BAYAN v.

ZAMORA

Facts:
The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed, among others, the possible
elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This resulted to a series of conferences and
negotiations which culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos
approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by Secretary Siazon and United States
Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.

Pres. Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, 1998 and on May 27, 1999, the senate approved
it by (2/3) votes.

Cause of Action:

Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art XVIII of the 1987 constitution is applicable and not
Section 21, Article VII.

Following the argument of the petitioner, under they provision cited, the “foreign military bases, troops,
or facilities” may be allowed in the Philippines unless the following conditions are sufficiently met:
a) it must be a treaty,
b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum held for that purpose if so required by congress, and
c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.

Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that, what is
requires for such treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the
members of the senate.

ISSUE: Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of
the Constitution?

HELD:
Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops
or facilities should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the
provisions of section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole
purpose of determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the senate.

The Constitution, makes no distinction between “transient” and “permanent.” We find nothing in
section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently
in the Philippines.

It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement
because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty.
Kuroda v. Jalandoni, G.R. No. L-2662, March 26, 1949

I. THE FACTS

Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda, the Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the
Philippines during the Japanese occupation, was charged before the Philippine Military Commission of
war crimes. He questioned the constitutionality of E.O. No. 68 that created the National War Crimes
Office and prescribed rules on the trial of accused war criminals. He contended the Philippines is not a
signatory to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore he
is charged of crimes not based on law, national and international.

II. THE ISSUES

Was E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition and upheld the validity and constitutionality of E.O. No. 68.]

YES, E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional.

Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that –

The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.

In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day including
the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international
jurisprudence established by the United Nation all those person military or civilian who have been
guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and
offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity
and civilization are held accountable therefor. Consequently in the promulgation and enforcement of
Execution Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally
accepted and policies of international law which are part of the our Constitution.

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts
committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines
is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and
regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the generally
accepted principals of international law. In facts these rules and principles were accepted by the two
belligerent nations the United State and Japan who were signatories to the two Convention. Such rule
and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to
the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in
its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of international law as contained in
treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.

Yamashita vs Styer
G.R. No. L-129 December 19, 1945
Facts:

Petitioner Tomoyuki Yamashita, the commanding general of the 14th army group of the Japanese
Imperial Army in the Philippines, after his surrender became a prisoner of war of the United States of
America but was later removed from such status and placed in confinement as an accused war
criminal charged before an American Military Commission constituted by respondent Lieutenant
General Styer, Commanding General of the United States Army Forces, Western Pacific.

Filing for habeas corpus and prohibition against respondent, he asks that he be reinstated to his
former status as prisoner of war, and that the Military Commission be prohibited from further trying
him. He questions, among others, the jurisdiction of said Military Commission.

Issue/s:

1. Should the petitions for habeas corpus and prohibition be granted in this case?

2. Was the Military Commission validly constituted by respondent, therefore having jurisdiction over
the war crimes?

Ruling: 1. NO. 2. YES.

1. A petition for habeas corpus is improper when release of petitioner is not sought. It seeks no
discharge of petitioner from confinement but merely his restoration to his former status as a prisoner of
war, to be interned, not confined. The relative difference as to the degree of confinement in such
cases is a matter of military measure, disciplinary in character, beyond the jurisdiction of civil courts.
Prohibition cannot issue against one not made party respondent. Neither may the petition for
prohibition prosper against Lt. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer. The Military Commission is not made party
respondent in this case, and although it may be acting, as alleged, without jurisdiction, no order may
be issued in these case proceedings requiring it to refrain from trying the petitioner.

The Court further ruled that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition even if the commission be
joined as respondent. As it has said, in Raquiza vs. Bradford (pp. 50, 61, ante), “. . . an attempt of our
civil courts to exercise jurisdiction over the United States Army before such period (state of war)
expires, would be considered as a violation of this country’s faith, which this Court should not be the
last to keep and uphold.”

2. Under the laws of war, a military commander has an implied power to appoint and convene a
military commission. This is upon the theory that since the power to create a military commission is an
aspect of waging war, military commanders have that power unless expressly withdrawn from them.
By the Articles of War, and especially Article 15, the Congress of the United States has explicitly
provided, so far as it may constitutionally do so, that military tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try
offenders or offenses against the laws of war in appropriate cases.

RENE A.V. SAGUISAG v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, GR No. 212426, 2016-
07-26
Facts:

petitioners respectfully pray that the Honorable Court RECONSIDER, REVERSE, AND SET - ASIDE
its Decision dated January 12, 2016, and issue a new Decision GRANTING the instant consolidated
petitions by declaring the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) entered into by the
respondents for the Philippine government, with the United States of America, UNCONSTITUTIONAL
AND INVALID and to permanently enjoin its implementation.

petitioners claim this Court erred when it ruled that EDCA was not a treaty.[5] In connection to this,
petitioners move that EDCA must be in the form of a treaty in order to comply with the constitutional
restriction under Section 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution on foreign military bases, troops,
and facilities.[6] Additionally, they reiterate their arguments on the issues of telecommunications,
taxation, and nuclear weapons.[7]

Petitioners assert that this Court contradicted itself when it interpreted the word "allowed in" to refer to
the initial entry of foreign bases, troops, and facilities, based on the fact that the plain meaning of the
provision in question referred to prohibiting the return of foreign bases, troops, and facilities except
under a treaty concurred in by the Senate

Secondly, by interpreting "allowed in" as referring to an initial entry, the Court has simply applied the
plain meaning of the words in the particular provision.[10] Necessarily, once entry has been
established by a subsisting treaty, latter instances of entry need not be embodied by a separate treaty.
After all, the Constitution did not state that foreign military bases, troops, and facilities shall not subsist
or exist in the Philippines.

Issues:

constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the Republic of
the Philippines and the United States of America (U.S.)

Ruling:

we find that EDCA did not go beyond the framework. The entry of US troops has long been authorized
under a valid and subsisting treaty, which is the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).[14] Reading the
VFA along with the longstanding Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT)[15] led this Court to the conclusion
that an executive agreement such as the EDCA was well within the bounds of the obligations imposed
by both treaties.

Thus, we find no reason for EDCA to be declared unconstitutional. It fully conforms to the Philippines'
legal regime through the MDT and VFA. It also fully conforms to the government's continued policy to
enhance our military capability in the face of various military and humanitarian issues that may arise.
This Motion for Reconsideration has not raised any additional legal arguments that warrant revisiting
the Decision.

Principles:

The settled rule is that the plain, clear and unambiguous language of the Constitution should be
construed as such and should not be given a construction that changes its meaning

With due respect, the Honorable Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno's theory of "initial entry"
mentioned above ventured into a construction of the provisions of Section 25, Article XVIII of the
Constitution which is patently contrary to the plain language and meaning of the said constitutional
provision.
On verba legis interpretation... verba legis

Petitioners' own interpretation and application of the verba legis rule will in fact result in an absurdity,
which legal construction strictly abhors.

KOOKOORITCHKIN V. SOLGEN (1943)

FACTS:
-Ermes Kookooritchkin was born in Russia, grew up as a citizen of the now defunct Imperial Russian
Government under the Czars
-during WW1, he was part of Russia's military service
-when the 1917 Russian revolution broke out, he joined the White Russian Army, but the latter was
overwhelmed by the Bolsheviks. He refused to join the Bolshevik regime so fled to Shanghai and
found his way to Manila (arrived under the group of Admiral Stark in 1923)
-he established permanent residence in Iriga, Camarines Sur since 1925
-he was a guerilla officer during the war
-married a Filipino named Concepcion Segovia, and had a son Ronald, who is studying at St. Agnes
Academy, a school duly recognized by the Government
-he is a shop superintendent and receives an annual salary of P13,200
-can speak and write English and Bicol dialect…
(basta, he showed he is qualified and has none of the disqualifications)
-disclaims allegiance to the present Communist Government of Russia
-he filed 1941 petition for naturalization

CFI: granted it
-OSG appealed:
(1) Russian: he failed to show that he has lost Russian citizenship and that Russia grants to Filipinos
the right to become naturalized citizens
(2) failed to establish that he was not disqualified

WON Kookooritchkin should be granted Cert of Naturalization?

YES
Kookooritchkin is Stateless: Empire of Russia ceased to exist and he disclaims allegiance or
connection with the Soviet Government now existing in Russia
-It is a "well-known fact that the ruthlessness of modern dictatorships had scattered throughout the
world a large number of stateless refugees or displaced persons, w/o country and w/o flag. The
tyrannical intolerance of said dictatorships toward all opposition induced them to resort to beastly
oppression, concentration camps and blood purges, and it is only natural that the not so fortunate
ones who were able to escape to foreign countries should feel the loss of all bonds of attachment to
the hells which were formerly their fatherland's."
Don't need to require Kookooritchkin to present evidence that he is stateless and had no allegiance to
Russian republic: He was at war with the said rule, plus acts of Kookooritchkin show that he does not
feel any bond of attachment to the Soviet dictatorship.
*AS LONG AS STATELESS PERSONS POSSESS ALL THE QUALIFICATIONS, THEY CAN BE
NATURALIZED AS PHILIPPINE CITIZENS W/O THE REQUIREMENT OF RECIPROCITY.
NORTH SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF CASES (SUMMARY)
International Court of Justice Contentious Case: The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases
(Germany/Denmark; Germany/Netherlands).

Year of Decision: 1969.

Note: This post discusses only aspects of the case related to treaty and customary international law.

Overview: The jurisprudence of the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases sets out the dual requirement
for the formation of customary international law: (1) State practice (the objective element) and (2)
opinio juris (the subjective element). In these cases, the Court explained the criteria necessary to
establish State practice – widespread and representative participation. It highlighted that the practices
of those States whose interests were specially affected by the custom were especially relevant in the
formation of customary law. It also held that uniform and consistent practice was necessary to
demonstrate opinio juris – opinio juris is the belief that State practice amounts to a legal obligation.
The North Sea Continental Self Cases also dispelled the myth that duration of the practice (i.e. the
number of years) was an essential factor in forming customary international law.

The case involved the delimitation of the continental shelf areas in the North Sea between Germany
and Denmark and Germany and Netherlands beyond the partial boundaries previously agreed upon
by these States. The parties requested the Court to decide the principles and rules of international law
that are applicable to the above delimitation because the parties disagreed on the applicable principles
or rules of delimitation. Netherlands and Denmark relied on the principle of equidistance (the method
of determining the boundaries in such a way that every point in the boundary is equidistant from the
nearest points of the baselines from which the breath of the territorial sea of each State is measured).
Germany sought to get a decision in favour of the notion that the delimitation of the relevant
continental shelf was governed by the principle that each coastal state is entitled to a just and
equitable share (hereinafter called just and equitable principle/method). Contrary to Denmark and
Netherlands, Germany argued that the principle of equidistance was neither a mandatory rule in
delimitation of the continental shelf nor a rule of customary international law that was binding on
Germany. The Court was not asked to delimit because the parties had already agreed to delimit the
continental shelf as between their countries, by agreement, after the determination of the Court on the
applicable principles.

Facts of the Case:

Netherlands and Denmark had drawn partial boundary lines based on the equidistance principle (A-B
and C-D). An agreement on further prolongation of the boundary proved difficult because Denmark
and Netherlands wanted this prolongation to take place based on the equidistance principle (B-E and
D-E) where as Germany was of the view that, together, these two boundaries would produce an
inequitable result for her. Germany stated that due to its concave coastline, such a line would result in
her loosing out on her share of the continental shelf based on proportionality to the length of its North
Sea coastline. The Court had to decide the principles and rules of international law applicable to this
delimitation. In doing so, the Court had to decide if the principles espoused by the parties were binding
on the parties either through treaty law or customary international law.

Screen Shot 2017-04-09 at 6.26.16 PM

North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (commons.wikimedia.org)

Questions before the Court (as relevant to this post):

Is Germany under a legal obligation to accept the equidistance-special circumstances principle,

contained in Article 6 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958, either as a
customary international law rule or on the basis of the Geneva Convention?

The Court’s Decision:

The use of the equidistance method had not crystallised into customary law and the method was not
obligatory for the delimitation of the areas in the North Sea related to the present proceedings.

Relevant Findings of the Court:

1. Nature of the treaty obligation: Is the 1958 Geneva Convention, and in particular Article 6, binding
on Germany?

1. Article 6 of the Geneva Convention stated that unless the parties had already agreed on a method
for delimitation or unless special circumstances exist, the equidistance method would apply. Germany
had signed, but not ratified, the Geneva Convention, while Netherlands and Denmark were parties to
the Convention. The latter two States argued that while Germany is not a party to the Convention (not
having ratified it), she was still bound by Article 6 of the Convention because:

“…(1) by conduct, by public statements and proclamations, and in other ways, the Republic has
unilaterally assumed the obligations of the Convention; or has manifested its acceptance of the
conventional regime; or has recognized it as being generally applicable to the delimitation of
continental shelf areas…

(2) the Federal Republic had held itself out as so assuming, accepting or recognizing, in such a
manner as to cause other States, and in particular Denmark and the Netherlands, to rely on the
attitude thus taken up” (the latter is called the principle of estoppel).

2. The Court rejected the first argument. It said that only a ‘very definite very consistent course of
conduct on the part of a State would allow the Court to presume that the State had somehow become
bound by a treaty (by a means other than in the formal manner: i.e. ratification) when the State was ‘at
all times fully able and entitled to…’ accept the treaty commitments in a formal manner. The Court
held that Germany had not unilaterally assumed obligations under the Convention. The court also took
notice of the fact that even if Germany ratified the treaty, she had the option of entering into a
reservation on Article 6, following which that particular article would no longer be applicable to
Germany (in other words, even if one were to assume that Germany had intended to become a party
to the Convention, it does not presuppose that it would have also undertaken those obligations
contained in Article 6).

3. Note: The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 (VCLT), which came into force in
1980, discusses in more detail treaty obligations of third States (those States who are not parties to
the treaty). It clearly stipulates that obligations arise for third States from a provision of a treaty only if
(1) the actual parties to the treaty intended the provision to create obligations for third States; and (2)
third State expressly accept those obligations in writing (Article 35 of the VCLT). The VCLT was not in
force when the Court deliberated on this case. However, as seen above, the Court’s position is
consistent the VCLT. (See the relevant provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).

4. The Court held that the existence of a situation of estoppel would have allowed Article 6 to become
binding on Germany – but held that Germany’s action did not support an argument for estoppel. The
Court also held that the mere fact that Germany may not have specifically objected to the equidistance
principle as contained in Article 6, is not sufficient to state that the principle is now binding upon it.

5. In conclusion, the Court held that Germany had not acted in any manner so as to incur obligations
contained in Article 6 of the Geneva Convention. The equidistance–special circumstances rule was
not binding on Germany by way of treaty law.

2. Nature of the customary international law obligation: Is Germany bound by the provisions of Article
6 of the Geneva Convention in so far as they reflect customary international law?
6. Netherlands and Denmark argued that Article 6 also reflected ‘the accepted rule of general
international law on the subject of continental shelf delimitation’ and that it existed independently of the
Convention. Therefore, they argued, Germany is bound by the subject matter of Article 6 by way of
customary international law.

7. To decide if the equidistance principle bound Germany by way of customary international law, the
Court examined (1) the status of the principle contained in Article 6 as it stood when the Convention
was being drawn up; and (2) its status after the Convention came into force.

(a) What was the customary law status of Article 6 at the time of drafting the Convention?

8. The Court held that the principle of equidistance, as contained in Article 6 did not form a part of
existing or emerging customary international law at the time of drafting the Convention. The Court
supported this finding based on (1) the hesitation expressed by the drafters of the Convention, the
International Law Commission, on the inclusion of Article 6 into the Convention and (2) the fact that
reservations to Article 6 was permissible under the Convention. The Court held:

“… Article 6 is one of those in respect of which, under the reservations article of the Convention
(Article 12) reservations may be made by any State on signing, ratifying or acceding, – for speaking
generally, it is a characteristic of purely conventional rules and obligations that, in regard to them,
some faculty of making unilateral reservations may, within certain limits, be admitted; whereas this
cannot be so in the case of general or customary law rules and obligations which, by their very nature,
must have equal force for all members of the international community, and cannot therefore be the
subject of any right of unilateral exclusion exercisable at will by any one of them in its own favor….
The normal inference would therefore be that any articles that do not figure among those excluded
from the faculty of reservation under Article 12, were not regarded as declaratory of previously existing
or emergent rules of law …” (see para 65 for a counter argument and the Court’s careful
differentiation)

(b) Did the provisions in Article 6 on the equidistance principle attain the customary law status after the
Convention came into force?

9. The Court then examined whether the rule contained in Article 6 had become customary
international law after the Convention entered into force – either due the Convention itself (i.e., if
enough States had ratified the Convention in a manner so as to fulfil the criteria specified below), or
because of subsequent State practice (i.e. even if an adequate number of States had not ratified the
Convention, one could find sufficient State practice to meet the criteria below). The Court held that
Article 6 of the Convention had not attained a customary law status. (Compare the 1958 Geneva
Convention with the four Geneva Conventions on 1949 relating to international humanitarian law in
terms of the latter’s authority as a pronouncement of customary international law).

10. For a customary rule to emerge the Court held that it needed: (1) very widespread and
representative participation in the Convention, including States whose interests were specially affected
(in this case, they were coastal States) (i.e. generality); and (2) virtually uniform practice (i.e.
consistent and uniform usage) undertaken in a manner that demonstrates (3) a general recognition of
the rule of law or legal obligation (i.e. opinio juries). In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases the court
held that the passage of a considerable period of time was unnecessary (i.e. duration) for the
formation of a customary law.

Widespread and representative participation

11. The Court held that the first criteria was not met. The number of ratifications and accessions to the
Convention (39 States) were not adequately representative or widespread.

Duration

12. The Court held that the duration taken for a customary law rule to emerge is not as important as
widespread and representative participation, uniform usage, and the existence of an opinio juris. It
held that:

“Although the passage of only a short period of time (in this case, 3 – 5 years) is not necessarily, or of
itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary international law on the basis of what was
originally a purely conventional rule, an indispensable requirement would be that within the period in
question, short though it might be, State practice, including that of States whose interests are specially
affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked
and should moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law
or legal obligation is involved.”

Opinio juris

13. Opinio juris is reflected in acts of States (Nicaragua Case) or in omissions (Lotus case), in so far
as those acts or omissions were done following a belief that the said State is obligated by law to act or
refrain from acting in a particular way. (For more on opinio juris click here).

14. The Court examined 15 cases where States had delimited their boundaries using the equidistance
method, after the Convention came into force (paras. 75 -77). The Court concluded that even if there
were some State practice in favour of the equidistance principle, the Court could not deduct the
necessary opinio juris from this State practice. The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases confirmed that
both State practice (the objective element) and opinio juris (the subjective element) are essential pre-
requisites for the formation of a customary law rule. This is consistent with Article 38 (1) (b) of the
Statute of the ICJ. The Court explained the concept of opinio juris and the difference between customs
(i.e. habits) and customary law:

“Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or be
carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the
existence of a rule of law requiring it. The need for such a belief, i.e, the existence of a subjective
element, is implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris sive necessitatis. The States concerned must
therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation. The frequency, or even
habitual character of the acts is not in itself enough. There are many international acts, e.g., in the field
of ceremonial and protocol, which are performed almost invariably, but which are motivated only by
considerations of courtesy, convenience or tradition, and not by any sense of legal duty.” (Para 77).

15. The Court concluded that the equidistance principle was not binding on Germany by way of treaty
or customary international law. In the case of the latter, the principle had not attained a customary
international law status at the time of the entry into force of the Geneva Convention or thereafter. As
such, the Court held that the use of the equidistance method is not obligatory for the delimitation of the
areas concerned in the present proceedings.

Brief Fact Summary. Australia and New Zealand (P) requested France (D) to put an halt to
atmospheric nuclear test in the South Pacific.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Declaration made through unilateral acts may have the effect of creating
legal obligations.

Facts. A series of nuclear tests was completed by France (D) in the South Pacific. This action made
Australia and New Zealand (P) to apply to the I.C.J. demanding that France (D) cease testing
immediately. Before the case could be completed, France (D) announced it had completed the test
and did not plan any further test. So France (D) moved for the dismissal of the application.

Issue. May declaration made through unilateral act has effect of creating legal obligations?

Held. Yes. Declaration made through unilateral acts may have the effect of creating legal obligations.
In this case, the statement made by the President of France must be held to constitute an
engagement of the State in regard to the circumstances and intention with which they were made.
Therefore, these statement made by the France (D) are relevant and legally binding. Application was
dismissed.

Discussion. The unilateral statements made by French authorities were first relayed to the government
of Australia. There was no need for the statements to be directed to any particular state for it to have
legal effect. The general nature and characteristics of the statements alone were relevant for
evaluation of their legal implications.

International Status Of South West Africa Case

Issue
How are general principles of law found and applied?

Facts
After WWII, the Union of South Africa, alleging that the Mandate it had been given by the League of
Nations to administer South West Africa had lapsed, sought the recognition of the United Nations to
the integration of the Territory in the Union. The UN General Assembly asked the Court to advise on
the international status of South West Africa (now Namibia). The Court was asked to determine the
meaning of the “sacred trust of civilization” accepted by South Africa under the Mandate.

Issue
What is the status of the relationship between South West Africa and South Africa?
DecisionEdit
South West Africa is a territory under the Mandate and South Africa is not competent to modify the
international status of South West Africa.

Reasons
McNair, in a separate opinion, set out how the Court finds and applies general principles of law. Article
38(I)(c) allows the Court to apply “the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.” This is
done by regarding any features or terminology which are reminiscent of the rules and institutions of
private law as an indication of policy and principles rather than as directly importing these rules and
institutions.

Applying this to the case at bar, the Court was tasked with interpreting "sacred trust of civilization”.
The historical basis of the legal enforcement of the English trust was that it was binding upon the
conscience of the trustee and thus should be enforceable in law. Nearly every legal system possesses
some institution whereby the property and sometimes the person of those who are not sui juris, such
as a minor or disabled person, can be entrusted to some responsible person as a trustee; the trust has
been used to protect the weak and the dependent.

There are three general principles which are common to all these institutions:

the control of the trustee over the property is limited in one way or another; he is not in the position of
the normal complete owner, who can do what he likes with his own, as he is precluded from
administering the property for his own personal benefit;
the trustee is under some kind of legal obligation, based on confidence and conscience, to carry out
the trust or mission confided to him for the benefit of some other person or for some public purposes;
and
any attempt by one of these persons to absorb the property entrusted to him into his own patrimony
would be illegal and would be prevented by the law.

Pimentel v. Executive Secretary Digest

G.R. No. 158088 July 6, 2005

Facts:

1. The petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and
the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippinesfor its concurrence pursuant to Sec. 21, Art VII of the
1987 Constitution.

2. The Rome Statute established the Int'l Criminal Court which will have jurisdiction over the most
serious crimes as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression as defined
by the Statute. The Philippines through the Chargie du Affairs in UN. The provisions of the Statute
however require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory state.
3. Petitioners contend that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic and international law, is a
function of the Senate, hence it is the duty of the Executive Department to transmit the signed copy to
the senate to allow it to exercise its discretion.

Issue: Whether or not the Exec. Secretary and the DFA have the ministerial duty to transmit to the
Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine mission to the U.N. even
without the signature of the President.

The Supreme Court held NO.

1. The President as the head of state is the sole organ and authorized in the external relations and he
is also the country's sole representative with foreign nations, He is the mouthpiece with respect to the
country's foreign affairs.

2. In treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states and enter into
treaties but this power is limited by the Constitution with the 2/3 required vote of all the members of the
Senate for the treaty to be valid. (Sec. 21, Art VII).

3. The legislative branch part is essential to provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign
relations, to ensure the nation's pursuit of political maturity and growth.

QATAR VS. BAHRAIN

Brief Fact Summary. A claim to settle a dispute involving sovereignty over certain islands, sovereign
rights over certain shoals and delimitation of a maritime boundary was filed by Qatar (P) in the
International Court of Justice against Bahrain (D). The Court’s jurisdiction was however disputed by
Bahrain (D).

Synopsis of Rule of Law. An international agreement creating rights and obligations can be constituted
by the signatories to the minutes of meetings and letters exchanged.

Facts. A dispute concerning sovereignty over certain islands and shoals, including the delimitation of a
maritime boundary were issues upon which Qatar (P) and Bahrain (D) sought to resolve for 20 years.
During this period of time, letters were exchanged and acknowledged by both parties heads of state. A
Tripartite Committee “for the purpose of approaching the International Court of Justice…..” was formed
by representatives of Qatar (P), Bahrain (D) and Saudi Arabia. Though the committee met several
time, it failed to produce an agreement on the specific terms for submitting the dispute to the Court.
Eventually, the meetings culminated in “Minutes”, which reaffirmed the process and stipulated that the
parties “may” submit the dispute to the I.C.J. after giving the Saudi King six months to resolve the
dispute. The Court’s jurisdiction was disputed by Bahrain (D) when Qatar (P) filed a claim in the I.C.J.

Issue. Yes. An international agreement creating rights and obligations can be constituted by the
signatories to the minutes of meetings and letters exchanged. Though Bahrain (D) argued that the
Minutes were only a record of negotiation and could not serve as a basis for the I.C.J.’s jurisdiction,
both parties agreed that the letters constituted an international agreement with binding force.
International agreements do not take a single form under the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, and the Court has enforced this rule in the past. In this case, the Minutes not only contain the
record of the meetings between the parties, it also contained the reaffirmation of obligations previously
agreed to and agreement to allow the King of Saudi Arabia to try to find a solution to the dispute
during a six-month period, and indicated the possibility of the involvement of the I.C.J. The Minutes
stipulated commitments to which the parties agreed, thereby creating rights and obligations in
international law. This is the basis therefore of the existence of international agreement.
On the part of the Bahrain’s (D) Foreign Minister, he argued that no agreement existed because he
never intended to enter an agreement fails on the grounds that he signed documents creating rights
and obligations for his country. Also, Qatar’s (P) delay in applying to the United Nations Secretariat
does not indicate that Qatar (P) never considered the Minutes to be an international agreement as
Bahrain (D) argued. However, the registration and non-registration with the Secretariat does not have
any effect on the validity of the agreement.

Held. Yes. An international agreement creating rights and obligations can be constituted by the
signatories to the minutes of meetings and letters exchanged. Though Bahrain (D) argued that the
Minutes were only a record of negotiation and could not serve as a basis for the I.C.J.’s jurisdiction,
both parties agreed that the letters constituted an international agreement with binding force.

Discussion. There is no doubt that language plays a vital role in influencing a court’s decision as to
whether an agreement has been entered into and in this particular case, the language was the main
focus of the I.C.J and it was the contents of the Minutes that persuaded the I.C.J. to reject the Bahrain
foreign minister’s (D) claim that he did not intend to enter into an agreement. Where this is compared
to general U.S. contract law, where a claim by one of the parties that no contract existed because
there was no meeting of the minds might be the ground upon which a U.S. court would consider
whether a contract did exist with more care and thought than the I.C.J. gave the foreign minister of
Bahrain’s (D) claims.