G.R. No. 134362 February 27, 2002 up.
2002 up. When Kuya Chito brought Macky to the hospital, his little brother, who could barely talk, was
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EMELITO SITCHON y TAYAG, accused-appellant.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
For beating to death the two-year old son of his common-law wife, accused-appellant Emelito
Sitchon y Tayag was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. His case is now before this Court on automatic review.
Appellant was charged in an information stating:
That on or about June 12, 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident
premeditation, attack, assault and use personal violence upon one MARK ANTHONY
FERNANDEZ y TABORA a minor, 2 ½ years old, by then and there mauling and clubbing him on
the different parts of his body with the use of a steel hammer and a wooden stick, approximately
18 inches long, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
Appellant pleaded not guilty to the above charge.2 However, before testifying in his own defense
on June 4, 1998, appellant admitted that he killed the victim and changed his plea to guilty.3
Five witnesses testified for the prosecution, namely, Lilia Garcia, a neighbor; the victim's eight-
year old brother Roberto; the investigating officer, PO3 Paul Dennis Javier; Dr. Manuel Lagonera,
medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI); and Felicisima Francisco, a
forensic chemist of the same agency.
Appellant lived in the second floor of a three-square meter house located at 2001 Batangas Street,
Tondo, Manila. His neighbor of two months, Lilia Garcia, resided in the first floor of the same
house.
At about 10:00 in the morning of June 12, 1996, Lilia was in front of the house attending to her
children when she heard the sound of a boy crying. Curious, Lilia went up the stairway, her
children in tow. The open door of the upper floor allowed Lilia to witness appellant beating two-
year old Mark Anthony Fernandez. From a distance of less than three arms’ length, Lilia saw
appellant hit various parts of the boy’s body with a piece of wood, about 14 ½ inches in length
and 2 ½ inches in diameter. Appellant also banged the head of the boy against the wooden wall.
The beating went on for about one hour. Lilia then saw appellant carry the boy down the house to
bring him to the hospital. The two-year old was "already black" and no longer moving.4
Eight-year old Roberto Fernandez is the elder brother of the victim, also known as Macky.
According to Roberto, Macky had scattered his feces all over the house. Appellant, whom Roberto
called Kuya Chito, thus beat Macky with a belt, a hammer and a "2x2" piece of wood. Roberto
could not do anything to help his brother because he was afraid Kuya Chito might also beat him
1
not crying anymore.5
Roberto identified the two pieces of wood6 that appellant allegedly used in beating the victim. He
also identified the T-shirt7 that Macky wore when he died.
A certain Alice Valerio from the Galang Medical Hospital informed PO3 Paul Dennis Javier that a
boy had been admitted there. When PO3 Javier went to the hospital, he found the boy already
dead. He observed that the child had wounds on the left middle finger, the right index finger and
both feet. The child also had lacerations in the upper lip and contusions all over his head and body.
PO3 Javier proceeded to appellant’s house at No. 2001, Batangas Ext., Tondo, Manila. Human feces
and fresh blood splattered on the floor. PO3 Javier recovered from the house the broken wooden
sticks, the steel hammer,8which were allegedly used to beat up the boy, as well as a bloodstained
white T-shirt.
PO3 Javier then went to the house of appellant’s sister in Del Fierro St., Tondo, who informed him
of matters relative to appellant’s identification. Thereafter, the police conducted a search operation
in Cavite where appellant’s mother lived but they did not find him there.1âwphi1 Later that
afternoon, PO3 Javier learned that appellant had surrendered to Station 3 of their district.
The following day, a staff member of the television program Magandang Gabi Bayan turned over to
PO3 Javier a brown belt which appellant allegedly also used in beating the victim. Roberto
Fernandez, the victim’s brother, had given the belt to the staff member.9
Dr. Manuel Lagonera, medico-legal officer of the NBI, conducted the postmortem examination of
the victim’s body on June 12, 1996 at 4:40 p.m. He found that the boy had suffered many injuries,
including three wounds at the head and the anterior chest, which could have been inflicted with the
use of blunt objects such as a piece of wood or a fist. The child could have been dead three to four
hours, or not more than eight hours, prior to the postmortem examination. Dr. Lagonera concluded
that the victim died of "bilateral pneumonia secondary to multiple blunt traversal injuries" or
complication of the lungs due to said injuries.10 The autopsy report of Dr. Lagonera shows that
Mark Anthony Fernandez sustained the following injuries:
EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. Multiple old scars, forehead.
2. Healing lacerated wound, left forehead.
3. Healed lacerated wound, above the left eyebrow, measuring 1.2x0.2 cm.
4. Healed linear abrasions, left cheek.
5. Lacerated wound, extending up to the mucous membrane of the upper lip, measuring 2
x0.3 cm.
6. Contussion (sic), left temporo-parietal region, measuring 6x5 cms.
7. Healing lacerated wound, left zygomatic region, measuring 0.5x0.3 cm.
8. Contussion (sic), left jaw, measuring 1.5x1 cm.
9. Contussion (sic), right anterior thorax, measuring 17x12 cms.
 10. Contussion (sic), right anterior forearm.
11. Lacerated wound, tip of the forefinger, right.
12. Old scar, upper 3rd , right anterior thigh.
13. Contussion (sic), right lower leg, above and below the knee measuring 9x5 cms.2
14. Contussion (sic), left lower leg, above and below the knee, measuring 13x6 cms.
15. Hematoma, big toe, under the nail bed, right.
16. Contusso-abrasion, dorsum of the left foot, measuring 6x2 cms.
17. Contussion (sic), left posterior thorax, measuring 17x6 cms.
18. Contussion (sic), right postero-lateral thorax, extending up to the right lumbar region,
measuring 13x6 cms.
19. Contussion (sic), right posterior forearm, measuring 24x8 cms.
20. Contussion (sic), left posterior forearm, measuring 22x7 cms.
21. Healing abrasion, right buttocks, measuring 2x0.5 cm.
22. Plucked finger nail, left middle finger, with hematoma of the nail bed.
23. Posterior hand, both swollen.
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. Presence of left sub-aponeurotic hematoma, temporo-parietal region and over the mid-
occipital region.
2. Hematoma over the sternum and pectoralis muscles.
3. Both lungs showed patcy and confluent consolidations.
4. Small amount of rice porridge was recovered from the stomach.11
Felicisima M. Francisco, NBI forensic chemist, conducted an examination to determine the
presence and "grouping" of human blood found on the steel hammer, the wooden sticks, and the
T-shirt that were sent to his office by P/Sr. Inspector Pedro Ramos Angulo, Jr. of the Western
Police District in Manila.12 She prepared Report No. B-96-941 stating that Specimen No. 1 or the
steel hammer, was positive for human blood "but insufficient for blood group." Specimen Nos. 2
(the broken wooden sticks) and 3 (the white T-shirt) were also positive for human blood "showing
reactions of Group A."13
Only appellant, 40, a sidewalk vendor, testified for the defense. As stated earlier, appellant
admitted killing the two-year old victim, the son of his "live-in" partner. He and the boy’s mother
had lived together for two years before the incident, starting when the boy was about a year old.
He claimed he enjoyed a harmonious relationship with his partner and that he killed the boy only
because he was under the influence of shabu, marijuana and Valium 10 at that time. Appellant
professed that he began using drugs in 1974 and that he had also taken drugs two weeks before
the incident.
On June 12, 1996, appellant came upon Macky playing with his feces, scattering them all over the
pillow, the bed sheets and the curtains. Appellant scolded the boy, "Putang-ina ka Macky! Bakit mo
2
ikinalat ng ganyan ang tae mo? Halika, dadalhin kita sa baba para hugasan!" Appellant got hold of Macky
but the boy struggled to free himself from appellant’s grasp. Appellant, still reeling from the
Valium 10 he had just taken, became so angry that he picked up a broom with a wooden handle,
and hit the boy. Appellant did not realize that he had hit Macky hard until he saw the boy sprawled
on the floor, breathing with difficulty. He dressed Macky and brought him to the Galang Medical
Center at the corner of Abad Santos Avenue and Tayabas Street, Manila. He prayed to God that
nothing serious would happen to the boy.
A lady doctor immediately attended to Macky. Appellant pleaded to the lady doctor to do all she
can to save the child; otherwise, he would be in serious trouble. After examining the child, the
doctor told appellant that she could not do anything more – Macky was dead. The same day,
appellant surrendered to the police. He was brought to the Homicide Section at 3:00 p.m.
Explaining his change of plea, appellant clarified that the killing of the boy was "accidental." He
reiterated that he was under the influence of drugs, which he had taken one after the other. He was
a drug dependent and, in fact, had been confined at the Tagaytay Rehabilitation Center. He said he
was conscious when the incident happened but he simply did not realize that he had hit the child
hard with the broom’s wooden handle. He denied having hit the boy with a hammer or having
banged his head against the wall. He hoped the trial court would be lenient with him because of his
voluntary surrender. He prayed that the court would not impose upon him the death penalty.14
Nevertheless, on July 3, 1998, the trial court promulgated its decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused, Emelito Sitchon y Tayag, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder and is sentenced to suffer the death penalty and to pay the costs. The
accused is further ordered to pay the mother of the victim Christina Tabora, moral and nominal
damages in the respective sums of P100,000.00 and P50,000.00, plus death compensation in the sum
of P50,000.00, with interest thereon at the legal rate from this date until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.15
The Court entertains little doubt that appellant is guilty of the killing of Mark Anthony Fernandez.
Appellant’s guilt was adequately established by the testimonies of Lilia Garcia and Roberto
Fernandez, who both saw appellant beat Macky. These testimonies were further corroborated by
those of PO3 Paul Dennis Javier, Dr. Manuel Lagonera and Felicisima Francisco, as well as the
various pieces of object evidence. Indeed, appellant in open court admitted beating the poor child,
which beating resulted in the latter’s death.
That appellant purportedly did not intend to kill the toddler would not exculpate him from
liability. Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability shall be incurred by
any "person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended." The rationale of the rule is found in the doctrine that "el que es causa de la causa
es causa del mal causado" (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused).16
Thus, where the accused violently kicked the sleeping victim in vital parts of the latter’s body, the
accused is liable for the supervening death as a consequence of the injuries.17 Assuming, therefore,
that appellant merely intended to inflict physical injuries upon the boy, he is nevertheless liable for
the death of the victim caused by such injuries.
The killing in this case was attended by treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and especially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.18 It is beyond dispute that the killing of minor
children who, by reason of their tender years, could not be expected to put up a defense, is
treacherous.19
Evident premeditation is absent. For the court to appreciate evident premeditation, the
prosecution must prove: (a) the time the accused decided to commit the crime; (b) an overt act
manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination; and (c) sufficient lapse of time between
the decision and the execution to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequence of his
act.20 The prosecution failed to establish any of these requisites.
The trial court incorrectly appreciated cruelty against the accused. The test in appreciating cruelty
as an aggravating circumstance is whether the accused deliberately and sadistically augmented
the wrong by causing another wrong not necessary for its commission, or inhumanly increased
the victim’s suffering or outraged or scoffed at his person or corpse.21 The nature of cruelty lies in
the fact that the culprit enjoys and delights in making his victim suffer slowly and gradually,
causing him moral and physical pain which is unnecessary for the consummation of the criminal
act which he intended to commit.22 The sheer number of wounds, however, is not a test for
determining whether cruelty attended the commission of a crime.23
The prosecution did not show that appellant enjoyed inflicting injuries upon the victim. The
inordinate force employed by appellant appears to have been caused not by any sadistic bend but
rather by the drugs that diminished his capacity.
The trial court also considered intoxication as an aggravating circumstance. The Solicitor General
defends this ruling, contending that appellant’s habitual drug addiction is an alternative
circumstance analogous to habitual intoxication under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code:
Intoxication of the offender shall be taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstance when
the offender has committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual or
subsequent to the plan to commit said felony; but when the intoxication is habitual or intentional,
it shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
The Court does not agree.1âwphi1 Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code provides a list of
mitigating circumstances, which work to reduce the accused’s penalty. Article 13(10) allows
courts to consider "any other circumstance of a similar nature and analogous to those" mentioned
therein. Neither Article 14 of the same Code on aggravating circumstances24 nor Article 15 on
alternative circumstances,25 however, contain a provision similar to Article 13(10). Accordingly,
the Court cannot consider appellant’s drug addiction as an aggravating circumstance. Criminal
statutes are to be strictly construed and no person should be brought within their terms who is
not clearly within them.26
Appellant maintains that his plea of guilt mitigates his criminal liability. On this matter, this Court
said in People v. Ramos:27
To effectively alleviate the criminal liability of an accused, a plea of guilt must be made at the first
opportunity, indicating repentance on the part of the accused. In determining the timeliness of a
3
plea of guilty, nothing could be more explicit than the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
requiring that the offender voluntarily confess his guilt before the court prior to the presentation of
the evidence for the prosecution. It is well-settled that a plea of guilty made after arraignment and
after trial had begun does not entitle the accused to have such plea considered as a mitigating
circumstance.
As appellant changed his plea only after the prosecution had rested its case and just when he was
just about to testify, said mitigating circumstance is unavailing.
The trial court credited appellant with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender.1âwphi1 For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, these elements must be established:
(1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a person in authority
or an agent of a person in authority; and (3) his surrender was voluntary.28 It is sufficient that the
surrender be "spontaneous and made in a manner clearly indicating the intent of the accused to
surrender unconditionally, either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the
authorities the trouble and expense which will necessarily be incurred in searching for and
capturing him.29
Appellant has failed to adequately prove voluntary surrender. While he claimed that he
"surrendered" to the police on the same day that the victim was killed, he did not detail the
circumstances like the time and place of such surrender. Neither did appellant state to whom he
surrendered. He did not indicate if the person was a person in authority or an agent of the latter.
PO3 Javier’s testimony that he "learned" of appellant’s alleged surrender is hearsay and does not
serve to corroborate appellant’s claim.
The Court, however, discerns no intention on the part of appellant to commit so grave a wrong
against his victim. Appellant’s intention was merely to maltreat the victim, not to kill him. When
appellant realized the horrible consequences of his felonious act, he immediately brought the
victim to the hospital.30 Sadly, his efforts were for naught.
In view of the attendance of the aggravating circumstance of treachery, the killing of the victim is
qualified to murder, punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code by reclusion perpetua to
death. The murder was attended by the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so
grave a wrong and there is no aggravating circumstance. Hence, the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua must be imposed upon appellant.31
Appellant is liable for civil indemnity of ₱50,000.00 without proof of damages. 32 Moral damages
that are recoverable for the mental anguish or emotional distress suffered by the heirs of the victim
cannot be awarded here as the prosecution did not present any evidence to justify its award.33
WHEREFORE, accused-appellant Emelito Sitchon y Tayag is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of Murder, as defined and punished by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay the heirs of Mark Anthony
Fernandez civil indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000.00.
G.R. No. 132392 January 18, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CESAR MARCOS Y MON, accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
Before this Court on automatic review is a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Burgos,
Pangasinan, Branch 70, in Criminal Case No. B-055, dated January 7, 1998, finding accused-
appellant Cesar Marcos y Mon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and
imposing upon him the supreme penalty of death.1âwphi1.nêt
In an Information1 dated October 11, 1996, accused-appellant Cesar Marcos y Mon was charged
with the crime of Murder, committed as follows:
"That on or about August 19, 1996, at noon, in Brgy. Bayambang, Municipality of Infanta,
Province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously hack Virgilio Marcos y Mon, his
elder brother with a bolo hitting on the right side of head, back of neck and other parts of
his body, inflicting upon him injuries, to wit:
- Hacking wound, right, temporo-parietal, 2 ½ inches
- Avulsion, right, temporo-parietal area, about one inch below the first
wound, about 5x3 inches
- Hacking wound, 5x3 inches, occipital area
- Hacking wound, 2 inches, submandibular area
- Hacking wound, right, elbow joint area, 4x2 inches
which caused his instantaneous death as a consequence, to the damage and prejudice of
his heirs.
CONTRARY to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code."
During the arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the offense charged and hence,
trial ensued. On January 7, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision2 the dispositive portion of
which reads:
"WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Cesar Marcos y Mon guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder punishable under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal
Code and sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of Death. Likewise, the accused is
hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of Fifty One Thousand Pesos
(P51,000.00) as actual damages and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral
damages."
Accused-appellant Cesar Marcos (Cesar) and the victim Virgilio Marcos (Virgilio) are brothers
and they live in the same house at Bayambang, Infanta Pangasinan.
Evidence for the prosecution shows that on August 19, 1996 at about 12:00 noon, Fernando
Marcos, Jr. (Fernando) was resting under a mango tree a few meters away from the house of the
Marcoses. After a while, his uncle Virgilio arrived and proceeded to the artesian well (jetmatic)
located just at the back of the house. Virgilio bent down to put on the ground the tools he was
carrying. It was at this precise moment that Fernando saw his uncle Cesar come out of the kitchen
door with a bolo in hand and suddenly hacked the unsuspecting Virgilio from behind. Virgilio
4
was hit on the nape of the neck which caused him to fall to the ground. Then Cesar hacked him
again and this time Virgilio was hit on the right side of the head. Fernando rushed to his uncle
Cesar and asked why he did that, to which Cesar replied "You go away if you do not want to get
involved." Out of fear, Fernando could only watch helplessly at Virgilio as the latter was asking him
for help. Then Fernando heard Cesar tell Virgilio "Your life is not enough to pay the money you
squandered."
Fernando ran to the house of Kagawad Solomon del Fierro (Solomon) to ask for assistance. After
learning of the hacking incident, Solomon went with Fernando to go to the Marcoses' house. On the
road, they met the Chief of the Civilian Voluntary Organization, Catalino Custodio (Catalino),
heading towards the same direction. When they reached the house, they saw Cesar seated inside
the sala where a bloodied bolo lay on top of the table beside Cesar.
Solomon then asked Cesar where the victim was and he motioned towards the back of the house.
When they saw the bloodied Virgilio sprawled on the ground near the artesian well, they shifted
him to a more comfortable position. Catalino was about to leave to look for a car that would bring
Virgilio to the hospital when the policemen arrived and went inside the house. Cesar surrendered
his bolo to SPO1 Oscar Lagasca and, without uttering a word, allowed himself to be hauled into the
police car together with the body of Virgilio. Solomon and the son of Virgilio went with them. On
the way to the police station, Solomon asked Cesar why he hacked his brother, to which the latter
answered "That's good for him," Solomon tried to explain to Cesar that he can be jailed for what he
did but Cesar simply replied "Even if I will be jailed." Then Cesar turned to the son of Virgilio and
said "Now you see what happened to your father." When they reached the police station, Virgilio
was already dead. Cesar was immediately detained.
Dr. Genaro Merino who conducted a post mortem examination on the body of Virgilio testified that
the victim died due to hemorrhage or loss of blood, secondary to multiple hacking wounds. He
surmised that by the nature of the wounds sustained, the same could have been caused by a bolo.
He claims that considering that majority of the wounds inflicted were located on the right side of
the victim, it is possible that the assailant was standing just behind the victim on his left side. He
discounted the possibility that the assailant and the victim could have been facing each other
because a person could not be hacked in front.
Accused-appellant gave a different version of what happened. According to him, in the afternoon
of August 19, 1996 he was on his way out of the house when he was met by Virgilio near the
artesian well who suddenly unsheathed his bolo and tried to hack him. Cesar was able to get hold
of Virgilio's arm and they grappled for the bolo. In the course of the struggle, Virgilio tripped and
fell to the ground thereby hitting his head with the bolo. When Cesar saw that Virgilio was already
wounded, he went inside the house and sat on the bamboo bed near the door where he stayed until
the policemen arrived. According to Cesar, the police retrieved the bolo from Virgilio who was then
holding it. He likewise testified that he agreed to go to the police station because he was asked by
the police to accompany his brother. However upon reaching the police station, he was
immediately detained, and several days thereafter, a criminal complaint was filed against him.
According to Cesar, Virgilio tried to hack him because he left Virgilio behind when he went out
fishing the night before.
Accused-appellant raises as his lone assignment of error the issue of whether or not the trial court
correctly imposed the penalty of death. It is argued that although the aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation was raised in the information, the prosecution failed to prove the same and
hence, accused-appellant can only be sentenced to reclusion perpetua, citing in support thereof
the rulings in the cases of People vs. Lucas (240 SCRA 68) and People vs. Saliling (249 SCRA 185).
In the latter case, the Court held that where the killing although qualified by treachery was not
attended by evident premeditation or any other aggravating circumstance, and neither was there
any mitigating circumstance, the penalty must be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
The Solicitor General countered that the presence or absence of evident premeditation should not
come to fore simply because it was never appreciated by the trial court in its questioned decision
nor was it considered in determining the penalty to be imposed. It submits that appellant's blood
relationship with the victim as an aggravating circumstance, in addition to the qualifying
circumstance of treachery, warrants the imposition of the death penalty.
The two conditions before treachery may be considered a qualifying circumstance are: (a) the
employment of means, methods, or manner of execution to ensure the safety of the malefactor
from defensive or retaliatory acts on the part of the victim; and (b) the deliberate adoption by the
offender of such means, methods, or manner of execution.3 It is well-established that treachery, to
be considered a qualifying circumstance, must be proven as clearly and indubitably as the crime
itself, and it may not be simply deduced from presumption.4 In the case at bar, prosecution
witness Fernando Marcos gave an eyewitness account of how appellant attacked the victim. He
testified that appellant, armed with a bolo, suddenly attacked the victim from behind and while
the latter was in a stooping position, thereby depriving the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting
victim a chance to repel or offer any defense of his person. And when the victim fell to the
ground, accused hacked him again guaranteeing that the victim would not survive the attack.
This undoubtedly constitutes treachery for the means employed by the accused ensured the
execution of his nefarious design upon the victim without risk to himself arising from any defense
which the offended party might have made.5 The aggravating circumstance of treachery qualifies
the crime to murder.
It is not disputed that the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, although alleged in
the information, was not duly proven by the prosecution and hence, it was properly not
appreciated by the trial court. However, the Solicitor General insists that since accused is a brother
of the victim, the alternative circumstance of relationship must be considered in determining the
imposable penalty.
In order that the alternative circumstance of relationship may be taken into consideration in the
imposition of the proper penalty, the offended party must either be the (a) spouse, (b) ascendant,
(c) descendant, (d) legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister, or (e) relative by affinity in the
same degree, of the offender.6 In the case at bar, prosecution eyewitness Fernando Marcos, Jr.
testified that Cesar and Virgilio Marcos are brothers.7 Accused likewise declared that Virgilio is
his brother.8 That the victim is the elder brother of Cesar is likewise alleged in the Information.
The rule is that relationship is aggravating in crimes against persons as when the offender and the
offended party are relatives of the same level such as killing a brother.9 Thus, relationship was
correctly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.
5
It appears from the records that a Certification was issued by the Philippine National Police at
Infanta, Pangasinan dated 18 February 1997,which states that herein accused "voluntarily
surrendered to this station with the weapon used."10 Nevertheless, the trial court did not take into
consideration this mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Neither was it raised in the
appellant's nor appellee's brief. Be that as it may, considering its possible effect on the penalty that
may be imposed in this case, it is well to ascertain if the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender may be appreciated in favor of herein accused.
For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the following requisites must be present: (a) that the
offender had not been actually arrested; (b) that the offender surrendered himself to a person in
authority or to the latter's agent; and (c) that the surrender was voluntary. The circumstances of the
surrender must show that it was made spontaneously and in a manner clearly indicating the intent
of the accused to surrender unconditionally, either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes
to save the authorities the trouble and expense which will necessarily be incurred in searching for
and capturing him.11
In the case at bar, appellant testified that he did not resist when the police brought him to the police
station but instead voluntarily and unconditionally placed himself at the disposal of the
authorities.12 The fact that appellant voluntarily surrendered is further buttressed by the
certification issued by the police to that effect. This was never refuted by the prosecution. In one
case, it was held that where the accused testified that he voluntarily surrendered to the police and
the prosecution did not dispute such claim, then the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender should be appreciated in his favor.13
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
Article 63 thereof provides the rules for the application of indivisible penalties, to wit:
"Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. – x x x.
In all cases in which the law prescribes the penalty composed of two indivisible penalties
the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance,
the greater penalty shall be applied.
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of
the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there
is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.1âwphi1.nêt
4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the
act, the courts shall reasonably allow them to offset one another in consideration of their
number and importance, for the purpose of applying the penalty in accordance with the
preceding rules, according to the result of such compensation."
In the present case, while the trial court correctly considered the qualifying circumstance of
treachery, it failed to make a finding as to the presence of any aggravating circumstance which
would justify the imposition of the death penalty. There is here present the aggravating
circumstance of relationship but this is offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. Perforce, pursuant to Article 63, the correct penalty to be imposed should only
be reclusion perpetua.
With regard to actual damages, the trial court likewise erred in awarding the sum of P51,000.00 to
the heirs of the victim which must be reduced to P18,000.00 since it is only the latter amount
which is supported by a receipt.14 The bare testimony of the victim's son as to the other expenses
was not substantially corroborated by receipts to prove the same. The court can only grant actual
damages for such expenses if they are supported by receipts.15 We affirm the award of moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00. In addition, the amount of P50,000.00 should also be
awarded as civil indemnity without need of proof other than the commission of the crime.16
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Burgos, Pangasinan, Branch
70, in Criminal Case No. B-055 dated January 7, 1998 finding appellant Cesar Marcos y Mon guilty
for the crime of the murder is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty is
hereby reduced to reclusion perpetua and that appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the
amounts of P18,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity ex delicto.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 194137
AMBASSADOR HOTEL, INC., Petitioner
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Respondent
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the July 29, 2010
Decision1 and October 18, 2010 Resolution2 of the Court Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 87948,
which affirmed in toto the December 20, 2005 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 218,
Quezon City (RTC) in Criminal Case No. Q-04-125458, a case for nonpayment of Social Security
System (SSS) contributions.
Sometime in September 2001, the SSS filed a complaint with the City Prosecutor's Office of
Quezon City against Ambassador Hotel, Inc. (Ambassador Hotel) and its officers for non-remittance
of SSS contributions and penalty liabilities for the period from June 1999 to March 2001 in the
aggregate amount of ₱769,575.48.
After preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor's Office filed an Information,4 dated January
28, 2004, before the RTC charging Ambassador Hotel, Inc.'s Yolanda Chan (Yolanda), as Pr
esident and Chairman of the Board; and Alvin Louie Rivera, as Treasurer and Head of the Finance
Department, with violation of Section 22(a), in relation to Section 22(d) and Section 28(e) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1161, as amended by R.A. No. 8282. Only Yolanda was arrested. Upon
arraignment, she pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued.
Evidence of the Prosecution
6
The prosecution presented Maria Rezell C. De Ocampo (De Ocampo), Accounts Officer of SSS and
Simeon Nicolas Chan (Simeon), former President of Ambassador Hotel. Their combined testimonies
tended to establish the following:
De Ocampo was assigned to investigate the account of Ambassador Hotel. In the course of her
investigation, she discovered that the hotel was delinquent in its payment of contributions for the
period from June 1999 to March 2001, as an examination of the hotel's records revealed that its last
payment was made in May 1999. Thereafter, De Ocampo prepared a delinquency assessment and a
billing letter for Ambassador Hotel. On April 17, 2001, she visited Ambassador Hotel, where a
certain Guillermo Ciriaco (Ciriaco) assisted her. De Ocampo then informed Ciriaco of the hotel's
delinquency. She showed him the assessment, billing letter, and letter of authority. De Ocampo also
requested for the records of previous SSS payments, but the same could not be produced. Thus, she
told Ciriaco that Ambassador Hotel had to comply with the said request within fifteen (15) days.
De Ocampo referred the matter to their Cluster Legal Unit. On May 23, 2001, she prepared an
investigation report stating that Ambassador Hotel failed to present the required reports and to
fully pay their outstanding delinquency. In turn, the Cluster Legal Unit issued a final demand letter
to Ambassador Hotel. De Ocampo sent the final demand letter to Ambassador Hotel via registered
mail. She also returned to the hotel to personally serve the said letter, which was received by
Norman Cordon, Chief Operating Officer of Ambassador Hotel.
On July 4, 2001, Pilar Barzanilla of Ambassador Hotel went to the SSS office and submitted a list of
unpaid contributions from June 1999 to March 2001.1âwphi1 On September 14, 2001, De Ocampo
went back to the hotel to seek compliance with the demand letter. The representatives of the hotel
requested that the delinquency be settled by installment. They also submitted a collection list, the
audited financial settlement and the request of installment to the SSS. Ambassador Hotel, however,
did not tender any postdated checks for the installment payments.
De Ocampo concluded that based on the actual assessment and documents submitted, the unpaid
contributions of Ambassador Hotel from June 1999 to March 2001 amounted to ₱303,459.00.
Further, as of January 2, 2005, the hotel is liable for penalties in the amount of ₱531,341.44.
On the other hand, Simeon testified that he was the President of Ambassador Hotel from 1971 until
he was replaced in 1998; and that on April 25, 1998, her daughter, Yolanda, became the President of
the hotel pursuant to Board Resolution No. 7, series of 1998.5
Evidence of the Defense
The defense presented the following witnesses: Yolanda, President and Chairman of the Board of
Ambassador Hotel; Atty. Laurenao Galon (Atty. Galon), lawyer of Ambassador Hotel; Michael
Paragas, Sheriff of RTC Branch 46; and Norman D. Cordon (Cordon), Chief Operating Officer of
Ambassador Hotel. Their testimonies are summarized, to wit:
Yolanda was elected as President of Ambassador Hotel on April 25, 1998. Simeon, however,
prevented her from assuming her office and performing her functions as President. Consequently,
she filed a case for grave coercion and grave threats against Simeon and his allies. On the other
hand, Simeon filed a case for injunction, damages and declaration of nullity of the corporate
meeting, which elected Yolanda as President. The case was raffled to RTC Branch 46, which ruled in
her favor. Pursuant to the Order, dated April 10, 2001 of R TC Branch 46, she assumed the
position of President of the hotel without any impediment.
Accordingly, Yolanda argued that because she was not performing the functions as the President
of Ambassador Hotel from April 25, 1998 until April 10, 2001, she could not be held criminally
liable for the non-payment of SSS contributions from June 1999 to March 2001.
Further, Cordon testified that the SSS indeed conducted an investigation as to their non-
remittance of contributions. He attempted to locate the records regarding their SSS contributions,
but could not find any. Cordon also communicated with the SSS, but it failed to respond and
instead filed the present case against them.
The RTC Ruling
In its December 20, 2005 Decision, the RTC held that Yolanda could not be held criminally liable
for the non-payment of SSS contributions because she was not performing the duties of the hotel's
president from June 1999 to March 2001. It opined that Yolanda could not be considered as the
managing head of the hotel within the purview of Section 28(f) of R.A. No. 8282; thus, she was not
criminally accountable. The RTC, however, ruled that the acquittal of Yolanda did not absolve
Ambassador Hotel from its civil liabilities. Thus, it concluded that Ambassador Hotel must pay
SSS in the amount of ₱584,804.00 as contributions for SSS Medicare and Employee Compensation,
including 3% penalties thereon.
Aggrieved, Ambassador Hotel filed an appeal insofar as the civil liability is concerned. It alleged
that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over its person because it was not a party in the said
case.
The CA Ruling
In its assailed decision, dated July 29, 2010, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling. It held that the
payment of SSS contributions is mandatory and its non-payment results in criminal prosecution.
The appellate court stated that every criminal liability carries with it civil liability. As Ambassador
Hotel neither waived nor reserved its right to institute a separate civil case, it was deemed
instituted in the criminal case. The CA opined that the acquittal of Yolanda did not extinguish the
civil action against Ambassador Hotel as the RTC did not declare that the fact from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist. Moreover, it underscored that Ambassador Hotel was not
deprived of due process as its directors and officers were informed numerous times regarding its
delinquency and the pending case filed against it. The CA concluded that Ambassador Hotel was
given every opportunity to contest its obligation with the SSS yet it did nothing.
Ambassador Hotel moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied by the CA in its assailed
resolution, dated October 18, 2010.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES
I Ambassador Hotel is obligated to remit SSS contributions
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
OF THE PETITIONER.
7
II
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS WHEN THE LOWER
COURT DECLARED IT LIABLE TO RESPONDENT SSS EVEN THOUGH IT IS NOT A PARTY TO
THE CASE.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE LOWER COURT DECLARING
PETITIONER LIABLE TO RESPONDENT SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM FOR ALLEGED
UNREMITTED SSS CONTRIBUTION IS VALID.6
In its Memorandum, 7 Ambassador Hotel argued that it has a separate and distinct personality
from its officers such as Yolanda; that it was neither a party to the criminal case nor was summons
issued against it, hence, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over it; that it was deprived due
process when the RTC ruled that it was civilly liable for the unpaid SSS contributions even though
the trial court had no jurisdiction over its person; and that the RTC had no right to render an
adverse decision against it because it was not a party in the criminal action.
In its Memorandum, 8 the SSS countered that under R.A. No. 8282, employers, including juridical
entities, that violate their obligation to remit the SSS contributions shall be criminally liable and that
in cases of corporations, it is the managing head that shall be the one criminally responsible. It
argued that since Yolanda, as President of Ambassador Hotel, was properly arrested, the RTC
acquired jurisdiction over it. The SSS added that the acquittal of Yolanda did not extinguish the
civil liability of the hotel because it was deemed instituted in the criminal action. Further, it
highlighted that Ambassador Hotel was given sufficient notice of its delinquency and the pending
case against it.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
The Social Security System is a government agency imbued with a salutary purpose to carry out the
policy of the State to establish, develop, promote and perfect a sound and viable tax-exempt social
security system suitable to the needs of the people throughout the Philippines which shall promote
social justice and provide meaningful protection to members and their beneficiaries against the
hazards of disability, sickness, maternity, old- age, death and other contingencies resulting in loss
of income or financial burden.9
The soundness and viability of the funds of the SSS in turn depend on the contributions of its
covered employee and employer members, which it invests in order to deliver the basic social
benefits and privileges to its members. The entitlement to and amount of benefits and privileges of
the covered members are contribution-based. Both the soundness and viability of the funds of the
SSS as well as the entitlement and amount of benefits and privileges of its members are adversely
affected to a great extent by the non-remittance of the much-needed contributions. 10
Under Section 8(c) of R.A. No. 8282, an employer is defined as "any person, natural
or juridical, domestic or foreign, who carries on in the Philippines any trade, business, industry,
undertaking, or activity of any kind and uses the services of another person who is under his
orders as regards the employment, except the Government and any of its political subdivisions,
branches or instrumentalities, including corporations owned or controlled by the Government."
Ambassador Hotel, as a juridical entity, is still bound by the provisions of R.A. No. 8282. Section
22 (a) thereof states:
Remittance of Contributions. (a) The contributions imposed in the preceding section shall be
remitted to the SSS within the first ten (10) days of each calendar month following the month for
which they are applicable or within such time as the Commission may prescribe. Every employer
required to deduct and to remit such contributions shall be liable for their payment and if any
contribution is not paid to the SSS as herein prescribed, he shall pay besides the contribution a
penalty thereon of three percent (3%) per month from the date the contribution falls due until
paid. If deemed expedient and advisable by the Commission, the collection and remittance of
contributions shall be made quarterly or semiannually in advance, the contributions payable by
the employees to be advanced by their respective employers: Provided, That upon separation of an
employee, any contribution so paid in advance but not due shall be credited or refunded to his
employer.
Verily, prompt remittance of SSS contributions under the aforesaid provision is mandatory. Any
divergence from this rule subjects the employer not only to monetary sanctions, that is, the
payment of penalty of three percent (3%) per month, but also to criminal prosecution if the
employer fails to: (a) register its employees with the SSS; (b) deduct monthly contributions from
the salaries/wages of its employees; or (c) remit to the SSS its employees' SSS contributions and/or
loan payments after deducting the same from their respective salaries/wages. 11
To acquire jurisdiction over Ambassador Hotel, its managing head, director or partner must be arrested
As discussed above, even when the employer is a corporation, it shall still be held liable for the
non-remittance of SSS contributions. It is, however, the head, directors or officers that shall suffer
the personal criminal liability. Although a corporation is invested by law with a personality
separate and distinct from that of the persons composing it, 12 the corporate veil is pierced when
a director, trustee or officer is made personally liable by specific provision of law. 13 In this
regard, Section 28 (f) of R.A. No. 8282 explicitly provides that "[i]f the act or omission penalized
by this Act be committed by an association, partnership, corporation or any other institution, its
managing head, directors or partners shall be liable to the penalties provided in this Act for the
offense." Thus, a corporation cannot invoke its separate judicial entity to escape its liability for
non-payment of SSS contributions.
To acquire jurisdiction over the corporation in a criminal case, its head, directors or partners must
be served with a warrant of arrest. Naturally, a juridical entity cannot be the subject of an arrest
because it is a mere fiction of law; thus, an arrest on its representative is sufficient to acquire
jurisdiction over it. To reiterate, the law specifically disregards the separate personality between
the corporation and its officers with respect to violations of R.A. No. 8282; thus, an arrest on its
officers binds the corporation.
In this case, Yolanda, as President of Ambassador Hotel, was arrested and brought before the R
TC. Consequently, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Yolanda and of
Ambassador Hotel as the former was its representative. No separate service of summons is
8
required for the hotel because the law simply requires the arrest of its agent for the court to acquire
jurisdiction over it in the criminal action. Likewise, there is no requirement to implead Ambassador
Hotel as a party to the criminal case because it is deemed included therein through its managing
head, directors or partners, as provided by Section 28 (f) of R.A. No. 8282.
The acquittal of Yolanda does not extinguish the civil liability of Ambassador Hotel
It is a basic rule that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless
the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action. 14Necessarily, when the Information was filed with the
R TC, the civil action against Ambassador Hotel for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
non-remittance of SSS contributions was deemed instituted therein.
Further, extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action, unless
the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist. 15When Yolanda was acquitted in the criminal case because it was
proven that she did not perform the functions of the president from June 1999 to March 2001, it did
not result in the dismissal of the civil case against Ambassador Hotel. The RTC did not declare in its
judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil action,
deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal case, remains.
The argument of Ambassador Hotel - that the RTC lost its jurisdiction over it when Yolanda was
acquitted - fails to convince. It is a well-settled rule that the jurisdiction of a court depends upon the
state of facts existing at the time it is invoked, and if the jurisdiction once attaches to the person and
subject matter of the litigation, the subsequent happening of events, although they are of such a
character as would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, will not operate
to oust jurisdiction already attached. 16 Also, it is fundamental that the jurisdiction of a court in
criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the information or criminal complaint and not by
the result of the evidence presented at the trial, much less by the trial judge's personal appraisal of
the affidavits and exhibits attached by the fiscal to the record of the case without hearing the parties
and their witnesses nor receiving their evidence at a proper trial. 17
In this case, the Information alleged that Yolanda was the President of Ambassador Hotel.
Moreover, such fact was supported by the affidavits and exhibits attached to the Information.
Hence, the R TC properly issued a warrant of arrest over Yolanda pursuant to Section 28(f) of R.A.
No. 8282 to acquire jurisdiction over her person and that of Ambassador Hotel. From that moment,
the jurisdiction over their persons was acquired.
Even though it was established during the trial that Yolanda was not performing the functions of
the hotel's president from June 1999 to March 2001, which negated her criminal responsibility, it
is non sequitur that the jurisdiction over Ambassador hotel will be detached. Any subsequent event
during trial will not strip the RTC of its jurisdiction because once it attaches, the same shall remain
with the said court until it renders judgment.
To subscribe to the theory of Ambassador Hotel - that evidence will dictate the jurisdiction of the
court - will create a chaotic situation. It will be absurd for the courts to first conduct trial on the
merits before it can determine whether it has jurisdiction over the person or subject matter. The
more logical and orderly approach is for the court to determine jurisdiction by the allegations in
the information or criminal complaint, as supported by the affidavits and exhibits attached
therein, and not by the evidence at trial. Once jurisdiction attaches, it shall not be removed from
the court until the termination of the case.
As the jurisdiction over Ambassador Hotel was obtained, it became a party in the case and, as will
be discussed later, it was given fair opportunity to present its evidence and controve1t the
prosecution's evidence. In fine, the RTC's jurisdiction over Ambassador Hotel continued in spite
of Yolanda's acquittal.
Ambassador Hotel failed to controvert the evidence of its non-remittance of SSS contributions
The CA found that· Ambassador Hotel was well informed of its delinquency by the SSS even
before the case was filed. When the case was eventually filed, its directors and officers were also
notified. Notably, even its own lawyer, Atty. Galon, testified during trial on its behalf.
Ambassador Hotel was given the opportunity to present its defense before the court for its non-
payment of SSS contributions. Thus, it was given the right to be heard and controvert the evidence
presented against it.
During trial, the prosecution established that the SSS, through De Ocampo, discovered that the
last remittance of SSS contributions by Ambassador Hotel was made in May 1999. She then
informed the hotel of its delinquency when she visited the establishment on April 17, 2001. She
gave the hotel's representative the delinquency assessment and the billing letter. De Ocampo also
requested that the records of previous SSS payments be presented, but these could
not be produced. After referring the case to the Cluster Legal Unit, De Ocampo sent a final
demand letter to Ambassador Hotel by registered mail and personal service. Notwithstanding the
several notices of its delinquency, Ambassador Hotel failed to settle its obligations. Moreover,
though it offered to pay its delinquency through installment, no postdated checks were ever
submitted.
On the other hand, Ambassador Hotel's evidence simply focused on establishing that Yolanda
was not acting as its President from June 1999 to March 2001 because of an internal dispute.
Although this may be sufficient to eliminate the criminal liability of Yolanda, it does not justify the
nonpayment of SSS contributions. Ambassador Hotel did not squarely address the issue on its
obligations because there was dearth of evidence that it remitted the said contributions. Cordon, a
witness for the hotel, even admitted that they were informed of their delinquency and that they
attempted to unearth its SSS records to defend its obligations, but failed to do so. The hotel never
proved that it had already paid its contributions or, if not, who should have been accountable for
its non-payment. Glaringly, even though Ambassador Hotel was given sufficient leeway to
explain its obligations, it did not take advantage of the said opportunity. Consequently, it had
nothing else to blame for its predicament but itself.
In fine, the Court is of the view that there is preponderance of evidence that Ambassador Hotel
failed to remit its SSS contributions from June 1999 to March 2001 in the amount of ₱584,804.00. It
must pay the said amount to the SSS plus interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The July 29, 2010 Decision and October 18, 2010
Resolution of the Court Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87948
9
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the judgment award shall earn interest at the rate of
six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 181084 June 16, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
BARTOLOME TAMPUS1 and IDA MONTESCLAROS, Defendants.
IDA MONTESCLAROS, Appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
On appeal is the decision2 of the Court of Appeals, Visayas Station, dated September 29, 2006 in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00215. The Court of Appeals affirmed, with modification, the decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City in Criminal Case No. 013324-L, finding appellant Ida
Montesclaros (Ida) guilty as an accomplice in the commission of rape.
The present appeal stems from two criminal cases: (1) Criminal Case No. 013324-L charging
Bartolome Tampus (Tampus) and Ida as conspirators in the rape of ABC4 on April 1, 1995 at 4:30
p.m.; and (2) Criminal Case No. 013325-L charging Tampus of raping ABC on April 4, 1995 at 1:00
a.m.
The Information5 in each case reads as follows:
CRIM. CASE NO. 013324-L6
That on the 1st day of April 1995, at about 4:30 o’clock [sic] in the afternoon, in Looc, Lapulapu
City, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Bartolome Tampus,
taking advantage that [ABC] was in deep slumber due to drunkenness, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with [sic] the latter, who was at that time
thirteen (13) years old, against her will, in conspiracy with the accused Ida Montesclaros who gave
permission to Bartolome Tampus to rape [ABC].
CONTRARY TO LAW.
CRIM. CASE NO. 013325-L7
That on the 3rd day of April, 1995,8 at about 1:00 o’clock [sic] dawn, in Looc, Lapulapu City,
Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with
a wooden club (poras), by means of threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with [sic] [ABC], who was at that time thirteen
(13) years old, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The offended party, ABC, is the daughter of appellant Ida, and was 13 years old at the time of the
incident. Ida worked as a waitress in Bayanihan Beer House in Mabini, Cebu City. On February 19,
1995, Ida and ABC started to rent a room in a house owned by Tampus, a barangay tanod. On April
1, 1995, about 4:30 p.m., ABC testified that she was in the house with Ida and Tampus9 who were
both drinking beer at that time. They forced her to drink beer10 and after consuming three and one-
half (3 ½) glasses of beer, she became intoxicated and very sleepy.11While ABC was lying on the
floor of their room, she overheard Tampus requesting her mother, Ida, that he be allowed to
"remedyo"12 or have sexual intercourse with her.13 Appellant Ida agreed and instructed Tampus
to leave as soon as he finished having sexual intercourse with ABC. Ida then went to work,
leaving Tampus alone with ABC. ABC fell asleep and when she woke up, she noticed that the
garter of her panties was loose and rolled down to her knees. She suffered pain in her head,
thighs, buttocks, groin and vagina, and noticed that her panties and short pants were stained with
blood which was coming from her vagina.14 When her mother arrived home from work the
following morning, she kept on crying but appellant Ida ignored her.15
ABC testified that on April 4, 1995 around 1:00 a.m., she was left alone in the room since her
mother was at work at the beer house.16 Tampus went inside their room and threatened to kill her
if she would report the previous sexual assault to anyone.17 He then forcibly removed her
panties. ABC shouted but Tampus covered her mouth and again threatened to kill her if she
shouted.18 He undressed himself, spread ABC’s legs, put saliva on his right hand and he applied
this to her vagina; he then inserted his penis into ABC’s vagina and made a push and pull
movement.19After consummating the sexual act, he left the house. When ABC told appellant Ida
about the incident, the latter again ignored her.20
On May 4, 1995, after being maltreated by her mother, ABC sought the help of her aunt, Nellie
Montesclaros (Nellie). She told Nellie about the rape and that her mother sold her.21 ABC,
together with Nellie and Norma Andales, a traffic enforcer, reported the incident of rape to the
police. On May 9, 1995, Nestor A. Sator , M.D. (Dr. Sator), head of the Medico-Legal Branch of the
Philippine National Crime Laboratory Services, Regional Unit 7, conducted a physical
examination of ABC and issued a Medico-Legal Report.22 Dr. Sator testified that the result of his
examination of ABC revealed a deep healed laceration at the seven (7) o’clock position and a
shallow healed laceration at the one (1) o’clock position on ABC’s hymen.
On September 22, 1995, ABC filed two Complaints. She accused Tampus of taking advantage of
her by having carnal knowledge of her, against her will, while she was intoxicated and sleeping
on April 1, 1995 at 4:30 p.m. She declared in her Complaint that this was done in conspiracy with
accused Ida who gave permission to Tampus to rape her. And again, she stated that on April 3,
1995, she was threatened with a wooden club by Tampus, who then succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her, against her will.
Tampus denied raping ABC on April 1, 1995. He claimed that at 4:00 p.m. of April 1, 1995, he left
the house to go to the public market of Lapu-lapu City. When he arrived home at 6:00 p.m., ABC
and Ida were not there as they usually go to the beer house at 4:00 p.m. or 5:00 p.m.23 He denied
forcing ABC to drink beer. He also denied asking Ida to allow him to have sexual intercourse with
ABC.24 Appellant Ida also testified that she and ABC left for the beer house at 4:00 p.m. of April 1,
1995 and they came back at 6:00 a.m. the following day.25 She said that she always brought her
daughter to the beer house with her and there was never an instance when she left her daughter
alone in the house.26 She denied forcing ABC to drink beer at 4:30 p.m. of April 1, 1995, and she
denied giving permission to Tampus to have sexual intercourse with ABC.27
Tampus also denied raping ABC on April 4, 1995. He testified that he arrived at the Barangay
Tanod Headquarters between 7:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. of April 3, 199528 and that his actual duty
10
time shift was from midnight to 5:00 a.m. of April 4, 1995. Guillermo Berdin (Berdin), a defense
witness, testified that on April 3, 1995, Tampus reported for duty at the police outpost at 8:00 p.m.
and left at 5:00 a.m. of April 4, 1995, as reflected in the attendance logbook. However, on cross-
examination, Berdin could not tell whether the signature appearing on the logbook really belonged
to Tampus. It was noted by the trial court that the handwriting used by Tampus in the logbook
entry on April 2, 1995 is different from his handwriting appearing on April 3, 1995.29 It was also
revealed that the house of Tampus is just 500 meters away or just a three-minute walk from the
barangay tanod outpost and that the barangay tanod on duty could leave the outpost unnoticed or
without permission.30
Agustos B. Costas, M.D.31 (Dr. Costas), the Head of the Department of Psychiatry of the Vicente
Sotto Memorial Medical Center, issued a Medical Certification,32 which showed that appellant Ida
was treated as an outpatient at the Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center Psychiatry Department
from November 11, 1994 to January 12, 1995 and was provisionally diagnosed with Schizophrenia,
paranoid type.
The trial court convicted Tampus of two counts of rape, as principal in Criminal Case No. 013324-L
and Criminal Case No. 013325-L. Appellant Ida was found guilty as an accomplice in Criminal Case
No. 013324-L. The trial court appreciated in Ida’s favor the mitigating circumstance of illness which
would diminish the exercise of will-power without depriving her of the consciousness of her acts,
pursuant to Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code.33 The dispositive portion of the trial court’s
decision states, viz.:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds accused Bartolome
Tampus GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of two counts of rape, as principals [sic], in
Criminal Case No. 013324-L and Criminal Case No. 013325-L and he is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua in each of the aforementioned cases.
The Court also finds accused Ida Montesclaros GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as an
accomplice in Criminal Case No. 013324-L, and she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years, and eight (8) months of Reclusion
Temporal.
Both accused are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to indemnify the offended party, [ABC], the
sum of P50,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 013324-L.
With costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED. 34
Pending resolution of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, accused Tampus died on November
16, 200035 and his appeal was dismissed by the Third Division of this Court.36 Thus, the appeal
before the Court of Appeals dealt only with that of appellant Ida. The appellate court gave credence
to the testimony of ABC and affirmed the trial court’s decision with modification. It appreciated the
mitigating circumstance of illness in favor of Ida, but found that Ida failed to prove that she was
completely deprived of intelligence on April 1, 1995. On the basis of the medical report and the
testimony of the attending physician, Ida’s schizophrenia was determined by both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals to have diminished the exercise of her will-power though it did not
deprive her of the consciousness of her acts. The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of
Appeals states:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed decision is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Ida Montesclaros is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as accomplice in the commission of rape and hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to twelve (12) years and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Further, she is ORDERED to pay moral damages
in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (Php 50,000.00) and exemplary damages in the amount of
twenty-five thousand pesos (Php 25,000.00).37
We find the findings of the lower courts to be well-taken.
The finding of guilt of Ida as an accomplice in the rape of ABC is dependent on proving the guilt
of the principal accused. Upon examination of the records of the case, we agree with the ruling of
the trial and appellate courts that the testimony of ABC is clear and straightforward, and is
sufficient to conclude that Tampus is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal in the rape of
ABC, in Criminal Case No. 013324-L, as well as to convict appellant Ida as an accomplice in the
same criminal case.
The findings of the trial courts carry great weight and respect and, generally, appellate courts will
not overturn said findings unless the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some
facts or circumstances of weight and substance which will alter the assailed decision or affect the
result of the case.38 The rule finds an even more stringent application where the said findings are
sustained by the Court of Appeals.39
The trial court has carefully scrutinized the testimony of complainant ABC and has given full faith
and credence to her testimony. Both the trial and appellate courts found that the rape of ABC by
Tampus on April 1, 1995 has been established beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, it is highly
inconceivable for a young girl to impute the crime of rape, implicate her own mother in such a
vile act, allow an examination of her private parts and subject herself to public trial if she has not
been a victim of rape and was impelled to seek justice for the defilement of her person.
Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full credit.40
Tampus was positively identified by ABC as the person who had carnal knowledge of her against
her will on April 1, 1995. The denial of Tampus cannot prevail over the positive and direct
identification by the victim, ABC. Although ABC was asleep and unconscious at the time the
sexual debasement was committed by Tampus, circumstantial evidence established beyond doubt
that it is Tampus who raped ABC. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there
is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.41 In cases like the one at bar, the Court takes into consideration the events that transpired
before and after the victim lost consciousness in order to establish the commission of the act of
coitus.42
The trial court correctly determined, thus:
The prosecution has clearly established by its evidence that accused Bartolome Tampus had carnal
knowledge of [ABC] on April 1, 1995 under the circumstance set forth in Article 335 (2) of the
11
Revised Penal Code, as amended; that is, when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious.
xxxx
The Court cannot accept accused Bartolome Tampus’ defense of denial and alibi. His denial pales in
effect against the positive evidence given by [ABC] that he ravished her [on] two occasions.
xxxx
It is true that in the first incident on April 1, 1995, [ABC] did not see Tampus lie down with her.
What she saw was the aftermath of her deflowering upon waking up. Nevertheless, the Court has
taken note of the following circumstances: (1) The drinking session where the complainant was
forced to drink beer by both accused; (2) The conversation between the two accused when accused
Tampus requested accused Ida Montesclaros, and was granted by the latter, permission to have
sexual intercourse with the complainant; (3) Accused Tampus and the complainant were the only
persons left in the house when Ida Montesclaros went to work after acceding to the request of
Tampus; (4) The bloodstained pants, the pain and blood in complainant’s vagina and the pain in
her head, groin and buttocks; (5) The threat made by accused Tampus on the complainant in the
dawn of April 4, 1995 that he would kill her if she would tell about the previous incident on April 1,
1995; and (6) The second incident of rape that immediately ensued. These circumstances form a
chain that points to accused Bartolome Tampus as the person who had carnal knowledge of [ABC]
when she was asleep in an inebriated condition. 43
After establishing the guilt of Tampus as principal, the trial court then determined the guilt of Ida.
Although Ida was charged as a conspirator, the trial court found her liable as an accomplice. The
trial court ruled that her act of forcing or intimidating ABC to drink beer and then acceding to the
request of co-accused Tampus to be allowed to have sexual intercourse with ABC did not prove
their conspiracy.44 Hence, it held that, "[u]ndoubtedly, Ida Montesclaros participated in the
commission of the crime by previous acts but her participation, not being indispensable, was not
that of a principal. She is liable as an accomplice."45
In her appeal, appellant Ida argued that it is against human nature for a mother to allow her
daughter to be raped. She maintained that there was no instance when she left ABC alone in the
house. The Court of Appeals dismissed appellant Ida’s appeal as it also gave credence to the
testimony of ABC.
In her appeal brief filed before this Court, Ida raises the following assignment of errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED BARTOLOME TAMPUS
OF THE CRIMES OF RAPE DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING IDA MONTESCLAROS AS
ACCOMPLICE TO THE CRIME OF RAPE DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION
TO PROVE HER GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.46
We affirm the trial and appellate courts in ruling that Ida is liable as an accomplice in the rape of
her daughter, ABC.
Accomplices are persons who, not being included in Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code,
cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.47 The following
requisites must be proved in order that a person can be considered an accomplice:
(a) community of design, i.e., knowing that criminal design of the principal by direct
participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose;
(b) he cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts; and,
(c) there must be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to
the person charged as accomplice.48
The testimony of ABC establishes that Ida cooperated in the execution of the rape by Tampus
when prior to the act of rape by Tampus, she forced ABC to drink beer and she agreed to Tampus’
request for him to have sexual intercourse with ABC. Ida’s acts show that she had knowledge of
and even gave her permission to the plan of Tampus to have sexual intercourse with her
daughter.1avvphi1
During the cross-examination by the defense counsel, Atty. Paulito Cabrera, of witness ABC, she
testified that:
Q Before this date, April 1, 1995, did you already usually drink beer?
A No, sir.
Q So, you are telling the Honorable Court that it was only on April 1, 1995 that you first
drank beer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did you say, you were forced to drink beer?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who forced you to drink beer in that afternoon of April 1, 1995?
A Bartolome Tampus and "Nanay", my mother.49
xxxx
Q By the way, your mother proposed to you to drink beer?
A Yes, sir.
Q Before you concede to her proposition, did you not complain that you had not been
used to drinking beer and then, why suddenly, she would let you drink beer at that
time?
A No, sir.
Q Did you not tell her that, "I am not used to drinking beer, so, I would not drink beer"?
A Because the beer was mixed with Coke.
Q So, you mean that you also agreed to drink beer at that time?
12
A I just agreed to the proposal of my mother.
Q But you never voiced any complaint or any refusal to her at that time?
A No, sir because I was afraid that she might maltreat me.
Q At that time when she proposed to you to drink beer, was she already threatening to
maltreat you if you would not drink that beer?
A Not yet.
Q And how were you able to conclude that she might maltreat you if you would not drink
that beer that she proposed for you to drink?
A Because "Nanay" stared at me sharply and she had a wooden stick prepared.
Q Are you sure that she was doing that while she was offering the glass of beer to you?
A Yes, sir.50
xxxx
Q While you were drinking beer, your mother and Bartolome went out of the house and
you overheard Bartolome asking or proposing to your mother that he would have sexual
intercourse with you which you term in the Visayan dialect "remedyo", Bartolome would
want to have a "remedyo" with you. When [sic], particular moment did you allegedly hear
this statement, while you were drinking beer or after you had finished drinking beer?
A When I was already lying on the floor of the room we were renting.51
xxxx
Q And, of course, as you have stated now, it was you, you were quite sure that it was you
who was being referred by Bartolome Tampus when he said to your mother in the Visayan
dialect that "gusto siya moremedyo nimo", he wants to have sexual intercourse with you?
A Yes, sir, but I don’t know the meaning of "remedyo".
Q At that time, you did not know the meaning of "remedyo"?
A Not yet, sir.52
xxxx
Q Was that the very first time that you ever heard of the word "remedyo"?
A Yes, sir53
xxxx
Q And when your mother came back from work at about 7:00 o’clock [sic] in the morning
of April 2, 1995, did you not also bother to tell her of what you suspected that something
serious or bad had happened to you in the previous day?
A Because she already knew, sir.
Q How did you know that she already knew?
A Because I heard her telling Omeng,54 "After you have sexual intercourse with her, leave
her immediately!"55
 xxxx
Q Considering that you never knew what is the meaning of the word, "remedyo", when
your mother arrived in the morning of April 2, 1995, did you not confront your mother,
did you not tell her that, "Is this what you mean by "remedyo", as what you had agreed
with Bartolome Tampus that he would do something to my genitals?
A No sir, because when she arrived, she kept on laughing.56
All the requisites concur in order to find Ida guilty as an accomplice to Tampus in the rape of
ABC. The testimony of ABC shows that there was community of design between Ida and Tampus
to commit the rape of ABC. Ida had knowledge of and assented to Tampus’ intention to have
sexual intercourse with her daughter. She forced ABC to drink beer, and when ABC was already
drunk, she left ABC alone with Tampus, with the knowledge and even with her express consent to
Tampus’ plan to have sexual intercourse with her daughter.
It is settled jurisprudence that the previous acts of cooperation by the accomplice should not be
indispensable to the commission of the crime; otherwise, she would be liable as a principal by
indispensable cooperation. The evidence shows that the acts of cooperation by Ida are not
indispensable to the commission of rape by Tampus. First, because it was both Ida and Tampus
who forced ABC to drink beer, and second because Tampus already had the intention to have
sexual intercourse with ABC and he could have consummated the act even without Ida’s consent.
The acts of Ida are closely related to the eventual commission of rape by Tampus. They both
forced ABC to drink beer; when ABC was already drunk, Tampus asked Ida if he could have
sexual intercourse with ABC and Ida gave her consent; and lastly, Ida left ABC alone with Tampus
so that he proceed with his plan to rape ABC.
Circumstances affecting the liability of the Appellant as an Accomplice
We agree with both the trial and appellate courts in their appreciation of the mitigating
circumstance of illness as would diminish the exercise of willpower of Ida without depriving her
of the consciousness of her acts, pursuant to Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code.
Dr. Costas testified that Ida was provisionally treated for schizophrenia a few months before the
incident, from November 11, 1994 to January 12, 1995. Based on his expert opinion, Ida was not
totally deprived of intelligence at the time of the incident; but, she may have poor judgment. On
Direct Examination of Dr. Costas by City Prosecutor Celso V. Espinosa, he testified as follows:
Q Doctor, taking into consideration your diagnosis, as you said, is provisional, would
you say that the patient [sic] totally deprived of intelligence or reason?
A Not totally.
Q She will be conscious of her acts?
A She may be, that is possible, for certain cause.
Q And there will be loss of intelligence?
A There could be.
Q Now, Doctor, she is charged her [sic] as one of the principals in the commission of the
crime of rape for having given her daughter to be sexually abused by her co-accused,
13
allegedly convinced by her co-accused on the first day of April, 1995. Now, if she was then
under treatment, Doctor, from November 11, 1994 to January 12, 1995, would you say,
Doctor, that having taken this diagnosis for [sic] schizophrenic patient, at the time, after
January 12, 1995, she must have acted with discernment?
A It is possible because you are this kind of mental illness even with the treatment, and
even without any medication, it may be what we called spontaneous, really it will get
back.
Q At that time it will loss the intelligence? [sic]
A I think because it might be back, the treatment should be yearly.
Q Doctor, in your opinion, since our office is very much concern [sic] on this, if a person is
totally deprived of intelligence, he has still discernment, she is unconscious of her act, she
or he may be exempted from any criminal liability, please tell, Doctor, in your personal
opinion for the purpose of this proceedings she may be acting with discernment and with
certain degree of intelligence?
A It is possible but I think of a mother feeding her own daughter to somebody, I think
there is a motive, she wants to gain financial or material things from the daughter if no
material gain, then perhaps it was borne out of her illness. This is my opinion.57
xxxx
Q Doctor, is this schizophrenic person can distinguish the right or wrong? [sic]
A If they are in the [sic] state of illness, judgment is impaired to discern between right or
wrong.
Q In the case of this particular accused, what would you say at the state of her ailment?
A When she was brought to the hospital, Your Honor, I think, although the mother alleged
that the sickness could be more than one year duration, it is in acute stage because she was
allegedly destroying everything in the house according to the mother, so she was in acute
stage.58
On cross-examination by Atty. Paulito Cabrera, Dr. Costas testified thus:
Q Would you say, Doctor, that that particular ailment of Ida Montesclaros affected her
sense of judgment?
A I think, so.
Q And that being scizophronic [sic] somehow, it has, while in that stage, the patient lost
contact with reality?
A Yes, that is possible.
Q In your opinion, Doctor, granting, for the sake of argument, the alleged accusation
against her is true, being an expert on scizophrania, could you tell the Honorable Court as
a mother, who would allegedly do such an offense to her daughter, is it still in her sound
mind or proper mental sane [sic]?
 A I think, as I said, one thing to be considered is the motivation if she want [sic] to gain
some material things, if not, it is because of her judgment.
Q If she would not gain anything from allowing her daughter allegedly to be rubbished
by another person, then there must be something wrong?
A There must be something wrong and it came up from scizpphrania.
A It is the judgment, in the case of the schizophrenic.59
We have previously held that Schizophrenia may be considered mitigating under Art. 13(9) if it
diminishes the exercise of the willpower of the accused.60 In this case, the testimony of Dr. Costas
shows that even though Ida was diagnosed with schizophrenia, she was not totally deprived of
intelligence but her judgment was affected. Thus, on the basis of the Medical Certification that Ida
suffered from and was treated for schizophrenia a few months prior to the incident, and on the
testimony of Dr. Costas, Ida’s schizophrenia could be considered to have diminished the exercise
of her willpower although it did not deprive her of the consciousness of her acts.
We note that in the case at bar, the undisputed fact that Ida is the mother of ABC—who was 13
years old at the time of the incident—could have been considered as a special qualifying
circumstance which would have increased the imposable penalty to death, under Article 266-B of
the Revised Penal Code, viz.:
ARTICLE 266-B. Penalties. —
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;
xxxx
Both the circumstances of the minority and the relationship of the offender to the victim, either as
the victim’s parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within
the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim, must be alleged in
the information and proved during the trial in order for them to serve as qualifying circumstances
under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code.61
In the case at bar, although the victim's minority was alleged and established, her relationship
with the accused as the latter's daughter was not properly alleged in the Information, and even
though this was proven during trial and not refuted by the accused, it cannot be considered as a
special qualifying circumstance that would serve to increase the penalty of the offender. Under
the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which should be given retroactive effect following the rule
that statutes governing court proceedings will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage,62 every Information must state the qualifying and the
aggravating circumstances attending the commission of the crime for them to be considered in the
imposition of the penalty.63Since in the case at bar, the Information in Criminal Case No. 013324-
L did not state that Ida is the mother of ABC, this circumstance could not be appreciated as a
14
special qualifying circumstance. Ida may only be convicted as an accomplice in the crime of simple
rape, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua. In any event, Republic Act No. 9346, entitled an
"An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," which was signed into law
on June 24, 2006 prohibits the imposition of the death penalty.
Civil indemnity imposed against the appellant
The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision ordered Tampus and Ida "jointly and severally,
to indemnify the offended party, [ABC], the sum of P50,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 013324-
L."64 The Court of Appeals, however, did not award any civil indemnity to ABC, and only awarded
moral and exemplary damages. We deem it necessary and proper to award ABC civil indemnity of
P50,000.00. Civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon finding of the fact of rape. This is distinct
from moral damages awarded upon such finding without need of further proof, because it is
assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling the victim to such
award.65
Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, the victim in simple rape cases is entitled to an award of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto and another P50,000.00 as moral damages. 66 However,
Tampus’ civil indemnity ex delicto has been extinguished by reason of his death before the final
judgment, in accordance with Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code.67 Thus, the amount of civil
indemnity which remains for accomplice Ida to pay is put at issue.
It becomes relevant to determine the particular amount for which each accused is liable when they
have different degrees of responsibility in the commission of the crime and, consequently, differing
degrees of liability. When a crime is committed by many, each one has a distinct part in the
commission of the crime and though all the persons who took part in the commission of the crime
are liable, the liability is not equally shared among them. Hence, an accused may be liable either as
principal, accomplice or accessory.
The particular liability that each accused is responsible for depends on the nature and degree of his
participation in the commission of the crime. The penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for
a particular crime is imposed upon the principal in a consummated felony.68 The accomplice is
only given the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by the law for the crime
committed69 and an accessory is given the penalty lower by two degrees.70However, a felon is not
only criminally liable, he is likewise civilly liable. 71 Apart from the penalty of imprisonment
imposed on him, he is also ordered to indemnify the victim and to make whole the damage caused
by his act or omission through the payment of civil indemnity and damages.
Civil liability arising from the crime is shared by all the accused. Although, unlike criminal liability
—in which the Revised Penal Code specifically states the corresponding penalty imposed on the
principal, accomplice and accessory—the share of each accused in the civil liability is not specified
in the Revised Penal Code. The courts have the discretion to determine the apportionment of the
civil indemnity which the principal, accomplice and accessory are respectively liable for, without
guidelines with respect to the basis of the allotment.
Article 109 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[i]f there are two or more persons civilly liable
for a felony, the courts shall determine the amount for which each must respond." Notwithstanding
the determination of the respective liability of the principals, accomplices and accessories within
their respective class, they shall also be subsidiarily liable for the amount of civil liability enforcement of the payment of civil indemnity to the offended party. When the liability in solidum
adjudged in the other classes. Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[t]he has been enforced, as when payment has been made, the person by whom payment has been made
principals, accomplices, and accessories, each within their respective class, shall be liable severally shall have a right of action against the other persons liable for the amount of their respective
(in solidum) among themselves for their quotas, and subsidiarily for those of the other persons shares.95 As against each other, whoever made the payment may claim from his co-debtors only
liable."72 the share that corresponds to each, with interest for the payment already made.96 In these cases,
As courts are given a free hand in determining the apportionment of civil liability, previous therefore, payment is made by either the principal or the accomplice, the one who made the
decisions dealing with this matter have been grossly inconsistent. payment to the victim could demand payment of the part of the debt corresponding to his co-
debtor. If for example the principal paid the victim the entire amount of the civil indemnity, he
In People v. Galapin,73 People v. Continente,74 United States v. Lasada,75 People v.
could go against the accomplice for one-fourth (1/4) of the total amount of civil indemnity and
Mobe,76 People v. Irinea,77People v. Rillorta,78 People v. Cagalingan,79 People v.
damages. The principal was primarily liable for only one-half (1/2) of the total amount of civil
Villanueva,80 People v. Magno,81 People v. del Rosario,82People v. Yrat,83 People v. Saul,84 and
indemnity and he was solidarily liable with the accomplice for the other half. Since the principal
People v. Tamayo,85 the principal and accomplice were ordered to pay jointly and severally the
paid for the half which the accomplice is solidarily liable with, he could claim one-half (1/2) of that
entire amount of the civil indemnity awarded to the victim. In People v. Sotto,86 the accomplice
amount from the accomplice. Thus, the principal would have become ultimately liable for three-
was ordered to pay half of the amount of civil indemnity imposed by the trial court, while the
fourths (3/4) of the total amount of the civil indemnity and damages, while the accomplice would
principal was liable for the other half. In People v. Toring,87 the principal, accomplice and the
have become liable for one-fourth (1/4) of such amount.
accessory were made jointly and severally liable for the entire amount of the civil indemnity.
In People v. Cortes,97 People v. Budol,98 People v. Nulla,99 and People v. Madali,100 the principal
In the cases mentioned above, the principal and accomplice were made to pay equal shares of the
was ordered to pay twice the share of the accomplice in the civil indemnity. In Nulla, the Court
civil indemnity. This makes the accomplice who had less participation in the commission of the
determined the respective amounts for which the principal, accomplice and accessory were liable
crime equally liable with the principal for the civil indemnity. The degree of their participation in
for. The principal was ordered to pay P20,000.00, the accomplice was ordered to pay P10,000.00,
the crime was not taken into account in the apportionment of the amount of the civil indemnity.
and the accessory was ordered to pay P2,000.00. Unlike the cases cited above where the principal
This is contrary to the principle behind the treble division of persons criminally responsible for
and accomplice were held solidarily liable for the entire amount of the civil indemnity or half of it,
felonies, i.e., that the liability must be commensurate with the degree of participation of the
in Nulla, the court particularly determined the amount for which each shall respond. This is
accused in the crime committed. In such a situation, the accomplice who just cooperated in the
consistent with Article 109 and Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code, which require that the courts
execution of the offense but whose participation is not indispensable to the commission of the
should determine the amount for which the principals, accomplices and accessories must respond
crime is made to pay the same amount of civil indemnity as the principal by direct participation
to and upon specifying this amount, the principals are solidarily liable within their class for their
who took a direct part in the execution of the criminal act. It is an injustice when the penalty and
quota, the accomplices are solidarily liable among themselves for their quota and the accessories
liability imposed are not commensurate to the actual responsibility of the offender; for criminal
are solidarily liable for their quota. If any one of the classes is unable to pay for its respective quota,
responsibility is individual and not collective, and each of the participants should be liable only
it becomes subsidiarily liable for the quota of the other classes, which shall be enforced first against
for the acts actually committed by him.88 The proportion of this individual liability must be
the property of the principals; next, against that of the accomplices; and lastly, against that of the
graduated not only according to the nature of the crime committed and the circumstances
accessories.101
attending it, but also the degree and nature of participation of the individual offender.
There are also cases where the principal was ordered to pay more than double the amount that the
In Garces v. People,89 People v. Flores,90 People v. Barbosa,91 People v. Ragundiaz,92 People v.
accomplice is liable for. In Lumiguis v. People,102 the civil liability of P6,000.00 was apportioned as
Bato,93 and People v. Garalde,94 the accomplice was held to be solidarily liable with the principal
follows: the sole principal was primarily liable for P3,000.00, the four accomplices were primarily
for only one-half (1/2) of the amount adjudged as civil indemnity. In Garces, the accomplice was
liable in solidum among themselves for the other half of the indemnity, or P3,000.00. Thus, each
held solidarily liable for half of the civil indemnity ex delicto but was made to pay the moral
accomplice was answerable for one-fourth (1/4) of P3,000.00 or one-eighth (1/8) of the entire amount
damages of P50,000.00 separately from the principal. In Flores, Ragundiaz, Bato, and Garalde, the
of civil indemnity, which is P750.00.
accomplice was held solidarily liable for half of the combined amounts of the civil indemnity ex
delicto and moral damages. In Ragundiaz, the accomplice was also made solidarily liable with the Similarly in People v. Bantagan,103 the principal was required to indemnify the heirs of the
principal for half of the actual damages, and in Garalde the accomplice was also held solidarily deceased in the amount of P500.00. In case of his insolvency, his three accomplices should be jointly
liable with the principal for half of the exemplary damages, aside from the civil and moral and severally liable. The three accomplices were jointly and severally liable for the other P500 and
damages. in case of their insolvency the principal was secondarily liable for such amount.

In these cases, the accomplice was made jointly and severally liable with the principal for only In People v. Castillo,104 the accomplice was ordered to pay one-fourth (1/4) of the amount of the
half of the amount of the civil indemnity and moral damages, only for purposes of the civil indemnity, while the principal was liable for the remaining three-fourths (3/4).

15
In People v. Cariaga,105 the total amount of indemnity and damages due to the heirs of the victim
amounted to P601,000.00. The sole accomplice was ordered to pay P101,000.00 which is roughly
one-sixth (1/6) of the entire civil indemnity, while the two principals were ordered to pay the rest
of the indemnity and damages amounting to P500,000.00.
The cases cited above demonstrate the ad hoc method by which the ratio of shares of the civil
indemnity and damages among the principal, accomplice and accessory is determined. Though
the responsibility to decide the respective shares of persons liable for a felony is left to the courts,
this does not mean that this amount can be decided arbitrarily or upon conjecture. The power of
the courts to grant indemnity and damages demands factual, legal and equitable justification, and
cannot be left to speculation and caprice.
The entire amount of the civil indemnity, together with the moral and actual damages, should be
apportioned among the persons who cooperated in the commission of the crime according to the
degree of their liability, respective responsibilities and actual participation in the criminal act.
Salvador Viada, an authority in criminal law, is of the opinion that there are no fixed rules which
are applicable in all cases in order to determine the apportionment of civil liability among two or
more persons civilly liable for a felony, either because there are different degrees of culpability of
offenders, or because of the inequality of their financial capabilities.106 On this note, he states in
his commentaries on the 1870 Penal Code of Spain that the law should leave the determination of
the amount of respective liabilities to the discretion of the courts.107 The courts have the
competence to determine the exact participation of the principal, accomplice, and accessory in the
commission of the crime relative to the other classes because they are able to directly consider the
evidence presented and the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses.
We must stress, however, that the courts’ discretion should not be untrammelled and must be
guided by the principle behind differing liabilities for persons with varying roles in the
commission of the crime. The person with greater participation in the commission of the crime
should have a greater share in the civil liability than those who played a minor role in the crime or
those who had no participation in the crime but merely profited from its effects. Each principal
should shoulder a greater share in the total amount of indemnity and damages than every
accomplice, and each accomplice should also be liable for a greater amount as against every
accessory. Care should also be taken in considering the number of principals versus that of
accomplices and accessories. If for instance, there are four principals and only one accomplice and
the total of the civil indemnity and damages is P6,000.00, the court cannot assign two-thirds (2/3)
of the indemnity and damages to the principals and one-third (1/3) to the accomplice. Even
though the principals, as a class, have a greater share in the liability as against the accomplice--
since one-third (1/3) of P6,000.00 is P2,000.00, while two-thirds (2/3) of P6,000.00 is P4,000.00--
when the civil liability of every person is computed, the share of the accomplice ends up to be
greater than that of each principal. This is so because the two-thirds (2/3) share of the principals—
or P4,000.00—is still divided among all the four principals, and thus every principal is liable for
only P1,000.00.
In the case at bar, the trial court ruled that the accomplice is solidarily liable with the principal for
the entire amount of the civil indemnity of P50,000.00. This is an erroneous apportionment of the
civil indemnity. First, because it does not take into account the difference in the nature and degree
16
of participation between the principal, Tampus, versus the accomplice, Ida. Ida’s previous acts of
cooperation include her acts of forcing ABC to drink beer and permitting Tampus to have sexual
intercourse with her daughter. But even without these acts, Tampus could have still raped ABC. It
was Tampus, the principal by direct participation, who should have the greater liability, not only in
terms of criminal liability, but also with respect to civil liability. Second, Article 110 of the Revised
Penal Code states that the apportionment should provide for a quota amount for every class for
which members of such class are solidarily liable within their respective class, and they are only
subsidiarily liable for the share of the other classes. The Revised Penal Code does not provide for
solidary liability among the different classes, as was held by the trial court in the case at
bar.lavvphi1
Thus, taking into consideration the difference in participation of the principal and accomplice, the
principal, Tampus, should be liable for two-thirds (2/3) of the total amount of the civil indemnity
and moral damages and appellant Ida should be ordered to pay one-third (1/3) of the amount. Civil
indemnity for simple rape was correctly set at P50,000.00 and moral damages at P50,000.00. The
total amount of damages to be divided between Tampus and Ida is P100,000.00, where Tampus is
liable for P66,666.67 (which is two-thirds [2/3] of P100,000.00) and Ida is liable for P33,333.33 (which
is one-third [1/3] of P100,000.00). This is broken down into civil indemnity of P16,666.67 and moral
damages of P16,666.67. However, since the principal, Tampus, died while the case was pending in
the Court of Appeals, his liability for civil indemnity ex delicto is extinguished by reason of his
death before the final judgment.108 His share in the civil indemnity and damages cannot be passed
over to the accomplice, Ida, because Tampus’ share of the civil liability has been extinguished. And
even if Tampus were alive upon the promulgation of this decision, Ida would only have been
subsidiarily liable for his share of the civil indemnity of P66,666.67. However, since Tampus’ civil
liability ex delicto is extinguished, Ida’s subsidiary liability with respect to this amount is also
eliminated, following the principle that the accessory follows the principal. Tampus’ obligation to
pay P66,666.67 — his quota of the civil indemnity — is the principal obligation, for which Ida is
only subsidiarily liable. Upon the extinguishment of the principal obligation, there is no longer any
accessory obligation which could attach to it; thus, the subsidiary liability of Ida is also
extinguished.
On the matter of exemplary damages, we find that exemplary damages were incorrectly awarded
by the Court of Appeals.
In criminal cases, exemplary damages are imposed on the offender as part of the civil liability when
the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.109 Also known as
"punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve as a
deterrent to serious wrongdoings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of
the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct.110 Exemplary
damages may be awarded only when one or more aggravating circumstances are alleged in the
information and proved during the trial.111
In the case at bar, no qualifying or aggravating circumstance was appreciated against Ida.
Although, the minority of the victim coupled with the fact that the offender is the parent of the
victim could have served to qualify the crime of rape, the presence of these concurring
circumstances cannot justify the award of exemplary damages since the relationship of the
offender, Ida, to the victim, ABC, was not alleged in the Information.112 The minority of the rape
victim and her relationship with the offender must both be alleged in the information and proved
during the trial in order to be appreciated as an aggravating/qualifying circumstance.113 While
the information in the instant case alleged that ABC was a minor during the incident, there was no
allegation that Ida was her parent. Since the relationship between ABC and appellant was not
duly established, the award of exemplary damages is not warranted.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, Visayas Station, dated September 29,
2006, in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00215, finding appellant Ida Montesclaros guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as accomplice in the crime of rape and sentencing her to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Ida
Montesclaros is ORDERED to pay civil indemnity in the amount of sixteen thousand, six hundred
sixty-six pesos and sixty-seven centavos (P16,666.67), and moral damages in the amount of sixteen
thousand, six hundred sixty-six pesos and sixty-seven centavos (P16,666.67). The award of
exemplary damages is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No.134847 December 6, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- appellee,
vs.
RUBY MARIANO y LARA and RUTH MARIANO y LARA, accused-appellants.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Heinous crimes are grievous, odious and hateful offenses which, by reason of their inherent
wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity, are repugnant to the common standards and
norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society.1 To this genre belong the
acts charged in the instant case - a bizarre and nauseating tale of outrageous cruelty and brutality.
The Court is now called upon to determine whether the accused are responsible therefor.
Driven by grinding poverty in her home province and lured by the prospect of a lucrative
employment in the big city, Michelle Priol, then only sixteen (16), left home for Manila in January
1996 to work as a domestic help. Soon enough Michelle found herself hired at the household of
the sisters Ruth Mariano and Ruby Mariano in Bambang, Pasig City.
Jenny Priol, Michelle's older sister, testified that she often visited Michelle at the
Mariano.residence. However, whenever she would visit Michelle, she and her sister could not
freely talk as Ruth and Ruby were always hovering about.2 Apparently unhappy with the manner
she was allowed to visit Michelle - they being constantly watched by the Mariano sisters and
denied their privacy - Jenny never went to her sister again after her last visit in November
1996.3 Sometime afterwards, Ruth and Ruby brought Michelle to her sister Jenny to complain to
her that their rice cooker no longer functioned and heaped the blame on Michelle. On that
occasion Jenny noticed that Michelle's hair was unevenly cut to the scalp. When asked what
happened, Michelle told her that it was Ruby who gave her the ugly haircut.4 Concerned with the
condition of her sister, Jenny confronted Ruby. But the latter angrily replied: "Why are you so
17
bold to ask me that question; why don't you ask your sister!"5 Jenny then told Ruby that she was
going to take her sister back from them but the furious Ruby hurriedly left with Ruth, taking
Michelle with them. That was the last time Jenny saw her younger sister alive.
On 17 August 1997 at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening, SPO2 Edgardo Hernandez of the Pasig
Police Station received an anonymous call reporting that a woman was seen in Bambang, Pasig
City, carrying a rectangular box with a human leg protruding. The caller further informed SPO2
Hernandez that the woman then placed the box inside the compartment of a car bearing plate
number UPR-561.6 On the basis of this information SPO2 Hernandez together with SPO1 Ruben
Fidelino immediately conducted a "stake-out and surveillance operation" in the vicinity of
Bambang as reported. After a couple of minutes, the police officers spotted two (2) women
boarding a car with the reported plate number. They turned out to be accused-appellants Ruth
Mariano y Lara and Ruby Mariano y Lara.7The vehicle was owned and driven by Ruby. The law
enforcers, riding in their patrol car with SPO1 Fidelino on the wheels, followed the vehicle. But the
women, perhaps sensing that they were being trailed, drove fast. Alarmed by the suspects' reaction
to their presence, the policemen sounded their siren. After a brief chase, the officers overtook the
suspects' vehicle and blocked its path. SPO2 Hernandez and SPO1 Fidelino alighted, from their
patrol car and introduced themselves as police officers. They ordered Ruth and Ruby to alight from
their vehicle.8
The lawmen then announced that they would be conducting a visual search of the luggage
compartment of the vehicle. Initially, Ruby refused saying that only dirty clothes were in the
compartment but later relented the police officers insisted.9 Upon opening the compartment, SPO2
Hernandez was greeted by a putrid odor emanating from a decomposing body inside the box. Ruth
and Ruby identified the body as that of their maid Michelle Priol.10 Ruth and Ruby were then
arrested and taken to the Pasig Police Station. Their vehicle was driven to the station by SPO2
Hernandez.
Senior Police Inspector Emmanuel L. Aranas, Medico-legal Officer of the PNP Crime laboratory,
conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of Michelle. The result was appalling and beyond belief. The
body was found to be poorly nourished and already in a state of decomposition. The skin and
underlying soft tissues on the chest appeared to have been gnawed by rats apparently attracted to
the exposed scalded flesh resulting from the repeated splashing of boiling water, and that the
victim had died two (2) to three (3) days prior to the autopsy. The autopsy findings were: (a) healed
and healing lacerated wounds on the upper lip caused by hard blunt object or fist blows healed
lacerated wound on the lower lip; (c) multiple lacerated swelling wounds on the right and left ear;
(d) two (2) healing wounds on the left illiac region; and, (e) the cause of death was multiple
traumatic wounds, and first and second degree scalding burns on the head, trunk, upper and lower
extremeties comprising about 72% of the body surface, caused by hot liquid within the range of
boiling point inflicted at various times prior to the death of the victim.11
With the foregoing findings, Ruth and Ruby were charged with murder. Ruth denied the charge
claiming that the victim "died because she got sick, and not because I mauled her."12 Nevertheless,
by her own narration and admission during the trial, Ruth described in lurid details what really
happened to Michelle. According to Ruth, Michelle was kind, industrious and respectful at first.
However, sometime November 1996 she and her sister Ruby caught Michelle stealing money and
jewelry from their bedroom. Thus, they brought her to the police but later desisted from
prosecuting Michelle when she pleaded for a second chance and promised that she would not do
it again.13 After that incident, Michelle's attitude changed completely. Ruth claimed that she often
caught her stealing money from them and destroying the appliances whenever she cleaned the
house, and that whenever she scolded Michelle she would answer back, triggering a fight
between them.14
Ruth confessed in her testimony that she doused boiling water on Michelle several times
whenever she was angry.15In those occasions, according to her, they were quarrelling and
Michelle would fight back.16 Ruth further said that only by pouring boiling water on Michelle
could she (Ruth) "pacify her (and stop her) from fighting back."17
Ruth likewise admitted having pulled Michelle's hair and banged her head (inuumpog ang
ulo),18 and that in the month of July 1997 alone they fought at least six (6) times. She added that
she was remorseful afterwards for what she had done and treated Michelle's seared flesh with
antibiotics and washed her wounds with guava leaves. As if explaining the fresh-looking wounds
on the body of Michelle, Ruth said that Michelle sometimes scratched her wounds thereby
removing the scabs and exposing the fresh wounds. But by August 1997 Michelle lost her appetite
and her condition started to deteriorate. Not long thereafter, she died. Ruth further testified, that
when she was about to wake Michelle up in the morning of 17 August 1997 she discovered
Michelle's body already bent and flexed forward (nakabaluktot) lying in bed, lifeless.19 So she
panicked and hurriedly placed the body in a box, which she then loaded inside the luggage
compartment of Ruby's car. According to Ruth, she was afraid that her 74-year old mother who
was suffering from a heart ailment would see the body, thus she concealed the corpse in the trunk
of the vehicle.20 When Ruby arrived that evening, Ruth met her at the gate of their house and told
her that she had a problem. Ruth then asked Ruby to drive and promised to tell her about it on
the way. It was then that they were apprehended by elements of the Pasig Police force.
On 22 June 1998 Ruth arid Ruby were convicted of murder by the trial court. Accordingly, Ruth
was sentenced to death while Ruby was found guilty as an accomplice and sentenced to reclusion
temporal. The trial court explained its Decision -
With such evidence on record, there is no doubt that Ruth was responsible for the death of
Michelle Priol and the killing was aggravated with (sic) cruelty making it a crime of murder.
Splashing boiling water six (6) times a month, even when the previous injuries were not yet
healed, is cruelty of the highest order. Splashing boiling water while the previous scalding burns
were not yet healed was deliberately done. Such act was inhumanly augmenting the suffering of
the victim. Ruth Mariano admitted this in her oral testimony and in her counter-affidavit x x x x
therefore, Ruth Mariano should be held to answer for the crime of murder as defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code x x x x
As to the liability of Ruby Mariano, the evidence appears to be circumstantial. [She] knew of the
death of Michelle Priol prior to the time her body was put in a box and loaded in the car x x x x
she [was] living with Ruth in the same apartment and as such, that place is not too big not to see
or know that a member of the household is (sic) dead.
18
Moreover, as admitted by Ruth Mariano in her testimony in Court that she poured boiling water on
Michelle Priol six (6) times a month. That alone must have been known to Ruby Mariano. For her
failure to prevent Ruth from pouring boiling water on Michelle Priol, which according to Dr.
Aranas was the cause of Priol's death, that constitute cooperation on her part in killing Michelle
Priol.
All the foregoing circumstances taken together constitute violation of Article 18 of the Revised
Penal Code, hence, Ruby Mariano is liable as an accomplice.
Considering that the act of putting the cadaver of victim Michelle Priol in a box and loading it in
the baggage compartment of a car is an outraging act, or, an act of scoffing at her person or corpse
which is an aggravating circumstance coupled with evident premeditation and taking advantage of
superior strength, the fact that the accused Ruth Mariano is a big buxom matured woman while the
victim Priol was a slim teenager, such aggravating circumstances, and there being no mitigating
circumstance, the imposition of the death penalty would be proper as against accused Ruth
Mariano y Lara.21
Hence, this automatic review of the death penalty imposed by the trial court.
The errors assigned by accused-appellants in their brief may be subsumed under the basic
contention that the trial court erred in convicting them as principal and accomplice to the crime of
murder notwithstanding the fact that the prosecution evidence was grossly insufficient to prove
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Aware that the life of a human being is here at stake, we have carefully examined every piece of
evidence on record as well as the arguments raised by accused-appellants in their pleadings no
matter how specious and ridiculous they may appear to be, but we fail to find any compelling
reason to overturn the findings of fact and conclusions of the court a quo, except as may be stated
hereunder.
First, on the criminal liability of Ruth Mariano. The defense at once crumbles in the face of accused-
appellant's own admission in open court that she employed violence on Michelle, dousing her with
boiling water and battering her into insensibility in the course of their supposed quarrels. She
virtually painted in her testimony a harrowing portrait of the barbaric episode culminating in the
death of the victim, thus -
A: Whenever I scolded her, she became angry and told me that I'm (sic) not the one who is (sic)
paying her salary and I am (sic) "masungit."
Q: And what else transpired, if any?
A: We have (sic) exchanges of word and that started our quarrel.
Q: When you said quarrel, what do you mean quarrel, just by exchanging words or what? You have
any physical contact?
A: We were engaged in physical fight.
Q: What else happened, if any?
A: If she fought back and I'm (sic) being hurt and if I'm (sic) already angry, I
splashed (nasasabuyan) her with boiling water x x x x22
Q: When for the first time did you have any occasion of splashing hot water on the person of These medical findings when combined with accused-appellant's judicial admission, certainly
Priol? wove a tight web of evidence as to accused-appellant's culpability. They clearly established her
A: July 1997. guilt to a moral certainty, for which she could not escape punishment.

Q: When was the second time? Accused-appellant however, by way of avoidance, maintains that she did not kill the victim,
insisting that the latter "died because she got sick, and not because I mauled her."
A: I cannot remember.
The Court is not persuaded. It is evident that the death of the victim was the direct, natural and
Q: Also in the month of July?
logical consequence of the injuries she sustained in the hands of accused-appellant Ruth Mariano.
A: Every time she fought against me. The wounds inflicted on the victim were of extremely dangerous nature, i.e., calculated to destroy
Q: When was the third time? life, although they did not immediately result in the victim's death. A person is to be held to
contemplate and be responsible for the natural consequences of her own acts. If she inflicts wounds
A: I cannot remember anymore.
of such gravity as to put the life of the victim in jeopardy, and death follows as a consequence of
Q: More or less, how many times did you splash her with hot water? her felonious and wicked acts, it does not alter the nature nor diminish the criminality of the acts to
COURT: Hot or boiling water? prove that other causes cooperated in producing the fatal result. Es que es causa de la causa es causa
del mal causado. He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.
PROSECUTOR LEONARDO: Boiling water.
Accused-appellant further asserts that (a) her acts of'pouring boiling water on Michelle were
A: Twice (2x) x x x x23
accidental; (b) she was unaware of the effects or danger of pouring boiling water on a human being;
Q: You splashed her frontally? and, (c) she treated the wounds and burns of the victim with antibiotics (Bactrim Forte) and washed
A: Yes, Ma'am. it with guava leaves until she got well.
Q: Facing each other? The artificiality of these assertions is self-evident. They are but fabrications to explain away the
A: Yes, Ma'am xxxx numerous mortal wounds of the victim. As to the alleged accidental pouring of boiling water, the
physical evidence shows that the victim suffered first and second degree scalding burns covering
Q: She does not run away when you saw her holding the airpot?
72% of the body surface, caused by accused-appellant's repeated acts of pouring boiling water on
A: When I splashed her she told me, that is (sic) enough, I will (sic) not fight anymore.24 the victim while they were allegedly embroiled in a quarrel. Clearly, the sheer number, and severe
Q: Just answer my question. nature and extent of the wounds suffered by the victim attest to their deliberate infliction.
A: No, your honor. As regards her claim that she was unaware of the effects or danger of pouring boiling water on a
human being, accused-appellant must have seen how the boiling water she poured the first time on
Q: She waits (sic) until you poured the boiling water on her?
Michelle seered the flesh of the victim, permanently disfiguring her body even as she agonized in
A: Yes, your honor. pain. Accused-appellant, who was thirty-four (34) years old then, was not shown to be a person of
Q: And when she tried to pull your hair, what do you do? diminutive intelligence as not to realize the lethal effects of repeatedly dousing boiling water on a
A: I pulled her hair also and sometimes banged (inuumpog) her head.25 human being. Neither can we attach any importance to her pretension that she administered
antibiotics and herbal medicine on the burns of Michelle until she recuperated, for it is contrary to
Accused-appellant's brutality was confirmed by Dr. Emmanuel L. Aranas who concluded in his the findings of Dr. Aranas who observed that there was no evidence of medical intervention
autopsy report that the cause of death of the victim was "multiple traumatic wounds, and first and notwithstanding the character and number of the victim's injuries.27
second degree scalding burns covering 72% of the body surface," which were the
very same injuries accused-appellant admitted she had inflicted on the victim. Dr. Aranas testified To compound accused-appellant Ruth Mariano's woes, her confessed act of putting the lifeless
- body of Michelle in a box and loading it in the luggage compartment of a car is obviously
inconsistent with her profession of innocence. As observed by the Solicitor General, to which we
Q: And after conducting the examination, what was the cause of death that you found? agree, "an innocent person would have lost no time in reporting to the police her discovery, right in
A: Well, the cause of death Ma'am, is the multiple traumatic injuries, as well as the scalding burns, her own house, of the death of a household member instead of taking pains in concealing it."28
first to second degree recovering 72% of the surface area. Quite obviously, accused appellant exceeded the limits of her credibility, as she was plainly
Q: Combined together? incredible. Her attempts to lessen the impression of sadism and viciousness of her crime only
A: Yes, your honor. All these are contributory to the death of the deceased.26

19
assault the intelligence of this Court. We are not that naive and gullible as the defense perhaps
thought.
Second, on the complicity of accused-appellant Ruby Mariano. There is no solid evidence on
record effectively linking accused-appellant Ruby Mariano to the gruesome killing of Michelle
Priol. There is no showing that she ever laid hands on the deceased nor was she ever seen helping
her sister Ruth on those occasions when Ruth reportedly manhandled Michelle, nor was there any
positive act of assent or cooperation on her part with Ruth ever satisfactorily established or
proved by the prosecution. All that can be gathered from evidence are: (a) Ruth and Ruby were
staying with Michelle in the same apartment, together with their 74-year old mother and Ruby's
children; (b) the victim had been dead for two (2) to three (3) days when placed in the car; and, (c)
Ruby owns the vehicle where the body of the victim was concealed and was in fact driving the
vehicle when the police intercepted them and found the body of Michelle in the trunk of their
vehicle. While these circumstances strongly indicate that Ruby had knowledge of what her sister
Ruth did to Michelle, they are too insufficient to support a finding that Ruby had something to do
with the crime so that she should likewise be answerable. With her nominal role, we cannot
conscientiously declare that Ruby was a principal or even an accomplice in the crime. The
presumption of innocence in her favor has not been overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
We cannot agree with the Solicitor General that Ruby should have been convicted as an accessory
after the fact -
x x x x since her act of driving the car where the corpse of Michelle was hidden, her resistance to
stop the car when chased by the police and to immediately open the luggage compartment as
requested by the police, her act of lying to the police by claiming that the box in the compartment
contained only dirty clothes, and her refusal to open said box sufficiently indicate knowledge of
the crime and assistance to Ruth Mariano in concealing the corpus delicti to prevent its discovery.
Accused-appellant Ruby Mariano is the sister of accused-appellant Ruth Mariano. As such, their
relationship exempts appellant Ruby Mariano from criminal liability under Art. 20 of The Revised
Penal Code -
Art. 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. - The penalties prescribed for
accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to their spouses,
ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by
affinity within the same degrees, with the single exception of accessories falling within the
provisions of paragraph 1 of the preceding article (underscoring supplied).
The reason for exemption is obvious; it is based on ties of blood and the preservation of the
cleanliness of one's name, which compels one to conceal crimes committed by relatives so near as
those mentioned in the above-quoted article. This Court is thus mandated by law to acquit
accused-appellant Ruby Mariano.
Third, the crime committed by accused-appellant Ruth Mariano was evidently murder, the killing
of the victim being qualified by cruelty. The autopsy report of Dr. Aranas abundantly shows
irrefutable evidence of cruelty -
FINDINGS: Poorly nourished, fairly developed female cadaver, in the beginning stage of
decomposition. Embalmed. The skin and underlying soft tissues on the chest gnawed by small
20
animals. HEAD, TRUNK AND EXTREMITIES: Healed lacerated wound, upper lip, measuring 1 by
0.7 cm., 1.5 cm., right of the anterior midline; Healing lacerated wound, upper lip, measuring .07 by
.3 cm., left of the anterior midline; Healed lacerated wound, non-coaptated, lower lip, measuring 1
by 1 cm., just left of the anterior midline; Multiple lacerated wounds, right ear, with multiple
contusions and swelling; Multiple lacerated wounds, left ear, with multiple contusions and
swelling.
CONCLUSION: Cause of death is multiple traumatic injuries and scalding burns, 1st and 2nd
degrees, 72% of the body surface area.
The wounds and scalding burns listed in the autopsy report were inflicted at different times but did
not immediately result in death, as some of the wounds were still in the process of healing at the
time of the autopsy. This clearly suggests that the victim was still alive even after those injuries
were sadistically and inhumanly inflicted on her. The nature and extent of those injuries
undoubtedly caused terrible sufferings on the victim for a long period of time resulting in a slow,
painful death. Explaining his medical findings on the cadaver of the victim, Dr. Aranas testified -
Q: In such a situation where there are several injuries, would you tell the Court how long after the
infliction of those injuries will the victim die?
A: Well, your Honor, there is evidence of a slow regression of the physical condition of the
deceased, so, the moment that injuries were inflicted on her a few days or may be a week prior to
death, there is already a regression of the body of the deceased considering the presence or the
observation of a collapsed lung and the presence of yellowish fluid on the lungs. This only means
that there was already a slow regression on the physical condition.
COURT: In a layman's language, what do you mean by slow regression?
A: Well, your Honor, there is an evidence of the process of weakening of the system of the body
and slowing down the function of the vital organs of the deceased.
Q: In other words, you would like to tell the Court that the victim has suffered for a long time
before she actually died?
A: Precisely, your Honor.
Q: Can you tell the Court, with the injuries that you have found in the body of the victim, how long
did that victim suffer before she died?
A: Well, your Honor, there are healed wounds and these would have been inflicted a week or more
prior to the death; and there are healing wounds and these were inflicted within a week prior to the
death; there were fresh wounds which were inflicted may be a few hours or day prior to the death.
So, she has been suffering for quite a long time prior to the death.29
Indeed, to the trained eye of medico-legal specialists, the inanimate remains of the dead give an
eloquent testimony of their own, and that is true even of the young victim, Michelle, who in life
could not have been as articulate. The test in appreciating cruelty, as a qualifying circumstance is
whether the accused deliberately augmented the wrong by causing another wrong not necessary
for its commission, or inhumanly increased the victim's sufferings or outrage, or scoffed at his
person or corpse.30 The prosecution evidence surmounted this test beyond any peradventure of
doubt.
We also find that the circumstance of abuse of superior strength aggravated the killing of the
victim.1âwphi1 There was gross physical disparity between the age, built and strength of
accused-appellant Ruth Mariano viz-a-viz the victim Michelle. The former is a big and burly
matured woman in her thirties, several inches taller than the victim, and "who could subdue her
[victim] even without a weapon."31 While the latter was merely a teenager, five (5) feet tall, slim
and poorly nourished and weighed less than 100 pounds according to Dr. Aranas.32 The records
also show that accused-appellant Ruth Mariano pulled the victim's hair, banged her head, and
repeatedly doused boiling water on her. On those occasions, the victim was not shown to be
equipped with reasonable means of defense. Abuse of superior strength depends upon the age,
size and strength of the parties. To take advantage of superior strength is to purposely use
excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked.33
Abuse of superior strength is a generic aggravating circumstance which is capable of being
proved and taken into consideration in imposing the sentence, even if it was not alleged in the
information. The evidence of its existence merely forms part of the proof of the actual commission
of the offense and does not violate the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.
We are not in accord with the trial court, however, in appreciating evident premeditation as an
aggravating circumstance. The essential elements of evident premeditation are: (a) the time when
the offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit had
clung to his determination; and, (c) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and
execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.34 These requisites
must be established with equal certainty and clarity as the criminal act itself before it can be
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.35 In the instant case, the records are bereft of any
evidence to show the nature of accused-appellant Ruth Mariano's planning and preparation to
slay her victim, or how much time had elapsed before it was carried out. Evident premeditation
must be based on external facts which are evident, not merely suspected, and which indicate
deliberate planning. Mere presumptions and inferences, no matter how logical or probable they
might be, would not be enough to sustain a finding of this aggravating circumstance.36
Article 248 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 6, RA 7659, punishes murder
with reclusion perpetua to death. The presence of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength warrants the imposition of the higher penalty of death on accused-appellant Ruth
Mariano in accordance with Art. 63 of The Revised Penal Code.37 In addition, the same accused-
appellant should be made to pay the heirs of the victim ₱50,000.00 for civil indemnity,
comformably with prevailing jurisprudence,38 P35,000.00 for actual damages, and P300,000.00 for
moral damages. Moreover, since there is present an aggravating circumstance, and considering
the peculiar circumstances of this case, an award of P50,000.00 for exemplary damages is proper.
Finally, we cannot write finis to this case without expressing our abhorrence to the manner by
which the crime was perpetrated. Accused-appellant Ruth Mariano's atrocious character, which
transfixes the soul with such horror and revulsion, truly merits the severest condemnation of this
Court. By her savagery and ruthlessness - by a woman to another woman - she forfeits her
rightful place in civilized society. Michelle, even in death, is entitled no less to the full measure of
justice as any other victim of a gruesome and senseless killing.
21
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo of 22 June 1998 is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant
Ruth Mariano is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER qualified by
extreme cruelty and is sentenced to DEATH. She is further ORDERED to pay the heirs of victim
Michelle Priol y Beronio the following amounts: P50,000.00 for civil indemnity, P35,000.00 for
actual damages, P300,000.00 for moral damages, another P50,000.00 for exemplary damages, and to
pay the costs.
As for accused-appellant Ruby Mariano, the Court finds the evidence insufficient to establish
beyond reasonable doubt her guilt as an accomplice in the commission of the said crime. Neither
can she be held liable as an accessory after the fact, as she is exempt from criminal liability by
reason of her relationship with her co-accused pursuant to Art. 20 of The Revised Penal
Code. Consequently, she is ACQUITTED of the crime charged and her immediate release from
custody is ordered unless she is being detained for some other lawful cause. The Director of Prisons
is DIRECTED to report to this Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt
hereof.
Four (4) members of the Court, although maintaining their adherence to the view that RA 7659,
insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional, nevertheless, bow to the ruling of the
Court, by a majority vote, that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should
accordingly be imposed. In accordance with Sec. 25 of RA 7659, amending Art. 83 of The Revised
Penal Code, upon the finality of this Decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to
the Office of the President for the possible exercise of his pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 227306
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
ROBERTO ESPERANZA JESALVA alias "ROBERT SANTOS", Accused-Appellant
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
This appeal seeks to reverse and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated September 28,
2015 in CA-G.R. CR-HC-06823. The CA upheld the Decision2 dated April 14, 2014 of the Regional
Trial Court (R TC) of Quezon City, Branch 80, in Criminal Case No. Q-08-152149, which found
accused-appellant Roberto Esperanza Jesalva alias "Robert Santos" (accused-appellant) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
An Information dated March 31, 2008 was filed charging accused-appellant,
Ryan Menieva y Labina3 (Menieva) and Junie Ilaw (Ilaw) for the
murder of Arnel Ortigosa y Cervana4 (Ortigosa), committed as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of September 2007, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill with evident premeditation, treachery
and taking advantage of superior strength, attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the
person of Amel [O]rtigosa y Cervana, by then and there stabbing him with a sharp bladed
instrument hitting him on the chest, thereby inflicting upon him serious and grave wounds which
were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of said Arnel [O]rtigosa y Cervana.
That the crime was committed with qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery when the
offended party was not given opportunity to make a defense as the attack was sudden,
unexpected and without warning.
That the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength for whereas the accused were
armed with a knife and firearm of unknown caliber, the victim was unarmed.
Contrary to law. 5
A warrant of arrest was issued against accused-appellant, Menieva and Ilaw. 6 However, only
accused-appellant was arrested. Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged. 7 Trial ensued.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On September 16, 2007, at around 1:00 a.m., Ortigosa, his cousin Renato B. Flores (Flores) and
Manny Boy Ditche were drinking in Dupax Street, Old Balara, Quezon City. Later, they decided
to go to a store to buy cigarettes.8 On their way to the store, Flores noticed accused-appellant
standing in a comer near the store and staring at them. Then, accused-appellant walked away and
disappeared. Later, accused-appellant reappeared, accompanied by Menieva and Ilaw, and
followed Ortigosa and his group to the store.9 When accused-appellant and his companions were
already in front of Ortigosa, Menieva uttered, "Ne!, ano ba yan?" and proceeded to stab Ortigosa
twice with an icepick. Menieva stabbed Ortigosa first on the right portion of his chest, then on his
left armpit. As Menieva stabbed Ortigosa, Ilaw pointed a sumpak at Ortigosa while accused-
appellant pointed at Ortigosa' s group and left. 10
After the stabbing, Ortigosa and his group tried to run back to where they were drinking. Before
they reached the place, Ortigosa fell on the ground. His companions rushed him to East Avenue
Medical Center where he died. 11
The prosecution and defense stipulated on the testimony of Dr. Filemon C. Porciuncula, Jr. (Dr.
Porciuncula), the medico-legal assigned with the Central Police District Crime Laboratory on
September 16, 2007. Dr. Porciuncula conducted a post-mortem examination on Ortigosa's cadaver,
detennined the cause of death as stab wounds on Ortigosa's trunk and prepared Medico-Legal
Report No. 599-07 and Ortigosa's death certificate. 12
For its part, the defense presented accused-appellant. Accused-appellant denied any participation
in Ortigosa's stabbing. He claimed that on the night of the incident, he was waiting for his sister
on the corner of Dupax Street. While waiting, he saw and heard people running and shouting
which caused him to leave the place. 13
On April 14, 2014, the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 80 rendered a Decision holding that accused-
appellant conspired with Menieva and Ilaw to kill Ortigosa. 14 The RTC held that Flores
positively identified accused-appellant in open court as the person who stabbed Ortigosa twice
with an icepick. 15 As treachery attended the killing, the crime is murder. The RTC convicted
accused-appellant, the dispositive portion of which reads:
22
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds accused ROBERTO ESPERANZA JESAL VA
alias ROBERT SANTOS guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Amel Ortigosa the amounts
of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱24,000.00 as actual damages, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Let an alias warrant of arrest be issued against accused RYAN MENIEBA y LABINA and JUNIE
ILAW, the same to remain standing until their apprehension.
SO ORDERED.16
On September 28, 2015, the CA affirmed with modification the trial court's Decision and held that
conspiracy was evident from the coordinated movements of the three accused. 17 The CA,
however, differed with the RTC's findings regarding accused-appellant's participation in the crime.
It determined that it was Menieva who stabbed Ortigosa and that accused-appellant' s participation
before, during and after the incident was confined to the following: (1) accompanying Menieva and
Ilaw to the store where Ortigosa and his group were; and (2) pointing at the group while Ortigosa
was stabbed. 18 The CA also held that the damages awarded shall earn interest at 6% per
annum from finality of judgment until fully satisfied. 19
Hence, this appeal.
On February 9, 2017, accused-appellant filed a Manifestation In Lieu of Supplemental
Brief20 requesting that his appellant's brief be adopted as his supplemental brief. On February 13,
2017, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) also filed its Manifestation and Motion In Lieu of
Supplemental Brief 21 stating that it would no longer file a supplemental brief as it has already
substantially and exhaustively responded to and refuted accused-appellant's arguments in its
appellee' s brief.
The appeal is meritorious.
As a general rule, we accord respect to the factual findings of the trial court as it is in a better
position to evaluate the testimonial evidence.22 The rule finds an even more stringent application
where the said findings are sustained by the CA.23 This rule, however, admits of exceptions, to wit:
But where the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight and substance which can affect the result of the case, this Court is duty-bound to correct this
palpable error for the right to liberty, which stands second only to life in the hierarchy of
constitutional rights, cannot be lightly taken away. x x x24
In this case, we find that the prosecution failed to prove that accused-appellant conspired with
Menieva and Ilaw in committing the crime of murder.
Conspiracy is said to exist where two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The essence of conspiracy is the unity of action and
purpose. Its elements, like the physical acts constituting the crime itself, must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. 25 We explained the reason for the rule, thus:
As a facile device by which an accused may be ensnared and kept within the penal fold,
conspiracy requires conclusive proof if we are to maintain in full strength the substance of the
time-honored principle of criminal law requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt before
conviction.
x x x26
Direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy for it may be deduced from the acts of the
accused before, during and after the commission of the crime charged, from which it may be
indicated that there is a common purpose to commit the crime.27 It is not sufficient, however, that
the attack be joint and simultaneous for simultaneousness does not of itself demonstrate the
concurrence of will or unity of action and purpose which are the bases of the responsibility of the
assailants. It is necessary that the assailants be animated by one and the same purpose. 28 We
held:
. "To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the execution; he need not even
take part in every act xxx. Each conspirator may be assigned separate and different tasks which
may appear unrelated to one another but, in fact, constitute a whole collective effort to achieve
their common criminal objective. Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all the
conspirators. The precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary,
since all the conspirators are principals."29
Both the RTC and the CA ruled that conspiracy was duly established. In particular, the CA
concluded:
In the present case, conspiracy was evident from the coordinated movements of the three (3)
accused. From the prosecution's evidence, [Flores] saw accused-appellant at the comer of the
street, who initially disappeared and reappeared with co-accused [Menieva and Ilaw]. While
[Menieva] was stabbing the victim, [Ilaw] was pointing a "sumpak" at the latter, with the accused-
appellant pointing his finger at them before leaving.
[Flores] positively identified the accused-appellant as the person who accompanied his co-accused
[Menieva and Ilaw]. He described accused-appellant's participation before the incident, during
the incident, i.e., while the victim was being stabbed by his co-accused [Menieva], and after the
incident. Evidently, the accused-appellant and company all acted in confabulation in furtherance
of their common design and purpose, i.e. to kill the victim. Thus, the court a quo correctly held that
conspiracy is present.30 (Citation omitted.)
We disagree.
To determine if accused-appellant conspired with Menieva and Ilaw, the focus of the inquiry
should necessarily be the overt acts of accusedappellant before, during and after the stabbing
incident.31
On accused-appellant's acts before the stabbing incident, the OSG argues that conspiracy to kill
Ortigosa is evident considering the proximity in time between accused-appellant's walking away
and re-appearing accompanied by Menieva and Ilaw. To the OSG, it can be reasonably inferred
that when accused-appellant disappeared, he sought the help of Menieva and Ilaw to carry out
the evil plan against Ortigosa or that accusedappellant signaled the arrival of the victim for his
group to execute their criminal design. 32
23
This argument is speculative and remains unsubstantiated. More, it falters as there is no evidence
that accused-appellant and his co-accused had any enmity or grudge against the deceased. In the
absence of strong motives on their part to kill the deceased, it cannot safely be concluded that they
conspired to commit the crime. 33 Likewise, there is no evidence showing that accused-appellant
was purposely waiting for Ortigosa at the time and place of the incident and that Menieva and Ilaw
were on standby, awaiting for accused-appellant's signal. Surely, accused-appellant could not have
anticipated that on September 16, 2007, at around 1:00 a.m., Ortigosa and his group would pass by
and go to the store to buy cigarettes.
During and after the stabbing incident, Flores testified that what accused-appellant did during the
stabbing was to point at them before walking away. On cross, Flores admitted that accused-apellant
did not inflict any injury on Ortigosa:
CROSS EXAMINATION OF ATTY. BANDAO
Atty. Bandao to Witness
Q A while ago, Mr. Witness, you testified that in the early morning of September 16, 2007, you were
in the company of one Arnel Ortigosa, is that correct?
CROSS EXAMINATION OF ATTY. BANDAO
Witness
A Yes, sir.
Atty. Bandao
Q Now, you claimed that while you were in the company of Arnel Ortigosa, it was then that Ryan
Menieba stabbed him, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, as far as the accused Robert Santos is concerned, you would agree with me that he never
inflicted any physical injuries or whatever kind of injury to Arnel Ortigosa?
A Yes, sir. 34 (Emphasis in the original.)
Accused-appellant's act of pointing to the victim and his group is not an overt act which shows that
accused-appellant acted in concert with his coaccused to cause the death of Ortigosa. We stress that
mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act, without the cooperation and the agreement
to cooperate, is not enough to establish conspiracy. Even if the accused were present and agreed to
cooperate with the main perpetrators of the crime, their mere presence does not make them parties
to it, absent any active participation in the furtherance of the common design or
purpose.35 Likewise, where the only act attributable to the other accused is an apparent readiness
to provide assistance, but with no certainty as to its ripening into an overt act, there is no
conspiracy.36 In this case, while accused-appellant's presence and act of pointing at the victim and
his group may mean he approved of the crime or that he was ready to assist his co-accused, absent
any other overt act on his part, there is no conspiracy.
We emphasize that the prosecution must establish conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt. A
conviction premised on a finding of conspiracy must be founded on facts, not on mere inferences
and presumption. 37 We repeat:
Conspiracy is not a harmless innuendo to be taken lightly or accepted at every tum. It is a legal
concept that imputes culpability under specific circumstances. As such, it must be established as
clearly as any element of the crime. The quantum of evidence to be satisfied is, we repeat, beyond
reasonable doubt. 38 (Citation omitted.)
In the absence of conspiracy, accused-appellant is responsible only for the consequences of his
own acts.39 In this case, all that accused-appellant did was to stare and point at the victim and his
companions.1âwphi1 These, however, are not crimes.
Neither can accused-appellant be considered a principal by indispensable cooperation nor an
accomplice in the crime of murder. The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance
knowingly or intentionally rendered which cannot exist without previous cognizance of the
criminal act intended to be executed. Thus, to be liable either as a principal by indispensable
cooperation or as an accomplice, the accused must unite with the criminal design of the principal
by direct participation.40 In this case, nothing in the records shows that accused-appellant knew
Menieva was going to stab Ortigosa, thus creating a doubt as to accused-appellant's criminal
intent.
Indeed, absent any evidence to create the moral certainty required to convict accused-appellant,
we cannot uphold the trial court's finding of guilt. Our legal culture demands the presentation of
proof beyond reasonable doubt before any person may be convicted of any crime and deprived of
his life, liberty, or even property. The hypothesis of his guilt must flow naturally from the facts
proved and must be consistent with all of them.41 Moral certainty, not mere possibility,
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.42
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant
ROBERTO ESPERANZA JESAL VA alias "Robert Santos" is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt of
the crime charged. Accordingly, he is ordered immediately released from custody unless he is
lawfully held for another cause.
G.R. No. 123939 May 28, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
DOMINGO VASQUEZ y PACHECO and RAMON VASQUEZ y PACHECO, accused.
DOMINGO VASQUEZ y PACHECO, appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us on appeal is the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch 121,
convicting the appellant Domingo Vasquez y Pacheco of murder for the death of Geronimo
Espinosa and sentencing him to suffer reclusion perpetua; and, of attempted homicide for which
the appellant was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty.
The appellant and his brother Ramon Vasquez were charged with murder and attempted murder
under two Informations. The accusatory portion of each Information reads as follows:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 48935(95)
(For Murder)
24
That on or about the 18th day of June 1995, Kalookan City, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and
mutually helping one another, without any justifiable cause, with deliberate intent to kill,
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously hack with a bolo one GERONIMO ESPINOSA, hitting him on the vital parts of
the body, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious physical injuries, which injuries caused
his instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
…
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 48936(95)
(For Attempted Murder)
That on or about the 18th day of June 1995 in Kalookan City, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and
mutually helping one another, without any justifiable cause, with deliberate intent to kill,
with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, hit and bump by (sic) a motor vehicle one LUIS LUABLE y DESCA, thus,
commencing directly by overt acts of the commission of the crime of Murder, however,
said accused was not able to perform all the acts of execution which would produce said
felony as a consequence, by reason of causes independent of the will of the herein accused,
that is, the said complainant was able to evade the vehicle.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
When arraigned, assisted by counsel, both accused entered their pleas of not guilty.
The Case for the Prosecution
Luis Luable, a twenty-seven-year-old employee of the Selecta Farms, testified that at 6.00 p.m. on
June 18, 1995, he was conversing with his brother-in-law, Antonio Cortez, in front of his house at
Ramvil 5, Robes Subdivision, Kalookan City. Roel Pacheco, who lived only about seven meters
away from their house, arrived and told Maria Theresa (Luis’ wife) that his father, Pedro Pacheco,
was stoning him. Before long, Pedro and his other son, Marlon, arrived. Marlon was armed with a
two-foot long bolo. Luis intervened and asked Pedro, "Ano ba iyan?" Pedro resented this question
and told him, "Bakit ka nakikialam sa away ng pamilya namin?" Luis told Pedro that if he and his
son Roel were bent on stoning each other, they should do so in their house and not in the streets
because there were plenty of children playing. Roel then grabbed the bolo from his brother Marlon
and suddenly hacked Luis. Luis was able to parry the blow with his arm, but his index finger was
hit. Luis moved backwards, but Roel picked up a stone about the size of a fist, and threw it at Luis,
hitting the latter on the forehead. Luis then fled towards the direction of the Selecta Farms where
the house of his half-brother, Geronimo Espinosa, was located, with Pedro and the latter’s two sons
in hot pursuit. The house was more than a kilometer away.
Luis arrived at the house of his brother, Geronimo, and told the latter that he was being chased and
stoned by Pedro and his two sons. He asked to be accompanied back to his house. Geronimo
agreed. Luis got home with Geronimo at about 7:00 p.m. After about five minutes, policemen
arrived at his house and brought him and Geronimo to the Vicas police precinct. Pedro and Marlon
were also brought to the police station so that their differences could be settled. Roel, however,
was nowhere to be found. Policemen advised Luis to have his wound treated first and to return to
the station later. As he did not bring any money for doctor’s fees and medicine, he decided to go
back home with Geronimo to get money.
Luis and Geronimo walked side by side on the right side of Lapu-Lapu Street at Urduja Village.
With them were their cousins, Raymund Luable, Angelo Luable and Orlando Desca. As they were
nearing a Meralco lamp post at the corner of Lapu-Lapu and Magat Salamat Streets,4 he saw a
blue-colored passenger jeep with a white-colored rear door and with its front lights on, driven by
Roel’s uncle, Domingo Vasquez, who was with Roel’s brother, Ramon, and five others. The jeep,
which was coming from the opposite direction, going towards the Vicas supermarket, sped
towards them. They dived to the ground near a grassy area, to avoid being hit. The vehicle sped
past Luis and Geronimo and stopped in front of the lamp post on the left side of the street.
Domingo and Ramon Vasquez, each armed with a bolo, with five others, alighted from the
jeepney and proceeded to where Luis and Geronimo were. Afraid for their lives, the two fled
towards the direction of Mary Homes at North Olympus Street. Luis ran ahead, and when he
looked back towards Geronimo, he saw the latter fleeing towards the direction of Sumakwel
Street5 with three persons, including Domingo and Ramon, in hot pursuit. By the time he reached
Datu Puti Street, only one man was pursuing him. Luis finally arrived at their house. He then
mounted his bicycle and pedaled to the police station to report the incident, only to learn that his
half-brother, Geronimo, was already dead. He and some policemen proceeded to Bagong Silang
Funeral Parlor where they saw Geronimo’s body.
Debbie Dorado, a twenty-seven-year-old housewife, testified that between 10:00 p.m. and 11:00
p.m. on June 18, 1995, she and her cousins, Raymund, Orlando and Angelo, were walking along
Lapu-Lapu Street, Urduja Village, Kalookan City. They were on their way home. Angelo and his
cousins Luis and Geronimo were walking ahead of her, while Orlando and Raymund strolled
behind. Suddenly, a passenger jeepney sped towards where her cousins Luis and Geronimo were
walking. The two dived into the grassy portion of the road to avoid being hit.6 They were near a
Meralco lamp post at the corner of Lapu-Lapu and Sumakwel Streets, about ten to fifteen meters
away from her. Three male persons alighted from the jeepney. One of them, who was armed with
a fan knife, placed his left hand on her right shoulder and was about to stab her. Debbie shouted,
"I am a woman!" Nonetheless, he held her by the neck and pushed her. The man then went back
to the passenger jeepney.
Raymund and Orlando approached Debbie and inquired what the commotion was all about,
"Manang, manang, ano yon?" Debbie replied, "Tayo yata ang hinahabol ng jeep, sige tumakbo na
kayo." She hurriedly left the place, but looked back towards the jeepney and saw that Luis and
Geronimo were still in the grassy area. Instead of walking towards Lapu-Lapu Street, she walked
towards Sumakwel Street because she saw a male person armed with a bolo who had alighted
from the jeepney. She looked back at her cousins, Luis and Geronimo. She saw Luis fleeing
towards Mary Homes at North Olympus Street. A man was chasing him. She also saw Geronimo
walking slowly, going towards the direction of Lakandula Street, 7 and was being chased by three
male persons, one of whom had a big stomach. The other man chasing Geronimo was Domingo
Vasquez, who was short, had a moustache and short hair. The third man was Ramon Vasquez
25
who had a jutting jaw ("babalu"). Domingo and Ramon were armed with bolos. She shouted to her
cousins Orlando, Angelo and Raymund not to leave their cousin Geronimo alone. When she
reached the corner of Lakandula Street, a tricycle arrived. She boarded the tricycle and told the
driver to bring her to the Vicas police station.
At the station, Debbie told the policemen that men armed with bolos were chasing her cousins Luis
and Geronimo. The policemen told her that they were going to the Tala hospital. She insisted that
they investigate the matter, but the policemen ignored her. They even told her, "Mrs., why are you
complaining, it’s just a simple matter, and you’re not telling the truth."
Maria Luisa Abellanosa, a thirty-two-year-old housewife, testified that between 9:30 and 10:30 p.m.
on June 18, 1995, she was walking with Debbie Dorado at the corner of Magat Salamat and Lapu-
Lapu Streets, Kalookan City, coming from the Vicas police station. She saw Luis and Geronimo
walking ahead of her. Suddenly, a blue-colored jeepney driven by Domingo Vasquez arrived and
bumped Geronimo. The jeepney stopped at the corner of Magat Salamat Street, even as Geronimo
fell to the ground. Ramil Gonzales alighted from the jeepney, poked his knife at Debbie and went
towards Geronimo. Fearing for her life, she hid near the concrete wall underneath a nearby bush.
Meanwhile, Geronimo stood up and fled towards the direction of Kalantiao Street, through
Sumakwel Street. Ramil ran after Geronimo and hacked him on the back part of the head.
Geronimo then fled for dear life. She saw her neighbors Marlon Pacheco, his brother Danny
Pacheco, each armed with bolos. The two of them, along with Roel Pacheco Ramil Bartonico, Dodoy
Bartonico and the appellant, were running to where Geronimo was. The appellant returned to the
jeepney and drove it towards where his companions were. The men had ganged up on Geronimo
and stabbed the latter. She heard the appellant say to his companions, "Sige patayin niyo na,
patayin niyo na, at huwag niyong iwanang buhay!" The appellant forthwith drove the jeepney
away. When Maria Luisa Abellanosa arrived home, she saw the Pacheco brothers and asked them
how they were, and they replied, "Ayos na po." She saw the front part of Dario Pacheco’s bloodied
body.
Maria Teresa Luable, the wife of Luis, testified that between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m. on June 18, 1995, she
was in front of their house. Roel Pacheco arrived and asked for her help. When she asked what had
happened, he replied that his father had stoned him and that he was wounded. Luis asked his wife
what was going on, and when apprised of Roel’s purpose, Luis told Roel that he and his father
should stone each other in their house and not in the street because children might be hit. Roel got
mad and hacked Luis, hitting the latter’s index finger. She ordered Luis to flee, but Roel picked up a
stone and hit Luis with it. Roel even warned him, "Baka ikaw pa ang ipasok sa kabaong." Luis then
left his house and later returned in the company of Geronimo. At about 9:00 p.m., policemen
arrived and brought Pedro Pacheco, Luis and Geronimo to the police station. She followed but
failed to find them there. When told that Luis had himself treated for his wound, she proceeded to
the San Lazaro Hospital but failed to locate him there. She went to the Vicas police precinct where
she was told that a man had arrived and informed the policemen that he saw a person lying
prostrate on Sumakwel Street. She then boarded a tricycle, returned to that street and saw
Geronimo sprawled on the ground. She looked for her husband at the Tala Hospital, and went
home when she failed to find him there.
PO3 Celerino del Rosario testified that at 8:00 p.m. on June 18, 1995, SPO4 Marvin Lardizabal
informed him of a stabbing incident in Sumakwel Street, Urduja Village, Kalookan City. He and
three other policemen arrived at the scene to conduct an on-the-spot investigation, and saw
Geronimo along Sumakwel Street sprawled on the ground near a Meralco lamp post with
multiple stab wounds.8 The policemen brought the cadaver to the funeral parlor for autopsy. Per
police report, Domingo and Ramon Vasquez, and Pedro and Marlon Pacheco were identified as
Geronimo’s assailants.
Dr. Rosaline Cosidon, Medico-Legal Officer, performed an autopsy on the cadaver of Geronimo
and submitted her report thereon which contained her findings, viz:
1. A wound appearing and starting at the right portion of the forehead extending just
above the ear up to the neck portion of the head. This type of wound could be caused by
a heavy instrument like a bolo, saver (sic) or an axe. This wound was fatal;
2. Injury located beside the left eye caused by friction with a rough surface. This injury
was not fatal.
3. The third injury was a hacked wound found below the left eye extending across the
left ear to the back portion of the leftside (sic) of the head. This injury could be caused by
a heavy cutting instrument like that in number 1. Said injury was, likewise, fatal.
4. The fourth injury was an incised wound located below the left cheek which could have
been caused by the sharp edge of a cutting instrument. This is not fatal.
5. Multiple abrasions located at the back portion of the left shoulder above the scapular
caused by friction with a hard, blunt object.
6. An incised wound at the back of the body at the right side just above the waistline
probably caused by the sharp edge of a cutting instrument.
7. A hacked wound located at the right shoulder just above the right arm caused by a
heavy cutting instrument. The wound was not fatal.
8. An incised wound measuring 11.5 by 0.4 cms. found below the right elbow caused by a
sharp-edged cutting instrument. And,
9. A hacked wound measuring 11 by 2.5 cms. at the right arm at the back of the wrist
probably caused by a heavy sharp linear-edged instrument.9
The Case for the Appellant
Domingo Vasquez denied killing Geronimo and attempting to kill Luis. He testified that Ramon
Vasquez was his brother, while Roel and Marlon were his first cousins. On June 18, 1995, a
Sunday, he was in his house at Lot 8-E, Block 8, Frontville-V, Kalookan City, repairing the
windows.
At 11:00 p.m., his wife awakened him as his brother Ramon had arrived in his house with a
policeman. The policeman and his companions brought Domingo to the Vicas police station
where he was detained. He saw Pedro and Marlon Pacheco, who were also detained. When he
asked why they were there, Pedro and Marlon replied that they arrived in the police station to
report the incident and found themselves inside the detention cell. He saw two women seated on
26
a bench near the cell with Luis, who turned out to be Debbie Dorado and Gemma Espinosa. A
policeman asked Debbie, "Ito ba?" But Debbie replied, "Hindi po." When asked again, Debbie fell
silent. When asked for the third time, Debbie replied, "Hindi po." Debbie was also asked to identify
Ramon, Pedro and Marlon, but she refused to do so. Policemen also asked Luis to identify the
appellant, but Luis replied, "No." A teenaged boy also arrived and was asked to identify him along
with Ramon, Pedro and Marlon, and the boy replied, "No." The policemen brought the boy out of
the police station, and when they returned, the boy pointed to him, Ramon, Pedro and Marlon, as
the culprits. The Vasquez brothers, Pedro and his son Marlon were then brought to the office of the
station commander where Luis finally identified the four of them as the culprits.
The policemen told Ramon and the appellant that they would be detained at the Hilcost police
station to protect them from their enemies. The appellant’s wife confirmed that many people were
waiting outside the police station.
Meanwhile, a policeman brought him on board a police car to his house, where he was asked to
drive the blue-colored jeepney of his brother Ramon. He drove the jeepney to the police station. He
had not driven any jeepney for the last three months or so.
Ramon Vasquez also denied killing Geronimo and attempting to kill Luis. He testified that his
house was only 800 meters away from Urduja Village. He did not know Luis Luable and Geronimo
Espinosa. On June 18, 1995, a Sunday, he was at home fixing the jalousy window of a blue, seven-
seater jeepney owned by Jessie Gomez, which he used as a service jeep to bring children to and
from school. He later used the jeep until 6:00 p.m. At 7:00 p.m., he went to sleep. Josefina Pacheco,
Pedro’s wife, and the latter’s children, Roel and Dario, arrived to borrow the jeepney. Dario had
apparently sustained a gunshot wound on the face. He agreed, provided that someone would drive
the vehicle. Josefina replied that the jeepney would be driven by Roel. He gave the keys of the
vehicle to Josefina and returned to bed.
At 11:00 p.m., Kagawad Ed Santos arrived with a policeman and told him that he and the appellant
would be brought to the Vicas police station. He was told to sit on a bench while Ed, the policeman
and the appellant, went out of the station. He and the appellant were then detained. A policeman
asked a man and two women to identify him and the appellant, "Sila ba? But the three replied,
"Hindi po." The two of them were then brought to the police station at Hilcost, followed by the
three witnesses. A policeman then asked the witnesses if he and the appellant were the assailants,
and the witnesses replied that they were not the ones.
Vaselisa Vasquez, the appellant’s wife, corroborated his testimony.
After trial, the court rendered judgment acquitting Ramon, but convicting the appellant of murder
for the killing of Geronimo, and attempted homicide for attempting to kill Luis. The decretal
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the accused RAMON VASQUEZ is hereby ACQUITTED
on reasonable doubt of the crimes of MURDER and ATTEMPTED MURDER. Accused DOMINGO
VASQUEZ is hereby found by this Court to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
MURDER and ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE and is accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA for Murder; to suffer an imprisonment of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY TO SIX (6) YEARS OF PRISION CORRECCIONAL for ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE; and to pay
the heirs of the deceased Geronimo Espinosa ₱18,000.00 for funeral expenses; ₱1,500,000.00 by
way of unrealized earnings; ₱50,000.00 by way of indemnity; ₱20,000.00 by way of moral
damages; and to pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.10
The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Maria Luisa Abellanosa and concluded that the
prosecution failed to prove the guilt of Ramon Vasquez beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
charged, viz:
On the other hand, another prosecution witness, Maria Luisa Abellanosa, identified the pursuers
as Roel and Dario Pacheco and Ramil and Dodoy Bartonico. Due to the glaring flaws in Debbie
Dorado’s testimony and considering further that Luis Luable’s testimony is mainly self-serving,
the Court gives more faith to Abellanosa’s version of facts. This is especially so because there is
nothing to show that Abellanosa’s testimony was tainted with impure motives. Indeed, it
behooves the Court to point out that the prosecution’s witnesses gave conflicting testimonies on
points which are of utmost importance.
In the light of such conflicting testimonies, the Court firmly believes that the accused Ramon
Vasquez was nowhere near the scene of the crimes on the night of June 18, 1995. The prosecution’s
eyewitnesses do not concur with respect to the presence of said accused on the scene of the crime.
Evidently, the prosecution failed to establish with certainty the accused Ramon Vasquez’s
involvement in the two crimes described in the information. The only fact that was clearly
established is that Ramon Vasquez drives the jeepney involved in this case when bringing
children to and from school. The mere fact that he had the jeepney in his possession is not
sufficient to connect him with the unlawful acts.
Domingo Vasquez, now the appellant, appealed the Decision contending that:
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH SUFFICIENT MOTIVE ON
HIS PART TO COMMIT THE CRIMES CHARGED.
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
DESPITE THE INCREDIBLE AND INCONSISTENT TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION
WITNESSES IN THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS ONE OF THE
PERPETRATORS OF THE CRIMES CHARGED.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI POSED BY THE
HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT THE EVIDENCE FOR THE
PROSECUTION IS WEAK.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS INDEED POSITIVELY
IDENTIFIED TO BE THE DRIVER OF THE BLUE-COLORED JEEPNEY DURING THE
INCIDENT IN QUESTION, THE TRIAL COURT, NONETHELESS ERRED IN FINDING HIM TO
BE A CONSPIRATOR AND NOT A MERE ACCOMPLICE IN THE MURDER OF THE VICTIM
GERONIMO ESPINOSA.11
As the assigned errors are interrelated, the Court shall delve into and resolve the same
simultaneously.
27
The appellant avers that he and his brother Ramon were not involved in the quarrel between Luis
Luable and Geronimo Espinosa, on the one hand, and Roel Pacheco, Marlon Pacheco and their
father Pedro Pacheco, on the other. He and his brother Ramon, thus, had no motive to kill
Geronimo. The appellant contends that the witnesses for the prosecution were not in agreement as
to who killed Geronimo. While Luis Luable and Debbie Dorado testified that they saw the
appellant stab Geronimo, Maria Luisa Abellanosa testified that Ramil Gonzales, Marlon Pacheco,
Dario Pacheco, Roel Pacheco, Ramil Bartonico and Dodoy Bartonico were the ones who stabbed
and killed the victim. The appellant noted that according to the testimony of Abellanosa, the
appellant stayed in the jeepney and merely yelled to his companions who ganged up on Geronimo,
"Sige patayin ninyo, patayin ninyo na, at huwag ninyong iwanang buhay!"
The appellant further posits that the prosecution witnesses were not even in accord as to where
Geronimo was stabbed to death. He pointed out that Luis Luable testified that Geronimo was
hacked to death at the corner of Lapu-Lapu and Sumakwel Streets, while Maria Luisa Abellanosa
testified that Geronimo was killed at the corner of Lapu-Lapu and Magat Salamat Streets.
Furthermore, Debbie Dorado was not certain where Geronimo was killed. The appellant asserts
that the location of the killing is important because the Meralco lamp post which illuminated the
place of the incident is located at the corner of Lapu-Lapu and Magat Salamat Streets, and not at
the corner of Lapu-Lapu and Sumakwel Streets. The appellant argues that because of the
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution, it failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. Hence, he should be acquitted of the said charges.
The Office of the Solicitor General, for its part, argues that there is no incongruence between the
testimony of Abellanosa, on the one hand, and those of Domingo and Luable, on the other, as to the
situs where Geronimo was killed. Moreover, whether the appellant is a principal by direct
participation or a principal by inducement is immaterial. In conspiracy, all the conspirators are
criminally liable for the death of the victim regardless of the degree of their participation in the
crime. The inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution are trivial. They do
not affect the credibility of the said witnesses and the veracity of the substance of their testimonies.
The appeal has no merit.
Prefatorily, we will no longer delve into and revisit the factual and legal basis for the acquittal of
Ramon Vasquez of the crimes charged. The decision of the trial court acquitting the said accused
and its basis for the said acquittal can no longer be altered without placing the said accused in
double jeopardy. Nonetheless, we are not precluded from delving into and reviewing the findings
of facts of the trial court in resolving the issues involved in this case relating to the appellant’s
appeal from its decision.
The general rule is that the findings of fact of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies, and the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions based
on the said findings, are accorded by the appellate court high respect, if not conclusive effect,
because of the unique advantage of the trial court in observing at close range the conduct and
deportment of the said witnesses. However, the appellate court may set aside the findings of the
trial court and its conclusions based on the said findings if it overlooked, ignored, misconstrued
and misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances which, if considered, would alter the outcome of
the case.
The trial court rejected the testimonies of Luis Luable, Debbie Dorado and gave credence to the
testimony of Maria Luisa Abellanosa, viz:
Luis Luable and Debbie Dorado testified that two of the three pursuers of the deceased, Geronimo
Espinosa, were herein accused Domingo and Ramon Vasquez. Moreover, they have been
pinpointed as the ones who wielded bolos. However, Debbie Dorado’s credibility is seriously
doubted by the Court on account of her failure to give the identities of the pursuers in her sworn
statement and her failure to issue a supplemental statement later when she finally made her
identification upon seeing the two accused. Additionally, it must be observed that she gave a
detailed physical description of the deceased’s pursuers despite the fact that during that time she
was running away from the scene of ambush. Hence, even if she looked back from time to time, it
could have been impossible for her to see the facial features of the pursuers because of two
reasons, to wit: (1) the pursuers were running towards the opposite direction and necessarily only
their backs could have been exposed to the witness, and (2) the surrounding darkness of night
and the increasing distance between the witness and the deceased’s pursuers could have made it
very difficult if not impossible for the witness to pay attention to tiny details such as the
moustache the former sported as well as the bone structure of the chin of accused Ramon
Vasquez.
On the other hand, another prosecution witness, Maria Luisa Abellanosa, identified the pursuers
as Roel and Dario Pacheco and Ramil and Dodoy Bartonico. Due to the glaring flaws in Debbie
Dorado’s testimony and considering further that Luis Luable’s testimony is merely self-serving,
the Court gives more faith to Abellanosa’s version of facts. This is especially so because there is
nothing to show that Abellanosa’s testimony was tainted with impure motives. Indeed, it
behooves the Court to point out that the prosecution’s witnesses gave conflicting testimonies on
points which are of utmost importance.12
We hold that the trial court erred in rejecting the testimonies of Luable and Dorado. The
credibility and probative weight of the testimony of Dorado cannot be assailed by her failure to
state the name of the appellant in her sworn statement to the police investigator13 as among those
who ran after Geronimo and Luis. The well-entrenched principle is that sworn statements being
ex parte are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate but do not really detract from the
credibility of the affiants.14
The failure of a witness to disclose the name of the culprit does not necessarily impair the
credibility of Dorado.15Moreover, as contended by the Office of the Solicitor General:
Debbie Dorado was recalled as witness, on a separate date. During the additional cross-
examination, it was admitted by both parties that the pictures presented by the defendants were
taken during daytime. She reiterated that there were three (3) persons chasing her cousin
Geronimo. She identified two (2) of the three (3) as the Vasqueses. When confronted as to her
failure to identify the accused when presented to her for identification as proven by the sworn
statement she gave to the police investigator, she averred that her statement had already been
taken, typewritten, and signed by her when she saw the accused and that it was only Luis Luable
who was brought to the detention cell to identify the accused…16
28
The affiants may give the names of the culprits subsequent to the submission of their affidavits and
even during the trial. It bears stressing that even in her sworn statement, Dorado declared that
three persons pursued Luis and Geronimo when they fled from the place, where they were almost
sideswiped by the appellant’s jeepney. Dorado’s declaration to the police investigator jibes with her
testimony before the trial court.
The culprit may be identified not only by his name or nickname but also by his physical
appearance, by his voice or by his gait.
The evidence on record shows that it was near Magat-Salamat Street corner Lapu-Lapu Street
where Luis and Geronimo were sideswiped by the jeepney driven by the appellant. The place was
lighted by a Meralco lamp post.17The appellant alighted from the jeepney along with other men.
Luable and Geronimo were near the jeepney. Dorado was barely fifteen meters away from the
place. Considering the lighting condition therein and the proximity of Luable, Dorado and
Abellanosa to the place where the incident occurred, they saw and recognized the appellant and
could, thus, identify him. When she testified, Dorado declared that the appellant was one of those
who pursued Luis and Geronimo after the appellant had alighted from the jeepney:
Q Would you again describe the other man who was armed with a bolo and who was
chasing the victim?
A The other man is short with a moustache and stout with short hair.
Q Will you please look around the courtroom and if this person you have just described is
presently inside the courtroom, will you please point him to the Honorable Court?
A Yes, he is here, Sir.
(At this juncture, the witness is pointing to a male person sitted (sic) inside the courtroom
who gave his name as Domingo Vasquez)
ATTY. COPE:
The man just pointed by the witness is sporting a moustache and sporting a short hair.18
For his part, Luis Luable testified that the appellant was among those who pursued him
and Geronimo, who, armed with a bolo, alighted from the jeepney.
Q Now, after you jumped to the right side of the road, what did the jeep do, if any, Mr.
Witness?
A The jeep stopped in front of the post.
Q Where was this post, Mr. Witness?
A Is (sic) located at the left side of Lapu-Lapu St.
Q And after the jeep stopped near the post Mr. Witness, what happened next?
A The driver alighted from the jeep together with his companion.
Q Were you able to recognize this driver Mr. Witness and his companion who went down
on the jeep?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And if you see them, would you be able to identify them?
 A Yes, Sir. COURT: Sustained.
Q Now, are those people inside the courtroom right now, Mr. Witness? ATTY. PAGUITON:
A Yes, Sir. Q Now, you mentioned earlier that you saw bolos, who were holding the bolos, Mr.
Q Now, can you point to them, Mr. Witness? Witness?

A Yes, Sir. A Ramon Vasquez and Domingo Vasquez were the ones holding bolos.

MS. DEL ROSARIO: At this juncture, witness is pointing to a male person sitted (sic)
inside the courtroom who gave their names as Domingo Vasquez and Ramon Vasquez.
ATTY. PAGUITON:
Q Now, of the two (2) people whom you are (sic) identified in court just right now, who
was driving the jeep?
MS. DEL ROSARIO: Witness pointing to Domingo Vasquez.
ATTY. PAGUITON:
Q And what about Mr. Ramon Vasquez, where was he sitted (sic) in the jeep, Mr.
Witness?
A Ramon Vasquez was sitted (sic) beside the driver.
Q Now, did you notice if there were other people who were inside the jeep, if any, Mr.
Witness?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Would you be able to say to this court how many people were there inside the jeep
including the driver and the passenger who was sitted (sic) in front?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And how many people are these, Mr. Witness?
Q What about the other people who alighted from the jeep, Mr. Witness?
A I did not notice whether they were armed because we already ran.
Q Towards what direction did you run, Mr. Witness?
A We ran towards the direction of North Olympus Street.19
In his sworn statement to the police investigator, Luable declared that the place where he and
Geronimo were sideswiped was lighted:
30. T: Dati mo na bang kakilala itong si Domingo Vasquez at Ramon Vasquez?
S: Hindo po.
31.T: Papaano mo silang (sic) nakilala?
S: Nakilala ko sila dahil sa maliwanag sa lugar na iyon.
32.T: Saan nanggagaling ang liwanag ng iyong sinasabi?
S: Sa ilaw ng poste.20
Luable and Dorado admitted that they did not see the appellant hack the victim. Neither did
Abellanosa. The latter testified that after failing to overtake Geronimo, the appellant returned to the
passenger jeepney and drove it to where Geronimo was hacked. The appellant, while still in the
jeepney ordered his cohorts, "Sige patayin niyo na, patayin niyo na, huwag niyong iwanang
buhay." She identified and pointed to the appellant in open court.

A More than seven (7) persons. Q Who was this person who was bumped by this jeep on that date and time?

Q Now, you mentioned earlier that when the jeep stopped… did you notice if they were A Geronimo Espinosa, Sir.
carrying anything, if any, Mr. Witness? Q What happened after Geronimo Espinosa was being (sic) bumped by the jeep?
ATTY. SAMPAGA: Leading, Your Honor. A Geronimo Espinosa fell down, Sir.
COURT: Sustained. Q Where did Geronimo Espinosa fall?
ATTY. PAGUITON: A At the corner of Magat Salamat, Sir.
Q When Domingo and Ramon Vasquez went down the jeep, what happened next? Q What happened after that?
A Domingo and Ramon chased me and my brother while they were holding a bolo. A And then I saw a male persons (sic) by the name of Ramil Gonzales alighted (sic) from
Q Now, what were the other people who were inside the jeep doing when Ramon and the jeep, Sir.
Domingo chased you? Q What happened next?
A They also alighted from the jeep and they also chased us. A Then Ramil Gonzales poked 29 knife on the body of a female person, Sir.
Q Were these other people also armed, Mr. Witness? Q Do you know this female person?
ATTY. SAMPAGA: Leading, Your Honor. A Yes, Sir, I know.

29
 Q What is her name? COURT:
A Her name is Debbie, Sir. Sustained.
Q Do you know the family name of Debbie? ATTY. COPE:
A I don’t know her family name, Sir. I think, Your Honor, it is different, the incident happened at Magat Salamat and then when
Q What happened after that? he was chased he run (sic) towards the direction of Kalantiao Street, now, we are asking
the question on what particular street where he was …
A And then Ramil Gonzales approached the person who fell down by the name of
Geronimo and then when Geronimo stood up Ramil (sic) chased Geronimo, Sir. COURT:

Q What happened when Ramil chased Geronimo? He was at Magat Salamat, towards the direction of Kalantiao Street.

A Ramil hacked Geronimo, Sir. ATTY. COPE:

Q What part of the body of Geronimo who (sic) was hacked? We submit, Your Honor.

A The back part of the head of Geronimo, Sir. Q What happened after Geronimo was chased?

Q What happened after that? A And the four (4) persons followed Ramil, and the persons who followed Ramil are two
Pachecos and two Bartoneco (sic), Sir.
A Geronimo run (sic) and then Ramil chased Geronimo, Sir.
COURT:
Q Where did Geronimo go when he was (sic) chased?
Q Are they brothers?
A Geronimo was proceeding to the direction of Kalantiao Street, Sir.
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Is this Kalantiao Street near Sumakwel Street?
ATTY. COPE:
ATTY. SAMPAGA:
Q Do you know the names of the Pachecos brothers (sic)?
Leading, Your Honor.
A…
COURT:
Q What are their names?
Sustained.
A Luis Pacheco, Danny Pacheco and Dario Pacheco, Roel Pacheco, Sir.
ATTY. COPE:
Q How about the Bartonico brothers, do you know their names?
Q What particular street did Geronimo passed (sic) while he was [being] chased?
A Yes, Sir.
ATTY. SAMPAGA:
Q What are their names?
Objection, Your Honor, already answered. He proceeded to Kalantiao Street.
A Darwin Bartonico and Dodoy Bartonico, Sir.
ATTY. COPE:
Q What happened after that?
Yes, Your Honor, proceeded to but this time the particular street he used when he was
being chased. A They gunned (sic) up Geronimo Espinosa, Sir.

COURT: Q Who was the driver of the jeep you saw?

At the corner of Magat Salamat. A Jun Vasquez, Sir.

ATTY. COPE: Q What is the real name of June?

Q When he was running away, what street did Geronimo use when he was running A Domingo Vasquez, Sir.
away when he was being chased? Q Where was this Domingo Vasquez when the person you mentioned was hacking
ATTY. SAMPAGA: Geronimo Espinosa?

Objection, Your Honor, Geronimo proceeded to Kalantiao Street. A He was inside the jeep, Sir.

30
 Q What was he doing? A For four (4) years, Sir.
A He was driving the jeep, Sir. Q What happened Ms. Abellanosa after the person you mentioned hacked Geronimo
Q What did he say when he was inside the jeep? Espinosa and Domingo Vasquez shouted "sige patayin niyo na, patayin niyo na, huwag niyong
iwanang buhay."
A I heard Domingo Vasquez uttered the following words – "Sige patayin niyo na, patayin
niyo na, huwag niyong iwanang buhay." A They already boarded the jeep and they proceeded in (sic) their house, Sir.21

COURT:
Q How far where (sic) you from Domingo Vasquez when you heard the words uttered
by him "sige patayin niyo na, patayin niyo na, huwag niyong iwanang buhay."
A I am (sic) just near, Your Honor, about five arms’ length.
ATTY. COPE:
Q Where were you when Domingo Vasquez uttered those statements?
A I was at the concrete wall underneath the plants, Sir.
Q How far was the jeep driven by accused Domingo Vasquez from where the persons
you mentioned, the Bartonico brothers and Pacheco brothers who were hacking
Geronimo Espinosa?
A Just near, Sir, just less than 10 arms’length.
Q Ms. Abellanosa, to whom was the accused Domingo Vasquez saying those statement
"sige patayin niyo na, patayin niyo na, huwag niyong iwanang buhay?"
ATTY. SAMPAGA:
Objection, Your Honor, she is incompetent to answer.
COURT:
Overruled, witness may answer.
A He was not mentioning any names, he was just shouting Ma’am, and uttering those
words.
ATTY. COPE:
The testimony of Abellanosa is corroborated by the autopsy report of Dr. Rosalyn Cosidon showing
that the victim sustained multiple incised hacked wounds and abrasions. Even if there is no
evidence that the appellant stabbed or hacked the victim, he is, nonetheless, criminally liable for the
victim’s death because he conspired with the principals by direct participation in the commission of
the crime. As the trial court ruled:
Whether Domingo Vasquez chased the deceased with a bolo was averred by Luis Luable or
whether the accused merely incited his companions in the jeepney to kill the deceased as averred
by Luisa Abellanosa, is immaterial in the determination of his liability because a conspiracy among
the occupants of the jeepney has been established.
In the case of People vs. Cortez, 57 SCRA 308 cited in Luis B. Reyes Revised Penal Code with
Annotations, Book I, 12th edition, 1981, p. 493, it was clarified, "In order to hold an accused guilty
as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, it must be established that he performed an overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy, either by actively participating in [the] actual commission of the
crime, or by lending moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the scene of the
crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators as to move them to
executing the conspiracy." (Underscoring supplied).
The Supreme Court, likewise, stressed in the case of People vs. Bernardo, 222 SCRA 502, "where
there are several accused and conspiracy has been established, the prosecution need not pinpoint
who among the accused inflicted the fatal wound."
And in the case of People vs. Magalang, 217 SCRA 571, it was held, "where conspiracy has been
established, evidence as to who among the accused rendered the fatal blow is not necessary. All the
conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the intent and character of their participation
because the act of one is the act of all."

Q Will you please repeat [the name of] the person who hacked Geronimo Espinosa? Hence, accused Domingo Vasquez is found by the Court to be a co-principal in the attempted
killing of Luis Luable as well as in the fatal hacking of Geronimo Espinosa.22
ATTY. SAMPAGA:
In People vs. Bisda,23 we held that:
Objection, Your Honor, already answered.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or more person
COURT:
agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. In People vs. Pagalasan, this Court held that
Sustained. conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. It may be inferred from the conduct of the
ATTY. COPE: accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a
common purpose and design. Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons
Q Why do you know these persons Roel Pacheco, Dario Pacheco, Ramil Bartonico,
aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so
Dodoy Bartonico, Ramon Vasquez, Ramil Gonzales and Domingo Vasquez?
that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other were, in fact, connected and
A Because they are my neighbors, Sir. cooperative, indicting a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment.
Q For how long have you been neighbors? Conspiracy once found, continues until the object of it has been accomplished and unless

31
abandoned or broken up. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he
must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.
There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the
common design and purpose.
We further ruled in the said case that:
Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates which follows
incidentally in the execution of a common design as one of its probable and natural consequences
even though it was not intended as part of the original design. Responsibility of a conspirator is
not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral
acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended. Conspirators are held to
have intended the consequences of their acts and by purposely engaging in conspiracy which
necessarily and directly produces a prohibited result, they are, in contemplation of law,
chargeable with intending that result. Conspirators are necessarily liable for the acts of another
conspirator unless such act differs radically and substantively from that which they intended to
commit. As Judge Learned Hand put it in Unites States vs. Andolscheck, "when a conspirator
embarks upon a criminal venture of indefinite outline, he takes his chances as to its content and
membership, so be it that they fall within the common purposes as he understands them."
In the case at bar, the appellant drove the passenger jeepney with his cohorts on board looking for
Luable and Geronimo. When the appellant saw the two going in the opposite direction, the
appellant drove the vehicle and sideswiped Geronimo. And when Geronimo fled, the appellant,
armed with a bolo, pursued him. When the appellant failed to overtake the victim, he returned to
the passenger jeepney and drove it to where his cohorts ganged up on the victim. The appellant
urged them on to kill Geronimo. Thereafter, he left the scene along with his cohorts, leaving the
hapless Geronimo mortally wounded. All the foregoing constitutes evidence beyond cavil of
conspiracy between the appellant and the principals by direct participation. The appellant is, thus,
criminally liable for the death of the victim, although there is no evidence that he did not actually
stab the latter.
There is no evidence on record that Luable, Dorado and Abellanosa nurtured any ill motive to
point to the appellant and falsely implicate him in the killing of Geronimo. Luable, for one thing,
did not know the appellant before the killing. Case law has it that in the absence of any improper
motive, the testimonies of the witnesses are worthy of full faith and credit.24
The bare claim of the appellant that he has no motive to kill Geronimo is not a valid defense to the
crime charged. Motive to commit a felony is not an element of the said crime; hence, the
prosecution is not burdened to prove the same. As we held in People vs. Delim:25
In murder, the specific intent is to kill the victim. In kidnapping, the specific intent is to deprive
the victim of his/her liberty. If there is no motive for the crime, the accused cannot be convicted
for kidnapping. In kidnapping for ransom, the motive is ransom. Where accused kills the victim
to avenge the death of a loved one, the motive is revenge.
In this case, it is evident on the fact of the Information that the specific intent of the malefactors in
barging into the house of Modesto was to kill him and that he was seized precisely to kill him
with the attendant modifying circumstances. The act of the malefactors of abducting Modesto was
32
merely incidental to their primary purpose of killing him. Moreover, there is no specific allegation
in the information that the primary intent of the malefactors was to deprive Modesto of his freedom
or liberty and that killing him was merely incidental to kidnapping. Irrefragably then, the crime
charged in the Information is Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and not
Kidnapping under Article 268 thereof.
The threshold issue that now comes to fore is whether or not the prosecution mustered the requisite
quantum of evidence to prove that Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty of murder.
In criminal prosecutions, the prosecution is burdened to prove the guilt of the accused beyond cavil
of doubt. The prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of
the evidence of the accused. The proof against the accused must survive the test of reason; the
strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment.
In the case at bar, the prosecution was burdened to prove the corpus delicti which consists of two
things: first, the criminal act and second, the defendant’s agency in the commission of the act.
Wharton says that corpus delicti includes two things: first, the objective; second, the subjective
element of crimes. In homicide (by dolo) and in murder cases, the prosecution is burdened to
prove: (a) the death of the party alleged to be dead; (b) that the death was produced by the criminal
act of some other than the deceased and was not the result of accident, natural cause or suicide; and
(c) that the defendant committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally responsible for the
act which produced the death. To prove the felony of homicide or murder, there must be
incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the victim was deliberately killed (with
malice); in other words, that there was intent to kill. Such evidence may consist inter alia in the use
of weapons by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim
and the words uttered by the malefactors before, at the time or immediately after the killing of the
victim. If the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is conclusively
presumed.
The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt either by direct
evidence or by circumstantial or presumptive evidence.
In the case at bar, the prosecution adduced the requisite quantum of proof of corpus delicti.
Modesto sustained five (5) gunshot wounds. He also sustained seven (7) stab wounds, defensive in
nature. The use by the malefactors of deadly weapons, more specifically handguns and knives, in
the killing of the victim, as well as the nature, number and location of the wounds sustained by said
victim are evidence of the intent by the malefactors to kill the victim with all the consequences
flowing therefrom. As the State Supreme Court of Wisconsin held in Cupps v. State:
"This rule, that every person is presumed to contemplate the ordinary and natural consequences of
his own acts, is applied even in capital cases. Because men generally act deliberately and by the
determination of their own will, and not from the impulse of blind passion, the law presumes that
every man always thus acts, until the contrary appears. Therefore, when one man is found to have
killed another, if the circumstances of the homicide do not themselves show that it was not
intended, but was accidental, it is presumed that the death of the deceased was designed by the
slayer; and the burden of proof is on him to show that it was otherwise."
The prosecution did not present direct evidence to prove the authors of the killing of Modesto. It
relied on circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden of proving the guilt of the accused-
appellants of murder.26
On the other hand, we are inclined to believe that the appellant joined cause with his cousins,
Roel Pacheco, Marlon Pacheco and Danny Pacheco in venting their ire on Geronimo and Luis for
the altercation which earlier transpired between Roel and Marlon, on the one hand, and Luis
Luable on the other. Geronimo was not involved in the altercation, but he was killed simply
because he was with his half-brother, Luis Luable, when the appellant and his cohorts caught up
with them.
The bare denial and alibi of the appellant cannot prevail over the collective testimonies of the
witnesses of the prosecution corroborated by the physical evidence that the appellant conspired
with the principals by direct participation to kill the victim. Denial and alibi are weak defenses. To
merit approbation of his defense of alibi, the appellant is burdened to prove, with clear and
convincing evidence that he was in a place other than the situs of the crime, such that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime when it was committed. The
appellant failed to do so. He relied merely on his bare testimony which is dubious in the first
place.
The trial court convicted the appellant of murder qualified by treachery. However, the trial court
failed to state in its decision the factual basis for such a finding. From all indications, the cohorts
of the appellant managed to overtake Geronimo along Sumakwel Street, as he ran for dear life
after being hit earlier by Ramil Gonzales on the head. Geronimo was, thus, aware of the peril to
his life.27 The assailants of Geronimo took advantage of their superior strength when they ganged
up on him, armed with bolos and hacked him to death. However, the qualifying circumstance of
abuse of superior strength is not alleged in the Information; hence, cannot qualify the crime to
murder. The appellant is guilty only of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code,
punishable by reclusion temporal.
We, likewise, agree with the conviction of the appellant of attempted homicide in Criminal Case
No. 48936(95). But we do not agree with the penalty meted on the appellant, six (6) months and
one (1) day to six (6) years of prision correccional. The imposable penalty for attempted homicide
is prision correccional which is two degrees lower than reclusion temporal. The maximum of the
indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the imposable penalty of prision correccional, taking
into account the modifying circumstances, if any. To determine the minimum of the
indeterminate penalty, the penalty of prision correccional has to be reduced by one degree, which
is arresto mayor. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the full range of
arresto mayor. Hence, the appellant may be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty from four (4)
months of arresto mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to three (3) years of prision
correccional, in its medium period, as maximum. Although the appellant used a vehicle to commit
attempted homicide, the said circumstance was not alleged in the Information, as mandated by
Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The said Rule should be applied
retroactively although the crime was committed before the effectivity of the same.
33
The trial court awarded ₱18,000 as actual damages for funeral expenses, ₱1,500 as unearned income
of the victim and ₱20,000 as moral damages. The trial court did not award exemplary damages to
Luis Luable. The decision of the trial court shall, thus, be modified.
In lieu of actual damages in the amount of ₱18,000.00, the heirs of the victim are entitled to
₱25,000.00 by way of temperate damages, conformably to current jurisprudence. The amount of
₱1,500,000.00 is deleted for failure of the prosecution to adduce any documentary and oral evidence
to prove the factual basis of such amount.28 The award of moral damages should be increased to
₱50,000.00 to conform to current jurisprudence. Luis Luable is entitled to ₱25,000.00 exemplary
damages.29
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kaloocan City,
Branch 121, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
1. In Criminal Case No. 48935(95), appellant Domingo Vasquez y Pacheco is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, and there being no modifying circumstance in the commission of the
crime, is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty from nine (9) years and four
(4) months of prision mayor, in its medium period, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, in its medium period, as
maximum. The said appellant is ORDERED to pay to the heirs of the victim Geronimo
Espinosa ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱50,000.00 as moral damages; ₱25,000.00 as
temperate damages;
2. In Criminal Case No. 48936(95), the appellant is found GUILTY of attempted homicide
under Article 249 in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code and there being no
modifying circumstances in the commission of the crime, is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty from four (4) months of arresto mayor, in its medium period, as
minimum, to three (3) years of prision correccional in its medium period, as maximum.
The said appellant is ORDERED to pay ₱25,000.00 to Luis Luable by way of exemplary
damages. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 128966 August 18, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDWIN DE VERA y GARCIA, RODERICK GARCIA y GALAMGAM, KENNETH FLORENDO
and ELMER CASTRO, accused,
EDWIN DE VERA y GARCIA, appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When is a lookout deemed an accomplice and when a conspirator? What is the distinction between
the two?
Statement of the Case
These are the main questions passed upon by the Court in resolving the present appeal, which
assails the March 12, 1997 Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 57) in
Criminal Case No. Q-92-31323, finding Appellant Edwin De Vera and Accused Roderick Garcia d) P500,000.00, as moral damages;
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentencing them to reclusion perpetua. e) Interest at the legal rate on a) and b), hereof from the filing of the information
In an Information dated June 11, 1992, Assistant City Prosecutor Tirso M. Gavero charged with until full payment; and,
murder Appellant Edwin De Vera, together with Roderick Garcia and two other persons who f) Costs of suit.16
were subsequently identified during the trial as Kenneth Florendo and Elmer Castro. The crime
Only Edwin De Vera filed a Notice of Appeal.7
was allegedly committed as follows:
The Facts
That on or about the 8th day of June, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring [and] confederating [with] and helping . . . two (2) other persons, did then Version of the Prosecution
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, with evident In its Brief,8 the Office of the Solicitor General presented the following narration of facts:9
premeditation, treachery and use of superior strength, attack, assault and employ
As earlier stated, the prosecution presented an eyewitness in the person of
personal violence upon the person of one FREDERICK CAPULONG y DIZON, by then
Bernardino Cacao, a resident of Denver Loop Street, Filinvest II, Quezon City
and there shooting him with the use of a .22 cal. with trade mark "Paspar Armas" bearing
before he moved to No. 58 Elisa Street, Caloocan City. He was residing at
SN-29069 with five (5) pieces of caliber 22 ammo inside, hitting him between his eyes and
Filinvest II, together with his wife and children, at the time of the incident on June
striking him with the use of a baseball bat in the mouth, thereby inflicting upon him
28, 1992 in the house owned by David Lim. He was then employed at a Kodak
serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely
branch in Caloocan City, while his wife served as secretary of the homeowners
death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said Frederick Capulong y Dizon.2
association.1âwphi1.nêt
On July 9, 1992, Assistant City Prosecutor Enrico P. Bringas filed a Motion to Amend the
About 1:30 in the afternoon of June 8, 1992, while bringing out the garbage, the
Information to include the use of a .32 caliber firearm in the killing of Frederick Capulong. The
witness saw a car passing by, driven by victim Frederick Capulong together with
trial court granted the Motion, and the Amended Information now reads as follows:
four (4) other passengers. He knew the victim by name who was a resident of the
That on or about the 8th day of June, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, subdivision. He recognized and identified two of the passengers as Kenneth
conspiring [and] confederating [with] and helping . . . two (2) other persons, did then Florendo and Roderick Garcia, both familiar in the subdivision.
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, with evident
Cacao did not at first notice anything unusual inside the car while it passed by
premeditation, treachery and use of superior strength, attack, assault and employ
him, but then he heard unintelligible voices coming from the car as it was
personal violence upon the person of one FREDERICK CAPULONG y DIZON, by then
cruising around Denver Loop Street, a circular road whose entrance and exit were
and there shooting him with the use of a .22 cal. with trade mark "Paspar Armas" bearing
through the same point (ibid, p. 12). His curiosity taking [the] better part of him,
SN-29069 with five (5) pieces of caliber 22 ammo inside and a .32 cal. firearm of still
Cacao walked to the opposite side of the road from where he saw the car already
undetermined make, hitting him between his eyes and striking him with the use of a
parked. Moments later, he saw the victim dragged out of the car by Florendo and
baseball bat in the mouth, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which
brought to a grassy place. Florendo was holding a gun (ibid, p. 13). Upon reaching
were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice
the grassy spot, Florendo aimed and fired the gun at the victim, hitting him
of the heirs of the said Frederick Capulong y Dizon.3
between the eyes, After the shooting, Florendo and his companions fled in
On their arraignment, Appellant Edwin De Vera4 and Roderick Garcia5 pleaded not guilty. The different directions.
other two accused were at large. Trial in due course proceeded only against De Vera and Garcia.
When he submitted a sworn statement to the investigating prosecutor, Cacao
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
attached a sketch of the crime scene prepared by police officers, indicating therein
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused EDWIN DE VERA y his relative position at the time of the incident. While testifying in court, Cacao
GARCIA and RODERICK GARCIA y GALAMGAM guilty beyond reasonable doubt of identified Garcia and pointed to appellant as among the companions of Florendo.
the crime of MURDER and they are hereby accordingly sentenced to suffer reclusion
Ten minutes later, or about 2:40 in the afternoon, the desk officer of the
perpetua, including all its accessory penalties; to indemnify the heirs of Frederick
Investigation Division, Station 5, Central Police District, Quezon City received a
Capulong y Dizon, as follows:
report about the shooting incident from a security guard of the subdivision. The
a) P50,000.00, as death indemnity; officer immediately dispatched a team to Filinvest II, composed of PO2 Armando
b) P211,670.00, as compensatory damages; Garcia, PO3 Armando Junio, and PO3 Jovencio Villacorte, to investigate and
gather evidence (TSN, p. 5, September 13, 1993). A security guard guided the
c) P600,000.00, as indemnification for loss of earning capacity;

34
 team to the corner of Denver and Doña Justina Streets, site of the shooting,
where they discovered blood stains and damaged grass (ibid, p. 6). The guard
informed them that the victim was rushed to the East Avenue Medical Center by
other security guards. The policemen then found a color red sports car with
plate no. NBZ 869, with engine still running and its doors opened. They
recovered inside the car several class cards and a license belonging to one Ric
Capulong, who was later identified as Frederick Capulong.
The policemen went around the subdivision to look for possible suspects. They
came upon a person wearing muddled maong pants and white t-shirt "standing
and walking around" near the clubhouse of the subdivision. When asked his
name, the person identified himself as Edwin de Vera, herein appellant.
Explaining the mud stains on his pants, appellant declared that he was a victim
of a hold-up. Suspicious [of] his conduct, the policemen brought appellant to
Station 5 and turned him over to the desk officer for investigation.
Another prosecution witness, SPO3 Mario Guspid, a police investigator since
1989, was assigned to investigate the shooting of Frederick Capulong. He was
assisted by SPO4 Pablito Selvido, SPO2 Armando Rivera, SPO3 Jovencio
Villacorte, SPO3 Rolando Gacute, SPO3 Danilo Castro and other police officers.
Upon receiving his assignment, SPO3 Guspid immediately went to the East
Avenue Medical Center where he saw the victim lying inside the intensive care
unit receiving medical treatment. The victim was unconscious. After conferring
with the victim's parents and relatives, SPO3 Guspid returned to Station 5. On
his arrival, the desk officer referred appellant to him for questioning. He was
told that appellant was picked up near the crime scene acting suspiciously.
When appellant was asked about his participation in the shooting, he was
reluctant at first to talk, but later relented after SPO3 Guspid told him that his
conscience would bother him less if he would tell the truth.
Without any hesitation, appellant admitted being [with the] group which
perpetrated the crime, and implicated Roderick Garcia. He was then persuaded
to accompany a group of policemen to the residence of Garcia, which turned out
to be at Doña Justina Street, Filinvest II Subdivision. Finding Garcia at home,
SPO3 Guspid informed him that he was implicated by appellant [in] the crime.
He was then invited to the station to shed light [on] the incident. Garcia
consented.
At Station 5, SPO3 Guspid interviewed appellant and Garcia. In the course of
the interview, Garcia revealed the place where he hid a .22 caliber gun, black t-
shirt and black cap. According to Garcia, Florendo asked them to wear black t-
shirts. With the revelation, SPO3 Guspid, SPO2 Rivera, SPO3 Gacute and SPO3
Castro, together with the suspects, went back to the subdivision and proceeded
to a grassy portion near the boundary of Filinvest II and San Mateo, Rizal. The
place was near a creek and about 50 meters away from the residence of Garcia
(TSN, pp. 9-14, September 30, 1993). Truly, the policemen recovered a .22 caliber
35
revolver, black t-shirt and black cap (TSN, pp. 12-13, August 24, 1993).While
there, SPO3 Guspid and SPO2 Rivera prepared a sketch of the crime scene to
reflect the explanations and answers given by appellant and Garcia in response to
their questions. As identifying marks, SPO3 Gacute placed his initials "OG"
(acronym for his first name and family name) between the handle and cylinder of
the gun, and on the neck of the t-shirt, as well as in the inner lining of the black
cap.
From the crime site, the policemen and the suspects returned to Station 5 where
SPO3 Guspid asked them if they were willing to give their written statements, to
which they assented. Consequently, they were brought to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, Quezon City Chapter, at Malakas Street, Diliman, Quezon City.
They were then introduced to Atty. Confesor Sansano, the [c]hairman of the Free
Legal Aid of the IBP. Also, present at that time were appellant's relatives,
including his mother and sisters, and other lawyers of the IBP.
SPO3 Guspid inquired from them if they would agree to be assisted by Atty.
Sansano, "a competent lawyer." They replied in the affirmative. Thereafter, the
two conferred with Atty. Sansano.
Atty. Sansano, a rebuttal witness of the prosecution, testified that upon arrival of
the suspects [i]n his office, he requested the policemen, as a matter of policy, to
step outside the building in order to assure that no pressure would be exerted on
the suspects even by their mere presence (TSN, p. 6, November 6, 1996). After
they left, Atty. Sansano interviewed the suspects for about twenty minutes,
informing them of their rights under the constitution and inquiring from them if
they indeed wanted to give voluntary statements. To the query, the suspects
answered positively. They also affirmed their earlier declaration that they were
willing to be assisted by the IBP (ibid, pp. 8-9). He further advised them of their
right during the investigation to answer or not to answer the questions which
they thought would incriminate them, but they retorted that they fully
understood their right.
Satisfied that they were not coerced or threatened to give their statements, Atty.
Sansano requested the suspects to show their upper bodies to enable him to
determine any telltale signs of torture or bodily harm. Finding no such signs, he
then summoned the policemen to re-enter the building. The investigators readied
two typewriters and each suspect was assigned to an investigator. He served as
the lawyer of the suspects, cautioning them against answering questions that they
did not understand, and to seek . . . a clarification, if needed.
According to Atty. Sansano, the interrogation took place in his office, a single
separate room from where his five staff members were visible. He sat between the
two tables used by the investigators for typing the questions and answers,
involving himself from beginning to end of the investigation until the signing of
the statements. He never left the office to attend to anything else, consistent with
 [the] standing policy of the IBP to properly safeguard the rights of suspects
during investigation.
He recalled that the investigators first typed the headings of the statements, then
informed the suspects before starting the investigation about their rights under
the constitution, specifically, the right of the suspects to have a lawyer of their
own choice; if not, the police would provide them with one who would assist
them; that they could answer or refuse to answer the questions. The
investigators also asked him if he was willing to serve as counsel of the suspects.
They also asked the suspects if they were willing to accept him as their counsel.
They agreed expressly by saying: "Oho."
SPO3 Guspid investigated Garcia while SPO4 Selvido investigated appellant.
They conducted the question and answer investigation in Pilipino. The statement
of appellant was marked as Exhibit O and that of Garcia was marked as Exhibit
N. The statements were signed by the suspects and Atty. Sansano.
For his part, SPO4 Selvido declared that SPO3 Guspid requested his help in
taking the statements of the suspects (TSN, p. 4, June 29, 1993). He took the
statement of appellant in the presence of Atty. Sansano. Before proceeding, he
reminded appellant of the constitutional warnings, consisting of four (4)
questions under the heading "Paunawa," to which the latter gave positive
answers. The statement was signed by appellant and Atty. Sansano. After taking
down the statement, he turned over appellant to SPO3 Guspid.
Following the investigation, the policemen brought the suspects to the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for paraffin testing. The result:
"both hands of Edwin de Vera y Garcia @ Boy/Bong gave positive results [in] the
test for gunpowder nitrates while both hands of Roderick Garcia y Galamgam @
Deo gave negative result [in] the test for gunpowder nitrates."
After coming from the crime laboratory, SPO3 Guspid contacted the mother of
the victim to get her own statement. Next, he obtained a death certificate and
prepared a referral to the Quezon City Prosecution Office which was signed by
Senior Inspector Ernesto Collado, Chief of the Station Investigation Division.
During the inquest, the prosecutor asked the suspects some clarificatory
questions.
Surveillance and follow-up operations were conducted against Florendo and his
other companion, Elmer Castro. However, the two were never arrested and
brought to trial.
Version of the Defense
Appellant claims that he had no part in the killing, and that it was Kenneth Florendo
who had shot the victim. He avers that he merely accompanied to Filinvest the other
accused and Florendo, who was his friend, upon the latter's request. A few hours after
the shooting incident, appellant was picked up by the police, who subsequently tortured
36
and coerced him into signing his Statement regarding the incident. The trial court
summarized appellant's evidence in this wise:10
Edwin de Vera admitted that, as of June 8, 1992, he and Kenneth Florendo were
already close friends for about a year, sometimes sleeping in the latter's house at
No. 106 Kamias Road, Quezon City. His own residence at the time was at No. 7
Bignay Street, Project 2, Quezon City. That was also the address of Elmer Castro,
his and Kenneth's friend.
Edwin had slept in Kenneth's house on Kamias Road from June 6 to June 8, 1992
and went home at 7:00 am of June 8th Later at around 10:30 am, Kenneth passed
by Edwin's house to invite him back to [the former's] house that morning and to
bring Elmer along. Kenneth mentioned that he, his girlfriend, and Deo, who were
then with him, would be going somewhere first. Deo, or Roderick Garcia, was
another friend of Kenneth's.
Edwin and Elmer later went to and arrived at Kenneth's house at 11:00 am.
Kenneth, his girlfriend, and Deo were already taking lunch, and invited the two
to lunch. After lunch, Kenneth asked Edwin to go with him to Filinvest without
telling why. It was Deo who mentioned to Edwin that Kenneth was going to see a
friend. Edwin was not aware if Kenneth had also asked the others to go with him
to Filinvest, but the four of them — Kenneth, Edwin, Elmer, and Deo — later
proceeded to Filinvest [i]n Kenneth's car. Edwin sat at the back seat. The time was
past 12:00 noon.
Kenneth drove his car. Upon reaching Filinvest, Kenneth stopped at a house and
the four of them alighted in front of the house. Edwin did not know whose house
it was. Kenneth and Elmer told Edwin and Deo to wait near the car because they
were going to see a friend. At that point in time, Edwin knew the person[,] whom
Kenneth and Elmer went to see[,] by name, never having met him personally
before then. From his conversation with Deo, Edwin found out that the house
was where Deo stayed.
Then, Edwin heard the voices of Kenneth and his friend and they appeared to be
arguing (". . . . parang nagtatalo sila") The voices came from some twenty-two (22)
meters away. Not before long, Edwin also heard a gunshot which came from
where Kenneth and Elmer had gone to. He was shocked because he was not used
to hearing gunfire. Frightened, he panicked and ran away from the place. His
singular thought while running was to get out of Filinvest. Deo also ran away.
Edwin denied that either he or Deo carried any firearm on that occasion.
Edwin was arrested by the police at past 2:00 p.m. when he was already outside
of Filinvest subdivision in front of Batasan. He was brought to Station 5 where
four (4) persons in civilian attire tortured him by forcing him to lie down on a
bench, tying his feet together and binding his hands from his back with
handcuffs, and then covering his face with a piece of dirty cloth into which water
was poured little by little into his face and mouth, while one of them sat on his
 thighs. This maltreatment lasted for about 20 or 25 minutes, because they
wanted him to admit "something" and to name "my companions" but he refused
to admit or to name anyone. They next took him outside to a mango tree where
they repeated his ordeal for 30 minutes. At one point during the torture, a
policeman untied his feet and hands and poked a gun to his temple, telling him
to run as it was his chance to escape, but he did not escape because he could see
that they were merely frightening him.
None of the policemen told him that he could . . . get a lawyer[;] instead, one of
them, whose name he [did] not know, told him that "I should listen only to them
and not to anyone else." He claimed that he saw one [of] his tormentors in court,
and he identified him as police officer Rivera. Guspid did not participate in his
torture, because he merely took down his statement. His tormentors were not
drunk or under the influence of drugs, but Guspid seemed to be under the
influence of drugs when he took his statement because of his troubled
appearance.
Edwin was not advised to inform or call any of his relatives. Before his torture,
his request to contact his relatives or lawyer was turned down. His intimidation
continued (". . . . puro pananakot and ginawa nila sa akin"). After his torture at
the mango tree, he was returned inside and thrown into a cell, where he
remained until the following day (June 9th). During the night, an inmate named
Cesar boxed him once in the upper body upon instruction of a policeman. He
was not given any dinner.
At around noontime of the next day (June 9th), Edwin was taken out of the cell
and brought to the IBP office by police officers Guspid and Selvido. Also with
them were Deo Garcia and two other police officers. At the IBP office, the
officers talked with one of the lawyers there, whom Edwin came to know to be
Atty. Sansano only after the lawyer was introduced ("present") to him and Deo.
That was the first he met and saw Atty. Sansano.
Atty. Sansano informed both Edwin and Deo that they had the choice whether
to talk or not. Edwin could not make any comment because "wala po ako sa
sarili ko". Then, Atty. Sansano warned Edwin substantially that: "Alam n'yo ba
na ang salaysay na ito ay maaring hindi ninyo sumpaan," referring to the
statement taken from Edwin by officers Guspid at around past 8 p.m. until 9
p.m. on the day before (June 8, 1992) at the police station. He was not assisted
by counsel, and had no relatives present. Guspid appeared to be "like drunk or
tipsy," when he took down Edwin's statement that night."
At the IBP office, Edwin's and Deo's statement were taken separately by Guspid
and Selvido, respectively. At the time, Edwin and Deo were about six (6) meters
from each other, but he could hear what was being asked of Deo. Guspid asked
the questions and typed both the questions and his answers, which were given
in Tagalog. All the while, Atty. Sansano was inside his office, which was about
seven (7) meters away from where he and Guspid were situated. The office of
37
Atty. Sansano was separated by a divider, so that he could not see what Atty.
Sansano was doing at the time. After the questioning, he signed a paper which he
was not able to read. He did not see Atty. Sansano sign the paper.
xxx xxx xxx
On July 14, 1992, Edwin executed a so-called salaysay ng pagbabawi ng
sinumpaang salaysay, which he swore to before Prosecutor Tobia of Quezon City,
for the purpose of recanting his statements given at the precinct in the evening of
June 8, 1992 and at the IBP office on June 9, 1992 on the ground that they were
given under coercion, intimidation, and in violation of his constitutional rights.
Ruling of the Trial Court
Based on the testimony of Eyewitness Bernardino Cacao, the trial court ruled that it was indeed
Kenneth Florendo who had actually shot the victim, Roderick Capulong. It convicted appellant as a
principal, however, because "the scientific and forensic findings on the criminal incident directly
and substantially confirmed the existence of conspiracy among the four [accused], namely, Kenneth
Florendo, Elmer Castro, Edwin de Vera, and Roderick Garcia.11
The Issues
Appellant submits for the consideration of this Court the following alleged errors:
I
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT PROSECUTION EYE-WITNESS
BERNARDO CACAO HAD TESTIFIED TO NO CRIMINAL ACT OF APPELLANT;
II
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS A
CONSPIRACY TO KILL THE VICTIM AND THAT APPELLANT WAS A CO-CONSPIRATOR;
III
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN ADMITTING EXHIBIT "O", ALLEGED STATEMENT OF
APPELLANT; AND IN NOT DECLARING THE SAME AS AN INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE
CONSIDERING THE BARBARIC MANNER UNDER WHICH IT WAS EXTRACTED/OBTAINED
FROM THE APPELLANT WHICH VIOLATED THE LATTER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS;
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING AND DECLARING THAT THE PROSECUTION
HAS NOT PROVED THE APPELLANT'S GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND IN NOT
ACQUITTING THE APPELLANT.12
In the main, the Court will resolve three questions: (1) the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence,
(2) the admissibility of appellant's extrajudicial statement, and (3) the nature of his liability.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious. Appellant should be convicted only as an accomplice, not as a
principal.
First and Third Issues:
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence and Appellant's Liability
Because the first and the third questions mentioned above are interrelated, they shall be discussed
jointly.
Eyewitness Account
In ruling that there was conspiracy between Florendo, Castro, Garcia and Appellant De Vera, the
trial court relied mainly on the testimony of Eyewitness Cacao. Specifically, it based its
conclusions on the following facts: appellant was seen with the other accused inside the victim's
car; the victim was clearly struck with a blunt object while inside the car, and it was unlikely for
Florendo to have done it all by himself; moreover, it was impossible for De Vera and Garcia to
have been unaware of Florendo's dark design on Roderick.
We disagree. It is axiomatic that the prosecution must establish conspiracy beyond reasonable
doubt.13 In the present case, the bare testimony of Cacao fails to do so.
Cacao testified that he saw Appellant De Vera in the car, where an altercation later occurred.
Thereafter, he saw Florendo drag out of the vehicle an apparently disabled Capulong and shoot
the victim in the head moments later.
Cacao's testimony contains nothing that could inculpate appellant. Aside from the fact that he was
inside the car, no other act was imputed to him. Mere presence does not amount to
conspiracy.14 Indeed, the trial court based its finding of conspiracy on mere presumptions, and
not on solid facts indubitably indicating a common design to commit murder. Such suppositions
do not constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. As the Court has repeatedly stated, criminal
conspiracy must be founded on facts, not on mere surmises or conjectures. Clearly, Cacao's
testimony does not establish appellant's culpability.
Appellant's Extrajudicial
Statement
Aside from the testimony of Cacao, the prosecution also presented Appellant De Vera's
extrajudicial statement, which established three points.
First, appellant knew of Kenneth Florendo's malevolent intention.
T: Ito bang balak ni Kenneth para patayin itong si Frederick ay alam mo ba ito at
pumayag kang maging kasapakat nito?
S: Sinabi po niya ito sa akin. Hindi po ako pumayag. Pero noong araw na iyon ay
nagkahiyaan na lamang at napilitan akong sumama.15
Second, appellant's companions were armed that day, a fact which revealed the unmistakable plan
of the group.
T: Ikaw ba ay mayroong dalang armas noong hapon na iyo[n]?
S: Wala po akong dalang armas. Pero itong si Kenneth ay mayroong dalang dalawang
baril[,] sina Deo at Elmer ay wala. Pero noong naroroon na kami sa lugar ay ibinigay ni
Kenneth ang isang baril niya kay Deo at itong si Elmer ay mayroong nang dalang
baseball bat.
38
Third, he cooperated with the other accused in the commission of the crime by placing himself at a
certain distance from Kenneth and the victim in order to act as a lookout. This is clear from the
following portion of his statement:
S: Kabarkada ko po si Kenneth at dalawang araw po akong nakitulog sa kanila at noong
araw ng June 08, 1992 ay sinabihan ako ni Kenneth Gumabao na huwag raw akong uuwi,
dahil [mayroon] daw po kaming lakad. Pagkaraan ng ilang oras ay dumating naman itong
si Roderick Garcia @ Deo at may sinabi sa kanya itong si Kenneth at sinabi naman ito sa
akin ni Deo na kaysa raw maunahan siya ni Frederick Sumulong [sic] ay uunahan na raw
po niya ito. Umalis po itong si Kenneth na kasama ang kanyang nobya at itong si Deo,
para ihatid ang kanyang [sic] sa hospital at bago sila umalis ay sinabihan ako ni Kenneth
na sunduin ko raw itong si Elmer Castro at magbhihai [magbihis] na rin daw ako at
pagdating nila ay . . . lalakad na raw po kami. Mga ilang oras pa ay sinundo ko na itong si
Elmer Castro at pagdating namin sa bahay nila Kenneth ay naroroon na itong si Kenneth
at Deo. Matapos magpalit ng damit itong si Kenneth ay sumakay na kami sa kanilang
kotse at nagtuloy sa kanilang katabing bahay at doon ay kumain kami. Pagkatapos noon
ay umalis na kami at nagtuloy sa F[i]l-Invest. P[a]gdating namin sa isang lugar doon sa
medyo malayo-layo sa bahay nila Deo ay bumaba na itong si Deo at Elmer at sila ay
nagpunta doon sa lugar ng pinagbarilan para kunin ang bayad sa utang ni Fred[er]ick
Capulong sa tiyuhin ni Deo P[a]gkaraan ng ilang minuto ay sumunod po kami ni Kenn[e]th sa
lugar at ako ay naiwan nang medyo malayo-layo sa lugar upang tingnan kung mayroong darating
na tao. Samantalang si Kenneth ay lumapit kina Deo at Frederick at kasunod noon ay
nagkaroon ng sagutan itong si Kenneth at Frederick at nakita kong inaawat ni Deo itong si
Kenneth. Hindi nakapagpigil itong si Kenneth at nasipa niya s[i] Frederick at kasunod
noon ay binunot niya ang kanyang baril na kalibre .38 at pinaputukan niya ng isang beses
itong si Frederick na noong tamaan ay natumba sa lupa. Lumapit si Elmer kina Kenneth
habang binabatak ni Kenneth itong si Frederick at kasunod po noon ay lumapit sa akin si
Deo at sinabihan ako na tumakbo na kami. Tumakbo na po kami, pero ako po ay nahuli ng
mga security guard ng Subdivision at itong si Deo ay nahuli naman sa kanilang bahay.
Itong sina Kenneth at Elmer ay hindi pa nahuhuli.16
Appellant an Accomplice,
Not a Conspirator
In other words, appellant's presence was not innocuous. Knowing that Florendo intended to kill the
victim and that the three co-accused were carrying weapons, he had acted as a lookout to watch for
passersby. He was not an innocent spectator; he was at the locus criminis in order to aid and abet the
commission of the crime. These facts, however, did not make him a conspirator; at most, he was
only an accomplice.
The Revised penal Code provides that a conspiracy exists when "two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it."17 To prove conspiracy,
the prosecution must establish the following three requisites: "(1) that two or more persons came to
an agreement, (2) that the agreement concerned the commission of a crime, and (3) that the
execution of the felony [was] decided upon."18 Except in the case of the mastermind of a crime, it
must also be shown that the accused performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.19 The
Court has held that in most instances, direct proof of a previous agreement need not be
established, for conspiracy may be deduced from the acts of the accused pointing to a joint
purpose, concerted action and community of interest.20
On the other hand, the Revised Penal Code defines accomplices as "those persons who, not being
included in Article 17,21 cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous
acts."22 The Court has held that an accomplice is "one who knows the criminal design of the
principal and cooperates knowingly or intentionally therewith by an act which, even if not
rendered, the crime would be committed just the same."23 To hold a person liable as an
accomplice, two elements must be present: (1) the "community" of criminal design; that is,
knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in
his purpose;" and (2) the performance of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable
to the commission of the crime.24
The distinction between the two concepts needs to be underscored, in view of its effect on
appellant's penalty. Once conspiracy is proven, the liability is collective and not individual. The
act of one of them is deemed the act of all.25 In the case of an accomplice, the liability is one
degree lower than that of a principal.
Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they know and agree with the criminal
design. Conspirators, however, know the criminal intention because they themselves have
decided upon such course of action. Accomplices come to know about it after the principals have
reached the decision, and only then do they agree to cooperate in its execution. Conspirators
decide that a crime should be committed; accomplices merely concur in it. Accomplices do not
decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely assent to the plan and cooperate in
its accomplishment. Conspirators are the authors of a crime; accomplices are merely their
instruments who perform acts not essential to the perpetration of the offense.
Thus, in People v. Castro,26 the Court convicted Rufino Cinco, together with two others, as a
principal, although he had acted merely as a lookout. The Court held that "their concerted action
in going armed and together to their victim's house, and there, while one stayed as a lookout, the
other two entered and shot the mayor and his wife, leaving again together afterwards, admits no
other rational explanation but conspiracy." It may be noted further that Cinco executed a Sworn
Statement that the three of them, together with some others, had planned to kill the victim on the
promise of a P5,000 reward.
In People v. Tawat et al.,27 the lookout, Nestor Rojo, was convicted as a principal for conspiring
with two others. The Court ruled that the conspiracy was shown by their conduct before, during
and after the commission of the crime. The Court also noted that, upon their arrest, they disclosed
that they had intended to rob the victim's store and that they did so in accordance with their plan.
In that case, it was clear that all three of them, including the lookout, were the authors of the
crime.
In People v. Loreno,28 the Supreme Court convicted all the accused as principals because they had
acted in band. In acting as a lookout, Jimmy Marantal was armed at the time like the other
conspirators, and he gave his companions effective means and encouragement to commit the
crime of robbery and rape.
39
Upon the other hand in People v. Corbes,29 the Court noted that Manuel Vergel knew of the criminal
design to commit a robbery, and that he cooperated with the robbers by driving the vehicle to and
from the crime scene. In convicting him as an accomplice and not as a conspirator, the Court
observed that he was merely approached by one of the robbers who was tasked to look for a
getaway vehicle. He was not with the robbers when they resolved to commit a robbery. When his
services were requested the decision to commit the crime had already been made.
In People v. Tatlonghari,30 the Court was asked to resolve the responsibility of some appellants who
"knowingly aid[ed] the actual killers by casting stones at the victim, and distracting his attention."
The Court ruled that they were accomplices and not co-conspirators, "[i]n the absence of clear proof
that the killing was in fact envisaged by them."
In People v. Suarez et al.,31 Wilfredo Lara merely introduced the gang of Reyes to Suarez who
intended to perpetrate the crime with the help of the said group. In ruling that he was merely an
accomplice, the Court noted that there was no evidence showing that he "took part in the planning
or execution of the crime, or any proof indicating that he profited from the fruits of the crime, or of
acts indicative of confederacy on his part."
In People v. Balili,32 the Court convicted appellant as an accomplice, holding that "in going with
them, knowing their criminal intention, and in staying outside of the house with them while the
others went inside the store to rob and kill, [he] effectively supplied the criminals with material and
moral aid, making him guilty as an accompliance." The Court noted that there was no evidence that
he "had conspired with the malefactors, nor that he actually participated in the commission of the
crime."
In People v. Doble,33 the Court held that Cresencio Doble did not become a conspirator when he
looked for a banca that was eventually used by the robbers. Ruled the Court: "Neither would it
appear that Joe Intsik wanted to draft Crescencio into his band of malefactors that would commit
the robbery more than Just asking his help to look for a banca. Joe Intsik had enough men, all with
arms and weapons to perpetrate the crime, the commission of which needed planning and men to
execute the plan with full mutual confidence of each other, which [was] not shown with respect to
appellants by the way they were asked to look and provide for a banca just a few hours before the
actual robbery."
In the present case, Appellant De Vera knew that Kenneth Florendo had intended to kill Capulong
at the time, and he cooperated with the latter. But he himself did not participate in the decision to
kill Capulong; that decision was made by Florendo and the others. He joined them that afternoon
after the decision to kill had already been agreed upon; he was there because "nagkahiyaan na."
This is clear from his statement, which we quote again for the sake of clarity:
T: Ito bang balak ni Kenneth para patayin itong si Frederick ay alam mo ba ito at pumayag
kang maging kasapakat nito?
S: Sinabi po niya ito sa akin. Hindi po ako pumayag. Pero noong araw na iyon ay
nagkahiyaan na lamang at napilitan akong sumama.34
Significantly, the plan to kill could have been accomplished without him. It should be noted further
that he alone was unarmed that afternoon. Florendo and Garcia had guns, and Castro had a
baseball bat.
In any event, the prosecution evidence has not established that appellant was part of the
conspiracy to kill the victim. His participation, as culled from his own Statement, was made. after
the decision to kill was already a fait accompli. Thus, in several cases, the Court has held:
[L]ack of complete evidence of conspiracy, that creates the doubt whether they had acted
as principals or accomplices in the perpetration of the offense, impels this Court to
resolve in their favor the question, by holding . . . that they were guilty of the "milder
form of responsibility," i.e., guilty as mere accomplices.35
Second Issue:
Admissibility of Extrajudicial Statement
Extrajudicial confessions must conform to constitutional requirements. Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution, provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right
to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel,
he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in
the presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
If the confession meets these requirements, "it is subsequently tested for voluntariness, i.e., if it
was given freely — without coercion, intimidation, inducement, or false promises; and
credibility, i.e., if it was consistent with the normal experience of mankind."36
Appellant claims that his extrajudicial statement was inadmissible, because it was not made in the
presence of counsel. Although Atty. Confesor Sansano of the Quezon City IBP Legal Aid
Committee purportedly assisted him and his co-accused in the execution of their extrajudicial
Statements, appellant asserts that the lawyer was in his office, not with them, at the time.
Appellant adds that he was tortured.
Appellant's claims must be rejected. Atty. Sansano testified that he did not leave them at any time.
Q: You were involved in the interrogation from the very start?
A: Yes, from the beginning to the end of the interview until the boys signed their
statements.
Q: Did you recall having at any time left your office to attend to some official matters?
A: I never left the office to attend to anything.
Q: Is that the usual manner by which you assist persons referred to you by the police
insofar as custodial investigation is concerned?
A: It is our policy that when we assist [in] that capacity, we [want] to see to it that the
rights of the accused or suspects are properly [protected] during the course of the entire
interrogation.37
40
In fact, Atty. Sansano even checked to see if there were torture marks on Appellant De Vera, and
Garcia and interviewed the two to make sure that they understood what they were doing.
Q: What was your purpose in asking the police officers to leave the room?
A: My purpose in asking the police officers to step out of the building was to assure myself
that no pressure could be exerted on the two boys by the presence of the police officers
during my personal interview. Before we allow any police officers to take the statements of
people brought before us[,] we see to it [that] we interview the persons personally out of
hearing and sight of any police officer.
Q: After the police officers left the room, completely left the room[,] you were able to
interview the two accused namely Mr. de Vera and Mr. Garcia?
A: Yes, I spent about 15 to 20 minutes interviewing the boys.
Q: What was the nature of your initial interview with these two accused?
A: I asked the boys Roderick and Edwin if it [was] true that they [were] going to give their
own statements to the police?
Q: And what did they say?
A: They said yes, sir.
Q: What was your reaction to that?
A: Routinely[,] I informed them about their rights under the constitution.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Having obtained their answers, what next transpired?
A: After telling them the statements they may give to the police could be used against
them for a [sic] in any court of the Phil., I was satisfied that nobody coerced them, that they
were never threatened by anybody much less by the police officers to give these
statements. Casually I asked the two boys to raise their upper clothes.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What was your purpose in requiring these persons to show you or remove their upper
clothing?
A: I wanted to assure myself that there were no telltale signs of torture or bodily harm
committed on the[m] prior to their [being brought] to the office. In spite of their [personal]
assurances . . . , verbal assurance that they were never hurt.38
The right to counsel is enshrined in the Constitution in order to address, among others, the use of
duress and undue influence in the execution of extrajudicial confessions.39 In the present case, the
Court is satisfied that Atty. Sansano sufficiently fulfilled the objective of this constitutional
mandate. Moreover, appellant's allegations of torture must be disregarded for being
unsubstantiated. To hold otherwise is to statements at the mere facilitate the retraction of solemnly
made statements of the mere allegation of torture, without any proof whatsoever.
When an extrajudicial statement satisfies the requirements of the Constitution, it constitutes
evidence of a high order, because of the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would
deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience.40 The
defense has the burden of proving that it was extracted by means of force, duress or promise of
reward.41 Appellant failed to overcome the overwhelming prosecution evidence to the contrary.
Sec. 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, provides that "[a]n extrajudicial confession made by an
accused shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus
delicti." In the present case, the prosecution presented other evidence to prove the two elements
of corpus delicti: (a) a certain result has been proven — for example, a man has died; and (b) some
person is criminally responsible.42 It is indubitable that a crime has been committed, and that the
other pieces of prosecution evidence clearly show that appellant had conspired with the other
accused to commit the crime. He himself does not deny that he was at the crime scene. In fact, he
was seen by the prosecution eyewitness in the company of the gunman. Furthermore, Atty.
Sansano and the police officers testified to the voluntariness of his confession. It must be stressed
that the aforementioned rule merely requires that there should be some other evidence "tending to
show the commission of the crime apart from the confession."43
Criminal and Civil Liability
In ruling that the crime committed was murder, the trial court found that the killing was attended
by treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength. One of these was enough to
qualify the crime as murder; the two others constituted generic aggravating circumstances. The
lower court explained that the evidence established evident premeditation, for Florendo's group
acted with deliberate forethought and tenacious persistence in the accomplishment of the criminal
design. Treachery was also proven, because the attack was planned and performed in such a way
as to guarantee the execution of the criminal design without risk to the group. There was also
abuse of superior strength, because the attackers took advantage of their superiority in numbers
and weapons.
We disagree with the court a quo in appreciating two generic aggravating circumstances, because
treachery absorbs abuse of superior strength.44 Hence, there is only one generic aggravating
circumstance, not two. Notwithstanding the presence of a generic aggravating circumstance, we
cannot impose the death penalty, because the crime was committed before the effectivity of the
Death Penalty Law.
In the present case, the penalty of appellant as an accomplice is one degree lower than that of a
principal, which in murder cases is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. He is also
entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
We sustain the trial court's grant of P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto, which may be awarded
without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. The award of P211,670 as
compensatory damages was duly supported by evidence. Based on the evidence presented, moral
damages is also warranted, but only in the amount of P50,000, not P500,000 as fixed by the trial
court. Furthermore, we affirm the payment of interest.45 However, the grant of P600,000 for loss
of earning capacity lacks factual basis. Such indemnification partakes of the nature of actual
damages, which must be duly proven.46 In this case, the trial court merely presumed the amount
of Capulong's earnings. Since the prosecution did not present evidence of the current income of
the deceased, the indemnity for lost earnings must be rejected.
41
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby partially GRANTED. Appellant De Vera is CONVICTED as an
accomplice, not as a principal, in the crime of murder. He is sentenced to an indeterminate prison
term of 8 years and 1 day ofprision mayor as minimum, to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal as maximum. We AFFIRM the awards of: (a) P50,000 indemnity ex delicto, (b) P211,670 as
compensatory damages and (c) interest of six percentper annum on these two amounts. The award
of moral damages is however REDUCED to P50,000 and the award for the loss of earning capacity
is DELETED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 150762 January 20, 2006
COVERDALE ABARQUEZ, y EVANGELISTA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 23 June 2000 Decision2 and the 7 November
2001 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21450. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the 30 September 1997 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 50 ("trial court") in
Criminal Cases Nos. 94-135055-56. The trial court found Coverdale Abarquez y Evangelista
("Abarquez") guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an accomplice in the crime of homicide in
Criminal Case No. 94-135055.
The Charge
The prosecution charged Abarquez with the crimes of homicide and attempted homicide in two
Informations,5 as follows:
Criminal Case No. 94-135055
The undersigned accuses COVERDALE ABARQUEZ Y EVANGELISTA of the crime of
HOMICIDE, committed as follows:
That on or about November 21, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring
and confederating with one ALBERTO ALMOJUELA Y VILLANUEVA, who has already been
charged for the same offense before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, under Crim. Case No. 93-
129891 and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
with intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal violence upon one RICARDO QUEJONG Y
BELLO, by then and there stabbing him twice with a bladed weapon and hitting him with a gun at
the back, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate
cause of his death thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
Criminal Case No. 94-135056
The undersigned accuses COVERDALE ABARQUEZ Y EVANGELISTA of the crime of
ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE, committed as follows:
That on or about November 21, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
conspiring and confederating with one ALBERTO ALMOJUELA Y VILLANUEVA, who has
already been charged for the same offense before the Regional Trial Court of Manila under Crim.
Case No. 93-129892 and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of homicide directly
by overt acts, to wit: by then and there holding one JOSE BUENJIJO PAZ Y UMALI and stabbing
him with a bladed weapon, hitting him on the left arm, but the said accused did not perform all
the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of homicide as a consequence, by
reason of causes other than his own spontaneous desistance, that is, the injury inflicted upon said
JOSE BUENJIJO PAZ Y UMALI is only slight and not fatal.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
Abarquez entered a plea of not guilty to both charges. The cases were tried jointly.
The Version of the Prosecution
On 21 November 1993 at 2:00 p.m., Jose Buenjijo Paz8 ("Paz"), Ricardo Quejong ("Quejong") and
their friends were in the house of one Boyet at 3342 San Jose St., Sta. Mesa, Manila. They were
drinking liquor in celebration of the birthday of Boyet’s son. About 7:45 p.m., Paz and Quejong
decided to go home. Boyet Tong, Abarquez’s son Bardie and Sonito Masula ("Masula") joined Paz
and Quejong. They proceeded towards the exit of San Jose St.
Meanwhile, about six or seven meters away from Boyet’s house, Alberto Almojuela also known as
Bitoy ("Almojuela"), a certain Ising and Abarquez also known as Dale, were likewise drinking
liquor in front of Almojuela’s house. As the group of Paz was passing towards the main road,
Almojuela and his companions blocked their path.
Almojuela asked Paz, "Are you brave?" Paz replied, "Why?" Almojuela got angry and attacked Paz
with a knife. Paz parried the attack with his left arm but sustained an injury. Abarquez held Paz
on both shoulders while Bardie pacified Almojuela. Paz asked Abarquez, "What is our atraso, we
were going home, why did you block our way?" Abarquez answered, "Masyado kang matapang.
Tumigil ka na, tumigil ka na."
Almojuela then confronted Quejong and they had an altercation, followed by a scuffle. Paz tried
to get away from Abarquez who continued restraining him. Upon seeing Almojuela and Quejong
fall on the ground, Paz struggled to free himself from Abarquez. Paz approached Quejong and
found him already bloodied. It turned out the Almojuela stabbed Quejong with a knife. Paz tried
to pull up Quejong but failed. Paz left Quejong and ran instead towards the exit of San Jose St. to
ask for help. While Paz was running away, he heard Abarquez shout, "You left your companion
already wounded!"
When Paz and his companions returned, they found Quejong still on the ground. Almojuela and
Abarquez were still in the area. Paz and his companions brought Quejong to the UST Hospital.
They next proceeded to Police Precinct No. 4 to report the incident. However, there was nobody
in the precinct. With Kagawad Villanio Usorio, Paz went to the WPD General Headquarters to
report the incident. At the WPD General Headquarters, they learned that Quejong died at the UST
42
Hospital. Paz then had his injury treated by Dr. Vic Managuelod at Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital.
The medico-legal certificate showed that Paz sustained a 3-cm. lacerated wound on his left forearm.
About 9:15 p.m., while SPO1 Danilo Vidad ("SPO1 Vidad") was at the WPD Homicide Division, his
station received a call from the UST Hospital informing them of the death of Quejong. SPO1 Vidad
and PO3 Ed Co went to the UST Hospital morgue and investigated the incident. They learned that
Almojuela, assisted by Abarquez, stabbed Quejong. Upon the execution of sworn statements by Paz
and Masula, SPO1 Vidad booked Almojuela and Abarquez for homicide and frustrated homicide
and prepared the referral letter to the inquest prosecutor.
Abarquez voluntarily appeared at the police station. Almojuela voluntarily surrendered to one
SPO4 Soriano at Police Station No. 10 and was turned over to the WPD Homicide Division.
Dr. Antonio Rebosa9 ("Dr. Rebosa"), a medico-legal consultant at UST Hospital, conducted the post-
mortem examination and autopsy on Quejong. Dr. Rebosa reported that Quejong sustained two
stab wounds and suffered from massive hemorrhage due to penetrating stab wounds to the heart
and left lung. According to Dr. Rebosa, a sharp instrument probably caused the wound. Dr. Rebosa
also reported that Quejong sustained abrasions and contusions on the right upper body, the wrist
and on the lower extremities.
The Version of the Defense
Abarquez countered that on 21 November 1993, he was in his residence at 3363 San Jose St., Sta.
Mesa, Manila. About 7:30 p.m., Almojuela’s wife informed him that the group of Paz was
challenging Almojuela to a fistfight. Abarquez, being a barangay kagawad, proceeded to
Almojuela’s house. Almojuela’s house was about twenty meters away from Abarquez’s house.
When he arrived at Almojuela’s house, Abarquez saw Almojuela on the ground being strangled by
Quejong. Paz was holding Almojuela’s waist and boxing him at the stomach. Masula was near
Almojuela’s head holding a piece of stone as if waiting for a chance to hit him. Abarquez shouted at
the group to stop. The group did not heed Abarquez, forcing him to fire a warning shot into the air.
Still, the group did not heed Abarquez who then fired a second warning shot. Paz, Quejong, and
Masula scampered away.
Almojuela told Abarquez that he was merely trying to stop the group of Paz from smoking
marijuana. Almojuela then went inside his house while Abarquez went home. On his way home,
Abarquez met the Chief Tanod of the barangay and two kagawads. Kagawad Rudy Lego ("Lego")
advised him to report the incident to the police. They all proceeded to Precinct No. 4 where Lego
reported the incident to the desk officer. The desk officer told them that a person had been stabbed.
When Abarquez reached their house, he saw policemen and media men with their barangay
chairman. He informed them that he had just reported the incident. Upon the request of SPO1
Vidad, Abarquez then went to the police station to shed light on the incident.
Almojuela testified that he was inside his house when his daughter informed him that there was
marijuana smoke coming to their window. He went outside to look for the source of the smoke and
saw Quejong, Paz, and Masula smoking marijuana. Almojuela asked the group to move away as
there were children inside the house. He was on his way back to the house when Quejong tried to
strangle him. Later, Almojuela heard a gunshot. He also heard Abarquez shouting, "Tumigil na
kayo." Quejong, Masula, and Paz ran away.
Winfred Evangelista10 ("Evangelista") testified that he was resting in front of his house when he
heard a commotion. He noticed that Paz and Quejong were quarreling. Evangelista saw Paz
kicking Almojuela. Abarquez arrived to break up the fight but he was told not to interfere.
Abarquez was forced to fire a warning shot and the persons involved in the commotion ran away.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In its Decision11 dated 30 September 1997, the trial court found Abarquez guilty as an accomplice
in the crime of homicide. The trial court held that the prosecution failed to prove that Abarquez
was a co-conspirator of Almojuela in the killing of Quejong. Hence, Abarquez could not be
convicted as a principal in the crime of homicide. However, the trial court ruled that Abarquez, in
holding and restraining Paz, prevented the latter from helping Quejong and allowed Almojuela to
pursue his criminal act without resistance.
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 94-135055, this Court finds the accused, Coverdale Abarquez,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide only as accomplice and hereby sentences
him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional to ten
(10) years of prision mayor. In Criminal Case No. 94-135056, the accused is hereby acquitted.
With costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.12
Abarquez appealed the trial court’s Decision before the Court of Appeals.
In its Decision13 of 23 June 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s Decision. The
Court of Appeals sustained the trial court in giving more credence to the testimony of Paz. The
Court of Appeals held that the prosecution was able to establish that Abarquez aided Almojuela
in fatally stabbing Quejong. The Court of Appeals rejected Abarquez’s allegation that he was
merely at the crime scene to pacify the quarreling parties.
In its 7 November 2001 Resolution,14 the Court of Appeals denied Abarquez’s motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
The issues15 Abarquez raises before the Court may be summarized as follows:
1. Whether the prosecution was able to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt;
2. Whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in giving more credence to the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses.
Abarquez alleges that the prosecution’s evidence does not satisfy the test of moral certainty and is
not sufficient to support his conviction as an accomplice. He further alleges that there was a
misapprehension of facts and that the trial court and the Court of Appeals reached their
conclusion based entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures. Abarquez also assails the
credibility of the witnesses against him.
43
The Ruling of This Court
The petition is meritorious.
The rule is that the trial court is in the best position to determine the value and weight of the
testimony of a witness. The exception is if the trial court failed to consider certain facts of substance
and value, which if considered, might affect the result of the case.16 This case is an exception to the
rule.
Concurrence in Criminal Design
Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code defines accomplices as "those persons who, not being included
in Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts."17
Two elements must concur before a person becomes liable as an accomplice: (1) community of
design, which means that the accomplice knows of, and concurs with, the criminal design of the
principal by direct participation; and (2) the performance by the accomplice of previous or
simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the crime.18 Mere commission of
an act, which aids the perpetrator, is not enough.19 Thus:
The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly rendered, which cannot exist
without the previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed. It is therefore required
in order to be liable as an accomplice, that the accused must unite with the criminal design of the
principal by direct participation.20
Indeed, in one case, the Court ruled that the mere presence of the accused at the crime scene cannot
be interpreted to mean that he committed the crime charged.21
Here, in convicting Abarquez, the trial court and the Court of Appeals relied mainly on the
testimony of Paz. Paz testified that he was held by Abarquez on the shoulders, thus preventing him
from helping Quejong who was grappling with Almojuela. Paz testified:
q. And what happened in the exchange of words or altercations between Bitoy and Ricardo
Quejong?
a. They grappled with each other, sir.
q. When Bitoy and Ricardo grappled with each other, what did you do, if any?
a. I was intending to help Ricky but I was held back by Dale, sir.
q. And how this Dale hold you?
a. He held my two shoulders, sir.
PROSECUTOR F. G. SUPNET:
I would like to make it of record demonstrated being held by the accused holding both shoulders,
your Honor.
q. Now, when this Dale Abarquez held both on your shoulders, what happened next, if any?
a. He got angry scolding us. While scolding me the two
who were grappling each other walking away, sir. (sic)
q. Now, you said Bitoy and Ricky were moving, what happened in the course of grappling, if any?
You testified that Ricky and Bitoy were grappling each other, what happened in the course of
grappling? (sic)
a. They fell to the ground, sir.
q. After that what happened next, if any?
a. When I saw them fall I struggle and I was able to release from the hold of Dale and I approach
the two. I saw Ricky blooded so I was trying to pull him, sir. (sic)
q. You said you saw Ricky blooded, why was he blooded? (sic)
a. He was stabbed by Bitoy, sir.
q. And did you see what instrument did Bitoy used in stabbing Ricky or Ricardo? (sic)
a. It was a knife, sir. (Witness indicating a length about 6 inches including the handle).
ATTY. GASCON:
The accused told you Joey tumigil ka na, Joey tumigil ka na because you were trying to attack
Bitoy, is it not?
a. How can I be charged, he was the one holding the knife, sir. (sic)
q. So what was the reason why the accused restrained you and told you Joey tumigal ka na, Joey
tumigil ka na. What would be the reason?
a. While I was just talking to Bitoy, when he told me to stop.
COURT:
Does the Court get from you that you are trying to explain to Bitoy when the accused tried to hold
you and prevent you?

q. Now, you said also that while the two were grappling while you were trying to free yourself a. Yes, sir.
from the hold Dale Abarquez, "Pinagalitan kayo", in what way or manner did Dale Abarquez q. That is why the reason you concluded that the accused is not pacifying you but to stop you from
reprimanded you? (sic) helping the victim?
a. You Jose is too brave, sir. (sic)22 a. Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
q. You said you were first attacked by Bitoy, is that correct? q. The only word that the accused [C]overdale Abarquez uttered was Joey, tumigil ka na, Joey
a. Yes, sir. tumigil ka na, is it not?

q. After Bitoy pacified Bardy Abarquez, he went after Ricky Quejong, is it not?23 a. He uttered that you are MATAPANG, Joey tumigil ka na, Joey tumigil ka na.24

a. They were just arguing, sir. Paz’s testimony does not show that Abarquez concurred with Almojuela’s criminal design.
"Tumigil" literally means "stop." Clearly, Abarquez was trying to stop Paz from joining the fray, not
[q.] And it was during that time when you were held in both shoulders by the accused
from helping Quejong. Paz claims that he was only trying to talk to Almojuela. However, Paz could
[C]overdale Abarquez?
not have been merely talking to Almojuela, as he tried to portray, because Almojuela was already
a. Yes, sir. grappling with Quejong at that time. Paz interpreted Abarquez’s action as an attempt to prevent
q. and that Coverdale Abarquez was infront of you, is it not? him from helping Quejong. His interpretation was adopted by the trial court and sustained by the
Court of Appeals. Yet, in his testimony, Paz admitted that while restraining him, Abarquez was
a. Yes, sir on my side.
scolding or reprimanding him and telling him to stop. It was not shown that Abarquez was
q. And he was holding your shoulder to pacify you and Bitoy from further quarrelling you, is it stopping Paz from helping Almojuela. It is more likely that Abarquez was trying to stop Paz from
not? joining the fight. Abarquez’s act of trying to stop Paz does not translate to assistance to Almojuela.
a. That is not the way of pacifying, sir. In People v. Fabros, 25 the Court explained:
q. How can you demonstrate how you were held on the shoulder by Abarquez? To be deemed an accomplice, one needs to have had both knowledge of and participation in the
ATTY. GASCON: criminal act. In other words, the principal and the accomplice must have acted in conjunction and
directed their efforts to the same end. Thus, it is essential that both were united in their criminal
Make I make it of record your Honor that the interpreter act as the witness while the witness act
design.
as the accused demonstrating holding both hands of interpreter preventing the witness and
saying Joey tumigil ka na, joey tumigil ka na. xxx. The mere fact that the (accused) had prior knowledge of the (principal’s) criminal design did
not automatically make him an accomplice. This circumstance, by itself, did not show his
COURT:
concurrence in the principal’s criminal intent.
q. How many times?
Paz stated that Abarquez did not do anything to stop Almojuela. However, Paz testified that
a. Twice, Your Honor. Abarquez’s son Bardie, who was one of Paz’s companions, was the one trying to pacify Almojuela.

44
The trial court in its factual findings confirmed this when it stated that while Abarquez was
holding Paz, his son Bardie was pacifying Almojuela.26
The prosecution argues that Abarquez was remiss in his duties as a barangay kagawad in not
extending assistance to the then wounded Quejong. This, however, does not necessarily show
concurrence in Almojuela’s criminal act. When Paz ran away, Abarquez shouted at him that he
left his wounded companion. Apparently, Abarquez was not aware of the extent of Quejong’s
injury and he expected Paz to look after his own companion.
When there is doubt on the guilt of an accused, the doubt should be resolved in his favor. Thus:
Every person accused has the right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond
reasonable doubt. The presumption of innocence stands as a fundamental principle of both
constitutional and criminal law. Thus, the prosecution has the burden of proving every single fact
establishing guilt. Every vestige of doubt having a rational basis must be removed. The defense of
the accused, even if weak, is no reason to convict. Within this framework, the prosecution must
prove its case beyond any hint of uncertainty. The defense need not even speak at all. The
presumption of innocence is more than sufficient.27
We apply in this case the equipoise rule. Where the evidence on an issue of fact is in issue or there
is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof
loses.28 Hence:
xxx The equipoise rule finds application if, as in this case, the inculpatory facts and circumstances
are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the
accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of
moral certainty, and does not suffice to produce a conviction. Briefly stated, the needed quantum
of proof to convict the accused of the crime charged is found lacking.29
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 23 June 2000 Decision and 7
November 2001 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21450, which affirmed the
30 September 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 50 in Criminal Cases
Nos. 94-135055-56. We ACQUIT Coverdale Abarquez y Evangelista as an accomplice in the crime
of homicide in Criminal Case No. 94-135055. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 148257 March 17, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
CESARIO MONTAÑEZ and DANIEL SUMAYLO, accused.
CESARIO MONTAÑEZ, appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
45
This case was certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals under Section 14, Rule 124 of the Rules
of Court, as amended. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision1 of the trial court dated
September 19, 1995 convicting the appellant of murder, as principal by direct participation, and set
aside the Order of the trial court dated November 17, 1995 modifying its decision and convicting
the appellant of murder, but only as accomplice.
The Proceedings in the Trial Court
On August 11, 1993, an Information was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Tangub City charging
the appellant of murder. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 20th day of July, 1993, at 12:00 midnight, more or less, in Barangay
Pangabuan, Tangub City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above named accused, with treachery and evident premeditation, and with intent to
kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot one Perlito Ollanes
resulting in the instantaneous death of the victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW with the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation.2
The appellant was arraigned, assisted by counsel, and entered a plea of not guilty. The prosecution
then adduced testimonial and documentary evidence and rested its case. The appellant also rested
his case after adducing his evidence. The prosecution then adduced rebuttal evidence and
presented Daniel Sumaylo as surrebuttal witness. Sumaylo declared that the appellant did not kill
the victim, but also stated that he did not know the killer. The appellant, thereafter, closed the
presentation of his evidence.
Before the court could render judgment, Daniel Sumaylo gave a statement on May 14, 1994 to SPO3
Julius Rosales admitting to having shot the victim. His mother, Lucia Sumaylo, executed a separate
affidavit corroborating that of her son. The appellant then filed a motion to re-open the trial to
enable him to present Daniel Sumaylo. Sumaylo testified that he executed his statement with full
knowledge of its contents and that he was not coerced and intimidated into making it. The court
granted the appellant’s motion and allowed him to present Sumaylo as his witness.
An Amended Information was filed on July 27, 1994 considering Daniel Sumaylo as an additional
accused. The accusatory portion of the Amended Information reads as follows:
That on or about the 20th day of July 1993, at 12:00 midnight, more or less, in Barangay
Pangabuan, Tangub City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring and helping one another, with treachery and
evident premeditation, and with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously shot one Perlito Ollanes resulting in the instantaneous death of the victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW with the qualifying circumstance of treachery and evident
premeditation.3
On April 7, 1995, Sumaylo was arraigned, assisted by counsel, and with conformity of the victim’s
father and the public prosecutor, entered a plea of guilty to the lesser crime of homicide.
Evidence for the Prosecution
Edmundo Ollanes testified that in the evening of July 20, 1993, he was fishing along the seashore
at Pangabuan, Toledo City with Joven Hintogaya and his younger brother, Perlito Ollanes. They
stopped fishing by 11:00 a.m., sold their catch, and went home. Edmundo took a shortcut, while
Joven and Perlito walked home together. He and Perlito had a flashlight with them, while Joven
carried a kerosene lamp. Perlito’s house was only about forty meters from his, and Joven lived
only about eighteen meters away.
As Edmundo was climbing the stairs to his house, he heard gunshot coming from the direction of
the house of Perlito. He rushed to the scene and passed by Joven’s house. He then saw his brother
lying prostrate nearby. As he was facing towards the ground, the left side of his face tilted
towards his left shoulder, he saw the appellant, who was armed with a long firearm.
Edmundo carried his brother in his arms and noticed the gunshot wounds on the latter’s chest. He
was still alive, but barely breathing. Perlito told him that he was on the verge of death. When
Edmundo asked Perlito who shot him, the latter declared that it was the appellant. Perlito
mentioned the appellant’s name three times. Edmundo carried Perlito to the hospital, but the
latter died on the way.
Joven Hintogaya corroborated Edmundo’s testimony. He testified that Perlito was his brother-in-
law. He was carrying a kerosene lamp as he and Perlito were on their way home that fateful night.
Perlito was about seven meters away from him. Suddenly, he heard a gunshot and saw that
Perlito was hit. He fell to the ground. Joven went near Perlito, still carrying the kerosene lamp,
and saw the appellant holding a long handgun in his right hand. In the meantime, the appellant
went near Perlito and dropped a piece of paper with writings in the Cebuano dialect,4 then left.
Momentarily, Edmundo arrived, carried Perlito and talked to him. Dadan Ollanes and Cresing
also arrived and helped Edmundo bring Perlito to the hospital. Perlito died on the way.
Dr. Paulita Almendras performed an autopsy on the cadaver of Perlito and prepared her report
containing her postmortem findings, thus:
Front view
Multiple gunshot wounds chest, abdominal region, pubic region approximately
numbering 25 with different sizes of wounds of entrance some ½ cm. in
diameter and some ¼ cm. in diameter.
Back view
Gunshot wounds of exit back, left side level of umbilicus – 8 cms. from the
spinal column & another one 5 cms. from the spinal column.5
The doctor also signed the Certificate of Death of Perlito Ollanes.6
The Case for the Appellant
Emilia Antipolo testified that at around 8:00 p.m. on July 20, 1993, she was in her house in Baybay,
Pangabuan, waiting for the fishermen to arrive. The appellant, Elizabeth Robillos and the latter’s
husband were her regular customers and were with her that night. When the fishermen arrived at
11:00 p.m., Emilia weighed the fish and sorted them with the help of Elizabeth and the appellant.
They finished the work at 2:00 a.m.
46
Emilia and her companions heard gunfire coming from the upper portion of Pangabuan. Not long
after, three CAFGUs arrived and asked Emilia if they heard the fire of the gun. She answered in the
affirmative. The following day, they learned that somebody had been killed at the upper portion of
Pangabuan where the victim lived.
Danilo Ollanes testified that at midnight of July 20, 1993, he was at home. He heard gunfire and
rushed to the place with his brother Edmundo. He brought a small petroleum lamp with him. They
saw somebody lying on the ground, face down. Edmundo lifted the fallen Perlito, and Danilo heard
him say that the person who shot him was Alfredo Ollanes. He did not see Cesario Montañez
during the incident. On cross examination, Danilo testified that he arrived at the place and he heard
gunfire a minute later. He did not see the appellant nor Alfredo Ollanes. According to his brother,
the appellant was implicated in the killing of Perlito because the former was involved in the plan.
Elizabeth, whom Emilia Antipolo alleged to be with the appellant at her house in the evening of
July 20, 1993, testified that she was also there with the appellant, CAFGUs Camilo Alipaopao, Boy
Aranilla and Eustaquio Abadia. She also heard the gunfire along with the others. She left the house
of Antipolo with the appellant at 2:00 a.m. Elizabeth also testified that she knew the victim, a
resident of Pangabuan who sometimes bought fish on the road.
Barangay Captain Rudy Matalines of Pangabuan, Tangub City, testified that the father of the victim
went to him for help when his son was killed. Rudy Matalines went to the place of the incident and
asked Edmundo whether he knew the culprit, and the latter answered in the negative. Danilo went
to his house to have his affidavit taken, where he stated that the person responsible for the killing
was Alfredo Ollanes. The affidavit was not sworn to and the barangay captain gave a copy to the
appellant.
Eutiquio Amodia corroborated the testimonies of witnesses Emilia Antipolo and Elizabeth Robillos
that the appellant was at the house of Emilio Antipolo at the time when they heard the gunfire in
the evening of July 20, 1993. When he left at about 1:00 a.m., the appellant and Elizabeth were still
there.
The appellant denied the allegations of Joven and Edmundo, reasoning that at the time of the
incident, he was in the house of Emilia Antipolo in Baybay Pangabuan, Tangub City, about one-
and-a-half kilometers away from the victim’s house. He testified that he arrived at the house of
Emilia at 8:00 p.m. to meet the fishermen and buy their catch. At 12:00 midnight, while he was still
in the house, he heard gunfire coming from the upper portion of Pangabuan. He denied having
known that the victim had impregnated Maricia Ollanes.
Daniel Sumaylo testified that Alfredo Ollanes ordered the killing of the victim and gave P100.00 for
the assignment. He conspired with Alfredo Ollanes, Federico Ollanes, Roque Ollanes, Larry Ollanes
and Rogelio Aman, Jr. to kill the victim, because the latter impregnated his cousin, Maricia Ollanes.
It was Roque Ollanes who dropped the note near the victim. Sumaylo stated that he used an
unlicensed firearm owned by Rogelio Aman, Jr. in the shooting. After the killing, he returned the
gun to Aman, Jr. The appellant was implicated because he had the same body built as Roque
Ollanes. Sumaylo gave his sworn statement to SPO3 Ramon Daomilas, Jr. in the presence of Erdie
Quinto, a minister of the Iglesia ni Kristo.
After trial, the court rendered judgment on September 19, 1995, convicting the appellant of
murder as principal and convicting Sumaylo of homicide. The decretal portion of the said
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused Cesario Montañez guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Murder, defined and penalized under Art. 248
of the Revised Penal Code and there being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance,
said accused Cesario Montañez is hereby sentenced to a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
while accused Daniel Sumaylo is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of Homicide defined and penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code, and
there being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, said accused Daniel Sumaylo is
hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from 8 years and 1 day of prision
mayor as its minimum period to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as its
maximum period.
Both accused Cesario Montañez and Daniel Sumaylo are to suffer the accessory penalties
provided by law, to solidarily and jointly indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of
P50,000.00, and to pay the costs.
They must be credited of the time according to law of the time they were under
preventive imprisonment.7
The appellant filed a motion for the reconsideration of the decision. On November 17, 1995, the
court issued an order partially granting the motion and convicting the appellant of murder, but
only as an accomplice. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, the decision dated September 19, 1995 is
hereby reconsidered and modified in the sense that accused Cesario Montañez is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an accomplice of the crime of Murder defined and
penalized under Art. 248 in relation to Art. 52 of the Revised Penal Code and he is
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from 8 years and 1 day of prision
mayor as its minimum to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as its
maximum period. All the other aspects of the penalty are hereby sustained.
SO ORDERED.8
The appellant appealed the decision, asserting that there was no proof of conspiracy between him
and Sumaylo; as such, he should be exonerated of the crime charged. Furthermore, he could not
be held criminally liable as an accomplice because there was no direct connection between his
presence at the scene of the crime and the killing of the victim.
On June 30, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment reversing the November 17, 1995
Order of the trial court and reinstating the trial court’s September 19, 1995 Decision.
Neither the appellant nor the Office of the Solicitor General filed their respective supplemental
briefs. The appellant manifested that he was adopting his brief in the Court of Appeals in the
instant appeal, where he asserted that:
47
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT CESARIO
MONTAÑEZ GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AS AN ACCOMPLICE OF THE
CRIME OF MURDER.9
The appellant contends that both the trial court and the appellate court erred in giving credence
and full probative weight to the testimonies of Edmundo and Joven. He insists that he was in the
house of Emilia Antipolo, one-and-a-half kilometers away from the house of the victim, when the
latter was shot. Besides, Sumaylo already confessed to being the sole assailant, and thereby
absolved him of any criminal liability for the victim’s death. The appellant argues that it was
illogical for the trial court to convict him of murder as an accomplice, although Sumaylo, who was
the principal by direct participation for the killing of the victim, was convicted of homicide. There
is no evidence on record that he conspired with Sumaylo in killing the victim. His mere presence at
the scene of the killing did not render him criminally liable as an accomplice.
The appellant’s submission has no merit.
We agree with the ratiocinations of the Court of Appeals in affirming the September 19, 1995
Decision of the trial court convicting the appellant of murder as principal by direct participation,
thus:
CESARIO contends that "[S]ince neither conspiracy nor unity of purpose and intention in
the commission of the crime charged on the accused-appellant was proven x x x [T]he
accused-appellant, therefore, deserves a verdict of acquittal."
The contention is without basis. The fact that CESARIO was at the scene of the crime is
established by JOVEN’s positive identification of him. Corollarily, the issue to be resolved
is the degree of his participation in the killing of JOVEN.
A reading of the prosecution’s evidence shows that CESARIO is a principal by direct
participation in the killing of PERLITO.
...
The incriminating circumstantial evidence that point to CESARIO as the perpetrator of the
crime are the following:
(1) After a shot was heard, JOVEN saw PERLITO fall to the ground and thereafter, JOVEN
saw CESARIO approached PERLITO, drop a piece of paper beside him and leave
immediately;
(2) At that time, CESARIO was seen carrying a firearm in his right arm; and
(3) A few moments later, EDMUNDO arrived and found out that PERLITO sustained a
gunshot wound in his chest. Upon inquiry, PERLITO answered, three (3) times, that it was
CESARIO who shot him. JOVEN saw them conversing but he could not hear what they
were talking about.
Since the prosecution witnesses had no motive whatsoever to falsify the truth and impute
to CESARIO the commission of so grave an offense, the foregoing circumstances cannot be
seriously disputed.
 The combination of the foregoing circumstances is sufficient to establish the guilt of
CESARIO beyond reasonable doubt.
In relation hereto, DANIEL’s testimony is given scant attention by this Court – "The
Court has held in a number of cases that a recantation of a testimony is exceedingly
unreliable, for there is always the probability that such recantation may later on be itself
repudiated. Courts look with disfavor upon retractions, because they can easily be
obtained from witnesses through intimidation or for monetary consideration.
Crime committed
CESARIO assails the logic of the trial court’s ruling on the ground that "[T]he principal
by direct participation was convicted of the lesser offense of homicide while his
accomplice in the commission of the crime, herein accused-appellant, was convicted of
the more serious crime of murder."
Murder has been defined as "the unlawful killing of any person which is not parricide or
infanticide, provided that any of the following circumstances is present: (a) With
treachery x x x"
The circumstance of treachery is attendant in the case at bar. "The killing of the deceased
is murder for the victim was not only unarmed but also deprived of every means to
defend himself from the treacherous attack. As testified by Joven Hintogaya, the victim
Perlito Ollanes was on the process of placing his push net above the door and when he
turned his side, he was shot.
Considering that treachery is present in the killing of PERLITO, the nature of the crime
committed is categorized as murder. The crime, as charged, remains notwithstanding
DANIEL’S plea of guilty to a lesser offense. That is, "where the accused is allowed to
plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether the same is or is not necessarily
included in the crime charged, no amendment of the complaint or information is
necessary." This is so because "[A] conviction under this plea shall be equivalent to a
conviction of the offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy." As stated by the
Solicitor General, "[I]t appears that in the eyes of the law, the convicted felone (sic) is still
convicted of the crime charged although he was benefited by his entering a plea of guilty
to the lesser offense."10
The conviction of the accused may be proved by the prosecution either by direct evidence or by
circumstantial evidence. As we held in People vs. Delim:11
… Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from
which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common
experience. What was once a rule of account respectability is now entombed in Section 4,
Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence which states that circumstantial evidence,
sometimes referred to as indirect or presumptive evidence, is sufficient as anchor for a
judgment of conviction if the following requisites concur:
" x x x if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived have been established; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
48
The prosecution is burdened to prove the essential events which constitute a compact
mass of circumstantial evidence, and the proof of each being confirmed by the proof of the
other, and all without exception leading by mutual support to but one conclusion: the guilt
of accused for the offense charged. For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a
conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis
that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. If the
prosecution adduced the requisite circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to
controvert the evidence of the prosecution.12
In this case, the prosecution failed to adduce direct evidence to prove that the appellant killed the
victim. However, the prosecution adduced sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove that the
culprit was the appellant, and no other.
First. Immediately after Joven and Edmundo heard the gunshot coming from the direction of
Perlito’s house, they rushed to the place and saw Perlito sprawled on the ground, mortally
wounded.
Second. The only person near Perlito was the appellant, who was holding a long firearm in his right
hand. No other person was near the victim or within the periphery of the crime scene when
Edmundo and Joven arrived.
Third. The appellant went near Perlito and dropped an unsigned note written in the Cebuano
dialect purporting to be from the BHB. The appellant then immediately left the scene.
Q When you reached, Perlito was already lying face down.
Were you bringing (sic) your flashlight?
A I was bringing (sic) a flashlight because I was not able to go upstairs.
Q What did you see beside the body of Perlito?
A A letter.
Q What was written in that letter?
A There was a treat (sic) that they will kill two more others come (sic) from HB (sic).
Q Where is that letter now?
A It is in the possession of the city fiscal.
COURT:
Show it to the witness, Fiscal.
Q Will you examine carefully this letter brought out by Fiscal Inting and tell the
Honorable Court that is this (sic) letter. Is this the one?
A This is the one.
FISCAL INTING:
Few questions, Your Honor.
 COURT:
Proceed.
FISCAL INTING:
Q How far from the body of Perlito Ollanes did you find this letter?
A Very near beside him.13
Translated in English, the note reads:
This man is not worth raising (sic), he is a garbage of society. This kind of man is not
worth to live; do not follow him (sic) because we oppose these works (sic). In this place
there are two whom we will eliminate.14
The contents of the note is self-explanatory. Its sender had the victim killed by the appellant
because of the belief that the victim was not a good member of society; hence, not fit to live.
Fourth. When Edmundo Ollanes asked his brother Perlito who shot him, Perlito replied three
times that it was the appellant. Perlito himself told his brother Edmundo that he was about to die.
In fact, the victim died on the way to the hospital.
Q Then what did you do after hearing the gun explosion coming from the direction of
the house of Perlito Ollanes?
A I ran towards their house.
Q And what did you observe when you arrived or when you were near the house of
Perlito Ollanes?
A I saw Perlito Ollanes lying with face downward.
Q What did you find on his body, if any?
A He was hit with the gun fire (sic).
Q How did you know that he was hit by the gunfire (sic)?
A I placed him in my arms.
Q How did you know that he was injured?
A I carried him in my arms because he was still alive.
Q Where did you find the injuries?
A On his breast. (Witness pointing from his breast to his stomach).
COURT:
Q Did your brother know that he was going to die because of that gunshot wound?
A Maybe he knew that he was about to die because he told me that he would die.
Q That was the time when you asked him who was responsible in shooting him?
A Yes.
Q And he answered you 3 times the name of Cesar Montañez?
A Yes.
COURT:
Proceed.
FISCAL INTING:
Q How serious was the physical condition of Perlito Ollanes when you asked him and
he answered you?
A He was uneasy.
COURT:
Q After answering you the name of Cesar Montañez, what happened to your brother,
Perlito?
A We carried him and brought him downward in order to bring him to the hospital.
Q He was still alive?
A Yes.
Q Until what point did you bring him downward?
A He died on the way.15
Perlito’s statement that it was the appellant who shot him was a dying declaration. The statement is
highly reliable, having been made in extremity when the declarant is at the point of death and
when any hope of survival is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and when the mind
is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth.16 Even if the declarant did not
make a statement that he was at the brink of death, the degree and seriousness of the words and the
fact that death superseded shortly afterwards may be considered as substantial evidence that the
declaration was made by the victim with full realization that he was in a dying condition.17

Q You said that when you placed Perlito Ollanes in your arms he was still alive, what The barefaced fact that Daniel Sumaylo pleaded guilty to the felony of homicide is not a bar to the
did you say, if any, to him? appellant being found guilty of murder as a principal. It bears stressing that Sumaylo plea-
bargained on his re-arraignment. Even if the public prosecutor and the father of the victim agreed
FISCAL INTING:
to Sumaylo’s plea, the State is not barred from prosecuting the appellant for murder on the basis of
Q (refer last). its evidence, independently of Sumaylo’s plea of guilt.
A I asked him whether he recognized the one who shot him. Neither is the appellant entitled to acquittal merely because Sumaylo confessed, after the appellant
Q And what did he answer, if any? had rested his case, to being the sole assailant. The trial court disbelieved Sumaylo’s testimony that
he alone killed the victim and that the appellant was not at all involved in the killing. The Court of
A He answered 3 times that it was Cesar Montañez.
Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. It bears stressing that when Sumaylo testified for

49
the appellant on surrebuttal, he declared that he did not know who killed the victim. He even
declared that the appellant did not kill the victim. However, he made a complete volte-facewhen he
executed an affidavit and testified that he alone killed the victim and that the appellant was not at
all involved in the killing. We are convinced that Sumaylo’s somersault was an afterthought, a
last-ditch attempt to extricate the appellant from an inevitable conviction. We agree with the
ratiocinations of the trial court, thus:
There is great doubt to the mind of the Court on the testimonies of accused Daniel
Sumaylo. He was presented as surrebuttal witness to deny the allegation of the
prosecution regarding the presence of the accused Cesario Montañez in the house of
Federico Ollanes on July 20, 1993. If it was true that he, Daniel Sumaylo, was there,
enabling him to tell whether accused Cesario Montañez was present or not, why was he
not able to give the date and time of said marriage arrangement? He did not know the
future groom and the future parents-in-law of the daughter of Federico Ollanes. He
could have, at least remembered any of the important matters about such marriage
arrangement if indeed he was there.
Accused Daniel Sumaylo’s affidavit was executed on May 14, 1994, a day after he was
presented as surrebuttal witness wherein he testified that he does not know who killed
the victim. He retracted such testimony given in Court for the reason that he was
disturbed by his conscience. However, the Court has looked with disfavor upon
retraction of testimonies previously given in Court. Recanted testimony is exceedingly
unreliable (People vs. Clamor, G.R. No. 82708, July 1, 1991, 198 SCRA 642). …18
The strategem of the appellant was evident. Sumaylo was to confess to having killed the victim,
and at the same time, absolve the appellant from any involvement in the crime. Sumaylo would
then plead guilty to the lesser felony of homicide and would be sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty. He expected to be free, after serving the minimum of his sentence. If the trial court
believed Sumaylo’s recantation, the appellant would be acquitted of the crime charged and, as a
consequence, would be set free. Unfortunately for the appellant, although the trial court allowed
Sumaylo to plead guilty to homicide and sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty, it
disbelieved the latter’s testimony exculpating the appellant.
The appellant’s strategy backfired. Instead of being content with his conviction of murder as an
accomplice, he appealed to the Court of Appeals, which found him guilty of murder as a principal
by direct participation.
On the civil liabilities of the appellant, the trial court did not award exemplary damages, contrary
to current jurisprudence.19 The decision of the trial court shall, thus, be modified.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tangub City, Branch 16, dated
September 19,1995 convicting the appellant as principal, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
The appellant Cesario Montañez is hereby directed to pay to the heirs of the victim Perlito Ollanes
the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
G.R. No. 181111, August 17, 2015
50
JACKSON PADIERNOS Y QUEJADA, JACKIE ROXAS Y GERMAN AND ROLANDO MESINA Y
JAVATE, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Jackson Padieraos y
Quejada (Padiernos), Jackie Roxas y German (Roxas) and Rolando Mesina y Javate (Mesina). The
petitioners seek the reversal of the Court of Appeals' (CA) decision1 dated May 10, 2007 and
resolution2 dated December 20, 2007 in CA-G.R. CR No. 28920. The assailed CA rulings affirmed
with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 66, Baler, Aurora in
Criminal Case No. 3122.
The petitioners were charged as accessories to the crime of illegal possession of lumber, in violation
of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705 or the Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines. According to
the Information, the petitioners took away the truck that carried the lumber to prevent its use as
evidence and to avoid its confiscation and forfeiture. The Information specifically states as follows:
That at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning on November 15, 2002, in Caragsacan, Dingalan, Aurora,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforesaid principals, confederating together
and mutually helping one another, did then and there, unlawfully, feloniously and willfully have
in their possession and control 818 pieces of lumber with a total volume of 10,253 board feet and
valued at P133,289.00 loaded on a ten-wheeler truck with Plate No. TFZ-747 and owned by the
accused Santiago Castillo y Cruz without any permit, license or documents from the proper
authority and that at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon on the following day, November 16, 2002,
the aforesaid accessories, confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and
there unlawfully, feloniously and willfully take and carry away the aforementioned ten wheeler
truck with Plate No. TFZ-747 so it could not be used as evidence and avoid confiscation and
forfeiture in favor of the government as tool or instrument of the crime, [emphasis and italics
supplied]
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Accused Santiago Castillo (Santiago), Frederico Castillo (Frederico), and Roger Mostera (Mostera)
remain at large; accused Eddie Gatdula (Gatdula) pleaded not guilty as principal to the crime;
while petitioners Padiernos, Mesina, and Roxas pleaded not guilty as accessories to the crime.
Prosecution's evidence
The presented evidence of the prosecution shows that on November 15, 2002, the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Officer (DENRO) Felimon Balico (Balico) approached a truck
loaded with lumber, which was parked at a national highway in Dingalan, Aurora (Dingalan)3 The
truck bore the name "JEROME" with Plate No. TFZ-747. Balico requested from the truck driver,
Frederico, and the truck helper, Mostera, the lumber's supporting documents but they failed to
produce any.

Balico reported the matter to SPO4 Ramil Gamboa (Gamboa) and SPO4 Romulo Derit. Thereafter,
he proceeded to the DENR office to report the incident. Some of the DENROs represented that the
transportation of the seized lumber had the required permit but they, too, failed to produce any
supporting document.
The DENRO group - composed of Balico, Tarcila Vivero (Vivero) and Rodolfo Tumagan
(Tumagan) - and the policemen, Gamboa and Romulo Derit, guarded the truck loaded with
lumber.4
The DENRO group decided to transfer the truck and the lumber to the police station at Poblacion.
They transferred the lumber first from November 15 to November 16, 2002, and left the truck at
the national highway in Dingalan, guarded by the DENROs and some police officers. 5
On November 16, 2002, accused Gatdula, Santiago, and petitioners Mesina, Roxas, and Padiernos
arrived at the place where the truck was being held in custody.6
Santiago, who claimed ownership of the truck,7 agreed with the DENROs and the police officers
to bring the truck to the police station. Santiago gave the truck key to Mesina who volunteered to
drive the truck; while Padiernos asked Balico where the seized lumbers were. 8
Mesina started the engine and Roxas, Santiago, and Padiernos immediately got on board at the
front of the truck. The DENRO group also got on board at the back of the truck. SPO2 Renato
Mendoza (Mendoza) and his companion, PO1 John Fajardo (Fajardo) follow on a motorcycle.
Since the truck was then parked opposite the direction to the police station, Balico thought that
Mesina would maneuver the truck so that they could proceed to the police station. To their
surprise, Mesina increased the truck's speed and headed towards the direction of Nueva Ecija,
leaving behind their two policemen escorts9 who chased the truck and fired three warning
shots.10
As the truck sped faster, Balico yelled "Saklolo! Saklolo!" but the truck maintained its speed. SPO2
Mendoza corroborated this testimony; he and Fajardo saw the three DENROs waving but could
not hear what they were saying.
When the truck had exited Dingalan, SPO2 Mendoza and Fajardo decided not to pursue the truck
anymore and simply reported the incident to the Philippine Army stationed at Brgy. Tanawan.
The Philippine Army blocked the road with a 50-caliber machine gun and flagged down the truck
at Brgy. Bagting, Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija.11
As the truck passengers alighted, petitioner Padiernos uttered bad words to them, saying that
51
they had no right to apprehend the truck and the lumber.12
Police officers Gamboa, Joemar Balmores, Sagudang, Fajardo, and Mendoza 13 immediately
proceeded to Brgy. Bagting where they found the DENRO group, Padiernos, and Roxas. The
DENROs and the policemen proceeded back to Dingalan, with police officer Gamboa driving the
truck to the police station compound.
Evidence for the defense
Mesina testified that on November 16, 2002, he was watching television with his wife and children
when his former employer, Santiago, arrived and asked him to bring the latter's truck to
Cabanatuan City. He refused Santiago's request because he knew that the truck had been engaged
in illegal activities; particularly, the truck had been previously loaded with lumber that were
confiscated.14
Santiago insisted and assured him that he would take care of everything and that there was really
no problem with the truck. Mesina finally agreed and rode in Santiago's car. Santiago asked him to
fetch Roxas to accompany them.15
Roxas was resting in his house when Santiago and Mesina arrived. Santiago asked Roxas if he
could drive his truck to Cabanatuan City.16 Roxas refused because he had already heard of the
truck's apprehension,17 but he finally relented after Santiago assured him that there was no
problem with the truck. They proceeded to Caragsacan, Dingalan where the truck was
parked.18 On cross-examination, Roxas testified that he knew very well that the vehicle was a "hot"
truck but he relied on Santiago's claim that the problem already been settled.19
On their way to Caragsacan, Dingalan, they saw Padiernos at the waiting shed of Aplayang Malaki,
Dingalan.20 According to Padiernos, he had been waiting for a ride to Cabanatuan City from 12:30
to 1:30 p.m. but only Santiago's group came by.21 Padiernos hitched a ride with them after learning
that they would bring Santiago's truck to Cabanatuan City. 22
Padiernos testified that he only learned where the truck was parked when they reached
Caragsacan.23
On reaching the place where the truck was parked, they all alighted from the car and walked
towards the back of the truck; Padiernos crossed the street. Mesina saw Santiago talk to DENRO
Tumagan and several other persons for about 25 to 30 minutes. 24
Thereafter, Santiago handed the truck keys to Mesina.25 Padiernos seated himself in the front cab of
the truck with Santiago and Roxas, while Mesina took the driver's seat.26 Mesina drove the car
towards Cabanatuan City upon Santiago's instruction. 27
The petitioners unanimously testified that they did not hear people shouting or tapping on the
28
truck to stop them. They also did not notice any motorcycle following them as the truck's side
mirrors were broken. They did not reach Cabanatuan City because the Philippine Army flagged
them down.29
After the incident, Padiernos boarded a jeepney bound for Cabanatuan City while Roxas and
Mesina boarded a jeepney bound for Dingalan.30
The RTC's ruling
The RTC convicted petitioners Padiernos, Mesina and Roxas as accessories to the crime of
violation of P.D. 705.31
The RTC ruled that the petitioners had a common design to take away the truck that earlier had
been used in violating P.D. No. 705 or the Forestry Reform Code. 32
The RTC found that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were categorical,
straightforward, and consistent; they had no improper motive to testify falsely against the
petitioners.33 Thus, the RTC disregarded the petitioners' defense that they did not intentionally
take away the truck.34
The RTC also found that the petitioners' testimonies and admissions established their prior
knowledge that the truck had been previously confiscated for illegal transport of forest products.
This explains the reluctance of Mesina and Roxas to go with Santiago in getting the truck. 35
The RTC further ruled that Padiernos' defense of denial fails in view of Balico's testimony that
Padiernos gave the DENROs a "tongue-lashing" as they had no right to apprehend the truck and
its cargo.36 Padiernos' knowledge of the status of the truck is also undeniable as he admitted his
familiarity with the townsfolk of Dingalan and its rampant problem of illegal transport of forest
products. The RTC concluded that the incident and the personalities involved could not have
escaped Padiernos' notice, yet he still went with them to get the truck. 37
Finally, the RTC disregarded the petitioners' claim that they did not hear the policemen's warning
shots and the DENROs' shouts because of the noisy engine and the defective windows of the
truck. The RTC had observed during its ocular inspection of the truck that both windows were in
order and sounds outside could be clearly heard even with a running engine. 38
The CA's ruling
The CA affirmed the RTC's decision and adopted its factual findings, but modified the penalty
imposed on the petitioners.39
52
The CA considered the subject truck as an "instrument" in the commission of the offense, within the
meaning of Article 19, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). While the lumber had already
been unloaded and placed in police custody, the truck still served as the essential link to the
discovery of the loaded undocumented lumber. Similarly, its presentation as evidence is material in
proving the commission of the offense of violation of P.D. 705, as amended. 40
The CA added that since the petitioners' violation of P.D. 705 is mala prohibita, their intent, motive,
or knowledge need not be shown. Nevertheless, their defense of denial must fail in view of the
evidence on record and their own admissions that they were aware of the truck's involvement in an
illegal activity at the time that they drove it towards Nueva Ecija.41
The prosecution had also clearly established Padiernos's close association with Santiago, Roxas, and
Mesina. Padiernos previously facilitated Santiago's application for mayor's permit as a lumber
dealer; Roxas is a family friend of Padiernos and his father is Padiernos's driver, while Mesina and
Padiernos' are long-time acquaintances.42
The Parties' Arguments
The petitioners argue that they could not be held liable as accessories for violation of P.D. 705
because the DENROs and the police authorities had already discovered the crime and had, in fact,
control over the truck when the petitioners drove it towards Nueva Ecija. 43 Article 19 of the RPC
only punishes accessories who prevent the discovery of the crime.44
On the other hand, the respondent maintains that the petitioners' acts were aimed at preventing the
discovery of the crime. The respondent alleges that without the truck, the accused in the present
case could easily produce the necessary transportation documents to account for the entire volume
of the confiscated lumber.45 The respondent refers to the testimony of James Martinez of CENRO
Dingalan who tried to make it appear that the seized lumber had the proper transportation permit
for 8,254 board feet and 261 pieces of lumber. This transportation permit did not tally, however,
with the actual volume of the confiscated lumber of 10,253 board feet, totaling 818 pieces. 46
The Court's Ruling
We emphasize at the outset the well-settled doctrine that an appeal throws the whole case wide
open for review. An appeal therefore empowers, and even obligates, the appellate court to correct
errors as may be found in the appealed judgment even if these errors have not been raised. It is
likewise settled that when an accused appeals, he opens the whole case for a new trial. 47
The Court is therefore not precluded from determining the correct criminal liability of the
appealing accused, and from imposing the corresponding punishment in accordance with the
charges in the Information and the crime proved during trial.
Thus, in People v. Manalili et al.,48 the Court held that since the Information in that case contained
a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessarily constituting both the crimes of
illegal possession of firearms and of murder, the separate crime of multiple murder may be
validly taken into account49 in the resolution of the appeal before the Court, although the
appellants have been acquitted of illegal possession of firearms. The Court ruled that the
appellants in that case were fairly apprised of the nature of the crime of multiple murder and
granted a fair opportunity to defend themselves.
Even with this premise, we find that insofar as the petitioners are concerned, the facts alleged in
the Information and the crime proved in the present case do not make the petitioners liable as
accessories for violation of P.D. 705. They are, however, liable for violation of Section 1(b) of P.D.
1829.
The petitioners are not liable as accessories to the crime
The well-settled doctrine is that the allegations in the Information determine the nature of the
offense, and not the technical name that the public prosecutor assigns in the preamble of the
Information. From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, the accused is not concerned
with the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a
defense on the merits. His attention should be directed and his interest should be on the facts
alleged. The real question is not "did he commit a crime given in the law with some technical and
specific name," but "did he perform the actsalleged in the body of the information in the manner
therein set forth."50
In the present case, the Information charges the petitioners of committing the following acts:
xxx the aforesaid accessories, confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then
and there unlawfully, feloniously and willfully take and carry away the aforementioned ten
wheeler truck with Plate No. TFZ-747 so it could not be used as evidence and avoid confiscation
and forfeiture in favor of the government as tool or instrument of the crime.
Applying the doctrine, the controlling charge against the petitioners is not the allegation that they
were accessories to the crime, which is merely the public prosecutor's conclusion of law or the
technical name of an accused's criminal participation under Article 19 of the RPC, but the factual
charges against them. In short, their alleged acts control in defining the crime for which they
should stand trial.
These material factual allegations pertain to their act of conspiring with each other to take and
carry away the subject truck so that it could not be used as evidence and to avoid its confiscation
and forfeiture in favor of the government as tool or instrument of the crime. Notably, the
petitioners had been sufficiently apprised of these factual allegations, against which they should
defend themselves.
Reading the facts alleged in the Information and proved at the trial, in relation with the legal
53
definition of "accessories" under Article 19 of the RPC, we find that the RTC and the CA erred in
convicting the accused as accessories to the crime of violation of P.D. 705.
Article 19, paragraph 251 defines "accessories" as those who, with knowledge of the commission of
the crime and without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part
subsequent to its commission by concealing or destroying the body of the crime, its effects or
instruments, in order to prevent its discovery.
Under this provision, the punished acts should have been committed for the purpose of preventing
the discovery of the crime.52
In the present case, the crime punishable under P.D. 705 - the illegal possession of lumber - had
already been discovered at the time the petitioners took the truck. This discovery led to the
confiscation of the truck and the loaded lumber on November 15, 2002. The petitioners took the
truck on November 16, 2002, after its confiscation.
In these lights, the petitioners are not liable as accessories to the crime charged in the Information
as the legal definition of the technical term "accessories" does not coincide with the factual
allegations in the Information that serves as the actual criminal charge against the petitioners.
The factual allegations in the Information constitute the crime of obstruction of justice under
Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829
The petitioners, however, cannot go scot-free. The factual allegations in the Information, while not
constituting an offense committed by accessories under Article 19, paragraph 2 of the RPC,
constitute instead the criminal offense of obstruction of justice, which is defined under Section 1(b)
of P.D. No. 1829 entitled "Penalizing Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal
Offenders."
P.D. 1829 addresses the necessity of penalizing acts which obstruct or frustrate or tend to obstruct
or frustrate the successful apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders.
Under Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829, the crime of obstruction of justice is committed through the
following acts:
Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to
6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs,
impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of
criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
(b) altering, destroying, suppressing or concealing any paper, record, document, or object, with
intent to impair its verity, authenticity, legibility, availability, or admissibility as evidence in any
investigation of or official proceedings in criminal cases, or to be used in the investigation of, or
official proceedings in criminal cases; xxx" [emphasis supplied]
The factual allegations in the Information, as duly proved during trial, show that the petitioners'
acts actually constituted a violation of Section 1(b) above.
First, the Information duly alleges all the essential elements of the crime of obstruction of justice
under Section 1(b).
The factual allegations in the Information clearly charge the accused of taking and carrying away
the truck so that it could not be used as evidence and to avoid its confiscation and forfeiture in
favor of the government as a tool or instrument of the crime.
In the present case, the truck that carried the undocumented lumber serves as material evidence
that is indispensable in the criminal investigation and prosecution for violation of P.D. 705.
Particularly, the truck is an indispensable link to the persons involved in the illegal
possession/transportation of the seized lumber as the permit for the transportation of the lumber
necessarily involves the truck and the lumber. According to DENR forest ranger Rogelio
53
Pajimna, the transport of lumber should be covered with supporting documents that should be
in the possession of the transporter.
Second, the petitioners deliberately took the truck or "suppressed" this particular evidence. The
term "suppress" means to subdue or end by force. 54
Specifically, the petitioners intentionally suppressed the truck as evidence, with the intent to
impair its availability and prevent its use as evidence in the criminal investigation or proceeding
for violation of P.D. 705. This intent was duly proved during trial.
It is undisputed that Santiago owns the truck, which serves as his link to the illegal
possession/transport of the seized lumber. Santiago had every reason and motive to take his truck
after its confiscation. Without the truck, Santiago could be exculpated and the forthcoming
criminal investigation or proceedings for violation of P.D. 705 would be frustrated.
The petitioners' intent to take and carry away the truck is established by their knowledge of the
status of the truck and their commission of the crime at Santiago's prompting.
Notably, both the RTC and the CA correctly considered the testimonies of the witnesses and the
petitioners' admissions in ruling that the petitioners knew that the truck had been involved in the
illegal transportation/possession of the seized lumber.
Mesina admitted that he knew the truck's involvement in illegal activities as it had
beenpreviously loaded with lumber that was confiscated.
According to Mesina, Roxas also initially refused to go with them because he already heard the
54
news of the truck's apprehension. Roxas admitted that he only agreed to join Santiago and
Mesina, after being assured that there was no problem with the truck.
Padiernos' demeanor after the army flagged them down establishes his knowledge of the truck's
involvement with the seized lumber. Padiernos uttered bad words at the DENROs, saying they had
no right to apprehend the truck and the lumber. This testimony, together with his close association
with the other petitioners, destroys his flimsy defense of denial.
The RTC's findings during its ocular inspection of the truck also prove that the petitioners
deliberately drove the truck to Nueva Ecija despite evident knowledge of the policemen's warning
shots, tapping, and the DENROs shouting for help from the back of the truck.
Clearly, these testimonies, the petitioners' admissions, and the findings of the trial court negate the
petitioners' defense of denial of their intent to take the truck and their knowledge of the truck's
involvement in an illegal activity.
The unanimous factual findings of the RTC and the CA - such as the petitioners' close association
with each other, their flimsy defense of denial of their intent to take away the truck, and the totality
of their acts showing their common design to take the truck - lead us to conclude that the
petitioners had indeed mutually conspired with one another to take away the truck to suppress it
from being used as evidence in the criminal investigation or proceeding for violation of P.D. 705.
Since the crime charged in the Information and the crime proved during trial point to the
petitioners' violation of P.D. 1829, we reverse the CA's findings and find the petitioners guilty of
Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829.
Under Section 1 of the same law, the penalty for the crime of obstruction of justice is prision
correccionalin its maximum period, or a fine ranging from P1,000.00 to P6,000.00 pesos, or
both.55chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and REVERSE the Court of Appeals' decision dated May
10, 2007, and its resolution dated December 20, 2007. We find petitioners Jackson Padiernos y
Quejada, Jackie Roxas y German, and Rolando Mesina y Javate GUILTY for violation of Section 1(b)
of P.D. 1829. They are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of prision correccional for 4 years, 9
months, and 11 days to 5 years, 4 months, and 20 days.
SO ORDERED.