Guest Editorial:

CRM: FROM THE INSTRUCTOR VIEWPOINT

By Robert Baron

In my years of being a flight, ground, and simulator instructor in high performance jets, I have had
the pleasure of observing a plethora of behaviors in the area of Crew Resource Management.
Additionally, as a CRM facilitator, I sometimes have access to the stories and confessions that some
pilots are willing to share in a casual, relaxed setting. That said, I wanted to share some observations
and recommendations for any person making an attempt to enhance their CRM skills.
A brief history of CRM might be appropriate. One of the most clear cut examples of a human
factors error occurred in 1972, when Eastern Flight 401 gradually descended into the Everglades as
all three crewmembers became fixated on a landing light indication and the autopilot became
disengaged. Other notable human factors-related accidents included United Airlines Flight 171
simply running out of fuel over Portland, Oregon in 1978. Nobody was paying attention! In 1982,
Air Florida Flight 90 was not properly de-iced and crashed shortly after takeoff from Washington,
DC. Contributing to this accident was the flight crew’s disregard for standard operating procedures.
In 1985, Delta Flight 191 was caught in an unreported wind shear on final approach to the
Dallas/Fort Worth Airport.
Crew Resource management, formerly known as Cockpit Resource Management, has its roots
at United Airlines, where in 1980, a formal training program was set up to concentrate on the human
factor in aviation. Airlines were noticing that although pilots were technically competent, their
people skills were deficient. In other words, the captain could fly a perfect ILS approach, but could
not work in a synergistic environment to effectively accomplish tasks. This can create a potentially
dangerous and antagonistic situation. CRM, amongst other things, teaches pilots how to improve
communication, prioritize tasks, delegate authority, and monitor automated equipment. Prior to
United’s program, the mentality in the business was “the captain is God, and what he says goes.”
Thankfully, we have long thrown that thinking out the door! United’s program is now called C/L/R
(Command/Leadership/Resource Management). Other airlines have followed suit and CRM is now
required training for all Part 121 (airline) operations. For all other operations, CRM is a prudent
supplement to normal training.
 When I am instructing students in the Learjet, I put a heavy emphasis on CRM and working
together as a crew. Many instructors, particularly less experienced ones, simply train the maneuvers
in order to pass the check ride. My approach focuses not only how to perform the maneuver to FAA
Practical Test Standards, but also how to perform the maneuver as a team. Occasionally, I need to
remind the students that the Learjet is certified as a two-pilot aircraft. I expect it to be flown that
way!
To illustrate this point, let’s say we are going to do steep turns. If the PF (Pilot Flying) does not
try to tap the help of the PNF (Pilot Not Flying), a relatively simple maneuver like steep turns can
become a nightmare. A good PNF, making the right callouts, can make the PF’s life a lot easier!
What kind of callouts are we talking about? Altitude and airspeed deviations for one. If the
maneuver is to be done at 10,000 feet and 250 knots, the PNF is in a great position to monitor and
make the necessary callouts to keep the PF on track. Bank angle is also important. Bank angle for
steep turns is usually 45º. The PF should make callouts when there are significant deviations here as
well. The FAA Practical Test Standards book will point out exactly how much tolerance is acceptable
based on the rating sought, and should be used as a guideline for standard callouts. Another nice
callout is the 90º, 30º, 20º and 10º rollout headings for your starting heading (that you had previously
bugged). The PF may also have the PNF make minor power changes to adjust airspeed. This is
perfectly acceptable!
The point is, even on a simple training maneuver, the use of all available resources (i.e.; PNF)
can be a huge benefit. Many pilots, however, have little or no experience in CRM or cockpit
management. Or, perhaps they are getting into their first two-pilot flight deck. When they come for
training, to paraphrase an earlier statement, most are technically competent, but their people skills
are deficient. Let’s take a look at some recurring CRM behaviors I have observed and analyze their
outcomes. To keep the size of this paper manageable, I will only highlight examples from three
different task areas. These will include the takeoff briefing, in-flight emergencies, and a normal ILS
approach to a missed approach.
 THE TAKEOFF BRIEFING

The takeoff briefing is one of the most important briefings during the course of a flight. Yet, I
have seen a multitude of problems in this area. My philosophy is “fly as you brief and brief as you
fly.” This just means that you are going to do what you said you would do. As an example, I have
listened to captains give a wonderful, detailed, and illustrious briefing that sounded something like
this:

“This will be a standard flaps 8 departure, fly runway heading to 3000 feet. I’ll have you set power
on my command. Call out Power Set, Airspeed Alive, 80 Knots Crosscheck, V1, Rotate, Positive
Rate, Gear Up, Yaw Damper Engaged. Any malfunctions below 80 Knots we will abort the takeoff.
Between 80 knots and V1, we will only abort for engine failure, engine fire, catastrophic failure, or
loss of directional control. I will call the abort and have you deploy the drag chute OR arm the thrust
reversers on my command. Any malfunctions after V1, we will continue the takeoff, climb to 1500
feet, and treat it as an in-flight emergency, going to the appropriate checklist once we reach a safe
altitude, clear of obstacles, and stabilized. We will return to Runway 9L. Any questions?”

Sounds good to me! But guess what? 75% of the time that wonderful briefing is thrown out the
door and the abort or takeoff procedure is deficient. Many times the event terminates as running off
the end of the runway, or becoming airborne and crashing after an engine failure at V1. Yes,
adhering to your takeoff briefing is THAT important!
Although this takeoff briefing is typical for the Learjet, other aircraft will be very similar. I will
break down the takeoff briefing into subparts and analyze each separately:

 FLAPS 8 DEPARTURE: Not verifying flap position. I have seen flaps either not being
selected at all, or takeoffs with full flaps (usually after a landing).
 FLY RUNWAY HEADING TO 3000 FEET: Normally, this is not a problem. However, I
have observed significant course deviations after a V1 cut because they PF had a hard time
“keeping it under control.” Just because you are flying on a single engine, you are not
relieved of your ATC clearance. And why is the PF not making a significant deviation callout
 before it gets to 40º? A 40º course deviation is NOT acceptable because you’ve lost an
engine. If you don’t believe me, try it on a check ride !
 80 KNOTS CROSSCHECK: What are we crosschecking? The primary purpose of this
callout is to verify that both airspeed indicators are alive and indicating approximately the
same speed. This is done by the PNF, since the PF has his head out the window during the
takeoff roll. What amazes me is how many times I have failed the PF’s airspeed indicator to
0, and the PNF has made the callout “80 knots crosschecked!”
 BETWEEN 80 KNOTS AND V1, WE WILL ONLY ABORT FOR ENGINE FAILURE,
ENGINE FIRE, CATASTROPHIC FAILURE, OR LOSS OF DIRECTIONAL
CONTROL: Such a critical part of the brief, yet, in the scheme of things, I’ve seen quite a
variety of deviations. There is a good reason we don’t abort for “non-critical items” above 80
knots, particularly if your runway is on the shorter side. The risk of running off the end of the
runway is most likely going to be greater than the problems we have to deal with after
takeoff for a single GEN (generator) light. The same is true for an illumination of the ALC AI
(alcohol anti-ice) light at high speeds. Would you really want to abort a takeoff for this? On
the other side of the coin, I have seen pilots lose an engine well before V1 and continue the
takeoff! Didn’t we brief that that was one of the high-speed abort scenarios? The point is, this
is a very critical area and pilots need to make sure that they execute the plan exactly as it was
briefed.
 THE ABORT CALLOUT: The actual ABORT callout itself is another area worth
mentioning. Once again, in the PF’s takeoff briefing (which may delegate the ABORT callout
to the PNF), I have seen too many pilots perform an aborted takeoff but failed to make the
ABORT callout! (this callout should actually be made three times, ABORT, ABORT,
ABORT). Let’s say the PF decides to ABORT for an engine failure. He is the first one to
notice it and decides to reject the takeoff. The PNF, doing his duties inside the cockpit, has no
idea what is happening. He is simply along for the ride. If the PF had actually called the
ABORT, the PNF would have known what was expected of him, since that was part of the
takeoff briefing! Maybe the PNF was supposed to deploy the drag chute or arm the thrust
reversers on the ABORT callout, but since there was no callout, he had no clue as to what
was going on. I think you get my point.
  ANY MALFUNCTIONS AFTER V1, WE WILL CONTINUE THE TAKEOFF, CLIMB TO
1500 FEET, AND TREAT IT AS AN IN-FLIGHT EMERGENCY, GOING TO THE
APPROPRIATE CHECKLIST ONCE WE REACH A SAFE ALTITUDE, CLEAR OF
OBSTACLES, AND STABILIZED: after V1, we are dedicated to go flying, whether we like
it or not! Even though V1 is referred to as “takeoff decision speed,” our decision has been
made for us. That is why we are gently (sometimes not so gently) reminded to remove our
hand from the throttle when the V1 callout is made. Occasionally, I see a pilot decide to
ABORT after V1. As you may have guessed, their logic is that they have a long runway. And
although a 10,000-foot runway may physically give you that comfort, legally we need to
follow the rules, regardless of runway length. The second part of this problem lies in what
should (or shouldn’t be done) during our climb to a “safe altitude, clear of obstacles, and
stabilized.” There is a huge amount of ambiguity here and here lies an area that can turn ugly,
fast! Let’s break this down further:

WHAT SHOULD BE DONE (below 1500 feet)

1. FLY THE AIRPLANE
2. FLY THE AIRPLANE
3. SEE #1AND #2
4. Perform checklist MEMORY items, (if applicable).
5. Contact ATC only to let them know you have a problem and you will need to maintain “runway
heading and 1500 feet” (or a safe altitude). This should be done just to alert ATC of your problem
and so they can adjust traffic accordingly. Until you figure out what is wrong, you should hold off on
declaring an emergency. You need to climb to a safe altitude first, get stabilized, retract the flaps, and
then analyze the situation. You may very well have a true emergency, but declaring it at 300 feet agl
(above ground level) is only going to saturate the PNF with excessive radio inquiries.

WHAT SHOULD NOT BE DONE (below 1500 feet)

1. Reading checklists (other than MEMORY items, if applicable).
2. Address the problem (other than what’s required to maintain aircraft control, you should not be
resetting switches, pulling back throttles, pulling FIRE T-HANDLES, etc.).
3. Having long conversations with ATC.
4. Fuel jettisoning
 Actually, this list could go on and on, but I think you get the point! Just fly the airplane until
you are at a safe altitude and clear of obstacles. If you have figured out that I have seen many things
that should not have been done at a particular time, you are absolutely correct! I have been in many
crashes (albeit virtual, thankfully) because the PF wanted to do everything right after an engine
failure on takeoff; talk on the radio, pull the FIRE T-HANDLE, jettison fuel, etc. Not only is this
ANTI-CRM, and not standard operating procedure, but there tends to be a reversion to single-pilot
tendencies when all hell breaks loose as well!

THE IN-FLIGHT EMERGENCY

Let’s start this topic by mentioning some of the interesting things I have observed in the
simulator. One of the biggest psychological lessons that I teach is what I call the “see what you want
to see syndrome.” The idea of seeing what you want to see in an airplane cockpit is very real! To cite
a couple of examples, let me give you two of my favorite scenarios:

SCENARIO #1 (GEAR ELECTRICAL FAILURE)

On the takeoff roll, I give a Landing Gear Electrical Failure, so when the PF calls for “gear up,”
the gear actually remains down and locked! After the PNF makes the call “positive rate,” the PF
calls for “gear up,” and the PNF gladly puts the gear handle in the up position and hastily calls
“gear up.” A few minutes later, the PF calls for the After Takeoff Checklist, which includes Landing
Gear-UP. The PNF responds that the gear is up! What’s wrong here? When the PNF is first instructed
to bring the gear up, he does. And just because the gear HANDLE is in the UP position, he sees what
he wants to see, even though there is a loud rumbling noise and the aircraft will not accelerate like
normal, not to mention that there are THREE GREEN DOWN AND LOCKED GEAR LIGHTS
ILLUMINATED IN FRONT OF HIM! I would say that approximately 80% of the pilots I train fall
victim to this “trap.” And not surprisingly, I often get both the PF and PNF together on this one!
 SCENARIO #2 (NOT CHECKING CIRCUIT BREAKERS/GAUGES)

This is another one of my favorites in the “see what you want to see” department! During the
approach checklist, we are supposed to check circuit breakers on both the pilot and co-pilot side
panels. What gets me here is that most pilots say “breakers in on my side” and DON’T EVEN LOOK
AT THE PANEL! Or, they simply run their hands over a couple of rows and say they are all in! Why?
Because they are assuming all the breakers are in because they have never had one popped out.
Guess what the instructor does when he sees this behavior? You got it. One of those breakers that
they “missed” is now popped and guess what that breaker protects? It might just be the landing gear,
but it definitely won’t be the COFFEE MACHINE!
The same holds true for pressure gauges. When you check the air, oxygen, and hydraulic pressure
gauges, make sure you’re really seeing what they read, rather than what you expect them to read.

Although these things may seem minor at first, they can easily become factors in the “error
chain” later. My advice is to always scan your panels. Every few minutes, take a good look at what’s
going on. Are the pressures good? Are there any popped circuit breakers? Are there any annunciator
lights illuminated? Let’s face it, most of the time there is not much to do during the enroute-phase.
Take a look around once in a while…you may be preventing some surprises during a critical phase
of the flight!
Let’s start the actual topic of in-flight emergencies with a real case study that I observed a few
years back:
 DC POWER FAILURE/SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

I had two fully qualified Learjet pilots in the simulator for recurrent training. During the training
period, I gave them a dual GEN (generator) failure. This situation is considered an EMERGENCY
because the only source of DC power is from the ship’s batteries (which will supply backup power for
only 30 minutes in this case). Because the batteries should keep everything energized after a dual
generator failure, it is not the kind of emergency that is “in your face.” Rather, we need to pick up on
visual clues. One visual clue will be the DC voltmeter indicating battery voltage. But a much bigger
clue would be the two bright amber GEN lights illuminated on the annunciator panel! Coupled with
the fact that the simulator is set up for night visuals, those amber lights are really an attention getter!
Well, guess what? Neither pilot even realized that they had a dual generator failure for 15 minutes!
Now you can understand the importance of scanning your cockpit once in a while. The inattention by
these pilots eventually caused the ship’s batteries to become depleted and they had to fly the aircraft
only by reference to the little emergency “peanut gyro” with no navigation capabilities, and in IMC
(Instrument Meteorological Conditions). That was not fun!

IN FLIGHT EMERGENCIES CHECKLISTS CRM

This is an integrated topic since any abnormal/emergency scenario can yield the same disastrous
results. When dealing with an in-flight emergency, the number 1 priority is….FLY THE
AIRPLANE! This is a two-pilot crew, and nowhere else is CRM more important than during high-
workload and/or emergency situations. Why does the captain (typically the PF) during an
emergency, resort to being a single pilot? Maybe because he feels that the co-pilot (PNF) can’t
handle the situation. Maybe because if he does everything himself it “will be done right,” or perhaps
he just has not had any real CRM training and this is his mindset. To make things even worse, I have
seen captains completely disregard a checklist and just start troubleshooting problems from
“experience.” Remember, in order to legally fly the airplane, both pilots must have a certain amount
of systems and emergency procedures training within the preceding 12 months. Therefore, both
pilots should be qualified to solve just about any problem that arises (in rare cases, you may be test
pilots. Just ask Capt. Al Haynes from United Airlines!)
So then, what is impressive CRM in this situation? In a nutshell, one pilot needs to be flying the
airplane, while the other pilot performs the checklist procedures and talks on the radio. Tasks can be
delegated, but generally this is the format. Believe me, each pilot will have their work cut out for
them! Use of challenge and response checklist procedures is recommended. Also, make sure if you
are using multiple checklists, and you have items that still need to be accomplished, use a sticky to
remind yourself to come back to that checklist. At certain times, there may be three or four checklists
being run concurrently.

THE NORMAL ILS APPROACH TO A MISSED APPROACH

The final area I wanted to cover deals with a “normal” ILS approach to a missed approach. In
this case “normal” means we have two operating engines, versus a single- engine approach. This
scenario can also apply to a single-engine approach. The following case illustrates an ongoing
problem:

THE PERFECT APPROACH---A DISASTROUS ARRIVAL

The flight crew sets up and briefs the ILS approach. The weather is reported as 200 overcast and ½
mile visibility (minimums). The PNF performs the APPROACH checklist, and the PF shoots a picture
perfect ILS! Both needles are crossed right down to Decision Height! And then…they crash! What
happened? At Decision Height, the PNF called “lights in sight,” the PF looks up away from his
instruments and sees nothing but an array of white flashing lights. He gets vertigo (spatial
disorientation), loses control of the aircraft, and balls it up in the approach light array.

ON LOW VIS APPROACHES, I CANNOT STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF “STAYING ON

THE GAUGES” UNTIL THE PNF CALLS RUNWAY IN SIGHT! This applies to the real aircraft
as much as it applies to the simulator. If the PF transitions from the instruments to the outside
without the actual runway in sight, there is a good chance he will become disoriented. I have seen
this happen over and over again in the simulator and it either ends as a crash or a missed approach!
To preclude this from happening, I highly recommend that the PF waits until the PNF calls out
“RUNWAY IN SIGHT, ? CLOCK POSITION” before going visual.
On the Missed Approach, there are also problems lurking. First and foremost, there is a saying
that I want to reiterate: Always treat a takeoff as if you are going to lose an engine, and always
think your approach will be a missed approach! This is pretty good advice, considering it keeps
your thought logic a few steps ahead (mental preparedness). That said, it amazes me how many
times I’ve observed a pilot having to “go missed” and just losing control (with no emergency or
abnormal problems!).
Remember, at Decision Height, one of two things will happen: We are either going to continue
the approach to land (barring loss of visual clues or not in a position to land without aerobatic
maneuvers), or we are going to execute a missed approach. Good CRM and communication between
the crew at this critical phase is absolutely necessary!
Standard callouts are another weak area. The importance of making callouts during the
approach cannot be overemphasized. Although many operators have their own Standard Operating
Procedures on what should be called out and when, the important part is that the callouts are actually
being made. The callouts should be helpful and timely, but not overdone. I have seen many PNF’s
try to really impress the PF by making callouts every second! This just becomes a distraction to the
PF.

THE CONCLUSION

Hopefully, I have provided some insight into the real-life world of Crew Resource
Management. Obviously, this is only the tip of the iceberg in my numerous observations. There is no
place for a single-pilot operation in a two-pilot aircraft!
CRM is no longer just for the “121 guys.” Any flight operation, Part 91 or Part 135, can benefit
from a formal CRM training program