S

SPE 1550
026

S
Simultane
eous Drillling & Prroduction
ns Operattions (SIM
MOPS)
M
Mohamed Wa
ajeeh Salman, ADMA-OPC
CO

C
Copyright 2012, Society
y of Petroleum Enginee
ers

T
This paper was prepare
ed for presentation at the SPE Middle East Health, Safety, Securityy, and Environment Coonference and Exhibitio
on held in Abu Dhabi, U
UAE, 2–4 April 2012.

T
This paper was selected for presentation by an a SPE program comm mittee following review of information containned in an abstract submmitted by the author(s)). Contents of the papeer have not been
re
eviewed by the Society y of Petroleum Engine eers and are subject to o correction by the autthor(s). The material ddoes not necessarily reeflect any position of the Society of Petroleu
um Engineers, its
officers, or members. Electronic
E reproductionn, distribution, or stora
age of any part of thiss paper without the wrritten consent of the S Society of Petroleum E Engineers is prohibite
ed. Permission to
eproduce in print is res
re stricted to an abstract of
o not more than 300 words;
w illustrations mayy not be copied. The abbstract must contain co
onspicuous acknowled dgment of SPE copyrig ght.

A
Abstract
TTo maintain oil production at sustainable e rates througgh minimizing g the production loss factorrs, there was a need to
in
nvestigate the e feasibility of conducting SIMOPS on old o wood, unp un-equipped, high producin
prepared & u ng oil Well
HHead Towers s (WHT). Forr this purpos se, Managem ment has form med a multi-d disciplined te
eam to invesstigate the
ppossibility of allowing
a oil production
p & water
w injectio
on operations while carryinng out drilling
g/workover acctivity in a
ssimilar manne er to that ado opted for ZAD DCO oil WHT Ts. While SIM MOPS has ne ever been im mplemented o on ADMA-
OOPCO WHTs for oil produc ction, it was noted
n that watter injection S
SIMOPS was already unde er implementaation.

T
The methodollogy adopted by the taskfo
orce is as follo
ows :
(i) re-visitin
ng the risk assessment
a which
w uted the bas is for the current SIMOP
constitu PS by ZADCO
O through
ADMA-O OPCO.

(ii) Categorrising & idenntifying the WHTs wherre SIMOPS can be imp
plemented ba
ased on con
nsiderable
increme
ental oil produ
uction level.

(iii) Site verrification of SIMOPS by ZA

ADCO.

(iv) Reviewing & amending the curre

ent SIMOPS procedures
p w
with the purpo
ose of produccing special p
procedure
MA-OPCO oil WHTs.
for ADM

SSite verificatio
on visits to rig
gs carrying out
o SIMOPS were w made wwhere open d
discussions w with rig personnel were
hheld and equ uipment / sys stems were checked
c and tested. It wa as noted during the functtion test of thhe deluge
ssystem that th he water supp ply by the inje
ection facilitie
es/ system on
n the WHTs iss satisfactoryy where as the
e back up
wwater supply from
f the rig was
w ineffective e.

T
The risk asse
essment has shown that most
m hazards
s are assesse
ed at ALARP
P or acceptab
ble level exce
ept for the
fo
following:

• Rig Collapse : Mitigation of

o the hazard d is through the major improvementss in NDC
Systems (Management, M Maintenance).
• Dropped
d Objects : Mitigation th
hrough re-ennforced Impacct Protection on top of p production
facilities.
• High Pre
essure Testin
ng : Shut down production a and depressu urisation of sservice pipe w
works will
ppropriate pro
constitute ap otection.

TThe current SIMOPS

S pro
ocedures maintained in ADMA-OPCO’
A ’s were revie
ewed and ammended to rreflect the
rrequired modification to alllow for SIMO
OPS on ADMAA-OPCO Tow wers. The SIMMOPS proced dure will requ
uire formal
aapproval of Site
S Operating g Authorities (Umm Al Sh
haif (US), Za kum (ZK)), b
both Asset Managers & th he Drilling
MManager.
2 SPE 155026

SIMOPS for Oil Well Head Towers

It was concluded that SIMOPS for the selected oil wellhead towers could be carried out subject to the
implementation of the proposed recommendations. These mainly include installation of portable fire & gas
detection system & deluge system with main water supply from the rig and back up from water injection facilities if
available.

Additional man-power resources would be required by production to be assigned for 24 hrs stay on the rigs during
SIMOPS. Roles & Responsibilities of all personnel involved are stipulated in the proposed SIMOPS procedures
which will constitute part of the Drilling Safety Reference Manual. Authority for the Permit to Work on the wellhead
towers will be vested in the Approved Person (Asset) and endorsed by the ADMA Drilling Superintendent on the
rig. Their roles with regard to this matter are well covered in the SIMOPS Procedures.

Certainly, Site Operating Authorities & involved operations personnel (US, ZK, Rigs) will require thorough &
detailed briefing, familiarization & understanding before implementing SIMOPS. This can be done through proper
training & familiarisation programme of all concerned (including back-to-back).

An action plan & risk assessment was drawn by the Assets & Drilling Division for the implementation of SIMOPS.

Risk Assessment

The various phases involved in the rig move to and from a wellhead platform and on station are as follows :

 Rig approach and final positioning.

 Pre-load (including jack-up to 5 ft.).
 Skidding out
 Rig operations
 Skidding In
 Jacking Down
 Moving out.

Tower topsides and oil subsea lines will be shutdown and depressurised, prior to rig approach & till BOP’s
installation, as per existing practice.

The listed below foreseeable hazards were identified and considered to be the main hazards encountered during
drilling/ workover operations and were subject to risk assessment by team members.

 Dropped objects
 Rig collapse (skidding during operation)
 Gas bubbling from seabed
 Uncontrolled flow
 Premature detonation (perforation)
 High pressure testing (below helideck)
 Hot work activities (on rig Wokshop only)
 Supply boat collision with tower (riser side)
 Other large marine unit out of control
 Leak from production line / valves / flanges
 Helicopter crash
 Toxic (H2S) cloud
 Leak from X – massTree (oil – gas)
 Uncontrolled high pressure water flow
 Structure failure
 Depressurization from Down Hole Safety Valve

The findings and recommendations were recorded on risk assessment worksheets. All foreseeable hazards were
assessed and found at ALARP or acceptable level except rig collapse, dropped object and high pressure testing
hazards which resulted in high risk. In order to eliminate / reduce the risk associated with these hazards, the risk
reduction measures recommended by the team are judged to be sufficient, as per the following criteria:
SPE 155026 3

Rig Collapse

The major changes in the Rig Contractor Management Systems, particularly in tackling
the jacking and leg system reflected the following improvements:

 Stringent planned maintenance system and internal audit system.

 Thorough inspection and reactive maintenance.
 Management of change procedure.
 Periodic 3rd party inspection.
 Competence of rig personnel in charge of jacking system

Dropped Object

The following control measures were recommended to reduce the risk:

 Re-inforce the rig floorsTimber screen angled to reflect dropped object must be
installed on critical equipment on WHTs.
 Helideck and other deck levels should be re-enforced by metal sheets.
 Installing temporary F&G and H2S detection system on WHT.
 Installing temporary deluge system on WHT.

High Pressure Testing

The following control measures were recommended to reduce the risk:

• Shutdown production and depressurize services pipeworks.

• Ensuring no residual pressure is remaining in the mud line.
• Assuring Preventive Maintenance System and conducting necessary Non-
Destructive Tests on pipelines.

Site Verification

A series of visits to ZADCO SIMOPS sites to verify implementation of the current procedures. Discussions were
held with Rig personnel as well as equipment and systems were checked and tested.

The following observations are noted:

 ADMA-OPCO Wellhead Towers are not equipped with Thermal Shutdown System,
Connected to deluge system.
 ADMA-OPCO Wellhead Towers are not equipped with F&G and H2S (sensors/
detectors) Shutdown System. Connected to deluge system.
 ADMA-OPCO WHT’s are not equipped with sump tank (except for seven Arab-D Towers
in US Field). There is a need to occasionally depressurize the production header/ pipe-
work before any hot-work or heavy lift on the WHT/ rig floor. Rigs are not at all times
equipped with burner boom to facilitate this depressurization.
 ADMA-OPCO Wellhead Towers (except for seven in US Field) are equipped with wooden
helideck.
 During the visit one production operator was available to supervise SIMOPS on 24 hrs
basis.
 Three ESD(Push button connected to the Thermal System) were installed and connected
to the rig(one each at rig floor, DS office & Radio Room)
 All pumps /Pneumatic system, ESD & thermo electric generator were operated by Gas
when rig is not there and once rig is at tower all are operated by air supplied from rig.
 Separator at tower is always shut down during SIMOPS and production is diverted
directly to complex.
 Deluge system at tower equipped with heat detectors operated at 60 psi , if any fusible
plug is broken then shut down will take place and showering all over the tower.
 Drain system (sump tank)/ venting system is connected to water level during SIMOPS.
4 SPE 155026

 Function test was made to deluge system supplied by the Field water injection network
facilities and found satisfactory operational and efficient.
 The back up fire fighting hydrant supplied by the rig through Zadco pump (located on the
Rig) to charge and operate the deluge system on the platform was tested and found
ineffective. Deluge lines being 6” while the rig’s hydrant feed is only 2”.

Conclusion

Simultaneous Drilling, Workover, Production and water Injection operations for the selected Wellhead Towers
could be successfully carried out through the newly developed SIMOPS Procedures.
Tower modifications have been implemented, Interface Documents (demonstrated in Appendix A) have been
created & strictly applied, training by a highly experienced consultant to the operations personnel was provided,
the F&G detection system has been delivered, the depressurization & clean-up system was up & running & the
whole SIMOPS operation was ready at full throttle.
Today, ADMA rigs are successfully employing SIMOPS operations in ADMA-OPCO & the benefits in terms of
cost savings & production enhancement are substantial.
To extend the horizon of this application further, the same procedures were applied for Gas Injection Platforms.

SIMOPS For Gas Injection Platforms.

In accordance with the framework of the existing HSE Management System, the new Gas Injection Platform
SIMOPS procedure represents a further development in the system. The new procedure demonstrates that all
interface activity hazards & effects are identified, understood & are being properly implemented & controlled.
Series of meetings, risk assessment sessions & a site visit have been completed by the team regarding the
application of SIMOPS for ADMA/ZADCO Gas Injection Platform.

Qualitative Risk Assessments were performed for some rig/barge operations, which were not firmly conclusive in
the previous risk assessments.

ADMA-OPCO/ZADCO WHPs for gas injection/gas lift are connected with Gas Injection Platform by 10” main line
(from Gas Injection Platform to WHP ZK-276), 6” main line (from Gas Injection Platform to WHP PC-55) and 6”
branch lines (from 10” main line to ZADCO WHPs PC-XXX and ADMA-OPCO WHPs ZK-YYY).

Since there isn’t any sub-sea isolation valve between the 10” main line & 6” branch lines, the line pressure of +/-
5,000 psi is always kept in the risers of above WHPs except PC-AAA, where a 6” injection line is directly
connected to Gas Injection Platform.

The possibility of installing the sub-sea isolation valve in each 6” branch line was already reviewed by ADMA &
ZADCO’s engineering section. However, it was recognized that the cost incurred would be extremely high and it
would take a long lead time for engineering, procurement, fabrication, etc, resulted in a difficulty to install the
isolation valves before commencing the drilling campaign planned between year 2007 and 2009.
This injection line layout suggested that the complete pressure bleeding off is mandatory for the 10” main line in
addition to the branch lines before rig/barge intervention to the WHPs PC-C, ZW-D, ZK-E and ZK-F. The entire
pressure bleeding off from main/branch lines through the flare stack usually takes +/-36 hrs and the similar
duration is required for re-pressuring the lines.

The qualitative risk assessment for gas injection WHP had been carried out by previous SIMOPS taskforce in
2002. In addition, the Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) was performed by a 3rd party. The QRA report
concluded that depressurizing of the lines are required during rig/barge approach to gas injection WHP, jacking
up/down, skidding out, and nippling up/down BOP.

The task force members agreed the above conclusions in principle. In addition, referring to the outcomes from the
previous risk assessments performed for rig activities, it was commonly understood that the riser pressure could
be maintained during normal drilling operation with the insurance of rig stability.

The entire pressure bleeding off is vital during the rig/barge approach and jacking up/down. However, in view of
the fact that frequent depressurizing of the lines will adversary impact on ZADCO/ADMA-OPCO gas injection pilot
SPE 155026 5

projects and drilling multiple wells in the same gas injection WHP of ZW-K is scheduled soon, it is recommended
to re-visit the depressurization requirement for the rig skidding (in/out/over) after completing each well in the same
platform through a comprehensive qualitative risk assessment.

Series of meetings, risk assessment sessions and a site visit have been completed by the team regarding the
application of SIMOPS for ZADCO Gas Injection Platform. The associated risk assessment worksheets assessed
and filled with risk ranking as per ADNOC Risk Matrix.
SIMOPS will be governed by production plans and potential production loss. The designated Asset Team Leaders
should be the authority to liaise with the Drilling Division and site in advance to secure equipment and man-power.
Requirements for SIMOPS to be marked on the DrillingBar chart with a distinguished colour to be easily identified
by all the multi-disciplinary teams. To maximize the production, planning for SIMOPS should consider the
following:

 Comply with the quarterly plan of SIMOPS to facilitate its success.

 Allowing SIMOPS all time of the year.
 SIMOPS may address all towers even of less than 5000 Bpd.

In accordance with the framework of the existing HSE Management System, “the new GIP SIMPOS procedures“
represents a further development in the system. The new procedure demonstrates that all interface activity
hazards and effects are identified, understood and are being properly implemented and controlled.

The economic benefits are illustrated by the anticipated results in maintaining Gas Injection for both ADMA –
OPCO and ZADCO which have significant impact on the productions of both company, this impact will extend to
ensure operational integrity, which will lead to cost savings and smoother operations.

The new SIMOPS procedure can be easily transferred to other offshore companies particular in the systematic
approach been followed in studying and analyzing the risk associated with such operations. This stand in
improving HSE related issues. Identifying and containing hazards will maintain ADMA-OPCO, ZADCO and
ADNOC high standards and reputation.

The new SIMOPS procedure is an innovative approach in the HSE Management System. Depressurizing the
lines & shuting down the GIP during the rig activity will adversely impact the ZADCO/ADMA-OPCO gas injection
projects. Moreover, drilling multiple wells in the same gas injection WHP of ZW-G is scheduled in the near future
& this procedure will definitely strengthen our codes of ethics, safety & integrity.
6 SP
PE 155026

A
Appendix A
S
SPE 155026 7
8 SP
PE 155026
SPE 155026 9