PROPERTY – Possession Cases
Lim Kieh Tong vs Court of Appeals and Hon. Judge Pizarro Held: From the foregoing facts alleged in the complaint, the Court holds that the suit is one for forcible
Facts: Petitioner is a duly organized domestic corporation and is the owner of a building.
Reginaldo Lim filed a complaint before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, alleging as follows:
Plaintiff Lim and his family had for some time resided in Room 301 until they transferred to their present
residence at No. 3 Igdalig Street, Quezon City. The said room 301 has been utilized by Lim as a place
where he keeps some of his important belongings, such as his law books, important documents,
appliances, etc. The aforementioned building has only one common main door through which all the
occupants of the various rooms therein, including that of plaintiff, can get in and out therefrom. Each
occupant of the building has been given a key or a duplicate key to the doorlock.
When Lim wanted to go inside his room in the following morning of September 30, 1987 to fetch three
(3) of his law books, which he needed to read in connection with a case he is handling, he was surprised
to find out that the key given him could no longer fit the door lock which was then already changed.
Consequently, plaintiff had to buy three (3) new law books for which he incurred expenses in the sum
of Pl,253.00, if only to be able to prepare for his cases. He was only able to contact defendant through
its Officer-in-Charge, Mr. Rafael Lim, the following day, October 1, 1987, but his request for him to be
provided with the appropriate key produced negative result, hence, this suit where plaintiff incurred
expenses in the form of attorney's fees and costs of suit.
Lim repleads the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. The failure and/or refusal of
defendant to furnish plaintiff the appropriate key, above-cited, constitutes a violation of the substantial
rights of plaintiff, who has a clear and unmistakable right to the use and enjoyment of Room 301 of the
building owned by defendant corporation, such that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction/restraining order commanding defendant to furnish plaintiff
the appropriate key in order to prevent great and and/or irreparable damages and injury upon plaintiff.
By reason of unjustifiable ouster of Lim from said premises, he filed an action for damages with
injunction against Rafael Lim and Lim Kieh Tong & Co., Inc. before the Metropolitan Trial Court. The
same was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Lim again instituted another action at the Metropolitan Trial
Court.
Metropolitan Trial Court: Temporary restraining order was issued by respondent judge pending trial on
the merits, commanding petitioner Lim Kieh Tong to deliver the appropriate keys to Lim and allow him
to enter the premises and occupancy of Room No. 301 of the building.
Court of Appeals: The appeal was dismissed for lack of merit. A motion for reconsideration filed by Lim
Kieh Tong, Inc. was denied in a resolution dated May 9, 1990. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether a complaint filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila is one for forcible entry and
detainer or one for specific performance.
entry and detainer under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Private respondent retained the possession of
Room 301 of petitioner's building which he claimed to have the right to use and enjoy, but petitioner
prevented him from enjoying his right by depriving him of the right of egress and ingress through the
main door of the building. Through stealth, petitioner changed the key to the main door thus depriving
private respondent of the possession of his rented room.
Any person deprived of possession of any land or building or part thereof, may file an action for forcible
entry and detainer in the proper inferior court against the person unlawfully depriving or withholding
possession from him.
This relief is not only available to a landlord, vendor, or vendee, but also to a lessee or tenant or any
other person against whom the possession of any land or building, or a part thereof, is unlawfully
withheld, or is otherwise unlawfully deprived possession thereof, within one (1) year after such unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Sarmiento vs Court of Appeals and Generosa S. Cruz
Facts: Cruz filed a complaint for ejectment with damages against Sarmiento in the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, alleging as follows:
Cruz acquired by purchase a parcel of land known as Lot No. 2-A. The adjacent lot of Cruz is still owned
by the family of Atty. Gonzalo Nuguid but the same is being used and occupied by Sarmiento where a
house was constructed thereon. When Cruz caused the relocation of her lot herein mentioned, it was
found out by the Geodetic Engineer that Sarmiento is encroaching on her lot for about 71 square
meters.
When Cruz talked to the defendant that she would like to remove the old fence so that she could
construct a new fence which will cover the true area of her property, the defendant vehemently refused
to let the plaintiff remove the said fence and menacingly alleged that if plaintiff remove(d) the said fence
to construct a new one, she would take action against the plaintiff legally or otherwise. For fear that
plaintiff may be charged in court should she insist on removing the fence encroaching on her property,
plaintiff now seeks judicial relief. This matter was referred to the Katarungang Pambarangay of Mabuco
for settlement, however, the efforts of the Lupon Tagapamayapa turned futile.
Plaintiff as much as possible would like to avoid court litigation because she is poor but nevertheless
she consulted the undersigned counsel and a demand letter was sent to the defendant for conference
and/or settlement but the defendant stood pat that she will not allow the removal of the fence, thus
PROPERTY – Possession Cases
depriving the plaintiff of the use and possession of the said portion of her lot (71 square meters) which
is being occupied by the defendant for several years. Cruz was forced to hire the services of counsel
for which she contracted to pay the sum of P2,000.00 plus acceptance of P1,000.00 until the termination
of this case before this Honorable Court.
Municipal Trial Court: Rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant. Sarmiento filed a
Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied by the Trial Court.
On appeal by Sarmiento to the Regional Trial Court, it questioned the jurisdiction of the court a quo.
RTC rendered the following disposition:
The court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the instant appealed case
based on (the) reason that the said case should be one of question of ownership or accion
rei(vin)dicatoria rather than that of forcible entry as there was no allegation of prior possession
by the plaintiff (of) the disputed lot as required by law and jurisprudence. Absence of allegations
and proof by the plaintiff in forcible entry case of prior possession of the disputed lot (sic) cannot
be said that defendant dispossesses her of the same, thus, the legal remedy sought by the
plaintiff is not the proper one as it should have been accion publiciana or accion rei(vin)dicatoria,
as the case may be, and the forum of which is the Regional Trial Court.
Court of Appeals: Reversed the decision of RTC. Affirmed the MTC.
Issues: Whether or not Municipal Trial Court has jurisdiction over ejectment cases.
Held: A careful reading of the facts averred in said complaint filed by herein private respondent reveals
that the action is neither one of forcible entry nor of unlawful detainer but essentially involves a boundary
dispute which must be resolved in an accion reivindicatoria on the issue of ownership over the disputed
71 square meters involved.
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are two distinct actions defined in Section 1, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court. What determines the cause of action is the nature of defendant's entry into the land. If
the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the intruder within one year therefrom is
forcible entry. If, on the other hand, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter became illegal, the
case is one of unlawful detainer which must be filed within one year from the date of the last demand.
In the case at bar, the complaint does not characterize herein petitioner's alleged entry into the land,
that is, whether the same was legal or illegal. It does not state how petitioner entered upon the land
and constructed the house and the fence thereon. It is also silent on whether petitioner's possession
became legal before private respondent made a demand on her to remove the fence. The complaint
merely avers that the lot being occupied by petitioner is owned by a third person, not a party to the
case, and that said lot is enclosed by a fence which private respondent claims is an encroachment on
the adjacent lot belonging to her.
Furthermore, it is also alleged and admitted in the complaint that the said fence was already in existence
on that lot at the time private respondent bought her own lot and it was only after a relocation survey
was made that it was found out that petitioner is allegedly encroaching on the lot of the former.
Consequently, there is here no contract, express or implied, between petitioner and private respondent
as would qualify it as a case of unlawful detainer. Neither was it alleged that the possession of the
disputed portion of said lot was acquired by petitioner through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth to make out a case of forcible entry.
Private respondent cannot now belatedly claim that petitioner's possession of the controverted portion
was by mere tolerance since that fact was never alleged in the former's basic complaint, and this
argument was raised in her later pleadings more as an afterthought. Also, it would be absurd to argue
that private respondent tolerated a state of affairs of which she was not even then aware. Finally, to
categorize a cause of action as one constitutive of unlawful detainer, plaintiff's supposed acts of
tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be
recovered.
The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts
constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or
how and when dispossession started, as in the case at bar, the remedy should either be an accion
publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court. 21
If private respondent is indeed the owner of the premises subject of this suit and she was unlawfully
deprived of the real right of possession or the ownership thereof, she should present her claim before
the regional trial court in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the municipal
trial court in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer or forcible entry. For even if one is the owner
of the property, the possession thereof cannot be wrested from another who had been in the physical
or material possession of the same for more than one year by resorting to a summary action for
ejectment. This is especially true where his possession thereof was not obtained through the means or
held under the circumstances contemplated by the rules on summary ejectment.
We have held that in giving recognition to the action of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, the purpose
of the law is to protect the person who in fact has actual possession; and in case of a controverted
proprietary right, the law requires the parties to preserve the status quo until one or the other sees fit
to invoke the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction upon the question of ownership.
Pecson vs Nuguid
Facts: Pecson was the owner of a commercial lot, on which he built a two-storey apartment building.
For his failure to pay realty taxes of P12,000.00, the lot was sold at public auction to Nepomuceno.
Nepomuceno sold the same to Sps Nuguid for 103,000.
PROPERTY – Possession Cases
Pecson challenged the validity of the auction sale before the RTC. The RTC then dismissed the
complaint, but as to the private respondents' claim that the sale included the apartment building, it held
that the issue concerning it was "not a subject of the litigation." In resolving the private respondents'
motion to reconsider this issue, the trial court held that there was no legal basis for the contention that
the apartment building was included in the sale.
Both parties then appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.Court of Appeals: Apartment building
was not included in the auction sale of the commercial lot. It was only the land — without the apartment
building — which was sold at the auction sale, for plaintiff's failure to pay the taxes due thereon.
RTC: The private respondents filed with the trial court a motion for delivery of possession of the lot and
the apartment building.
The petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the order but it was not acted upon by the trial court.
The petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition
assailing the order of RTC. CA affirmed part of RTC’s resolution. It stated:
WHEREFORE, while it appears that private respondents have not yet indemnified petitioner
with the cost of the improvements, since Annex I shows that the Deputy Sheriff has enforced
the Writ of Possession and the premises have been turned over to the possession of private
respondents, the quest of petitioner that he be restored in possession of the premises is
rendered moot and academic, although it is but fair and just that private respondents pay
petitioner the construction cost of P53,000.00; and that petitioner be ordered to account for any
and all fruits of the improvements received by him starting on June 23, 1993, with the amount
of P53,000.00 to be offset therefrom.
Petitioner filed the instant petition.
Issues: Whether or not Articles 448 and 456 be applied.
Held: By its clear language, Article 448 refers to a land whose ownership is claimed by two or more
parties, one of whom has built some works, or sown or planted something. The building, sowing or
planting may have been made in good faith or in bad faith. The rule on good faith laid down in Article
526 of the Civil Code shall be applied in determining whether a builder, sower or planter had acted in
good faith. 12
Article 448 does not apply to a case where the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or planter who
then later loses ownership of the land by sale or donation. This Court said so in Coleongco
vs. Regalado: 13
Article 361 of the old Civil Code is not applicable in this case, for Regalado constructed
the house on his own land before he sold said land to Coleongco. Article 361 applies
only in cases where a person constructs a building on the land of another in good or in
bad faith, as the case may be. It does not apply to a case where a person constructs
a building on his own land, for then there can be no question as to good or bad faith
on the part of the builder.
Thus in strict point of law, Article 448 is not appropriate to the case at bar. Nevertheless, we
believe that the provision therein on indemnity may be applied by analogy considering that the
primary intent of Article 448 is to avoid a state of forced co-ownership and that the parties,
including the two courts below, in the main agree that Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code are
applicable and indemnity for the improvements may be paid although they differ as to the basis
of the indemnity.
Article 546 does not specifically state how the value of the useful improvements should be determined.
The objective of Article 546 of the Civil Code is to administer justice between the parties involved.
Guided by this precept, it is therefore the current market value of the improvements which should be
made the basis of reimbursement. A contrary ruling would unjustly enrich the private respondents who
would otherwise be allowed to acquire a highly valued income-yielding four-unit apartment building for
a measly amount. Consequently, the parties should therefore be allowed to adduce evidence on the
present market value of the apartment building upon which the trial court should base its finding as to
the amount of reimbursement to be paid by the landowner.
The trial court also erred in ordering the petitioner to pay monthly rentals equal to the aggregate rentals
paid by the lessees of the apartment building. Since the private respondents have opted to appropriate
the apartment building, the petitioner is thus entitled to the possession and enjoyment of the apartment
building, until he is paid the proper indemnity, as well as of the portion of the lot where the building has
been constructed. This is so because the right to retain the improvements while the corresponding
indemnity is not paid implies the tenancy or possession in fact of the land on which it is built, planted
or sown. 18 The petitioner not having been so paid, he was entitled to retain ownership of the building
and, necessarily, the income therefrom.
Bunyi vs Factor
Facts: Factor is one of the co-owners of an 18-hectare piece of land. The ownership of the land
originated from respondent’s paternal grandparents Constantino Factor and Maura Mayuga-Factor who
had been in actual, continuous, peaceful, public, adverse and exclusive possession and occupation of
the land even before 1906.
December 9, 1975, the children of Constantino Factor and Maura Mayuga-Factor filed a
Petition for Original Registration and Confirmation of Imperfect Title to the said parcel of land. The same
was granted by the RTC and declared the children of Constantino Factor and Maura Mayuga-Factor
as co-owners of the property. The children of Constantino Factor and Maura Mayuga-Factor thereafter
PROPERTY – Possession Cases
sold seven hectares of the Factor family property during the same year. The siblings, except Enrique
Factor, respondent’s father, shared and divided the proceeds of the sale among themselves, with the
agreement that Enrique would have as his share the portion of the property located in Antioch Street,
Pilar Executive Village, Almanza I, Las Piñas City, known as the Factor compound. Enrique caused the
construction of several houses in the compound including the subject property, a rest house, where
members of the Factor family stayed during get- togethers and visits.7 Petitioners Precy Bunyi and her
mother, Mila Bunyi, were tenants in one of the houses inside the compound.
When Enrique Factor died, the administration of the Factor compound including the subject rest house
and other residential houses for lease was transferred and entrusted to Enrique’s eldest child, Gloria
Factor-Labao.
When Gloria died on January 15, 2001, the administration and management of the Factor compound
including the subject rest house, passed on to respondent Fe S. Factor as co-owner of the property.
As an act of goodwill and compassion, considering that Ruben Labao (son of Gloria) was sickly and
had no means of income, respondent allowed him to stay at the rest house for brief, transient and
intermittent visits as a guest of the Factor family. Ruben Labao married petitioner Precy Bunyi. On
2002, Ruben Labao died.
At about this time, respondent Fe discovered that petitioners forcibly opened the doors of the rest house
and stole all the personal properties owned by the Factor family and then audaciously occupied the
premises. Respondent alleged that petitioners unlawfully deprived her and the Factor family of the
subject property’s lawful use and possession. Respondent also added that when she tried to enter the
rest house on December 1, 2002, an unidentified person who claimed to have been authorized by
petitioners to occupy the premises, barred, threatened and chased her with a jungle bolo. Thus, on
September 12, 2003, respondent Fe S. Factor filed a complaint for forcible entry against herein
petitioners Precy Bunyi and Mila Bunyi.
Petitioners, for their part, questioned Fe’s claim of ownership of the subject property and the alleged
prior ownership of her father Enrique Factor. They asserted that the subject property was owned by
Ruben Labao, and that petitioner Precy with her husband moved into the subject property.
Metropolitan Trial Court: Ruled in favor of Fe. Petitioners wer ordered to immediately vacate the subject
premises and surrender possession thereof to the plaintiff and to pay the monthly rental of ₱2,000.00
from December 1, 2002 up to the time they finally vacate the premises.
RTC and Court of Appeals: Denied Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not there was force, threat, intimidation and stealth committed by the petitioners in
occupying the subject residential house.
(2) Whether or not the respondent has a better right of physical and material possession of the subject
property.
(3) Whether or not petitioners are liable to pay the monthly rental of ₱2,000.00 from December 1, 2002
up to the time they finally vacate premises.
Held:
(1) Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. RTC and CA determination of facts coincide.
(2) Fe Factor has a has a better right of physical and material possession of the subject
property. Petitioners insist that petitioner Precy has a better right of possession over the subject
property since she inherited the subject property as the surviving spouse and sole heir of Ruben
Labao, who owned the property before his death. Respondent, on the other hand, hinges her claim of
possession on the fact that her predecessor-in-interest had prior possession of the property as early
as 1975.
In ejectment cases, the only issue for resolution is who is entitled to the physical or material
possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership set forth by any of the
party- litigants. Petitioners argue that respondent was never in possession of the subject property
since the latter never occupied the same. They claim that they have been in actual possession of the
disputed property from the time petitioner Precy married Ruben Labao in 2002. In this instance,
however, petitioners’ contention is unconvincing.
For one to be considered in possession, one need not have actual or physical occupation of every
square inch of the property at all times. Possession can be acquired not only by material occupation,
but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one’s will or by the proper acts and legal
formalities established for acquiring such right.
Moreover, Precy Bunyi failed to prove that they had prior possession of the subject property. Their
marriage certificate and Ruben’s death certificate revealed that at the time of their marriage, Ruben
was residing at 123 A. Lake St., San Juan, Metro Manila. Considering that her husband was never a
resident of the subject property, petitioner Precy failed to explain convincingly how she was able to
move in with Ruben Labao in the subject property during their marriage. On the other hand, RTC
issued Certificate of Title in favor of Constantino and Maura way back in 1994. As heir, respondent
had the right to the possession of the property, which is one of the attributes of ownership. As a
consequence of her ownership thereof, respondent is entitled to its possession, considering
petitioners’ failure to prove prior possession.
(3) The reasonable amount of any rent could not be determined by mere judicial notice but by
supporting evidence. In the instant case, we find no evidence on record to support the MeTC’s award
of rent.
PROPERTY – Possession Cases
Briones vs Macabagdal
Facts: This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals ordering petitioners Luciano and
Nelly Briones to remove the improvements they have made on the disputed property or to pay
respondent- spouses Jose and Fe Macabagdal the prevailing price of the land as compensation.
Respondent-spouses purchased from Vergon Realty Investments Corporation (Vergon) Lot 2-R
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title.On the other hand, petitioners are the owners of Lot
No. 2-S, which is adjacent to their lot.
Petitioners constructed a house on Lot No. 2-R which they thought was Lot No. 2-S. After being
informed of the mix up by Vergon's manager, respondent-spouses immediately demanded
petitioners to demolish the house and vacate the property. Petitioners, however, refused to heed
their demand. Thus, respondent-spouses filed an action to recover ownership and possession of
the said parcel of land with the RTC of Makati City.
Petitioners insisted that the lot on which they constructed their house was the lot which was
consistently pointed to them as theirs by Vergon's agents over the seven (7)-year period they
were paying for the lot. They interposed the defense of being buyers in good faith and impleaded
Vergon as third-party defendant.
Regional Trial Court: Ruled in favor of respondent- spouses. Defendants, jointly and severally,
are ordered to demolish their house and vacate the premises and return the possession of the
portion of Lot No. 2-R as above-described to plaintiffs within thirty (30) days from receipt of this
decision, or in the alternative, plaintiffs should be compensated by defendants, jointly and
severally, by the payment of the prevailing price of the lot involved xxx
Court of Appeals: Affirmed the RTC's finding that the lot upon which petitioners built their house
was not the one (1) which Vergon sold to them.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the appellate court. Hence,
this petition.
Issue: Whether or not CA erred in affirming the decision of the trial court ordering petitioners to
demolish their only house and vacate the lot and to pay moral and compensatory damages as
well as attorney's fee in the total amount of 110,000.
Held: In the main, it is petitioners' position that they must not bear the damage alone. Petitioners insist
that they relied with full faith and confidence in the reputation of Vergon's agents when they pointed the
wrong property to them. Even the President of Vergon, Felix Gonzales, consented to the construction
of the house when he signed the building permit. Also, petitioners are builders in good faith. The petition
is partly meritorious.
At the outset, we note that petitioners raise factual issues, which are beyond the scope of a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules. Well settled is the rule that the
jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to it from the CA via a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 is limited to the review of errors of law.
We note that the CA and RTC did not overlook or fail to appreciate any material circumstance
which, when properly considered, would have altered the result of the case.
However, the trial court nonetheless erred in outrightly ordering petitioners to vacate the subject
property or to pay respondent spouses the prevailing price of the land as compensation. Article 527[14]
of the Civil Code presumes good faith, and since no proof exists to show that the mistake was done by
petitioners in bad faith, the latter should be presumed to have built the house in good faith. The builder
in good faith can compel the landowner to make a choice between appropriating the building by
paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of the land. The choice belongs
to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory
follows the principal and not the other way around. However, even as the option lies with the
landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. He must choose one.
Consequently, the respondent-spouses have the option to appropriate the house on the subject
land after payment to petitioners of the appropriate indemnity or to oblige petitioners to pay the
price of the land, unless its value is considerably more than the value of the structures, in which
case petitioners shall pay reasonable rent.
As to the liability of Vergon, petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to show negligence on
Vergon's part. The signature of the President of Vergon on the building permit merely proved that
petitioners were authorized to make constructions within the subdivision project of Vergon. And
while petitioners acted in good faith in building their house on Lot No. 2-R, petitioners did not show
by what authority the agents or employees of Vergon were acting when they pointed to the lot
where the construction was made nor was petitioners' claim on this matter corroborated by
sufficient evidence.
Considering that petitioners acted in good faith in building their house on the subject property of
the respondent-spouses, there is no basis for the award of moral damages to respondent-spouses.
Nenita Quality Foods vs Galabo
Facts: Respondents are heirs of Donato Galabo. In 1948, Donato obtained Lot No. 722, a portion of
the Arakaki Plantation owned by National Abaca and Other Fibers Corporation. Donato and the
respondents assumed that Lot No. 722 included Lot No. 102, per the original survey of 1916 to 1920.
When the Board of Liquidators (BOL) took over the administration of the Arakaki Plantation in the
1950s, it had Lot No. 722 resurveyed. Allegedly, the resurvey did not include Lot No. 102; thus, when
Donato acquired Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-214966 for Lot No. 722 on April 26, 1953, Lot No.
102 was not included. The respondents, however, continue to posses, occupy and cultivate Lot No.
PROPERTY – Possession Cases
102. When NQFC opened its business in Toril, Davao City, it allegedly offered to buy Lot No. 102.
Crisostomo fenced off the entire perimeter of Lot No. 102 and built his house on it.
Respondents received a letter from Santos Nantin demanding that they vacate Lot No. 102. Santos
claimed ownership of this lot per the Deed of Transfer of Rights (Deed of Transfer)7 dated July 10,
1972, which the respondents and their mother allegedly executed in Santos’ favor. The respondents
denied this claim and maintained that they had been occupying Lot No. 102, which the BOL itself
recognized per its letters8 and the Certification9 dated April 12, 2000 confirming Donato as the long-
time occupant and awardee of the property. To perfect their title, the respondents applied for free patent
over Lot No. 102 on September 6, 2000.
On January 3, 2001 and again on a later date, NQFC’s workers, with armed policemen of Toril, Davao
City, entered by force Lot No. 102 to fence it. The respondents reported the entry to the authorities. On
April 16, 2001, Crisostomo received a letter from NQFC’s counsel demanding that he removes his
house from Lot No. 102. NQFC subsequently removed the existing fence and cut down various trees
that the respondents had planted on the property.
NQFC claimed that Santos immediately occupied and possessed Lot No. 102 after he purchased it
from the respondents in 1972 and declared it under his name for taxation purposes. Santos was also
granted Free Patent over the property by the Bureau of Lands, and obtained Original Certificate of Title
on June 18, 1974. On December 29, 2000, the heirs of Santos conveyed Lot No. 102 to NQFC via the
Deed of Absolute Sale11 of even date. NQFC then filed a petition for cancellation of the respondents’
patent application over Lot No. 102, which the BOL- Manila granted on April 19, 2001, on the ground
that Donato failed to perfect his title over Lot No. 102 which has long been titled in Santos’ name.
When conciliation failed, the respondents filed a complaint for forcible entry with damages before
the MTCC against NQFC, alleging that: (1) they had been in prior physical possession of Lot No. 102;
and (2) NQFC deprived them of possession through force, intimidation, strategy, threats and stealth.
MTCC: Dismissed respondent’s complaint.
RTC: Denied the appeal of the respondents. NQFC’s possession of Lot No. 102 was anchored on a
Deed of Absolute Sale, while that of the respondents was based merely on the allegation of possession
and occupation by Donato, and not on any title.
CA: Granted the respondents’ petition and ordered NQFC to vacate Lot No. 102. The CA explained
that a plaintiff, in a forcible entry case, only has to prove prior material and physical possession of the
property in litigation and undue deprivation of it by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth.
CA denied NQFC’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
Issues: Whether or not NQFC had been in prior physical possession of Lot No. 102.
Held: No. To prove prior physical possession of Lot No. 102, NQFC presented the Deed of Transfer,
Santos’ OCT P-4035, the Deed of Absolute Sale, and the Order of the Bureau of Lands approving
Santos’ free patent application. In presenting these pieces of evidence, NQFC is apparently mistaken
as it may have equated possession that is at issue as an attribute of ownership to actual possession.
The latter type of possession is, however, different from and has different legal implications than the
former. While these documents may bear weight and are material in contests over ownership of Lot
No. 102, they do not per se show NQFC’s actual possession of this property.
We agree that ownership carries the right of possession, but the possession contemplated by the
concept of ownership is not exactly the same as the possession in issue in a forcible entry case.
Possession in forcible entry suits refers only to possession de facto, or actual or material possession,
and not possession flowing out of ownership; these are different legal concept.
We agree with the respondents that instead of squarely addressing the issue of possession and
presenting evidence showing that NQFC or Santos had been in actual possession of Lot No. 102, the
former merely narrated how it acquired ownership of Lot No. 102 and presented documents to this
effect. Its allegation that Santos occupied Lot No. 102 in 1972 is uncorroborated. Even the tax
declarations under Santos’ name are hardly of weight; "tax declarations and realty tax payments are
not conclusive proof of possession. They are merely good indicia of possession in the concept of
owner"50 but not necessarily of the actual possession required in forcible entry cases.
We agree, too, as we have indicated in passing above, that the issue of ownership can be material and
relevant in resolving the issue of possession. The Rules in fact expressly allow this: Section 16, Rule
70 of the Rules of Court53 provides that the issue of ownership shall be resolved in deciding the issue
of possession if the question of possession is intertwined with the issue of ownership. But this provision
is only an exception and is allowed only in this limited instance-- to determine the issue of possession
and only if the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership.54
Save for this instance, evidence of ownership is not at all material, as in the present case.
Petition denied.
Olegario vs Mari
Facts: Juan Mari, the father of respondent, declared his ownership over a parcel of land for tax
purposes. He took possession of the same by delineating the limits with a bamboo fence, 5 planting
various fruit bearing trees and bamboos 6 and constructing a house thereon.7 The subject realty was
transferred to respondent, Pedro Mari, by virtue of a deed of sale.
Meanwhile, Wenceslao Olegario (adjacent north of Mari’s land) and father of petitioner Arsenio
Olegario, filed a new tax declaration9 for a certain 50-square meter parcel of land executed a "Deed
of Quit-Claim of Unregistered Property"10in favor of Arsenio Olegario transferring to the latter inter
alia the aforementioned 50-square meter property.
Sometime around 1988, respondent filed with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Regional Office in Pangasinan a protest against the petitioners because of their encroachment into
the disputed realty. After investigation, said office decided in favor of the respondent and found the
PROPERTY – Possession Cases
latter to be the owner of Lot Nos. 17526, 17553 and 14356. Petitioners did not appeal and the said
decision became final and executory.
In 1989, Arsenio Olegario caused the amendment of his tax declaration 12 for the 50-square meter
property to reflect 1) an increased area of 341 square meters.
RTC: Respondent alleged, inter alia, that Juan Mari, and subsequently his successor, was deprived by
the Olegarios of the possession of portions of subject realty which respondent owned. Trial thereafter
ensued. RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners.
CA: Reversed the RTC.
Petitioners' Arguments
Petitioners contend that they have been in possession of the disputed lots since 1948 or thereabouts,
or for more than 30 years already. Hence, they acquired ownership thereover by virtue of prescription.
They also impute negligence or failure on the part of respondent to assert his alleged rights within a
reasonable time.
Respondent's Arguments
On the other hand, respondent asserts that petitioners claim ownership over only a certain 50-square
meter parcel of land, as evidenced by their tax declaration which consistently declared only such area.
It was only in September 1989 that petitioners sought to expand the area of their claim to 341 square
meters by virtue of a letter to the Provincial Assessor of Pangasinan. Hence, respondent asserts that
prescription has not set in. Respondent also contends that petitioners' occupancy has been illegal from
the point of inception and thus, such possession can never ripen into a legal status.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals failed to find an[d] declare the petitioners as having acquired
ownership of the disputed lots by acquisitive prescription;
(2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in its failure to declare the action as barred by laches.
Held:
(1) Respondent's predecessor, Juan Mari, had declared the disputed realty 24 for tax purposes as early
as 1916. The tax declarations show that he had a two storey house on the realty. He also planted fruit
bearing trees and bamboos thereon. The records 25 also show that the 897-square meter property had
a bamboo fence along its perimeter. All these circumstances clearly show that Juan Mari was in
possession of subject realty in the concept of owner, publicly and peacefully since 1916 or long before
petitioners entered the disputed realty sometime in 1965.
Based on Article 538 of the Civil Code,26 the respondent is the preferred possessor because, benefiting
from his father's tax declaration of the subject realty since 1916, he has been in possession thereof for
a longer period. On the other hand, petitioners acquired joint possession only sometime in 1965.
Despite 25 years of occupying the disputed lots, therefore, petitioners did not acquire ownership. Firstly,
they had no just title. Petitioners did not present any document to show how the titles over Lot Nos.
17526 and 17533 were transferred to them, whether from respondent, his predecessor, or any other
person.27 Petitioners, therefore, could not acquire the disputed real property by ordinary prescription
through possession for 10 years. Secondly, it is settled that ownership cannot be acquired by mere
occupation. Unless coupled with the element of hostility towards the true owner, occupation and use,
however long, will not confer title by prescription or adverse possession. 28 In other words, possession,
to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be possession under claim of title, that is, it
must be adverse.
On the other hand, being the sole transferree of his father, respondent showed through his tax
declarations which were coupled with possessory acts that he, through his predecessor, had been in
possession of the land for more than 30 years since 1916. "Open, exclusive and undisputed
possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby
the land, upon completion of the requisite period - ipso jureand without the need of judicial or other
sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property." 34Ownership of immovable property
is acquired by extraordinary prescription through possession for 30 years. 35 For purposes of deciding
the instant case, therefore, the possession by respondent and his predecessor had already ripened
into ownership of the subject realty by virtue of prescription as early as 1946.
(2) Petitioners cannot find refuge in the principle of laches. It is not just the lapse of time or delay that
constitutes laches. The essence of laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, through due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, thus
giving rise to a presumption that the party entitled to assert it had earlier abandoned or declined to
assert it.
The essential elements of laches are: (a) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom
he claims, giving rise to the situation complained of; (b) delay in asserting complainant's rights after he
had knowledge of defendant's acts and after he has had the opportunity to sue; (c) lack of knowledge
or notice by defendant that the complainant will assert the right on which he bases his suit and (d) injury
or prejudice to the defendant in the event the relief is accorded to the complainant. 36 In the instant case,
the second and third elements are missing.
On the other hand, it was petitioners who suddenly changed their position in 1989 by changing the area
of the property declared in their name from 50 square meters to 341 square meters and specifying the
details to make it appear that the tax declaration for the 50-square meter property pertained to Lot No.
17526. As previously discussed, it was only at this point, in 1989, that it can be clearly stated that
petitioners were making their claim of ownership public and unequivocal and converting their
possession over Lot No. 17526 into one in the concept of owner.
PROPERTY – Possession Cases
Upon discovery of this clear and unequivocal change in status of petitioners’ position over the disputed
land respondent immediately acted. He filed in 1990 the complaint for recovery of possession and
nullification of tax declaration. Hence, we find no laches in the instant case.
Sps. Padilla vs Velasco
Facts: Respondents are heirs of Dr. Velasco who died single and without any issue on January 22,
1949. During his lifetime, Artemio acquired Lot No. 2161 consisting of 7,791 square meters
covered by Tax Declaration No. 4739. Artemio acquired the lot from spouses Brigido Sacluti and
Melitona Obial, evidenced by a deed of sale dated February 14, 1944.
In October 1987, petitioners entered the property as trustees by virtue of a deed of sale executed
by the Rural Bank of Pagsanjan in favor of spouses Bartolome Solomon, Jr. and Teresita Padilla
(Solomon spouses).
Respondents demanded that petitioners vacate the property, but the latter refused. The matter
was referred to the barangay for conciliation; however, the parties failed to reach an amicable
settlement. Thereafter, petitioners caused the cutting of trees in the area, fenced it and built a
house thereon. They harvested the crops and performed other acts of dominion over the property.
On October 14, 1991, respondents filed a complaint for accion publiciana, accounting and
damages against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santa Cruz, Laguna. They
asked the court to order petitioners to vacate the property and to pay moral and exemplary
damages, attorney’s fees and cost of suit.
Isauro, brother of Artemio presented himself as a witness and show proofs to prove that Artemio
was the owner of the property (e.g Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan, tax declarations, tax receipts
and Certification from LRA).
RTC: Judgement is hereby rendered in favor of the respondents ordering the petitioners to vacate
the land presently occupied by them and restore possession thereof to the respondents.
CA: Affirmed RTC.
Issues:
(1) Who, as between the parties, have a better right of possession of Lot No. 2161;
(2) Whether the complaint for accion publiciana has already prescribed;
(3) Whether the negligence of respondent’s counsel entitles them to a new trial.
Held:
(1) The instant case is for accion publiciana, or for recovery of the right to possess. This was a
plenary action filed in the regional trial court to determine the better right to possession of realty
independently of the title.18 Accion publiciana is also used to refer to an ejectment suit where the
cause of dispossession is not among the grounds for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, or when
possession has been lost for more than one year and can no longer be maintained under Rule 70
of the Rules of Court. The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession
only, not ownership.19
Based on the findings of facts of the RTC which were affirmed by the CA, respondents were able
to establish lawful possession of Lot No. 2161 when the petitioners occupied the property. Lot No.
2161 was the subject of Decree No. 403348 based on the decision dated October 10, 1930 in
Cadastre (Cad.) Case No. 11, LRC Record No. 208. The Original Certificate of Title to the land
was issued to Brigido Sacluti and Melitona Obial. On February 14, 1944, the original owners of the
land sold the same to Artemio. From the date of sale, until Artemio’s death on January 22, 1949,
he was in continuous possession of the land. When Artemio died, Isauro acted as administrator of
the land with Tomas Vivero as caretaker. In 1987, petitioners occupied the property by virtue of a
deed of sale between the Rural Bank of Pagsanjan and the Solomon spouses. The land bought
by the Solomon spouses from the Bank is denominated as Lot No. 76-pt and previously owned by
Valeriano. However, it was proved during trial that the land occupied by petitioners was Lot No.
2161 in the name of Artemio, whereas the land sold by the bank to the petitioners was Lot No. 76-
pt.
Given this factual milieu, it can readily be deduced that respondents are legally entitled to the
possession of Lot No. 2161.
(2) The case filed by respondents for accion publiciana has not prescribed. The action was filed
with the RTC on October 14, 1991. Petitioners dispossessed respondents of the property in
October 1987. At the time of the filing of the complaint, only four (4) years had elapsed from the
time of dispossession.
Under Article 555(4) of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the real right of possession is not lost till
after the lapse of ten years. It is settled that the remedy of accion publiciana prescribes after the
lapse of ten years.21 Thus, the instant case was filed within the allowable period.
(3) The illness of petitioners’ counsel and his alleged failure to present additional evidence during
the trial of the case do not constitute sufficient ground for a new trial.
Suarez vs Emboy
Facts: At the center of the dispute is a 222-square meter parcel of land, designated as Lot No. 1907-
A-2 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of Carmencita on February 9, 2005. The
subject lot used to be a part of Lot No. 1907-A,8 was partitioned among the heirs of Spouses Carlos
Padilla (Carlos) and Asuncion Pacres (Asuncion): 9
A house occupied by respondents Felix and Marilou, stands in the subject lot. The respondents claim
that their mother, Claudia, had occupied the subject lot during her lifetime and it was earmarked to
become her share in Lot No. 1907-A. They had thereafter stayed in the subject lot for decades after
PROPERTY – Possession Cases
inheriting the same from Claudia, who had in turn succeeded her own parents, Carlos and Asuncion.11
In 2004, respondents Felix and Marilou were asked by their cousins, who are the Heirs of Vicente, to
vacate the subject lot and to transfer to Lot No. 1907-A-5, a landlocked portion san a right of way.
They refused to comply insisting that Claudia’s inheritance pertained to Lot No. 1907-A-2.
Not long after, the respondents received from Carmencita’s counsel, a demand letter, dated February
23, 2004, requiring them to vacate the subject lot. They were informed that Carmencita had already
purchased on February 12, 2004 the subject lot from the former’s relatives. However, the respondents
did not heed the demand. Instead, they examined the records pertaining to the subject lot and
uncovered possible anomalies, i.e., forged signatures and alterations, in the execution of a series of
deeds of partition relative to Lot No. 1907-A. On August 13, 2004, they filed before the RTC of Cebu
City a complaint13 for nullification of the partition and for the issuance of new TCTs covering the heirs’
respective portions of Lot No. 1907-A.14
Carmencita filed before the MTCC and against the respondents a complaint for unlawful detainer, the
origin of the instant petition. She alleged that she bought the subject lot from Remedios, Moreno,
Veronica and Dionesia,15 the registered owners thereof and the persons who allowed the respondents
to occupy the same by mere tolerance.
MTCC: Upheld Carmencita’s claim
RTC: Affirmed MTCC.
CA: Reversed RTC. It stated: When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or
unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession
started, as in the case at bar, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion
reivindicatoria in the proper RTC. If [Carmencita] is truly the owner of the subject property and she was
unlawfully deprived of the real right of possession or ownership thereof, she should present her claim
before the RTC in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the municipal trial
court in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer or forcible entry.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Carmencita’s complaint against the respondents had sufficiently alleged and proven
a cause of action for unlawful detainer.
(2) Whether or not the pendency of the respondents’ petition for nullification of partition of Lot No. 1907-
A and for the issuance of new certificates of title can abate Carmencita’s ejectment suit.
Held:
(1) In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following key jurisdictional facts must be alleged and
sufficiently established:
a) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the
plaintiff;
b) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latter’s right of possession;
c) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of
the enjoyment thereof; and
d) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.
In the case at bar, the first requisite mentioned above is markedly absent. Carmencita failed to clearly
allege and prove how and when the respondents entered the subject lot and constructed a house upon
it.41 Carmencita was likewise conspicuously silent about the details on who specifically permitted the
respondents to occupy the lot, and how and when such tolerance came about. 42 Instead, Carmencita
cavalierly formulated a legal conclusion, sans factual substantiation, that (a) the respondents’ initial
occupation of the subject lot was lawful by virtue of tolerance by the registered owners, and (b) the
respondents became deforciants unlawfully withholding the subject lot’s possession after Carmencita,
as purchaser and new registered owner, had demanded for the former to vacate the property. 43 It is
worth noting that the absence of the first requisite assumes even more importance in the light of the
respondents’ claim that for decades, they have been occupying the subject lot as owners thereof.
The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts
constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or
how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria.44
(2) As a general rule, therefore, a pending civil action involving ownership of the same property does
not justify the suspension of ejectment proceedings. "The underlying reasons for the above ruling were
that the actions in the Regional Trial Court did not involve physical or de facto possession, and, on not
a few occasions, that the case in the Regional Trial Court was merely a ploy to delay disposition of the
ejectment proceeding, or that the issues presented in the former could quite as easily be set up as
defenses in the ejectment action and there resolved." Only in rare instances is suspension allowed to
await the outcome of the pending civil action.
Necessarily, the affirmance of the MCTC Decision would cause the respondent to go through the whole
gamut of enforcing it by physically removing the petitioners from the premises they claim to have been
occupying since 1937. (Respondent is claiming ownership only of the land, not of the house.)
Needlessly, the litigants as well as the courts will be wasting much time and effort by proceeding at a
stage wherein the outcome is at best temporary, but the result of enforcement is permanent, unjust and
probably irreparable.
We should stress that respondent’s claim to physical possession is based not on an expired or a
violated contract of lease, but allegedly on "mere tolerance." Without in any way prejudging the
proceedings for the quieting of title, we deem it judicious under the present exceptional circumstances
to suspend the ejectment case. Further, should Carmencita’s complaint be granted, the respondents’
house, which has been standing in the subject lot for decades, would be subject to demolition. The
PROPERTY – Possession Cases
foregoing circumstances, thus, justify the exclusion of the instant petition from the purview of the The contract of sale is consensual and is perfected once agreement is reached between the parties
general rule. on the subject matter and the consideration.
It is clear that ownership in the thing sold shall not pass to the buyer until full payment of the purchase
only if there is a stipulation to that effect. Otherwise, the rule is that such ownership shall pass from the
EDCA Publishing vs Sps. Santos vendor to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery of the thing sold even if the purchase
Facts: Professor Jose Cruz placed an order by telephone with the petitioner company for 406 books, price has not yet been paid. Non-payment only creates a right to demand payment or to rescind the
payable on delivery. 4 EDCA prepared the corresponding invoice and delivered the books as ordered, contract, or to criminal prosecution in the case of bouncing checks. But absent the stipulation above
for which Cruz issued a personal check covering the purchase price of P8,995.65. 5 On October 7, noted, delivery of the thing sold will effectively transfer ownership to the buyer who can in turn transfer
1981, Cruz sold 120 of the books to private respondent Leonor Santos who, after verifying the seller's it to another.
ownership from the invoice he showed her, paid him P1,700.00. 6 Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership over the books which he
could then validly transfer to the private respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid for them to
Meanwhile, EDCA having become suspicious over a second order placed by Cruz even before
EDCA was a matter between him and EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by the private
clearing of his first check, made inquiries with the De la Salle College where he had claimed to be a
respondents to the books.
dean and was informed that there was no such person in its employ. Further verification revealed that
Cruz had no more account or deposit with the Philippine Amanah Bank, against which he had drawn It bears repeating that in the case before us, Leonor Santos took care to ascertain first that the books
the payment check. 7 EDCA then went to the police, which set a trap and arrested Cruz on October belonged to Cruz before she agreed to purchase them. The EDCA invoice Cruz showed her assured
7, 1981. Investigation disclosed his real name as Tomas de la Peña and his sale of 120 of the books her that the books had been paid for on delivery. By contrast, EDCA was less than cautious — in fact,
he had ordered from EDCA to the private respondents. too trusting in dealing with the impostor. Although it had never transacted with him before, it readily
delivered the books he had ordered (by telephone) and as readily accepted his personal check in
On the night of the same date, EDCA sought the assistance of the police in Precinct 5 at the UN Avenue, payment. It did not verify his identity although it was easy enough to do this. It did not wait to clear the
which forced their way into the store of the private respondents and threatened Leonor Santos with check of this unknown drawer. Worse, it indicated in the sales invoice issued to him, by the printed
prosecution for buying stolen property. They seized the 120 books without warrant, loading them in a terms thereon, that the books had been paid for on delivery, thereby vesting ownership in the buyer.
van belonging to EDCA, and thereafter turned them over to the petitioner. 9
Protesting this high-handed action, the private respondents sued for recovery of the books after
demand for their return was rejected by EDCA. A writ of preliminary attachment was issued and the
petitioner, after initial refusal, finally surrendered the books to the private respondents. 10 As previously
stated, the petitioner was successively rebuffed in the three courts below and now hopes to secure
relief from us.
The Court expresses its disapproval of the arbitrary action of the petitioner in taking the law into its own
hands and forcibly recovering the disputed books from the private respondents. The circumstance that
it did so with the assistance of the police, which should have been the first to uphold legal and peaceful
processes, has compounded the wrong even more deplorably. Questions like the one at bar are
decided not by policemen but by judges and with the use not of brute force but of lawful writs.
Issues: Whether or not petitioner Santos has been unlawfully deprived of the books because the
check issued by the impostor (Cruz) in payment therefor was dishonored.
Held: The petitioner argues that it was, because the impostor acquired no title to the books that he
could have validly transferred to the private respondents. Its reason is that as the payment check
bounced for lack of funds, there was a failure of consideration that nullified the contract of sale between
it and Cruz.