence of debt, though not intended for encashment,
has the same effect like any other check. It is within the contemplation of B.P.
22, which is explicit that "any person who makes or draws and issues any check
to apply for an account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank x x x which check is
subsequently dishonored x x x shall be punished by imprisonment."28 (Emphasis
supplied.)
"BP 22 does not appear to concern itself with what might actually be
envisioned by the parties, its primordial intention being to instead ensure the
stability and commercial value of checks as being virtual substitutes for
currency. It is a policy that can be easily eroded if one has yet to determine the
reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their
issuance, before an appropriate application of the legislative enactment can be
made."29 (Emphasis supplied)
Additionally, petitioner argues that as no bank representative testified as to "whether
the questioned checks were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds (sic)," such
element was not clearly and convincingly proven,30 hence, the trial court failed to
uphold her right to presumption of innocence when she was convicted based on the
sole testimony of Yolanda.
Whether the checks were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds, or "Account
Closed" as alleged in the informations and testified on by Yolanda, 31 petitioner’s
argument is untenable.
"It is not required much less indispensable, for the prosecution to present the
drawee bank’s representative as a witness to testify on the dishonor of the
checks because of insufficiency of funds. The prosecution may present, as it
did in this case, only complainant as a witness to prove all the elements of
the offense charged. She is competent and qualified witness to testify that she
deposited the checks to her account in a bank; that she subsequently received
from the bank the checks returned unpaid with a notation ‘drawn against
insufficient funds’ stamped or written on the dorsal side of the checks
themselves, or in a notice attached to the dishonored checks duly given to the
complainant, and that petitioner failed to pay complainant the value of the
checks or make arrangements for their payment in full within five (5) banking
days after receiving notice that such checks had not been paid by the drawee
bank."32 (Emphasis supplied)
Yolanda’s testimony that when she deposited the checks to her depository bank they
were dishonored due to "Account Closed"33 thus sufficed. In fact, even petitioner’s
counsel during trial admitted the dishonor, and on that ground.34
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION OF CASES BATCH 8
Finally, petitioner imputes bias on the part of the appellate court when it decided her
petition for review without the comment of the Office of the Solicitor General.

The rendition of the decision by the appellate court without the comment of the
People-Appellee is not by itself proof of bias. In any event, the Office of the Solicitor
General gave its comment on petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate
court’s decision.

In fine, the affirmance of petitioner’s conviction is in order.

Under Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, imprisonment need not be imposed on

those found guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22. Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 issued
on February 14, 2001 vests in the courts the discretion to determine, taking into
consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, whether the imposition of fine
alone would best serve the interests of justice, or whether forbearing to impose
imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the
social order, or otherwise contrary to the imperatives of justice.35

In the case at bar, this Court notes that no proof, nay allegation, was proffered that
petitioner was not a first time offender. Considering this and the correctness of the
case, it would best serve the interests of justice if petitioner is just fined to enable her
to continue her dental practice so as not to deprive her of her income, thus insuring
the early settlement of the civil aspect of the case, not to mention the FINE.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals finding petitioner JOY LEE
RECUERDO guilty of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION.

In lieu of imprisonment, accused-herein petitioner JOY LEE RECUERDO, is ordered to

pay a FINE equivalent to double the amount of each dishonored check subject of the
five cases at bar. And she is also ordered to pay private complainant, Yolanda Floro,
the amount of Two Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) Pesos representing the total
amount of the dishonored checks.

SO ORDERED.

12 | E l i x i r C . L a n g a n l a n g a n
Constitutional Law, Atty. Carlomagno Calingin
XU – College of Law
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION OF CASES BATCH 8
G.R. No. L-63419 December 18, 1986 LUIS M. HOJAS, petitioner,
vs.
FLORENTINA A. LOZANO, petitioner, HON. JUDGE SENEN PENARANDA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Cagayan
vs. de Oro City, Branch XX, HONORABLE JUDGE ALFREDO LAGAMON, Presiding Judge,
THE HONORABLE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch XXII, HONORABLE CITY FISCAL
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XX, Manila, and the NOLI T. CATHI, City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City, respondents.
HONORABLE JOSE B. FLAMINIANO, in his capacity as City Fiscal of Manila,
respondents. G.R. No. 75789 December 18, 1986

G.R. No. L-66839-42 December 18, 1986 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
LUZVIMINDA F. LOBATON petitioner, HON. DAVID G. NITAFAN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital
vs. Judicial Region, Branch 52, Manila and THELMA SARMIENTO, respondents.
HONORABLE GLICERIO L. CRUZ, in his capacity as Presiding Executive Judge,
Branch V, Region IV, Regional Trial Court, sitting at Lemery, Batangas, THE R.R. Nogales Law Office for petitioner in G.R. No. 63419, G.R. Nos. 74524-25, G.R. Nos. 75812-
PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF BATANGAS, and MARIA LUISA TORDECILLA, respondents. 13, G.R. Nos. 75765-67 and counsel for respondent in G.R. No. 75789.
Pio S. Canta for petitioner in G.R. Nos. 66839-42.
G.R No. 71654 December 18, 1986 Hermogenes Datuin, Jr. for petitioner in G.R. No. 71654.
Abinoja, Tabalingcos, Villalon & Associates for petitioner in G.R. Nos. 75122-49.
ANTONIO DATUIN and SUSAN DATUIN, petitioners,
The Solicitor General for respondent in G.R. No. 63419, G.R. Nos. 66839-42, G.R. No. 71654,
vs.
G.R. Nos. 74524-25, G.R. Nos. 75122-49, G.R. Nos. 75812-13, G.R. Nos. 75765-67 and counsel
HONORABLE JUDGE ERNANI C. PANO, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch
for petitioner in G.R. No. 75789.
LXXXVIII, HONORABLE ClTY FISCAL OF QUEZON CITY, respondents.
YAP, J.:
G.R. No. 74524-25 December 18, 1986
The constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as
OSCAR VIOLAGO, petitioner,
the Bouncing Check Law, which was approved on April 3, 1979, is the sole issue presented
vs.
by these petitions for decision. The question is definitely one of first impression in our
HONORABLE JUDGE ERNANI C. PAÑ;O Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch
jurisdiction.
LXXXVIII, HONORABLE CITY FISCAL OF QUEZON CITY, respondents.
These petitions arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under the statute. The
G.R. No. 75122-49 December 18, 1986
defendants in those cases moved seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that
ELINOR ABAD, petitioner, the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The
vs. motions were denied by the respondent trial courts, except in one case, which is the
THE HONORABLE NICOLAS A. GEROCHI, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge, subject of G. R. No. 75789, wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 139, Makati and dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected have come to us for relief.
FEDERICO L. MELOCOTTON JR., in his capacity as Trial Fiscal Regional Trial Court,
As a threshold issue the former Solicitor General in his comment on the petitions,
Branch 139, Makati, respondents.
maintained the posture that it was premature for the accused to elevate to this Court the
G.R No. 75812-13 December 18, 1986 orders denying their motions to quash, these orders being interlocutory. While this is
correct as a general rule, we have in justifiable cases intervened to review the lower court's
AMABLE R. AGUILUZ VII and SYLVIA V. AGUILUZ, spouses, petitioners, denial of a motion to quash. 1 In view of the importance of the issue involved here, there
vs. is no doubt in our mind that the instant petitions should be entertained and the
HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 154, now vacant but temporarily constitutional challenge to BP 22 resolved promptly, one way or the other, in order to put
presided by HONORABLE ASAALI S. ISNANI Branch 153, Court of First Instance of to rest the doubts and uncertainty that exist in legal and judicial circles and the general
Pasig, Metro Manila, respondent. public which have unnecessarily caused a delay in the disposition of cases involving the
enforcement of the statute.
G.R No. 75765-67 December 18, 1986

13 | E l i x i r C . L a n g a n l a n g a n
Constitutional Law, Atty. Carlomagno Calingin
XU – College of Law
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
For the purpose of resolving the constitutional issue presented here, we do not find it
necessary to delve into the specifics of the informations involved in the cases which are
the subject of the petitions before us. 2 The language of BP 22 is broad enough to cover all
kinds of checks, whether present dated or postdated, or whether issued in payment of pre-
existing obligations or given in mutual or simultaneous exchange for something of value.
I penalize the issuance of bouncing or rubber checks. Criminal law has dealth with the
BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for
value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank for the payment of said check in full upon presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would
have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason,
ordered the bank to stop payment." The penalty prescribed for the offense is
imprisonment of not less than 30 days nor more than one year or a fine or not less than
the amount of the check nor more than double said amount, but in no case to exceed
P200,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court. 3
The statute likewise imposes the same penalty on "any person who, having sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to
keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if
presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which
reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank. 4
An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of the maker or drawer of
the check of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank to cover the check
upon its presentment. Since this involves a state of mind difficult to establish, the statute
itself creates a prima facie presumption of such knowledge where payment of the check
"is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank when
presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check. 5 To mitigate the harshness
of the law in its application, the statute provides that such presumption shall not arise if
within five (5) banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, the maker or drawer
makes arrangements for payment of the check by the bank or pays the holder the amount
of the check.
Another provision of the statute, also in the nature of a rule of evidence, provides that the
introduction in evidence of the unpaid and dishonored check with the drawee bank's
refusal to pay "stamped or written thereon or attached thereto, giving the reason therefor,
"shall constitute prima facie proof of "the making or issuance of said check, and the due
presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof ... for the reason written,
stamped or attached by the drawee on such dishonored check." 6
The presumptions being merely prima facie, it is open to the accused of course to present
proof to the contrary to overcome the said presumptions.
II
14 | E l i x i r C . L a n g a n l a n g a n
Constitutional Law, Atty. Carlomagno Calingin
XU – College of Law
OF CASES BATCH 8
BP 22 is aimed at putting a stop to or curbing the practice of issuing checks that are
worthless, i.e. checks that end up being rejected or dishonored for payment. The practice,
as discussed later, is proscribed by the state because of the injury it causes to t public
interests.
Before the enactment of BP 22, provisions already existed in our statute books which
problem within the context of crimes against property punished as "estafa" or crimes
involving fraud and deceit. The focus of these penal provisions is on the damage caused to
the property rights of the victim.
The Penal Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 1887 until it was
replaced by the Revised Penal Code in 1932, contained provisions penalizing, among
others, the act of defrauding another through false pretenses. Art. 335 punished a person
who defrauded another "by falsely pretending to possess any power, influence,
qualification, property, credit, agency or business, or by means of similar deceit." Although
no explicit mention was made therein regarding checks, this provision was deemed to
cover within its ambit the issuance of worthless or bogus checks in exchange for money. 7
In 1926, an amendment was introduced by the Philippine Legislature, which added a new
clause (paragraph 10) to Article 335 of the old Penal Code, this time referring in explicit
terms to the issuance of worthless checks. The amendment penalized any person who 1)
issues a check in payment of a debt or for other valuable consideration, knowing at the
time of its issuance that he does not have sufficient funds in the bank to cover its amount,
or 2) maliciously signs the check differently from his authentic signature as registered at
the bank in order that the latter would refuse to honor it; or 3) issues a postdated check
and, at the date set for its payment, does not have sufficient deposit to cover the same.8
In 1932, as already adverted to, the old Penal Code was superseded by the Revised Penal
Code. 9 The above provisions, in amended form, were incorporated in Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code defining the crime of estafa. The revised text of the provision read as
follows:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa).—Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to
or simultaneously with the commis sion of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by
means of other similar deceits;
xxx xxx xxx
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation the offender
knowing that at the time he had no funds in the bank, or the funds deposited by him
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
were not sufficient to cover the amount of the cheek without informing the payee of
such circumstances.
The scope of paragraph 2 (d), however, was deemed to exclude checks issued in payment
of pre-existing obligations. 10 The rationale of this interpretation is that in estafa, the
deceit causing the defraudation must be prior to or simultaneous with the commission of
the fraud. In issuing a check as payment for a pre-existing debt, the drawer does not derive
any material benefit in return or as consideration for its issuance. On the part of the payee,
he had already parted with his money or property before the check is issued to him hence,
he is not defrauded by means of any "prior" or "simultaneous" deceit perpetrated on him
by the drawer of the check.
With the intention of remedying the situation and solving the problem of how to bring
checks issued in payment of pre-existing debts within the ambit of Art. 315, an amendment
was introduced by the Congress of the Philippines in 1967, 11 which was enacted into law
as Republic Act No. 4885, revising the aforesaid proviso to read as follows:
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the
offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient
to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit
the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice
from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for
lack or insufficiency of funds shall be puma facie evidence of deceit constituting false
pretense or fraudulent act.
However, the adoption of the amendment did not alter the situation materially. A divided
Court held in People vs. Sabio, Jr. 12 that Article 315, as amended by Republic Act 4885,
does not cover checks issued in payment of pre-existing obligations, again relying on the
concept underlying the crime of estafa through false pretenses or deceit—which is, that
the deceit or false pretense must be prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the
fraud.
Since statistically it had been shown that the greater bulk of dishonored checks consisted
of those issued in payment of pre-existing debts, 13 the amended provision evidently
failed to cope with the real problem and to deal effectively with the evil that it was
intended to eliminate or minimize.
With the foregoing factual and legal antecedents as a backdrop, the then Interim Batasan
confronted the problem squarely. It opted to take a bold step and decided to enact a law
dealing with the problem of bouncing or worthless checks, without attaching the law's
umbilical cord to the existing penal provisions on estafa. BP 22 addresses the problem
directly and frontally and makes the act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum.
14
The question now arises: Is B P 22 a valid law?
15 | E l i x i r C . L a n g a n l a n g a n
Constitutional Law, Atty. Carlomagno Calingin
XU – College of Law
OF CASES BATCH 8
Previous efforts to deal with the problem of bouncing checks within the ambit of the law
on estafa did not evoke any constitutional challenge. In contrast, BP 22 was challenged
promptly.
Those who question the constitutionality of BP 22 insist that: (1) it offends the
constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt; (2) it impairs freedom of
contract; (3) it contravenes the equal protection clause; (4) it unduly delegates legislative
and executive powers; and (5) its enactment is flawed in that during its passage the
Interim Batasan violated the constitutional provision prohibiting amendments to a bill on
Third Reading.
The constitutional challenge to BP 22 posed by petitioners deserves a searching and
thorough scrutiny and the most deliberate consideration by the Court, involving as it does
the exercise of what has been described as "the highest and most delicate function which
belongs to the judicial department of the government." 15
As we enter upon the task of passing on the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate
branch of the government, we need not be reminded of the time-honored principle, deeply
ingrained in our jurisprudence, that a statute is presumed to be valid. Every presumption
must be indulged in favor of its constitutionality. This is not to say that we approach our
task with diffidence or timidity. Where it is clear that the legislature has overstepped the
limits of its authority under the constitution we should not hesitate to wield the axe and
let it fall heavily, as fall it must, on the offending statute.
III
Among the constitutional objections raised against BP 22, the most serious is the alleged
conflict between the statute and the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for
debt. It is contended that the statute runs counter to the inhibition in the Bill of Rights
which states, "No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax." 16
Petitioners insist that, since the offense under BP 22 is consummated only upon the
dishonor or non-payment of the check when it is presented to the drawee bank, the statute
is really a "bad debt law" rather than a "bad check law." What it punishes is the non-
payment of the check, not the act of issuing it. The statute, it is claimed, is nothing more
than a veiled device to coerce payment of a debt under the threat of penal sanction.
First of all it is essential to grasp the essence and scope of the constitutional inhibition
invoked by petitioners. Viewed in its historical context, the constitutional prohibition
against imprisonment for debt is a safeguard that evolved gradually during the early part
of the nineteenth century in the various states of the American Union as a result of the
people's revulsion at the cruel and inhumane practice, sanctioned by common law, which
permitted creditors to cause the incarceration of debtors who could not pay their debts.
At common law, money judgments arising from actions for the recovery of a debt or for
damages from breach of a contract could be enforced against the person or body of the
debtor by writ of capias ad satisfaciendum. By means of this writ, a debtor could be seized
and imprisoned at the instance of the creditor until he makes the satisfaction awarded. As
a consequence of the popular ground swell against such a barbarous practice, provisions
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
forbidding imprisonment for debt came to be generally enshrined in the constitutions of
various states of the Union. 17
This humanitarian provision was transported to our shores by the Americans at the turn
of t0he century and embodied in our organic laws. 18 Later, our fundamental law outlawed
not only imprisonment for debt, but also the infamous practice, native to our shore, of
throwing people in jail for non-payment of the cedula or poll tax. 19
The reach and scope of this constitutional safeguard have been the subject of judicial
definition, both by our Supreme Court 20 and by American State courts.21 Mr. Justice
Malcolm speaking for the Supreme Court in Ganaway vs. Queen, 22 stated: "The 'debt'
intended to be covered by the constitutional guaranty has a well-defined meaning. Organic
provisions relieving from imprisonment for debt, were intended to prevent commitment
of debtors to prison for liabilities arising from actions ex contractu The inhibition was
never meant to include damages arising in actions ex delicto, for the reason that damages
recoverable therein do not arise from any contract entered into between the parties but
are imposed upon the defendant for the wrong he has done and are considered as
punishment, nor to fines and penalties imposed by the courts in criminal proceedings as
punishments for crime."
The law involved in Ganaway was not a criminal statute but the Code of Procedure in Civil
Actions (1909) which authorized the arrest of the defendant in a civil case on grounds akin
to those which justify the issuance of a writ of attachment under our present Rules of
Court, such as imminent departure of the defendant from the Philippines with intent to
defraud his creditors, or concealment, removal or disposition of properties in fraud of
creditors, etc. The Court, in that case, declared the detention of the defendant unlawful,
being violative of the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt, and ordered
his release. The Court, however, refrained from declaring the statutory provision in
question unconstitutional.
Closer to the case at bar is People v. Vera Reyes,23 wherein a statutory provision which
made illegal and punishable the refusal of an employer to pay, when he can do so, the
salaries of his employees or laborers on the fifteenth or last day of every month or on
Saturday every week, was challenged for being violative of the constitutional prohibition
against imprisonment for debt. The constitutionality of the law in question was upheld by
the Court, it being within the authority of the legislature to enact such a law in the exercise
of the police power. It was held that "one of the purposes of the law is to suppress possible
abuses on the part of the employers who hire laborers or employees without paying them
the salaries agreed upon for their services, thus causing them financial difficulties. "The
law was viewed not as a measure to coerce payment of an obligation, although obviously
such could be its effect, but to banish a practice considered harmful to public welfare.
IV
Has BP 22 transgressed the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt? To
answer the question, it is necessary to examine what the statute prohibits and punishes as
an offense. Is it the failure of the maker of the check to pay a debt? Or is it the making and
16 | E l i x i r C . L a n g a n l a n g a n
Constitutional Law, Atty. Carlomagno Calingin
XU – College of Law
OF CASES BATCH 8
issuance of a worthless check in payment of a debt? What is the gravamen of the offense?
This question lies at the heart of the issue before us.
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless
check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-
payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to
coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal
sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its
deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law
punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.
Admittedly, the distinction may seem at first blush to appear elusive and difficult to
conceptualize. But precisely in the failure to perceive the vital distinction lies the error of
those who challenge the validity of BP 22.
It may be constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to penalize a person for non-
payment of a debt ex contractu But certainly it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking
body to proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala
in se are not the only acts which the law can punish. An act may not be considered by
society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se but because of the harm that it inflicts
on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The
state can do this in the exercise of its police power.
The police power of the state has been described as "the most essential, insistent and
illimitable of powers" which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety
and welfare of society. 24 It is a power not emanating from or conferred by the
constitution, but inherent in the state, plenary, "suitably vague and far from precisely
defined, rooted in the conception that man in organizing the state and imposing upon the
government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable
individual citizens or group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such
salutary measures to ensure communal peace, safety, good order and welfare." 25
The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy,
the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by
the imposition of penal sanctions.
It is not for us to question the wisdom or impolicy of the statute. It is sufficient that a
reasonable nexus exists between means and end. Considering the factual and legal
antecedents that led to the adoption of the statute, it is not difficult to understand the
public concern which prompted its enactment. It had been reported that the approximate
value of bouncing checks per day was close to 200 million pesos, and thereafter when
overdrafts were banned by the Central Bank, it averaged between 50 minion to 80 million
pesos a day. 26
By definition, a check is a bill of exchange drawn on a bank and payable on demand. 27 It
is a written order on a bank, purporting to be drawn against a deposit of funds for the
payment of all events, of a sum of money to a certain person therein named or to his order
or to cash and payable on demand. 28 Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
undertaking to pay an amount of money. It is an order addressed to a bank and partakes
of a representation that the drawer has funds on deposit against which the check is drawn,
sufficient to ensure payment upon its presentation to the bank. There is therefore an
element of certainty or assurance that the instrument wig be paid upon presentation. For
this reason, checks have become widely accepted as a medium of payment in trade and
commerce. Although not legal tender, checks have come to be perceived as convenient
substitutes for currency in commercial and financial transactions. The basis or foundation
of such perception is confidence. If such confidence is shakes the usefulness of checks as
currency substitutes would be greatly diminished or may become nit Any practice
therefore tending to destroy that confidence should be deterred for the proliferation of
worthless checks can only create havoc in trade circles and the banking community.
Recent statistics of the Central Bank show that one-third of the entire money supply of the
country, roughly totalling P32.3 billion, consists of peso demand deposits; the remaining
two. 29 These de deposit thirds consists of currency in circulation. ma deposits in the banks
constitute the funds against which among others, commercial papers like checks, are
drawn. The magnitude of the amount involved amply justifies the legitimate concern of
the state in preserving the integrity of the banking system. Flooding the system with
worthless checks is like pouring garbage into the bloodstream of the nation's economy.
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the
parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at
large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury
to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation,
multiplied a thousand fold, can very wen pollute the channels of trade and commerce,
injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public
interest. As aptly stated — 30
The 'check flasher' does a great deal more than contract a debt; he shakes the pillars
of business; and to my mind, it is a mistaken charity of judgment to place him in the
same category with the honest man who is unable to pay his debts, and for whom the
constitutional inhibition against' imprisonment for debt, except in cases of fraud was
intended as a shield and not a sword.
In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not
repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.
This Court is not unaware of the conflicting jurisprudence obtaining in the various states
of the United States on the constitutionality of the "worthless check" acts. 31 It is needless
to warn that foreign jurisprudence must be taken with abundant caution. A caveat to be
observed is that substantial differences exist between our statute and the worthless check
acts of those states where the jurisprudence have evolved. One thing to remember is that
BP 22 was not lifted bodily from any existing statute. Furthermore, we have to consider
that judicial decisions must be read in the context of the facts and the law involved and, in
a broader sense, of the social economic and political environment—in short, the milieu—
under which they were made. We recognize the wisdom of the old saying that what is
sauce for the goose may not be sauce for the gander.
17 | E l i x i r C . L a n g a n l a n g a n
Constitutional Law, Atty. Carlomagno Calingin
XU – College of Law
OF CASES BATCH 8
As stated elsewhere, police power is a dynamic force that enables the state to meet the
exigencies of changing times. There are occasions when the police power of the state may
even override a constitutional guaranty. For example, there have been cases wherein we
held that the constitutional provision on non-impairment of contracts must yield to the
police power of the state. 32 Whether the police power may override the constitutional
inhibition against imprisonment for debt is an issue we do not have to address. This bridge
has not been reached, so there is no occasion to cross it.
We hold that BP 22 does not conflict with the constitutional inhibition against
imprisonment for debt.
V
We need not detain ourselves lengthily in the examination of the other constitutional
objections raised by petitioners, some of which are rather flimsy.
We find no valid ground to sustain the contention that BP 22 impairs freedom of contract.
The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into
"lawful" contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. 33 Besides, we
must bear in mind that checks can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial
instrument which, in this modem day and age, has become a convenient substitute for
money; it forms part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free from the
regulatory power of the state.
Neither do we find substance in the claim that the statute in question denies equal
protection of the laws or is discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of the check, but
not the payee. It is contended that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as the
drawer of the check, since without the indispensable participation of the payee by his
acceptance of the check there would be no crime. This argument is tantamount to saying
that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both the swindler and the swindled.
The petitioners' posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause "equal protection
of the laws." The clause does not preclude classification of individuals, who may be
accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is no unreasonable
or arbitrary. 34
It is also suggested that BP 22 constitutes undue or improper delegation of legislative
powers, on the theory that the offense is not completed by the sole act of the maker or
drawer but is made to depend on the will of the payee. If the payee does not present the
check to the bank for payment but instead keeps it, there would be no crime. The logic of
the argument stretches to absurdity the meaning of "delegation of legislative power." What
cannot be delegated is the power to legislate, or the power to make laws. 35 which means,
as applied to the present case, the power to define the offense sought to be punished and
to prescribe the penalty. By no stretch of logic or imagination can it be said that the power
to define the crime and prescribe the penalty therefor has been in any manner delegated
to the payee. Neither is there any provision in the statute that can be construed, no matter
how remotely, as undue delegation of executive power. The suggestion that the statute
unlawfully delegates its enforcement to the offended party is farfetched.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION OF CASES BATCH 8
Lastly, the objection has been raised that Section 9 (2) of Article VII of the 1973
Constitution was violated by the legislative body when it enacted BP 22 into law. This
constitutional provision prohibits the introduction of amendments to a bill during the
Third Reading. It is claimed that during its Third Reading, the bill which eventually became
BP 22 was amended in that the text of the second paragraph of Section 1 of the bill as
adopted on Second Reading was altered or changed in the printed text of the bill submitted
for approval on Third Reading.

A careful review of the record of the proceedings of the Interim Batasan on this matter
shows that, indeed, there was some confusion among Batasan Members on what was the
exact text of the paragraph in question which the body approved on Second Reading. 36
Part of the confusion was due apparently to the fact that during the deliberations on
Second Reading (the amendment period), amendments were proposed orally and
approved by the body or accepted by the sponsor, hence, some members might not have
gotten the complete text of the provisions of the bill as amended and approved on Second
Reading. However, it is clear from the records that the text of the second paragraph of
Section 1 of BP 22 is the text which was actually approved by the body on Second Reading
on February 7, 1979, as reflected in the approved Minutes for that day. In any event, before
the bin was submitted for final approval on Third Reading, the Interim Batasan created a
Special Committee to investigate the matter, and the Committee in its report, which was
approved by the entire body on March 22, 1979, stated that "the clause in question was ...
an authorized amendment of the bill and the printed copy thereof reflects accurately the
provision in question as approved on Second Reading. 37 We therefore, find no merit in the
petitioners' claim that in the enactment of BP 22 the provisions of Section 9 (2) of Article
VIII of the 1973 Constitution were violated.

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered granting the petition in G.R. No. 75789 and setting
aside the order of the respondent Judge dated August 19, 1986. The petitions in G.R. Nos.
63419, 66839-42, 71654, 74524-25, 75122-49, 75812-13 and 75765-67 are hereby
dismissed and the temporary restraining order issued in G.R. Nos. 74524-25 is lifted. With
costs against private petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

18 | E l i x i r C . L a n g a n l a n g a n
Constitutional Law, Atty. Carlomagno Calingin
XU – College of Law
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
G.R. No. 149927 March 30, 2004
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
Under then Minister ERNESTO R. MACEDA; and Former Government Officials
CATALINO MACARAIG, FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, ANGEL C. ALCALA, BEN
MALAYANG, ROBERTO PAGDANGANAN, MARIANO Z. VALERA and ROMULO
SAN JUAN, petitioners,
vs.
ROSEMOOR MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PEDRO DEL CONCHA,
and ALEJANDRO and RUFO DE GUZMAN, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A mining license that contravenes a mandatory provision of the law under which it is
granted is void. Being a mere privilege, a license does not vest absolute rights in the
holder. Thus, without offending the due process and the non-impairment clauses of
the Constitution, it can be revoked by the State in the public interest.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
nullify the May 29, 2001 Decision2 and the September 6, 2001 Resolution3 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 46878. The CA disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto."4
The questioned Resolution denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.
On the other hand, trial court’s Decision, which was affirmed by the CA, had disposed
as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring that the cancellation of License No. 33 was done without jurisdiction
and in gross violation of the Constitutional right of the petitioners against
deprivation of their property rights without due process of law and is hereby
set aside.
2. Declaring that the petitioners’ right to continue the exploitation of the marble
deposits in the area covered by License No. 33 is maintained for the duration
19 | E l i x i r C . L a n g a n l a n g a n
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XU – College of Law
OF CASES BATCH 8
of the period of its life of twenty-five (25) years, less three (3) years of
continuous operation before License No. 33 was cancelled, unless sooner
terminated for violation of any of the conditions specified therein, with due
process.
3. ‘Making the Writ of preliminary injunction and the Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction issued as permanent.
4. Ordering the cancellation of the bond filed by the Petitioners in the sum of 1
Million.
5. Allowing the petitioners to present evidence in support of the damages they
claim to have suffered from, as a consequence of the summary cancellation of
License No. 33 pursuant to the agreement of the parties on such dates as
maybe set by the Court; and
6. Denying for lack of merit the motions for contempt, it appearing that
actuations of the respondents were not contumacious and intended to delay
the proceedings or undermine the integrity of the Court.
‘No pronouncement yet as to costs.’"5
The Facts
The CA narrated the facts as follows:
"The four (4) petitioners, namely, Dr. Lourdes S. Pascual, Dr. Pedro De la Concha,
Alejandro De La Concha, and Rufo De Guzman, after having been granted permission
to prospect for marble deposits in the mountains of Biak-na-Bato, San Miguel,
Bulacan, succeeded in discovering marble deposits of high quality and in commercial
quantities in Mount Mabio which forms part of the Biak-na-Bato mountain range.
"Having succeeded in discovering said marble deposits, and as a result of their tedious
efforts and substantial expenses, the petitioners applied with the Bureau of Mines,
now Mines and Geosciences Bureau, for the issuance of the corresponding license to
exploit said marble deposits.
xxxxxxxxx
"After compliance with numerous required conditions, License No. 33 was issued by
the Bureau of Mines in favor of the herein petitioners.
xxxxxxxxx
"Shortly after Respondent Ernesto R. Maceda was appointed Minister of the
Department of Energy and Natural Resources (DENR), petitioners’ License No. 33 was
cancelled by him through his letter to ROSEMOOR MINING AND DEVELOPMENT
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
CORPORATION dated September 6, 1986 for the reasons stated therein. Because of
the aforesaid cancellation, the original petition was filed and later substituted by the
petitioners’ AMENDED PETITION dated August 21, 1991 to assail the same.
"Also after due hearing, the prayer for injunctive relief was granted in the Order of
this Court dated February 28, 1992. Accordingly, the corresponding preliminary writs
were issued after the petitioners filed their injunction bond in the amount of ONE
MILLION PESOS (₱1,000,000.00).
xxxxxxxxx
"On September 27, 1996, the trial court rendered the herein questioned decision."6
The trial court ruled that the privilege granted under respondents’ license had
already ripened into a property right, which was protected under the due process
clause of the Constitution. Such right was supposedly violated when the license was
cancelled without notice and hearing. The cancellation was said to be unjustified,
because the area that could be covered by the four separate applications of
respondents was 400 hectares. Finally, according to the RTC, Proclamation No. 84,
which confirmed the cancellation of the license, was an ex post facto law; as such, it
violated Section 3 of Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, herein petitioners asked whether PD 463 or the
Mineral Resources Development Decree of 1974 had been violated by the award of
the 330.3062 hectares to respondents in accordance with Proclamation No. 2204.
They also questioned the validity of the cancellation of respondents’ Quarry
License/Permit (QLP) No. 33.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Sustaining the trial court in toto, the CA held that the grant of the quarry license
covering 330.3062 hectares to respondents was authorized by law, because the
license was embraced by four (4) separate applications -- each for an area of 81
hectares. Moreover, it held that the limitation under Presidential Decree No. 463 --
that a quarry license should cover not more than 100 hectares in any given province
-- was supplanted by Republic Act No. 7942,7 which increased the mining areas
allowed under PD 463.
It also ruled that the cancellation of respondents’ license without notice and hearing
was tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law. It added that
under the clause in the Constitution dealing with the non-impairment of obligations
and contracts, respondents’ license must be respected by the State.
20 | E l i x i r C . L a n g a n l a n g a n
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XU – College of Law
OF CASES BATCH 8
Hence, this Petition.8
Issues
Petitioners submit the following issues for the Court’s consideration:
"(1) [W]hether or not QLP No. 33 was issued in blatant contravention of Section 69,
P.D. No. 463; and (2) whether or not Proclamation No. 84 issued by then President
Corazon Aquino is valid. The corollary issue is whether or not the Constitutional
prohibition against ex post facto law applies to Proclamation No. 84"9
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition has merit.
First Issue: Validity of License
Respondents contend that the Petition has no legal basis, because PD 463 has already
been repealed.10 In effect, they ask for the dismissal of the Petition on the ground of
mootness.
PD 463, as amended, pertained to the old system of exploration, development and
utilization of natural resources through licenses, concessions or leases.11 While these
arrangements were provided under the 1935 12 and the 197313 Constitutions, they
have been omitted by Section 2 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.14
With the shift of constitutional policy toward "full control and supervision of the
State" over natural resources, the Court in Miners Association of the Philippines v.
Factoran Jr. 15 declared the provisions of PD 463 as contrary to or violative of the
express mandate of the 1987 Constitution. The said provisions dealt with the lease of
mining claims; quarry permits or licenses covering privately owned or public lands;
and other related provisions on lease, licenses and permits.
RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 embodies the new constitutional
mandate. It has repealed or amended all laws, executive orders, presidential decrees,
rules and regulations -- or parts thereof -- that are inconsistent with any of its
provisions.16
It is relevant to state, however, that Section 2 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
does not apply retroactively to a "license, concession or lease" granted by the
government under the 1973 Constitution or before the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution on February 2, 1987.17 As noted in Miners Association of the Philippines
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
v. Factoran Jr., the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission 18 emphasized the
intent to apply the said constitutional provision prospectively.
While RA 7942 has expressly repealed provisions of mining laws that are inconsistent
with its own, it nonetheless respects previously issued valid and existing licenses, as
follows:
"SECTION 5. Mineral Reservations. — When the national interest so requires,
such as when there is a need to preserve strategic raw materials for industries
critical to national development, or certain minerals for scientific, cultural or
ecological value, the President may establish mineral reservations upon the
recommendation of the Director through the Secretary. Mining operations in
existing mineral reservations and such other reservations as may thereafter be
established, shall be undertaken by the Department or through a contractor:
Provided, That a small scale-mining cooperative covered by Republic Act No.
7076 shall be given preferential right to apply for a small-scale mining
agreement for a maximum aggregate area of twenty-five percent (25%) of such
mineral reservation, subject to valid existing mining/quarrying rights as
provided under Section 112 Chapter XX hereof. All submerged lands within the
contiguous zone and in the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines are
hereby declared to be mineral reservations.
"x x x x x x x x x
"SECTION 7. Periodic Review of Existing Mineral Reservations. — The Secretary
shall periodically review existing mineral reservations for the purpose of
determining whether their continued existence is consistent with the national
interest, and upon his recommendation, the President may, by proclamation,
alter or modify the boundaries thereof or revert the same to the public domain
without prejudice to prior existing rights."
"SECTION 18. Areas Open to Mining Operations. — Subject to any existing rights
or reservations and prior agreements of all parties, all mineral resources in
public or private lands, including timber or forestlands as defined in existing
laws, shall be open to mineral agreements or financial or technical assistance
agreement applications. Any conflict that may arise under this provision shall be
heard and resolved by the panel of arbitrators."
"SECTION 19. Areas Closed to Mining Applications. -- Mineral agreement or
financial or technical assistance agreement applications shall not be allowed:
(a) In military and other government reservations, except upon prior
written clearance by the government agency concerned;
21 | E l i x i r C . L a n g a n l a n g a n
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XU – College of Law
OF CASES BATCH 8
(b) Near or under public or private buildings, cemeteries, archeological and
historic sites, bridges, highways, waterways, railroads, reservoirs, dams
or other infrastructure projects, public or private works including
plantations or valuable crops, except upon written consent of the
government agency or private entity concerned;
(c) In areas covered by valid and existing mining rights;
(d) In areas expressly prohibited by law;
(e) In areas covered by small-scale miners as defined by law unless with
prior consent of the small-scale miners, in which case a royalty payment
upon the utilization of minerals shall be agreed upon by the parties, said
royalty forming a trust fund for the socioeconomic development of the
community concerned; and
(f) Old growth or virgin forests, proclaimed watershed forest reserves,
wilderness areas, mangrove forests, mossy forests, national parks,
provincial/municipal forests, parks, greenbelts, game refuge and bird
sanctuaries as defined by law and in areas expressly prohibited under the
National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS) under Republic Act
No. 7586, Department Administrative Order No. 25, series of 1992 and
other laws."
"SECTION 112. Non-impairment of Existing Mining/ Quarrying Rights. — All
valid and existing mining lease contracts, permits/licenses, leases pending
renewal, mineral production-sharing agreements granted under Executive
Order No. 279, at the date of effectivity of this Act, shall remain valid, shall not
be impaired, and shall be recognized by the Government: Provided, That the
provisions of Chapter XIV on government share in mineral production-sharing
agreement and of Chapter XVI on incentives of this Act shall immediately govern
and apply to a mining lessee or contractor unless the mining lessee or contractor
indicates his intention to the secretary, in writing, not to avail of said provisions:
Provided, further, That no renewal of mining lease contracts shall be made after
the expiration of its term: Provided, finally, That such leases, production-sharing
agreements, financial or technical assistance agreements shall comply with the
applicable provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
"SECTION 113. Recognition of Valid and Existing Mining Claims and
Lease/Quarry Application. — Holders of valid and existing mining claims,
lease/quarry applications shall be given preferential rights to enter into any
mode of mineral agreement with the government within two (2) years from the
promulgation of the rules and regulations implementing this Act."
(Underscoring supplied)
Section 3(p) of RA 7942 defines an existing mining/quarrying right as "a valid and
subsisting mining claim or permit or quarry permit or any mining lease contract or
agreement covering a mineralized area granted/issued under pertinent mining laws."
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
Consequently, determining whether the license of respondents falls under this
definition would be relevant to fixing their entitlement to the rights and/or
preferences under RA 7942. Hence, the present Petition has not been mooted.
Petitioners submit that the license clearly contravenes Section 69 of PD 463, because
it exceeds the maximum area that may be granted. This incipient violation, according
to them, renders the license void ab initio.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that the license was validly granted, because
it was covered by four separate applications for areas of 81 hectares each.
The license in question, QLP No. 33,19 is dated August 3, 1982, and it was issued in the
name of Rosemoor Mining Development Corporation. The terms of the license
allowed the corporation to extract and dispose of marbleized limestone from a
330.3062-hectare land in San Miguel, Bulacan. The license is, however, subject to the
terms and conditions of PD 463, the governing law at the time it was granted; as well
as to the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder. 20 By the same token,
Proclamation No. 2204 -- which awarded to Rosemoor the right of development,
exploitation, and utilization of the mineral site -- expressly cautioned that the grant
was subject to "existing policies, laws, rules and regulations."21
The license was thus subject to Section 69 of PD 463, which reads:
"Section 69. Maximum Area of Quarry License – Notwithstanding the provisions
of Section 14 hereof, a quarry license shall cover an area of not more than one
hundred (100) hectares in any one province and not more than one thousand
(1,000) hectares in the entire Philippines." (Italics supplied)
The language of PD 463 is clear. It states in categorical and mandatory terms that a
quarry license, like that of respondents, should cover a maximum of 100 hectares in
any given province. This law neither provides any exception nor makes any reference
to the number of applications for a license. Section 69 of PD 463 must be taken to
mean exactly what it says. Where the law is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.22
Moreover, the lower courts’ ruling is evidently inconsistent with the fact that QLP No.
33 was issued solely in the name of Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation,
rather than in the names of the four individual stockholders who are respondents
herein. It likewise brushes aside a basic postulate that a corporation has a separate
personality from that of its stockholders.23
The interpretation adopted by the lower courts is contrary to the purpose of Section
69 of PD 463. Such intent to limit, without qualification, the area of a quarry license
22 | E l i x i r C . L a n g a n l a n g a n
Constitutional Law, Atty. Carlomagno Calingin
XU – College of Law
OF CASES BATCH 8
strictly to 100 hectares in any one province is shown by the opening proviso that
reads: "Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 hereof x x x." The mandatory
nature of the provision is also underscored by the use of the word shall. Hence, in the
application of the 100-hectare-per-province limit, no regard is given to the size or the
number of mining claims under Section 14, which we quote:
"SECTION 14. Size of Mining Claim. -- For purposes of registration of a mining
claim under this Decree, the Philippine territory and its shelf are hereby divided
into meridional blocks or quadrangles of one-half minute (1/2) of latitude and
longitude, each block or quadrangle containing area of eighty-one (81) hectares,
more or less.
"A mining claim shall cover one such block although a lesser area may be
allowed if warranted by attendant circumstances, such as geographical and
other justifiable considerations as may be determined by the Director: Provided,
That in no case shall the locator be allowed to register twice the area allowed for
lease under Section 43 hereof." (Italics supplied)
Clearly, the intent of the law would be brazenly circumvented by ruling that a license
may cover an area exceeding the maximum by the mere expediency of filing several
applications. Such ruling would indirectly permit an act that is directly prohibited by
the law.
Second Issue: Validity of Proclamation No. 84
Petitioners also argue that the license was validly declared a nullity and consequently
withdrawn or terminated. In a letter dated September 15, 1986, respondents were
informed by then Minister Ernesto M. Maceda that their license had illegally been
issued, because it violated Section 69 of PD 463; and that there was no more public
interest served by the continued existence or renewal of the license. The latter reason,
they added, was confirmed by the language of Proclamation No. 84. According to this
law, public interest would be served by reverting the parcel of land that was excluded
by Proclamation No. 2204 to the former status of that land as part of the Biak-na-Bato
national park.
They also contend that Section 74 of PD 463 would not apply, because Minister
Maceda’s letter did not cancel or revoke QLP No. 33, but merely declared the latter’s
nullity. They further argue that respondents waived notice and hearing in their
application for the license.
On the other hand, respondents submit that, as provided for in Section 74 of PD 463,
their right to due process was violated when their license was cancelled without
notice and hearing. They likewise contend that Proclamation No. 84 is not valid for
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
the following reasons: 1) it violates the clause on the non-impairment of contracts; 2)
it is an ex post facto law and/or a bill of attainder; and 3) it was issued by the President
after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution.
This Court ruled on the nature of a natural resource exploration permit, which was
akin to the present respondents’ license, in Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining
Corporation v. Balite Portal Mining Cooperative,24 which held:
"x x x. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals in its challenged decision, EP No.
133 merely evidences a privilege granted by the State, which may be amended,
modified or rescinded when the national interest so requires. This is necessarily
so since the exploration, development and utilization of the country’s natural
mineral resources are matters impressed with great public interest. Like timber
permits, mining exploration permits do not vest in the grantee any permanent
or irrevocable right within the purview of the non-impairment of contract and
due process clauses of the Constitution, since the State, under its all-
encompassing police power, may alter, modify or amend the same, in
accordance with the demands of the general welfare."25
This same ruling had been made earlier in Tan v. Director of Forestry 26 with regard
to a timber license, a pronouncement that was reiterated in Ysmael v. Deputy
Executive Secretary,27 the pertinent portion of which reads:
"x x x. Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal
instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be
gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified
entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the
particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly
amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national
interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of
the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705,
as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27,
1983, 125 SCRA 302]."28 (Italics supplied)
In line with the foregoing jurisprudence, respondents’ license may be revoked or
rescinded by executive action when the national interest so requires, because it is not
a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the
Constitution.29 Respondents themselves acknowledge this condition of the grant
under paragraph 7 of QLP No. 33, which we quote:
"7. This permit/license may be revoked or cancelled at any time by the Director
of Mines and Geo-Sciences when, in his opinion public interests so require or,
upon failure of the permittee/licensee to comply with the provisions of
23 | E l i x i r C . L a n g a n l a n g a n
Constitutional Law, Atty. Carlomagno Calingin
XU – College of Law
OF CASES BATCH 8
Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and the rules and regulations
promulgated thereunder, as well as with the terms and conditions specified
herein; Provided, That if a permit/license is cancelled, or otherwise terminated,
the permittee/licensee shall be liable for all unpaid rentals and royalties due up
to the time of the termination or cancellation of the permit/license[.]" 30 (Italics
supplied)
The determination of what is in the public interest is necessarily vested in the State
as owner of all mineral resources. That determination was based on policy
considerations formally enunciated in the letter dated September 15, 1986, issued by
then Minister Maceda and, subsequently, by the President through Proclamation No.
84. As to the exercise of prerogative by Maceda, suffice it to say that while the
cancellation or revocation of the license is vested in the director of mines and geo-
sciences, the latter is subject to the former’s control as the department head. We also
stress the clear prerogative of the Executive Department in the evaluation and the
consequent cancellation of licenses in the process of its formulation of policies with
regard to their utilization. Courts will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion
without any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion.31
Moreover, granting that respondents’ license is valid, it can still be validly revoked by
the State in the exercise of police power.32 The exercise of such power through
Proclamation No. 84 is clearly in accord with jura regalia, which reserves to the State
ownership of all natural resources.33 This Regalian doctrine is an exercise of its
sovereign power as owner of lands of the public domain and of the patrimony of the
nation, the mineral deposits of which are a valuable asset.34
Proclamation No. 84 cannot be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment
clause. As pointed out earlier, respondents’ license is not a contract to which the
protection accorded by the non-impairment clause may extend.35 Even if the license
were, it is settled that provisions of existing laws and a reservation of police power
are deemed read into it, because it concerns a subject impressed with public
welfare.36 As it is, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the
state.37
We cannot sustain the argument that Proclamation No. 84 is a bill of attainder; that
is, a "legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial."38 Its declaration
that QLP No. 33 is a patent nullity39 is certainly not a declaration of guilt. Neither is
the cancellation of the license a punishment within the purview of the constitutional
proscription against bills of attainder.
Too, there is no merit in the argument that the proclamation is an ex post facto law.
There are six recognized instances when a law is considered as such: 1) it criminalizes
and punishes an action that was done before the passing of the law and that was
innocent when it was done; 2) it aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION OF CASES BATCH 8
when it was committed; 3) it changes the punishment and inflicts one that is greater
than that imposed by the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; 4) it alters
the legal rules of evidence and authorizes conviction upon a less or different
testimony than that required by the law at the time of the commission of the offense;
5) it assumes the regulation of civil rights and remedies only, but in effect imposes a
penalty or a deprivation of a right as a consequence of something that was considered
lawful when it was done; and 6) it deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful
protection to which he or she become entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or an acquittal or the proclamation of an amnesty.40 Proclamation No. 84
does not fall under any of the enumerated categories; hence, it is not an ex post facto
law.

It is settled that an ex post facto law is limited in its scope only to matters criminal in
nature.41 Proclamation 84, which merely restored the area excluded from the Biak-
na-Bato national park by canceling respondents’ license, is clearly not penal in
character.

Finally, it is stressed that at the time President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 84 on
March 9, 1987, she was still validly exercising legislative powers under the
Provisional Constitution of 1986.42 Section 1 of Article II of Proclamation No. 3, which
promulgated the Provisional Constitution, granted her legislative power "until a
legislature is elected and convened under a new Constitution." The grant of such
power is also explicitly recognized and provided for in Section 6 of Article XVII of the
1987 Constitution.43

WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby GRANTED and the appealed Decision of the
Court of Appeals SET ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

24 | E l i x i r C . L a n g a n l a n g a n
Constitutional Law, Atty. Carlomagno Calingin
XU – College of Law
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
G.R. No. 184467 June 19, 2012
EDGARDO NAVIA,1 RUBEN DIO,2 and ANDREW BUISING, Petitioners,
vs.
VIRGINIA PARDICO, for and in behalf and in representation of BENHUR V. PARDICO
Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
For the protective writ of amparo to issue in enforced disappearance cases, allegation and
proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be shown
by the required quantum of proof that their disappearance was carried out by, "or with
the authorization, support or acquiescence of, [the government] or a political organization,
followed by a refusal to acknowledge [the same or] give information on the fate or
whereabouts of [said missing] persons."3
This petition for review on certiorari4 filed in relation to Section 19 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-
SC5 challenges the July 24, 2008 Decision6 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20,
Malolos City which granted the Petition for Writ of Amparo7 filed by herein respondent
against the petitioners.
Factual Antecedents
On March 31, 2008, at around 8:30 p.m., a vehicle of Asian Land Strategies Corporation8
(Asian Land) arrived at the house of Lolita M. Lapore (Lolita) located at 7A Lot 9, Block 54,
Grand Royale Subdivision, Barangay Lugam, Malolos City. The arrival of the vehicle
awakened Lolita’s son, Enrique Lapore (Bong), and Benhur Pardico (Ben), who were then
both staying in her house. When Lolita went out to investigate, she saw two uniformed
guards disembarking from the vehicle. One of them immediately asked Lolita where they
could find her son Bong. Before Lolita could answer, the guard saw Bong and told him that
he and Ben should go with them to the security office of Asian Land because a complaint
was lodged against them for theft of electric wires and lamps in the subdivision.9
Shortly thereafter, Bong, Lolita and Ben were in the office of the security department of
Asian Land also located in Grand Royale Subdivision.10 The supervisor of the security
guards, petitioner Edgardo Navia (Navia), also arrived thereat.
As to what transpired next, the parties’ respective versions diverge.
Version of the Petitioners
Petitioners alleged that they invited Bong and Ben to their office because they
received a report from a certain Mrs. Emphasis, a resident of Grand Royale
25 | E l i x i r C . L a n g a n l a n g a n
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XU – College of Law
OF CASES BATCH 8
Subdivision, that she saw Bong and Ben removing a lamp from a post in said
subdivision.11 The reported unauthorized taking of the lamp was relayed thru radio
to petitioners Ruben Dio (Dio) and Andrew Buising (Buising), who both work as
security guards at the Asian Land security department. Following their department’s
standard operating procedure, Dio and Buising entered the report in their logbook
and proceeded to the house of Mrs. Emphasis. It was there where Dio and Buising
were able to confirm who the suspects were. They thus repaired to the house of Lolita
where Bong and Ben were staying to invite the two suspects to their office. Bong and
Ben voluntarily went with them.
At the security office, Dio and Buising interviewed Bong and Ben. The suspects
admitted that they took the lamp but clarified that they were only transferring it to a
post nearer to the house of Lolita.12 Soon, Navia arrived and Buising informed him
that the complainant was not keen in participating in the investigation. Since there
was no complainant, Navia ordered the release of Bong and Ben. Bong then signed a
statement to the effect that the guards released him without inflicting any harm or
injury to him.13 His mother Lolita also signed the logbook below an entry which
states that she will never again harbor or entertain Ben in her house. Thereafter,
Lolita and Bong left the security office.
Ben was left behind as Navia was still talking to him about those who might be
involved in the reported loss of electric wires and lamps within the subdivision. After
a brief discussion though, Navia allowed Ben to leave. Ben also affixed his signature
on the logbook to affirm the statements entered by the guards that he was released
unharmed and without any injury.14
Upon Navia’s instructions, Dio and Buising went back to the house of Lolita to make
her sign the logbook as witness that they indeed released Ben from their custody.
Lolita asked Buising to read aloud that entry in the logbook where she was being
asked to sign, to which Buising obliged. Not contented, Lolita put on her reading
glasses and read the entry in the logbook herself before affixing her signature therein.
After which, the guards left.
Subsequently, petitioners received an invitation15 from the Malolos City Police
Station requesting them to appear thereat on April 17, 2008 relative to the complaint
of Virginia Pardico (Virginia) about her missing husband Ben. In compliance with the
invitation, all three petitioners appeared at the Malolos City Police Station. However,
since Virginia was not present despite having received the same invitation, the
meeting was reset to April 22, 2008.16
On April 22, 2008, Virginia attended the investigation. Petitioners informed her that
they released Ben and that they have no information as to his present whereabouts.17
They assured Virginia though that they will cooperate and help in the investigation of
her missing husband.18
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
Version of the Respondent
According to respondent, Bong and Ben were not merely invited. They were
unlawfully arrested, shoved into the Asian Land vehicle and brought to the security
office for investigation. Upon seeing Ben at the security office, Navia lividly grumbled
"Ikaw na naman?"19 and slapped him while he was still seated. Ben begged for mercy,
but his pleas were met with a flurry of punches coming from Navia hitting him on
different parts of his body.20 Navia then took hold of his gun, looked at Bong, and
said, "Wala kang nakita at wala kang narinig, papatayin ko na si Ben."21
Bong admitted that he and Ben attempted to take the lamp. He explained that the area
where their house is located is very dark and his father had long been asking the
administrator of Grand Royale Subdivision to install a lamp to illumine their area. But
since nothing happened, he took it upon himself to take a lamp from one of the posts
in the subdivision and transfer it to a post near their house. However, the lamp Bong
got was no longer working. Thus, he reinstalled it on the post from which he took it
and no longer pursued his plan. 22
Later on, Lolita was instructed to sign an entry in the guard’s logbook where she
undertook not to allow Ben to stay in her house anymore.23 Thereafter, Navia again
asked Lolita to sign the logbook. Upon Lolita’s inquiry as to why she had to sign again,
Navia explained that they needed proof that they released her son Bong unharmed
but that Ben had to stay as the latter’s case will be forwarded to the barangay. Since
she has poor eyesight, Lolita obligingly signed the logbook without reading it and then
left with Bong.24 At that juncture, Ben grabbed Bong and pleaded not to be left alone.
However, since they were afraid of Navia, Lolita and Bong left the security office at
once leaving Ben behind.25
Moments after Lolita and Bong reached their house, Buising arrived and asked Lolita
to sign the logbook again. Lolita asked Buising why she had to sign again when she
already twice signed the logbook at the headquarters. Buising assured her that what
she was about to sign only pertains to Bong’s release. Since it was dark and she has
poor eyesight, Lolita took Buising’s word and signed the logbook without, again,
reading what was written in it. 26
The following morning, Virginia went to the Asian Land security office to visit her
husband Ben, but only to be told that petitioners had already released him together
with Bong the night before. She then looked for Ben, asked around, and went to the
barangay. Since she could not still find her husband, Virginia reported the matter to
the police.
In the course of the investigation on Ben’s disappearance, it dawned upon Lolita that
petitioners took advantage of her poor eyesight and naivete. They made her sign the
logbook as a witness that they already released Ben when in truth and in fact she
26 | E l i x i r C . L a n g a n l a n g a n
Constitutional Law, Atty. Carlomagno Calingin
XU – College of Law
OF CASES BATCH 8
never witnessed his actual release. The last time she saw Ben was when she left him
in petitioners’ custody at the security office.27
Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her husband, Virginia filed a
Petition for Writ of Amparo28 before the RTC of Malolos City. Finding the petition
sufficient in form and substance, the amparo court issued an Order29 dated June 26,
2008 directing, among others, the issuance of a writ of amparo and the production of
the body of Ben before it on June 30, 2008. Thus:
WHEREFORE, conformably with Section 6 of the Supreme Court Resolution [in] A.M.
No. 07-[9]-12-SC, also known as "The Rule On The Writ Of Amparo", let a writ of
amparo be issued, as follows:
(1) ORDERING [petitioners] Edgardo Navia, Ruben Dio and Andrew Buising of the
Asian Land Security Agency to produce before the Court the body of aggrieved
party Benhur Pardico, on Monday, June 30, 2008, at 10:30 a.m.;
(2) ORDERING the holding of a summary hearing of the petition on the
aforementioned date and time, and DIRECTING the [petitioners] to personally
appear thereat;
(3) COMMANDING [petitioners] Edgardo Navia, Ruben Dio and Andrew Buising to
file, within a non-extendible period of seventy-two (72) hours from service of
the writ, a verified written return with supporting affidavits which shall,
among other things, contain the following:
a) The lawful defenses to show that the [petitioners] did not violate or
threaten with violation the right to life, liberty and security of the
aggrieved party, through any act or omission;
b) The steps or actions taken by the [petitioners] to determine the fate
or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or persons
responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
c) All relevant information in the possession of the [petitioners]
pertaining to the threat, act or omission against the aggrieved party.
(4) GRANTING, motu proprio, a Temporary Protection Order prohibiting the
[petitioners], or any persons acting for and in their behalf, under pain of
contempt, from threatening, harassing or inflicting any harm to [respondent],
his immediate family and any [member] of his household.
The Branch Sheriff is directed to immediately serve personally on the [petitioners], at
their address indicated in the petition, copies of the writ as well as this order, together
with copies of the petition and its annexes.30
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
A Writ of Amparo31 was accordingly issued and served on the petitioners on June 27,
2008.32 On June 30, 2008, petitioners filed their Compliance33 praying for the denial
of the petition for lack of merit.
A summary hearing was thereafter conducted. Petitioners presented the testimony of
Buising, while Virginia submitted the sworn statements34 of Lolita and Enrique
which the two affirmed on the witness stand.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 24, 2008, the trial court issued the challenged Decision35 granting the
petition. It disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby grants the privilege of the writ of amparo, and deems
it proper and appropriate, as follows:
(a) To hereby direct the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to immediately
conduct a deep and thorough investigation of the [petitioners] Edgardo
Navia, Ruben Dio and Andrew Buising in connection with the circumstances
surrounding the disappearance of [Benhur] Pardico, utilizing in the process,
as part of the investigation, the documents forming part of the records of this
case;
(b) To hereby direct the NBI to extend to the family of [Benhur] Pardico and the
witnesses who testified in this case protection as it may deem necessary to
secure their safety and security; and
(c) To hereby direct the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan to
investigate the circumstances concerning the legality of the arrest of
[Benhur] Pardico by the [petitioners] in this case, utilizing in the process, as
part of said investigation, the pertinent documents and admissions forming
part of the record of this case, and take whatever course/s of action as may
be warranted.
Furnish immediately copies of this decision to the NBI, through the Office of Director
Nestor Mantaring, and to the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan.
SO ORDERED.36
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration37 which was denied by the trial court
in an Order38 dated August 29, 2008.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues for our consideration:
27 | E l i x i r C . L a n g a n l a n g a n
Constitutional Law, Atty. Carlomagno Calingin
XU – College of Law
OF CASES BATCH 8
4.1. WHETHER X X X THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
RULING THAT RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT
OF AMPARO.
4.1.1. WHETHER X X X RESPONDENT WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH THAT
PETITIONERS HAVE COMMITTED OR ARE COMMITTING ACTS IN
VIOLATION OF HER HUSBAND’S RIGHT TO LIFE, LIBERTY, OR
SECURITY.
4.1.2. WHETHER X X X RESPONDENT SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED THE
FACT OF THE DISAPPEARANCE OF BENHUR PARDICO.
4.1.3. WHETHER X X X RESPONDENT WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH THAT THE
ALLEGED DISAPPEARANCE OF BENHUR PARDICO WAS AT THE
INSTANCE OF HEREIN PETITIONERS.39
Petitioners’ Arguments
Petitioners essentially assail the sufficiency of the amparo petition. They contend that
the writ of amparo is available only in cases where the factual and legal bases of the
violation or threatened violation of the aggrieved party’s right to life, liberty and
security are clear. Petitioners assert that in the case at bench, Virginia miserably failed
to establish all these. First, the petition is wanting on its face as it failed to state with
some degree of specificity the alleged unlawful act or omission of the petitioners
constituting a violation of or a threat to Ben’s right to life, liberty and security. And
second, it cannot be deduced from the evidence Virginia adduced that Ben is missing;
or that petitioners had a hand in his alleged disappearance. On the other hand, the
entries in the logbook which bear the signatures of Ben and Lolita are eloquent proof
that petitioners released Ben on March 31, 2008 at around 10:30 p.m. Petitioners thus
posit that the trial court erred in issuing the writ and in holding them responsible for
Ben’s disappearance.
Our Ruling
Virginia’s Petition for Writ of Amparo is fatally defective and must perforce be
dismissed, but not for the reasons adverted to by the petitioners.
A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated to arrest
the rampant extralegal killings and enforced disappearances in the country. Its
purpose is to provide an expeditious and effective relief "to any person whose right
to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act
or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity." 40
Here, Ben’s right to life, liberty and security is firmly settled as the parties do not
dispute his identity as the same person summoned and questioned at petitioners’
security office on the night of March 31, 2008. Such uncontroverted fact ipso facto
established Ben’s inherent and constitutionally enshrined right to life, liberty and
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
security. Article 641 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights42
recognizes every human being’s inherent right to life, while Article 943 thereof
ordains that everyone has the right to liberty and security. The right to life must be
protected by law while the right to liberty and security cannot be impaired except on
grounds provided by and in accordance with law. This overarching command against
deprivation of life, liberty and security without due process of law is also embodied
in our fundamental law.44
The pivotal question now that confronts us is whether Ben’s disappearance as alleged
in Virginia’s petition and proved during the summary proceedings conducted before
the court a quo, falls within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC and relevant laws.
It does not. Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC provides:
SECTION 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation
by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof. (Emphasis ours.)
While Section 1 provides A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC’s coverage, said Rules does not,
however, define extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. This omission was
intentional as the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court which drafted A.M. No.
07-9-12-SC chose to allow it to evolve through time and jurisprudence and through
substantive laws as may be promulgated by Congress.45 Then, the budding
jurisprudence on amparo blossomed in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis46 when this Court defined
enforced disappearances. The Court in that case applied the generally accepted
principles of international law and adopted the International Convention for the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance’s definition of enforced
disappearances, as "the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation
of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts
of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the
law."47
Not long thereafter, another significant development affecting A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC
came about after Congress enacted Republic Act (RA) No. 985148 on December 11,
2009. Section 3(g) thereof defines enforced or involuntary disappearances as follows:
28 | E l i x i r C . L a n g a n l a n g a n
Constitutional Law, Atty. Carlomagno Calingin
XU – College of Law
OF CASES BATCH 8
(g) "Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons" means the arrest, detention,
or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a
State or a political organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation
of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with
the intention of removing from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of
time.
Then came Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo49 where Justice Arturo D. Brion wrote in his
Separate Opinion that with the enactment of RA No. 9851, "the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo is now a procedural law anchored, not only on the constitutional rights to the
rights to life, liberty and security, but on a concrete statutory definition as well of what
an ‘enforced or involuntary disappearance’ is."50 Therefore, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC’s
reference to enforced disappearances should be construed to mean the enforced or
involuntary disappearance of persons contemplated in Section 3(g) of RA No. 9851.
Meaning, in probing enforced disappearance cases, courts should read A.M. No. 07-9-
12-SC in relation to RA No. 9851.
From the statutory definition of enforced disappearance, thus, we can derive the
following elements that constitute it:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of
liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of,
the State or a political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to
acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person
subject of the amparo petition; and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
As thus dissected, it is now clear that for the protective writ of amparo to issue,
allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It
must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was
carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a
political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of
removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. Simply
put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial
evidence the indispensable element of government participation.
In the present case, we do not doubt Bong’s testimony that Navia had a menacing
attitude towards Ben and that he slapped and inflicted fistic blows upon him. Given
the circumstances and the pugnacious character of Navia at that time, his threatening
statement, "Wala kang nakita at wala kang narinig, papatayin ko na si Ben," cannot be
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION OF CASES BATCH 8
taken lightly. It unambiguously showed his predisposition at that time. In addition,
there is nothing on record which would support petitioners’ assertion that they
released Ben on the night of March 31, 2008 unscathed from their wrath. Lolita
sufficiently explained how she was prodded into affixing her signatures in the logbook
without reading the entries therein. And so far, the information petitioners
volunteered are sketchy at best, like the alleged complaint of Mrs. Emphasis who was
never identified or presented in court and whose complaint was never reduced in
writing.1âwphi1

But lest it be overlooked, in an amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is not

enough. It is likewise essential to establish that such disappearance was carried out
with the direct or indirect authorization, support or acquiescence of the government.
This indispensable element of State participation is not present in this case. The
petition does not contain any allegation of State complicity, and none of the evidence
presented tend to show that the government or any of its agents orchestrated Ben’s
disappearance. In fact, none of its agents, officials, or employees were impleaded or
implicated in Virginia’s amparo petition whether as responsible or accountable
persons.51 Thus, in the absence of an allegation or proof that the government or its
agents had a hand in Ben’s disappearance or that they failed to exercise extraordinary
diligence in investigating his case, the Court will definitely not hold the government
or its agents either as responsible or accountable persons.

We are aware that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of amparo may lie
against a private individual or entity. But even if the person sought to be held
accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is a private individual or entity, still,
government involvement in the disappearance remains an indispensable element.
Here, petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision in Brgy.
Lugam, Malolos City and their principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do
not work for the government and nothing has been presented that would link or
connect them to some covert police, military or governmental operation. As discussed
above, to fall within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No. 9851, the
disappearance must be attended by some governmental involvement. This hallmark
of State participation differentiates an enforced disappearance case from an ordinary
case of a missing person.

WHEREFORE, the July 24, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20,
Malolos City, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition for Writ of Amparo filed by
Virginia Pardico is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

29 | E l i x i r C . L a n g a n l a n g a n
Constitutional Law, Atty. Carlomagno Calingin
XU – College of Law
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
G.R. No. 180906 October 7, 2008
THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
While victims of enforced disappearances are separated from the rest of the world behind
secret walls, they are not separated from the constitutional protection of their basic rights.
The constitution is an overarching sky that covers all in its protection. The case at bar
involves the rights to life, liberty and security in the first petition for a writ of Amparo filed
before this Court.
This is an appeal via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to
Section 191 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, seeking to reverse and set aside on both
questions of fact and law, the Decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R.
AMPARO No. 00001, entitled "Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo, petitioners, versus
The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines,
respondents."
This case was originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO)2 filed before this Court by herein respondents (therein petitioners) on August
23, 2007 to stop herein petitioners (therein respondents) and/or their officers and agents
from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. Therein petitioners
also sought ancillary remedies, Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner,
Inspection and Access Orders, and all other legal and equitable reliefs under Article VIII,
Section 5(5)3 of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. In our
Resolution dated August 24, 2007, we (1) ordered the Secretary of the Department of
National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP, their agents, representatives, or persons
acting in their stead, including but not limited to the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical
Unit (CAFGU) to submit their Comment; and (2) enjoined them from causing the arrest of
therein petitioners, or otherwise restricting, curtailing, abridging, or depriving them of
their right to life, liberty, and other basic rights as guaranteed under Article III, Section 1 4
of the 1987 Constitution.5
While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect
on October 24, 2007. Forthwith, therein petitioners filed a Manifestation and Omnibus
Motion to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and
to Grant Interim and Final Amparo Reliefs. They prayed that: (1) the petition be considered
a Petition for the Writ of Amparo under Sec. 266 of the Amparo Rule; (2) the Court issue
the writ commanding therein respondents to make a verified return within the period
provided by law and containing the specific matter required by law; (3) they be granted
the interim reliefs allowed by the Amparo Rule and all other reliefs prayed for in the
30 | E l i x i r C . L a n g a n l a n g a n
Constitutional Law, Atty. Carlomagno Calingin
XU – College of Law
OF CASES BATCH 8
petition but not covered by the Amparo Rule; (4) the Court, after hearing, render judgment
as required in Sec. 187 of the Amparo Rule; and (5) all other just and equitable reliefs.8
On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the August 23, 2007 Petition as a petition
under the Amparo Rule and further resolved, viz:
WHEREFORE, let a WRIT OF AMPARO be issued to respondents requiring them to
file with the CA (Court of Appeals) a verified written return within five (5) working
days from service of the writ. We REMAND the petition to the CA and designate the
Division of Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin to conduct the summary hearing on
the petition on November 8, 2007 at 2:00 p.m. and decide the petition in accordance
with the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.9
On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of therein
petitioners (herein respondents), the dispositive portion of which reads, viz:
ACCORDINGLY, the PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO is GRANTED.
The respondents SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and AFP CHIEF OF STAFF
are hereby REQUIRED:
1. To furnish to the petitioners and to this Court within five days from notice of
this decision all official and unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken
in connection with their case, except those already on file herein;
2. To confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt
Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas within five days from notice of
this decision.
3. To cause to be produced to this Court all medical reports, records and charts,
reports of any treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed,
if any, to the petitioners, to include a list of medical and (sic) personnel
(military and civilian) who attended to them from February 14, 2006 until
August 12, 2007 within five days from notice of this decision.
The compliance with this decision shall be made under the signature and oath of
respondent AFP Chief of Staff or his duly authorized deputy, the latter's authority to
be express and made apparent on the face of the sworn compliance with this
directive.
SO ORDERED.10
Hence, this appeal. In resolving this appeal, we first unfurl the facts as alleged by herein
respondents:
Respondent Raymond Manalo recounted that about one or two weeks before February 14,
2006, several uniformed and armed soldiers and members of the CAFGU summoned to a
meeting all the residents of their barangay in San Idelfonso, Bulacan. Respondents were
not able to attend as they were not informed of the gathering, but Raymond saw some of
the soldiers when he passed by the barangay hall.11
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
On February 14, 2006, Raymond was sleeping in their house in Buhol na Mangga, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan. At past noon, several armed soldiers wearing white shirts, fatigue
pants and army boots, entered their house and roused him. They asked him if he was
Bestre, but his mother, Ester Manalo, replied that he was Raymond, not Bestre. The armed
soldier slapped him on both cheeks and nudged him in the stomach. He was then
handcuffed, brought to the rear of his house, and forced to the ground face down. He was
kicked on the hip, ordered to stand and face up to the light, then forcibly brought near the
road. He told his mother to follow him, but three soldiers stopped her and told her to
stay.12
Among the men who came to take him, Raymond recognized brothers Michael de la Cruz,
Madning de la Cruz, "Puti" de la Cruz, and "Pula" de la Cruz, who all acted as lookout. They
were all members of the CAFGU and residing in Manuzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. He also
recognized brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also members of the CAFGU.
While he was being forcibly taken, he also saw outside of his house two barangay
councilors, Pablo Cunanan and Bernardo Lingasa, with some soldiers and armed men.13
The men forced Raymond into a white L300 van. Once inside, he was blindfolded. Before
being blindfolded, he saw the faces of the soldiers who took him. Later, in his 18 months
of captivity, he learned their names. The one who drove the van was Rizal Hilario alias
Rollie Castillo, whom he estimated was about 40 years of age or older. The leader of the
team who entered his house and abducted him was "Ganata." He was tall, thin, curly-haired
and a bit old. Another one of his abductors was "George" who was tall, thin, white-skinned
and about 30 years old.14
The van drove off, then came to a stop. A person was brought inside the van and made to
sit beside Raymond. Both of them were beaten up. On the road, he recognized the voice of
the person beside him as his brother Reynaldo's. The van stopped several times until they
finally arrived at a house. Raymond and Reynaldo were each brought to a different room.
With the doors of their rooms left open, Raymond saw several soldiers continuously
hitting his brother Reynaldo on the head and other parts of his body with the butt of their
guns for about 15 minutes. After which, Reynaldo was brought to his (Raymond's) room
and it was his (Raymond's) turn to be beaten up in the other room. The soldiers asked him
if he was a member of the New People's Army. Each time he said he was not, he was hit
with the butt of their guns. He was questioned where his comrades were, how many
soldiers he had killed, and how many NPA members he had helped. Each time he answered
none, they hit him.15
In the next days, Raymond's interrogators appeared to be high officials as the soldiers who
beat him up would salute them, call them "sir," and treat them with respect. He was in
blindfolds when interrogated by the high officials, but he saw their faces when they arrived
and before the blindfold was put on. He noticed that the uniform of the high officials was
different from those of the other soldiers. One of those officials was tall and thin, wore
white pants, tie, and leather shoes, instead of combat boots. He spoke in Tagalog and knew
much about his parents and family, and a habeas corpus case filed in connection with the
respondents' abduction.16 While these officials interrogated him, Raymond was not
manhandled. But once they had left, the soldier guards beat him up. When the guards got
31 | E l i x i r C . L a n g a n l a n g a n
Constitutional Law, Atty. Carlomagno Calingin
XU – College of Law
OF CASES BATCH 8
drunk, they also manhandled respondents. During this time, Raymond was fed only at
night, usually with left-over and rotten food.17
On the third week of respondents' detention, two men arrived while Raymond was
sleeping and beat him up. They doused him with urine and hot water, hit his stomach with
a piece of wood, slapped his forehead twice with a .45 pistol, punched him on the mouth,
and burnt some parts of his body with a burning wood. When he could no longer endure
the torture and could hardly breathe, they stopped. They then subjected Reynaldo to the
same ordeal in another room. Before their torturers left, they warned Raymond that they
would come back the next day and kill him.18
The following night, Raymond attempted to escape. He waited for the guards to get drunk,
then made noise with the chains put on him to see if they were still awake. When none of
them came to check on him, he managed to free his hand from the chains and jumped
through the window. He passed through a helipad and firing range and stopped near a
fishpond where he used stones to break his chains. After walking through a forested area,
he came near a river and an Iglesia ni Kristo church. He talked to some women who were
doing the laundry, asked where he was and the road to Gapan. He was told that he was in
Fort Magsaysay.19 He reached the highway, but some soldiers spotted him, forcing him to
run away. The soldiers chased him and caught up with him. They brought him to another
place near the entrance of what he saw was Fort Magsaysay. He was boxed repeatedly,
kicked, and hit with chains until his back bled. They poured gasoline on him. Then a so-
called "Mam" or "Madam" suddenly called, saying that she wanted to see Raymond before
he was killed. The soldiers ceased the torture and he was returned inside Fort Magsaysay
where Reynaldo was detained.20
For some weeks, the respondents had a respite from all the torture. Their wounds were
treated. When the wounds were almost healed, the torture resumed, particularly when
respondents' guards got drunk.21
Raymond recalled that sometime in April until May 2006, he was detained in a room
enclosed by steel bars. He stayed all the time in that small room measuring 1 x 2 meters,
and did everything there, including urinating, removing his bowels, bathing, eating and
sleeping. He counted that eighteen people22 had been detained in that bartolina, including
his brother Reynaldo and himself.23
For about three and a half months, the respondents were detained in Fort Magsaysay. They
were kept in a small house with two rooms and a kitchen. One room was made into the
bartolina. The house was near the firing range, helipad and mango trees. At dawn, soldiers
marched by their house. They were also sometimes detained in what he only knew as the
"DTU."24
At the DTU, a male doctor came to examine respondents. He checked their body and eyes,
took their urine samples and marked them. When asked how they were feeling, they
replied that they had a hard time urinating, their stomachs were aching, and they felt other
pains in their body. The next day, two ladies in white arrived. They also examined
respondents and gave them medicines, including orasol, amoxicillin and mefenamic acid.
They brought with them the results of respondents' urine test and advised them to drink
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
plenty of water and take their medicine. The two ladies returned a few more times.
Thereafter, medicines were sent through the "master" of the DTU, "Master" Del Rosario
alias Carinyoso at Puti. Respondents were kept in the DTU for about two weeks. While
there, he met a soldier named Efren who said that Gen. Palparan ordered him to monitor
and take care of them.25
One day, Rizal Hilario fetched respondents in a Revo vehicle. They, along with Efren and
several other armed men wearing fatigue suits, went to a detachment in Pinaud, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan. Respondents were detained for one or two weeks in a big two-storey
house. Hilario and Efren stayed with them. While there, Raymond was beaten up by
Hilario's men.26
From Pinaud, Hilario and Efren brought respondents to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on
board the Revo. They were detained in a big unfinished house inside the compound of
"Kapitan" for about three months. When they arrived in Sapang, Gen. Palparan talked to
them. They were brought out of the house to a basketball court in the center of the
compound and made to sit. Gen. Palparan was already waiting, seated. He was about two
arms' length away from respondents. He began by asking if respondents felt well already,
to which Raymond replied in the affirmative. He asked Raymond if he knew him. Raymond
lied that he did not. He then asked Raymond if he would be scared if he were made to face
Gen. Palparan. Raymond responded that he would not be because he did not believe that
Gen. Palparan was an evil man.27
Raymond narrated his conversation with Gen. Palparan in his affidavit, viz:
Tinanong ako ni Gen. Palparan, "Ngayon na kaharap mo na ako, di ka ba natatakot sa
akin?"
Sumagot akong, "Siyempre po, natatakot din..."
Sabi ni Gen. Palparan: "Sige, bibigyan ko kayo ng isang pagkakataon na mabuhay,
basta't sundin n'yo ang lahat ng sasabihin ko... sabihin mo sa magulang mo - huwag
pumunta sa mga rali, sa hearing, sa Karapatan at sa Human Right dahil niloloko lang
kayo. Sabihin sa magulang at lahat sa bahay na huwag paloko doon. Tulungan kami
na kausapin si Bestre na sumuko na sa gobyerno."28
Respondents agreed to do as Gen. Palparan told them as they felt they could not do
otherwise. At about 3:00 in the morning, Hilario, Efren and the former's men - the same
group that abducted them - brought them to their parents' house. Raymond was shown to
his parents while Reynaldo stayed in the Revo because he still could not walk. In the
presence of Hilario and other soldiers, Raymond relayed to his parents what Gen. Palparan
told him. As they were afraid, Raymond's parents acceded. Hilario threatened Raymond's
parents that if they continued to join human rights rallies, they would never see their
children again. The respondents were then brought back to Sapang.29
When respondents arrived back in Sapang, Gen. Palparan was about to leave. He was
talking with the four "masters" who were there: Arman, Ganata, Hilario and Cabalse. 30
When Gen. Palparan saw Raymond, he called for him. He was in a big white vehicle.
32 | E l i x i r C . L a n g a n l a n g a n
Constitutional Law, Atty. Carlomagno Calingin
XU – College of Law
OF CASES BATCH 8
Raymond stood outside the vehicle as Gen. Palparan told him to gain back his strength and
be healthy and to take the medicine he left for him and Reynaldo. He said the medicine was
expensive at Php35.00 each, and would make them strong. He also said that they should
prove that they are on the side of the military and warned that they would not be given
another chance.31 During his testimony, Raymond identified Gen. Palparan by his
picture.32
One of the soldiers named Arman made Raymond take the medicine left by Gen. Palparan.
The medicine, named "Alive," was green and yellow. Raymond and Reynaldo were each
given a box of this medicine and instructed to take one capsule a day. Arman checked if
they were getting their dose of the medicine. The "Alive" made them sleep each time they
took it, and they felt heavy upon waking up.33
After a few days, Hilario arrived again. He took Reynaldo and left Raymond at Sapang.
Arman instructed Raymond that while in Sapang, he should introduce himself as "Oscar,"
a military trainee from Sariaya, Quezon, assigned in Bulacan. While there, he saw again
Ganata, one of the men who abducted him from his house, and got acquainted with other
military men and civilians.34
After about three months in Sapang, Raymond was brought to Camp Tecson under the 24 th
Infantry Battalion. He was fetched by three unidentified men in a big white vehicle. Efren
went with them. Raymond was then blindfolded. After a 30-minute ride, his blindfold was
removed. Chains were put on him and he was kept in the barracks.35
The next day, Raymond's chains were removed and he was ordered to clean outside the
barracks. It was then he learned that he was in a detachment of the Rangers. There were
many soldiers, hundreds of them were training. He was also ordered to clean inside the
barracks. In one of the rooms therein, he met Sherlyn Cadapan from Laguna. She told him
that she was a student of the University of the Philippines and was abducted in Hagonoy,
Bulacan. She confided that she had been subjected to severe torture and raped. She was
crying and longing to go home and be with her parents. During the day, her chains were
removed and she was made to do the laundry.36
After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two days from his arrival, two
other captives, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino, arrived. Karen and Manuel were put in
the room with "Allan" whose name they later came to know as Donald Caigas, called
"master" or "commander" by his men in the 24th Infantry Battalion. Raymond and
Reynaldo were put in the adjoining room. At times, Raymond and Reynaldo were
threatened, and Reynaldo was beaten up. In the daytime, their chains were removed, but
were put back on at night. They were threatened that if they escaped, their families would
all be killed.37
On or about October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. He told the detainees that
they should be thankful they were still alive and should continue along their "renewed
life." Before the hearing of November 6 or 8, 2006, respondents were brought to their
parents to instruct them not to attend the hearing. However, their parents had already left
for Manila. Respondents were brought back to Camp Tecson. They stayed in that camp
from September 2006 to November 2006, and Raymond was instructed to continue using
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
the name "Oscar" and holding himself out as a military trainee. He got acquainted with
soldiers of the 24th Infantry Battalion whose names and descriptions he stated in his
affidavit.38
On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel, were
transferred to a camp of the 24th Infantry Battalion in Limay, Bataan. There were many
huts in the camp. They stayed in that camp until May 8, 2007. Some soldiers of the battalion
stayed with them. While there, battalion soldiers whom Raymond knew as "Mar" and
"Billy" beat him up and hit him in the stomach with their guns. Sherlyn and Karen also
suffered enormous torture in the camp. They were all made to clean, cook, and help in
raising livestock.39
Raymond recalled that when "Operation Lubog" was launched, Caigas and some other
soldiers brought him and Manuel with them to take and kill all sympathizers of the NPA.
They were brought to Barangay Bayan-bayanan, Bataan where he witnessed the killing of
an old man doing kaingin. The soldiers said he was killed because he had a son who was a
member of the NPA and he coddled NPA members in his house.40 Another time, in another
"Operation Lubog," Raymond was brought to Barangay Orion in a house where NPA men
stayed. When they arrived, only the old man of the house who was sick was there. They
spared him and killed only his son right before Raymond's eyes.41
From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel were transferred to
Zambales, in a safehouse near the sea. Caigas and some of his men stayed with them. A
retired army soldier was in charge of the house. Like in Limay, the five detainees were
made to do errands and chores. They stayed in Zambales from May 8 or 9, 2007 until June
2007.42
In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the camp in Limay. Raymond, Reynaldo, and
Manuel were tasked to bring food to detainees brought to the camp. Raymond narrated
what he witnessed and experienced in the camp, viz:
Isang gabi, sinabihan kami ni Donald (Caigas) na matulog na kami. Nakita ko si
Donald na inaayos ang kanyang baril, at nilagyan ng silenser. Sabi ni Donald na kung
mayroon man kaming makita o marinig, walang nangyari. Kinaumagahan, nakita
naming ang bangkay ng isa sa mga bihag na dinala sa kampo. Mayroong binuhos sa
kanyang katawan at ito'y sinunog. Masansang ang amoy.
Makaraan ang isang lingo, dalawang bangkay and ibinaba ng mga unipormadong
sundalo mula sa 6 x 6 na trak at dinala sa loob ng kampo. May naiwang mga bakas ng
dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas.
Makalipas ang isa o dalawang lingo, may dinukot sila na dalawang Ita. Itinali sila sa
labas ng kubo, piniringan, ikinadena at labis na binugbog. Nakita kong nakatakas ang
isa sa kanila at binaril siya ng sundalo ngunit hindi siya tinamaan. Iyong gabi nakita
kong pinatay nila iyong isang Ita malapit sa Post 3; sinilaban ang bangkay at ibinaon
ito.
33 | E l i x i r C . L a n g a n l a n g a n
Constitutional Law, Atty. Carlomagno Calingin
XU – College of Law
OF CASES BATCH 8
Pagkalipas ng halos 1 buwan, 2 pang bangkay ang dinala sa kampo. Ibinaba ang mga
bangkay mula sa pick up trak, dinala ang mga bangkay sa labas ng bakod.
Kinaumagahan nakita kong mayroong sinilaban, at napakamasangsang ang amoy.
May nakilala rin akong 1 retiradong koronel at 1 kasama niya. Pinakain ko sila. Sabi
nila sa akin na dinukot sila sa Bataan. Iyong gabi, inilabas sila at hindi ko na sila
nakita.
xxx xxx xxx
Ikinadena kami ng 3 araw. Sa ikatlong araw, nilabas ni Lat si Manuel dahil
kakausapin daw siya ni Gen. Palparan. Nakapiring si Manuel, wala siyang suot pang-
itaas, pinosasan. Nilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng
sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel. Sumilip ako sa isang
haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel.
Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw
pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa
ng mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o hindi.
Tinanggal ang aming kadena. Kinausap kami ni Donald. Tinanong kami kung ano ang
sabi ni Manuel sa amin. Sabi ni Donald huwag na raw naming hanapin ang dalawang
babae at si Manuel, dahil magkakasama na yung tatlo. Sabi pa ni Donald na kami ni
Reynaldo ay magbagong buhay at ituloy namin ni Reynaldo ang trabaho. Sa gabi,
hindi na kami kinakadena.43
On or about June 13, 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo were brought to Pangasinan,
ostensibly to raise poultry for Donald (Caigas). Caigas told respondents to also farm his
land, in exchange for which, he would take care of the food of their family. They were also
told that they could farm a small plot adjoining his land and sell their produce. They were
no longer put in chains and were instructed to use the names Rommel (for Raymond) and
Rod (for Reynaldo) and represent themselves as cousins from Rizal, Laguna.44
Respondents started to plan their escape. They could see the highway from where they
stayed. They helped farm adjoining lands for which they were paid Php200.00 or
Php400.00 and they saved their earnings. When they had saved Php1,000.00 each,
Raymond asked a neighbor how he could get a cellular phone as he wanted to exchange
text messages with a girl who lived nearby. A phone was pawned to him, but he kept it first
and did not use it. They earned some more until they had saved Php1,400.00 between
them.
There were four houses in the compound. Raymond and Reynaldo were housed in one of
them while their guards lived in the other three. Caigas entrusted respondents to Nonong,
the head of the guards. Respondents' house did not have electricity. They used a lamp.
There was no television, but they had a radio. In the evening of August 13, 2007, Nonong
and his cohorts had a drinking session. At about 1:00 a.m., Raymond turned up the volume
of the radio. When none of the guards awoke and took notice, Raymond and Reynaldo
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
proceeded towards the highway, leaving behind their sleeping guards and barking dogs.
They boarded a bus bound for Manila and were thus freed from captivity.45
Reynaldo also executed an affidavit affirming the contents of Raymond's affidavit insofar
as they related to matters they witnessed together. Reynaldo added that when they were
taken from their house on February 14, 2006, he saw the faces of his abductors before he
was blindfolded with his shirt. He also named the soldiers he got acquainted with in the
18 months he was detained. When Raymond attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay,
Reynaldo was severely beaten up and told that they were indeed members of the NPA
because Raymond escaped. With a .45 caliber pistol, Reynaldo was hit on the back and
punched in the face until he could no longer bear the pain.
At one point during their detention, when Raymond and Reynaldo were in Sapang,
Reynaldo was separated from Raymond and brought to Pinaud by Rizal Hilario. He was
kept in the house of Kapitan, a friend of Hilario, in a mountainous area. He was instructed
to use the name "Rodel" and to represent himself as a military trainee from Meycauayan,
Bulacan. Sometimes, Hilario brought along Reynaldo in his trips. One time, he was brought
to a market in San Jose, del Monte, Bulacan and made to wait in the vehicle while Hilario
was buying. He was also brought to Tondo, Manila where Hilario delivered boxes of "Alive"
in different houses. In these trips, Hilario drove a black and red vehicle. Reynaldo was
blindfolded while still in Bulacan, but allowed to remove the blindfold once outside the
province. In one of their trips, they passed by Fort Magsaysay and Camp Tecson where
Reynaldo saw the sign board, "Welcome to Camp Tecson."46
Dr. Benito Molino, M.D., corroborated the accounts of respondents Raymond and Reynaldo
Manalo. Dr. Molino specialized in forensic medicine and was connected with the Medical
Action Group, an organization handling cases of human rights violations, particularly cases
where torture was involved. He was requested by an NGO to conduct medical
examinations on the respondents after their escape. He first asked them about their ordeal,
then proceeded with the physical examination. His findings showed that the scars borne
by respondents were consistent with their account of physical injuries inflicted upon them.
The examination was conducted on August 15, 2007, two days after respondents' escape,
and the results thereof were reduced into writing. Dr. Molino took photographs of the
scars. He testified that he followed the Istanbul Protocol in conducting the examination.47
Petitioners dispute respondents' account of their alleged abduction and torture. In
compliance with the October 25, 2007 Resolution of the Court, they filed a Return of the
Writ of Amparo admitting the abduction but denying any involvement therein, viz:
13. Petitioners Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were not at any time arrested,
forcibly abducted, detained, held incommunicado, disappeared or under the custody
by the military. This is a settled issue laid to rest in the habeas corpus case filed in
their behalf by petitioners' parents before the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No.
94431 against M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, as head of the 24 th Infantry
Battalion; Maj. Gen. Jovito Palparan, as Commander of the 7 th Infantry Division in
Luzon; Lt. Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, in his capacity as the Commanding General of
the Philippine Army, and members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit
(CAFGU), namely: Michael dela Cruz, Puti dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Pula dela
34 | E l i x i r C . L a n g a n l a n g a n
Constitutional Law, Atty. Carlomagno Calingin
XU – College of Law
OF CASES BATCH 8
Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza. The respondents therein submitted a
return of the writ... On July 4, 2006, the Court of Appeals dropped as party
respondents Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr., then Commanding General of the
Philippine Army, and on September 19, 2006, Maj. (sic) Jovito S. Palparan, then
Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, stationed at Fort
Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija, upon a finding that no evidence was
introduced to establish their personal involvement in the taking of the Manalo
brothers. In a Decision dated June 27, 2007..., it exonerated M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka
Rollie Castillo for lack of evidence establishing his involvement in any capacity in the
disappearance of the Manalo brothers, although it held that the remaining
respondents were illegally detaining the Manalo brothers and ordered them to
release the latter.48
Attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of therein respondent (herein
petitioner) Secretary of National Defense, which attested that he assumed office only on
August 8, 2007 and was thus unaware of the Manalo brothers' alleged abduction. He also
claimed that:
7. The Secretary of National Defense does not engage in actual military directional
operations, neither does he undertake command directions of the AFP units in
the field, nor in any way micromanage the AFP operations. The principal
responsibility of the Secretary of National Defense is focused in providing
strategic policy direction to the Department (bureaus and agencies) including the
Armed Forces of the Philippines;
8. In connection with the Writ of Amparo issued by the Honorable Supreme Court
in this case, I have directed the Chief of Staff, AFP to institute immediate action
in compliance with Section 9(d) of the Amparo Rule and to submit report of such
compliance... Likewise, in a Memorandum Directive also dated October 31, 2007,
I have issued a policy directive addressed to the Chief of Staff, AFP that the AFP
should adopt the following rules of action in the event the Writ of Amparo is
issued by a competent court against any members of the AFP:
(1) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;
(2) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance
of the person identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution
of the person or persons responsible;
(3) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the
death or disappearance;
(4) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or
disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought
about the death or disappearance;
(5) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or
disappearance; and
(6) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.49
Therein respondent AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit, attached to the
Return of the Writ, attesting that he received the above directive of therein respondent
Secretary of National Defense and that acting on this directive, he did the following:
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
3.1. As currently designated Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), I have
caused to be issued directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing
the circumstances of the alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the
petitioners.
3.2. I have caused the immediate investigation and submission of the result thereof to
Higher headquarters and/or direct the immediate conduct of the investigation on
the matter by the concerned unit/s, dispatching Radio Message on November 05,
2007, addressed to the Commanding General, Philippine Army (Info:
COMNOLCOM, CG, 71D PA and CO 24 IB PA). A Copy of the Radio Message is
attached as ANNEX "3" of this Affidavit.
3.3. We undertake to provide result of the investigations conducted or to be conducted
by the concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of
the persons in whose favor the Writ of Amparo has been sought for as soon as the
same has been furnished Higher headquarters.
3.4. A parallel investigation has been directed to the same units relative to another
Petition for the Writ of Amparo (G.R. No. 179994) filed at the instance of relatives
of a certain Cadapan and Empeño pending before the Supreme Court.
3.5. On the part of the Armed Forces, this respondent will exert earnest efforts to
establish the surrounding circumstances of the disappearances of the petitioners
and to bring those responsible, including any military personnel if shown to have
participated or had complicity in the commission of the complained acts, to the bar
of justice, when warranted by the findings and the competent evidence that may
be gathered in the process.50
Also attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of Lt. Col. Felipe Anontado, INF
(GSC) PA, earlier filed in G.R. No. 179994, another Amparo case in this Court, involving
Cadapan, Empeño and Merino, which averred among others, viz:
10. Upon reading the allegations in the Petition implicating the 24 th Infantry Batallion
detachment as detention area, I immediately went to the 24th IB detachment in
Limay, Bataan and found no untoward incidents in the area nor any detainees by
the name of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino being held
captive;
11. There was neither any reports of any death of Manuel Merino in the 24th IB in
Limay, Bataan;
12. After going to the 24th IB in Limay, Bataan, we made further inquiries with the
Philippine National Police, Limay, Bataan regarding the alleged detentions or
deaths and were informed that none was reported to their good office;
13. I also directed Company Commander 1st Lt. Romeo Publico to inquire into the
alleged beachhouse in Iba, Zambales also alleged to be a detention place where
Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino were detained. As per the
inquiry, however, no such beachhouse was used as a detention place found to have
been used by armed men to detain Cadapan, Empeño and Merino.51
It was explained in the Return of the Writ that for lack of sufficient time, the affidavits of
Maj. Gen Jovito S. Palparan (Ret.), M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, and other persons
35 | E l i x i r C . L a n g a n l a n g a n
Constitutional Law, Atty. Carlomagno Calingin
XU – College of Law
OF CASES BATCH 8
implicated by therein petitioners could not be secured in time for the submission of the
Return and would be subsequently submitted.52
Herein petitioners presented a lone witness in the summary hearings, Lt. Col. Ruben U.
Jimenez, Provost Marshall, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, based in Fort Magsaysay,
Palayan City, Nueva Ecija. The territorial jurisdiction of this Division covers Nueva Ecija,
Aurora, Bataan, Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac and a portion of Pangasinan. 53 The 24th
Infantry Battalion is part of the 7th Infantry Division.54
On May 26, 2006, Lt. Col. Jimenez was directed by the Commanding General of the 7th
Infantry Division, Maj. Gen. Jovito Palaran,55 through his Assistant Chief of Staff,56 to
investigate the alleged abduction of the respondents by CAFGU auxiliaries under his unit,
namely: CAA Michael de la Cruz; CAA Roman de la Cruz, aka Puti; CAA Maximo de la Cruz,
aka Pula; CAA Randy Mendoza; ex-CAA Marcelo de la Cruz aka Madning; and a civilian
named Rudy Mendoza. He was directed to determine: (1) the veracity of the abduction of
Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo by the alleged elements of the CAFGU auxiliaries; and (2)
the administrative liability of said auxiliaries, if any.57 Jimenez testified that this particular
investigation was initiated not by a complaint as was the usual procedure, but because the
Commanding General saw news about the abduction of the Manalo brothers on the
television, and he was concerned about what was happening within his territorial
jurisdiction.58
Jimenez summoned all six implicated persons for the purpose of having them execute
sworn statements and conducting an investigation on May 29, 2006.59 The investigation
started at 8:00 in the morning and finished at 10:00 in the evening.60 The investigating
officer, Technical Sgt. Eduardo Lingad, took the individual sworn statements of all six
persons on that day. There were no other sworn statements taken, not even of the Manalo
family, nor were there other witnesses summoned and investigated 61 as according to
Jimenez, the directive to him was only to investigate the six persons.62
Jimenez was beside Lingad when the latter took the statements.63 The six persons were
not known to Jimenez as it was in fact his first time to meet them.64 During the entire time
that he was beside Lingad, a subordinate of his in the Office of the Provost Marshall,
Jimenez did not propound a single question to the six persons.65
Jimenez testified that all six statements were taken on May 29, 2006, but Marcelo Mendoza
and Rudy Mendoza had to come back the next day to sign their statements as the printing
of their statements was interrupted by a power failure. Jimenez testified that the two
signed on May 30, 2006, but the jurats of their statements indicated that they were signed
on May 29, 2006.66 When the Sworn Statements were turned over to Jimenez, he
personally wrote his investigation report. He began writing it in the afternoon of May 30,
2006 and finished it on June 1, 2006.67 He then gave his report to the Office of the Chief of
Personnel.68
As petitioners largely rely on Jimenez's Investigation Report dated June 1, 2006 for their
evidence, the report is herein substantially quoted:
III. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
4. This pertains to the abduction of RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO
who were forcibly taken from their respective homes in Brgy. Buhol na Mangga,
San Ildefonso, Bulacan on 14 February 2006 by unidentified armed men and
thereafter were forcibly disappeared. After the said incident, relatives of the
victims filed a case for Abduction in the civil court against the herein suspects:
Michael dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Puti Dela Cruz, Pula Dela Cruz, Randy
Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza as alleged members of the Citizen Armed Forces
Geographical Unit (CAFGU).
a) Sworn statement of CAA Maximo F. dela Cruz, aka Pula dated 29 May 2006
in (Exhibit "B") states that he was at Sitio Mozon, Brgy. Bohol na Mangga,
San Ildefonso, Bulacan doing the concrete building of a church located
nearby his residence, together with some neighbor thereat. He claims that
on 15 February 2006, he was being informed by Brgy. Kagawad Pablo
Umayan about the abduction of the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo
Manalo. As to the allegation that he was one of the suspects, he claims that
they only implicated him because he was a CAFGU and that they claimed
that those who abducted the Manalo brothers are members of the Military
and CAFGU. Subject vehemently denied any participation or involvement
on the abduction of said victims.
b) Sworn statement of CAA Roman dela Cruz y Faustino Aka Puti dtd 29 May
2006 in (Exhibit "C") states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol
na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a CAA member based at Biak na Bato
Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo
Manalo being his neighbors are active members/sympathizers of the
CPP/NPA and he also knows their elder Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE of
being an NPA Leader operating in their province. That at the time of the
alleged abduction of the two (2) brothers and for accusing him to be one of
the suspects, he claims that on February 14, 2006, he was one of those
working at the concrete chapel being constructed nearby his residence. He
claims further that he just came only to know about the incident on other
day (15 Feb 06) when he was being informed by Kagawad Pablo Kunanan.
That subject CAA vehemently denied any participation about the incident
and claimed that they only implicated him because he is a member of the
CAFGU.
c) Sworn Statement of CAA Randy Mendoza y Lingas dated 29 May 2006 in
(Exhibit "O") states that he is a resident of Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan and a member of CAFGU based at Biak na Bato
Detachment. That being a neighbor, he was very much aware about the
background of the two (2) brothers Raymond and Reynaldo as active
supporters of the CPP NPA in their Brgy. and he also knew their elder
brother "KUMANDER BESTRE" TN: Rolando Manalo. Being one of the
accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was at Brgy. Magmarate,
San Miguel, Bulacan in the house of his aunt and he learned only about the
incident when he arrived home in their place. He claims further that the
only reason why they implicated him was due to the fact that his mother
has filed a criminal charge against their brother Rolando Manalo @ KA
36 | E l i x i r C . L a n g a n l a n g a n
Constitutional Law, Atty. Carlomagno Calingin
XU – College of Law
OF CASES BATCH 8
BESTRE who is an NPA Commander who killed his father and for that
reason they implicated him in support of their brother. Subject CAA
vehemently denied any involvement on the abduction of said Manalo
brothers.
d) Sworn Statement of Rudy Mendoza y Lingasa dated May 29, 2006 in
(Exhibit "E") states that he is a resident of Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan.
He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to him being his
barriomate when he was still unmarried and he knew them since
childhood. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006,
he was at his residence in Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims that
he was being informed only about the incident lately and he was not aware
of any reason why the two (2) brothers were being abducted by alleged
members of the military and CAFGU. The only reason he knows why they
implicated him was because there are those people who are angry with
their family particularly victims of summary execution (killing) done by
their brother @ KA Bestre Rolando Manalo who is an NPA leader. He claims
further that it was their brother @ KA BESTRE who killed his father and he
was living witness to that incident. Subject civilian vehemently denied any
involvement on the abduction of the Manalo brothers.
e) Sworn statement of Ex-CAA Marcelo dala Cruz dated 29 May 2006 in
(Exhibit "F") states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na
Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, a farmer and a former CAA based at Biak
na Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo
Manalo are familiar to him being their barrio mate. He claims further that
they are active supporters of CPP/NPA and that their brother Rolando
Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA leader. Being one of the accused, he claims
that on 14 February 2006, he was in his residence at Sitio Muzon, Brgy.
Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. That he vehemently denied any
participation of the alleged abduction of the two (2) brothers and learned
only about the incident when rumors reached him by his barrio mates. He
claims that his implication is merely fabricated because of his relationship
to Roman and Maximo who are his brothers.
f) Sworn statement of Michael dela Cruz y Faustino dated 29 May 2006 in
(Exhibit "G") states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na
Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, the Chief of Brgy. Tanod and a CAFGU
member based at Biak na Bato Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims
that he knew very well the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in their
barangay for having been the Tanod Chief for twenty (20) years. He alleged
further that they are active supporters or sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and
whose elder brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA leader
operating within the area. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14
Feb 2006 he was helping in the construction of their concrete chapel in
their place and he learned only about the incident which is the abduction of
Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo when one of the Brgy. Kagawad in the
person of Pablo Cunanan informed him about the matter. He claims further
that he is truly innocent of the allegation against him as being one of the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
abductors and he considers everything fabricated in order to destroy his
name that remains loyal to his service to the government as a CAA member.
IV. DISCUSSION
5. Based on the foregoing statements of respondents in this particular case, the
proof of linking them to the alleged abduction and disappearance of Raymond
and Reynaldo Manalo that transpired on 14 February 2006 at Sitio Muzon, Brgy.
Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, is unsubstantiated. Their alleged
involvement theretofore to that incident is considered doubtful, hence, no basis
to indict them as charged in this investigation.
Though there are previous grudges between each families (sic) in the past to
quote: the killing of the father of Randy and Rudy Mendoza by @ KA BESTRE TN:
Rolando Manalo, this will not suffice to establish a fact that they were the ones
who did the abduction as a form of revenge. As it was also stated in the testimony
of other accused claiming that the Manalos are active sympathizers/supporters
of the CPP/NPA, this would not also mean, however, that in the first place, they
were in connivance with the abductors. Being their neighbors and as members
of CAFGU's, they ought to be vigilant in protecting their village from any
intervention by the leftist group, hence inside their village, they were fully aware
of the activities of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in so far as their connection
with the CPP/NPA is concerned.
V. CONCLUSION
6. Premises considered surrounding this case shows that the alleged charges of
abduction committed by the above named respondents has not been established
in this investigation. Hence, it lacks merit to indict them for any administrative
punishment and/or criminal liability. It is therefore concluded that they are
innocent of the charge.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
7. That CAAs Michael F. dela Cruz, Maximo F. Dela Cruz, Roman dela Cruz, Randy
Mendoza, and two (2) civilians Maximo F. Dela Cruz and Rudy L. Mendoza be
exonerated from the case.
8. Upon approval, this case can be dropped and closed.69
In this appeal under Rule 45, petitioners question the appellate court's assessment of the
foregoing evidence and assail the December 26, 2007 Decision on the following grounds,
viz:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN BELIEVING
AND GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE INCREDIBLE, UNCORROBORATED,
CONTRADICTED, AND OBVIOUSLY SCRIPTED, REHEARSED AND SELF-SERVING
AFFIDAVIT/TESTIMONY OF HEREIN RESPONDENT RAYMOND MANALO.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN REQUIRING
RESPONDENTS (HEREIN PETITIONERS) TO: (A) FURNISH TO THE MANALO
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XU – College of Law
OF CASES BATCH 8
BROTHER(S) AND TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL
REPORTS OF THE INVESTIGATION UNDERTAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR
CASE, EXCEPT THOSE ALREADY IN FILE WITH THE COURT; (B) CONFIRM IN
WRITING THE PRESENT PLACES OF OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT OF M/SGT. HILARIO
aka ROLLIE CASTILLO AND DONALD CAIGAS; AND (C) CAUSE TO BE PRODUCED
TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL MEDICAL REPORTS, RECORDS AND CHARTS,
AND REPORTS OF ANY TREATMENT GIVEN OR RECOMMENDED AND MEDICINES
PRESCRIBED, IF ANY, TO THE MANALO BROTHERS, TO INCLUDE A LIST OF
MEDICAL PERSONNEL (MILITARY AND CIVILIAN) WHO ATTENDED TO THEM
FROM FEBRUARY 14, 2006 UNTIL AUGUST 12, 2007.70
The case at bar is the first decision on the application of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
(Amparo Rule). Let us hearken to its beginning.
The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a recurring proposition in the
recommendations that resulted from a two-day National Consultative Summit on
Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances sponsored by the Court on July 16-17,
2007. The Summit was "envisioned to provide a broad and fact-based perspective on the
issue of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances,"71 hence "representatives from
all sides of the political and social spectrum, as well as all the stakeholders in the justice
system"72 participated in mapping out ways to resolve the crisis.
On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule "in light of the prevalence
of extralegal killing and enforced disappearances."73 It was an exercise for the first time of
the Court's expanded power to promulgate rules to protect our people's constitutional
rights, which made its maiden appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to the
Filipino experience of the martial law regime.74 As the Amparo Rule was intended to
address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its
coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof.
"Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal
safeguards or judicial proceedings."75 On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are
"attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person
by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct
or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or
whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of
liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law."76
The writ of Amparo originated in Mexico. "Amparo" literally means "protection" in
Spanish.77 In 1837, de Tocqueville's Democracy in America became available in Mexico and
stirred great interest. Its description of the practice of judicial review in the U.S. appealed
to many Mexican jurists.78 One of them, Manuel Crescencio Rejón, drafted a constitutional
provision for his native state, Yucatan,79 which granted judges the power to protect all
persons in the enjoyment of their constitutional and legal rights. This idea was
incorporated into the national constitution in 1847, viz:
The federal courts shall protect any inhabitant of the Republic in the exercise and
preservation of those rights granted to him by this Constitution and by laws enacted
pursuant hereto, against attacks by the Legislative and Executive powers of the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
federal or state governments, limiting themselves to granting protection in the
specific case in litigation, making no general declaration concerning the statute or
regulation that motivated the violation.80
Since then, the protection has been an important part of Mexican constitutionalism.81 If,
after hearing, the judge determines that a constitutional right of the petitioner is being
violated, he orders the official, or the official's superiors, to cease the violation and to take
the necessary measures to restore the petitioner to the full enjoyment of the right in
question. Amparo thus combines the principles of judicial review derived from the U.S.
with the limitations on judicial power characteristic of the civil law tradition which
prevails in Mexico. It enables courts to enforce the constitution by protecting individual
rights in particular cases, but prevents them from using this power to make law for the
entire nation.82
The writ of Amparo then spread throughout the Western Hemisphere, gradually evolving
into various forms, in response to the particular needs of each country.83 It became, in the
words of a justice of the Mexican Federal Supreme Court, one piece of Mexico's self-
attributed "task of conveying to the world's legal heritage that institution which, as a shield
of human dignity, her own painful history conceived."84 What began as a protection against
acts or omissions of public authorities in violation of constitutional rights later evolved for
several purposes: (1) Amparo libertad for the protection of personal freedom, equivalent
to the habeas corpus writ; (2) Amparo contra leyes for the judicial review of the
constitutionality of statutes; (3) Amparo casacion for the judicial review of the
constitutionality and legality of a judicial decision; (4) Amparo administrativo for the
judicial review of administrative actions; and (5) Amparo agrario for the protection of
peasants' rights derived from the agrarian reform process.85
In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ of Amparo has been constitutionally
adopted to protect against human rights abuses especially committed in countries under
military juntas. In general, these countries adopted an all-encompassing writ to protect
the whole gamut of constitutional rights, including socio-economic rights.86 Other
countries like Colombia, Chile, Germany and Spain, however, have chosen to limit the
protection of the writ of Amparo only to some constitutional guarantees or fundamental
rights.87
In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly provide for the writ of
Amparo, several of the above Amparo protections are guaranteed by our charter. The
second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, the Grave Abuse
Clause, provides for the judicial power "to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government." The Clause accords a similar general
protection to human rights extended by the Amparo contra leyes, Amparo casacion, and
Amparo administrativo. Amparo libertad is comparable to the remedy of habeas corpus
found in several provisions of the 1987 Constitution.88 The Clause is an offspring of the
U.S. common law tradition of judicial review, which finds its roots in the 1803 case of
Marbury v. Madison.89
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XU – College of Law
OF CASES BATCH 8
While constitutional rights can be protected under the Grave Abuse Clause through
remedies of injunction or prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and a petition
for habeas corpus under Rule 102,90 these remedies may not be adequate to address the
pestering problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. However, with the
swiftness required to resolve a petition for a writ of Amparo through summary
proceedings and the availability of appropriate interim and permanent reliefs under the
Amparo Rule, this hybrid writ of the common law and civil law traditions - borne out of the
Latin American and Philippine experience of human rights abuses - offers a better remedy
to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances and threats thereof. The remedy
provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only
substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an
action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for
damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring
substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings.91
The writ of Amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem
of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the
expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses; it is curative in that it
facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to
subsequent investigation and action. In the long run, the goal of both the preventive and
curative roles is to deter the further commission of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances.
In the case at bar, respondents initially filed an action for "Prohibition, Injunction, and
Temporary Restraining Order"92 to stop petitioners and/or their officers and agents from
depriving the respondents of their right to liberty and other basic rights on August 23,
2007,93 prior to the promulgation of the Amparo Rule. They also sought ancillary remedies
including Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and
Access Orders and other legal and equitable remedies under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of
the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. When the Amparo Rule
came into effect on October 24, 2007, they moved to have their petition treated as an
Amparo petition as it would be more effective and suitable to the circumstances of the
Manalo brothers' enforced disappearance. The Court granted their motion.
With this backdrop, we now come to the arguments of the petitioner. Petitioners' first
argument in disputing the Decision of the Court of Appeals states, viz:
The Court of Appeals seriously and grievously erred in believing and giving full faith
and credit to the incredible uncorroborated, contradicted, and obviously scripted,
rehearsed and self-serving affidavit/testimony of herein respondent Raymond
Manalo.94
In delving into the veracity of the evidence, we need to mine and refine the ore of
petitioners' cause of action, to determine whether the evidence presented is metal-strong
to satisfy the degree of proof required.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the following causes of action, viz:
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof. (emphasis supplied)
Sections 17 and 18, on the other hand, provide for the degree of proof required, viz:
Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall
establish their claims by substantial evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 18. Judgment. - ... If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial
evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be
proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. (emphases
supplied)
Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.95
After careful perusal of the evidence presented, we affirm the findings of the Court of
Appeals that respondents were abducted from their houses in Sito Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na
Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on February 14, 2006 and were continuously detained
until they escaped on August 13, 2007. The abduction, detention, torture, and escape of
the respondents were narrated by respondent Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing
manner. His account is dotted with countless candid details of respondents' harrowing
experience and tenacious will to escape, captured through his different senses and etched
in his memory. A few examples are the following: "Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig
at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel."96 "(N)ilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na galing
sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel." 97 "May
naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang
nililinis ang bakas."98 "Tumigil ako sa may palaisdaan kung saan ginamit ko ang bato para
tanggalin ang mga kadena."99 "Tinanong ko sa isang kapit-bahay kung paano ako
makakakuha ng cell phone; sabi ko gusto kong i-text ang isang babae na nakatira sa
malapit na lugar."100
We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on respondent
Raymond Manalo's affidavit and testimony, viz:
...the abduction was perpetrated by armed men who were sufficiently identified by
the petitioners (herein respondents) to be military personnel and CAFGU auxiliaries.
Raymond recalled that the six armed men who barged into his house through the
rear door were military men based on their attire of fatigue pants and army boots,
and the CAFGU auxiliaries, namely: Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, Puti de la
Cruz and Pula de la Cruz, all members of the CAFGU and residents of Muzon, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan, and the brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also CAFGU
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XU – College of Law
OF CASES BATCH 8
members, served as lookouts during the abduction. Raymond was sure that three of
the six military men were Ganata, who headed the abducting team, Hilario, who
drove the van, and George. Subsequent incidents of their long captivity, as narrated
by the petitioners, validated their assertion of the participation of the elements of
the 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, and their CAFGU auxiliaries.
We are convinced, too, that the reason for the abduction was the suspicion that the
petitioners were either members or sympathizers of the NPA, considering that the
abductors were looking for Ka Bestre, who turned out to be Rolando, the brother of
petitioners.
The efforts exerted by the Military Command to look into the abduction were, at best,
merely superficial. The investigation of the Provost Marshall of the 7 th Infantry
Division focused on the one-sided version of the CAFGU auxiliaries involved. This
one-sidedness might be due to the fact that the Provost Marshall could delve only
into the participation of military personnel, but even then the Provost Marshall
should have refrained from outrightly exculpating the CAFGU auxiliaries he
perfunctorily investigated...
Gen. Palparan's participation in the abduction was also established. At the very least,
he was aware of the petitioners' captivity at the hands of men in uniform assigned to
his command. In fact, he or any other officer tendered no controversion to the firm
claim of Raymond that he (Gen. Palparan) met them in person in a safehouse in
Bulacan and told them what he wanted them and their parents to do or not to be
doing. Gen. Palparan's direct and personal role in the abduction might not have been
shown but his knowledge of the dire situation of the petitioners during their long
captivity at the hands of military personnel under his command bespoke of his
indubitable command policy that unavoidably encouraged and not merely tolerated
the abduction of civilians without due process of law and without probable cause.
In the habeas proceedings, the Court, through the Former Special Sixth Division
(Justices Buzon, chairman; Santiago-Lagman, Sr., member; and Romilla-Lontok, Jr.,
member/ponente.) found no clear and convincing evidence to establish that M/Sgt.
Rizal Hilario had anything to do with the abduction or the detention. Hilario's
involvement could not, indeed, be then established after Evangeline Francisco, who
allegedly saw Hilario drive the van in which the petitioners were boarded and ferried
following the abduction, did not testify. (See the decision of the habeas proceedings
at rollo, p. 52)
However, in this case, Raymond attested that Hilario drove the white L-300 van in
which the petitioners were brought away from their houses on February 14, 2006.
Raymond also attested that Hilario participated in subsequent incidents during the
captivity of the petitioners, one of which was when Hilario fetched them from Fort
Magsaysay on board a Revo and conveyed them to a detachment in Pinaud, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan where they were detained for at least a week in a house of strong
materials (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) and then Hilario (along with Efren) brought them
to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo, to an unfinished house inside the
compound of Kapitan where they were kept for more or less three months. (Exhibit
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
D, rollo, p. 205) It was there where the petitioners came face to face with Gen.
Palparan. Hilario and Efren also brought the petitioners one early morning to the
house of the petitioners' parents, where only Raymond was presented to the parents
to relay the message from Gen. Palparan not to join anymore rallies. On that occasion,
Hilario warned the parents that they would not again see their sons should they join
any rallies to denounce human rights violations. (Exhibit D, rollo, pp. 205-206)
Hilario was also among four Master Sergeants (the others being Arman, Ganata and
Cabalse) with whom Gen. Palparan conversed on the occasion when Gen. Palparan
required Raymond to take the medicines for his health. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 206)
There were other occasions when the petitioners saw that Hilario had a direct hand
in their torture.
It is clear, therefore, that the participation of Hilario in the abduction and forced
disappearance of the petitioners was established. The participation of other military
personnel like Arman, Ganata, Cabalse and Caigas, among others, was similarly
established.
xxx xxx xxx
As to the CAFGU auxiliaries, the habeas Court found them personally involved in the
abduction. We also do, for, indeed, the evidence of their participation is
overwhelming.101
We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalo's statements were not
corroborated by other independent and credible pieces of evidence. 102 Raymond's
affidavit and testimony were corroborated by the affidavit of respondent Reynaldo
Manalo. The testimony and medical reports prepared by forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and
the pictures of the scars left by the physical injuries inflicted on respondents, 103 also
corroborate respondents' accounts of the torture they endured while in detention.
Respondent Raymond Manalo's familiarity with the facilities in Fort Magsaysay such as
the "DTU," as shown in his testimony and confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be the "Division
Training Unit,"104 firms up respondents' story that they were detained for some time in
said military facility.
In Ortiz v. Guatemala,105 a case decided by the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, the Commission considered similar evidence, among others, in finding that
complainant Sister Diana Ortiz was abducted and tortured by agents of the Guatemalan
government. In this case, Sister Ortiz was kidnapped and tortured in early November
1989. The Commission's findings of fact were mostly based on the consistent and credible
statements, written and oral, made by Sister Ortiz regarding her ordeal.106 These
statements were supported by her recognition of portions of the route they took when she
was being driven out of the military installation where she was detained.107 She was also
examined by a medical doctor whose findings showed that the 111 circular second degree
burns on her back and abrasions on her cheek coincided with her account of cigarette
burning and torture she suffered while in detention.108
With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the
victim during detention, it logically holds that much of the information and evidence of the
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XU – College of Law
OF CASES BATCH 8
ordeal will come from the victims themselves, and the veracity of their account will depend
on their credibility and candidness in their written and/or oral statements. Their
statements can be corroborated by other evidence such as physical evidence left by the
torture they suffered or landmarks they can identify in the places where they were
detained. Where powerful military officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to
surface and testify against them comes as no surprise.
We now come to the right of the respondents to the privilege of the writ of Amparo. There
is no quarrel that the enforced disappearance of both respondents Raymond and Reynaldo
Manalo has now passed as they have escaped from captivity and surfaced. But while
respondents admit that they are no longer in detention and are physically free, they assert
that they are not "free in every sense of the word"109 as their "movements continue to be
restricted for fear that people they have named in their Judicial Affidavits and testified
against (in the case of Raymond) are still at large and have not been held accountable in
any way. These people are directly connected to the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
are, thus, in a position to threaten respondents' rights to life, liberty and security."110
(emphasis supplied) Respondents claim that they are under threat of being once again
abducted, kept captive or even killed, which constitute a direct violation of their right
to security of person.111
Elaborating on the "right to security, in general," respondents point out that this right is
"often associated with liberty;" it is also seen as an "expansion of rights based on the
prohibition against torture and cruel and unusual punishment." Conceding that there is no
right to security expressly mentioned in Article III of the 1987 Constitution, they submit
that their rights "to be kept free from torture and from incommunicado detention and
solitary detention places112 fall under the general coverage of the right to security of
person under the writ of Amparo." They submit that the Court ought to give an expansive
recognition of the right to security of person in view of the State Policy under Article II of
the 1987 Constitution which enunciates that, "The State values the dignity of every human
person and guarantees full respect for human rights." Finally, to justify a liberal
interpretation of the right to security of person, respondents cite the teaching in Moncupa
v. Enrile113 that "the right to liberty may be made more meaningful only if there is no
undue restraint by the State on the exercise of that liberty"114 such as a requirement to
"report under unreasonable restrictions that amounted to a deprivation of liberty" 115 or
being put under "monitoring and surveillance."116
In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in the threat to their right
to life and liberty, and a violation of their right to security.
Let us put this right to security under the lens to determine if it has indeed been
violated as respondents assert. The right to security or the right to security of person
finds a textual hook in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution which provides, viz:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge...
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
At the core of this guarantee is the immunity of one's person, including the extensions
of his/her person - houses, papers, and effects - against government intrusion. Section
2 not only limits the state's power over a person's home and possessions, but more
importantly, protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself. 117 The purpose
of this provision was enunciated by the Court in People v. CFI of Rizal, Branch IX,
Quezon City, viz: 118
The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures is to prevent violations of private security in person and property and
unlawful invasion of the security of the home by officers of the law acting under
legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy against such usurpation when
attempted. (Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 858; Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637
[1946]). The right to privacy is an essential condition to the dignity and
happiness and to the peace and security of every individual, whether it be
of home or of persons and correspondence. (Tañada and Carreon, Political
Law of the Philippines, Vol. 2, 139 [1962]). The constitutional inviolability of this
great fundamental right against unreasonable searches and seizures must be
deemed absolute as nothing is closer to a man's soul than the serenity of his
privacy and the assurance of his personal security. Any interference
allowable can only be for the best causes and reasons.119 (emphases supplied)
While the right to life under Article III, Section 1120 guarantees essentially the right to
be alive121 - upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the right
to security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this life, viz: "The life to
which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and property
may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the
assurance that the government he established and consented to, will protect the
security of his person and property. The ideal of security in life and property...
pervades the whole history of man. It touches every aspect of man's existence." 122 In
a broad sense, the right to security of person "emanates in a person's legal and
uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation.
It includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is
invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those things which are necessary
to the enjoyment of life according to the nature, temperament, and lawful desires of
the individual."123
A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of
the exercise of this right.
First, the right to security of person is "freedom from fear." In its "whereas"
clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that "a
world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom
from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common
people." (emphasis supplied) Some scholars postulate that "freedom from fear" is not
only an aspirational principle, but essentially an individual international human
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right.124
It is the "right to security of person" as the word "security" itself means
"freedom from fear."125 Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.126 (emphasis
supplied)
In furtherance of this right declared in the UDHR, Article 9(1) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also provides for the right to security
of person, viz:
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his
liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as
are established by law. (emphasis supplied)
The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.
In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, "freedom from fear" is the right and
any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is
a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the
same stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded as people react
differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the variation
of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past experience with
the stimulus. Thus, in the Amparo context, it is more correct to say that the "right to
security" is actually the "freedom from threat." Viewed in this light, the "threatened
with violation" Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of
violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision. 127
Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological
integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that,
as a general rule, one's body cannot be searched or invaded without a search
warrant.128 Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may
constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As
the degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in
criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because they are an
affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person.129
Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of bodily integrity. When
employed to vitiate the free will such as to force the victim to admit, reveal or
fabricate incriminating information, it constitutes an invasion of both bodily and
psychological integrity as the dignity of the human person includes the exercise of
free will. Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution more specifically proscribes
bodily and psychological invasion, viz:
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
2. No torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation, or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against him (any person under investigation
for the commission of an offense). Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
Parenthetically, under this provision, threat and intimidation that vitiate the free will
- although not involving invasion of bodily integrity - nevertheless constitute a
violation of the right to security in the sense of "freedom from threat" as afore-
discussed.
Article III, Section 12 guarantees freedom from dehumanizing abuses of persons
under investigation for the commission of an offense. Victims of enforced
disappearances who are not even under such investigation should all the more be
protected from these degradations.
An overture to an interpretation of the right to security of person as a right against
torture was made by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in the recent case
of Popov v. Russia.130 In this case, the claimant, who was lawfully detained, alleged
that the state authorities had physically abused him in prison, thereby violating his
right to security of person. Article 5(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights
provides, viz: "Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall
be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a
procedure prescribed by law ..." (emphases supplied) Article 3, on the other hand,
provides that "(n)o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment." Although the application failed on the facts as the alleged
ill-treatment was found baseless, the ECHR relied heavily on the concept of security
in holding, viz:
...the applicant did not bring his allegations to the attention of domestic
authorities at the time when they could reasonably have been expected to take
measures in order to ensure his security and to investigate the circumstances
in question.
xxx xxx xxx
... the authorities failed to ensure his security in custody or to comply with the
procedural obligation under Art.3 to conduct an effective investigation into his
allegations.131 (emphasis supplied)
The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has also
made a statement that the protection of the bodily integrity of women may also be
related to the right to security and liberty, viz:
...gender-based violence which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of
human rights and fundamental freedoms under general international law or
under specific human rights conventions is discrimination within the meaning
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of article 1 of the Convention (on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women). These rights and freedoms include . . . the right to liberty and
security of person.132
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's rights
by the government. In the context of the writ of Amparo, this right is built into the
guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and
guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right
to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State
"guarantees full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987
Constitution.133 As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the
Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered
ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when
they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations,
organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of
extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their
families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The Inter-American Court of
Human Rights stressed the importance of investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez
Case,134 viz:
(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not
as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must
have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not as a
step taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the
victim or his family or upon their offer of proof, without an effective search for
the truth by the government.135
This third sense of the right to security of person as a guarantee of government
protection has been interpreted by the United Nations' Human Rights Committee136
in not a few cases involving Article 9137 of the ICCPR. While the right to security of
person appears in conjunction with the right to liberty under Article 9, the Committee
has ruled that the right to security of person can exist independently of the right
to liberty. In other words, there need not necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for
the right to security of person to be invoked. In Delgado Paez v. Colombia,138 a case
involving death threats to a religion teacher at a secondary school in Leticia,
Colombia, whose social views differed from those of the Apostolic Prefect of Leticia,
the Committee held, viz:
The first sentence of article 9 does not stand as a separate paragraph. Its location
as a part of paragraph one could lead to the view that the right to security arises
only in the context of arrest and detention. The travaux préparatoires indicate
that the discussions of the first sentence did indeed focus on matters dealt with
in the other provisions of article 9. The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, in article 3, refers to the right to life, the right to liberty and the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
right to security of the person. These elements have been dealt with in
separate clauses in the Covenant. Although in the Covenant the only
reference to the right of security of person is to be found in article 9, there
is no evidence that it was intended to narrow the concept of the right to
security only to situations of formal deprivation of liberty. At the same
time, States parties have undertaken to guarantee the rights enshrined in
the Covenant. It cannot be the case that, as a matter of law, States can
ignore known threats to the life of persons under their jurisdiction, just
because that he or she is not arrested or otherwise detained. States parties
are under an obligation to take reasonable and appropriate measures to
protect them. An interpretation of article 9 which would allow a State
party to ignore threats to the personal security of non-detained persons
within its jurisdiction would render totally ineffective the guarantees of
the Covenant.139 (emphasis supplied)
The Paez ruling was reiterated in Bwalya v. Zambia,140 which involved a political
activist and prisoner of conscience who continued to be intimidated, harassed, and
restricted in his movements following his release from detention. In a catena of cases,
the ruling of the Committee was of a similar import: Bahamonde v. Equatorial
Guinea,141 involving discrimination, intimidation and persecution of opponents of the
ruling party in that state; Tshishimbi v. Zaire,142 involving the abduction of the
complainant's husband who was a supporter of democratic reform in Zaire; Dias v.
Angola,143 involving the murder of the complainant's partner and the
harassment he (complainant) suffered because of his investigation of the
murder; and Chongwe v. Zambia,144 involving an assassination attempt on the
chairman of an opposition alliance.
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted the "right to
security" not only as prohibiting the State from arbitrarily depriving liberty, but
imposing a positive duty on the State to afford protection of the right to liberty.145 The
ECHR interpreted the "right to security of person" under Article 5(1) of the European
Convention of Human Rights in the leading case on disappearance of persons, Kurt v.
Turkey.146 In this case, the claimant's son had been arrested by state authorities and
had not been seen since. The family's requests for information and investigation
regarding his whereabouts proved futile. The claimant suggested that this was a
violation of her son's right to security of person. The ECHR ruled, viz:
... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with
the substantive and procedural rules of national law but must equally be in
keeping with the very purpose of Article 5, namely to protect the individual from
arbitrariness... Having assumed control over that individual it is incumbent on
the authorities to account for his or her whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5
must be seen as requiring the authorities to take effective measures to
safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to conduct a prompt
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effective investigation into an arguable claim that a person has been taken
into custody and has not been seen since.147 (emphasis supplied)
Applying the foregoing concept of the right to security of person to the case at bar, we
now determine whether there is a continuing violation of respondents' right to
security.
First, the violation of the right to security as freedom from threat to
respondents' life, liberty and security.
While respondents were detained, they were threatened that if they escaped, their
families, including them, would be killed. In Raymond's narration, he was tortured
and poured with gasoline after he was caught the first time he attempted to escape
from Fort Magsaysay. A call from a certain "Mam," who wanted to see him before he
was killed, spared him.
This time, respondents have finally escaped. The condition of the threat to be killed
has come to pass. It should be stressed that they are now free from captivity not
because they were released by virtue of a lawful order or voluntarily freed by their
abductors. It ought to be recalled that towards the end of their ordeal, sometime in
June 2007 when respondents were detained in a camp in Limay, Bataan, respondents'
captors even told them that they were still deciding whether they should be executed.
Respondent Raymond Manalo attested in his affidavit, viz:
Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na
araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil
pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o hindi.148
The possibility of respondents being executed stared them in the eye while they were
in detention. With their escape, this continuing threat to their life is apparent, moreso
now that they have surfaced and implicated specific officers in the military not only
in their own abduction and torture, but also in those of other persons known to have
disappeared such as Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño, and Manuel Merino, among
others.
Understandably, since their escape, respondents have been under concealment and
protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty and security.
The threat vitiates their free will as they are forced to limit their movements or
activities.149 Precisely because respondents are being shielded from the perpetrators
of their abduction, they cannot be expected to show evidence of overt acts of threat
such as face-to-face intimidation or written threats to their life, liberty and security.
Nonetheless, the circumstances of respondents' abduction, detention, torture and
escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will
again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to
their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of Amparo.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
Next, the violation of the right to security as protection by the government.
Apart from the failure of military elements to provide protection to respondents by
themselves perpetrating the abduction, detention, and torture, they also miserably
failed in conducting an effective investigation of respondents' abduction as revealed
by the testimony and investigation report of petitioners' own witness, Lt. Col. Ruben
Jimenez, Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division.
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Finally, we come to the reliefs granted by the Court of Appeals, which petitioners
question.
First, that petitioners furnish respondents all official and unofficial reports of the
investigation undertaken in connection with their case, except those already in file
with the court.

The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very limited, superficial, and Second, that petitioners confirm in writing the present places of official
one-sided. He merely relied on the Sworn Statements of the six implicated members assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas.
of the CAFGU and civilians whom he met in the investigation for the first time. He was
Third, that petitioners cause to be produced to the Court of Appeals all medical
present at the investigation when his subordinate Lingad was taking the sworn
reports, records and charts, and reports of any treatment given or
statements, but he did not propound a single question to ascertain the veracity of
recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the Manalo brothers, to
their statements or their credibility. He did not call for other witnesses to test the
include a list of medical personnel (military and civilian) who attended to them
alibis given by the six implicated persons nor for the family or neighbors of the
from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007.
respondents.
With respect to the first and second reliefs, petitioners argue that the production
In his affidavit, petitioner Secretary of National Defense attested that in a
order sought by respondents partakes of the characteristics of a search warrant. Thus,
Memorandum Directive dated October 31, 2007, he issued a policy directive
they claim that the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant must be complied
addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff, that the AFP should adopt rules of action in the
with prior to the grant of the production order, namely: (1) the application must be
event the writ of Amparo is issued by a competent court against any members of the
under oath or affirmation; (2) the search warrant must particularly describe the place
AFP, which should essentially include verification of the identity of the aggrieved
to be searched and the things to be seized; (3) there exists probable cause with one
party; recovery and preservation of relevant evidence; identification of witnesses and
specific offense; and (4) the probable cause must be personally determined by the
securing statements from them; determination of the cause, manner, location and
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
time of death or disappearance; identification and apprehension of the person or
witnesses he may produce.152 In the case at bar, however, petitioners point out that
persons involved in the death or disappearance; and bringing of the suspected
other than the bare, self-serving and vague allegations made by respondent Raymond
offenders before a competent court.150 Petitioner AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his
Manalo in his unverified declaration and affidavit, the documents respondents seek
own affidavit attesting that he received the above directive of respondent Secretary
to be produced are only mentioned generally by name, with no other supporting
of National Defense and that acting on this directive, he immediately caused to be
details. They also argue that the relevancy of the documents to be produced must be
issued a directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the
apparent, but this is not true in the present case as the involvement of petitioners in
circumstances of the alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the
the abduction has not been shown.
respondents, and undertook to provide results of the investigations to
respondents.151 To this day, however, almost a year after the policy directive was Petitioners' arguments do not hold water. The production order under the Amparo
issued by petitioner Secretary of National Defense on October 31, 2007, respondents Rule should not be confused with a search warrant for law enforcement under Article
have not been furnished the results of the investigation which they now seek through III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. This Constitutional provision is a protection of
the instant petition for a writ of Amparo. the people from the unreasonable intrusion of the government, not a protection of the
government from the demand of the people such as respondents.
Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to warrant the conclusion
that there is a violation of respondents' right to security as a guarantee of protection Instead, the Amparo production order may be likened to the production of documents
by the government. or things under Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which provides in
relevant part, viz:
In sum, we conclude that respondents' right to security as "freedom from threat" is
violated by the apparent threat to their life, liberty and security of person. Their right Section 1. Motion for production or inspection order.
to security as a guarantee of protection by the government is likewise violated by the
ineffective investigation and protection on the part of the military. Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an
action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the

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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION OF CASES BATCH 8
inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, SO ORDERED.
of any designated documents, papers, books of accounts, letters, photographs,
objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence
material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession,
custody or control...

In Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. v. Judge Natividad,153 the respondent judge,

under authority of Rule 27, issued a subpoena duces tecum for the production and
inspection of among others, the books and papers of Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc.
The company questioned the issuance of the subpoena on the ground that it violated
the search and seizure clause. The Court struck down the argument and held that the
subpoena pertained to a civil procedure that "cannot be identified or confused with
unreasonable searches prohibited by the Constitution..."

Moreover, in his affidavit, petitioner AFP Chief of Staff himself undertook "to provide
results of the investigations conducted or to be conducted by the concerned unit
relative to the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the persons in whose
favor the Writ of Amparo has been sought for as soon as the same has been furnished
Higher headquarters."

With respect to the second and third reliefs, petitioners assert that the disclosure
of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald
Caigas, as well as the submission of a list of medical personnel, is irrelevant, improper,
immaterial, and unnecessary in the resolution of the petition for a writ of Amparo.
They add that it will unnecessarily compromise and jeopardize the exercise of official
functions and duties of military officers and even unwittingly and unnecessarily
expose them to threat of personal injury or even death.

On the contrary, the disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario
aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas, whom respondents both directly implicated as
perpetrators behind their abduction and detention, is relevant in ensuring the safety
of respondents by avoiding their areas of territorial jurisdiction. Such disclosure
would also help ensure that these military officers can be served with notices and
court processes in relation to any investigation and action for violation of the
respondents' rights. The list of medical personnel is also relevant in securing
information to create the medical history of respondents and make appropriate
medical interventions, when applicable and necessary.

In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and security, these
rights are snuffed out from victims of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
The writ of Amparo is a tool that gives voice to preys of silent guns and prisoners
behind secret walls.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the

Court of Appeals dated December 26, 2007 is affirmed.

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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
G.R. No. 193636 July 24, 2012
MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA, Petitioner,
vs.
P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, in his capacity as the PNP-Provincial Director of
Ilocos Norte, and P/SUPT. WILLIAM 0. FANG, in his capacity as Chief,
Intelligence Division, PNP Provincial Office, Ilocos Norte, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before this Court is an Appeal by Certiorari (Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court) filed
pursuant to Rule 191 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data,2 seeking a review of the
9 September 2010 Decision in Special Proc. No. 14979 of the Regional Trial Court,
First Judicial Region, Laoag City, Branch 13 (RTC Br. 13).3 The questioned Decision
denied petitioner the privilege of the writ of habeas data.4
At the time the present Petition was filed, petitioner Marynette R. Gamboa (Gamboa)
was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte.5 Meanwhile, respondent Police Senior
Superintendent (P/SSUPT.) Marlou C. Chan was the Officer-in-Charge, and
respondent Police Superintendent (P/SUPT.) William O. Fang was the Chief of the
Provincial Investigation and Detective Management Branch, both of the Ilocos Norte
Police Provincial Office.6
On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Administrative Order No. 275 (A.O. 275), "Creating an Independent Commission to
Address the Alleged Existence of Private Armies in the Country."7 The body, which
was later on referred to as the Zeñarosa Commission,8 was formed to investigate the
existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the country with a view to eliminating
them before the 10 May 2010 elections and dismantling them permanently in the
future.9 Upon the conclusion of its investigation, the Zeñarosa Commission released
and submitted to the Office of the President a confidential report entitled "A Journey
Towards H.O.P.E.: The Independent Commission Against Private Armies’ Report to
the President" (the Report).10
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos Norte)
conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her aides,11 and
classified her as someone who keeps a PAG.12 Purportedly without the benefit of data
verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the
Zeñarosa Commission,13 thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration
of individuals maintaining PAGs.14 More specifically, she pointed out the following
items reflected therein:
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(a) The Report cited the PNP as its source for the portion regarding the status of
PAGs in the Philippines.15
(b) The Report stated that "x x x the PNP organized one dedicated Special Task
Group (STG) for each private armed group (PAG) to monitor and counteract
their activities."16
(c) Attached as Appendix "F" of the Report is a tabulation generated by the PNP
and captioned as "Status of PAGs Monitoring by STGs as of April 19, 2010,"
which classifies PAGs in the country according to region, indicates their
identity, and lists the prominent personalities with whom these groups are
associated.17 The first entry in the table names a PAG, known as the Gamboa
Group, linked to herein petitioner Gamboa.18
(d) Statistics on the status of PAGs were based on data from the PNP, to wit:
The resolutions were the subject of a national press conference held in
Malacañang on March 24, 2010 at which time, the Commission was also asked to
comment on the PNP report that out of one hundred seventeen (117) partisan
armed groups validated, twenty-four (24) had been dismantled with sixty-seven
(67) members apprehended and more than eighty-six (86) firearms confiscated.
Commissioner Herman Basbaño qualified that said statistics were based on PNP
data but that the more significant fact from his report is that the PNP has been
vigilant in monitoring the activities of these armed groups and this vigilance is
largely due to the existence of the Commission which has continued
communicating with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and PNP
personnel in the field to constantly provide data on the activities of the PAGs.
Commissioner Basbaño stressed that the Commission’s efforts have preempted
the formation of the PAGs because now everyone is aware that there is a body
monitoring the PAGs movement through the PNP. Commissioner Lieutenant
General Edilberto Pardo Adan also clarified that the PAGs are being destabilized
so that their ability to threaten and sow fear during the election has been
considerably weakened.19
(e) The Report briefly touched upon the validation system of the PNP:
Also, in order to provide the Commission with accurate data which is truly reflective
of the situation in the field, the PNP complied with the Commission’s recommendation
that they revise their validation system to include those PAGs previously listed as
dormant. In the most recent briefing provided by the PNP on April 26, 2010, there are
one hundred seven (107) existing PAGs. Of these groups, the PNP reported that seven
(7) PAGs have been reorganized.20
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news program the portion
of the Report naming Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged to be maintaining a
PAG.21 Gamboa averred that her association with a PAG also appeared on print
media.22 Thus, she was publicly tagged as someone who maintains a PAG on the basis
of the unverified information that the PNP-Ilocos Norte gathered and forwarded to
the Zeñarosa Commission.23 As a result, she claimed that her malicious or reckless
inclusion in the enumeration of personalities maintaining a PAG as published in the
Report also made her, as well as her supporters and other people identified with her,
susceptible to harassment and police surveillance operations.24
Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and
destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition dated 9 July 2010 for the issuance of a writ of
habeas data against respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos
Norte.25 In her Petition, she prayed for the following reliefs: (a) destruction of the
unverified reports from the PNP-Ilocos Norte database; (b) withdrawal of all
information forwarded to higher PNP officials; (c) rectification of the damage done to
her honor; (d) ordering respondents to refrain from forwarding unverified reports
against her; and (e) restraining respondents from making baseless reports.26
The case was docketed as Special Proc. No. 14979 and was raffled to RTC Br. 13, which
issued the corresponding writ on 14 July 2010 after finding the Petition meritorious
on its face.27 Thus, the trial court (a) instructed respondents to submit all
information and reports forwarded to and used by the Zeñarosa Commission as basis
to include her in the list of persons maintaining PAGs; (b) directed respondents, and
any person acting on their behalf, to cease and desist from forwarding to the Zeñarosa
Commission, or to any other government entity, information that they may have
gathered against her without the approval of the court; (c) ordered respondents to
make a written return of the writ together with supporting affidavits; and (d)
scheduled the summary hearing of the case on 23 July 2010.28
In their Return of the Writ, respondents alleged that they had acted within the bounds
of their mandate in conducting the investigation and surveillance of Gamboa.29 The
information stored in their database supposedly pertained to two criminal cases in
which she was implicated, namely: (a) a Complaint for murder and frustrated murder
docketed as NPS DOC No. 1-04-INQ-091-00077, and (b) a Complaint for murder,
frustrated murder and direct assault upon a person in authority, as well as indirect
assault and multiple attempted murder, docketed as NPS DOCKET No. 1-04-INV-10-
A-00009.30
Respondents likewise asserted that the Petition was incomplete for failing to comply
with the following requisites under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data: (a) the
manner in which the right to privacy was violated or threatened with violation and
how it affected the right to life, liberty or security of Gamboa; (b) the actions and
recourses she took to secure the data or information; and (c) the location of the files,
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registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in possession
or in control of the data or information.31 They also contended that the Petition for
Writ of Habeas Data, being limited to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, was not the proper remedy to address the alleged besmirching of the
reputation of Gamboa.32
RTC Br. 13, in its assailed Decision dated 9 September 2010, dismissed the Petition.33
The trial court categorically ruled that the inclusion of Gamboa in the list of persons
maintaining PAGs, as published in the Report, constituted a violation of her right to
privacy, to wit:
In this light, it cannot also be disputed that by her inclusion in the list of persons
maintaining PAGs, Gamboa’s right to privacy indubitably has been violated. The
violation understandably affects her life, liberty and security enormously. The untold
misery that comes with the tag of having a PAG could even be insurmountable. As she
essentially alleged in her petition, she fears for her security that at any time of the day
the unlimited powers of respondents may likely be exercised to further malign and
destroy her reputation and to transgress her right to life.
By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, it is likewise undisputed that
there was certainly intrusion into Gamboa’s activities. It cannot be denied that
information was gathered as basis therefor. After all, under Administrative Order No.
275, the Zeñarosa Commission was tasked to investigate the existence of private
armies in the country, with all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37,
Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987.
xxx xxx xxx
By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, Gamboa alleged as she
accused respondents, who are public officials, of having gathered and provided
information that made the Zeñarosa Commission to include her in the list. Obviously,
it was this gathering and forwarding of information supposedly by respondents that
petitioner barks at as unlawful. x x x.34
Despite the foregoing findings, RTC Br. 13 nevertheless dismissed the Petition on the
ground that Gamboa failed to prove through substantial evidence that the subject
information originated from respondents, and that they forwarded this database to
the Zeñarosa Commission without the benefit of prior verification.35 The trial court
also ruled that even before respondents assumed their official positions, information
on her may have already been acquired.36 Finally, it held that the Zeñarosa
Commission, as the body tasked to gather information on PAGs and authorized to
disclose information on her, should have been impleaded as a necessary if not a
compulsory party to the Petition.37
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
Gamboa then filed the instant Appeal by Certiorari dated 24 September 2010,38
raising the following assignment of errors:
1. The trial court erred in ruling that the Zeñarosa Commission be impleaded as
either a necessary or indispensable party;
2. The trial court erred in declaring that Gamboa failed to present sufficient proof
to link respondents as the informant to [sic] the Zeñarosa Commission;
3. The trial court failed to satisfy the spirit of Habeas Data;
4. The trial court erred in pronouncing that the reliance of the Zeñarosa
Commission to [sic] the PNP as alleged by Gamboa is an assumption;
5. The trial court erred in making a point that respondents are distinct to PNP as
an agency.39
On the other hand, respondents maintain the following arguments: (a) Gamboa failed
to present substantial evidence to show that her right to privacy in life, liberty or
security was violated, and (b) the trial court correctly dismissed the Petition on the
ground that she had failed to present sufficient proof showing that respondents were
the source of the report naming her as one who maintains a PAG.40
Meanwhile, Gamboa argues that although A.O. 275 was a lawful order, fulfilling the
mandate to dismantle PAGs in the country should be done in accordance with due
process, such that the gathering and forwarding of unverified information on her
must be considered unlawful.41 She also reiterates that she was able to present
sufficient evidence showing that the subject information originated from
respondents.42
In determining whether Gamboa should be granted the privilege of the writ of habeas
data, this Court is called upon to, first, unpack the concept of the right to privacy;
second, explain the writ of habeas data as an extraordinary remedy that seeks to
protect the right to informational privacy; and finally, contextualize the right to
privacy vis-à-vis the state interest involved in the case at bar.
The Right to Privacy
The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty, has long been recognized as a
constitutional right. This Court, in Morfe v. Mutuc,43 thus enunciated:
The due process question touching on an alleged deprivation of liberty as thus
resolved goes a long way in disposing of the objections raised by plaintiff that the
provision on the periodical submission of a sworn statement of assets and liabilities
is violative of the constitutional right to privacy. There is much to be said for this view
of Justice Douglas: "Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than freedom
from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a
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repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom."
As a matter of fact, this right to be let alone is, to quote from Mr. Justice Brandeis "the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."
The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for
his personality as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and interference
demands respect. xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
x x x In the leading case of Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Douglas, speaking for five
members of the Court, stated: "Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right
of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have
seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers ‘in
any house’ in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that
privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the ‘right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.’ The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to
create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his
detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: ‘The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people." After referring to various American Supreme Court decisions, Justice Douglas
continued: "These cases bear witness that the right of privacy which presses for
recognition is a legitimate one."
xxx xxx xxx
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of
constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The
concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental
powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is
indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government.
Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the
hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government, safeguards
a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the
public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector —
protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual — has become
increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the forces of a
technological age — industrialization, urbanization, and organization — operate to
narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the
capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference
between a democratic and a totalitarian society."44 (Emphases supplied)
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
In Ople v. Torres,45 this Court traced the constitutional and statutory bases of the
right to privacy in Philippine jurisdiction, to wit:
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is
recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution. It is expressly
recognized in section 3 (1) of the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires
otherwise as prescribed by law.
Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of
Rights, viz:
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by
law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right
to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public
health as may be provided by law.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law
shall not be abridged.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code
provides that "every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace
of mind of his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as actionable torts several
acts by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also holds a
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public officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any
violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of
letters and other private communications. The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the
violation of secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and
trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-
Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act and the Intellectual Property
Code. The Rules of Court on privileged communication likewise recognize the privacy
of certain information.
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of
government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest
and that it is narrowly drawn. x x x.46 (Emphases supplied)
Clearly, the right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be protected
from intrusion or constraint. However, in Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate
Committee on Banks,47 this Court underscored that the right to privacy is not
absolute, viz:
With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has violated,
suffice it to state that privacy is not an absolute right. While it is true that Section 21,
Article VI of the Constitution, guarantees respect for the rights of persons affected by
the legislative investigation, not every invocation of the right to privacy should be
allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry. In Sabio v. Gordon, we have held
that the right of the people to access information on matters of public concern
generally prevails over the right to privacy of ordinary financial transactions. In that
case, we declared that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding
compelling state interest. Employing the rational basis relationship test, as laid down
in Morfe v. Mutuc, there is no infringement of the individual’s right to privacy as the
requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose, in this case, to ensure
that the government agencies involved in regulating banking transactions adequately
protect the public who invest in foreign securities. Suffice it to state that this purpose
constitutes a reason compelling enough to proceed with the assailed legislative
investigation.48
Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state objective,
the courts are required to weigh both notions. In these cases, although considered a
fundamental right, the right to privacy may nevertheless succumb to an opposing or
overriding state interest deemed legitimate and compelling.
The Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect
the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual,
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational
privacy.49 It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding
oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through
unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.50 It must be emphasized that in
order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the
right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data reads:
Habeas data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose
right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act
or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data information regarding the
person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
The notion of informational privacy is still developing in Philippine law and
jurisprudence. Considering that even the Latin American habeas data, on which our
own Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data is rooted, finds its origins from the European
tradition of data protection,51 this Court can be guided by cases on the protection of
personal data decided by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Of particular
note is Leander v. Sweden,52 in which the ECHR balanced the right of citizens to be
free from interference in their private affairs with the right of the state to protect its
national security. In this case, Torsten Leander (Leander), a Swedish citizen, worked
as a temporary replacement museum technician at the Naval Museum, which was
adjacent to a restricted military security zone.53 He was refused employment when
the requisite personnel control resulted in an unfavorable outcome on the basis of
information in the secret police register, which was kept in accordance with the
Personnel Control Ordinance and to which he was prevented access.54 He claimed,
among others, that this procedure of security control violated Article 8 of the
European Convention of Human Rights55 on the right to privacy, as nothing in his
personal or political background would warrant his classification in the register as a
security risk.56
The ECHR ruled that the storage in the secret police register of information relating
to the private life of Leander, coupled with the refusal to allow him the opportunity
to refute the same, amounted to an interference in his right to respect for private
life.57 However, the ECHR held that the interference was justified on the following
grounds: (a) the personnel control system had a legitimate aim, which was the
protection of national security,58 and (b) the Personnel Control Ordinance gave the
citizens adequate indication as to the scope and the manner of exercising discretion
in the collection, recording and release of information by the authorities.59 The
following statements of the ECHR must be emphasized:
58. The notion of necessity implies that the interference corresponds to a
pressing social need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate
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aim pursued (see, inter alia, the Gillow judgment of 24 November 1986, Series A
no. 109, p. 22, § 55).
59. However, the Court recognises that the national authorities enjoy a margin
of appreciation, the scope of which will depend not only on the nature of the
legitimate aim pursued but also on the particular nature of the interference
involved. In the instant case, the interest of the respondent State in protecting
its national security must be balanced against the seriousness of the interference
with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life.
There can be no doubt as to the necessity, for the purpose of protecting national
security, for the Contracting States to have laws granting the competent domestic
authorities power, firstly, to collect and store in registers not accessible to the public
information on persons and, secondly, to use this information when assessing the
suitability of candidates for employment in posts of importance for national security.
Admittedly, the contested interference adversely affected Mr. Leander’s legitimate
interests through the consequences it had on his possibilities of access to certain
sensitive posts within the public service. On the other hand, the right of access to
public service is not as such enshrined in the Convention (see, inter alia, the Kosiek
judgment of 28 August 1986, Series A no. 105, p. 20, §§ 34-35), and, apart from those
consequences, the interference did not constitute an obstacle to his leading a private
life of his own choosing.
In these circumstances, the Court accepts that the margin of appreciation available to
the respondent State in assessing the pressing social need in the present case, and in
particular in choosing the means for achieving the legitimate aim of protecting
national security, was a wide one.
xxx xxx xxx
66. The fact that the information released to the military authorities was not
communicated to Mr. Leander cannot by itself warrant the conclusion that the
interference was not "necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security", as it is the very absence of such communication which, at least partly,
ensures the efficacy of the personnel control procedure (see, mutatis mutandis, the
above-mentioned Klass and Others judgment, Series A no. 28, p. 27, § 58).
The Court notes, however, that various authorities consulted before the issue of the
Ordinance of 1969, including the Chancellor of Justice and the Parliamentary
Ombudsman, considered it desirable that the rule of communication to the person
concerned, as contained in section 13 of the Ordinance, should be effectively applied
in so far as it did not jeopardise the purpose of the control (see paragraph 31 above).
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
67. The Court, like the Commission, thus reaches the conclusion that the safeguards
contained in the Swedish personnel control system meet the requirements of
paragraph 2 of Article 8 (art. 8-2). Having regard to the wide margin of appreciation
available to it, the respondent State was entitled to consider that in the present case
the interests of national security prevailed over the individual interests of the
applicant (see paragraph 59 above). The interference to which Mr. Leander was
subjected cannot therefore be said to have been disproportionate to the legitimate
aim pursued. (Emphases supplied)
Leander illustrates how the right to informational privacy, as a specific component of
the right to privacy, may yield to an overriding legitimate state interest. In similar
fashion, the determination of whether the privilege of the writ of habeas data, being
an extraordinary remedy, may be granted in this case entails a delicate balancing of
the alleged intrusion upon the private life of Gamboa and the relevant state interest
involved.
The collection and forwarding of information by the PNP vis-à-vis the interest of the
state to dismantle private armies.
The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other
armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority.60 It also provides for
the establishment of one police force that is national in scope and civilian in character,
and is controlled and administered by a national police commission.61
Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275
articulates a legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the existence of PAGs with
the ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently.
To enable the Zeñarosa Commission to achieve its goals, A.O. 275 clothed it with the
powers of an investigative body, including the power to summon witnesses,
administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation and use
compulsory processes to produce documents, books, and records.62 A.O. 275
likewise authorized the Zeñarosa Commission to deputize the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, the National Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, the PNP,
and any other law enforcement agency to assist the commission in the performance
of its functions.63
Meanwhile, the PNP, as the national police force, is empowered by law to (a) enforce
all laws and ordinances relative to the protection of lives and properties; (b) maintain
peace and order and take all necessary steps to ensure public safety; and (c)
investigate and prevent crimes.64
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XU – College of Law
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Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the foregoing powers
and functions accorded to the Zeñarosa Commission and the PNP, the latter collected
information on individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs, monitored them and
counteracted their activities.65 One of those individuals is herein petitioner Gamboa.
This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data
contained in the Report listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP. Contrary to
the ruling of the trial court, however, the forwarding of information by the PNP to the
Zeñarosa Commission was not an unlawful act that violated or threatened her right
to privacy in life, liberty or security.
The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs
with the body specifically created for the purpose of investigating the existence of
these notorious groups. Moreover, the Zeñarosa Commission was explicitly
authorized to deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the former’s mandate, and
thus had the power to request assistance from the latter.
Following the pronouncements of the ECHR in Leander, the fact that the PNP released
information to the Zeñarosa Commission without prior communication to Gamboa
and without affording her the opportunity to refute the same cannot be interpreted
as a violation or threat to her right to privacy since that act is an inherent and crucial
component of intelligence-gathering and investigation.1âwphi1 Additionally, Gamboa
herself admitted that the PNP had a validation system, which was used to update
information on individuals associated with PAGs and to ensure that the data mirrored
the situation on the field.66 Thus, safeguards were put in place to make sure that the
information collected maintained its integrity and accuracy.
Pending the enactment of legislation on data protection, this Court declines to make
any further determination as to the propriety of sharing information during specific
stages of intelligence gathering. To do otherwise would supplant the discretion of
investigative bodies in the accomplishment of their functions, resulting in an undue
encroachment on their competence.
However, to accord the right to privacy with the kind of protection established in
existing law and jurisprudence, this Court nonetheless deems it necessary to caution
these investigating entities that information-sharing must observe strict
confidentiality. Intelligence gathered must be released exclusively to the authorities
empowered to receive the relevant information. After all, inherent to the right to
privacy is the freedom from "unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from
intrusion into one’s private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a
person’s ordinary sensibilities."67
In this case, respondents admitted the existence of the Report, but emphasized its
confidential nature.1âwphi1 That it was leaked to third parties and the media was
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION OF CASES BATCH 8
regrettable, even warranting reproach. But it must be stressed that Gamboa failed to
establish that respondents were responsible for this unintended disclosure. In any
event, there are other reliefs available to her to address the purported damage to her
reputation, making a resort to the extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas data
unnecessary and improper.

Finally, this Court rules that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial
evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and
her supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this
regard, respondents sufficiently explained that the investigations conducted against
her were in relation to the criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public
officials, they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome.

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling PAGs far
outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the
collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a
lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed Decision in
Special Proc. No. 14979 dated 9 September 2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Laoag
City, Br. 13, insofar as it denies Gamboa the privilege of the writ of habeas data, is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
G.R. No. 191805 November 15, 2011
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA
IN FAVOR OF NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, PDG JESUS AME VERSOZA,
LT. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, MAJ. GEN. NESTOR Z. OCHOA, P/CSUPT. AMETO G.
TOLENTINO, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, COL. REMIGIO M. DE VERA, an officer
named MATUTINA, LT. COL. MINA, CALOG, GEORGE PALACPAC under the name
"HARRY," ANTONIO CRUZ, ALDWIN "BONG" PASICOLAN and VINCENT CALLAGAN,
Respondents.
x------------------------x
G.R. No. 193160
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA
IN FAVOR OF NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, POLICE DIR. GEN. JESUS A. VERSOZA,
P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, BGEN. REMEGIO M. DE VERA, 1st LT. RYAN S.
MATUTINA, LT. COL. LAURENCE E. MINA, ANTONIO C. CRUZ, ALDWIN C. PASICOLAN
and VICENTE A. CALLAGAN, Petitioners,
vs.
NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before this Court are two consolidated cases, namely, (1) Petition for Partial Review on
Certiorari dated 20 April 2010 (G.R. No. 191805), and (2) Petition for Review on Certiorari
dated 19 August 2010 (G.R. No. 193160).1 Both Petitions assail the 12 April 2010 Decision
of the Court of Appeals, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition for writ of amparo and writ of habeas data is GRANTED.
Respondents Gen. Victor S. Ibrado, Lt. Gen. Delfin Bangit, Maj. Gen. Nestor Z. Ochoa, PCSupt.
Ameto G. Tolentino, PSSupt. Jude W. Santos, Col. Remigio M. De Vera, Lt. Col. Laurence E.
Mina and 1Lt. Ryan S. Matutina, or their replacements in their official posts if they have
already vacated the same, are ORDERED to furnish this Court within five (5) days from
notice of this decision, official or unofficial reports pertaining to petitioner – covering but
not limited to intelligence reports, operation reports and provost marshal reports prior to,
during and subsequent to September 6, 2009 – made by the 5th Infantry Division,
Philippine Army, its branches and subsidiaries, including the 17th Infantry Battalion,
Philippine Army.
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The above-named respondents are also DIRECTED to refrain from using the said reports
in any transaction or operation of the military. Necessarily, the afore-named respondents
are ORDERED to expunge from the records of the military all documents having any
reference to petitioner.
Likewise, the afore-named respondents, as well as respondents Police Director General
Jesus Ame Versoza, Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan and Vicente Callagan are DIRECTED to
ensure that no further violation of petitioner’s rights to life, liberty and security is
committed against the latter or any member of his family.
The petition is DISMISSED with respect to President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on account
of her presidential immunity from suit. Similarly, the petition is DISMISSED with respect
to respondents Calog and George Palacpac or Harry for lack of merit.
Petitioner’s prayer for issuance of a temporary protection order and inspection order is
DENIED.
Noriel Rodriguez (Rodriguez) is petitioner in G.R. No. 191805 and respondent in G.R. No.
193160. He is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant
organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP).
On the other hand, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (former President Arroyo), Police Director
General (PDG.) Jesus A. Verzosa, Police Senior Superintendent (P/SSupt.) Jude W. Santos,
Brigadier General (Brig. Gen.) Remegio M. De Vera, First Lieutenant (1st Lt.) Ryan S.
Matutina, Lieutenant Colonel (Lt. Col.) Laurence E. Mina, Antonio C. Cruz (Cruz), Aldwin C.
Pasicolan (Pasicolan) and Vicente A. Callagan (Callagan) are respondents in G.R. No.
191805 and petitioners in G.R. No. 193160. At the time the events relevant to the present
Petitions occurred, former President Arroyo was the President of the Philippines. PDG.
Verzosa, P/SSupt. Santos, Brig. Gen. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina and Lt. Col. Mina were
officers of the Philippine National Police (PNP). Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan were Special
Investigators of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) in Region II.
Antecedent Facts
Rodriguez claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan
Bantay Laya, making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances.2
On 6 September 2009, at 5:00 p.m., Rodriguez had just reached Barangay Tapel, Cagayan
onboard a tricycle driven by Hermie Antonio Carlos (Carlos), when four men forcibly took
him and forced him into a car. Inside the vehicle were several men in civilian clothes, one
of whom was holding a .45 caliber pistol. Subsequently, three more persons arrived, and
one of them carried a gun at his side. Two men boarded the car, while the others rode on
the tricycle.3
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
The men tied the hands of Rodriguez, ordered him to lie on his stomach, sat on his back
and started punching him. The car travelled towards the direction of Sta. Teresita-Mission
and moved around the area until about 2:00 a.m. During the drive, the men forced
Rodriguez to confess to being a member of the New People’s Army (NPA), but he remained
silent. The car then entered a place that appeared to be a military camp. There were
soldiers all over the area, and there was a banner with the word "Bravo" written on it.
Rodriguez later on learned that the camp belonged to the 17th Infantry Battalion of the
Philippine Army.4
Rodriguez was brought to a canteen, where six men confronted him, ordering him to
confess to his membership in the NPA. Due to his exhaustion, he unintentionally fell asleep.
As a result, the men hit him on the head to wake him up. After the interrogation, two of the
men guarded him, but did not allow him to sleep.5
In the morning of 7 September 2009, the men tied the hands of Rodriguez, blindfolded him
and made him board a vehicle. While they were in transit, the soldiers repeatedly hit him
in the head and threatened to kill him. When the car stopped after about ten minutes, the
soldiers brought him to a room, removed his blindfold, and forced him to confess to being
a member of the NPA. During the interrogation, the soldiers repeatedly hit him on the
head. Thereafter, he was detained inside the room for the entire day. The soldiers tied his
stomach to a papag, and gave him rice and viand. Fearing that the food might be poisoned,
he refused to eat anything. He slept on the papag while being tied to it at the waist.6
On 8 September 2009, the men forced Rodriguez into a vehicle, which brought them to
Bugey and Mission. While passing houses along the way, the men asked him if his contacts
lived in those houses. When he failed to answer, a soldier pointed a gun to his head and
threatened to kill him and his family. Because he remained silent, the soldiers beat him
and tied him up. The vehicle returned to the military camp at past 1:00 p.m., where he was
again subjected to tactical interrogation about the location of an NPA camp and his alleged
NPA comrades. He suffered incessant mauling every time he failed to answer.7
At dawn on 9 September 2009, soldiers armed with rifles took Rodriguez and made him
their guide on their way to an NPA camp in Birao. Accompanying them was a man named
Harry, who, according to the soldiers, was an NPA member who had surrendered to the
military. Harry pointed to Rodriguez and called him a member of the NPA. He also heard
Harry tell the soldiers that the latter knew the area well and was acquainted with a man
named Elvis. The soldiers loaded Rodriguez into a military truck and drove to Tabbak,
Bugey. While he was walking with the soldiers, he noticed a soldier with the name tag
"Matutina," who appeared to be an official because the other soldiers addressed him as
"sir."8
Upon reaching Birao on foot, the soldiers looked for and was able to locate a certain Elvis
and told him that Rodriguez had identified his whereabouts location. The soldiers forced
Rodriguez to convince Elvis to disclose the location of the NPA camp. They brought the
two to the mountains, where both were threatened with death. When the soldiers punched
Elvis, Rodriguez told them that he would reveal the location of the NPA camp if they let
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XU – College of Law
OF CASES BATCH 8
Elvis go home. They finally released Elvis around 3:00 p.m. that day. The soldiers and
Rodriguez spent the next three nights in the mountains.9
On 12 September 2009, the soldiers again hit Rodriguez and forced him to identify the
location of the NPA camp. He was blindfolded and warned to get ready because they would
beat him up again in the military camp. Upon arrival therein, they brought him to the same
room where he had first been detained, and two soldiers mauled him again. They
repeatedly punched and kicked him. In the afternoon, they let him rest and gave him an
Alaxan tablet. Thereafter, he fell asleep due to over-fatigue and extreme body pain. The
soldiers, however, hit him again. After giving him a pen and a piece of paper, they ordered
him to write down his request for rice from the people. When he refused, the soldiers
maltreated him once more.10
On 13 September 2009, the soldiers forced Rodriguez to sign documents declaring that he
had surrendered in an encounter in Cumao, and
that the soldiers did not shoot him because he became a military asset in May. When he
refused to sign the document, he received another beating. Thus, he was compelled to sign,
but did so using a different signature to show that he was merely coerced.11
The soldiers showed Rodriguez photographs of different persons and asked him if he knew
the men appearing therein. When he told them that he did not recognize the individuals
on the photos, the soldiers instructed him to write down the name of his school and
organization, but he declined. The soldiers then wrote something on the paper, making it
appear that he was the one who had written it, and forced him to sign the document. The
soldiers took photographs of him while he was signing. Afterwards, the soldiers forced
him down, held his hands, and sat on his feet. He did not only receive another beating, but
was also electrocuted. The torture lasted for about an hour.12
At 11:00 p.m. on 15 September 2009, the soldiers brought Rodriguez to a military
operation in the mountains, where he saw Matutina again. They all spent the night there.13
In the morning of 16 September 2009, the soldiers and Rodriguez started their descent.
When they stopped, the soldiers took his photograph and asked him to name the location
of the NPA camp. Thereafter, they all returned to the military camp. The soldiers asked
him to take a bath and wear a white polo shirt handed to him. He was then brought to the
Enrile Medical Center, where Dr. Juliet Ramil (Dr. Ramil) examined him.14 When the doctor
asked him why he had bruises and contusions, he lied and told her that he sustained them
when he slipped, as he noticed a soldier observing him. Dr. Ramil’s medical certificate
indicated that he suffered from four hematomas in the epigastric area, chest and
sternum.15
Back at the camp, the soldiers let Rodriguez eat with several military officials and took
pictures of him while he was eating with them. They also asked him to point to a map in
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
front of him and again took his photograph. Later, they told him that he would finally see
his mother. 16
Rodriguez was brought to another military camp, where he was ordered to sign a piece of
paper stating that he was a surrenderee and was never beaten up. Scared and desperate
to end his ordeal, he signed the paper and was warned not to report anything to the
media.17
Around 6:00 a.m. on 17 September 2009, the soldiers instructed petitioner to take a bath.
They gave him a pair of jeans and perfume. While he was having breakfast, the two soldiers
guarding him repeatedly reminded him not to disclose to the media his experience in the
camp and to say instead that he had surrendered to the military.18
At 9:00 a.m. on the same day, the mother and the brother of Rodriguez arrived surrounded
by several men. His mother, Wilma Rodriguez (Wilma), talked to Lt. Col. Mina. Rodriguez
heard one of the soldiers tell Wilma that he had surrendered to the military and had long
been its asset. His brother, Rodel Rodriguez (Rodel), informed him that the men
accompanying them were from the CHR, namely, Pasicolan, Cruz and Callagan. Upon
seeing Rodriguez, Cruz instructed him to lift up his shirt, and one of the CHR employees
took photographs of his bruises.19
A soldier tried to convince Wilma to let Rodriguez stay in the camp for another two weeks
to supposedly prevent the NPA from taking revenge on him. Respondent Calog also
approached Rodriguez and Rodel and asked them to become military assets. Rodel refused
and insisted that they take Rodriguez home to Manila. Again, the soldiers reminded them
to refrain from facing the media. The soldiers also told them that the latter will be taken to
the Tuguegarao Airport and guarded until they reached home.20
Rodriguez and his family missed their flight. Subsequently, the soldiers accompanied them
to the CHR office, where Rodriguez was made to sign an affidavit stating that he was
neither abducted nor tortured. Afraid and desperate to return home, he was forced to sign
the document. Cruz advised him not to file a case against his abductors because they had
already freed him. The CHR personnel then led him and his family to the CHR Toyota
Tamaraw FX service vehicle. He noticed that a vehicle with soldiers on board followed
them.21
The Tamaraw FX pulled over and respondent 1st Lt. Matutina boarded the vehicle. Upon
reaching a mall in Isabela, Rodriguez, his family, Callagan, 1st Lt. Matutina and two other
soldiers transferred to an orange Toyota Revo with plate number WTG 579. Upon reaching
the boundary of Nueva Ecija and Nueva Viscaya, 1st Lt. Matutina alighted and called
Rodriguez to a diner. A certain Alan approached Rodriguez and handed him a cellphone
with a SIM card. The latter and his family then left and resumed their journey back home.22
Rodriguez reached his house in Sta. Ana, Manila at 3:00 a.m. on 18 September 2010.
Callagan and two soldiers went inside the house, and took photographs and a video
55 | E l i x i r C . L a n g a n l a n g a n
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XU – College of Law
OF CASES BATCH 8
footage thereof. The soldiers explained that the photos and videos would serve as evidence
of the fact that Rodriguez and his family were able to arrive home safely. Despite
Rodriguez’s efforts to confront the soldiers about their acts, they still continued and only
left thirty minutes later.23
On 19 September 2009, Dr. Reginaldo Pamugas, a physician trained by the International
Committee on Torture and Rehabilitation, examined Rodriguez and issued a Medical
Certificate stating that the latter had been a victim of torture.24
Around 7:00 a.m. on 3 November 2010, Rodriguez and his girlfriend, Aileen Hazel Robles,
noticed that several suspicious-looking men followed them at the Metro Rail Transit
(MRT), in the streets and on a jeepney.25
On 7 December 2009, Rodriguez filed before this Court a Petition for the Writ of Amparo
and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of
Place, and Production of Documents and Personal Properties dated 2 December 2009. 26
The petition was filed against former President Arroyo, Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Versoza, Lt. Gen.
Bangit, Major General (Maj. Gen.) Nestor Z. Ochoa, P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos,
Col. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, Calog, George Palacpac (Palacpac), Cruz, Pasicolan and
Callagan. The petition prayed for the following reliefs:
a. The issuance of the writ of amparo ordering respondents to desist from violating
Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty and security.
b. The issuance of an order to enjoin respondents from doing harm to or approaching
Rodriguez, his family and his witnesses.
c. Allowing the inspection of the detention areas of the Headquarters of Bravo Co.,
5th Infantry Division, Maguing, Gonzaga, Cagayan and another place near where
Rodriguez was brought.
d. Ordering respondents to produce documents submitted to them regarding any
report on Rodriguez, including operation reports and provost marshall reports of
the 5th Infantry Division, the Special Operations Group of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), prior to, on and subsequent to 6 September 2009.1âwphi1
e. Ordering records pertinent or in any way connected to Rodriguez, which are in the
custody of respondents, to be expunged, disabused, and forever barred from being
used.27
On 15 December 2009, we granted the respective writs after finding that the petition
sufficiently alleged that Rodriguez had been abducted, tortured and later released by
members of the 17th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army.28 We likewise ordered
respondents therein to file a verified return on the writs on or before 22 December 2009
and to comment on the petition on or before 4 January 2010.29 Finally, we directed the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
Court of Appeals to hear the petition on 4 January 2010 and decide on the case within 10
days after its submission for decision.30
During the initial hearing on 4 January 2010, the Court of Appeals required the parties to
submit affidavits and other pieces of evidence at the next scheduled hearing on 27 January
2010.31
On 8 January 2010, respondents therein, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed their Return of the Writ, which was likewise considered as their comment on the
petition.32 In their Return, respondents therein alleged that Rodriguez had surrendered to
the military on 28 May 2009 after he had been put under surveillance and identified as "Ka
Pepito" by former rebels.33 According to his military handlers, Corporal (Cpl.) Rodel
B. Cabaccan and Cpl. Julius P. Navarro, Rodriguez was a former member of the NPA
operating in Cagayan Valley.34 Wanting to bolt from the NPA, he told Cpl. Cabaccan and
Cpl. Navarro that he would help the military in exchange for his protection.35
Upon his voluntary surrender on 28 May 2009, Rodriguez was made to sign an Oath of
Loyalty and an Agent’s Agreement/Contract, showing his willingness to return to society
and become a military asset.36 Since then, he acted as a double agent, returning to the NPA
to gather information.37 However, he feared that his NPA comrades were beginning to
suspect him of being an infiltrator.38 Thus, with his knowledge and consent, the soldiers
planned to stage a sham abduction to erase any suspicion about him being a double
agent.39 Hence, the abduction subject of the instant petition was conducted.40
Meanwhile, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan filed a Consolidated Return of the Writ dated 15
January 2010,41 alleging that they had exercised extraordinary diligence in locating
Rodriguez, facilitating his safe turnover to his family and securing their journey back home
to Manila. More specifically, they alleged that, on 16 September 2009, after Wilma sought
their assistance in ascertaining the whereabouts of her son, Cruz made phone calls to the
military and law enforcement agencies to determine his location.42 Cruz was able to speak
with Lt. Col. Mina, who confirmed that Rodriguez was in their custody.43 This information
was transmitted to CHR Regional Director Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga. He, in turn, ordered Cruz,
Pasicolan and Callagan to accompany Wilma to the 17th Infantry Division.44
When the CHR officers, along with Wilma and Rodel, arrived at the 17th Infantry Battalion
at Masin, Alcala, Cagayan, Brigade Commander Col. de Vera and Battalion Commander Lt.
Col. Mina alleged that Rodriguez had become one of their assets, as evidenced by the
Summary on the Surrender of Noriel Rodriguez and the latter’s Contract as Agent.45 The
CHR officers observed his casual and cordial demeanor with the soldiers.46 In any case,
Cruz asked him to raise his shirt to see if he had been subjected to any maltreatment. Cruz
and Pasicolan did not see any traces of torture. Thereafter, Rodriguez was released to his
family, and they were made to sign a certification to this effect. During the signing of the
document, herein CHR officers did not witness any threat, intimidation or force employed
against Rodriguez or his family. 47
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XU – College of Law
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During their journey back to the home of Rodriguez, the CHR officers observed that he was
very much at ease with his military escorts, especially with 1st Lt. Matutina.48 Neither was
there any force or intimidation when the soldiers took pictures of his house, as the taking
of photographs was performed with Wilma’s consent.49
During the hearing on 27 January 2010, the parties agreed to file additional affidavits and
position papers and to have the case considered submitted for decision after the filing of
these pleadings.50
On 12 April 2010, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision.51 Subsequently, on
28 April 2010, respondents therein filed their Motion for Reconsideration. 52 Before the
Court of Appeals could resolve this Motion for Reconsideration, Rodriguez filed the instant
Petition for Partial Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 191805), raising the following
assignment of errors:
a. The Court of Appeals erred in not granting the Interim Relief for temporary
protection order.
b. The Court of Appeals erred in saying: "(H)owever, given the nature of the writ of
amparo, which has the effect of enjoining the commission by respondents of
violation to petitioner’s right to life, liberty and security, the safety of petitioner is
ensured with the issuance of the writ, even in the absence of an order preventing
respondent from approaching petitioner."
c. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that respondent Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
had command responsibility.53
On the other hand, respondents therein, in their Comment dated 30 July 2010, averred:
a. The Court of Appeals properly dropped then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as
a party-respondent, as she may not be sued in any case during her tenure of office
or actual incumbency.
b. Petitioner had not presented any adequate and competent evidence, much less
substantial evidence, to establish his claim that public respondents had violated,
were violating or threatening to violate his rights to life, liberty and security, as
well as his right to privacy. Hence, he was not entitled to the privilege of the writs
of amparo and habeas data or to the corresponding interim reliefs (i.e. inspection
order, production order and temporary protection order) provided under the rule
on the writ of amparo and the rule on the writ of habeas data.54
On 19 August 2010, PDG. Verzosa, P/SSupt. Santos, BGen. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, Lt. Col.
Mina, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari, seeking the
reversal of the 12 April 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals.55 They alleged that
Rodriguez –
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
Has not presented any adequate and competent evidence, must less substantial evidence,
to establish his claim that petitioners have violated, are violating or threatening with
violation his rights to life, liberty and security, as well as his right to privacy; hence, he is
not entitled to the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data and their
corresponding interim reliefs (i.e., inspection order, production order and temporary
protection order) provided under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and the Rule on the Writ
of Habeas Data.56
In ascertaining whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in issuing its
assailed Decision and Resolution, the following issues must be resolved:
I. Whether the interim reliefs prayed for by Rodriguez may be granted after the
writs of amparo and habeas data have already been issued in his favor.
II. Whether former President Arroyo should be dropped as a respondent on the
basis of the presidential immunity from suit.
III. Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and
habeas data cases.
IV. Whether the rights to life, liberty and property of Rodriguez were violated or
threatened by respondents in G.R. No. 191805.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the writs of amparo and habeas data were
promulgated to ensure the protection of the people’s rights to life, liberty and security.57
The rules on these writs were issued in light of the alarming prevalence of extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances.58 The Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on 24
October 2007,59 and the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data on 2 February 2008.60
The writ of amparo is an extraordinary and independent remedy that provides rapid
judicial relief, as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial
evidence to make the appropriate interim and permanent reliefs available to the
petitioner.61 It is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or
administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and
exhaustive proceedings.62 Rather, it serves both preventive and curative roles in
addressing the problem of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. 63 It is
preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these
offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators
by inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and action.64
Meanwhile, the writ of habeas data provides a judicial remedy to protect a person’s right
to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances where such information
is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.65 As an
independent and summary remedy to protect the right to privacy – especially the right to
informational privacy66 – the proceedings for the issuance of the writ of habeas data does
not entail any finding of criminal, civil or administrative culpability. If the allegations in
the petition are proven through substantial evidence, then the Court may (a) grant access
to the database or information; (b) enjoin the act complained of; or (c) in case the database
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XU – College of Law
OF CASES BATCH 8
or information contains erroneous data or information, order its deletion, destruction or
rectification.67
First issue: Grant of interim reliefs
In the petition in G.R. No. 191805, Rodriguez prays for the issuance of a temporary
protection order. It must be underscored that this interim relief is only available before
final judgment. Section 14 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo clearly provides:
Interim Reliefs. – Upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final judgment, the court,
justice or judge may grant any of the following reliefs:
Temporary Protection Order. – The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio,
may order that the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate
family be protected in a government agency or by an accredited person or private
institution capable of keeping and securing their safety. If the petitioner is an organization,
association or institution referred to in Section 3(c) of this Rule, the protection may be
extended to the officers involved.
The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private institutions that shall extend
temporary protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the
immediate family, in accordance with guidelines which it shall issue.
The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply with the rules and conditions
that may be imposed by the court, justice or judge.
(a) Inspection Order. – The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after due
hearing, may order any person in possession or control of a designated land or other
property, to permit entry for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or
photographing the property or any relevant object or operation thereon.
The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be inspected. It shall be supported by
affidavits or testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge of the enforced
disappearance or whereabouts of the aggrieved party.
If the motion is opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of
the information, the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to
determine the merit of the opposition.
The movant must show that the inspection order is necessary to establish the right of the
aggrieved party alleged to be threatened or violated.
The inspection order shall specify the person or persons authorized to make the
inspection and the date, time, place and manner of making the inspection and may
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all parties. The order shall
expire five (5) days after the date of its issuance, unless extended for justifiable reasons.
(b) Production Order. – The court, justice, or judge, upon verified motion and after due
hearing, may order any person in possession, custody or control of any designated
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, or
objects in digitized or electronic form, which constitute or contain evidence relevant to the
petition or the return, to produce and permit their inspection, copying or photographing
by or on behalf of the movant.
The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature
of the information, in which case the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in
chambers to determine the merit of the opposition.
The court, justice or judge shall prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional
rights of all the parties.
(c) Witness Protection Order. – The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio,
may refer the witnesses to the Department of Justice for admission to the Witness
Protection, Security and Benefit Program, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6981.
The court, justice or judge may also refer the witnesses to other government agencies, or
to accredited persons or private institutions capable of keeping and securing their safety.
(Emphasis supplied)
We held in Yano v. Sanchez68 that "[t]hese provisional reliefs are intended to assist the
court before it arrives at a judicious determination of the amparo petition." Being interim
reliefs, they can only be granted before a final adjudication of the case is made. In any case,
it must be underscored that the privilege of the writ of amparo, once granted, necessarily
entails the protection of the aggrieved party. Thus, since we grant petitioner the privilege
of the writ of amparo, there is no need to issue a temporary protection order
independently of the former. The order restricting respondents from going near Rodriguez
is subsumed under the privilege of the writ.
Second issue: Presidential immunity from suit
It bears stressing that since there is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal
liability in amparo and habeas data proceedings, courts can only go as far as ascertaining
responsibility or accountability for the enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing. As
we held in Razon v. Tagitis:69
It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather,
it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for
purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance.
Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial
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XU – College of Law
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evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced
disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the
directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in
the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies
that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced
disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility
defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance
and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge,
the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.
In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of
addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his liberty and
security are restored.70 (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, in the case at bar, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision 71 found respondents in G.R.
No. 191805 – with the exception of Calog, Palacpac or Harry – to be accountable for the
violations of Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty and security committed by the 17th Infantry
Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army. 72 The Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition with respect to former President Arroyo on account of her presidential
immunity from suit. Rodriguez contends, though, that she should remain a respondent in
this case to enable the courts to determine whether she is responsible or accountable
therefor. In this regard, it must be clarified that the Court of Appeals’ rationale for
dropping her from the list of respondents no longer stands since her presidential
immunity is limited only to her incumbency.
In Estrada v. Desierto,73 we clarified the doctrine that a non-sitting President does not
enjoy immunity from suit, even for acts committed during the latter’s tenure. We
emphasize our ruling therein that courts should look with disfavor upon the presidential
privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the
vindication of a right, to wit:
We reject [Estrada’s] argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must
first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner
Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his
loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution
No. 83 "Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio." Since the
Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he
should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if
granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing
to commend itself for it will place him in a better situation than a non-sitting President
who has not been subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a
criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission make it
clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of
the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him, viz:
"x x x xxx xxx
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an impeachment proceeding has been filed against the
President, for example, and the President resigns before judgment of conviction has been
rendered by the impeachment court or by the body, how does it affect the impeachment
proceeding? Will it be necessarily dropped?
Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose of impeachment to remove one from office, then his
resignation would render the case moot and academic. However, as the provision says, the
criminal and civil aspects of it may continue in the ordinary courts."
This is in accord with our ruling in In Re: Saturnino Bermudez that "incumbent Presidents
are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their
incumbency and tenure" but not beyond. xxx
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting
President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They
involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can
these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged
mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this
Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure
immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from
liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials
are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in
the same footing as any other trespasser.
Indeed, a critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial
disinclination to expand the privilege especially when it impedes the search for truth or
impairs the vindication of a right. In the 1974 case of US v. Nixon, US President Richard
Nixon, a sitting President, was subpoenaed to produce certain recordings and documents
relating to his conversations with aids and advisers. Seven advisers of President Nixon's
associates were facing charges of conspiracy to obstruct justice and other offenses which
were committed in a burglary of the Democratic National Headquarters in Washington's
Watergate Hotel during the 1972 presidential campaign. President Nixon himself was
named an unindicted co-conspirator. President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on
the ground, among others, that the President was not subject to judicial process and that
he should first be impeached and removed from office before he could be made amenable
to judicial proceedings. The claim was rejected by the US Supreme Court. It concluded that
"when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a
criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail
over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal
justice." In the 1982 case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the US Supreme Court further held that
the immunity of the President from civil damages covers only "official acts." Recently, the
US Supreme Court had the occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the case of Clinton v. Jones
where it held that the US President's immunity from suits for money damages arising out
of their official acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct.74 (Emphasis supplied)
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XU – College of Law
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Further, in our Resolution in Estrada v. Desierto,75 we reiterated that the presidential
immunity from suit exists only in concurrence with the president’s incumbency:
Petitioner stubbornly clings to the contention that he is entitled to absolute immunity from
suit. His arguments are merely recycled and we need not prolong the longevity of the
debate on the subject. In our Decision, we exhaustively traced the origin of executive
immunity in our jurisdiction and its bends and turns up to the present time. We held that
given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is
a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive immunity
for his alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting President. Petitioner's rehashed
arguments including their thinly disguised new spins are based on the rejected contention
that he is still President, albeit, a President on leave. His stance that his immunity covers
his entire term of office or until June 30, 2004 disregards the reality that he has
relinquished the presidency and there is now a new de jure President.
Petitioner goes a step further and avers that even a non-sitting President enjoys immunity
from suit during his term of office. He buttresses his position with the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission, viz:
"Mr. Suarez. Thank you.
The last question is with reference to the Committee's omitting in the draft proposal the
immunity provision for the President. I agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the
Committee did very well in striking out this second sentence, at the very least, of the
original provision on immunity from suit under the 1973 Constitution. But would the
Committee members not agree to a restoration of at least the first sentence that the
president shall be immune from suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not
provide him that kind of an immunity, he might be spending all his time facing litigations,
as the President-in-exile in Hawaii is now facing litigations almost daily?
Fr. Bernas: The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present
jurisprudence that during his tenure he is immune from suit.
Mr. Suarez: So there is no need to express it here.
Fr. Bernas: There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by the 1973
Constitution was to make that explicit and to add other things.
Mr. Suarez: On the understanding, I will not press for any more query, madam President.
I thank the Commissioner for the clarification."
Petitioner, however, fails to distinguish between term and tenure. The term means the
time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval
after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the
term during which the incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be shorter than
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent. From the deliberations,
the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent
only with his tenure and not his term.76 (Emphasis supplied)
Applying the foregoing rationale to the case at bar, it is clear that former President Arroyo
cannot use the presidential immunity from suit to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that
would assess whether, within the context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or
accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez.
Third issue: Command responsibility in amparo proceedings
To attribute responsibility or accountability to former President Arroyo, Rodriguez
contends that the doctrine of command responsibility may be applied. As we explained in
Rubrico v. Arroyo,77 command responsibility pertains to the "responsibility of
commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other
persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict."78 Although
originally used for ascertaining criminal complicity, the command responsibility doctrine
has also found application in civil cases for human rights abuses.79 In the United States, for
example, command responsibility was used in Ford v. Garcia and Romagoza v. Garcia – civil
actions filed under the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Torture Victim Protection Act.80 This
development in the use of command responsibility in civil proceedings shows that the
application of this doctrine has been liberally extended even to cases not criminal in
nature. Thus, it is our view that command responsibility may likewise find application in
proceedings seeking the privilege of the writ of amparo. As we held in Rubrico:
It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold
military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or
threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the command
responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or customary
international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution.
xxx xxx xxx
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should,
at most, be only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and
has the duty to address, the disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable
the Court to devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the premises to
protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however, the
determination should not be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory
to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under
existing administrative issuances, if there be any.81 (Emphasis supplied.)
Precisely in the case at bar, the doctrine of command responsibility may be used to
determine whether respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address the
abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to devise remedial measures to
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protect his rights. Clearly, nothing precludes this Court from applying the doctrine of
command responsibility in amparo proceedings to ascertain responsibility and
accountability in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. In this regard, the
Separate Opinion of Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales in Rubrico is worth noting, thus:
That proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo do not determine criminal, civil
or administrative liability should not abate the applicability of the doctrine of command
responsibility. Taking Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo and Razon v. Tagitis in
proper context, they do not preclude the application of the doctrine of command
responsibility to Amparo cases.
Manalo was actually emphatic on the importance of the right to security of person and its
contemporary signification as a guarantee of protection of one’s rights by the government.
It further stated that protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization
of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or
enforced disappearances, or threats thereof, and/or their families, and bringing offenders
to the bar of justice.
Tagitis, on the other hand, cannot be more categorical on the application, at least in
principle, of the doctrine of command responsibility:
Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members were the ones who
were remiss in their duties when the government completely failed to exercise the
extraordinary diligence that the Amparo Rule requires. We hold these organizations
accountable through their incumbent Chiefs who, under this Decision, shall carry the
personal responsibility of seeing to it that extraordinary diligence, in the manner the
Amparo Rule requires, is applied in addressing the enforced disappearance of Tagitis.
Neither does Republic Act No. 9851 emasculate the applicability of the command
responsibility doctrine to Amparo cases. The short title of the law is the "Philippine Act on
Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against
Humanity." Obviously, it should, as it did, only treat of superior responsibility as a ground
for criminal responsibility for the crimes covered. Such limited treatment, however, is
merely in keeping with the statute’s purpose and not intended to rule out the application
of the doctrine of command responsibility to other appropriate cases.
Indeed, one can imagine the innumerable dangers of insulating high-ranking military and
police officers from the coverage of reliefs available under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
The explicit adoption of the doctrine of command responsibility in the present case will
only bring Manalo and Tagitis to their logical conclusion.
In fine, I submit that the Court should take this opportunity to state what the law ought to
be if it truly wants to make the Writ of Amparo an effective remedy for victims of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. While there is a genuine dearth of
evidence to hold respondents Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
accountable under the command responsibility doctrine, the ponencia’s hesitant
application of the doctrine itself is replete with implications abhorrent to the rationale
behind the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.82 (Emphasis supplied.)
This Separate Opinion was reiterated in the recently decided case of Boac v. Cadapan,83
likewise penned by Justice Carpio-Morales, wherein this Court ruled:
Rubrico categorically denies the application of command responsibility in amparo cases to
determine criminal liability. The Court maintains its adherence to this pronouncement as
far as amparo cases are concerned.
Rubrico, however, recognizes a preliminary yet limited application of command
responsibility in amparo cases to instances of determining the responsible or accountable
individuals or entities that are duty-bound to abate any transgression on the life, liberty
or security of the aggrieved party.
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should,
at most, be only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and
has the duty to address, the disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable
the Court to devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the premises to
protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however, the
determination should not be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory
to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under
existing administrative issuances, if there be any.
In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order
to identify those accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement
whatever processes an amparo court would issue. In such application, the amparo court
does not impute criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to
be in the best position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party.
Such identification of the responsible and accountable superiors may well be a preliminary
determination of criminal liability which, of course, is still subject to further investigation
by the appropriate government agency. (Emphasis supplied.)
As earlier pointed out, amparo proceedings determine (a) responsibility, or the extent the
actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever
way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, and (b) accountability, or the
measure of remedies that should be addressed to those (i) who exhibited involvement in
the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility defined above; or (ii) who are imputed with knowledge relating to the
enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or (iii) those who carry,
but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of
the enforced disappearance. Thus, although there is no determination of criminal, civil or
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administrative liabilities, the doctrine of command responsibility may nevertheless be
applied to ascertain responsibility and accountability within these foregoing definitions.
a. Command responsibility of the President
Having established the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo
proceedings, it must now be resolved whether the president, as commander-in-chief of the
military, can be held responsible or accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. We rule in the affirmative.
To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following
elements must obtain:
a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as
superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate;
b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had
been committed; and
c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the
criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.84
The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces,85 necessarily possesses
control over the military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the
command responsibility doctrine. 86
On the issue of knowledge, it must be pointed out that although international tribunals
apply a strict standard of knowledge, i.e., actual knowledge, such may nonetheless be
established through circumstantial evidence.87 In the Philippines, a more liberal view is
adopted and superiors may be charged with constructive knowledge. This view is
buttressed by the enactment of Executive Order No. 226, otherwise known as the
Institutionalization of the Doctrine of ‘Command Responsibility’ in all Government Offices,
particularly at all Levels of Command in the Philippine National Police and other Law
Enforcement Agencies (E.O. 226).88 Under E.O. 226, a government official may be held
liable for neglect of duty under the doctrine of command responsibility if he has
knowledge that a crime or offense shall be committed, is being committed, or has been
committed by his subordinates, or by others within his area of responsibility and, despite
such knowledge, he did not take preventive or corrective action either before, during, or
immediately after its commission.89 Knowledge of the commission of irregularities, crimes
or offenses is presumed when (a) the acts are widespread within the government official’s
area of jurisdiction; (b) the acts have been repeatedly or regularly committed within his
area of responsibility; or (c) members of his immediate staff or office personnel are
involved.90
Meanwhile, as to the issue of failure to prevent or punish, it is important to note that as
the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the president has the power to effectively
command, control and discipline the military.91
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
b. Responsibility or accountability of former President Arroyo
The next question that must be tackled is whether Rodriguez has proven through
substantial evidence that former President Arroyo is responsible or accountable for his
abduction. We rule in the negative.
Rodriguez anchors his argument on a general allegation that on the basis of the "Melo
Commission" and the "Alston Report," respondents in G.R. No. 191805 already had
knowledge of and information on, and should have known that a climate of enforced
disappearances had been perpetrated on members of the NPA. 92 Without even attaching,
or at the very least, quoting these reports, Rodriguez contends that the Melo Report points
to rogue military men as the perpetrators. While the Alston Report states that there is a
policy allowing enforced disappearances and pins the blame on the President, we do not
automatically impute responsibility to former President Arroyo for each and every count
of forcible disappearance.93 Aside from Rodriguez’s general averments, there is no piece
of evidence that could establish her responsibility or accountability for his abduction.
Neither was there even a clear attempt to show that she should have known about the
violation of his right to life, liberty or security, or that she had failed to investigate, punish
or prevent it.
Fourth issue: Responsibility or accountability of respondents in G.R. No. 191805
The doctrine of totality of evidence in amparo cases was first laid down in this Court’s
ruling in Razon,94 to wit:
The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in
their totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules
to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. In other words,
we reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason – i.e., to the relevance of the evidence
to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence. Thus,
even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test.95 (Emphasis
supplied.)
In the case at bar, we find no reason to depart from the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals, the same being supported by substantial evidence. A careful examination of the
records of this case reveals that the totality of the evidence adduced by Rodriguez
indubitably prove the responsibility and accountability of some respondents in G.R. No.
191805 for violating his right to life, liberty and security.
a. The totality of evidence proved by substantial evidence the responsibility or
accountability of respondents for the violation of or threat to Rodriguez’s right to life,
liberty and security.
After a careful examination of the records of these cases, we are convinced that the Court
of Appeals correctly found sufficient evidence proving that the soldiers of the 17th Infantry
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Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the military abducted Rodriguez on 6 September 2009,
and detained and tortured him until 17 September 2009.
Rodriguez’s Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 4 December 2009 was a meticulous and
straightforward account of his horrific ordeal with the military, detailing the manner in
which he was captured and maltreated on account of his suspected membership in the
NPA.96 His narration of his suffering included an exhaustive description of his physical
surroundings, personal circumstances and perceived observations. He likewise positively
identified respondents 1st Lt. Matutina and Lt. Col. Mina to be present during his
abduction, detention and torture,97 and respondents Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan as the
CHR representatives who appeared during his release.98
More particularly, the fact of Rodriguez’s abduction was corroborated by Carlos in his
Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 16 September 2009,99 wherein he recounted in detail the
circumstances surrounding the victim’s capture.
As regards the allegation of torture, the respective Certifications of Dr. Ramil and Dr.
Pamugas validate the physical maltreatment Rodriguez suffered in the hands of the
soldiers of the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division. According to the Certification
dated 12 October 2009 executed by Dr. Ramil,100 she examined Rodriguez in the Alfonso
Ponce Enrile Memorial District Hospital on 16 September 2009 and arrived at the
following findings:
FACE
- 10cm healed scar face right side
- 2cm healed scar right eyebrow (lateral area)
- 2cm healed scar right eye brow (median area)
- 4cm x 2cm hematoma anterior chest at the sternal area right side
- 3cm x 2cm hematoma sternal area left side
- 6cm x 1cm hematoma from epigastric area to ant. chest left side
- 6cm x 1cm hematoma from epigastric area to ant. chest right side
- Multiple healed rashes (brownish discoloration) both forearm
- Multiple healed rashes (brownish discoloration)
- both leg arm
- hip area/lumbar area101
Dr. Pamugas performed a separate medical examination of Rodriguez on 19 September
2009, the results of which confirmed that the injuries suffered by the latter were inflicted
through torture. Dr. Pamugas thus issued a Medical Report dated 23 September 2009,102
explicitly stating that Rodriguez had been tortured during his detention by the military, to
wit:
X. Interpretation of Findings
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
The above physical and psychological findings sustained by the subject are related to the
torture and ill-treatment done to him. The multiple circular brown to dark brown spots
found on both legs and arms were due to the insect bites that he sustained when he was
forced to join twice in the military operations. The abrasions could also be due to the
conditions related during military operations. The multiple pin-point blood spots found
on his left ear is a result of an unknown object placed inside his left ear. The areas of
tenderness he felt during the physical examination were due to the overwhelming
punching and kicking on his body. The occasional difficulty of sleeping is a symptom
experience (sic) by the subject as a result of the psychological trauma he encountered
during his detention.
XI. Conclusions and Recommendations
The physical injuries and psychological trauma suffered by the subject are secondary to
the torture and ill-treatment done to him while in detention for about 11 days. The
physical injuries sustained by the subject, of which the age is compatible with the alleged
date of infliction (sic).103 (Emphasis supplied.)
In assessing the weight of the Certifications, the Court of Appeals correctly relied on the
medical finding that the injuries suffered by Rodriguez matched his account of the
maltreatment inflicted on him by the soldiers of the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry
Division of the Philippine Army. Further, the kind of injuries he sustained showed that he
could not have sustained them from merely falling, thus making respondents’ claim highly
implausible.
Despite these medical findings that overwhelmingly supported and lent credibility to the
allegations of Rodriguez in his Sinumpaang Salaysay, respondents in G.R. No. 191805 still
stubbornly clung to their argument that he was neither abducted nor detained. Rather,
they claimed that he was a double agent, whose relationship with the military was at all
times congenial. This contention cannot be sustained, as it is far removed from ordinary
human experience.
If it were true that Rodriguez maintained amicable relations with the military, then he
should have unhesitatingly assured his family on 17 September 2009 that he was among
friends. Instead, he vigorously pleaded with them to get him out of the military facility. In
fact, in the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 4 December 2009104 Wilma executed, she made the
following averments:
18. Na nang Makita ko ang aking anak ay nakaramdam ako sa kanya ng awa dahil sa
mukha syang pagod at malaki ang kanyang ipinayat.
19. Na niyakap ko sya at sa aming pagkakayakap ay binulungan nya ako na wag ko
syang iiwan sa lugar na iyon;
xxx xxx xxx
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23. Na sinabihan ako ng mga sundalo na kung pwede daw ay maiwan muna ng
dalawang linggo sa kampo ako at si Noriel para daw matrain pa si Noriel sa loob ng
kampo;
24. Na hindi ako pumayag na maiwan ang aking anak;
xxx xxx xxx
33. Na sa kasalukuhan, hanggang ngayon ay nag-aalala pa ako sa paa (sic) sa
kaligtasan ng aming buong pamilya, lalo na kay Noriel; xxx105
Also, Rodel made the following supporting averments in his Sinumpaang Salaysay
dated 3 December 2009:106
24. Na nang makita ko si Noriel, hindi sya makalakad ng diretso, hinang-hina sya,
malaki ang ipinayat at nanlalalim ang mga mata;
25. Na nang makita ko ang aking kapatid ay nakaramdam ako ng awa dahil nakilala
ko syang masigla at masayahin;
26. Na ilang minuto lang ay binulugan nya ako ng "Kuya, ilabas mo ako dito,
papatayin nila ako."
27. Na sinabihan kami ni Lt. Col. Mina na baka pwedeng maiwan pa ng dalwang linggo
ang aking kapatid sa kanila para raw ma-train sya.
28. Na hindi kami pumayag ng aking nanay; xxx107
Moreover, the Court of Appeals likewise aptly pointed out the illogical, if not outrightly
contradictory, contention of respondents in G.R. No. 191805 that while Rodriguez had
complained of his exhaustion from his activities as a member of the CPP-NPA, he
nevertheless willingly volunteered to return to his life in the NPA to become a double-
agent for the military. The lower court ruled in this manner:
In the Return of the Writ, respondent AFP members alleged that petitioner confided to his
military handler, Cpl. Navarro, that petitioner could no longer stand the hardships he
experienced in the wilderness, and that he wanted to become an ordinary citizen again
because of the empty promises of the CPP-NPA. However, in the same Return, respondents
state that petitioner agreed to become a double agent for the military and wanted to re-
enter the CPP-NPA, so that he could get information regarding the movement directly from
the source. If petitioner was tired of life in the wilderness and desired to become an
ordinary citizen again, it defies logic that he would agree to become an undercover agent
and work alongside soldiers in the mountains – or the wilderness he dreads – to locate the
hideout of his alleged NPA comrades.108 (Emphasis supplied.)
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
Furthermore, the appellate court also properly ruled that aside from the abduction,
detention and torture of Rodriguez, respondents, specifically 1st Lt. Matutina, had violated
and threatened the former’s right to security when they made a visual recording of his
house, as well as the photos of his relatives, to wit:
In the videos taken by the soldiers – one of whom was respondent Matutina – in the house
of petitioner on September 18, 2009, the soldiers even went as far as taking videos of the
photos of petitioner’s relatives hung on the wall of the house, as well as videos of the
innermost part of the house. This Court notes that 1Lt. Matutina, by taking the said videos,
did not merely intend to make proofs of the safe arrival of petitioner and his family in their
home. 1Lt. Matutina also desired to instill fear in the minds of petitioner and his family by
showing them that the sanctity of their home, from then on, will not be free from the
watchful eyes of the military, permanently captured through the medium of a seemingly
innocuous cellhpone video camera. The Court cannot – and will not – condone such act, as
it intrudes into the very core of petitioner’s right to security guaranteed by the
fundamental law.109 (Emphasis supplied.)
Taken in their totality, the pieces of evidence adduced by Rodriguez, as well as the
contradictory defenses presented by respondents in G.R. No. 191805, give credence to his
claim that he had been abducted, detained and tortured by soldiers belonging to the 17th
Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the military.
It must be pointed out, however, that as to respondents Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan, there
was no substantial evidence to show that they violated, or threatened with violation,
Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty and security. Despite the dearth of evidence to show the
CHR officers’ responsibility or accountability, this Court nonetheless emphasizes its
criticism as regards their capacity to recognize torture or any similar form of abuse. The
CHR, being constitutionally mandated to protect human rights and investigate violations
thereof,110 should ensure that its officers are well-equipped to respond effectively to and
address human rights violations. The actuations of respondents unmistakably showed
their insufficient competence in facilitating and ensuring the safe release of Rodriguez
after his ordeal.
b. The failure to conduct a fair and effect investigation amounted to a violation of or
threat to Rodriguez’s rights to life, liberty and security.
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo explicitly states that the violation of or threat to the right
to life, liberty and security may be caused by either an act or an omission of a public
official.111 Moreover, in the context of amparo proceedings, responsibility may refer to the
participation of the respondents, by action or omission, in enforced disappearance. 112
Accountability, on the other hand, may attach to respondents who are imputed with
knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure;
or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in
the investigation of the enforced disappearance.113
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In this regard, we emphasize our ruling in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo 114 that
the right to security of a person includes the positive obligation of the government to
ensure the observance of the duty to investigate, viz:
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the
government. In the context of the writ of Amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of
the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the
right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and
psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this
third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full respect for human
rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief
guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty
and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to
these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting
effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to
victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their
families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The Inter-American Court of Human
Rights stressed the importance of investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case, viz:
(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere
formality preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be
assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not as a step taken by private interests that
depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon their offer of proof, without
an effective search for the truth by the government.
xxx xxx xxx
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted the "right to
security" not only as prohibiting the State from arbitrarily depriving liberty, but imposing
a positive duty on the State to afford protection of the right to liberty. The ECHR
interpreted the "right to security of person" under Article 5(1) of the European Convention
of Human Rights in the leading case on disappearance of persons, Kurt v. Turkey. In this
case, the claimant's son had been arrested by state authorities and had not been seen since.
The family's requests for information and investigation regarding his whereabouts proved
futile. The claimant suggested that this was a violation of her son's right to security of
person. The ECHR ruled, viz:
... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the
substantive and procedural rules of national law but must equally be in keeping with the
very purpose of Article 5, namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness... Having
assumed control over that individual it is incumbent on the authorities to account for his
or her whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5 must be seen as requiring the authorities
to take effective measures to safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to
conduct a prompt effective investigation into an arguable claim that a person has
been taken into custody and has not been seen since.115 (Emphasis supplied)
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – COMPILATION
In the instant case, this Court rules that respondents in G.R. No. 191805 are responsible or
accountable for the violation of Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty and security on account of
their abject failure to conduct a fair and effective official investigation of his ordeal in the
hands of the military. Respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Maj. Gen.
Ochoa, Col. De Vera and Lt. Col. Mina only conducted a perfunctory investigation, exerting
no efforts to take Ramirez’s account of the events into consideration. Rather, these
respondents solely relied on the reports and narration of the military. The ruling of the
appellate court must be emphasized:
In this case, respondents Ibrado, Verzosa, Bangit, Tolentino, Santos, De Vera, and Mina are
accountable, for while they were charged with the investigation of the subject incident, the
investigation they conducted and/or relied on is superficial and one-sided. The records
disclose that the military, in investigating the incident complained of, depended on the
Comprehensive Report of Noriel Rodriguez @Pepito prepared by 1Lt. Johnny Calub for the
Commanding Officer of the 501st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division, Philippine Army.
Such report, however, is merely based on the narration of the military. No efforts were
undertaken to solicit petitioner’s version of the subject incident and no witnesses were
questioned regarding the alleged abduction of petitioner.
Respondent PDG Verzosa, as Chief of the PNP, is accountable because Section 24 of
Republic Act No. 6975, otherwise known as the "PNP Law," specifies the PNP as the
governmental office with the mandate "to investigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrest
of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist in their prosecution." In this
case, PDG Verzosa failed to order the police to conduct the necessary investigation to
unmask the mystery surrounding petitioner’s abduction and disappearance. Instead, PDG
Verzosa disclaims accountability by merely stating that petitioner has no cause of action
against him. Palpable, however, is the lack of any effort on the part of PDG Verzosa to
effectively and aggressively investigate the violations of petitioner’s right to life, liberty
and security by members of the 17th Infantry Battalion, 17th Infantry Division, Philippine
Army.116 (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, the absence of a fair and effective official investigation into the claims of Rodriguez
violated his right to security, for which respondents in G.R. No. 191805 must be held
responsible or accountable.
Nevertheless, it must be clarified that Rodriguez was unable to establish any responsibility
or accountability on the part of respondents P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Calog
and Palacpac. Respondent P/CSupt. Tolentino had already retired when the abduction and
torture of Rodriguez was perpetrated, while P/SSupt. Santos had already been reassigned
and transferred to the National Capital Regional Police Office six months before the subject
incident occurred. Meanwhile, no sufficient allegations were maintained against
respondents Calog and Palacpac.
From all the foregoing, we rule that Rodriguez was successful in proving through
substantial evidence that respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Maj. Gen.
Ochoa, Brig. Gen. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, and Lt. Col. Mina were responsible and
65 | E l i x i r C . L a n g a n l a n g a n
Constitutional Law, Atty. Carlomagno Calingin
XU – College of Law
OF CASES BATCH 8
accountable for the violation of Rodriguez’s rights to life, liberty and security on the basis
of (a) his abduction, detention and torture from 6 September to 17 September 2009, and
(b) the lack of any fair and effective official investigation as to his allegations. Thus, the
privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data must be granted in his favor. As a result,
there is no longer any need to issue a temporary protection order, as the privilege of these
writs already has the effect of enjoining respondents in G.R. No. 191805 from violating his
rights to life, liberty and security.
It is also clear from the above discussion that despite (a) maintaining former President
Arroyo in the list of respondents in G.R. No. 191805, and (b) allowing the application of
the command responsibility doctrine to amparo and habeas data proceedings, Rodriguez
failed to prove through substantial evidence that former President Arroyo was responsible
or accountable for the violation of his rights to life, liberty and property. He likewise failed
to prove through substantial evidence the accountability or responsibility of respondents
Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan.
WHEREFORE, we resolve to GRANT the Petition for Partial Review in G.R. No. 191805 and
DENY the Petition for Review in G.R. No. 193160. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.
The case is dismissed with respect to respondents former President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, P/CSupt. Ameto G. Tolentino, and P/SSupt. Jude W. Santos, Calog, George Palacpac,
Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan and Vicent Callagan for lack of merit.
This Court directs the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and the Department of
Justice (DOJ) to take the appropriate action with respect to any possible liability or
liabilities, within their respective legal competence, that may have been incurred by
respondents Gen. Victor Ibrado, PDG. Jesus Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Delfin Bangit, Maj. Gen. Nestor
Ochoa, Brig. Gen. Remegio De Vera, 1st Lt. Ryan Matutina, and Lt. Col. Laurence Mina. The
Ombudsman and the DOJ are ordered to submit to this Court the results of their action
within a period of six months from receipt of this Decision.
In the event that herein respondents no longer occupy their respective posts, the
directives mandated in this Decision and in the Court of Appeals are enforceable against
the incumbent officials holding the relevant positions. Failure to comply with the foregoing
shall constitute contempt of court.
SO ORDERED.