[A.M. No. P-04-1884.

December 9, 2004]

QBE INSURANCE (PHILS.) INC. By: MARCELINA F.

VALLES, complainant, vs. CRESENCIANO K. RABELLO, JR.,
Sheriff IV, RTC, Branch 71 Pasig City, respondent.

RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:

The instant administrative case arose from a Complaint dated 19 May

2003 filed by Q.B.E. Insurance (Phils.) Inc., at the instance of Marcelina F.
[1]

Valles, Financial Controller of the corporation, which charged Sheriff

Cresenciano K. Rabello, Jr. with Gross Misconduct, Grave Abuse of Authority
and Deliberately Giving a False and Perjurious Manifestation and
Motion relative to Civil Case No. 68287 entitled “Lavine Loungewear Mfg., Inc.
v. Philippine Marine and Fire Insurance Corporation, et al.” assigned to
Branch 71 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City.
Complainant alleged that respondent sheriff unlawfully and maliciously
dragged Q.B.E. Insurance (Phils.), Inc. into the aforementioned civil case
when the latter falsely reported to the court through an Urgent Ex-Parte
Manifestation and Motion dated 24 May 2002 that defendant Rizal Surety
[2]

and Insurance Company (Rizal Surety, for brevity) had changed its corporate
name to Q.B.E. Insurance (Phils.) Inc. (QBE, for brevity). On the basis of the
patently perjurious information in respondent’s manifestation and motion,
complainant averred, Judge Celso D. Laviña issued the Order dated 27 May
2002 directing the implementation of the Writ of Execution against Rizal
[3]

Surety under its new name QBE Insurance (Phils.), Inc.

A year later or on 24 March 2003, respondent sheriff swooped down on
the offices of the QBE at Makati City, served a Notice of Immediate
Payment and then garnished its bank accounts. Despite the representations
of Atty. Ireneo U. Gacad, in-house counsel and Corporate Secretary of Rizal
Surety, that said corporation is separate and distinct from QBE, respondent
allegedly arrogantly refused to listen and even threatened to pull out the
properties of QBE should it refuse to immediately pay.
On 25 March 2003 QBE filed an Urgent Motion to Lift 27 May 2002 Order
and 24 March 2003 Notice of Garnishment. Subsequently, on 11 April 2003,
[4]
QBE filed an Affidavit of Third-Party Claim. Instead of expediting service,
[5]

respondent sent the notice of the filing of an Affidavit of Third-Party Claim to

judgment obligee Haresh Ramnani by registered mail, rather than by personal
service, and gave the latter ten (10) days within which to post the required
indemnity bond. QBE added that although no indemnity bond was posted by
judgment obligee Haresh Ramnani, respondent unlawfully refused to lift the
garnishment on the bank accounts of QBE.
Finally, QBE alleged that respondent was fully aware that the trial court’s
decision in Civil Case No. 68627 had been appealed to the Court of Appeals
and that the appellate court had issued an injunctive writ, enjoining and
restraining the enforcement of the RTC decision yet he proceeded with the
implementation of the Writ of Execution.
In compliance with the directive dated 5 June 2003 of the Honorable
[6]

Court Administrator, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., respondent submitted

his Comment dated 31 July 2003, denying the allegations in the Complaint.
[7]

He explained that the Order dated 20 May 2002 directed him to enforce
the Writ of Execution against the judgment debtors, among them Rizal
Surety. Complying with the trial court’s Order, he tried to serve the Writ of
Execution upon Rizal Surety but he failed to do so because he was informed
that the latter had changed its name to QBE Insurance (Phils.), Inc.
Subsequently, on 24 May 2002 he submitted an Ex-Parte Manifestation and
Motion informing the court of this development. Consequently, the court
issued the Order dated 27 May 2002, authorizing the enforcement of the Writ
of Execution against Rizal Surety and/or Q.B.E Insurance Company, Inc.
Respondent further alleged that notwithstanding the issuance of
the Order dated 27 May 2002, he held in abeyance the implementation of
the Writ of Execution upon the instructions of the judgment obligee, Haresh
Ramnani, on the ground that he would first investigate the alleged change of
name of Rizal Surety with the Office of the Insurance Commission and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Sometime in the first week of
March 2003, Mr. Ramnani verbally requested him to proceed with the
execution of the writ as Ramnani’s investigation revealed that QBE and Rizal
Surety are indeed one and the same entity. This was followed up by a letter-
request on 24 March 2003 from Ramnani and respondent then enforced the
[8]

writ by serving a Notice of Immediate Payment to Rizal Surety and/or QBE at

its office located at the 3rd Flr., Prudential Life Bldg., 843 A. Arnaiz Ave.,
Legaspi Village, Makati City and by levying its bank accounts in the ANZ
Bank, Ayala branch. On the same occasion, Atty. Ireneo U. Gacad, Jr.
conferred with Mr. Ramnani and they eventually entered into an arrangement
whereby two checks amounting to a total sum of P5,000,000.00 were
delivered to the latter as partial payment for his claims.
Respondent added that after complainant filed its Urgent Motion to Lift 27
May 2002 Order and 24 March 2003 Notice of Garnishmentwhich Mr.
Ramnani opposed, the latter requested him in a letter dated 28 April 2003 not
[9]

to act on the third-party claim since only the courts can determine the merits
of the grounds relied upon by the complainant, which is essentially the same
ground raised in their Urgent Motion to Lift Notice of Garnishment.
Meanwhile, on 11 April 2003, QBE filed an Affidavit of Third-Party
Claim anchored on the same arguments earlier raised in its Urgent Motion to
Lift.
Respondent asserted that his report/ex-parte manifestation that Rizal
Surety changed its name to QBE was made in good faith as it was based on
what he saw in the office of Rizal Surety and the information relayed to him by
the employees there. He argued that had QBE simply filed a third-party claim,
he would have no other recourse but to release the levied property under
Section 16 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court upon failure of the judgment
creditor to post the required indemnity bond. But since QBE had earlier asked
the court to lift the garnishment for the very same reasons advanced in the
third-party claim, respondent asseverated that he had no option but to await
the resolution of the court, otherwise he would have pre-empted the ruling of
the court on the matter. Further, respondent stressed that in its Order dated
15 May 2003, the trial court denied QBE’s motion for lack of merit and he
[10]

contended that he was after all justified in not releasing the levied accounts.
Finally, on the charge that he defied the resolution of the Court of Appeals
dated 5 August 2002 in C.A. G.R. No. 70292, granting QBE’s Petition for
Preliminary Injunction, respondent clarified that the injunction bond in the
amount of fifty million pesos was never approved by the appellate court as it
was allegedly defective. As a consequence thereof, no preliminary injunction
was ever issued by the appellate court to restrain the enforcement of the Writ
of Execution.
QBE filed its Reply dated 16 September 2003 wherein it argued that
[11]

under Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, it becomes the ministerial
duty of the Sheriff or the levying officer to release the garnished property upon
the filing of a third-party claim unless the judgment obligee, on the sheriff’s
demand, files an indemnity bond in a sum not less than the value of the
garnished property.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that
respondent be ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00 for gross inefficiency and
admonished to always discharge his responsibilities with due diligence and
warned that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt
with more severely.
The rule is that when a writ of execution is placed in the hands of a sheriff
it is his duty to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute it
pursuant to its mandate. [12]

As officers of the Court, however, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs are bound to
discharge their duties with utmost care and diligence, particularly in
implementing the orders of the court, for if they err, they will affect the efficacy
of the process by which justice is administered. [13]

In the instant case, respondent asserted that the manifestation he filed

before the trial court stating that Rizal Surety and Insurance Co. had recently
changed its corporate name to QBE Insurance (Phils.) was based on what he
saw in the office of Rizal Surety and information relayed to him by its
employees. Respondent ought to be aware that execution could only be
issued against a party and not against one who was not accorded his day in
court and it was his bounden duty to see to it that the writ of execution would
[14]

be implemented only upon properties unquestionably belonging to the

judgment debtor. Property belonging to third persons cannot thus be levied
upon. [15]

It behooved respondent to confirm and establish the veracity of the

information he received by making his own verification with the SEC. Instead
of doing so, he unthinkingly accepted the representations of the employees of
Rizal Surety and hastily filed the Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and
Motion dated 24 May 2002, informing the trial court, among others, that Rizal
Surety had changed its corporate name to QBE Ins. (Phils.), Inc. This
prompted the trial court to issue its 27 May 2002 Order, directing the
implementation of the Writ of Execution against the properties of QBE. While
respondent’s acts may not have been tainted with bad faith or malice, he
nevertheless failed to discharge his duties with prudence, caution and
attention which careful men usually exercise in the management of their
affairs. [16]

The fact that the trial court eventually denied QBE’s Urgent Motion to
Lift in its Order dated 15 May 2003 is inconsequential for purposes of
determining respondent’s liability. As may be gleaned from the Order, the trial
court’s basis in denying QBE’s motion consisted of the fact that the latter
entered into a Business Run-Off Agreement with Rizal Surety whereby QBE
agreed, among others, to handle all claims on policies of Rizal Surety and not
for the reason stated in respondent’s ex-parte motion. Undoubtedly, however,
respondent’s allegation in his motion initially became the basis of the trial
court’s Order dated 27 May 2002 which directed the implementation of the writ
of execution against QBE.
Respondent must be reminded that he should at all times show a high
degree of professionalism in the performance of his duties; and owing to the
[17]

very sensitive function that he performs in the dispensation of justice, his

conduct, moreover, must at all times be above suspicion. [18]

However, respondent could not be entirely faulted for his failure to

immediately release and/or discharge the garnished bank accounts of the
complainant. A careful examination of the records would reveal that
complainant’s bank accounts were garnished by the respondent on 24 March
2003. Instead of immediately filing a third-party claim, QBE filed on 25 March
2003, an Urgent Motion to Lift 27 May 2002 Order and 24 March 2003 Notice
of Garnishment. It was only on 11 April 2003, that complainant filed
an Affidavit of Third-Party Claim.
Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that the moment a third
party claim is filed, the sheriff is not bound to keep the property levied upon,
unless the creditor insists that it should be continued, which may be done if
such creditor files a bond sufficient to indemnify the sheriff for whatever
damages he may be held liable should the third party succeed in vindicating
his title in a proper action brought separately for the purpose. If the third-
party claim is sufficient, the sheriff upon receiving it is not bound to proceed
with the levy of the property, unless he is given by the judgment creditor or his
agent an indemnity bond against the claim. [19]

The remedies just mentioned are without prejudice to “any proper action”
that a third-party claimant may deem suitable, to vindicate his claim to the
property. Such a “proper action” is entirely distinct from that explicitly
described in Section 17 Rule 39, i.e., an action for damages brought by the
[20]

third-party claimant against the officer within one hundred twenty (120) days
from the date of the filing of the bond for the taking or keeping of the property
subject of the terceria. Quite obviously, this proper action would have for its
object the recovery of the possession of the property seized by the sheriff, as
well as damages resulting from the allegedly wrongful seizure and detention
thereof despite the third-party claim; and it may be brought against the sheriff,
and such other parties as may be alleged to have colluded with the sheriff in
the supposedly wrongful execution proceedings, such as the judgment
creditor himself.
[21]

It is worthy of note that QBE, instead of availing of the remedy of “terceria”

authorized under Section 16 of Rule 39 which would have been the proper
remedy considering that QBE is not a party to the case against Rizal Surety,
opted instead to file an urgent motion for the lifting of the notice of
garnishment. QBE then argues that it is the ministerial duty of the levying
officer to release the property the moment a third-party claim is filed.
While it is true that once a third-party files an affidavit of his title or right to
the possession of the property levied upon, the sheriff is bound to release the
property of the third-party claimant unless the judgment creditor files a bond
approved by the court, the circumstances of the instant case constrain us to
deviate from the literal tenor of the rules.
Admittedly, QBE’s motion was already pending in court at the time that it
filed its Affidavit of Third-Party Claim on 11 April 2003. Respondent, in
deference to the authority of the court, refused to act on the third-party claim
considering that QBE’s Urgent Motion to Lift andAffidavit of Third-Party
Claim are based on the same grounds. Under the circumstances, respondent
was left with little or no alternative but to wait for the trial court’s resolution of
the pending motion lest he be charged with usurping a function reserved for
the courts alone. Respondent could not be faulted for QBE’s gaffe in availing
of the wrong remedy specially so in this case where QBE failed to show that
respondent’s acts were motivated by malice or bad faith.
WHEREFORE, respondent is found GUILTY of simple neglect of duty and
accordingly ordered to pay a FINE of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) and
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar conduct shall be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

BELEN SAGAD ANGELES, G.R. No. 153798

Petitioner,
Present:

PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
- versus - CARPIO-MORALES, and
GARCIA, JJ.

Promulgated:
ALELI “CORAZON” ANGELES
MAGLAYA,
Respondent. September 2, 2005
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court, petitioner Belen Sagad Angeles seeks to set aside the
Decision dated May 29, 2002[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No.
66037, reversing an earlier Order of the Regional Trial Court at Caloocan
City which dismissed the petition for the settlement of the intestate estate
of Francisco Angeles, thereat commenced by the herein respondent Aleli
“Corazon” Angeles-Maglaya.

The legal dispute between the parties started when, on March 25,
1998, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Caloocan City, respondent filed
a petition[2] for letters of administration and her appointment as
administratrix of the intestate estate of Francisco M. Angeles (Francisco,
hereinafter). In the petition, docketed as Special Proceedings No. C-
2140 and raffled to Branch 120 of the court, respondent alleged, among
other things, the following:
1. That Francisco, a resident of 71 B. Serrano St., Grace Park,
Caloocan, died intestate on January 21, 1998 in the City of Manila, leaving
behind four (4) parcels of land and a building, among other valuable
properties;
2. That there is a need to appoint an administrator of Francisco’s
estate;
3. That she (respondent) is the sole legitimate child of the deceased
and Genoveva Mercado, and, together with petitioner, Belen S. Angeles,
decedent’s wife by his second marriage, are the surviving heirs of the
decedent; and
4. That she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
required of an administrator.
 Petitioner opposed the basic petition and prayed that she, instead of
respondent, be made the administratrix of Francisco’s estate.[3] In support
of her opposition and plea, petitioner alleged having married Francisco on
August 7, 1948 before Judge Lucio M. Tianco of the Municipal Court of
Rizal, a union which was ratified two (2) months later in religious rites at
the Our Lady of Grace Parish in Caloocan City, and that Francisco
represented in their marriage contract that he was single at that time.
Petitioner also averred that respondent could not be the daughter of
Francisco for, although she was recorded as Francisco’s legitimate
daughter, the corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him.
Pressing on, petitioner further alleged that respondent, despite her claim of
being the legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado, has not
presented the marriage contract between her supposed parents or
produced any acceptable document to prove such union. And evidently to
debunk respondent’s claim of being the only child of Francisco, petitioner
likewise averred that she and Francisco had, during their marriage, legally
adopted Concesa A. Yamat, et al. Petitioner thus urged that she, being
the surviving spouse of Francisco, be declared as possessed of the superior
right to the administration of his estate.

In her reply to opposition, respondent alleged, inter alia, that per

certification of the appropriate offices, the January to December 1938
records of marriages of the Civil Registrar of Bacolor, Pampanga where the
alleged 1938 Francisco-Genoveva wedding took place, were destroyed. In
the same reply, respondent dismissed as of little consequence the adoption
adverted to owing to her having interposed with the Court of Appeals a
petition to nullify the decree of adoption entered by the RTC at Caloocan.[4]

Issues having been joined, trial ensued. Respondent, as petitioner a

quo, commenced the presentation of her evidence by taking the witness
stand. She testified having been born on November 20, 1939 as the
legitimate child of Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Mercado, who died
in January 1988.[5] She also testified having been in open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child. Four (4) other witnesses
testified on her behalf, namely: Tomas Angeles,[6] Francisco Yaya,[7] Jose
O. Carreon[8] and Paulita Angeles de la Cruz.[9] Respondent also offered in
evidence her birth certificate which contained an entry stating that she was
born at the Mary Johnston Hospital, Tondo, Manila, to Francisco Angeles
and Genoveva Mercado and whereon the handwritten word “Yes” appears
on the space below the question “Legitimate? (Legitimo?)”; pictures taken
during respondent’s wedding as bride to Atty. Guillermo T. Maglaya; and a
copy of her marriage contract. Likewise offered were her scholastic and
government service records.

After respondent rested her case following her formal offer of

exhibits, petitioner filed a “Motion to Dismiss” under Section 1(g), Rule 16
of the Rules of Court. In it, she prayed for the dismissal of the petition for
letters of administration on the ground that the petition failed “to state or
prove a cause of action”, it being her stated position that “[P]etitioner
[Corzaon], by her evidence, failed to establish her filiation vis-à-vis the
decedent, i.e., that she is in fact a legitimate child of Francisco M.
Angeles.”[10]

To the motion to dismiss, respondent interposed an opposition,

followed by petitioner’s reply, to which respondent countered with a
rejoinder.

Eventually, in an Order dated July 12, 1999,[11] the trial court, on its
finding that respondent failed to prove her filiation as legitimate child of
Francisco, dismissed the petition, thus:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby

ordered DISMISSED for failure of the [respondent] to state a cause of
action in accordance with Section 1(g) of Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil of Procedure. (Word in bracket added]

Respondent then moved for reconsideration, which motion was

denied by the trial court in its Order of December 17, 1999.[12] Therefrom,
respondent went on appeal to the Court of Appeals where her recourse
was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 66037.

As stated at the threshold hereof, the Court of Appeals, in its assailed

Decision dated May 29, 2002,[13]reversed and set aside the trial court’s
order of dismissal and directed it to appoint respondent as administratrix of
the estate of Francisco, to wit:
 WHEREFORE, the appealed order of dismissal
is REVERSED. The Trial Court is hereby ordered to appoint petitioner-
appellant Aleli “Corazon” Angeles as administratrix of the intestate
estate of Francisco Angeles.

SO ORDERED.

The appellate court predicated its ruling on the interplay of the

following main premises:
1. Petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss filed with the trial court, albeit
premised on the alleged failure of the underlying petition for letter of
administration to state or prove a cause of action, actually partakes of a
demurrer to evidence under Section 1 of Rule 33;[14]
2. Petitioner’s motion being a demurer, it follows that she thereby
waived her right to present opposing evidence to rebut respondent’s
testimonial and documentary evidence; and
3. Respondent has sufficiently established her legitimate filiation with
the deceased Francisco.

Hence, petitioner’s instant petition for review on certiorari, on the

submission that the Court of Appeals erred: (1) in reversing the trial court’s
order of dismissal;[15] (2) in treating her motion to dismiss as a demurrer
to evidence; (3) in holding that respondent is a legitimate daughter of
Francisco; and (4) in decreeing respondent’s appointment as administratrix
of Francisco’s intestate estate.

We resolve to grant the petition.

The principal issue tendered in this case boils down to the question
of whether or not respondent is the legitimate child of decedent Francisco
M. Angeles and Genoveva Mercado. The Court of Appeals resolved the
issue in the affirmative and, on the basis of such determination, ordered
the trial court to appoint respondent as administratrix of Francisco’s estate.

We are unable to lend concurrence to the appellate court’s conclusion

on the legitimate status of respondent, or, to be precise, on her legitimate
filiation to the decedent. A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore,
implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the element of lawful union
and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article
164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: “Children
conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.”

In finding for respondent, the Court of Appeals, citing and extensibly

quoting from Tison vs. Court of Appeals,[16] stated that since
petitioner “opted not to present any contrary evidence”, the presumption
on respondent’s legitimacy stands “unrebutted.”[17]

Following is an excerpt from Tison:

It seems that both the court a quo and respondent appellate court
have regrettably overlooked the universally recognized presumption on
legitimacy. There is no presumption of the law more firmly established
and founded on sounder morality and more convincing than
the presumptionthat children born in wedlock are legitimate. And
well-settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked
collaterally.

The rationale for this rule has been explained in this wise:
‘The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code . . .
actually fixes a status for the child born in wedlock, and
that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. xxx

xxx xxx xxx

‘Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article

170 [of the Family Code], the action to impugn the
legitimacy of a child can no longer be bought. The status
conferred by the presumption, therefore, becomes fixed, and
can no longer be questioned. The obvious intention of the
law is to prevent the status of a child born in wedlock from
being in a state of uncertainty. It also aims to force early
action to settle any doubt as to the paternity of such child so
that the evidence material to the matter . . . may still be easily
available.’
xxx xxx xxx
 ‘Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of
a child born to his wife . . . .’(Words in bracket added;
Emphasis ours)

Contextually, the correct lesson of Tison, which the appellate court

evidently misapplied, is that: (a) a child is presumed legitimate only if
conceived or born in wedlock; and (b) the presumptive legitimacy of such
child cannot be attacked collaterally.

A party in whose favor the legal presumption exists may rely on and
invoke such legal presumption to establish a fact in issue. He need not
introduce evidence to prove that fact.[18] For, a presumption is prima
facie proof of the fact presumed. However, it cannot be over-emphasized,
that while a fact thus prima facie established by legal presumption shall,
unless overthrown, stand as proved,[19] the presumption of legitimacy
under Article 164 of the Family Code[20] may be availed only upon
convincing proof of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the child’s parents
were legally married and that his/her conception or birth occurred during
the subsistence of that marriage. Else, the presumption of law that a child
is legitimate does not arise.

In the case at bench, the Court of Appeals, in its decision under

review, did not categorically state from what facts established during the
trial was the presumption of respondent’s supposed legitimacy arose. But
even if perhaps it wanted to, it could not have possibly done so. For, save
for respondent’s gratuitous assertion and an entry in her certificate of
birth, there is absolutely no proof of the decedent’s marriage to
respondent’s mother, Genoveva Mercado. To stress, no marriage certificate
or marriage contract – doubtless the best evidence of Francisco’s and
Genoveva’s marriage, if one had been solemnized[21] – was offered in
evidence. No priest, judge, mayor, or other solemnizing authority was
called to the witness box to declare that he solemnized the marriage
between the two. None of the four (4) witnesses respondent presented
could say anything about, let alone affirm, that supposed marriage. At
best, their testimonies proved that respondent was Francisco’s daughter.
For example, Tomas Angeles and Paulita Angeles de la Cruz testified that
they know respondent to be their cousin because his (Tomas’) father and
her (Paulita’s) mother, who are both Francisco’s siblings, told them so.[22]
And one Jose Carreon would testify seeing respondent in 1948 in
Francisco’s house in Caloocan, the same Francisco who used to court
Genoveva before the war.[23] In all, no evidence whatsoever was
presented of the execution of the Francisco Angeles-Genoveva Mercado
marriage contract; when and where their marriage was solemnized; the
identity of the solemnizing officer; the persons present, and like significant
details.

While perhaps not determinative of the issue of the existence of

marriage between Francisco and Genoveva, we can even go to the extent
of saying that respondent has not even presented a witness to testify that
her putative parents really held themselves out to the public as man-and-
wife. Clearly, therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in crediting respondent
with the legal presumption of legitimacy which, as above explained, should
flow from a lawful marriage between Francisco and Genevova. To reiterate,
absent such a marriage, as here, there is no presumption of legitimacy
and, therefore, there was really nothing for petitioner to rebut.

Parenthetically, for all her unyielding stance that her mother and
Francisco Angeles were married in 1938, respondent never, thru the years,
even question what would necessarily be a bigamous Francisco-Belen
Sagad marriage. Ironical as it may seem, respondent herself undermined
her very own case. As it were, she made certain judicial admission
negating her own assertion – as well as the appellate court’s conclusion -
that Francisco was legally married to Genoveva. As may be recalled,
respondent had declared that her mother Genoveva died in 1988,
implying, quite clearly, that when Francisco contracted marriage with
petitioner Belen S. Angeles in 1948, Genoveva and Francisco were already
“spouses”. Now, then, if, as respondent maintained despite utter lack of
evidence, that Genoveva Mercado and Francisco were married in 1938, it
follows that the marriage of Francisco to petitioner Belen Angeles in 1948,
or prior to Genoveva’s death, would necessarily have to be bigamous,
hence void,[24] in which case petitioner could not be, as respondent alleged
in her petition for letters of administration, a “surviving spouse” of the
decedent. We quote the pertinent allegation:
 4. The surviving heirs of decedent are the petitioner [Corazon]
herself who is 58 years old, and BELEN S. Angeles, the surviving
spouse of deceased Francisco M. Angeles by his second marriage, who
is about 77 years old . . . .YEARS OLD . . . ” (Emphasis and word in
bracket added)

We can concede, because Article 172 of the Family Code appears to

say so, that the legitimate filiation of a child can be established by any of
the modes therein defined even without direct evidence of the marriage of
his/her supposed parents. Said article 172 reads:

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by

any of the following:

1. The record of birth appearing in the civil register or

a final judgments; or

2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public

document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation

shall be proved by:

1. The open and continuous possession of the status of

a legitimate child; or

2. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and

special laws.

Here, respondent presented, in support of her claim of legitimacy, a

copy of her Birth Certificate dated November 23, 1939 issued by the Civil
Registrar of the City of Manila (Exh. “E”). In it, her birth was recorded as
the legitimate child of Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado. And the
word “married” is written in the certificate to indicate the union of
Francisco and Genoveva.

Petitioner, however, contends, citing jurisprudence, that “[I]t was

error for the Court of Appeals to have ruled . . . that [respondent’s] Birth
Certificate indubitably establishes that she is the legitimate daughter of
Francisco and Genoveva who are legally married”.

The contention commends itself for concurrence. The reason is as

simple as it is elementary: the Birth Certificate presented was not signed
by Francisco against whom legitimate filiation is asserted. Not even by
Genoveva. It was signed by the attending physician, one Rebecca De
Guzman, who certified to having attended the birth of a child. Such
certificate, albeit considered a public record of a private document is, under
Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, evidence only of the fact which
gave rise to its execution: the fact of birth of a child.[25]Jurisprudence
teaches that a birth certificate, to be considered as validating proof of
paternity and as an instrument of recognition, must be signed by the father
and mother jointly, or by the mother alone if the father refuses.[26] Dr.
Arturo Tolentino, commenting on the probative value of the entries in a
certificate of birth, wrote:

xxx if the alleged father did not intervene in the making of the
birth certificate, the putting of his name by the mother or doctor or
registrar is void; the signature of the alleged father is necessary.[27]

The conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals that the Birth

Certificate of respondent, unsigned as it were by Francisco and Genoveva,
establishes – and “indubitably” at that - not only respondent’s filiation to
Francisco but even her being a legitimate daughter of Francisco and
Genoveva, taxes credulity to the limit. In a very real sense, the appellate
court regarded such certificate as defining proof of filiation, and not just
filiation but of legitimate filiation, by inferring from it that Francisco and
Genoveva are legally married. In the apt words of petitioner, the appellate
court, out of a Birth Certificate signed by a physician who merely certified
having attended “the birth of a child who was born alive at 3:50
P.M. ”, created “ a marriage that of ‘ Francisco and Genoveva’, and
filiation (that said child) is the daughter of ‘Francisco’”’[28]

It cannot be over-emphasized that the legitimate filiation of a child is

a matter fixed by law itself.[29] It cannot, as the decision under review
seems to suggest, be made dependent on the declaration of the attending
physician or midwife, or that of the mother of the newborn child. For then,
an unwed mother, with or without the participation of a doctor or midwife,
could veritably invest legitimate status to her offspring through the simple
expedient of writing the putative father’s name in the appropriate space in
the birth certificate. A long time past, this Court cautioned against
according a similar unsigned birth certificate prima facie evidentiary value
of filiation:

Give this certificate evidential relevancy, and we thereby pave the

way for any scheming unmarried mother to extort money for her child
(and herself) from any eligible bachelor or affluent pater familias. How?
She simply causes the midwife to state in the birth certificate that the
newborn babe is her legitimate offspring with that individual and the
certificate will be accepted for registration . . . . And any lawyer with
sufficient imagination will realize the exciting possibilities from such
mischief of such prima facie evidence – when and if the “father” dies in
ignorance of the fraudulent design xxx[30]

Just like her Birth Certificate, respondent can hardly derive comfort
from her marriage contract to Atty. Maglaya and from her student and
government records which indicated or purported to show that Francisco
Angeles is her father. The same holds true for her wedding pictures which
showed Francisco giving respondent’s hands in marriage. These papers or
documents, unsigned as they are by Francisco or the execution of which he
had no part, are not sufficient evidence of filiation or recognition.[31] And
needless to stress, they cannot support a finding of the legitimate union of
Francisco and Genoveva.

The argument may be advanced that the aforesaid wedding

pictures, the school and service records and the testimony of respondent’s
witnesses lend support to her claim of enjoying open and continuous
possession of the status of a child of Francisco. The Court can even
concede that respondent may have been the natural child of Francisco with
Genoveva. Unfortunately, however, that angle is not an, or at issue in the
case before us. For, respondent peremptorily predicated her petition for
letters of administration on her being a legitimate child of Francisco who
was legally married to her mother, Genoveva, propositions which we have
earlier refuted herein.
 If on the foregoing score alone, this Court could very well end this
disposition were it not for another compelling consideration which
petitioner has raised and which we presently take judicially notice of.

As may be recalled, respondent, during the pendency of the

proceedings at the trial court, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
the annulment of the decision of the RTC Caloocan granting the petition of
spouses Francisco Angeles and petitioner Belen S. Angeles for the adoption
of Concesa A. Yamat and two others. In that petition, docketed with the
appellate court as CA-G.R. SP No. 47832 and captioned “Aleli ‘Corazon’
Angeles Maglaya vs. Hon Jaime T. Hamoy, Consesa A. Yamat, Teodora A.
Santos, Franco Angeles and Belen S. Angeles”, respondent alleged that as
legitimate daughter of Francisco, she should have been notified of the
adoption proceedings.

Following a legal skirmish, the Court of Appeals referred the

aforementioned annulment case to RTC, Caloocan for reception of
evidence. Eventually, in a Decision[32] dated December 17, 2003, the Court
of Appeals dismissedCA-G.R. SP No. 47832 on the ground, inter alia, that
herein respondent is not, contrary to her claim, a “legitimate daughter” of
Francisco, nor “a child of a lawful wedlock between Francisco M. Angeles
and Genoveva Y. Mercado”. Wrote the appellate court in that case:

Petitioner [Aleli “Corazon Maglaya] belabors with repetitious

persistence the argument that she is a legitimate child or the only
daughter of Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado . . . .

In the case at bench, other than the self-serving declaration of the

petitioner, there is nothing in the record to support petitioner’s claim that
she is indeed a legitimate child of the late Francisco M. Angeles and
Genoveva Y. Mercado. xxx In other words, Francisco M. Angeles
was nevermarried before or at anytime prior to his marriage to Belen
Sagad, contrary to the claim of petitioner that Francisco M. Angeles and
Genoveva Y. Mercado were married in 1938

While petitioner may have submitted certifications to the effect

that the records of marriages during the war years . . . were totally
destroyed, no secondary evidence was presented by petitioner to prove
the existence of the marriage between Francisco M. Angeles and
 Genoveva Y. Mercado, even as no witness was presented to confirm the
celebration of such marriage . . . .

Petitioner presented pictures. x x x However, it is already settled

law that photographs are not sufficient evidence of filiation or
acknowledgment.

To be sure, very little comfort is provided by petitioner’s birth

certificate and even her marriage contract.. . . Reason: These documents
were not signed by Francisco . . . . Equally inconsequential are
petitioner’s school records . . . . all these lacked the signatures of both
Francisco and Genoveva . . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Having failed to prove that she is the legitimate daughter or

acknowledged natural child of the late Francisco M. Angeles, petitioner
cannot be a real party in interest in the adoption proceedings, as her
consent thereto is not essential or required. (Emphasis in the original;
words in bracket added)

Significantly, the aforesaid December 17, 2003 Decision of the

appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No.47832 was effectively affirmed by this
Court via its Resolution dated August 9, 2004 in G.R. No.
163124, denying Aleli “Corazon” Maglaya’s petition for Review on
Certiorari,[33] and Resolution dated October 20, 2004,[34] denying with
“FINALITY” her motion for reconsideration. Another Resolution dated
January 24, 2005 resolved to “NOTE WITHOUT ACTION” Maglaya’s
second motion for reconsideration.

In the light of the ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.

47832, as affirmed with finality by this Court in G.R. No. 163124, there
can be no serious objection to applying in this case the rule on
conclusiveness of judgment,[35] one of two (2) concepts embraced in
the res judicata principle. Following the rule on conclusiveness of
judgment, herein respondent is precluded from claiming that she is the
legitimate daughter of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado. In fine, the issue
of herein respondent’s legitimate filiation to Francisco and the latter’s
marriage to Genoveva, having been judicially determined in a final
judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction, has thereby become res
judicata and may not again be resurrected or litigated between herein
petitioner and respondent or their privies in a subsequent action,
regardless of the form of the latter.[36]

Lest it be overlooked, the same ruling of the appellate court in CA-

G.R. SP No. 47832, as sustained by this Court in G.R. No. 163124,
virtually confirms the ratio of the trial court’s order of dismissal in Special
Proceedings (SP) No. C-2140, i.e, that respondent failed to establish that
she is in fact a legitimate child of Francisco. Accordingly, the question of
whether or not the Motion to Dismiss[37] interposed by herein petitioner, as
respondent in SP No. C-2140, is in the nature of a demurer to evidence has
become moot and academic. It need not detain us any minute further.

Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of

administrator of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse is
preferred over the next of kin of the decedent.[38] When the law speaks of
“next of kin”, the reference is to those who are entitled, under the statute
of distribution, to the decedent’s property;[39] one whose relationship is
such that he is entitled to share in the estate as distributed,[40] or, in
short, an heir. In resolving, therefore, the issue of whether an applicant
for letters of administration is a next of kin or an heir of the decedent, the
probate court perforce has to determine and pass upon the issue of
filiation. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits. Upon
this consideration, the trial court acted within bounds when it looked into
and pass upon the claimed relationship of respondent to the late Francisco
Angeles.

WHEREFORE, the herein assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is

hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the order of the trial court
dismissing Special Proceedings No. C-2140 REINSTATED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 139325. April 12, 2005]

PRISCILLA C. MIJARES, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, HILDA B.

NARCISO, SR. MARIANI DIMARANAN, SFIC, and JOEL C.
LAMANGAN in their behalf and on behalf of the Class Plaintiffs
in Class Action No. MDL 840, United States District Court of
Hawaii, petitioners, vs. HON. SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 137, Regional Trial Court,
Makati City, and the ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
through its court appointed legal representatives in Class Action
MDL 840, United States District Court of Hawaii, namely: Imelda
R. Marcos and Ferdinand Marcos, Jr.,respondents.

DECISION
TINGA, J.:

Our martial law experience bore strange unwanted fruits, and we have yet
to finish weeding out its bitter crop. While the restoration of freedom and the
fundamental structures and processes of democracy have been much lauded,
according to a significant number, the changes, however, have not sufficiently
healed the colossal damage wrought under the oppressive conditions of the
martial law period. The cries of justice for the tortured, the murdered, and
the desaparecidos arouse outrage and sympathy in the hearts of the fair-
minded, yet the dispensation of the appropriate relief due them cannot be
extended through the same caprice or whim that characterized the ill-wind of
martial rule. The damage done was not merely personal but institutional, and
the proper rebuke to the iniquitous past has to involve the award of
reparations due within the confines of the restored rule of law.
The petitioners in this case are prominent victims of human rights
violations who, deprived of the opportunity to directly confront the man who
[1]

once held absolute rule over this country, have chosen to do battle instead
with the earthly representative, his estate. The clash has been for now
interrupted by a trial court ruling, seemingly comported to legal logic, that
required the petitioners to pay a whopping filing fee of over Four Hundred
Seventy-Two Million Pesos (P472,000,000.00) in order that they be able to
enforce a judgment awarded them by a foreign court. There is an
understandable temptation to cast the struggle within the simplistic confines of
a morality tale, and to employ short-cuts to arrive at what might seem the
desirable solution. But easy, reflexive resort to the equity principle all too often
leads to a result that may be morally correct, but legally wrong.
Nonetheless, the application of the legal principles involved in this case
will comfort those who maintain that our substantive and procedural laws, for
all their perceived ambiguity and susceptibility to myriad interpretations, are
inherently fair and just. The relief sought by the petitioners is expressly
mandated by our laws and conforms to established legal principles. The
granting of this petition for certiorari is warranted in order to correct the legally
infirm and unabashedly unjust ruling of the respondent judge.
The essential facts bear little elaboration. On 9 May 1991, a complaint was
filed with the United States District Court (US District Court), District of Hawaii,
against the Estate of former Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos
(Marcos Estate). The action was brought forth by ten Filipino citizens who [2]

each alleged having suffered human rights abuses such as arbitrary

detention, torture and rape in the hands of police or military forces during the
Marcos regime. The Alien Tort Act was invoked as basis for the US District
[3]

Court’s jurisdiction over the complaint, as it involved a suit by aliens for

tortious violations of international law. These plaintiffs brought the action on
[4]

their own behalf and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals,

particularly consisting of all current civilian citizens of the Philippines, their
heirs and beneficiaries, who between 1972 and 1987 were tortured,
summarily executed or had disappeared while in the custody of military or
paramilitary groups. Plaintiffs alleged that the class consisted of approximately
ten thousand (10,000) members; hence, joinder of all these persons was
impracticable.
The institution of a class action suit was warranted under Rule 23(a) and
(b)(1)(B) of the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the provisions of which
were invoked by the plaintiffs. Subsequently, the US District Court certified the
case as a class action and created three (3) sub-classes of torture, summary
execution and disappearance victims. Trial ensued, and subsequently a jury
[5]

rendered a verdict and an award of compensatory and exemplary damages in

favor of the plaintiff class. Then, on 3 February 1995, the US District Court,
presided by Judge Manuel L. Real, rendered a Final Judgment (Final
Judgment) awarding the plaintiff class a total of One Billion Nine Hundred
Sixty Four Million Five Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty Nine Dollars and Ninety
Cents ($1,964,005,859.90). The Final Judgment was eventually affirmed by
the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a decision rendered on 17
December 1996. [6]
 On 20 May 1997, the present petitioners filed Complaint with the Regional
Trial Court, City of Makati (Makati RTC) for the enforcement of the Final
Judgment. They alleged that they are members of the plaintiff class in whose
favor the US District Court awarded damages. They argued that since the
[7]

Marcos Estate failed to file a petition for certiorari with the US Supreme Court
after the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had affirmed the Final Judgment, the
decision of the US District Court had become final and executory, and hence
should be recognized and enforced in the Philippines, pursuant to Section 50,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court then in force. [8]

On 5 February 1998, the Marcos Estate filed a motion to dismiss, raising,

among others, the non-payment of the correct filing fees. It alleged that
petitioners had only paid Four Hundred Ten Pesos (P410.00) as docket and
filing fees, notwithstanding the fact that they sought to enforce a monetary
amount of damages in the amount of over Two and a Quarter Billion US
Dollars (US$2.25 Billion). The Marcos Estate cited Supreme Court Circular
No. 7, pertaining to the proper computation and payment of docket fees. In
response, the petitioners claimed that an action for the enforcement of a
foreign judgment is not capable of pecuniary estimation; hence, a filing fee of
only Four Hundred Ten Pesos (P410.00) was proper, pursuant to Section 7(c)
of Rule 141.[9]

On 9 September 1998, respondent Judge Santiago Javier Ranada of the [10]

Makati RTC issued the subject Order dismissing the complaint without
prejudice. Respondent judge opined that contrary to the petitioners’
submission, the subject matter of the complaint was indeed capable of
pecuniary estimation, as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court
ordering the payment of definite sums of money, allowing for easy
determination of the value of the foreign judgment. On that score, Section 7(a)
of Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil Procedure would find application, and the
RTC estimated the proper amount of filing fees was approximately Four
Hundred Seventy Two Million Pesos, which obviously had not been paid.
Not surprisingly, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which
Judge Ranada denied in an Order dated 28 July 1999. From this denial,
petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the twin orders
of respondent judge. They prayed for the annulment of the questioned
[11]

orders, and an order directing the reinstatement of Civil Case No. 97-1052
and the conduct of appropriate proceedings thereon.
Petitioners submit that their action is incapable of pecuniary estimation as
the subject matter of the suit is the enforcement of a foreign judgment, and not
an action for the collection of a sum of money or recovery of damages. They
also point out that to require the class plaintiffs to pay Four Hundred Seventy
Two Million Pesos (P472,000,000.00) in filing fees would negate and render
inutile the liberal construction ordained by the Rules of Court, as required by
Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly the inexpensive
disposition of every action.
Petitioners invoke Section 11, Article III of the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution, which provides that “Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial
bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by
reason of poverty,” a mandate which is essentially defeated by the required
exorbitant filing fee. The adjudicated amount of the filing fee, as arrived at by
the RTC, was characterized as indisputably unfair, inequitable, and unjust.
The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) was permitted to intervene in
this case. It urged that the petition be granted and a judgment rendered,
[12]

ordering the enforcement and execution of the District Court judgment in

accordance with Section 48, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. For
the CHR, the Makati RTC erred in interpreting the action for the execution of a
foreign judgment as a new case, in violation of the principle that once a case
has been decided between the same parties in one country on the same issue
with finality, it can no longer be relitigated again in another country. The CHR
[13]

likewise invokes the principle of comity, and of vested rights.

The Court’s disposition on the issue of filing fees will prove a useful
jurisprudential guidepost for courts confronted with actions enforcing foreign
judgments, particularly those lodged against an estate. There is no basis for
the issuance a limited pro hac vice ruling based on the special circumstances
of the petitioners as victims of martial law, or on the emotionally-charged
allegation of human rights abuses.
An examination of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court readily evinces that the
respondent judge ignored the clear letter of the law when he concluded that
the filing fee be computed based on the total sum claimed or the stated value
of the property in litigation.
In dismissing the complaint, the respondent judge relied on Section 7(a),
Rule 141 as basis for the computation of the filing fee of over P472 Million.
The provision states:

SEC. 7. Clerk of Regional Trial Court.-

(a) For filing an action or a permissive counterclaim or money claim

against an estate not based on judgment, or for filing with leave of court a
third-party, fourth-party, etc., complaint, or a complaint in intervention, and for
 all clerical services in the same time, if the total sum claimed, exclusive of
interest, or the started value of the property in litigation, is:

1. Less than P 100,00.00 – P 500.00

2. P 100,000.00 or more - P 800.00
but less than P 150,000.00
3. P 150,000.00 or more but - P 1,000.00
less than P 200,000.00
4. P 200,000.00 or more but
less than P 250,000.00 - P 1,500.00
5. P 250,000.00 or more but
less than P 300,00.00 - P 1,750.00
6. P 300,000.00 or more but
not more than P 400,000.00 - P 2,000.00
7. P 350,000.00 or more but not
more than P400,000.00 - P 2,250.00
8. For each P 1,000.00 in excess of
P 400,000.00 -P 10.00

. . .

(Emphasis supplied)

Obviously, the above-quoted provision covers, on one hand, ordinary

actions, permissive counterclaims, third-party, etc. complaints and complaints-
in-interventions, and on the other, money claims against estates which are not
based on judgment. Thus, the relevant question for purposes of the present
petition is whether the action filed with the lower court is a “money claim
against an estate not based on judgment.”
Petitioners’ complaint may have been lodged against an estate, but it is
clearly based on a judgment, the Final Judgment of the US District Court. The
provision does not make any distinction between a local judgment and a
foreign judgment, and where the law does not distinguish, we shall not
distinguish.
A reading of Section 7 in its entirety reveals several instances wherein the
filing fee is computed on the basis of the amount of the relief sought, or on the
value of the property in litigation. The filing fee for requests for extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage is based on the amount of indebtedness or the
mortgagee’s claim. In special proceedings involving properties such as for
[14]

the allowance of wills, the filing fee is again based on the value of the
property. The aforecited rules evidently have no application to petitioners’
[15]

complaint.
Petitioners rely on Section 7(b), particularly the proviso on actions where
the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated. The provision reads in
full:

SEC. 7. Clerk of Regional Trial Court.-

(b) For filing

1. Actions where the value

of the subject matter
cannot be estimated --- P 600.00

2. Special civil actions except

judicial foreclosure which
shall be governed by
paragraph (a) above --- P 600.00

3. All other actions not

involving property --- P 600.00

In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated
value, thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing the
fees.

It is worth noting that the provision also provides that in real actions, the
assessed value or estimated value of the property shall be alleged by the
claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees. Yet again, this provision
does not apply in the case at bar. A real action is one where the plaintiff seeks
the recovery of real property or an action affecting title to or recovery of
possession of real property. Neither the complaint nor the award of damages
[16]

adjudicated by the US District Court involves any real property of the Marcos
Estate.
Thus, respondent judge was in clear and serious error when he concluded
that the filing fees should be computed on the basis of the schematic table of
Section 7(a), as the action involved pertains to a claim against an estate
based on judgment. What provision, if any, then should apply in determining
the filing fees for an action to enforce a foreign judgment?
To resolve this question, a proper understanding is required on the nature
and effects of a foreign judgment in this jurisdiction.
 The rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a
usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of
competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious
under certain conditions that may vary in different countries. This principle
[17]

was prominently affirmed in the leading American case of Hilton v.

Guyot and expressly recognized in our jurisprudence beginning
[18]

with Ingenholl v. Walter E. Olsen & Co. The conditions required by the
[19]

Philippines for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment were

originally contained in Section 311 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which was
taken from the California Code of Civil Procedure which, in turn, was derived
from the California Act of March 11, 1872. Remarkably, the procedural rule
[20]

now outlined in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure has
remained unchanged down to the last word in nearly a century. Section 48
states:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments. — The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of

a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the
title to the thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a

right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title;

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact.

There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an action in

rem and one in personam. For an action in rem, the foreign judgment is
deemed conclusive upon the title to the thing, while in an
action in personam, the foreign judgment is presumptive, and not conclusive,
of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title. However, in both cases, the foreign judgment is susceptible
[21]

to impeachment in our local courts on the grounds of want of jurisdiction or

notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Thus,
[22] [23] [24]

the party aggrieved by the foreign judgment is entitled to defend against the
enforcement of such decision in the local forum. It is essential that there
should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the
court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy.[25]
 It is clear then that it is usually necessary for an action to be filed in order
to enforce a foreign judgment , even if such judgment has conclusive effect
[26]

as in the case of in rem actions, if only for the purpose of allowing the losing
party an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, and in order for the
court to properly determine its efficacy. Consequently, the party attacking a
[27]

foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its

validity.
[28]

The rules are silent as to what initiatory procedure must be undertaken in

order to enforce a foreign judgment in the Philippines. But there is no question
that the filing of a civil complaint is an appropriate measure for such purpose.
A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, and clearly an action to enforce a foreign judgment is in
[29]

essence a vindication of a right prescinding either from a “conclusive

judgment upon title” or the “presumptive evidence of a right.” Absent perhaps
[30]

a statutory grant of jurisdiction to a quasi-judicial body, the claim for

enforcement of judgment must be brought before the regular courts. [31]

There are distinctions, nuanced but discernible, between the cause of

action arising from the enforcement of a foreign judgment, and that arising
from the facts or allegations that occasioned the foreign judgment. They may
pertain to the same set of facts, but there is an essential difference in the
right-duty correlatives that are sought to be vindicated. For example, in a
complaint for damages against a tortfeasor, the cause of action emanates
from the violation of the right of the complainant through the act or omission of
the respondent. On the other hand, in a complaint for the enforcement of a
foreign judgment awarding damages from the same tortfeasor, for the
violation of the same right through the same manner of action, the cause of
action derives not from the tortious act but from the foreign judgment itself.
More importantly, the matters for proof are different. Using the above
example, the complainant will have to establish before the court the tortious
act or omission committed by the tortfeasor, who in turn is allowed to rebut
these factual allegations or prove extenuating circumstances. Extensive
litigation is thus conducted on the facts, and from there the right to and
amount of damages are assessed. On the other hand, in an action to enforce
a foreign judgment, the matter left for proof is the foreign judgment itself, and
not the facts from which it prescinds.
As stated in Section 48, Rule 39, the actionable issues are generally
restricted to a review of jurisdiction of the foreign court, the service of personal
notice, collusion, fraud, or mistake of fact or law. The limitations on review is
in consonance with a strong and pervasive policy in all legal systems to limit
repetitive litigation on claims and issues. Otherwise known as the policy of
[32]

preclusion, it seeks to protect party expectations resulting from previous

litigation, to safeguard against the harassment of defendants, to insure that
the task of courts not be increased by never-ending litigation of the same
disputes, and – in a larger sense – to promote what Lord Coke in the Ferrer’s
Case of 1599 stated to be the goal of all law: “rest and quietness.” If every [33]

judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would
be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the
previously concluded litigation. [34]

Petitioners appreciate this distinction, and rely upon it to support the

proposition that the subject matter of the complaintthe enforcement of a
foreign judgmentis incapable of pecuniary estimation. Admittedly the
proposition, as it applies in this case, is counter-intuitive, and thus deserves
strict scrutiny. For in all practical intents and purposes, the matter at hand is
capable of pecuniary estimation, down to the last cent. In the
assailed Order, the respondent judge pounced upon this point without
equivocation:

The Rules use the term “where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated.”
The subject matter of the present case is the judgment rendered by the foreign court
ordering defendant to pay plaintiffs definite sums of money, as and for compensatory
damages. The Court finds that the value of the foreign judgment can be estimated;
indeed, it can even be easily determined. The Court is not minded to distinguish
between the enforcement of a judgment and the amount of said judgment, and
separate the two, for purposes of determining the correct filing fees. Similarly, a
plaintiff suing on promissory note for P1 million cannot be allowed to pay onlyP400
filing fees (sic), on the reasoning that the subject matter of his suit is not the P1
million, but the enforcement of the promissory note, and that the value of such
“enforcement” cannot be estimated. [35]

The jurisprudential standard in gauging whether the subject matter of an

action is capable of pecuniary estimation is well-entrenched. The Marcos
Estate cites Singsong v. Isabela Sawmill and Raymundo v. Court of Appeals,
which ruled:

[I]n determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the
nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a
sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether
jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend
on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than
the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or
a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as
cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and
are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).

On the other hand, petitioners cite the ponencia of Justice JBL Reyes
in Lapitan v. Scandia, from[36]
which the rule
in Singsong andRaymundo actually derives, but which incorporates this
additional nuance omitted in the latter cases:

xxx However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum
of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the
contract (specific performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of
judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions as
cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and
are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance. [37]

Petitioners go on to add that among the actions the Court has recognized
as being incapable of pecuniary estimation include legality of conveyances
and money deposits, validity of a mortgage, the right to support, validity of
[38] [39] [40]

documents, rescission of contracts, specific performance, and validity or

[41] [42] [43]

annulment of judgments. It is urged that an action for enforcement of a

[44]

foreign judgment belongs to the same class.

This is an intriguing argument, but ultimately it is self-evident that while the
subject matter of the action is undoubtedly the enforcement of a foreign
judgment, the effect of a providential award would be the adjudication of a
sum of money. Perhaps in theory, such an action is primarily for “the
enforcement of the foreign judgment,” but there is a certain obtuseness to that
sort of argument since there is no denying that the enforcement of the foreign
judgment will necessarily result in the award of a definite sum of money.
But before we insist upon this conclusion past beyond the point of
reckoning, we must examine its possible ramifications. Petitioners raise the
point that a declaration that an action for enforcement of foreign judgment
may be capable of pecuniary estimation might lead to an instance wherein a
first level court such as the Municipal Trial Court would have jurisdiction to
enforce a foreign judgment. But under the statute defining the jurisdiction of
first level courts, B.P. 129, such courts are not vested with jurisdiction over
actions for the enforcement of foreign judgments.
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate
and intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the
value of the personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila where such personal
property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed Two hundred thousand
pesos (P200,000.00) exclusive of interest damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses, and costs, the amount of which must be specifically alleged:
Provided, That where there are several claims or causes of action between the same
or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall
be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the
causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the question of
ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession.
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or
interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That value of such property shall be
determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.[45]
Section 33 of B.P. 129 refers to instances wherein the cause of action or
subject matter pertains to an assertion of rights and interests over property or
a sum of money. But as earlier pointed out, the subject matter of an action to
enforce a foreign judgment is the foreign judgment itself, and the cause of
action arising from the adjudication of such judgment.
An examination of Section 19(6), B.P. 129 reveals that the instant
complaint for enforcement of a foreign judgment, even if capable of pecuniary
estimation, would fall under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts, thus
negating the fears of the petitioners. Indeed, an examination of the provision
indicates that it can be relied upon as jurisdictional basis with respect to
actions for enforcement of foreign judgments, provided that no other court or
office is vested jurisdiction over such complaint:

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:

xxx
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or
body exercising jurisdiction or any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions.

Thus, we are comfortable in asserting the obvious, that the complaint to

enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary
estimation. But at the same time, it is also an action based on judgment
against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of Section 7(a) of Rule
141. What provision then governs the proper computation of the filing fees
over the instant complaint? For this case and other similarly situated
instances, we find that it is covered by Section 7(b)(3), involving as it does,
“other actions not involving property.”
Notably, the amount paid as docket fees by the petitioners on the premise
that it was an action incapable of pecuniary estimation corresponds to the
same amount required for “other actions not involving property.” The
petitioners thus paid the correct amount of filing fees, and it was a grave
abuse of discretion for respondent judge to have applied instead a clearly
inapplicable rule and dismissed the complaint.
There is another consideration of supreme relevance in this case, one
which should disabuse the notion that the doctrine affirmed in this decision is
grounded solely on the letter of the procedural rule. We earlier adverted to
the the internationally recognized policy of preclusion, as well as the[46]

principles of comity, utility and convenience of nations as the basis for the
[47]

evolution of the rule calling for the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments. The US Supreme Court in Hilton v. Guyot relied heavily on the
[48]

concept of comity, as especially derived from the landmark treatise of Justice

Story in his Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws of 1834. Yet the notion of
[49]

“comity” has since been criticized as one “of dim contours” or suffering from
[50]

a number of fallacies. Other conceptual bases for the recognition of foreign

[51]

judgments have evolved such as the vested rights theory or the modern
doctrine of obligation. [52]

There have been attempts to codify through treaties or multilateral

agreements the standards for the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments, but these have not borne fruition. The members of the European
Common Market accede to the Judgments Convention, signed in 1978, which
eliminates as to participating countries all of such obstacles to recognition
such as reciprocity and révision au fond. The most ambitious of these
[53]

attempts is the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign

Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, prepared in 1966 by the Hague
Conference of International Law. While it has not received the ratifications
[54]
needed to have it take effect, it is recognized as representing current
[55]

scholarly thought on the topic. Neither the Philippines nor the United States
[56]

are signatories to the Convention.

Yet even if there is no unanimity as to the applicable theory behind the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments or a universal treaty
rendering it obligatory force, there is consensus that the viability of such
recognition and enforcement is essential. Steiner and Vagts note:

. . . The notion of unconnected bodies of national law on private international law,

each following a quite separate path, is not one conducive to the growth of a
transnational community encouraging travel and commerce among its members.
There is a contemporary resurgence of writing stressing the identity or similarity of
the values that systems of public and private international law seek to further – a
community interest in common, or at least reasonable, rules on these matters in
national legal systems. And such generic principles as reciprocity play an important
role in both fields.
[57]

Salonga, whose treatise on private international law is of worldwide

renown, points out:

Whatever be the theory as to the basis for recognizing foreign judgments, there can be
little dispute that the end is to protect the reasonable expectations and demands of the
parties. Where the parties have submitted a matter for adjudication in the court of one
state, and proceedings there are not tainted with irregularity, they may fairly be
expected to submit, within the state or elsewhere, to the enforcement of the judgment
issued by the court.[58]

There is also consensus as to the requisites for recognition of a foreign

judgment and the defenses against the enforcement thereof. As earlier
discussed, the exceptions enumerated in Section 48, Rule 39 have remain
unchanged since the time they were adapted in this jurisdiction from long
standing American rules. The requisites and exceptions as delineated under
Section 48 are but a restatement of generally accepted principles of
international law. Section 98 of The Restatement, Second, Conflict of Laws,
states that “a valid judgment rendered in a foreign nation after a fair trial in a
contested proceeding will be recognized in the United States,” and on its face,
the term “valid” brings into play requirements such notions as valid jurisdiction
over the subject matter and parties. Similarly, the notion that fraud or
[59]

collusion may preclude the enforcement of a foreign judgment finds

affirmation with foreign jurisprudence and commentators, as well as the
[60]

doctrine that the foreign judgment must not constitute “a clear mistake of law
or fact.” And finally, it has been recognized that “public policy” as a defense
[61]

to the recognition of judgments serves as an umbrella for a variety of

concerns in international practice which may lead to a denial of recognition. [62]

The viability of the public policy defense against the enforcement of a

foreign judgment has been recognized in this jurisdiction. This defense
[63]

allows for the application of local standards in reviewing the foreign judgment,
especially when such judgment creates only a presumptive right, as it does in
cases wherein the judgment is against a person. The defense is also
[64]

recognized within the international sphere, as many civil law nations adhere to
a broad public policy exception which may result in a denial of recognition
when the foreign court, in the light of the choice-of-law rules of the recognizing
court, applied the wrong law to the case. The public policy defense can
[65]

safeguard against possible abuses to the easy resort to offshore litigation if it

can be demonstrated that the original claim is noxious to our constitutional
values.
There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that
requires the Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or allow a procedure
for the enforcement thereof. However, generally accepted principles of
international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form
part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty
obligations. The classical formulation in international law sees those
[66]

customary rules accepted as binding result from the combination two

elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of
States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive
necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a
belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a
rule of law requiring it.
[67]

While the definite conceptual parameters of the recognition and

enforcement of foreign judgments have not been authoritatively established,
the Court can assert with certainty that such an undertaking is among those
generally accepted principles of international law. As earlier demonstrated,
[68]

there is a widespread practice among states accepting in principle the need

for such recognition and enforcement, albeit subject to limitations of varying
degrees. The fact that there is no binding universal treaty governing the
practice is not indicative of a widespread rejection of the principle, but only a
disagreement as to the imposable specific rules governing the procedure for
recognition and enforcement.
Aside from the widespread practice, it is indubitable that the procedure for
recognition and enforcement is embodied in the rules of law, whether statutory
or jurisprudential, adopted in various foreign jurisdictions. In the Philippines,
this is evidenced primarily by Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
has existed in its current form since the early 1900s. Certainly, the Philippine
legal system has long ago accepted into its jurisprudence and procedural
rules the viability of an action for enforcement of foreign judgment, as well as
the requisites for such valid enforcement, as derived from internationally
accepted doctrines. Again, there may be distinctions as to the rules adopted
by each particular state, but they all prescind from the premise that there is a
[69]

rule of law obliging states to allow for, however generally, the recognition and
enforcement of a foreign judgment. The bare principle, to our mind, has
attained the status of opinio juris in international practice.
This is a significant proposition, as it acknowledges that the procedure and
requisites outlined in Section 48, Rule 39 derive their efficacy not merely from
the procedural rule, but by virtue of the incorporation clause of the
Constitution. Rules of procedure are promulgated by the Supreme
Court, and could very well be abrogated or revised by the high court itself.
[70]

Yet the Supreme Court is obliged, as are all State components, to obey the
laws of the land, including generally accepted principles of international law
which form part thereof, such as those ensuring the qualified recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments. [71]

Thus, relative to the enforcement of foreign judgments in the Philippines, it

emerges that there is a general right recognized within our body of laws, and
affirmed by the Constitution, to seek recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments, as well as a right to defend against such enforcement on the
grounds of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact.
The preclusion of an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment in this
country merely due to an exhorbitant assessment of docket fees is alien to
generally accepted practices and principles in international law. Indeed, there
are grave concerns in conditioning the amount of the filing fee on the
pecuniary award or the value of the property subject of the foreign decision.
Such pecuniary award will almost certainly be in foreign denomination,
computed in accordance with the applicable laws and standards of the
forum. The vagaries of inflation, as well as the relative low-income capacity
[72]

of the Filipino, to date may very well translate into an award virtually
unenforceable in this country, despite its integral validity, if the docket fees for
the enforcement thereof were predicated on the amount of the award sought
to be enforced. The theory adopted by respondent judge and the Marcos
Estate may even lead to absurdities, such as if applied to an award involving
real property situated in places such as the United States or Scandinavia
where real property values are inexorably high. We cannot very well require
that the filing fee be computed based on the value of the foreign property as
determined by the standards of the country where it is located.
As crafted, Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil Procedure avoids
unreasonableness, as it recognizes that the subject matter of an action for
enforcement of a foreign judgment is the foreign judgment itself, and not the
right-duty correlatives that resulted in the foreign judgment. In this particular
circumstance, given that the complaint is lodged against an estate and is
based on the US District Court’s Final Judgment, this foreign judgment may,
for purposes of classification under the governing procedural rule, be deemed
as subsumed under Section 7(b)(3) of Rule 141, i.e., within the class of “all
other actions not involving property.” Thus, only the blanket filing fee of
minimal amount is required.
Finally, petitioners also invoke Section 11, Article III of the Constitution,
which states that “[F]ree access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and
adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of
poverty.” Since the provision is among the guarantees ensured by the Bill of
Rights, it certainly gives rise to a demandable right. However, now is not the
occasion to elaborate on the parameters of this constitutional right. Given our
preceding discussion, it is not necessary to utilize this provision in order to
grant the relief sought by the petitioners. It is axiomatic that the
constitutionality of an act will not be resolved by the courts if the controversy
can be settled on other grounds or unless the resolution thereof is
[73]

indispensable for the determination of the case. [74]

One more word. It bears noting that Section 48, Rule 39 acknowledges
that the Final Judgment is not conclusive yet, but presumptive evidence of a
right of the petitioners against the Marcos Estate. Moreover, the Marcos
Estate is not precluded to present evidence, if any, of want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
This ruling, decisive as it is on the question of filing fees and no other, does
not render verdict on the enforceability of the Final Judgment before the
courts under the jurisdiction of the Philippines, or for that matter any other
issue which may legitimately be presented before the trial court. Such issues
are to be litigated before the trial court, but within the confines of the matters
for proof as laid down in Section 48, Rule 39. On the other hand, the speedy
resolution of this claim by the trial court is encouraged, and contumacious
delay of the decision on the merits will not be brooked by this Court.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders are
NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE, and a new order REINSTATING Civil Case No.
97-1052 is hereby issued. No costs.
SO ORDERED.