PUBLIC CORPORATIONS, ELECTION LAW, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, AND LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

Reconstituted Final Exams

Atty. Randolph Pascasio
AY 2017-2018
Reconstituted by: Kiko Corpuz, 2S

1. Define the following:

a. Election protest
Refers to an election contest involving the election and returns of municipal elective officials,
grounded on fraud or irregularities committed in the conduct of the elections, i.e., in the
casting and the counting of the ballots, in the consolidation of votes and in the canvassing of
returns, not otherwise classified as a pre-proclamation controversy cognizable by the
COMELEC. The issue is who obtained the plurality of valid votes cast.

b. Quo Warranto proceeding

Refers to an election contest involving the qualifications for office of an elective municipal
official, on the ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. The issue is
whether the respondent possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
prescribed by law.

Note: A candidate who files a protest against one who has been proclaimed as having received
the highest number of votes basing his protest merely on the ground of his ineligibility to hold
office, cannot disguise his action so as to make his protest a justification to be seated in office. In
other words, he cannot convert an action for quo warranto into an election protest. This is
because these two cases are fundamentally different in nature and in purpose. In quo warranto,
"there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, and the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an
ineligible candidate to any other candidate," while in a protest, "the question is as to who
received a plurality of the legally cast ballots" (Luison v. Garcia)

c. Pre-Proclamation Controversy

A pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question pertaining to or affecting the

proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any
registered political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the
Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns

2. Distinguish the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and doctrine of primary

jurisdiction.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where the administrative agency, as in the case of
ERC, exercises its quasi-judicial and adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases involving specialized
disputes, the practice has been to refer the same to an administrative agency of special
competence pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The courts will not determine a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior
to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a
uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the premises of the regulatory statute administered.
(BF Homes v. Manila Electric Company)
On the other hand, the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies provides that if a remedy
within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer
concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such
remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s judicial power can be sought. The
underlying principle of the rule rests on the presumption that the administrative agency, if
afforded a complete chance to pass upon the matter will decide the same correctly. (Republic
v. Transunion Corporation)

3. Enumerate at least 5 exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies

The doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies are subject to
certain exceptions, to wit:

(a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine;

(b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction

(c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the
complainant;

(d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and
oppressive;

(e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the
courts of justice;

(f) where judicial intervention is urgent;

(g) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage;

(h) where the controverted acts violate due process;

(i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot;

(j) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;

(k) where strong public interest is involved; and

(l) in quo warranto proceedings. (Samelco II v. Seludo)

4. Distinguish a de jure officer from a de facto officer and a usurper.

Codilla v. Martinez: An officer de facto is to be distinguished from an officer de jure, and is one
who has the reputation or appearance of being the officer he assumes to be but who, in fact,
under the law, has no right or title to the office he assumes to hold. He is distinguished from a
mere usurper or intruder by the fact that the former holds by some color of right or title while the
latter intrudes upon the office and assumes to excercise its functions without either the legal title
or color of right to such office. (McQuillin , Municipal Corporations, Vol. 3, 3rd ed., pp. 376-377.)
To constitute a de facto officer, there must be an office having a de facto existence, or at least
one recognized by law and the claimant must be in actual possession of the office under color
of title or authority. State vs. Babb, 124 W. Va. 428, 20 S.E. (2d) 683. (McQuillin, Municipal
Corporations, supra footnote No. 11, p. 383.)

5. Enumerate the four inviolable parameters in the Philippine Party-list system

To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the Constitution and Republic
Act (RA) No. 7941 mandate at least four inviolable parameters. These are:

First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not
exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including
those elected under the party list.

Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of
the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;

Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional
seats.

Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to
shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes.” (Veterans v. Comelec)

6. What is the threefold liability rule?

The "threefold liability rule" holds that the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give
rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability. This simply means that a public officer may be
held civilly, criminally, and administratively liable for a wrongful doing. (Ramiscal v. Commission
on Audit)

7. X filed CoC as mayor of ABC City under the PDP Laban party, despite being only 22 years old
by the time of the election. However, when she realized her mistake that she was actually
underage for the elections (because the requirement was the candidate must be 23 y/o by the
time of the election), she withdrew her CoC. At the same time of her withdrawal, Y filed her CoC
as a substitute for X. The Legal Department of the COMELEC advised the COMELEC officials to
cancel the substitution of X by Y. COMELEC en banc heeded, and cancelled Y’s CoC substituting
herself in place of X.

a. Was the cancellation of the CoC for substitution correct?

NO. The cancellation of the CoC for substitution is not correct.

In the case of Francisco v. Comelec, the Court held that a Petition to Deny Due Course or to
Cancel COC under Sec. 78 of the OEC to prosper, the candidate must have made a material
misrepresentation involving his eligibility or qualification for the office to which he seeks election,
such as the requisite residency, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary to run
for elective office26 enumerated under Sec. 74 of the OEC. Moreover, the false representation
under Sec. 78 must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which
would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. The relief is granted not because of the
candidate's lack of eligibility per se, but because of his or her false misrepresentation of
possessing the statutory qualifications.

In the case given, X has no deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible. Hence, the Comelec cannot cancel the substitution of
X by Y if Y complied with all the procedural requirements prescribed by law.

8. X, a member of Ang Bukid party-list, is a duly-elected party-list representative. His party-mates

filed with the COMELEC a petition for his removal as a member of the party. COMELEC granted
the petition. Thereafter, his party-mates sought to remove X as a representative, since he was not
a part of the party anymore. The party-mates filed another petition with the COMELEC for his
removal from office. The COMELEC denied the petition on the ground that they no longer have
jurisdiction over that matter.

Is the action of the COMELEC in the first petition correct? Explain A: Comelec has no
jurisdiction.

Is the action of the COMELEC in the second petition correct? Explain. A: They have no
jurisdiction in the very first place.

In the case of Lico v. Comelec, the Court held that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over
the expulsion of a sitting party-list representative.

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution endows the HRET with jurisdiction to resolve
questions on the qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of party-list
representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case upon
proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of
office as member of the House of Representatives. In this case, the COMELEC proclaimed
Ating Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico took his oath; and he assumed
office in the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and not the COMELEC, that has
jurisdiction over the disqualification case.

The Court found to be without legal basis, however, is the action of the COMELEC in
upholding the validity of the expulsion of petitioner Lico from Ating Koop, despite its own
ruling that the HRET has jurisdiction over the disqualification issue. These findings already
touch upon the qualification requiring a party-list nominee to be a bona fide member of
the party-list group sought to be represented.

The rules on intra-party matters and on the jurisdiction of the HRET are not parallel
concepts that do not intersect. Rather, the operation of the rule on intra-party matters is
circumscribed by Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and jurisprudence on
the jurisdiction of electoral tribunals. The jurisdiction of the HRET is exclusive. It is given full
authority to hear and decide the cases on any matter touching on the validity of the title
of the proclaimed winner. (Lico v. Commission on Elections)

A. May political parties join the party-list system elections?

NO. It is part of the electoral process that enables small political parties and marginalized and
underrepresented sectors to obtain possible representation in the House of Representatives,
which traditionally is dominated by parties with big political machinery.

B. Are nominees of the sectoral party required to belong to the sector which they represent?

YES. Under Section 15 of Article 7194, any elected party-list representative who changes his
political party or sectoral affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided, That if
he changes his political party or sectoral affiliation within six (6) months before an election, he
shall not be eligible for nomination as party-list representative under his new party or
organization. (cannot find the answer, inference ko lang)

9. Diocese of Bacolod case, exact same facts: same names, same situation. COMELEC issued
order to remove tarpaulin posted by DoB (Team Patay – Team Buhay). DoB went directly to the
Supreme Court alleging that their freedom of expression is being violated by the COMELEC
order. Decide on the case. [NOTE: issue here is the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies]

Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the controversy is
already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the “prerequisite that something had by then been
accomplished or performed by either branch or in this case, organ of government before a
court may come into the picture.”

Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their medium, had
understandable relevance especially during the elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening the
filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this right.
The impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.

In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested in
their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech.

10. X was appointed by the President as the private sector representative of the National Book
Something Something, a GOCC.

May X assert that he is not a public officer to escape the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan?

NO. A Public Officer means any person holding any public office in the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines by virtue of an appointment, election or contract.
”Government” includes the National Government, and any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities, including government-owned or -controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries.

[forgot the second subquestion]