ISIDRO ABLAZA

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. 158298 August 11, 2010BERSAMIN,
J.
FACTS:
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner, Isidro Ablaza filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage
contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila
Honato. The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been
celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9,
1950,thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without
a marriage license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had
died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano
before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself
included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any
time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is a real party in interest in the action to seek the declaration of nullity
of the marriage of his deceased brother.

HELD:
The Court Ruled that, being good for no legal purpose other than remarriage, a void marriage
invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material,
either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before
or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts
rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is
not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding
instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be
impeached, and is made good ab initio

Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of
the marriage of his deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the old Civil
Code is the legal issue to be determined in this appeal brought by the petitioner
whose action for that purpose has been dismissed by the lower courts on the
ground that he, not being a party in the assailed marriage, had no right to bring the
action.

The petition is meritorious.

A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife and
to give rise to the mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out of such relation.
The law prescribes the requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the validity of a
marriage is tested according to the law in force at the time the marriage is
contracted.[6] As a general rule, the nature of the marriage already celebrated
cannot be changed by a subsequent amendment of the governing law. [7] To
illustrate, a marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister was void under
the Civil Code, but is not anymore prohibited under the Family Code; yet, the
intervening effectivity of the Family Code does not affect the void nature of a
marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister solemnized under the regime of
the Civil Code. The Civil Code marriage remains void, considering that the validity
of a marriage is governed by the law in force at the time of the marriage
ceremony.[8]
Ninal vs Bayadog
Ninal vs. Bayadog

328 SCRA 122

FACTS:

Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3 children namely
Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on
April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later,
Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. They instituted an affidavit stating
that they had lived together for at least 5 years exempting from securing the marriage license. Pepito died
in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack of marriage
license.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?

2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of Pepito’s marriage
after his death?

HELD:

The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They cannot be exempted
even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years because from the
time of Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20
months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
Norma had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their
five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to
Norma is still void.

Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It can be
questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested party may attack a void
marriage.

The Supreme Court ruled that:

(1) The applicable law, for the determination of marriage, is the Civil Code and not the Family Code. (In
determining the validity of marriage, it is to be tested by the law in force at the time the marriage was
contracted.)

(2) There is no second marriage. The absence of a marriage license renders marriage void ab initio. The
exemption for a marriage license, the cohabitation, was not the one described by the Civil Code. It is not
the one described by the Civil Code because the cohabitation, after the first marriage, was only twenty
months whereas the law requires five years. If the respondent took into consideration the other years and
months before the second marriage, then the cohabitation would include the period of the first marriage.
This is in violation of the law.

(3) Separation in fact (not the legal separation) by the first marriage does not count cohabitation.

“This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a
period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity – meaning no third party was involved at any time
within the 5 years and continuity – that is unbroken.”
(4) The judge’s ruling (lower court), where void and voidable marriages are made identical is erroneous.
Void and voidable marriages are not identical.

“A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is
void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken place.”
“A voidable can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while a void
marriage can never be ratified.”
“A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void
marriage can be attacked collaterally.”
“Void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be
assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and
their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.”
“The action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action
prescribes.”
“Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void
marriage.“
“Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the
alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, and its effect on
the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well
as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable
marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are
legitimate.”
(5) The Supreme Court requires a judicial decree of nullity of second marriage before determining
succession rights.
“Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the
nullity of a marriage. But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second
marriage.”
“However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage
an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that
matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question
the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue
that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary
even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause “on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void” in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be
obtained only for purpose of remarriage.”
DOMINGO v. CA
PARTIES:

Petitioner: Robert Domingo

Respondents: Court of Appeals, Delia Soledad Avera represented by her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R.
AVERA

FACTS:

April 25, 1969, Robert Domingo married Emerlina dela Paz on which marriage is valid and still existing

November 29, 1976, he married Delia Soledad

January 23 1979 up to the present, Soledad has been working in Saudi Arabia

1983, Emerlina sued for bigamy, respondent found out about the prior marriage

May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig entitled “Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property” against petitioner
Roberto Domingo

1989, respondent found out that they are cohabiting and Robert was spending and disposing of some of
her properties without her knowledge or consent
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in the affirmative,
whether the same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.

HELD:
Yes. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of
action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said
projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void

Constitution as an “inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family;” as such, it “shall be
protected by the State. As a matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of
contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or of
one that their union is so defective with respect to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as
to render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect

ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in affirmative,
whether the same should be filed only for purpose of remarriage.

RULING:
Yes. A declaration of the absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action
or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purpose of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for the said projected
marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.

The requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the
spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial
declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged
with bigamy.

Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. A person can conceive of
other instances other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution
and separation of property between the spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support of
their common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, however,
one is required by law to show proof that the previous one was an absolute nullity.

Marriage is an “inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family;” as such, it “shall be
protected by the State. As a matter of policy, there should be a final judgment declaring the marriage
void and a party should not declare for himself or herself whether or not the marriage is void.

Domingo vs. CA226 SCRA 572

Facts:

Delia Domingo, private respondent, filed a petition before RTC of Pasig for the declaration of nullity of
marriage and separation of property against Roberto Domingo, petitioner. She alleged that they were
married at Carmona, Cavite with evidences of marriage certificate and marriage license, unknown to
her, petitioner had a previous marriage with Emerlina dela Paz which is still valid and existing. She came
to know the prior marriage when Emerlina sued them for bigamy. She prays that their marriage be
declared null and void and, as a consequence, to declare thatshe is the
exclusive owner of all properties she acquired during the marriage and to recover them from him.
Roberto moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the marriage being void ab initio, the petition
of declaration of nullity is unnecessary. It added that private respondent has no property which in his
possession.

Issue: Whether or not respondent may claim for the declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of
property against petitioner on the ground of bigamy.

Ruling: There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated while the
former's previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting is bigamous. As such, it is
from the beginning. Petitioner himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of their marriage. The
Court had ruled that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous
marriage. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one
of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations governing them. It
stands to reason hat the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage
isbrought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidentalquestions regarding the couple's
properties

REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, Petitioner, vs.

ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE
CASTRO, Respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They applied
for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September
1994. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage
license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a
marriage license, they executed a false affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they
had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got
married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after
the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes and did not
live together as husband and wife.
On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De
Castro. On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is
married to petitioner and that the latter has “reneged on his responsibility/obligation to
financially support her “as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child.” Petitioner denied that
he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void ab initio since the
marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by
respondent to sign the marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and possible
administrative prosecution due to her pregnant state; and that he was not able to get
parental advice from his parents before he got married. He also averred that they never
lived together as husband and wife and that he has never seen nor acknowledged the
child.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid
because it was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared petitioner as
the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her support. The Court of
Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is presumed to be
subsisting until a judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court
declared that the child was born during the subsistence and validity of the parties’
marriage. In addition, the Court of Appeals frowned upon petitioner’s refusal to undergo
DNA testing to prove the paternity and filiation, as well as his refusal to state with
certainty the last time he had carnal knowledge with respondent, saying that petitioner’s
“forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to relieve him of his obligation and reward
him of his being irresponsible.” Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the affidavit dated
7 April 1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted that he is the
legitimate father of the child. The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an
action for support, it was improper for the trial court to declare the marriage of petitioner
and respondent as null and void in the very same case. There was no participation of the
State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there is no collusion
between the parties, as required by the Family Code in actions for declaration of nullity of a
marriage. The burden of proof to show that the marriage is void rests upon
petitioner, but it is a matter that can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and
not in the instant proceedings.

ISSUE: Whether of not their marriage is valid.

HELD: Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites
shall render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites
shall render the marriage voidable. In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence
presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage license when they
contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been
living together for more than five years. However, respondent herself in effect admitted
the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination. The falsity of
the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of
marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a
woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for
a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of
this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment
concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to
the publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage license. In the instant case, there
was no “scandalous cohabitation” to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The
false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with
the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt
from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage
license renders their marriage void ab initio.

On the paternity of Reiann Tricia:

“Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioner’s
illegitimate daughter, and therefore entitled to support.Illegitimate
children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and
on the same evidence as legitimate children. Thus, one can prove
illegitimate filiation through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules
of Court and special laws.28 The Certificate of Live Birth of the child
lists petitioner as the father. In addition, petitioner, in an affidavit
waiving additional tax exemption in favor of respondent, admitted that
he is the father of the child, thus stating:
1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO who
was born on November 3, 1995 at Better Living, Parañaque, Metro
Manila;30
We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the trial
court:
That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the petitioner is
supported not only by the testimony of the latter, but also by
respondent’s own admission in the course of his testimony wherein he
conceded that petitioner was his former girlfriend. While they were
sweethearts, he used to visit petitioner at the latter’s house or clinic. At
times, they would go to a motel to have sex. As a result of their sexual
dalliances, petitioner became pregnant which ultimately led to their
marriage, though invalid, as earlier ruled. While respondent claims
that he was merely forced to undergo the marriage ceremony, the
pictures taken of the occasion reveal otherwise (Exhs. “B,” “B-1,” to
“B-3,” “C,” “C-1” and “C-2,” “D,” “D-1” and “D-2,” “E,” “E-1” and “E-2,”
“F,” “F-1” and “F-2,” “G,” “G-1” and “G-2” and “H,” “H-1” to “H-3”). In
one of the pictures (Exhs. “D,” “D-1” and “D-2”), defendant is seen
putting the wedding ring on petitioner’s finger and in another picture
(Exhs. “E,” “E-1” and “E-2″) respondent is seen in the act of kissing
the petitioner”

ALAIN M. DIÑO v. MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO

FACTS:
January 1998 petitioner and respondent got married. On May 2001, petitioner
filed an action for Declaration of Niullity of Marriagw against respondent citing
psychological incapacity under article 36. Petitioner alleged that respondent
failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to him, and had
abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping
sprees and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets.
Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would at times
become violent and hurt him. The trial court declared their marriage void ab
initio.
The court ruled that A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only
be issued upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code. It later
altered it to” A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued
after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code”

ISSUE: WON the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute
nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and
distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code

HELD:
The court erred. The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City
that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the
parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or
Article 148 of the Family Code.7 Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union
of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner
and respondent in the case before the Court.

For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be
present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article
147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and
respondent.

It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule
applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final
judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of
the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio
under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without
waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.

Since the property relations of the parties in art 40 and 45 are governed by
absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a
need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of
annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the
ordinary rules on co-ownership.

In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article
3615 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs
the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent
are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property
relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is
governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on
co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in
accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496
of the Civil Code, “[p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or
by judicial proceedings. x x x.” It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of
the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.

DIÑO V. DIÑO; 640 SCRA 148; G.R. NO. 178044; JANUARY

19, 2011
*Note: This case digest mainly covers Article 147 of the Family Code.
Topic: Article 147 of Family Code
On May 30, 2011, petitioner Alain M. Diño filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
against respondent Ma. Caridad L. Diño, citing Psychological Incpacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code. The Office of Las Piñas prosecutor, upon finding no indicative facts of collusion, set
the case for trial.
The Trial Court declared on its October 18, 2006 decision on the dissolution of Absolute
Community Property and ruled that a DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall
only be issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
Petitioner filed for a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the Dissolution of the Absolute
Community Property and the ruling that a decree of annulment shall only be issued upon
compliance with Art. 50 and 51
The Trial Court partially granted the motion and modified its October 18, 2006 decision stating
that a DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued after the
liquidation, partition and distribution of properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
Issue: WON the Trial court erred when it ordered that a DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE shall only be issued after the liquidation, partition and distribution of properties
under Article 147 of the Family Code.
Held: YES
In a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.
The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spoused should be liquidated in
accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the New Civil
Code, “partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings”
xxx. It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same
proceeding of nullity of marriage.
 Title 3
INSURABLE INTEREST

Section 10. Every person has an insurable interest in the life and health:

(a) Of himself, of his spouse and of his children;

(b) Of any person on whom he depends wholly or in part for education or support, or in
whom he has a pecuniary interest;

(c) Of any person under a legal obligation to him for the payment of money, or
respecting property or services, of which death or illness might delay or prevent the
performance; and

(d) Of any person upon whose life any estate or interest vested in him depends.

Section 11. The insured shall have the right to change the beneficiary he designated in the
policy, unless he has expressly waived this right in said policy.

Section 12. The interest of a beneficiary in a life insurance policy shall be forfeited when the
beneficiary is the principal, accomplice, or accessory in willfully bringing about the death of the
insured; in which event, the nearest relative of the insured shall receive the proceeds of said
insurance if not otherwise disqualified.

Section 13. Every interest in property, whether real or personal, or any relation thereto, or
liability in respect thereof, of such nature that a contemplated peril might directly damnify the
insured, is an insurable interest.

Section 14. An insurable interest in property may consist in:

Section 15. A carrier or depository of any kind has an insurable interest in a thing held by him
as such, to the extent of his liability but not to exceed the value thereof.

Section 16. A mere contingent or expectant interest in anything, not founded on an actual right
to the thing, nor upon any valid contract for it, is not insurable.

Section 17. The measure of an insurable interest in property is the extent to which the insured
might be damnified by loss or injury thereof.

Chapter 1
THE CONTRACT OF INSURANCE

Title 1
WHAT MAY BE INSURED

Section 3. Any contingent or unknown event, whether past or future, which may
damnify a person having an insurable interest, or create a liability against him, may
be insured against, subject to the provisions of this chapter.

The consent of the husband is not necessary for the validity of an insurance policy
taken out by a married woman on her life or that of her children.

Any minor of the age of eighteen years or more, may, notwithstanding such minority,
contract for life, health and accident insurance, with any insurance company duly
authorized to do business in the Philippines, provided the insurance is taken on his
own life and the beneficiary appointed is the minor’s estate or the minor’s father,
mother, husband, wife, child, brother or sister.

The married woman or the minor herein allowed to take out an insurance policy may
exercise all the rights and privileges of an owner under a policy.
All rights, title and interest in the policy of insurance taken out by an original owner
on the life or health of a minor shall automatically vest in the minor upon the death of
the original owner, unless otherwise provided for in the policy.

Section 4. The preceding section does not authorize an insurance for or against the
drawing of any lottery, or for or against any chance or ticket in a lottery drawing a
prize.

Section 5. All kinds of insurance are subject to the provisions of this chapter so far
as the provisions can apply.

MOE VS DINKINS
Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiffs were prevented from entering into marriage because
a New York law required minors to obtain parental consent prior to marriage.
Plaintiffs brought suit claiming the law violated the Due Process Clause of the United
States Constitution.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Because of the unique position between minors and
marriage, the law is examined under a rational relationship test rather than strict
scrutiny.

Facts. A New York Domestic Relations Law provided that all male marriage license
applicants between 16 and 18 and all female applicants between 14 and 18 must
obtain written consent from both parents (that are living). Section 15.3 of the law
requires women between the ages of 14 and 16 to obtain judicial approval of the
marriage in addition to parental consent.
Plaintiff Raoul Roe, 18, and Plaintiff Maria Moe, 15, had a one year old son, Plaintiff
Ricardo Roe. Plaintiffs live together as a family unit and desire to be married to
cement their family unit and remove the stigma of illegitimacy from their son. Maria
requested consent from her widowed mother to marry Raoul, but she refused,
allegedly because she wished to continue receiving welfare benefits for Maria.

Proposed plaintiff-intervenors Pedro Doe, 17, and Christina Coe, 15, reside in the
home of Pedro’s father and step-mother. Christina is eight months pregnant with
Pedro’s child. Christina’s mother refused a Christina’s request to marry Pedro, and
arranged for Christina to have an abortion. Christina refused to do so, and
consequently her mother told her she wished to have nothing more to do with her
and was leaving the country to return to the Dominican Republic.

Issue. Does the law requiring parental consent to marry deprive Plaintiffs of the
liberty guaranteed them by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Federal Constitution?

Held. The law is constitutional because the State has a legitimate interest in
protecting minors from immature decision making.

Previous case law has recognized a constitutional liberty interest in marriage, but
has not addressed the marriages of minors. The constitutional rights of children
cannot be equated with adults for three reasons: a) the peculiar vulnerability of
children; (b) the inability to make critical decisions in an informed and mature matter;
(c) the importance of the parental role in child-rearing.

This law should not be examined under a strict scrutiny standard, but rather it must
be determined if there is a rational relationship between the means chosen and the
legitimate state interests advanced. The parent consent requirement ensures that at
least one mature person will participate in the marriage decision. Because of this
and minors’ lack of experience, perspective, and judgment, the law is rationally
related to a legitimate state interest.

Plaintiffs also allege that the courts as a non-interested party would be in a better
position to judge than parents that are potentially biased. However, the law assumes
that parents will act in the best interests of their children. Plaintiffs also claim that
this law should be analogized with contraception and abortion laws, and that the law
denies them the means with which to legitimize their children. However, this ignores
the fact that the law is only a postponement to the right to marry.

Discussion. The court applied a rational relationship test to the New York law rather
than strict scrutiny because the rights involved were those of minors.

Moe v. Dinkins
533 F.Supp. 623 (1981), 669 F.2d 67 (1982)

 Raoul (who was 18) wanted to marry Maria (who was 15). They lived together
and had a child (Ricardo). However, in order to get a marriage license, they
needed parental consent, which Maria's mother would not give.
o Maria's mother wanted to continue getting welfare benefits from her
minor child, and would lose the benefits if Maria married.
 Raoul, Maria, and Ricardo sued (in Federal Court) to have the New York
parental consent requirement declared and unconstitutional violation of due
process.
o In New York, parental consent was required for those under 18.
 Another underage couple (Pedro (17) and Cristina (15 and pregnant))
intervened to turn this into a class action suit.
 The Trial Court found for New York and dismissed the suit.
o The Trial Court found that while minors do have constitutional rights,
courts have long recognized the government's power to make
adjustments to the constitutional rights of minors.
 For example, children can't get driver's licenses or buy alcohol.
o The Court found that the right of minors to marry is not a fundamental
right, and that the courts do not need to apply strict scrutiny. All that is
required is that New York have a rational basis for making the law.
 The rational basis test only asks whether the governmental action
at issue is a rational means to an end that may be legitimately
pursued by government.
o The Court found that New York had a rational basis for the law.
 The State has the paternalistic power to promote the welfare of
children who lack the capacity to act in their own best interest.
The State interests in mature decision-making and in preventing
unstable marriages are legitimate under its parents patriae power.
 In addition, the Court found that the State has a legitimate interest
in supporting the fundamental privacy right of a parent to act in
 what the parent perceives to be the best interest of the child free
from State court scrutiny.
o Raoul et. al. argued that the courts were in a better position to determine
maturity on a case-by-case basis because they were disinterested parties.
But the Court found that in most cases, "the natural bonds of affection
lead parents to act in the best interest of their children."
o The Court found that they weren't denying Raoul and Maria's rights, they
were simply delaying those rights. As soon as they turned 18 they'd be
allowed to marry anyone they want.
 The Appellate Court affirmed.
 Maria did not argue equal protection, right to privacy, or right to free
association. All of those could theoretically been the basis for finding that she
has a right to marry.
o She could have also gone to another State where the age of consent was
lower.
 Under the historical common-law, the age of consent for marriage was 14 for
males and 12 for females. Children as young as 7 were presumed to have the
capacity to consent to a future marriage.

Buccat v Buccat (1941)

Buccat v. Mangonon de Buccat

April 25, 1941

Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio.

Facts:

Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccat met in March 1938, became engaged in
September, and got married in Nov 26.

On Feb 23, 1939 (89 days after getting married) Luida, who was 9 months pregnant, gave
birth to a son. After knowing this, Godofredo left Luida and never returned to married life with
her.

On March 23, 1939, he filed for an annulment of their marriage on the grounds that when he
agreed to married Luida, she assured him that she was a virgin.

The Lower court decided in favor of Luida.

Issue:

Should the annulment for Godofredo Buccat’s marriage be granted on the grounds that Luida
concealed her pregnancy before the marriage?

Held:

No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage, a sacred institution in
which the State is interested and where society rests.

In this case, the court did not find any proof that there was concealment of pregnancy
constituting fraud as a ground for annulment. It was unlikely that Godofredo, a first-year law
student, did not suspect anything about Luida’s conditionconsidering that she was in an
advanced stage of pregnancy (highly developed physical manifestation, ie. enlargedstomach )
when they got married.

Decision:

SC affirmed the lower court’s decision. Costs to plaintiff-appellant

Aquino vs. Delizo
FACTS:

Fernando Aquino filed a complaint in September 1955 on the ground of fraud against Conchita
Delizo that at the date of her marriage with the former on December 1954, concealed the fact that
she was pregnant by another man and sometime in April 1955 or about 4 months after their
marriage, gave birth to a child. During the trial, Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco represent the state
in the proceedings to prevent collusion. Only Aquino testified and the only documentary
evidence presented was the marriage contract between the parties. Delizo did not appear nor
presented any evidence.

CFI-Rizal dismissed petitioner’s complaint for annulment of marriage, which was affirmed by
CA thus a petition for certiorari to review the decisions.

ISSUE: Whether or not concealment of pregnancy as alleged by Aquino does not constitute such
fraud as would annul a marriage.

HELD:

The concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a
man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is a ground for annulment of marriage. Delizo
was allegedly to be only more than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage. At this
stage, it is hard to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent especially since she was
“naturally plump” or fat. It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the
woman’s abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen
more general and apparent.

In the following circumstances, the court remanded the case for new trial and decision
complained is set aside.

Aquino vs Delizo
FACTS:

Fernando Aquino filed a complaint in September 1955 on the ground of fraud against Conchita
Delizo that at the date of her marriage with the former on December 1954, concealed the fact that
she was pregnant by another man and sometime in April 1955 or about 4 months after their
marriage, gave birth to a child. During the trial, Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco represent the state
in the proceedings to prevent collusion. Only Aquino testified and the only documentary
evidence presented was the marriage contract between the parties. Delizo did not appear nor
presented any evidence.

CFI-Rizal dismissed petitioner’s complaint for annulment of marriage, which was affirmed by
CA thus a petition for certiorari to review the decisions.
ISSUE: Whether or not concealment of pregnancy as alleged by Aquino does not constitute such
fraud as would annul a marriage.

HELD:

The concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a
man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is a ground for annulment of marriage. Delizo
was allegedly to be only more than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage. At this
stage, it is hard to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent especially since she was
“naturally plump” or fat. It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the
woman’s abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen
more general and apparent.

Anaya v.Palaroan, G.R. No. L-27930, Nov. 26, 1970

FACTS: In 1953, Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married. In 1954, Palaroan filed
an action for annulment of their marriage on the ground that his consent was obtained through
force and intimidation. The petition was dismissed. Hence, marriage is subsisting. Later on,
Palaroan confessed that he had pre-marital relationship with a close relative of his. Aurora
claimed that the non-disclosure of such pre-marital relationship constituted fraud in obtaining her
consent. She prayed for annulment of their marriage on such ground.

ISSUE: Whether or not the non-disclosure of a husband to her wife of his pre-marital
relationship is a ground for annulment of marriage

HELD: No. It is not enumerated in Family Code Art 46 that would constitute fraud as ground for
annulment. In the case at bar, the concealment of his previous relationship does not constitute
fraud and therefore would not warrant an annulment of marriage.

Facts: On 7 January 1954, after one month of marriage to Aurora Anaya, Fernando

Palaroan filed a complaint to annul it on the ground that his consent was obtained through force

and intimidation. The court dismissed the complaint and granted Aurora's counterclaim. While

the amount of the counterclaim was being negotiated, Fernando allegedly divulged that

several months prior to the marriage, he had pre-marital relationships with a close relative of

his. Anaya filed suit to annul the marriage and to recover moral damages.

Fernando denied having had pre-marital relationship with a close relative and having committed

any fraud against Aurora. He did not pray for the dismissal of the complaint but for its dismissal

"with respect to the alleged moral damages." Aurora replied stating that Fernando had no

intention of performing his marital duties and obligations since the marriage was contracted as a

means for him to escape marrying the close relative that was intimated above. The trial court

dismissed the complaint, holding that Aurora's allegation of the fraud was legally insufficient to

invalidate her marriage. Aurora appealed.

Issue: Is non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship

with another woman a ground for annulment of marriage?

Held: No. Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is

not one of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is

further excluded by the last paragraph of the article, providing that "no other misrepresentation

or deceit as to ... chastity" shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. While a woman

may detest such non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated into

giving her consent to the marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her

consent was solemnly given, for upon marriage she entered into an institution in which society,

and not herself alone, is interested. The lawmaker's intent being plain, the Court's duty is to give

effect to the same, whether it agrees with the rule or not.

JIMENEZ VS. REPUBLIC

JIMENEZ VS. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. L-12790, August 31, 1960

Plaintiff-Appellee: Joel Jimenez

Defendant: Remedios Canizares

Intervenor-Appellant: Republic of the Philippines

Ponente: J. Padilla

Facts:

In a complaint filed on June 7, 1955, in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Zamboanga, the plaintiff prays
for a decree annulling his marriage to the defendant with the following facts:

(a) Such marriage was contracted on August 3, 1950 before a judge of the municipal court of
Zamboanga City;

(b) The ground for the annulment was that the office of the defendant’s genitals was to small to
allow the penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation;

(c) On June 14, 1955, the defendant was summoned and served a copy of the complaint. She
did not file an answer.

(d) On September 29, 1956, pursuant to Article 88 of the Civil Code, the Court directed the city
attorney of Zamboanga to inquire whether there was a collusion, to intervene for the State to see that the
evidence of the plaintiff is not a frame-up, concocted, or fabricated;

(e) On December 17, 1956, the Court entered an order requiring the defendant to submit to a
physical examination by a competent lady physician to determine her physical capacity for copulation and
to submit, within ten (10) days from the receipt of the order, a medical certificate on the result thereof.

(f) On March 14, 1957, the defendant was granted additional five (5) days to comply in relation to
the order issued in the preceding number.
 (g) On April, 11, 1957, the defendant did not show. The Court deemed lack of interest on her part
in the case. The Court entered a decree annulling the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant.

On April 26, 1957, the city attorney filed a motion for reconsideration of the decree thus entered upon the
ground that:

(a) The defendant’s impotency was not satisfactorily established as required by law;

(b) That instead of annulling the marriage the Court should have punished her for contempt of
court and compelled her to undergo a physical examination and submit a medical certificate; and

(c) That the decree sough to be reconsidered would open the door to married couples, who want
to end their marriage to collude or connive with each other by just alleging impotency of one of them.

He prayed that the complaint be dismissed that the wife be ordered for a physical examination.

On May 13, 1957, the motion for reconsideration was denied.

Issues:

The issue is whether or not the marriage in question may be annulled on the strength only of the lone
testimony of the husband who claimed and testified that his wife was and is impotent.

Held:

No. The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is
insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife. The incidents of
the status are governed by law, not by will of the parties. The law specifically enumerates the legal
grounds that must be proved to exist by indubitable evidence, to annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the
annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was
expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and
seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established,

The decree is set aside and the case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in
accordance with the decision, without pronouncement as to costs.
Impotency

Joel and Remedios are husband and wife. Joel later filed for annulment on grounds that
Remedios is impotent because her genitals were too small for copulation and such was
already existing at the time of the marriage. Remedios was summoned to answer the
complaint of Joel but she refused to do so. It was found that there was no collusion
between the parties notwithstanding the non-cooperation of Remedios in the case.
Remedios was ordered to have herself be submitted to an expert to determine if her
genitals are indeed too small for copulation. Remedios again refused to do as ordered.
The trial was heard solely on Joel’s complaint. The marriage was later annulled.
ISSUE: Whether or not Remedios’ impotency has been established.
HELD: In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon
the sole testimony of Joel who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at
securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether Remedios is
really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established, because from
the commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained
from taking part therein. Although her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in
court show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of
the suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred, because women of this
country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical
examination unless compelled to by competent authority. Impotency being an abnormal
condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency. The lone
testimony of Joel that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient
to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.

Jones v. Hortiguela, 64 Phil 179

FACTS

Marciana Escano and Arthur Jones got married in December 1914. On January 10, 1918, Jones
secured a passport. She never heard from him again. In 1919, she filed for a proceeding to
judicially declare Arthur missing. On October 25, 1919, the court declared Arthur as an absentee
with the proviso that said judicial declaration of absence would not take effect until six months
after its publication in the official newspapers pursuant to Art. 186 of the Old Civil Code. In 23
April 1921, the court issued another order for the taking effect of the declaration of absence,
publication thereof having been made in the Official Gazette and in "El Ideal." On May 6, 1927,
Marciana contracted a second marriage with Felix Hortiguela. When Marciana died intestate,
Felix was appointed as judicial administrator of the estate. Angelita Jones, Marciana’s daughter
from her first marriage, filed a case and alleged that she is the only heir of her mother and that
her mother’s marriage to Felix was null and void on the ground that from April 23, 1921 (when
the court issued an order for the taking effect of declaration of absence & publication thereof) to
May 6, 1927 (her mother and Felix’s marriage) was below the 7-year prescriptive period. With
this, the marriage would be null and void and would render her as the sole heir.

ISSUE: W/N the marriage of Marciana and Felix is null and void. W/N Felix is a legitimate heir
of Marciana.

HELD. Yes and Yes. the absence of Marciana Escaño's former husband should be counted from
January 10, 1918, the date on which the last news concerning Arthur W. Jones was received, and
from said date to May 6, 1927, more than nine years elapsed. The validity of the marriage makes
him a legitimate heir.
SSS v.Jarque, G.R. No. 165545, March 24, 2006
FACTS:

On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon and Alice P. Diaz contracted marriage in Barcelona,
Sorsogon. On October 9, 1970, Bailon filed before the CFI of Sorsogon a petition to declare
Alice presumptively dead. On December 10, 1970, the CFI granted the petition. Close to 13
years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively dead or on August 8, 1983, Bailon
contracted marriage with Teresita Jarque in Casiguran, Sorsogon. She was designated as SSS
beneficiary of Bailon. SSS cancelled the claim of respondent Teresita Jarque of her monthly
pension for death benefits on the basis of the opinion rendered by its legal department that her
marriage with Bailon was void as it was contracted during the subsistence of Bailon’s marriage
with Alice. Teresita protested the cancellation of her monthly pension for death benefits asserting
that her marriage with Bailon was not declared before any court of justice as bigamous or
unlawful. Hence, it remained valid and subsisting for all legal intents and purposes.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subsequent marriage of Clemente Bailon and respondent Teresita
Jarque may terminate by mere reappearance of the absent spouse of Bailon

HELD: The second marriage contracted by a person with an absent spouse endures until
annulled. It is only the competent court that can nullify the second marriage pursuant to Article
87 of the Civil Code and upon the reappearance of the missing spouse, which action for
annulment may be filed. The two marriages involved here falls under the Civil Code. Under the
Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable, it is terminated by final judgment of
annulment in a case instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses in
the subsequent marriage. Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent
marriage is necessary. Thus Article 42 thereof provides the subsequent marriage shall be
automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse,
unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio. If the
absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by affidavit
or by court action, such absentee‘s mere reappearance will not terminate such marriage. Since
the second marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is
dead, such presumption continues inspite of the spouse‘s physical reappearance. In the case at
bar, as no step was taken to nullify Bailon & Jargue’s marriage, Teresita is proclaimed to be
rightfully the dependent spouse-beneficiary of Bailon.

FACTS:
In 1955 Clemente Bailon and Alice Diaz married in Barcelona, Sorsogon. 15+ years
later, Clemente filed an action to declare the presumptive death of Alice she being an
absentee. The petition was granted in 1970. In 1983, Clemente married Jarque. The
two live together untile Clemente’s death in 1998. Jarque then sought to claim her
husband’s SSS benefits and the same were granted her. On the other hand, a certain
Cecilia Baion-Yap who claimed that she is the daughter of Bailon to a certain Elisa
Jayona petitioned before the SSS that they be given the reimbursement for the funeral
spending for it was actually them who shouldered the burial expenses of Clemente.
They further claim that Clemente contracted three marriages; one with Alice, another
with Elisa and the other with Jarque. Cecilia also averred that Alice is alive and kicking
and Alice subsequently emerged; Cecilia claimed that Clemente obtained the
declaration of Alice’s presumptive death in bad faith for he was aware of the
whereabouts of Alice or if not he could have easily located her in her parent’s place.
She was in Sorsogon all along in her parents’ place. She went there upon learning that
Clemente had been having extra-marital affairs. SSS then ruled that Jarque should
reimburse what had been granted her and to return the same to Cecilia since she
shouldered the burial expenses and that the benefits should go to Alice because her
reappearance had terminated Clemente’s marriage with Harque. Further, SSS ruled
that the RTC’s decision in declaring Alice to be presumptively death is erroneous.
Teresita appealed the decision of the SSS before the Social Security Comission and the
SSC affirmed SSS. The CA however ruled the contrary.
ISSUE: Whether or not the mere appearance of the absent spouse declared
presumptively dead automatically terminates the subsequent marriage.
HELD: There is no previous marriage to restore for it is terminated upon Clemente’s
death. Likewise there is no subsequent marriage to terminate for the same is terminated
upon Clemente’s death. SSS is correct in ruling that it is futile for Alice to pursue the
recording of her reappearance before the local civil registrar through an affidavit or a
court action. But it is not correct for the SSS to rule upon the declaration made by the
RTC. The SSC or the SSS has no judicial power to review the decision of the RTC. SSS
is indeed empowered to determine as to who should be the rightful beneficiary of the
benefits obtained by a deceased member in case of disputes but such power does not
include the appellate power to review a court decision or declaration. In the case at bar,
the RTC ruling is binding and Jarque’s marriage to Clemente is still valid because no
affidavit was filed by Alice to make known her reappearance legally. Alice reappeared
only after Clemente’s death and in this case she can no longer file such an affidavit; in
this case the bad faith [or good faith] of Clemente can no longer be raised – the
marriage herein is considered voidable and must be attacked directly not collaterally – it
is however impossible for a direct attack since there is no longer a marriage to be
attacked for the same has been terminated upon Clemente’s death.
Valdez vs Republic
Valdez vs. Republic

GR No. 180863, September 8, 2009

FACTS:

Angelita Valdez was married with Sofio in January 1971. She gave birth to a baby girl named Nancy.
They argued constantly because Sofio was unemployed and did not bring home any money. In March
1972, the latter left their house. Angelita and her child waited until in May 1972, they decided to go back
to her parent’s home. 3 years have passed without any word from Sofio until in October 1975 when he
showed up and they agreed to separate and executed a document to that effect. It was the last time they
saw each other and had never heard of ever since. Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner
married Virgilio Reyes in June 1985. Virgilio’s application for naturalization in US was denied because
petitioner’s marriage with Sofio was subsisting. Hence, in March 2007, petitioner filed a petition seeking
declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration of
presumptive death of Sofio.

HELD:

The court ruled that no decree on the presumption of Sofio’s death is necessary because Civil Code
governs during 1971 and not Family Code where at least 7 consecutive years of absence is only needed.
Thus, petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio and their marriage is legal and valid.

Facts: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971. They begot 5

children. In 1992, Valdez filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground

of psychological incapacity. The trial court granted the petition, thereby declaring their marriage
null and void. It also directed the parties to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common

properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions

of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code.

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision. She asserted that the Family Code

contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions
withoutmarriage.

In an Order, the trial court made the following clarification: "Consequently, considering that

Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the property acquired by both parties

during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained

through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and
defendant will own their 'family home' and all their other properties for that matter in equal

shares. In the liquidation and partition of the properties owned in common by the plaintiff and

defendant, the provisions on co-ownership found in the Civil Code shall apply."

Valdes moved for reconsideration of the Order which was denied. Valdes appealed, arguing that:

(1) Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychological
incapacitated; (2) Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code
govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio,

including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses;

(3) Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the

ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with
Article 129.

Issues:
Whether Art 147 FC is the correct law governing the disposition of property in the case at bar.

Held:
Yes. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties

during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such

as the case may be, of the Family Code.

Article 147 applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each

other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the
benefit of marriage. Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their

work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired

during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A
party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having
contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the

family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate

property are not included in the co-ownership.

REPUBLIC V. GRANADA
DOCTRINE:

Even if the RTC erred in ruling that therespondent was able to prove her “well-
founded belief” that her absent spouse was already dead, such order already final
and can no longer be modified or reversed. Indeed, “[n]othing is more settled in law
than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and
unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of
fact or law.”

FACTS:

Cyrus and Yolanda Granada, both employees of Sumida Electric Company, got
married in 1993.

Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down, Cyrus went
to Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from that time, she did not
receive any communication from her husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate him.
Her brother testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latter’s
whereabouts, to no avail.

After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared
presumptively dead with the RTC Lipa City. On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered
a Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead.

On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the OSG,

filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision. Petitioner argued that Yolanda
had failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed to prove her well-
founded belief that he was already dead. The motion was denied. The OSG then
elevated the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals. Yolanda filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal. She argued
that her Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death, based on Article 41 of the
Family Code, was a summary judicial proceeding, in which the judgment is
immediately final and executory and, thus, not appealable.

The appellate court granted Yolanda’s Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. Citing Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, the CA ruled that a petition for
declaration of presumptive death under Rule 41 of the Family Code is
a summary proceeding. Thus, judgment thereon is immediately final and executory
upon notice to the parties.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied. Hence, the present petition
under Rule 45.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the order of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties and,
hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal.

2. Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s grant of the petition for declaration
of presumptive death based on evidence that respondent had presented.

HELD:

Yes, the declaration of presumptive death is finaland immediately executory. Even if

the RTC erred in granting the petition, such order can no longer be assailed.

The Facts:
Edna and Romeo were married on December 21, 1978. In 1992,
Edna went to work as a domestic helper in Singapore, while Romeo
was left behind to work as a mechanic. Sometime in 1993, Edna
learned from her children that Romeo left the conjugal home, never to
return and to be heard again. Thus, she took a leave of absence from
work to look for Romeo; she inquired from her friends as well as her
parents-in-law the whereabouts of Romeo, to no avail She also went
to his hometown in Escalante, Negros Oriental to look for him. On the
basis of these efforts, Edna filed a petition for declaration of
presumptive death of Romeo before the RTC on August 6, 2009, in
accordance with Article 41 of the Family Code. After trial, the RTC,
basing on the lone testimony of Edna, granted the petition for
declaration of presumptive death of Romeo. The Office of the Solicitor
General assailed the RTC thru a petition for certiorari before the Court
of Appeals, arguing that the decision was not in accord with
established jurisprudence in Republic v. Nolasco⁠1 (Nolasco) and U.S.
v. Biasbas⁠2 The CA, however, dismissed the petition for certiorari,
hence the OSG elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
The Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC decision granting
the petition for declaration of presumptive death of Romeo.

The Ruling:
The Court grants the petition.

Article 41 of the Family Code provides that before a judicial

declaration of presumptive death may be granted, the present spouse
must prove that he/she has a well-founded belief that the absentee is
dead.⁠3In this case, Edna failed. The RTC and the CA overlooked
Edna’s patent non-compliance with the said requirement. The well-
founded belief in the absentee’s death requires the present spouse to
prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable
efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts
and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the
absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort
(not a mere passive one). Mere absence of the spouse (even beyond
the period required by law), lack of any news that the absentee
spouse is still alive, mere failure to communicate, or general
presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice.⁠4 The
premise is that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present
spouse the burden of complying with the stringent requirement of well-
founded belief which can only be discharged upon a showing of
proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not
only the absent spouse’s whereabouts but, more importantly, whether
the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.⁠5

G.R. No. 164915 March 10, 2006ERIC JONATHAN YU vs.

CAROLINE T. YUFACTS:
Eric Jonathan Yu filed a petition for habeas corpus before CAalleging that his estranged wife
Caroline Yu unlawfully withheld from himthe custody of their minor child Bianca.
Subsequently, respondent filed apetition for declaration of nullity of marriage and dissolution of
theabsolute community of property. The petition included a prayer for theaward to her of the sole
custody of Bianca and for the fixing of scheduleof peti
tioner’s visiting rights "subject only to the final and executory
judgment of the CA.

ISSUE:
Is WHC available to determine the custodial rights of parents overtheir children?

HELD:No.
Articles 49 and 50 of the Family Code provides that the issue on the
custody of the spouse’s common children is deemed pleaded in the
declaration of nullity case. Hence, the writ of habeas corpus cannot beavailed of by either
spouse. Pursuant to the aforementioned provisions, itis the court who shall determine the custody
of the common children inthe case for declaration of nullity

Tamano v.Judge Ortiz, G.R. No. 126603, June 29, 1998

FACTS:
Sen. Tamano and Zorayda Tamano married in civil rites. Before Sen. Tamano died, he married
Estrellita in civil rites too. A year after Sen. Tamano’s death, Zorayda and her son filed a
complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage of her husband and Estrellita on the ground that
it was bigamous. Zorayda further claimed that her husband claimed to be divorces and Estrellita
as single, hence, their marriage was fraudulent. Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that
QC RTC has no jurisdiction because only a party to a marriage could file an action for
annulment against the other spouse. Estrellita also contended that since Tamano and Zorayda
were both Muslims and married in Muslim rites, the jurisdiction to hear and try the case is vested
in Sharia courts pursuant to Art 155 of Code of Muslim. RTC denied the petition and ruled it has
jurisdiction since Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil Code. Motion
for reconsideration was also denied. Petitioner referred to SC which ruled that it should be
referred to CA first. The CA ruled that the case would fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of
sharia courts only when filed in places where there are sharia courts. But in places where there
are no sharia courts, the instant petition could be at RTC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N Sharia courts and not the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject case and the nature
of action.

HELD: SC held that RTC has jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of marriage and
marital relations. In this case, both petitioner and the deceased were married through a civil
wedding. And whether or not they were likewise married in a Muslim wedding, sharia courts are
still not vested with original jurisdiction over marriages married under civil and Muslim law.
Tamano vs. Ortiz, G.R. NO. 126603, June 29, 1998
FACTS:
In 1958, Senator Tamano married private respondent Zorayda Tamano in civil rites. Prior to his
death, particularly in 1993, Tamano also married petitioner Estrelita Tamano in civil rites in
Malabang, Lanao del Sur.

In 1994, private respondent Zorayda joined by her son Adib Tamano filed a
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
of Tamano and Estrelita on the ground that it was bigamous. Private respondent claimed that
Tamano and Estrelita mis represented themselves as divorced and single, respectively, thus
making the entries in the marriage contract false and fraudulent

Estrelita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City was
without jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the action alleging that “only a party to
marriage” could file an action for annulment of marriage against the other spouse. Petitioner
likewise contended that since Tamano and Zorayda were both Muslims and married in Muslim
rites the jurisdiction to hear and try the instant case was vested in the shari’a courts pursuant to
Art. 155 of the Code of Muslim.

The lower court denied the petition and ruled that it has jurisdiction since Estrelita and Tamano
were married in accordance with the Civil Code and not exclusively under PD. No.1083. The
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied

Petitioner referred the case to the Supreme Court where a resolution was issued to refer thecase
to the CA for consolidation. Respondents Zorayda however filed a motion, which theCA granted,
to resolve the Complaint for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage ahead of other consolidated
cases

The CA ruled that the instant case would fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of shari’a courts
only when filed in places where there are shari’a courts. But in places where there not shari’a
courts, like Quezon City, the instant case could properly be filed before the Regional Trial
Courts.

Hence, the petition

ISSUE:
1.Whether or not the Shari’a Court and not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over
thesubject case and the nature of action?

ISSUE:
1. The Court held that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the subject case. Under the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980
, the Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of marriage
and marital relations. There should be no question by now that what determines the nature of an
action and correspondingly the court which has jurisdiction over it are the allegations made by
the plaintiff in this case. The Regional Trial Court was not divested of jurisdiction to hear and
try the instant case despite the allegation in the Motion for Reconsideration that Estrellita and
Taman were likewise married in Muslim rites. This is because a court’s jurisdiction cannot be
made to depend upon defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss, or in a motion
for reconsideration, but only upon allegations of the complaint