PRESIDENCY UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TOPIC : CONSTRUCTION EJUSDEM GENERIS

SUBJECT : INTERPERTATION OF SATUTES

SUBMITTED BY SUBMITTED TO

DIVYASHREE PROF. DEVI PRABHA MA’AM

2016BCLOO3 SCHOOL OF LAW

7TH SEM

BCOMLLB
 CONSTRUCTION EJUSDEM GENERIS

INTRODUCTION

There are are certain general principles of interpretation which has been applied by the courts
from time to time. And one of them viz. Construction Ejusdem Generis has been explained
herein below. Ejusdem Generis is a Latin term which means "of the same kind," it is used to
interpret loosely written statutes. Where a law lists specific classes of persons or things and
then refers to them in general, the general statements only apply to the same kind of persons or
things specifically listed.

Example: if a law refers to automobiles, trucks, tractors, motorcycles and other motor-powered
vehicles, "vehicles" would not include airplanes, since the list was of land-based transportation.
The term Ejusdem Generis in other words means words of a similar class. The rule is that where
particular words have a common characteristic (i.e. of a class) any general words that follow
should be construed as referring generally to that class; no wider construction should be
afforded.

Construction Ejusdem Generis

According to the Black's Law Dictionary (8th edition, 2004) the principle of Ejusdem
Generis is where general words follow an
enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general
words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to
persons or things of the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned. it is a
canon of statutory construction, where general words follow the enumeration of particular
classes of things, the general words will be construed as applying only to things of the same
general class as those enumerated.

The expression Ejusdem Generis means of the same kind. Normally, general words should be
given their natural meaning like all other words unless the context requires otherwise. But
when a general word follows specific words of a distinct category, the general word may be
given a restricted meaning of the same category. The general expression takes it's meaning
from the preceding particular expressions because the legislature by using the particular
words of a distinct genus has shown its intention to that effect. This principle is limited in its
application to general word following less general word only. If the specific words do not
belong to a distinct. Genus, this rule is inapplicable. Consequently, if a general word follows
only one particular word, that single particular word does not constitute a distinct genus and,
therefore, Ejusdem Generis rule cannot be applied in such a case. Exceptional stray instances
are, however, available where one word genus has been created by the courts and the general
word following such a genus given a restricted meaning. If the particular words exhaust the
whole genus, the general word following these particular words is construed as embracing a
larger genus. The principle of Ejusdem Generis is not a universal application. If the context
of legislation rules out the applicability of this rule, it has no part to play in the interpretation
of general words. The basis of the principle of Ejusdem Generis is that if the legislature
intended general words to be used in unrestricted sense, it would not have bothered to use
particular words at all.

CASE LAWS

In Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan, the validity of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and
Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952 was impugned. One of the tenures was known as Bhomichar tenure
and it was contended that its holders were not jagirdars. It was held: We agree with the petitioners
that a jagir can be created only by a grant, and that if it is established that Bhomichara tenure is not
held under a grant, it cannot be classed as a jagir. We do not base this conclusion on the ground put
forward that the word 'Jagir' in Article 31-A of the Constitution should be read Ejusdem Generis with
'other similar grants', because, the true scope of the rule of 'Ejusdem Generis' is that words of a
general nature following specific and particular words should be
construed as limited to things which are of the same nature as those specified and not its reverse,
that specific words which precede are controlled by the general words which follow.

In State of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan, the question was whether the appellant was entitled under
Section 6(4)(a) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, to requisition, as for a public purpose,
premises for housing a member of a foreign consulate. The sub-section provided that the State
Government may requisition for the purpose of a State or any other public purpose . . .. The High
Court held that the words 'any other purpose' should be read' Ejusdem Generis' with the purpose of
the State that accommodation for a member of the foreign consulate staff is a 'purpose of the
Union' and hence the State Government was not entitled to requisition. Allowing the appeal, the
Supreme Court held: With great respect, we are constrained to say that the 'Ejusdem Generis' rule of
construction, which found favour in the court below for reaching the result that the words 'any
other public purpose' are restricted to a public purpose which is also a purpose of the State, has
scarcely any application. Apart from the fact that the rule must be confined within narrow limits, and
general or comprehensive words should receive their full and natural meaning unless they are
clearly restrictive in their intendment, it is requisite that there must be a distinct genus, which must
comprise more than one species, before the rule can be applied.

In Lilavati Bai v. Bombay State, the petitioner was the widow of a tenant of certain premises and she
had vacated from such premises. Finding the premises vacant, the respondent requisitioned the
premises under Section 6(4)(a) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, for the public purpose of
housing a government servant. One of the contentions of the petitioner was that under the
Explanation to the sub-section there would be deemed to be a vacancy when the tenant 'ceases to
be in occupation upon termination of his tenancy, eviction or assignment or transfer in any other
manner of his interest in the premises or otherwise', and that the words 'or otherwise' should be
construed as Ejusdem Generis with the words immediately preceding them. It was held:

the rule Ejusdem Generis sought to be expressed in aid of the petitioner can possibly have no
application. The legislature, when it used the words 'or otherwise', apparently intended to cover
other cases which may not come within the meaning of the preceding clauses, for example, a case
where the tenant's occupation has ceased as a result of trespass by a third party. The legislature
intended to cover all possible cases of vacancy occurring due to any reasons whatsoever. Hence, far
from using those words Ejusdem Generis with the preceding clauses of the explanation, the
legislature used those words in an all-inclusive sense. The rule of Ejusdem Generis is intended to be
applied where general words have been used following particular and specific words of the same
nature on the established rule of construction that the legislature presumed to use the general
words in a restricted sense that is to say, as belonging to the same genus as the particular and
specific words.

Such a restricted meaning has to be given to words of general import only where the context of the
whole scheme of legislation requires it. But where the context and the object and mischief of the
enactment do not require such restricted meaning be attached to words of general import, it
becomes the duty of the courts to give those words their plain and ordinary meaning.