Electronically FILED by Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles on 12/12/2019 04:40 PM Sherri R.

Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk of Court, by A. Miro,Deputy Clerk

1 MITCHELL SILBERBERG & KNUPP LLP

ADAM LEVIN (SBN 156773), axl@msk.com
2 YAKUB HAZZARD (SBN 150242), yxh@msk.com
CHRISTOPHER A. ELLIOTT (SBN 266226), cae@msk.com
3 2049 Century Park East, 18th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90067-3120
4 Telephone: (310) 312-2000
Facsimile: (310) 312-3100
5
Attorneys for Defendant
6 Agency For The Performing Arts, LLC, f/k/a
Agency For The Performing Arts, Inc., dba
7 APA Agency, Jim Gosnell, Paul Santana, and
Josh Humiston
8

9 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

10 FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

11

12 JANE DOE, an individual, CASE NO. 19STCV21336

13 Plaintiff, NOTICE OF RULING ON

DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO COMPEL
14 v. ARBITRATION AND PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO SEAL
15 AGENCY FOR THE PERFORMING ARTS,
INC., a Delaware Corporation, dba APA Judge: Hon. Malcolm H. Mackey
16 AGENCY; JIM GOSNELL, an individual; Dept.: 55
PAUL SANTANA, an individual; JOSH File Date: June 19, 2019
17 HUMISTON, an individual; MICHAEL Trial Date: None.
HAMMOND, an individual; COLLINS
18 AVENUE ENTERTAINTMENT, a Delaware
limited liability company, dba COLLINS
19 AVENUE, and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,

20 Defendants.

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Mitchell 28
Silberberg &
Knupp LLP
NOTICE OF RULING ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO SEAL
 1 TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on December 11, 2019, at 8:30 a.m., the following motions

3 came on for hearing before the Honorable Malcolm Mackey in Department 55 of the above

4 referenced court:

5  Defendants Agency For The Performing Arts, Inc., Jim Gosnell, Paul Santana, And

6 Josh Humiston’s Motion To Compel Arbitration And For A Stay Of Proceedings

7 (the “APA Motion to Compel Arbitration”);

8  Defendants Collins Avenue Entertainment, LLC’s and Michael Hammond’s

9 Motion to Compel Arbitration of Plaintiff Jane Doe’s Complaint, Stay Action, and

10 Joinder to Defendants Agency For The Performing Arts, Inc., Jim Gosnell, Paul

11 Santana, And Josh Humiston’s Motion To Compel Arbitration And For A Stay Of

12 Proceedings (the “Collins Avenue Motion to Compel Arbitration”); and

13  Plaintiff Jane Doe’s Notice Of Motion And Motion To Seal Case Records Pursuant

14 To CRC 2.551(B)(3)(b) (the “Motion to Seal”).

15 Adam Levin, Esq. of Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp LLP, appeared on behalf of Defendants

16 Agency for the Performing Arts, Inc., dba APA Agency, Jim Gosnell, Paul Santana and Josh

17 Humiston. Matthew Hoesly of Geragos & Geragos appeared in person and Michael Popok of

18 Zumpano Patricios & Popok PLLC appeared telephonically on behalf of Plaintiff Jane Doe. Esra

19 Hudson of Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP appeared on behalf of Defendant Collins Avenue

20 Entertainment, LLC. Stanton L. Stein of Russ, August & Kabat LLP appeared on behalf of

21 Defendant Michael Hammond.

22 At the hearing, after considering the papers filed in support of and opposition to the

23 motions, and after hearing oral argument, the Court ruled as follows:

24 The Court GRANTED the APA Motion to Compel Arbitration and the Collins Avenue

25 Motion to Compel Arbitration and ordered Plaintiff and all moving and joining Defendants to

26 arbitrate the whole Complaint. The Court further ordered this entire action stayed until such

27 arbitration has been completed.

Mitchell 28
Silberberg & 2
Knupp LLP
NOTICE OF RULING ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO SEAL
 1 The Court DENIED the Motion to Seal.

2 The Court adopted its tentative ruling as final. A true and correct copy of the Court’s

3 tentative ruling is attached hereto as Exhibit A. The Court ordered counsel for Defendants Agency

4 For The Performing Arts, Inc., Jim Gosnell, Paul Santana, and Josh Humiston to give notice.

5
DATED: December 12, 2019 Respectfully submitted,
6
MITCHELL SILBERBERG & KNUPP LLP
7 ADAM LEVIN
YAKUB HAZZARD
8 CHRISTOPHER A. ELLIOTT
9

10 By: /S/ Adam Levin

Adam Levin
11 Attorneys for Defendant
Agency for the Performing Arts, Inc.,
12 a Delaware Corporation, dba APA Agency,
Jim Gosnell, an Individual, Paul Santana,
13 an Individual, Josh Humiston, an Individual
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Mitchell 28
Silberberg & 3
Knupp LLP
NOTICE OF RULING ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO SEAL
EXHIBIT A
EXH. A - PG. 4
 Confidential - Court Document

JANE DOE v. AGENCY FOR THE PERFORMING ARTS 19STCV21336

Hearing Date: 12/11/19, Dept. 55

#7:

1. MOTION TO SEAL RECORDS.

2. MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION.
3. MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION.

Notice: Okay

Opposition Filed

MP:

1. Plaintiff
2. Co-Defendants COLLINS AVENUE ENTERTAINMENT, LLC; MICHAEL
HAMMOND
3. Co-Defendants AGENCY FOR THE PERSFORMING ARTS; GOSNELL;
SANTANA; HUMISTON.

RP:

1. Defendants
2. Plaintiff
3. Plaintiff

EXH. A - PG. 5
Summary

On 6/19/19, Plaintiff JANE DOE filed a Complaint against defendants AGENCY FOR THE
PERSFORMING ARTS (APA), et al..

On 7/31/19, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint, alleging that, during her employment as a
talent agent, with Defendant, a talent agency, her male counterparts of senior apex management
incessantly subjected her to sexual advances, crude and obscene comments, and retaliation.

The causes of action are:

1. SEXUAL HARRASMENT

2. GENDER VIOLENCE

3. CIVIL HARRASMENT

4. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

5. NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

6. NEGLIGLENT RETENTION AND SUPERVISION

7. RETALIATION

8. WRONGFUL TERMINATION

9. SEXUAL BATTERY.

MP Positions

First, moving party requests an order sealing records, for reasons including the following:

 Plaintiff seeks that filed pages revealing her identity be sealed, and that her name be
redacted from public court filings and that she be permitted to proceed under a
pseudonym—a practice widely recognized under California law.
 Plaintiff met the standard that California law has set for her to proceed as an anonymous
litigant. Plaintiff has been emotionally harmed by Defendants’ severe sexual harassment
and discrimination. Many courts have permitted plaintiffs to proceed under a pseudonym

EXH. A - PG. 6
 when the matter concerns the area of sexuality. See Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
United of Wisc., (7th Cir. 1997) 112 F.3d 869, 872. Plaintiff will likely be required to
disclose highly sensitive and personal information, including information relating to her
mental and emotional health and experiences of terrible trauma, sexual and otherwise, at
the hands of Defendants. Plaintiff may disclose information related to medical and
psychological issues. Identification also exposes Plaintiff to a serious risk of retaliatory
mental and physical harm. Plaintiff has a reasonable fear that Defendants may publicly
retaliate.
 Defendants’ due process concerns with being unable to confront their accuser is a red
herring, because defendants admittedly know who Plaintiff is.
 Defendants true motivation for seeking to publicly reveal the identity of Plaintiff is to
malign her good name and subject her to further harassment.
 There is no issue here of a gag order against defendants making them unable to prepare
their case for trial.

Second, moving parties request the Court to compel arbitration, on grounds including the
following:

 In May 2015, Plaintiff entered into a written arbitration agreement with APA, having a
broad arbitration agreement requiring that Plaintiff arbitrate a wide range of disputes
arising from, related to, or in connection with, Plaintiff's employment.
 Plaintiff is required to arbitrate her claims pursuant to the Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate,
incorporating JAMS rules, which she signed.
 Although they are not signatories to the Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate, the Collins
Defendants are nevertheless entitled to compel arbitration pursuant to it under the
doctrine of equitable estoppel, since the First Amended Complaint makes obvious that
Plaintiff relies on the same set of facts to support her claims against the Collins
Defendants, as those alleged against the APA Defendants.
 Plaintiff admits she signed the Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate, rendering her mutual
assent argument moot. There is no dispute that Plaintiff executed the Mutual Agreement
to Arbitrate, and her objections to the Johnson Declaration are irrelevant.
 Her employment with APA along with APA’s mutual agreement to arbitrate constitute
valid consideration.
 She contends that the Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate is unconscionable, but she fails to
meet her burden of proving both procedural and substantive unconscionability.
 Plaintiff’s argument that the phrase “[t]o the extent required by law,” by itself, somehow
makes the Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate substantively unconscionable is nonsensical.

EXH. A - PG. 7
 The Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate expressly provides that it will comply with applicable
law regarding employee liability for attorneys’ fees. Arbitration provisions providing that
costs or fees are to be allocated according to applicable law have been widely upheld.
See, e.g., Chin v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., 2017 WL 3977381, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 11, 2017).
 Plaintiff admits that the claims subject to arbitration include claims between Plaintiff and
APA’s “employees, independent contractors, owners, agents, directors … ,” which
includes moving co-defendants Gosnell, Santana, and Humiston.

RP Positions

First, opposing parties request an order denying sealing records, for reasons including the
following:

 Plaintiff seeks to seal Court records including her name, claiming that she can proceed
anonymously, simply because she has alleged sexual harassment and a purported sexual
assault by one of the Defendants. See, e.g., Doe v. Lincoln Unified School Dist., 188
Cal. App. 4th 758 (2010).
 What Plaintiff really seeks is a license to continue defaming Defendants, publishing
sordid allegations to the media in an attempt to further damage their reputations, while
barring Defendants from defending themselves and shielding Plaintiff from the
consequences when her outrageous allegations are proven false.
 Plaintiff does not cite to any case that allows a sexual harassment Plaintiff to sue as a
Jane Doe. Nor has she offered any evidence that she meets any of the defined
circumstances in which Courts have allowed Plaintiffs to sue anonymously.
 Plaintiff has not met the requirements of California Rule Of Court 2.550 to seal the
records.

Second, opposing party requests that the Court not compel arbitration, on grounds including the
following:

1. The APA Arbitration Agreement’ (“Agreement”) that Plaintiff was coerced into

signing at the start of her employment is unenforceable under prevailing California

EXH. A - PG. 8
 law because as contract of adhesion, it lacks “mutual assent,” or proper

consideration.

2. The Agreement is procedurally and substantively unconscionable and runs afoul of

California’s strong Public Policy2.

3. The Collins Avenue Defendants—strangers to the employment relationship

between Plaintiff and APA—lacks standing to enforce the Agreement.

4. An arbitration agreement between Collins Avenue and APA is of no moment to

this case, and cannot be enforced against Plaintiff.

5. Public Policy disfavors allowing third parties—such as the Collins Avenue

Defendants—to enforce arbitration agreements to which they are not a party, and

whose scope does not cover the claims raised in the suit.

(Opposition, p. 2.)

 There was no mutual consent. Plaintiff never received a full copy of the Agreement when
she signed it on May 6, 2015. [Declaration of Jane Doe ¶ 9]. Plaintiff did not see a full
copy of the Agreement until March 2018, and it appeared to have a forged signature no
looking like the signature Plaintiff had seen during employment.
 Plaintiff had no understanding that she was signing an arbitration agreement, let alone
what the effect of signing the Agreement would have. [Jane Doe Decl. ¶ 10].
 Plaintiff was rushed to sign the Agreement and felt coerced and compelled to do so in
order to begin her career at APA. [Jane Doe Decl. ¶¶ 6, 8, 11].
 At no time did any APA employee explain what the terms of APA’s Agreement were, or
the effect that those terms would have on her legal rights. [Jane Doe Decl. ¶ 10].
 Plaintiff did not have the ability to negotiate any of the terms of the Agreement. [Jane
Doe Decl. ¶ 11].
 There was no consideration of value to Plaintiff for the agreement.

EXH. A - PG. 9
  The Agreement’s fee-shifting provision regarding arbitration fees and costs is at best
vague, and at worst, a tremendous financial burden for Plaintiff. [See Exhibit 1 to APA
Defendants’ Motion, pg. 27, ¶ 8].
 Non-signatories cannot compel arbitration under an equitable estoppel doctrine when the
plaintiff does not rely on the arbitration agreement to hold a non-signatory defendant
liable. See Goldman v. KPMG, LLF, 73 Cal. App. 4th 209, 219 (2009).

Tentative Ruling

The motion to seal is denied.

The motions to compel arbitration are granted.

Plaintiff and all moving and joining defendants shall arbitrate the whole complaint in accordance
with their agreement to arbitrate.

This entire action is stayed until such arbitration has been completed.

Sealing

The Court has considered the applicable factors to find that Plaintiff does not qualify for sealing
all requested pages, including because the evidence, attached to the motion to seal, is
insufficiently a cursory and argumentative declaration of counsel, which is not based on personal
knowledge of facts.

As to requirements to be Doe plaintiffs, a treatise summarizes the law as follows:

[2:136.5] “Doe” plaintiffs? Filing a complaint under a fictitious name impairs the public's
right of access to court records (CRC 2.550(c); see ¶ 9:416). It also violates the statutory
requirement that a complaint include “names of all the parties” (CCP § 422.40).
Therefore, plaintiffs are not permitted to use fictitious names (e.g., “John Doe” or “Jane
Doe”) absent “exceptional circumstances.” [Doe v. Lincoln Unified School Dist (2010)
188 CA4th 758, 767, 115 CR3d 191, 197-198]

EXH. A - PG. 10
(1) [2:136.6] “Exceptional circumstances”: A court may permit plaintiff to proceed under
a fictitious name when exceptional circumstances justify protecting his or her true
identity, including:

— matters of a highly sensitive and personal nature (e.g., prior criminal history, HIV-
positive status, victim of sexual assault) (Doe v. Sup.Ct. (Luster) (2011) 194 CA4th 750,
754, 123 CR3d 557, 560); or

— a real danger of physical or mental harm to plaintiff; or

— where the injury sought to be avoided by the complaint (e.g., invasion of plaintiff's
privacy) would be incurred by disclosure of plaintiff's identity. [See Doe v. Lincoln
Unified School Dist., supra, 188 CA4th at 767, 115 CR3d at 197-198—tenured teacher
accused of being mentally unfit to teach allowed to sue as “Doe”]

(2) [2:136.7] Factors considered: Although there is little case law on point in California,
federal courts consider the following in determining whether to allow plaintiff to proceed
under a fictitious name:

— the severity of the threatened harm;

— the reasonableness of plaintiff's fears;

— plaintiff's vulnerability to harm or retaliation;

— whether the proceedings can be structured to avoid any prejudice to defendant in

allowing plaintiff to proceed anonymously; and

— whether the public's interest in the case would be best served by requiring that the
litigants reveal their identities. [See Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant (2nd Cir. 2008)
537 F3d 185, 189; Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp. (9th Cir. 2000) 214 F3d
1058, 1067]

Additional factors the court may consider include:

— the age of the person whose identity is sought to be protected;

— whether the action is against a private party or the government; and

— whether nondisclosure of plaintiff's identity would prejudice the defendant. [Sealed

Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, supra, 537 F3d at 190 (collecting cases and listing
additional factors)]

[2:136.8 - 2:136.9] Reserved.

EXH. A - PG. 11
 (3) [2:136.10] Compare—statutory authorization: Use of a “Doe” designation for filings
may be authorized by statute. [See Civ.C. § 1708.85(f)(1)—pseudonym permitted in suit
against person who distributes photos, films, etc. of plaintiff's intimate body parts; Doe v.
Sup.Ct. (Nikolay) (2016) 3 CA5th 915, 918-919, 207 CR3d 818, 819-820 (vacating order
compelling parties to file future documents utilizing Doe's true name in § 1708.85(f)
action)]

Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Pro. Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2019) § 12:136.5 et seq.

Further, this Court follows California court opinions, not federal ones cited by the parties.
Federal case law is not binding upon California courts, and may be only persuasive in some
circumstances. Alameida v. State Personnel Bd. (2004) 120 Cal. App. 4th 46, 61. California
appellate courts are not bound to follow decisions of lower federal courts. People v. Sup. Ct.
(2002) 103 Cal. App. 4th 409, 431.

As for sealing law: Courts must find compelling reasons, prejudice absent sealing and the lack
of less-restrictive means, before ordering filed documents sealed. McGuan v. Endovascular
Technologies, Inc. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 974, 988 (“the protection of trade secrets is an
interest that can support sealing records ….”); Hurvitz v. Hoefflin (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1232,
1246; NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1178, 1208-09 n. 25;
Champion v. Sup. Ct. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 777, 787; In re Providian Credit Card Cases
(2002) 96 Cal. App. 4th 292, 310 (trial court decision that defendants had showed no overriding
interest that overcomes the right of public access, was not abuse of discretion); Universal City
Studios v. Sup. Ct. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1273, 1283-84 (failure to show prejudice caused to
legitimate commercial interests, absent sealing, in addition to showing contractual obligation not
to disclose which can constitute an overriding interest); Huffy Corp. v. Sup. Ct. (2003) 112
Cal.App.4th 97, 105-08 (failure to show overriding interest and prejudice, and findings required
for sealing); Woodside Homes of Cal., Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (2003) 107 Cal. App. 4th 723, 732
(parties prohibited from agreeing to secret judicial proceedings, in light of public interest); CRC
Rule 2.550(d) (requiring an “overriding interest”); Copley Press, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (1998) 63 Cal.
App. 4th 367, 375–76 (regarding sealing, “no authority that the amount of money a person
receives in … settlement as the result of tortious conduct is confidential,” and no showing that
the “amount of the settlement,… outweighs the public right of access to court records.”).

A proposed sealing must be narrowly tailored to serve the overriding interest, such as by sealing
portions of pleadings or redacting particular text. In re Marriage of Burkle (2006) 135
Cal.App.4th 1045, 1052, 1070. One prescribed procedure is for parties (1) to file a public
redacted version of a document, and (2) to lodge a complete version conditionally under seal.

EXH. A - PG. 12
CRC Rule 2.551(b)(5). Cf. Garcia v. Sup. Ct. (2007) 4 Cal.4th 63, 73 (in Pitchess motion
matters, counsel file and serve redacted document, and lodge unredacted document under seal).

Additionally, before ordering substantive courtroom proceedings closed, or transcripts sealed,

judges must hold a hearing and make factual findings supporting the order, including “(i) there
exists an overriding…interest supporting closure and/or sealing; (ii) there is a substantial
probability… that the interest will be prejudiced absent closure and/or sealing; (iii) the proposed
closure and/or sealing is narrowly tailored to serve the overriding interest; and (iv) there is no
less restrictive means of achieving the overriding interest.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein
(2007) 158 Cal. App. 4th 60, 96 (citing NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV) v. Sup. Ct. (1999) 20 Cal.
4th 1178, 1217-18).

Arbitration

Contract Formation

Plaintiff’s declaration, attached to the opposition, primarily addressing signing pages as a

condition of employment, without then seeing the full agreement, or hearing explanations,
sufficiently could support findings of lack of assent. However, the Court resolves the conflicts in
the evidence to find that Plaintiff and Defendant signed the agreement and unreasonably failed to
read all available pages and explanations (e.g., Johnson Decl., ¶ 6 (“When began her
employment with APA, she signed a Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate which she then delivered to
me. I stored a copy of this agreement in APA's files. Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a true and
correct copy of the Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate signed by on or about May 6, 2015)).
Assuming Defendant’s signature is forged, the Court finds that the signature was not necessary
to create mutual assent here.

“[I]f substantial evidence supports the trial court's determination that a valid agreement to
arbitrate exists, an appellate court will affirm that determination.” Banner Ent., Inc. v. Sup. Ct.
(1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 348, 357. Accord Zavala v. Scott Bros. Dairy, Inc. (2006) 143
Cal.App.4th 585, 589-90.

Acceptance of an arbitration agreement may be implied-in-fact where the employee's continued

employment constitutes acceptance of the agreement proposed by the employer. Craig v. Brown
& Root (2000) 84 Cal. App. 4th 416, 420. “California law permits employers to implement
policies that may become unilateral implied-in-fact contracts when employees accept them by
continuing their employment…. [W]hether employment policies create unilateral contracts will
be a factual question in each case.” Asmus v. Pacific Bell (2000) 23 Cal. 4th 1, 11.

EXH. A - PG. 13
“[I]t is not the presence or absence of a signature which is dispositive; it is the presence or
absence of evidence of an agreement to arbitrate which matters.” Banner Entertainment, Inc. v.
Sup. Ct. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 348, 361 (finding a complete absence of proof of circumstances
showing assent). See also Saint Agnes Medical Center v. PacifiCare of Cal. (2003) 31 Cal.4th
1187, 1200 (finding assent because parties did not deny agreeing to the terms, and party’s
petition to compel arbitration reflected intent to be bound).

Failure to read a contract with reasonable diligence is not a ground to avoid arbitration.
Brookwood v. Bank of America (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1667, 1673.

Unconscionability

Plaintiff’s declaration, primarily focusing on signing pages as a condition of employment,

without then seeing the full agreement, or hearing explanations, sufficiently could support
findings of procedural unconscionability. However, the Court finds that there is no substantive
unconscionability present, including because the agreement’s fees and expenses provision, at
paragraph 8, expressly states that the provision will be handled in compliance with law, and such
law provides that employers cannot impose upon employees arbitration costs that they would not
normally have to pay should the case be litigated in court.

"[A] compulsory predispute arbitration agreement is not rendered unenforceable just because it is
required as a condition of employment or offered on a 'take it or leave it' basis." Lagatree v.
Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps (1999) 74 Cal. App. 4th 1105, 1127. Accord Giuliano v.
Inland Empire Personnel, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1292. An arbitration agreement
that is a required condition of employment, with some one-sided provisions, can be
unenforceable as unconscionable. Martinez v. Master Protection Corp. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th
107, 113-14; Fitz v. NCR Corp. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 702, 712-13, 721-25.

“Whether a document purportedly incorporated by reference was ‘readily available’ is a

question of fact.” Baker v. Osborne Development Corp. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 884, 895.

Employers cannot impose on employees arbitration costs he or she would not normally have to
pay if the case were litigated in a court, including based on provisions that arbitrators may
impose costs and arbitration fees on the losing party. Wherry v. Award, Inc. (2011) 192
Cal.App.4th 1242, 1248. To avoid being determined unconscionable, an arbitration agreement
must provide for relief from any unaffordable arbitration expenses. Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc.
(2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 77, 92.

10

EXH. A - PG. 14
 Nonsignatories

The Court finds that all moving defendants have standing to enforce the arbitration agreement.
Defendants allegedly are agents of other defendants, which infers signatories (e.g., First
Amended Complaint, 6:11). Further, termination was in violation of “Defendant APA’s own
internal procedures and practices”, which infers Defendant’s arbitration procedures and practices
rooted in the arbitration agreement (First Amended Complaint, ¶ 119).

“[A] plaintiff's allegations of an agency relationship among defendants is sufficient to allow the
alleged agents to invoke the benefit of an arbitration agreement executed by their principal even
though the agents are not parties to the agreement.” Thomas v. Westlake (2012) 204
Cal.App.4th 605, 614-15.

“[T]he sine qua non for application of equitable estoppel as the basis for allowing a nonsignatory
to enforce an arbitration clause is that the claims the plaintiff asserts against the nonsignatory
must be dependent upon, or founded in and inextricably intertwined with, the underlying
contractual obligations of the agreement containing the arbitration clause.” Goldman v. KPMG
LLP (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 209, 217-18. Courts “ look to the nature of the claims and the
relationships of persons, wrongs and issues in determining whether a plaintiff is estopped from
asserting the invalidity of an arbitration provision because plaintiff's claims are dependent on, or
inextricably bound up with, the obligations imposed by the contract the plaintiff executed with
the signatory defendant.” Jones v. Jacobson (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1, 21 n.13. A party may be
equitably estopped from denying arbitration, such as where a signatory plaintiff sues
nonsignatories as related or affiliated persons with the signatory entity, based upon an arbitration
agreement. See, e.g., Rowe v. Exline (2007) 153 Cal. App. 4th 1276, 1287.. The doctrine of
equitable estoppel does not bind nonsignatories to an arbitration agreement, where the
Complaint, as to them, is not founded upon that contract. DMS Services, Inc. v. Sup.Ct. (2012)
205 Cal.App.4th 1346, 1356-57.

Stay

Where a court has ordered arbitration, it shall stay the pending action, until an arbitration is had
in accordance with the order to arbitrate, or another earlier time, and the stay may be with respect
to an issue that is severable. CCP §1281.4; Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. (2003) 30
Cal. 4th 303, 320; Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Sup. Ct. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 188,
192; Heritage Provider Network, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1152, 1154 n.
12.

11

EXH. A - PG. 15
 1 PROOF OF SERVICE

2 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

3 I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California, I am over the age of
eighteen years and am not a party to this action; my business address is Mitchell Silberberg &
4 Knupp LLP, 2049 Century Park East, 18th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90067, and my business email
address is gnf@msk.com.
5
On December 12, 2019, I served a copy of the foregoing document(s) described as
6 NOTICE OF RULING ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO COMPEL ARBITRATION
AND PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO SEAL on the interested parties in this action at their last
7 known address as set forth below by taking the action described below:
8 Attorneys for Plaintiff JANE DOE Attorneys for Defendant
COLLINS AVENUE
9 Ben J. Meiselas meiselas@geragos.com ENTERTAINMENT, LLC
Matthew M. Hoesly mhoesly@geragos.com
10 GERAGOS & GERAGOS John M. Gatti jgatti@manatt.com
644 S. Figueroa St. Esra A. Hudson ehudson@manatt.com
11 Los Angeles, CA 90017 Katrina Dela Cruz kdelacruz@manatt.com
MANATT, PHELPS & PHILLIPS, LLP
12 11355 West Olympic Boulevard
Michael S. Popok mpopok@zplaw.com Los Angeles, CA 90064-1614
13 ZUMPANO PATRICIOS & POPOK PLLC
100 Wall St., 10th Floor
14 New York, NY 10005 Attorneys for Defendant MICHAEL
HAMMOND
15
Stanton “Larry Stein lstein@raklaw.com
16 Ashley R. Yeargan ayeargan@raklaw.com
Mary Keller mkeller@raklaw.com
17 RUSS, AUGUST & KABAT
12424 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor
18 Los Angeles, CA 90025
19  BY ELECTRONIC MAIL: I served the above-mentioned document electronically on
the parties listed at the email addresses above and, to the best of my knowledge, the
20 transmission was complete and without error in that I did not receive an electronic
notification to the contrary.
21
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is
22 true and correct.
23 Executed on December 12, 2019, at Los Angeles, California.
24
/S/ Greg Fisk
25 Greg Fisk
26

27
Mitchell 28
Silberberg &
Knupp LLP
16
11751786.1
PROOF OF SERVICE