Qualified Theft and Estafa As Furtive Crimes

Cases on Qualified theft and Estafa as Furtive Crimes
Prepared by AB POL SCI Practicum Students of Ateneo de Davao University

Delgado, Mendoza, and Canda
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
THIRD DIVISION
1.
G.R. No. 176114 April 8, 2015
GRACE SAN DIEGO y TRINIDAD, Petitioner,

vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For resolution of this Court is the Petition for Review, dated January 23, 2007, of petitioner Grace
San Diego which seeks to reverse arid set aside the Decision1 and Resolution,2 dated March 6, 2006
and December 14, 2006, respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming with modification the
Decision3 dated August 20, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 1 7,
finding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft.
The following are the antecedent facts as found in the records.
Petitioner Grace San Diego had been the accountant of Obando Fisherman's Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, Inc. (OFMPCI) from January 1993 to March 11, 1997. Petitioner was in charge of
accounting all business transactions of the cooperative and performed the functions of cashier and
teller, granted loans and did check discounting and trading. She also recorded and reported the cash
in bank transactions and summarized the bank transactions for the day and was also entrusted with
a set of blank checks pre-signed and was authorized to fill up the checks, particularly the date, the
amount in words and in figures, and the payee.
That from November 18, 1996 to January 6, 1997, petitioner acted as cashier when Teresita
Gonzales was on maternity leave and acted as teller from January 13- 30, 1997 when Flordeliza
Ocampo was on her honeymoon. She then, on both occasions, had complete access to the cash
vaults and filing cabinets of the cooperative where its documents were kept.
On March 12, 1997, petitioner stopped reporting for work. Narciso Correa, the General Manager of
the cooperative, then instructed the bookkeeper, Angelita Dimapelis, to prepare bank book balance
based on the cash transactions during the day at the office. They tried to establish the accountability
of San Diego by comparing the cash position she prepared and certified as correct against the
balances of the bank. Dimapelis asked the different depository banks for their bank balances since
their savings account passbooks and bank statements were missing at that time.4
It was only after Corres and Dimapelis reconciled the cash position with the bank balances that they
discovered the discrepancies in petitioner's report. The audited figure showed the cash on hand in
bank to be Php3,712,442.80 as of March 11, 1997.However, petitioner reported and certified the
cash on hand of the cooperative with the total amount of Php9,590,455.17 to be correct. Dimapelis
reported the said discrepancies to Correa and the Board of Directors. It was then that they decided
to file a criminal complaint against San Diego.5
Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of qualified theft,6 which reads as
follows:
That [on] or about the period from January 1996 up to March 1997 in the [M]unicipality of Obando,
[P]rovince of Bulacan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being employed as accountant, cashier and teller of Obando Fisherman's Multi-
Purpose Cooperative, Inc. (OFMPCI) and as such had access to the books, cash vaults and bank
deposits of the Cooperative and with grave abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of Obando
Fisherman's Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc., take, steal and carry away with her cash amounting to
Php6,016,084.26, to [the] damage and prejudice of the said Obando Fisherman's Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, Inc., in the said amount of Php6,016,084.26. CONTRARY TO LAW.7
Upon arraignment on December 11, 1987, the accused, then assisted by counsel de oficio for
arraignment only, entered a plea of not guilty. The pre-trial having been waived, trial on the merits
ensued.
The prosecution, to prove the above-stated facts, presented the testimonies of Alfonso Piscasio, its
expert witness, Narciso Correa, Angelita Demapilis, Teresita Gonzales, Noel Hilario and Santiago
Panganiban. The testimonies of Dante Liwanag, Cecilia Sayo and Jessybelle San Diego were
dispensed with. The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimonies of Alberto C. Gonzales
and Criselda Sarmiento-Oplas. The testimony of Oplas, the defense's expert witness, can be
summarized as follows:
Oplas stated that she went over the bank reconciliation statements for the whole year of 1996 and
January to March 1997, the financial statements called financial conditions and the financial
operations of the company for the years ending December 1996 and March 1997. She noticed that
one of the recording items stated "overstatement of deposit" or overecording of deposit so that it was
deducted from the book. Another reconciling item stated "understatement deposit" and it was added.
In "overstatement of deposit," she found a notation "shortage" but did not find that the amount added
in the case of understatement of deposit was offset against the shortage or the amount deducted
from the book in case of overstatement of deposit.8
Consequently, the RTC rendered a Decision dated August 20, 2001, finding petitioner Grace San
Diego guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, thus:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing findings, the Court hereby finds accused GRACE SAN
DIEGO y TRINIDAD guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT as defined
and penalized under Article 310, in relation to Articles 308 and 309 of the Revised Penal Code, and
accordingly, sentences her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for forty years without pardon
before the lapse of 40 years and with the accessory penalties of death under Article 40 of the
Revised Penal Code, and to indemnify the Obando Fisherman's Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc., in
the amount of Php6,016,084.26.
SO ORDERED.9
Due to the nature of the judgment, petitioner filed her appeal with this Court. However, in
accordance with the ruling in People v. Mateo,10 the appeal was transmitted to the CA for
intermediate review. The CA then affirmed the decision of the RTC, with modification that she
indemnify the Obando Fisherman's Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. in the amount of
Php2,080,000.00. The dispositive portion of the said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the trial court appealed from which found
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that she is to indemnify the Obando Fisherman's Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, Inc. in the amount of Php 2,080,000.00.
SO ORDERED.11
Petitioner, after the CA denied her motion for reconsideration, filed with this Court the present
petition stating the following grounds:
a) THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT HELD

THAT THE PROOF ADDUCED BY THE PEOPLE SUFFICES TO OVERTURN THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE;
b) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN THE CHARACTERIZATION OF THE OFFENSE

ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN COMMITTED, AND IN CONSEQUENCE, COMMITTED[A]
GRAVE LEGAL ERROR WHEN IT HELD THAT THE PROOF ADDUCED CONGRUES
WITH THE OFFENSE WITH WHICH APPELLANT WAS CHARGED; AND
c) THE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW IN THE

MATTER OF THE PENALTY IMPOSED.
In its comment dated April 18, 2007, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) stated that impleading
the CA is procedurally improper. It was stressed that the petition was an offshoot of a criminal case,
thus, the real party-respondent-in-interest is the People of the Philippines. The OSG prayed that the
petition be dismissed outrightly.
This Court finds the present petition partially with merit.
It is settled that absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid of support in the records, or
that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion, the factual findings of
the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry even more weight when said court affirms the
findings of the trial court.12 Petitioner is of the opinion that the CA erred in affirming the factual
findings of the RTC. She insists that the prosecution was not able to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt because there was no proof in the audit that the cooperative had really so much
funds and that in consequence there was deficiency of some Php6,000,000 when compared to
pertinent bank statements. As such, petitioner asserts that it is essential for a successful prosecution
for theft that the existence of the personality stolen be established by qualitative evidence, so the
prosecution must fail if no such proof of good quality was adduced.13
This Court disagrees.
The CA did not err when it ruled that the proof adduced by the prosecution is sufficient to prove
petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution presented the testimony of its expert
witness, Alfonso Piscasio, the cooperative's independent auditor since 1992. He stated that his audit
was based on standard and generally accepted auditing procedures.14 The audit report, duly offered
and presented in the trial, was supported by certifications by several depository banks of the
cooperative indicating its balance on its account. Records are bereft of any showing that the audit
report made by the independent auditor is erroneous and unsupported by documents and bank
statements. Thus, there lies no reason for this Court not to afford full faith and credit to his report.
Petitioner's own expert witness, Criselda Sarmiento Oplas, failed to dispute the audit report
presented. She admitted to focusing her review on bank reconciliation made by Piscasio.15 It was
only upon cross-examination that she saw the daily cash flow that petitioner prepared and
certified.16 She did not go over the primary books of accounts of the cooperative like the ledgers,
journals and vouchers nor its commercial documents such as invoices, returned checks including
account deposits. She limited herself to the monthly conciliation reports.17 Petitioner also asserts that
the People did not present any witness who categorically testified that petitioner ran away with the
supposed missing funds. She claimed that the demonstration that some checks of varying amounts
not recorded in petitioner's books notwithstanding their return or dishonor, only proved her
incompetence in the performance of her assigned task and not necessarily criminal authorship.
This Court does not agree. It was held in People v. Ragon that resort to circumstantial evidence is
inevitable when there are no eyewitnesses to a crime.18 Direct evidence of the commission of a crime
is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt.19 The courts
are allowed to rule on the bases of circumstantial evidence if the following requisites concur: (1)
there is more than one circumstance, (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven,
and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.20 The corollary rule is that the circumstances established must constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.21
In the instant case, the following facts were established in the trial court, which the CA later affirmed:
1) Petitioner was the accountant of the cooperative. She had custody of the cooperative's
checks which were pre-signed by its Manager and Chairman of the Board of Directors. She
was likewise in charge of cash in bank. She had custody of the documents pertaining to the
withdrawal of the cooperative's deposits with its depository banks.
2) Petitioner completed said checks by filling in all the details inclusive of the date, name of
payee and the amount of the check in words and in figures but exclusive of the signatures.
3) From November 18, 1996 to January 6, 1997, she acted as cashier when Teresita
Gonzales was on maternity leave and acted as teller from January 13-30, 1997 when
Flordeliza Ocampo went into her honeymoon. She then, on both occasions, had complete
access to the cash vaults and filing cabinets of the cooperative where its documents were
kept.
4) Petitioner prepared a certification that the amount of Php9,653,527.06 represented the

total cash balance of the cooperative its depository banks as of March 11, 1997. Upon actual
verification, it was shown that the total cash balance was only Php3,637,442. 80, indicating
that there was a difference of Php 6,016,084.25 and the loss of which were unexplained.
5) Petitioner admitted in a letter to her father that she withdrew Php200,000 from his account
and Php20,000 from her sister-in-law's account in the cooperative.
6) Petitioner deposited Php1,050,000 and Php250,000 to her account with PCI Bank on
August 13, 1996 and May 28, 1996, respectively.
7) Petitioner stopped reporting for work since March 12, 1997.22
In view of the foregoing circumstances and based on records, such created an unbroken chain
which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the petitioner, to the exclusion of all
others, as the guilty person.
Petitioner then insists that the proof adduced plausibly indicates commission of estafa and not
qualified theft. Petitioner argued that if the thing is not taken away, but received and then
appropriated or converted without the consent of the owner, the crime committed is estafa.23 This
Court is not persuaded by her argument. One of the elements of estafa24 with abuse of confidence is
that the money, goods or other personal property be received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery
of, or to return, the same. When the thing is received by the offender from the offended party in trust
or in commission or for administration, the offender acquires both material or physical possession
and juridical possession of the thing received.25
Juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over the thing
transferred and this he may set up even against the owner.26 It was established in the trial that
petitioner never received the sum of money in trust, or on commission or for administration. Correa
outlined the procedure followed by the cooperative in the deposit of its funds with the cooperative's
depository banks, thus:
A: There were cash summarized for the day and the checks collected during the day for the different
depository banks are summarized and prepared by Grace San Diego and this(sic) were being
brought to the different depository banks and sent through our liaison office Mr. Al Gonzales.27
xxx
When asked how said funds were withdrawn from said banks by the cooperative, Correa answered:
A: Normally, withdrawals are made by checks and if there are no cleared checks in the bank the
accountant because she knew the cash position in the bank if there is a need of cash, a check is
converted into cash in the depository bank and sent through the liaison officer and handed to the
chief accountant because she was the one responsible.28
xxx
As to how checks were prepared as far as withdrawals were concerned was, Correa's answer was:
A: Because we have so many things to do, we were busy we were preoccupied, we prepared set of
blank check resigned and we entrusted this to Ms. Grace San Diego and she filled up the checks
particularly the date, the words, the amount in words and in figure numbers, sir.29 Clearly, the above
testimonies show that petitioner did not have juridical possession of the sum of money. She did not
have the right over the sum of money she may have received in the course of her functions as
accountant, teller and cashier of the cooperative. The CA was correct when it described the
possession of the petitioner was akin to that of a receiving teller of funds received from third persons
paid to the bank. Payment by third persons to the teller is payment to the bank itself; the teller is a
mere custodian or keeper of the funds received, and has no independent, autonomous right to retain
the money or goods received in consequence of the agency, as when the principal fails to reimburse
him for advances he has made, and indemnify him for damages suffered without his fault.30
Anent the issue of penalty, the penalty for the crime of qualified theft based on Article 310 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC)is the penalty next higher by two (2) degrees than those respectively
specified in Article 309 of the RPC, thus:
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is
more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen
exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this
paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the
penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. From the
provisions of Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC, the penalty that is two (2) degrees higher than prision
mayor in its minimum and medium periods is reclusion temporalin its medium and maximum periods.
In view, however, of the incremental penalty in simple theft under Article 309 of the RPC, which is
likewise applicable to the crime of qualified theft, when the value of the thing stolen is more than
₱22,000.00, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period with an additional period of one (1)
year for every ₱10,000.00 in excess of ₱22,000.00. In the case at bar, the value of the property
stolen as determined by the RTC and modified by the CA is ₱2,080,000.00. Deducting ₱22,000.00
to the amount, the difference of ₱2,058,000.00 will then be divided by ₱10,000.00, disregarding any
amount less than ₱10,000.00, we will have two hundred five (205). Thus, 205 years is the
incremental penalty. Since the imposable penalty for qualified theft is reclusion temporalin its
medium and maximum periods to be imposed in its maximum period which is eighteen (18) years,
two (2) months, and twenty-one (21) days to twenty (20) years, if we add the incremental penalty of
two hundred five (205) years, then the range of the penalty is two hundred twenty-three (223) years,
two (2) months, and twenty-one (21) days to two hundred twenty-five (225) years. However, such
penalty cannot be imposed because the maximum penalty that can be imposed is only up to 40
years, which is the maximum period of reclusion perpetua.
Unlike in Simple Theft where the maximum penalty cannot exceed twenty (20) years, in Qualified
Theft such limitation does not exist. Nonetheless, inasmuch as the penalty imposable in the case at
1âwphi1
bar exceeds twenty (20) years, logically, the penalty that should be imposed is reclusion perpetua,
which is the penalty one degree higher than reclusion temporal.
There is now a need to modify the penalty imposed by the lower court and affirmed by the CA.
Verily, the proper penalty imposable is, thus, the penalty of reclusion perpetua, but it was incorrect
for the R TC to sentence the accused to the penalty of reclusion perpetua for forty ( 40) years
without pardon because that would be a limitation on the part of the power of the Chief Executive.
The exercise of the pardoning power is discretionary in the President and may not be controlled by
the legislature or reversed by the court, save only when it contravenes the limitations set forth by the
Constitution.31 Interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum is likewise imposed from date of
finality of this Decision until full payment pursuant to Nacar v. Gallery Frames.32
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Consequently, the Decision and Resolution, dated March 6,
2006 and December 14, 2006, respectively, of the Court of Appeals affirming with modification the
Decision dated August 20, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 17, finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft under Article 310, in
connection with Article 308 of the Revised· Penal Code, are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Petitioner Grace San Diego y Trinidad is sentenced to reclusion perpetua, with all
its accessory penalties. and to indemnify the Obando Fisherman's Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. in
the amount of Php2,080,000.00, plus interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from finality
of judgment until full satisfaction:
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO* BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Footnotes
* Designated Acting Member, per Special Order No. 1958 dated March 23, 2015.
1
Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok, with Associate Justices Marina
L. Buson and Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now a member of this Court), concurring; rollo, pp. 22-
53.
2
Id. at 63-56.
3
Penned by Presiding Judge Teresita V. Diaz-Baldos; id. at 86-110.
4
CA Decision p. 6,rollop. 27.
5
TSN, November 17, 1998, pp. 11-12
6
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. — Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to
gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take
personal property of another without the latter's consent.
Art. 310. Qualified theft. — The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next
higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article,
if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the
property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts
taken from the premises of the plantation or fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or if
property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic erruption, or
any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
7
Rollo, p. 86.
8
TSN, June 22, 2000, p. 20.
9
Rollop. 110.
10
G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
11
CA Decision, p. 31, rollo p. 52.
12
Libuit v. People, 506 Phil. 591, 599 (2005).
13
Rollo, p. 8.
14
TSN, April 28, 1998, p. 18.
15
TSN, June 22, 2000, p. 15.
16
CA Decision, pp. 23-24; rollo, pp. 44-45;
17
TSN, July 27, 2000, pp- 9-10
18
346 Phil. 772, 779 (1997).
People v. Danao, 313 Phil. 178, 184 (1995), citing People v. Desalisa, G. R. No. 95262,
19
January 4, 1994, 229 SCRA 35.

20
Id., citing People v. Sunga, et al., G.R. No. 106096, November 22, 1994, 238 SCRA 274.
Id., citing People v. Genobia, et al., G.R. No. 110058, August 3, 1994, 234 SCRA 699;
21
People v. Estrellanes, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 111003, December 15, 1994, 239 SCRA 235.
22
CA Decision, pp. 26-27; rollo, pp. 47-48.
23
Citing People v. Nieves De Vera, 43 Phil. 1000, 1004 (1922); People v. Jaranilla, G.R. No.
L-28547, February 22, 1974, 55 SCRA 563.
Art. 315 Swindling (estafa) Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
24
mentioned herein below shall be punished by:
x x x x 1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
x x x (b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money,

goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to
make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or
partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or
other property.
25
Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, 2008 ed., Book Two, p. 781.
26
Id.
27
TSN, August 25, 1998, p. 20.
28
CA Decision, p. 8; rollo, p. 29.
29
TSN, August 25, 1998, p. 21.
30
Citing Guzman vs. CA, 99 Phil. 704, 707 (1956), citing Article 1915, New Civil Code.
31
Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 2002 ed., p. 230.
32
G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013, 703 SCRA 439.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 199208 July 30, 2014

2.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
TRINIDAD A. CAHILIG, Appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is an appeal by Trinidad A. Cahilig (Cahilig) from the Decision qf the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01381 affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 137, Makati City in Criminal Case Nos. 03-2178 to 2207 finding her guilty of thirty
(30) counts of Qualified Theft.
The Facts
Cahilig worked as cashier at Wyeth Philippines Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc.
(WPESLAI) from December 1992 until 7 November 2001. She was tasked with handling, managing,
receiving, and disbursing the funds of the WPESLAI.1
It was discovered that from 31 May 2000 to 31 July 2001, Cahilig made withdrawals from the funds
ofWPESLAI and appropriated the same for her personal benefit.2 Cahilig would prepare
disbursement vouchers, to be approved by the WPESLAI president and Board of Directors, in order
to withdraw funds from one of WPESLAI’s bank accounts then transfer these funds to its other bank
account. The withdrawal was done by means of a check payable to Cahilig, in her capacity as
WPESLAI cashier. This procedure for transferringfunds from one bank account to another was said
to be standard practice at WPESLAI. However, Cahilig did not actually transfer the funds. Instead,
she made it appear in her personal WPESLAI ledger that a deposit was made into her account and
then she would fill out a withdrawal slip to simulate a withdrawal of said amount from her capital
contribution.3
The trial court found that Cahilig employed the same scheme in each of the 30 cases of qualified
theft filed against her, allowing her to pilfer from WPESLAI’S funds a total of ₱6,268,300.00,
brokendown into the following amounts:
Criminal Case No. 03-2178 ₱200,000.00
Criminal Case No. 03-2179 ₱250,000.00
Criminal Case No. 03-2180 ₱200,000.00
Criminal Case No. 03-2181 ₱55,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2182 ₱55,000.00
Criminal Case No. 03-2183 ₱85,000.00
Criminal Case No. 03-2184 ₱350,000.00
Criminal Case No. 03-2185 ₱250,000.00
Criminal Case No. 03-2186 ₱20,000.00
Criminal Case No. 03-2187 ₱250,000.00
Criminal Case No. 03-2188 ₱60,000.00
Criminal Case No. 03-2189 ₱150,000.00
Criminal Case No. 03-2190 ₱50,000.00
Criminal Case No. 03-2191 ₱46,300.00
Criminal Case No. 03-2192 ₱205,000.00
Criminal Case No. 03-2193 ₱200,000.00
Criminal Case No. 03-2194 ₱25,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2195 ₱500,000.00
Criminal Case No. 03-2196 ₱500,000.00
Criminal Case No. 03-2197 ₱30,000.00
Criminal Case No. 03-2198 ₱400,000.00
Criminal Case No. 03-2199 ₱300,000.00
Criminal Case No. 03-2200 ₱500,000.00
Criminal Case No. 03-2201 ₱65,000.00
Criminal Case No. 03-2202 ₱47,000.00
Criminal Case No. 03-2203 ₱500,000.00
Criminal Case No. 03-2204 ₱40,000.00
Criminal Case No. 03-2205 ₱400,000.00
Criminal Case No. 03-2206 ₱35,000.00
Criminal Case No. 03-2207 ₱500,000.0
All 30 cases were consolidated and jointly heard. Upon agreement of the parties, only three of the 30
cases went thru trial. The remaining 27 cases were the subject of a written stipulation of facts, on the
basis of which these were submitted for resolution. The stipulation stated, among others: That for
purposes of efficient and speedy administration of these cases, the parties herein agreed, during the
pre-trial conference and approved by the Honorable Court, that the actualtrial and presentation of
evidence will be done only on the first three (3) counts of the cases, i.e., on Cases Numbers 03-2178
to 03-2180, with the understanding and agreement that after the termination of the hearing onsaid
three (3) cases, the parties shall adopt the results thereof in the remaining twenty-seven (27) counts,
considering that all the cases arose from similar transactions with the same methods or modus
operandi used in committing the crime charged, and involving the same accused and the same
offended party[.]4
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC found Cahilig guilty of the crimes charged, in a Decision dated 16 June 2005, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court hereby finds Trinidad Cahlig guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft in each of the informations, and sentences her to
suffer the penalty of:
1. In Criminal Case No. 03-2178, reclusion perpetuaand to indemnify the private complainant
in the amount of ₱200,000.00;
2. In Criminal Case No. 03-2179, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of ₱250,000.00;
9. In Criminal Case No. 03-2186, ten (10) years and one (1) days (sic) as minimum to twenty
(20) years as maximum and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
₱20,000.00;
14. In Criminal Case No. 03-2191, ten (10) years and one (1) day as minimum to twenty (20)
years as maximum and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of ₱4[6],300.00;
years as maximum and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of ₱25,000.00;
complainant in the amount of ₱500,000.00.
Costs against accused in eachof the above numbered cases.
SO ORDERED.5
The RTC held that Cahilig, as cashier of WPESLAI, was granted trust and confidence by the key
officers ofthe association. The RTC noted that Cahilig "enjoyed access to the funds and financial
records of the association, a circumstance that understandably facilitated her easy withdrawal of
funds which she converted to her personal use in the manner heretofore described. Undoubtedly,
she betrayed the trust and confidence reposed upon her by her employer."6
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Cahilig appealed her conviction to the CA. In a Decision dated 18 February 2011, the CA denied her
appeal and affirmed the RTC’s Decision.
The CA held that all the elements of Qualified Theft were present in every charge:
x x x First, there was taking ofpersonal property, when accusedappellant took the proceeds of the
WPESLAI checks issued in her name as cashier of the association which are supposed to be
redeposited to another account of WPESLAI. Second, the property belongs to another, since the
funds undisputably belong to WPESLAI. Third, the taking was done without the consent of the
owner, which is obvious because accusedappellant created a ruse showing that the funds were
credited to another account but were actually withdrawn from her own personal account. Fourth, the
taking was done with intentto gain, as accused-appellant, for her personal benefit, took the fundsby
means of a modus operandi that made it appear through the entries inthe ledgers that all
withdrawals and deposits were made in the normal course of business and with the approval of
WPESLAI. Fifth, the taking was accomplished without violence or intimidation against the person [or]
force upon things. And finally, the acts were committed with grave abuse of confidence considering
that her position as cashier permeates trust and confidence.7
The Court’s Ruling
The Court denies the petition. However, the penalties imposed by the trial court in six of the 30
cases are incorrect and, therefore, must be modified.
Qualified Theft
Article 310, in relation to Article 308, of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime of Qualified Theft:
Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two
degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding articles, if committed by a domestic
servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or
large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, fish taken froma
fishpond or fishery, orif property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic
eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. - Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but
without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal
property of another without the latter’s consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lostproperty, shall fail to deliver the same to the local
authorities or to its owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove
or make use of the fruits or objects of the damage caused by him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or
which belongs to another and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the
same or shall gather fruits, cereals, or other forest or farm products.
Thus, the elements of Qualified Theft, committed with grave abuse of confidence, are as follows:
1. Taking of personal property;
2. That the said property belongs to another;
3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That it be done without the owner’s consent;
5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of
force upon things;
6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.8
It is clear that all the elements ofQualified Theft are present in these cases.
Cahilig took money from WPESLAI and its depositors by taking advantage of her position. Her intent
to gain is clear in the use of a carefully planned and deliberately executed scheme to commit the
theft.
Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of Qualified Theft, "must be the result of the relation by
reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between the appellant and the offended party that
might create a high degree of confidence betweenthem which the appellant abused."9
Cahilig’s position was one reposed with trust and confidence, considering that it involves "handling,
managing, receiving, and disbursing" money from WPESLAI’s depositors and other funds of the
association. Cahilig’s responsibilities as WPESLAI cashier required prudence and vigilance over the
1âwphi1
money entrusted into her care.
However, instead of executing her duties, she deliberately misled the board of directors into
authorizing disbursements for money that eventually ended up in her personal account, a fact that
Cahilig did not deny.
Proper Penalty
The trial court, however, erred inthe penalty imposed in Criminal Case Nos. 03-2186, 03-2191, 03-
2194, 03-2197, 03-2204, and 03-2206.
To recall, the amounts involved in the aforesaid cases are ₱20,000.00, ₱46,300.00, ₱25,000.00,
₱30,000.00, ₱40,000.00, and ₱35,000.00, respectively.
Article 310 provides that Qualified Theft "shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two
degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article." Article 309, in turn, states:
Art. 309. Penalties. -Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is
paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalty shall be termed pr is ion mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
xxxx
In the aforementioned six cases, none of the amounts are below ₱12,000.00. Hence, if the crime
charged had been simple theft, the penalty in any of these six cases would have been, at least,
prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Since it was established that the crime was
qualified by grave abuse of confidence, Article 310 provides that the penalty to be imposed shall be
the one "next higher by two degrees," which in this case is reclusion perpetua. Accordingly, the
penalty in these six cases should be reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01381 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. In lieu of the penalties meted out by the trial court in Criminal Case Nos. 03-
2186, 03-2191, 03-2194, 03-2197, 03-2204, and 03-2206, appellant Trinidad A. Cahilig is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of qualified theft in the aforesaid
cases. The judgment to indemnify the amounts in each of the corresponding charges stands.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN* JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
3.
ATTESTATION
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
NewsMetro
3 ex-LandBank officials, 2 Uniwide finance execs sued for theft, estafa
By Joel R. San Juan -February 4, 2018
A complaint for qualified theft and estafa has been filed before the Department of Justice against former
executives of state-owned Land Bank of the Philippines (LandBank) and finance officers of Uniwide
Holdings Inc. (UHI) for allegedly conspiring to defraud the UHI owner amounting to almost P4 billion
worth of prime real properties and shares of stocks through deceit and fraudulent means.
A 13-page complaint filed with the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office cited Jimmy Gow, board chairman of
the UHI, Uniwide Sales Inc. (USI) and Uniwide Sales Realty and Resources Corp. (USSRC), as plaintiff. The
complaint named the accused as UHI CFO Jaime Cabangis, Comptroller and Assets Manager Corazon
Rey, former LandBank Chairman Roberto de Ocampo, former LandBank President Margarito Teves and
LandBank Loan Officer Peter Edmard Tamayo.
The complaint said Gow accused these persons of committing the crime of qualified theft and estafa
through alleged deceit, rigged and manipulated dacion en pago of real properties and UHI shares of
stock to LandBank, “without the knowledge and prior approval” of UHI’s board of directors and its
investors.
Dacion en pago is a mode of extinguishing an obligation, whereby the debtor alienates in favor of the
creditor property for the satisfaction of monetary debt.
Also named respondents were Interim Receivership Committee (IRC) Chairman Monico Jacob and
members Cornelio Peralta and Arthur Aguilar. The IRC was created by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) arising from the petition for rehabilitation that Cabangis filed with the regulator.
“As a consequence of the crime perpetrated by respondents and [LandBank] through its officials—de
Ocampo, Teves and Tamayo— we suffered damages amounting to P3.843 billion, representing P1.5
billion worth of mortgaged real properties sold by means of dacion en pago; P143,840,193, representing
the 20-percent addition to the loan; P1.8 billion worth of shares of stock, which [LandBank] should
return to UHI; and P400 million representing the current appraised value of Gow’s Wack-Wack
property,” Gow said in the complaint. He claims the latter asset “was mortgaged illegally and under
deception.”
Gow cited these “damages” in seeking for the prosecution of the respondents for qualified theft and
estafa charges.
Case history
GOW said that sometime in 1993 he allowed Cabangis, who was introduced to him as partner of
prominent accounting firm SGV (SyCip Gores Velayo) & Co., to join in the UHI Group of Cos. after
Cabangis promised to make UHI a publicly listed corporation and generate a capital investment of P4
billion. This came into fruition in 1996, with UHI’s capital investment generated from 27,000 investors.
According to Gow, Cabangis organized the UHI, made himself the CFO with annual salary of P5 million.
He added Cabangis hired ex-SGV executive Rey as comptroller and assets manager. Cabangis, according
to Gow, also named Cezar Virata and Bernardo Villegas as board of directors and retained prominent
law firms.
Gow said he gave full trust and confidence to Cabangis in the management of financial operation of UHI
and affiliates. He said he did not expect that the respondent would take advantage of his trust and
found out later Cabangis alone had been dealing with the banks and making decisions without
consulting him and without prior approval from the board.
In 2014, after a thorough review of the SEC records, Gow said he discovered that Cabangis and the other
respondents “conspired together and defrauded us [and] stole billions of pesos, representing the market
value of our prime real properties and UHI shares of stock fraudulently mortgaged/pledged and sold to
[the LandBank] through rigged and manipulated dacion en pago, without the knowledge and prior
approval of the board of directors and 27,000 stockholders of UHI.”
USWCI loan
CITING 1997 records, Gow stressed that UHI had on hand P4.3-billion capital investment and did not
incur loan liability with any bank.
He added that while liability was absent in UHI nor USSRC, it was only present in the Uniwide Sales
Warehouse Club Inc. (USWCI) to which the LandBank extended a trade loan of P500 million, due to
latter’s rapid growth and phenomenal success in retail business.
However, the USWCI’s loan of P500 million with LandBank was fraudulently transferred and converted
into a loan of UHI by Cabangis, without approval of the board and 27,000 stockholders of UHI, according
to Gow.
“Thereafter, Cabangis and Rey connived, stole and delivered to LandBank as the collaterals of the P500-
million loan originally belonging to USWCI, the UHI’s certificate of title of real property and stock
certificates, USRRC’s certificate of title of prime properties and our [Sps. Jimmy Gow and Amelita Gow’s]
certificate of title of real properties,” he said.
According to Gow, Cabangis and Rey “surreptitiously took away” the certificates of titles and stocks
certificates from the vault that was in custody of the comptroller in their office at a six-story building in
Libis, Quezon City.
Rehabilitation filed
GOW alleged that respondents were able to manipulate and steal billions of pesos from Gow and his
companies by filing an application for rehabilitation of the owner’s companies without the prior
approval of the board of directors and stockholders of each of the companies.
The said application for rehabilitation of Gow’s group of companies was filed notwithstanding the fact
that at the time, the combined assets of the UHI was worth P19,864,007,881, aside from more than P1.5
billion worth of merchandise inventory and P10 billion worth of shares of stocks in contrast to the more
than P11-billion liabilities, the complainant noted.
Records also showed that several rehabilitation plans were made by respondents, led by Cabangis, and
the same were actually implemented when the SEC formed an IRC composed of Jacob as chairman and
Peralta and Aguilar as members.
Because of the petition for rehabilitation filed before the SEC, the control over Gow’s mortgaged assets
was transferred to the SEC, exercised through the IRC chaired by Jacob, a known partner of Cesar
Buenaventura who was also financial advisor of Cabangis, the complaint stated.
Alleged manipulation
GOW alleged that respondents connived in manipulating the arrangement of dacion en pago for the
payment of LandBank loan’s collectibles amounting to P588 million as of May 31, 1999.
“Worse, 20 percent of the fixed loan of P719,200,967, which amounted to P143,840,193, was added,
increasing the loan obligation to P863,040,160,” he added. The complainant alleged the P3 billion worth
of mortgaged properties of UHI were grossly undervalued at P892,645,812 only, which resulted in a
price deficit or shortage of about P1.5 billion.
“The SEC records clearly reveal that I was tricked and deceived into signing the dacion en pago
agreement by the respondents, particularly Jacob who threatened to issue a liquidation order if I did not
sign,” the complainant said. “LandBank officials, particularly respondents Teves, who was then the
president [of LandBank] and Tamayo, the loan officer, connived with respondents and did not
release/return UHI’s 359-million shares of stock worth P1.8 billion,” Gow claimed. Despite the UHI’s
shares of stock worth P1.8 billion being still with the LandBank, officials, in connivance with the
corespondents and through fraudulent manipulation, made to appear that UHI had still loan-balance
deficiency of P39,150,368, the complaint said. The complainant insisted that UHI should have been
entitled or should recover from LandBank P1.5-billion price deficit of the P3 billion worth of mortgaged
real properties sold by means of dacion en pago at grossly undervalued price of P892,645,812.
“Evidently, I was deceived and my consent to the restructuring of loan and the mortgage of my Wack-
Wack property was all vitiated under threat of ‘Order of Liquidation’ of UHI’s assets,” he said
4.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 200308 February 23, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MERA "JOY" ELEUTERIO NIELLES, @ MERA NIELLES DELOS REYES, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Appellant Mera Joy Eleuterio Nielles @Mera Nielles Delos Reyes was charged with the crime of
Qualified Theft in an Information that reads as follows:
That on or about and sometime in July, 2004 in the City of Makati, Philippines and a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the cashier of
complainant Juanita J. Flores and as such enjoying the trust and confidence reposed upon her by
the said complainant, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner
thereof, with grave abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
steal, and carry away collected money in the total amount of ₱640,353.86 to the damage and
prejudice of the complainant, in the aforementioned amount of ₱640,353.86. CONTRARY TO LAW.1
In an Order2 dated January 18, 2005, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 132,
ordered appellant's release from confinement after having posted a bond in the amount ₱100,000.00
undertaken by Far Eastern Surety & Insurance Company, Inc. under Bond No. 8385. Appellant was
thereafter arraigned where she pleaded not guilty to the charges.3
Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution established that private complainant Juanita Flores (Flores) was engaged in the
business of guaranteeing purchase orders and gift checks of Shoemart and Landmark and
disposing, selling or transferring them for consideration. Appellant initially worked as Flores’ house
help but was eventually hired to work at Flores’ office performing clerical jobs like sorting invoices.
When Flores’ business grew, appellant was assigned to bill and collect from sub-guarantors, and to
encash and deposit checks. On July 15, 2004, appellant collected ₱640,353.86 from the sub-
guarantors. However, appellant did not remit the amount to Flores or deposit it in her (Flores’)
account. Instead, she issued 15 personal checks totaling ₱640,353.86 and deposited them to Flores’
account. All the checks were dishonored upon presentment due to "account closed." Appellant
thereafter absconded.
For her part, appellant denied having stolen the amount of ₱640,353.86.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
In a Judgment4 dated March 26, 2008, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 132, found appellant guilty of
the crime of qualified theft, thus:
Given the foregoing, accused Nielles took ₱640,353.86 belonging to private complainant Juanita J.
Flores, without the latter’s consent. The taking was done with intent to gain because when the
accused’s checks bounced, she failed to remit or return the amount. The accused’s act was
accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, but
rather by the use of abuse of confidence reposed [by] private complainant [upon] her. Thus, the
elements of theft, as well as the circumstances that made the same as qualified theft, are present in
the instant case.
Accused Nielles, on the other hand, denied having stolen and carried away ₱640,353.86. Aside from
her bare denial, she did not present any evidence to support this claim. In fact, she did not deny that
the checks were issued and deposited by her. Furthermore, she did not provide any reason or
motive why Juanita would file the present case against her. Accordingly, her denial has no basis and
deserves no consideration.5
The dispositive portion of the RTC Judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Mera "Joy" Eleuterio Nielles a.k.a. Mera Nielles Delos
Reyes, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Theft and hereby sentences her
to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years of prision correccional, as minimum to twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. She is ordered to pay private complainant Juanita J.
Flores ₱640,353.86 as actual damages.
SO ORDERED.6
Aggrieved, appellant filed a notice of appeal. At the same time, she submitted a Renewal
Certificate7 of her bond effective for the period January 18, 2008 to January 18, 2009.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA)
In her Brief, appellant asserted that since private complainant Flores was abroad on July 15, 2004,
she could not have personally known whether appellant indeed collected amounts from the sub-
guarantors. She posited that mere issuance of the 15 checks is not proof that she received/collected
payments from the sub-guarantors or that she failed to remit the monies belonging to Flores. She
insisted that the prosecution failed to establish that she indeed collected monies from the sub-
guarantors amounting to ₱640,353.86. Appellant also theorized that she might have issued the
checks in favor of the sub-guarantors for whatever transactions they have between them; and that
thereafter, when she went to these sub-guarantors to collect their dues for private complainant,
these sub-guarantors used the same checks she previously issued as their payment for private
complainant. For that reason her personal checks were deposited in private complainant’s account.
The CA, however, in its Decision8 dated May 26, 2011, was not impressed by appellant’s
protestations. It held that the fact that Flores was out of the country during the commission of the
offense is irrelevant since the prosecution has satisfactorily established that upon her arrival in the
Philippines, she immediately investigated the matter and talked to the sub-guarantors. Flores also
confirmed that indeed appellant issued 15 personal checks in lieu of the amounts collected and
deposited the same to Flores’ account but were all dishonored upon presentment. Significantly, the
CA noted that aside from her bare denial, appellant did not present any evidence to support her
claim that she did not steal the amount of ₱640,353.86 from Flores. In fine, the CA found all the
elements for the crime of qualified theft to be present.
Thus, the CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the trial court, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the
assailed 26 March 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 132 in Criminal
Case No. 04-3643 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. She is further ordered to pay Private Complainant the
amount of ₱640,353.86.
SO ORDERED.9
Hence, this appeal. In a Resolution10 dated April 18, 2012, we required both parties to file their
Supplemental Briefs. The Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it is no longer filing its
supplemental brief. On the other hand, appellant maintains in her Supplemental Brief11 that the
prosecution failed to establish that she unlawfully took the amount of ₱640,353.86 belonging to
Flores. She claims that mere issuance of the checks does not prove unlawful taking of the
unaccounted amount. She insists that, at most, the issuance of the checks proves that the same was
issued for consideration. On February5, 2013, appellant furnished this Court her bond renewal
certificate12 issued by Far Eastern Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. effective for the period January 18,
2013 to January 18, 2014.
Our Ruling
We concur with the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the prosecution
satisfactorily established all the elements of qualified theft, to wit: 1) taking of personal property;2)
that said property belongs to another; 3) that the said taking was done with intent to gain; 4) that it
was done without the owner’s consent; 5) that it was accomplished without the use of violence or
intimidation against persons, or of force upon things; and 6) that it was done with grave abuse of
confidence.13 As correctly found by the appellate court:
Private complainant testified that Accused-appellant took the amount of ₱640,353.86 from her
without her consent by failing to turn over the amount she collected from the former’s sub-
guarantors. Instead, she issued fifteen (15) personal checks and deposited the same to Private
Complainant’s account which however, all bounced for the reason "account closed". The taking of
the amount collected by Accused-appellant was obviously done with intent to gain as she failed to
remit the same to Private Complainant. Intent to gain is presumed from the act of unlawful taking.
Further, the unlawful act was accomplished by Accused-appellant without the use of violence or
intimidation against persons, [or] of force upon things as the payment to her of the said amount was
voluntarily handed to her by the sub-guarantors as she was known to be entrusted with the collection
of payments.
The circumstance of grave abuse of confidence that made the same as qualified theft was also
proven. Accused-appellant herself testified that as a cashier, her functions and responsibilities
1âw phi 1
include billings and collections from their agents and making of deposits and withdrawals in behalf of
Private Complainant. Moreover, when the payment for the purchase orders or gift checks becomes
due, she would fill up the four (4) blank checks given by the sub-guarantor with the knowledge and
consent of Private Complainant. It is beyond doubt that an employee like a cashier who comes into
possession of the monies she collected enjoys the confidence reposed in her by her employer, as in
the instant case.14
We are one with the trial court and the appellate court in finding that the element of taking of
personal property was satisfactorily established by the prosecution. During her cross-examination,
private complainant Flores testified that upon having been apprised of the unremitted collections,
she conducted an investigation and inquired from her sub-guarantors who admitted making
payments to appellant.15 She also testified during cross-examination that when appellant arrived from
Hongkong, the latter went to Flores’ office and admitted to having converted the collections to her
personal use.16 Interestingly, when it was her turn to testify, appellant did not rebut Flores’ testimony.
During her direct examination, appellant only testified thus:
Atty. Regino – Question:

Madam Witness, you are being charged here with taking, stealing and carrying away collected
money in the total amount of ₱640,353.86, that is owned by Juanita J. Flores. What can you say
about this allegation?
Witness:
That is not true, sir.
Atty. Regino – Question:
What is your basis in stating that?
Witness:
I never took that six hundred forty thousand that they are saying and, I never signed any document
with the sub-guarantors that I [took] money from them.17
Notably, when Flores testified during her cross-examination that she talked to the sub-guarantors
who admitted having made payments to appellant, the latter’s counsel no longer made further
clarifications or follow-up questions. Thus, Flores’ testimony on this fact remains on record
unrebutted. Clearly, it is futile on the part of the appellant to belatedly claim in her Brief before the
appellate court that the prosecution should have presented these sub-guarantors so they could be
cross-examined.18 There is likewise no merit in her contention that the prosecution is guilty of
suppression of evidence when they did not present these sub-guarantors19 simply because the
defense, on its own initiative, could very well compel, thru the compulsory processes of the court, the
attendance of these sub-guarantors as witnesses.20 Moreover, we note that appellant did not even
attempt to discredit the testimony of Flores to the effect that upon her arrival from Hongkong,
appellant went to Flores’ office and admitted to having committed the offense.
Significantly, when appellant was placed on the witness stand, she did not even make any attempt to
explain her issuance of the 15 checks. In fact, during her entire testimony, she never made any
mention about the personal checks that she issued and deposited in Flores’ account. It was only in
her Memorandum21 filed with the trial court and her Brief22 submitted to the appellate court that the
same was discussed. However, her explanation as to its issuance is so convoluted that it defies
belief. All that appellant could claim is that the issuance of the checks only proves that the same was
for a consideration – but omitted to explain what the consideration was. She also theorized that she
might have issued the checks to the sub-guarantors for her personal transactions but likewise failed
to elaborate on what these transactions were. In any event, if indeed appellant did not steal the
amount of ₱640,353.86 belonging to Flores, how come she issued 15 personal checks in favor of
the latter and deposited the same in her account, albeit they were subsequently dishonored?
Besides, we note that in appellant’s Counter Affidavit23 dated August 20, 2004 subscribed before 3rd
Assistant City Prosecutor Hannibal S. Santillan of Makati City, she already admitted having taken
without the knowledge and consent of private complainant several purchase orders and gift checks
worth thousands of pesos. She claimed though that she was only forced to do so by Edna Cruz and
cohorts.
We also concur with the findings of the trial court and the CA that the prosecution established
beyond reasonable doubt that the amount of ₱640,353.86 actually belonged to Flores; that appellant
stole the amount with intent to gain and without Flores’ consent; that the taking was accomplished
without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, or of force upon things; and that it was
committed with grave abuse of confidence.
Anent the penalty imposed, Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code state:
Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is
paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total penalty which may be
imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
xxxx
Art. 310. Qualified theft. The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two
degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding articles, if committed by a domestic
servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or
large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of the plantation or fish taken from a
fishpond or fishery, or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic
eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
Based on the foregoing, since the amount taken is ₱640,353.86, then the imposable penalty shall be
the maximum period of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, or eight(8) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day to ten (10) years, adding one (1) year for each additional ₱10,000.00. Thus,
from ₱640,353.86, we deduct ₱22,000.00, giving us a balance of ₱618,353.86 which we divide by
₱10,000.00. We now have sixty-one (61)years which we will add to the basic penalty of eight (8)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years. However, as stated in Article 309, the
imposable penalty for simple theft should not exceed a total of twenty (20) years. Thus, if appellant
had committed only simple theft, her penalty would be twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal.
Considering however that in qualified theft, the penalty is two degrees higher, then the appellate
court properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.24
Finally, we note that appellant has not yet been committed to prison. In view thereof and based on
our foregoing discussion, appellant must be ordered arrested and committed to prison to start
serving her sentence.
ACCORDINGLY, the assailed May 26, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
31635 is AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 132 is DIRECTED to issue a
warrant for the arrest of appellant and to order her commitment at the Correctional Institution for
Women, and to submit to this Court a Report of such commitment, all within ten (10) days from
receipt of this Resolution. The Superintendent, Correctional Institution for Women is DIRECTED to
confirm to this Court the confinement of appellant within ten (10) days therefrom.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.* JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

Chief Justice
Footnotes
* Per Special Order No. 1910 dated January 12, 2015.
1
Records, p. I.
2
Id. at 50; penned by Pairing Judge Ricardo R. Rosario.
3
Id. at 54.
4
Id. at 201-206; penned by Judge Rommel O. Baybay.
5
Id. at 205.
6
Id. at 206.
7
Id. at 211.
8
CA rollo, pp. 89-97; penned by Associate Justice Florito S. Macalino and concurred in by
Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Ramon M. Bato, Jr.
9
Id. at 97.
10
Rollo, pp. 19-20.
11
Id. at 35-40.
12
Id. at 53.
13
See People v. Mirto, G.R. No. 193479, October 19, 2011, 659 SCRA 796, 807.
14
CA rollo, pp. 93-94.
15
TSN, May 25, 2005, p. 18.
16
Id. at 17.
17
TSN, July 19, 2006, pp. 16-17.
18
CA rollo, p. 30.
19
Id.
20
See RULES OF COURT, Rule 115, Section 1(g).
21
Records, pp. 194-200.
22
CA rollo, pp. 26-33.
23
Records, pp. 5-10.
24
People v. Mirto, supra note 13 at 814-816.
CASE WHERE CASE OF ESTAFA IS DISMISSED

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 205144 November 26, 2014
MARGIE BALERTA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
The instant petition for review on certiorari1 assails the Decision2 rendered by the Court of Appeals
(CA) on October 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR No. 00693 affirming, albeit with modification as to the
penalty imposed, the Decision3 dated November 15, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Barotac Viejo, Iloilo, Branch 66, in Criminal Case No. 99-1103, convicting Margie Balerta (petitioner)
of Estafa.
Antecedents
The Information, dated October 27,1999, filed against the petitioner before the RTC partially reads
as follows:
That on or about May 31, 1999 until June 17, 1999, in the Municipality of Balasan, Province ofIloilo,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then
an employee/cashier of Balasan Associated Barangays Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BABMPC)[,]
was in[-]charge of collecting and keeping the collections turned over to her by the collectors of the
cooperative [and of] account[ing] for and deposit[ing] the collected amount to the depository bank
which is the Balasan Rural Bank, Balasan, Iloilo, but said accused, far from complying with her
obligation, with unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence, did then and there wilfully, unlawfullyand
feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert toher personal use and benefit the total collection
of One Hundred Eighty[-]Five Thousand Five Hundred Eighty[-]Four Pesos and 06/100
(₱185,584.06) Philippine Currency and despite repeated demands, the said accused failed and still
fails, to liquidate or render formal accounting of her collections or return the aforesaid amount to the
Balasan Associated Barangays Multi-Purpose Cooperative, to its damage and prejudice in the
aforesaid amount of ₱185,584.06.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
During arraignment, the petitioner entered a "not guilty" plea.5 Pre-trial then ensued. The parties
stipulated on the following: (a) the identity and existence of Balasan Associated Barangays Multi-
Purpose Cooperative (BABMPC); (b) the identity of the petitioner and her position as a cashier in
BABMPC; (c) the petitioner "cannot withdraw from the bank account of [BABMPC] alone;" and (d)
the criminal complaint against the petitioner was filed on the basis of the findings of an internal
auditor and not of an independent accountant.6
Version of the Prosecution
During the pre-trial, the prosecution manifested that BABMPC’s Manager, Napoleon Timonera
(Timonera), and Internal Auditor, Ruben Ambros (Ambros), would take the witness stand. Timonera
would testify on the function of BABMPC and the duties of the petitioner, while Ambros’ testimony
would revolve on the facts and circumstances leading to the filing of the complaint. The prosecution
intended to offer before the RTC no other documentary evidence except the affidavits of Timonera
and Ambros.7
In the course of the trial, only Timonera appeared to testify. When the proceedings before the RTC
was concluded, both the prosecution and the defense did not formally offer any documentary
evidence.8
In Timonera’s testimony, he stated that BABMPC is registered with the Cooperative Development
Authority and is engaged in micro-lending, trading and equipment rental.9 At the time he took the
witness stand, Timonera was BABMPC’s Manager, and he was authorized through a board
resolution to represent the cooperative in pursuing the criminal complaint against the petitioner.10
According to Timonera, the petitioner worked as one of the three cashiers in BABMPC.11 She used to
receive daily remittances, deposit to the bank, withdraw and issue loans12 specifically in connection
with Care Philippines’ account involving an amount of ₱1,250,000.00.13 Care Philippines entrusted
the sum to BABMPC, which in turn can release to borrowers loans ranging from ₱500.00 to
₱50,000.00.14
The petitioner neither resigned nor was terminated from employment, but she stopped reporting for
work from June 19, 1999 onwards after BABMPC discovered discrepancies and fraud in her
records.15 Bank records showed that there was a variance of ₱40.00 indicated in BABMPC’s
passbook, on one hand, and in the deposit slip, on the other.16 This prompted BABMPC’s
bookkeeper, Rose De Asis (De Asis) to request the Internal Auditor, Ambros, to verify with the bank,
which in turn disowned the entries and signatures in the passbook made and affixed between March
12, 1999 and June 15, 1999.17 BABMPC also found out from the bank teller that the petitioner
declaredthe cooperative’s passbook as missing since March 1999, hence, a new one was issued on
May 6, 1999.18 The petitioner used the new passbook in making actual transactions with the bank,
but she kept the old passbook, upon which she made falsified entries to prevent BABMPC from
discovering the discrepancies.19 The court asked Timonera how he knew that the signatures in the
old passbook were affixed by the petitioner herself. Timonera replied that it was the petitioner who
kept the passbook, 20 and collected, remitted and withdrew money from the bank.21 BABMPC’s
bookkeeper, De Asis, on the other hand, merely controlled the vouchers and the records of the
transactions.22 The petitioner and De Asis were the two authorized signatories of BABMPC as
regards the passbook kept with the bank.23
Upon audit, BABMPC found that "there was a discrepancy of some ₱185,000.00," ₱90,000.00 of
which in the passbook, while the rest of the amount related to the records of the cooperative kept by
the petitioner. When asked by the petitioner’s counsel about where exactly was the discrepancy
shown in the copy of the bank’s ledger and pages of a passbook, which were part of BABMPC’s
records, Timonera answered that he is not an accountant and Ambros knew more about the matter.24
Timonera also stated that BABMPC had sent the petitioners three letters, dated June 22, 1999, June
24, 1999 and August 30, 1999. The first letter requested the petitioner to report to the office to
explain the discrepancies. The second letter requested the petitioner to pay BABMPC. The first two
letters were brought tothe petitioner’s house by BABMPC’s secretary, Marilyn Mombay (Mombay).
Both times, the petitioner was not at home, and it was Estela Balerta, the former’s sister-in-law, who
received the letters. The last letter was sentby mail, but the petitioner refused to receive it as well.25
Timonera also testified that without the petitioner’s presence and permission, the latter’s table and
drawers were opened through the use of duplicate keys kept by De Asis. The use of the duplicate
keys to open each other’s office drawers was howevera common practice between the petitioner and
De Asis.26
Version of the Defense
The defense, on its part, offered the testimony of the petitioner.
The petitioner testified that the lastday she reported for work as a cashier in BABMPC was on June
17, 1999. Timonera got angry that day when the petitioner reminded him of his cash advances,
which were already equivalent to his salaries for five months. The petitioner emphasized that
Timonera had exceeded the allowable cash advance amount of one month salary.27
On June 18, 1999, the petitioner suffered from migraine and was advised by her doctor to rest for
two weeks. The day after, Timonera visited the petitioner’s house, instructed her to rest, and
informed her that she will be notified in case a necessity for her toreport for work arises. On June 25,
1999, the petitioner received a letter requiring her to go to BABMPC’s office. She complied with the
directive on the same day. Timonera then presented to the petitioner the result of Ambros’ audit
showing that she incurred a shortage of ₱80,000.00. She was not however furnished a copy thereof.
The petitioner also protested that the audit was conducted in her absence, but Timonera informed
her that they would just thresh the matter up in court.28
The petitioner likewise stated that she can no longer find the receipts, vouchers and books in her
drawers showing the cash advances of Timonera. Her plea for the conduct of an independent audit
also fell on deaf ears.29
On July 7, 1999, the petitioner proceeded to the Balasan Police Station to report about the forced
opening of her table and drawers which occurred on June 25, 1999. She also informed the police
that the amount of ₱5,000.00 kept in the drawers was missing. She confronted BABMPC about the
missing cash. Ambros admitted that he and De Asis opened the drawers, but made no mention of
any cash found thereon.30
The petitioner alleged that Timonera was ill motivated when he initiated the filing of the criminal
complaint against her. Timonera intended to evade his financial liabilities from BABMPC relative to
his cash advances and the money which he had diverted to other projects in violation of the rules of
the cooperative. The petitioner also suspected that Timonera must have speculated that the former
had money as she then had plans to go abroad.31
Prior to the petitioner’s reminder to Timonera about the latter’s cash advances, there was no
untoward incident whatsoever between them. She admitted though that she did not report
Timonera’s cash advances to BABMPC’s board.32
The petitioner testified that the only shortage she was aware of involved the amount of ₱1,896.00,
which was reflected in a past monthly audit. To date, the amount remains unsettled.33
Ruling of the RTC
On November 15, 2006, the RTC rendered a Decision,34 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the [petitioner] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Estafa by misappropriation and hereby sentences [the petitioner to] five (5) years, five (5) months
and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal
as maximum, together with the accessory penalty provided by law, to pay [BABMPC] ₱185,584.06
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.35
The RTC’s reasonsare quoted below:
According to the [petitioner], the internal audit wherein she has a shortage of ₱185,584.06 was false.
However, she failed to prove and explain to the Court the exact figure or amount of money she is
accountable of. She failed to cause an audit of her own to show that no shortage was incurred by
her. Her testimony was not corroborated by any witness or other documentary evidence. What she
did was simply to deny her shortage and pointed to [Timonera] as one responsible for the filing of
charges against her. But the [petitioner] alone, being the one keeping the passbook of the
cooperative, was able to misrepresent with the Rural Bank of Balasan that the passbook was lost
and thereafter, she secured a new passbook. After she secured a new passbook, she used both the
old passbook and new passbook and falsified the entries in the old passbook making it appear that
the old passbook was presented and transactions were made using the old passbook with the bank.
With this scheme, it is clear that the accused has all the intention to defraud. For what is the purpose
of using the old passbook when it was already cancelled and of no legal use? Worst is that, by
means of falsification, she made false entries in the old passbook to mislead the officers of
[BABMPC] to believe that the money entrusted to her is safely kept, when in truth[,] there were
already shortages.
The Court believes that the evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming to point out the [petitioner’s]
criminal liability to the offense charged.36
Ruling of the CA
The petitioner challenged the above ruling before the CA raising the factual issues of whether or not,
as claimed by BABMPC, she had (a) falsified the entries in the passbook, (b) received collections for
remittance to the bank, (c) misappropriated BABMPC’s money, and (d) committed estafa.37
On October 31, 2012, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision, the decretal portion of which
states:
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Decision dated November 15, 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 66, Barotac Viejo, Iloilo in Criminal Case No. 99-1103 with modifications with respect
to the indeterminate penalties imposed. The [petitioner] is hereby sentenced to four (4) years and
one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporalas
maximum and to pay [BABMPC] the amount of Php185,584.06.
SO ORDERED.38
The CA based its disposition on the following:
The elements of estafa through conversion or misappropriation under subsection 1 (b) of Art. 315 of
the Revised Penal Code are as follows:
I. That money, goods, or other personal property be received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery
of, or to return, the same, even though the obligation is guaranteed by a bond;
II. That there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the person who
received it, or a denial on his part that he received it;
III. That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
IV. That there be demand for the return of the property.
The essence of this kind of estafais the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to
the prejudice of the entity to whom a return should be made. The words "convert" and
"misappropriate" connote the act of using or disposing of another’s property as if it were one’s own,
or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. Tomisappropriate for one’s own
use includes not only conversion to one’s personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of
the property of another without right. In proving the element of conversion or misappropriation, a
legal presumption of misappropriation arises when the accused fails to deliver the proceeds of the
sale or to return the items to besold and fails to give an account of their whereabouts.39
All the elements are present in the instant case. Firstly, it was sufficiently proven from the
testimonies of both the prosecution and defense witnesses that the [petitioner] was employed as one
of the three cashiers of the cooperative. From the testimonies, it was established that as a cashier,
she was responsible in handling the specific account of the money loaned by Care Philippines to the
cooperative. The money from Care Philippines was used by the cooperative for micro-lending, that
is, lending a small amount of money to small entrepreneurs from ₱500.00 to ₱50,000.00. Being such
a cashier, [thepetitioner’s] duties include receiving daily remittances, making deposits to and
withdrawals from the bank, as well as issuing loans. By receiving the money of the cooperative, [the
petitioner] also had the obligation to make delivery of or to return the same to the cooperative.
Secondly, on the matter of misappropriation, [the petitioner] deplored the conduct of an internal audit
in her absence but she merely denied the shortage of money as shown by the result of the internal
audit. [The petitioner] did not cause an audit of her own to rebut the evidence against her. She did
not show any documentary evidence nor present any witness to support her claims. It is axiomatic
that denial is the weakest form of defense. As held in People v. Magbanua, "[i]t is elementary that
denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative and self-serving evidence
which has far less evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.
Through the use of the two (2) passbooks, [the petitioner] was able to dispose of the funds of the
cooperative to the latter’s disadvantage. Moreover, [the petitioner] did not refute the evidence of the
private offended party that she maintained two (2) passbooks. The certification issued by the
Assistant Manager of the rural bank showing that [the petitioner] had declared as lost the old
passbook was not contradicted by the defense at all. In like manner, there was no evidence
presented by the defense to controvert the claim that the [petitioner] falsified the initials of the bank
employees every time she records an entry in the old passbook, either withdrawal or deposit.
Thirdly, it is needless to say that the cooperative was greatly prejudiced by the misappropriation of
its funds and by the denial of [the petitioner] of the shortfall. Considering that the amount loaned by
Care Philippines to the cooperative for its micro-lending project was Php1,250,000.00 and
considering further that most of its clients only borrow from Php500.00 to Php50, 000.00, [the
petitioner’s] shortage of ₱185, 584.06 is already a substantial amount that could have been lent to a
number of borrowers of the cooperative.
As to the last element pertaining to the demand by the offended party, it has been held that, "[i]n a
prosecution for estafa, demand is not necessary where there is evidenceof misappropriation or
conversion. However, failure to account upon demand, for funds or property held in trust, is
circumstantial evidence of misappropriation". Moreover, a query as to the whereabouts of the
money, such as the one proven in the present case, is tantamount to a demand. The prosecution in
the case at bar, was able to show that the offended party inquired as to the whereabouts of the
shortage amounting to Php185, 584.06. The General Manager of the cooperative sent letters to the
[petitioner] asking her to report to the offices of the cooperative in order to explain a number of
questionable transactions that they have discovered.
In fine, the evidence of the prosecution was able to establish beyond any reasonable doubt that [the
petitioner] committed estafa by misappropriation under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code.
With the evidence on record, We find no convincing reason to disturb the findings of the trial
court.40 (Some citations omitted, underscoring ours and italics in the original)
Issues
Undaunted, the petitioner assails the above ruling. Restated, the issues she presents for our
resolution are whether or not: (a) she is entitled to an acquittal considering that a cashier possesses
no juridical possession over the funds he or she holds; (b) demand, as an element of the crime of
estafa, had been proven in the instant case;and (c) her guilt had been proven beyond reasonable
doubt.41
The petitioner claims that in Chua-Burce v. Court of Appeals,42 the Court ruled that a cashier cannot
be convicted of estafaif he or she has no juridical possession over the funds held.43 Further, the
element of demand was not established. There was no proof conclusively showing that the three
letters were sent to the petitioner by BABMPC. Assuming they were sent, no ample evidence exists
to prove that they were in fact received by the petitioner.44
More importantly, the prosecution had not discharged the burden of proof required to convict in
criminal cases. First. Timonera admitted that he did not have any personal knowledge about how the
petitioner committed the acts of misappropriation.45 Second. The statements of the Internal Auditor,
Ambros, were vital, but he never appeared in court to testify or to shed light on any documents
purportedly pointing to the petitioner’s liability.46 Third. No representatives of the bank testified on the
alleged inconsistencies found in the passbooks.47 Fourth. Even the amount of money claimed to have
been misappropriated was not determined with certainty.48 Fifth. In convicting the petitioner, the RTC
and the CA primarily relied on the falsified entries made on the passbooks, but they were not
formally offered as evidence, and the prosecution failed to establish that the petitioner was solely in
control of the said passbooks.49
In its Comment,50 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that the petitioner had juridical
possession over the funds, which were lent by Care Philippines to BABMPC. The petitioner received
daily remittances, deposited to and withdrew money from the bank, and issued loans in connection
with the said account. Moreover, while denying having incurred the shortage, she offered no
explanation as to how much money she was accountable for. No other witness corroborated the
petitioner’s claims as well. The petitioner also failed to refute the existence of the two passbooks.
Anent the prejudice caused to BABMPC, the amount of ₱185,584.06 was substantial and could have
been loanedto a number of borrowers.
Ruling of the Court
There is merit in the instant petition.
The petitioner had no juridical possession over the allegedly misappropriated funds.
Chua-Burce is instructive anent what constitutes mere material possession, on one hand, and
juridical possession, on the other, for the purpose of determining whether the first element of estafais
present in a particular case, viz:
Have the foregoing elements been met in the case at bar? We find the first element absent. When
the money, goods, or any other personal property is received bythe offender from the offended party
(1) in trustor (2) on commissionor (3) for administration, the offender acquires both material or
physical possession and juridical possessionof the thing received. Juridical possession means a
possession which gives the transferee a right over the thing which the transferee may set up even
against the owner. In this case, petitioner was a cash custodian who was primarily responsible for
the cash-in-vault. Her possession of the cash belonging to the bank is akin to that of a bank teller,
both being mere bank employees.
In People v. Locson, the receiving teller ofa bank misappropriated the money received by him for the
bank. He was found liable for qualified theft on the theory that the possession of the teller is the
possession of the bank. We explained in Locson that –
"The money was in the possession of the defendant as receiving teller of the bank, and the
possession of the defendant was the possession of the bank. When the defendant, with grave abuse
of confidence, removed the money and appropriated it to his own use without the consent of the
bank, there was the taking or apoderamiento contemplated in the definition of the crime of theft."
In the subsequent case of Guzman v. Court of Appeals, a travelling sales agent misappropriated or
failed to return to his principal the proceeds of things or goods he was commissioned or authorized
to sell. He was, however, found liable for estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code,
and not qualified theft. In the Guzman case, we explained the distinction between possession of a
bank teller and an agent for purposes of determining criminal liability – "The case cited by the Court
of Appeals (People vs. Locson, 57 Phil. 325), in support of its theory that appellant only had the
material possession of the merchandise he was selling for his principal, or their proceeds, is not in
point. In said case, the receiving teller of a bank who misappropriated money received by him for the
bank, was held guilty of qualified theft on the theory that the possession of the teller is the
possession of the bank. There is an essential distinction between the possession by a receiving
teller of funds received from third persons paid to the bank, and an agent who receives the proceeds
of sales of merchandise delivered to him in agency by his principal. In the former case, payment by
third persons to the teller is payment to the bank itself; the teller is a mere custodian or keeper of the
funds received, and has no independent right or title to retain or possess the same as against the
bank. Anagent, on the other hand, can even assert, as against his own principal, an independent,
autonomous, right to retain money or goods received in consequence of the agency; as when the
principal fails to reimburse him for advances he has made, and indemnify him for damages suffered
without his fault (Article 1915, [N]ew Civil Code; Article 1730, old)."51 (Citations omitted, underscoring
ours and italics in the original)
In the case at bench, there is no question that the petitioner was handling the funds lent by Care
Philippines to BABMPC. However, she held the funds in behalf of BABMPC. Over the funds, she
had mere physical or material possession, but she held no independent right or title, which she can
set up against BABMPC. The petitioner was nothing more than a mere cash custodian. Hence, the
Court finds that juridical possession of the funds as an element of the crime of estafaby
misappropriation is absent in the instant case.
In the prosecution of the crime of estafa, demand need not be formal if there exists evidence of
misappropriation. However, in the instant case, conclusive proofs of both misappropriation and
demand are wanting.
"Fundamental is the precept in all criminal prosecutions, that the constitutive acts of the offense must
be established with unwavering exactitude and moral certainty because this is the critical and only
requisite to a finding of guilt."52
At the outset, it is significant to point out that neither the prosecution nor the defense had made any
formal offer of documentary evidence.53 The two passbooks, ledger, and three demand letters, while
mentioned by Timonera in his testimony, were notformally offered as evidence. The Court notes too
that the contending parties each had only one witness, namely, Timonera, for the prosecution, and
the petitioner, for the defense. Both of their testimonies were therefore without any corroboration.
Considering the absence of formal offers of documentary evidence, the judgments rendered by the
RTC and the CA solely hinged on who was more credible between the two witnesses.
While this Court does not find Timonera’s testimony as incredible, by itself alone, it is insufficient to
discharge the burden of proof required for conviction in criminal cases. The petitioner was indicted
for allegedly misappropriating the amount of 185,584.06. However, Timonera failed to state with
certainty where in the records held by the petitioner were the discrepancies shown. Timonera
evaded answering the question by emphasizing that he is not an accountant and that Ambros knew
more about the matter.54 Note too that Timonera admitted it was the petitioner and De Asis who were
the two authorized signatories relative to the funds lent to BABMPC by Care Philippines.55Hence, the
petitioner did not have sole access over the records and funds. Consequently, the authorship of the
falsified entries in the passbook cannot be attributed with certainty to the petitioner alone. It was thus
fatal for the prosecution’s cause that Ambros, De Asis, Mombay and the bank personnel did not take
the witness stand especially since documentary evidence were never formally offered as well.
The RTC and the CA faulted the petitioner for not offering countervailing evidence, including an audit
conducted in her own behalf. Still, it does not justify a conviction tobe handed on that ground
because the "[c]ourts cannot magnify the weakness of the defense and overlook the prosecution’s
failure to discharge the onus probandi."56
"Concededly, the evidence of the defense is weak and uncorroborated. This, however, cannot be
used to advance the cause of the prosecution as the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall
on its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense.
Moreover, when the circumstances are capable of two or more inferences, as in this case, such that
one of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence and the other is compatible with guilt,
the presumption of innocence must prevail and the court must acquit."57
"In a criminal case, the accused isentitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond doubt.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of
error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind."58
In the case at bar, however, the paltry evidence for the prosecution, consisting merely of Timonera’s
testimony, casts doubts anent the guilt of the petitioner, and does not amply rebut her right to be
presumed innocent of the crime charged.
The acquittal of the accused from the crime charged does not necessarily negate the existence of
civil liability. However, in the instant case, the prosecution had failed as well to present preponderant
1âw phi1
evidence from which the Court can determinately conclude that the petitioner should pay BABMPC
the amount of ₱185,584.06.
Eusebio-Calderon v. People59 is instructive anent the effects of the two kinds of acquittal on the civil
liability of the accused, viz:
In the case of Manantan v. Court of Appeals, we elucidated on the two kinds of acquittal recognized
by our law as well as its different effects on the civil liability of the accused. Thus:
x x x. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission
complained of this instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to benot
the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission.
There being no delict, civil liability ex delictois out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which
may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation
contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on
reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not
been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only. This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, x
x x.60 (Citation omitted and underscoring ours)
In the case now under consideration, the Court acquits the petitioner notbecause she is found
absolutely innocent of the crime charged. The Court acquits merely because reasonable doubt
exists anent her guilt. Hence, the petitioner can still be held civilly liable to BABMPC if preponderant
evidence exist to prove the same.
Rule 133, Section 1 of the Rules of Court indicates how preponderance of evidence shall be
determined, viz:
Section 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. — In civil cases, the party having the
burden of proofmust establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the
preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all
the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their
means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to
which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest,
and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The
court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with
the greater number. (Underscoring ours)
In the instant petition, the prosecution manifested during the pre-trial that Timonera's testimony
would touch on the functions of the BABMPC and the duties of the petitioner.61 During the trial,
Timonera made references to the alleged falsifications and misappropriations committed by the
petitioner. However, he denied specific knowledge of where exactly the falsifications and
misappropriations were shown and recorded.62 This, plus the fact that the prosecution made no
formal offer of documentary evidence, leaves the Court in the dark as to how the petitioner's civil
liability, if any, shall be determined.
In precis, the Court finds that Timonera's testimony does not quality as preponderant evidence from
which the Court can conclude that the petitioner is civilly liable to pay BABMPC the amount of
₱185,584.06.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated October 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR No. 00693 is REVERSED. The petitioner, MARGIE
BALERTA, is ACQUITTED of the crime of Esta/a under Article 315(l)(b) of the Revised Penal Code.
The directive of the Court of Appeals for Margie Balerta to PAY Balasan Associated Barangays
Multi-Purpose Cooperative the amount oL₱185,584.06 as CIVIL LIABILITY is likewise SET ASIDE
for lack of basis.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

Associate Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO* DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION

Chief Justice

Qualified Theft and Estafa As Furtive Crimes

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Qualified Theft and Estafa As Furtive Crimes

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Cases on Qualified theft and Estafa as Furtive Crimes

Prepared by AB POL SCI Practicum Students of Ateneo de Davao University

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 176114 April 8, 2015

GRACE SAN DIEGO y TRINIDAD, Petitioner,

The following are the antecedent facts as found in the records.

a) THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT HELD

b) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN THE CHARACTERIZATION OF THE OFFENSE

c) THE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW IN THE

This Court finds the present petition partially with merit.

4) Petitioner prepared a certification that the amount of Php9,653,527.06 represented the

7) Petitioner stopped reporting for work since March 12, 1997.22

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO* BIENVENIDO L. REYES

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

January 4, 1994, 229 SCRA 35.

mentioned herein below shall be punished by:

x x x x 1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:

x x x (b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money,

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 199208 July 30, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

Criminal Case No. 03-2178 ₱200,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2179 ₱250,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2180 ₱200,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2181 ₱55,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2183 ₱85,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2184 ₱350,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2185 ₱250,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2186 ₱20,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2187 ₱250,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2188 ₱60,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2189 ₱150,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2190 ₱50,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2191 ₱46,300.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2192 ₱205,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2193 ₱200,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2194 ₱25,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2196 ₱500,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2197 ₱30,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2198 ₱400,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2199 ₱300,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2200 ₱500,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2201 ₱65,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2202 ₱47,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2203 ₱500,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2204 ₱40,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2205 ₱400,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2206 ₱35,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2207 ₱500,000.0

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

Costs against accused in eachof the above numbered cases.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court’s Ruling

Theft is likewise committed by:

1. Taking of personal property;

2. That the said property belongs to another;

3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;

4. That it be done without the owner’s consent;

6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.8

money entrusted into her care.