Kashmir Conflict

BACKGROUND:
 According to folk etymology, the name "Kashmir" means "desiccated land" (from
the Sanskrit: Ka = water and shimira = desiccate).
 An earlier and well known recorded reference can be found in the writings of
Hsien Tsang, a 6th Century Chinese Buddhist who referred to a state called
'Kash-mi-lo' that had existed in the 1st century.
 The mid-12th century Rajatarangini, a history of Kashmir written by Kalhana,
records that the valley of Kashmir was formerly a lake.
 The Pashtun Durrani Empire ruled Kashmir in the 18th century until its 1819
conquest by the Sikh ruler Ranjit Singh.
 Following the First Anglo-Sikh War (1845–1846), Kashmir was ceded under the
Treaty of Lahore to the East India Company, who sold it shortly afterwards
through the Treaty of Amritsar to Gulab Singh, Raja of Jammu, who thereafter
received the title Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir.
 From then until the 1947 Partition of India, Kashmir was ruled by the Hindu
Maharajas of the princely state of Kashmir and Jammu, although the majority of
the population were Muslim

CURRENT SCENARIO:

 Chief Minister: Mehbooba Mufti Sayeed , 28 SEATS OUT OF 87, PEOPLE

DEMOCRATIC PARTY
 HURRIYAT PARTY LEADER : YASIN MALIK arrested and other leaders are house
arrest
 Protests are ongoing by common man as well as college students including girls
 Martyrdom of Burhan wani, rapidly grew the wave of freedom
 2016-OCT: UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon on Friday regretted the fact that
the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was
unable to fully function in held Kashmir due to India’s non-cooperation.
 2016-OCT: Pakistan's Permanent Representative to UN Dr Maleeha Lodhi, in the
meeting with the top diplomat, asked the UN secretary general to ensure that
UNMOGIP is able to report facts independently regarding the situation in held
Kashmir to the UN Security Council.
Facts:

 Kashmir is an 86,000-square mile region in the northern part of the Indian

subcontinent.
 The separatist violence has killed more than 47,000 people, which does not
include people who have disappeared due to the conflict. Some human rights
groups and nongovernmental organizations put the death toll at twice that
amount.
 India and Pakistan have been fighting over Kashmir since both countries gained
their independence in 1947.
 The Line of Control separating Indian- and Pakistani-controlled parts of Kashmir is
435 miles (700 km) long.
 India-controlled: One state, called Jammu and Kashmir, makes up the southern
and eastern portions of the region, totaling about 45% of Kashmir.
 Pakistan-controlled: Three areas called Azad Kashmir, Gilgit and Baltistan make
up the northern and western portions of the region, totaling about 35% of
Kashmir.
 China-controlled: One area called Aksai Chin in the northeastern part of the
region, equaling 20% of Kashmir.
 Between January 1990 and April 2011: 43,460 people have been killed in the
Kashmir insurgency. Of these, 21,323 are militants, 13,226 civilians killed by
militants, 3,642 civilians killed by security forces, and 5,369 policemen killed by
militants. The 21,323 militants were killed in operations by security forces and
include both Kashmiri and foreign militants. And of the 5,369 members of the
security forces, around 1,500 are Kashmiri policemen.

DEVELOPMENTS:
1990s - The insurgency continues, with Kashmiri militants training in Pakistan and India deploying
hundreds of thousands of troops in Jammu and Kashmir. Violence against civilians by both sides is
widespread.

1999 - India and Pakistan go to war again after militants cross from Pakistani-administered Kashmir
into the Indian-administered Kargil district. India repulses the attack, accuses Pakistan of being
behind it, and breaks off relations.

2001-2004 - Moves to boost relations between the two countries are punctuated by continuing
violence, notably an attack on the parliament of Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir in Srinagar
in 2001.

2010 - Major protests erupt in the Kashmir Valley of Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir over
the summer after a demonstrator is killed by the Indian army. The protests abate in September after
the government announce measures to ease tension.

2011 August - Chief Minister Omar Abdullah announces an amnesty for the 1,200 young men who
threw stones at security forces during the anti-government protests in the Kashmir Valley the
previous year.

Indian State Human Rights Commission confirms presence of more than 2,000 unidentified bodies in
unmarked graves near the Line of Control. Activists say many may be people who disappeared after
being arrested by security forces.
2011 September - Indian forces kill three Pakistani soldiers in firing across the Line of Control. India
accuses Pakistan of opening fire first.

2013 February - Kashmiri Jaish-e-Mohammed member Mohammad Afzal Guru hanged over role in
2001 Indian parliament terror attack, prompting protests in which two young men are killed.

2013 September - Prime ministers of India and Pakistan meet and agree to try reduce the number of
violent incidents at their disputed border in Kashmir.

2014 August - India cancels talks with Pakistan after accusing it of interfering in India's internal
affairs. The decision comes after Pakistan's High Commissioner in Delhi consulted Kashmiri separatist
leaders in advance of the talks. During a visit to the disputed border state of Jammu and Kashmir,
India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi accuses Pakistan of waging a proxy war against India in
Kashmir.

2014 October - Pakistan and India exchange strongly-worded warnings, after a flare-up of violence
across their common border leaves at least 18 people dead.

BJP joins government

2015 March - India's ruling BJP party is sworn into government in Indian-administered Kashmir for
first time in coalition with local People's Democratic Party, with the latter's Mufti Mohammad
Sayeed as chief minister.

2015 September - Muslim separatist leaders in Indian-administered Kashmir close shops, businesses
and government departments in protest at the enforcement of a colonial-era ban on eating beef.

2015 November - One person dies in violent protests following a visit to Indian-administered
Kashmir by Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

2016 April - Mehbooba Mufti, the leader of the People's Democratic Party (PDP), becomes the first
female chief minister of Indian-administered Kashmir following the death of her father and party
founder Mufti Mohammad Sayeed.

Curfew

2016 July - Authorities impose an indefinite curfew in most parts of Indian-administered Kashmir
after the killing of popular militant by security forces of Burhan Wani, a popular militant and top
commander of the Hizbul Mujahideen group, sparks violent protests.

2016 August - A curfew in most parts of Indian-administered Kashmir is lifted but schools, shops and
most banks remain shut and mobile and internet services remain suspended. At least 68 civilians and
two security officials have died and more than 9,000 people injured in over 50 days of violence
according to official tallies.

2016 September - India and Pakistan exchange a war of words after 18 Indian soldiers are killed in a
raid by gunmen on an army base in Indian-administered Kashmir.

2016 September - India says it has carried out "surgical strikes" against suspected militants along the
de-facto border with Pakistan in Kashmir but Pakistan rejects the claims.

2016 October - The Indian army shoots dead three suspected militants as they try to enter an army
camp in northern Kashmir.
2016 November - Human Rights Watch appeals for an end to the burning of schools in Indian-
administered Kashmir after the total set alight since a wave of pro-separatist unrest began in July
reaches 25.

2016―17 unrest in Kashmir:

 Killing of Burhan Wani
 Media blackout
 Social Media ban
 Newspaper ban
 Arrest of human rights activist
 Action against security personnel
 Internet Ban
 Persistent militarisation of Kashmir
 Human rights abuses
 Use of pellet guns , tear gas shells, rubber bullets, as well as assault rifles(According
to official records at SMHS, the main hospital in Srinagar, 570 people
sought treatment after their eyeballs were ruptured by metal pellets )
 Aggressive movement ever
 CPEC issue: India claims this territory

As working president of the National Conference, he said, “To blame Pakistan alone for the
political situation or the current unrest in the Valley is a distortion of the truth.

Partition and dispute:

 British rule in India ended in 1947 with the creation of a new state: the Dominion
of Pakistan Muslim league alongside the Union of India, the successor state to
British India,
 while British suzerainty over the 562 Indian princely states ended. According to
the Indian Independence Act 1947, States were thereafter left to choose whether
to join India or Pakistan or to remain independent.
 Jammu and Kashmir, the largest of the princely states, had a predominantly
Muslim population ruled by the Hindu Maharaja Hari Singh. Following partition,
Pakistan had expected the annexation of Kashmir to its territory.

Reasons behind the dispute:

 Both countries subsequently made claims to Kashmir, based on the history
and religious affiliations of the Kashmiri people.
  The princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, which lies strategically in the
north-west of the subcontinent bordering Afghanistan and China, was formerly
ruled by Maharaja Hari Singh under the paramountcy of British India.
 In geographical and legal terms, the Maharaja could have joined either of the
two new countries. Although urged by the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten of
Burma, to determine the future of his state before the transfer of power took
place, Singh demurred.
 In October 1947, incursions by Pakistan took place leading to a war, as a
result of which the state of Jammu and Kashmir remains divided between
India and Pakistan.

ROLE OF MAHARAJA:

 Hari Singh, the maharaja of Kashmir, initially believed that by delaying his
decision he could maintain the independence of Kashmir
 Maharaja signed an instrument of accession on 25 October 1947 to the Indian
union.
 Revolution among his Muslim subjects along the western borders of the state and
the intervention of Pashtun tribesmen

Indo-Pakistani War of 1947:

 Maharaja supported the annexation of Kashmir by India, militant Muslims from
western Kashmir and Pakistani tribesmen made rapid advances into the
Baramulla sector.
 Maharaja of Kashmir Hari Singh asked the government of India to intervene.
However, India and Pakistan had signed a non-intervention agreement.
 Before the tribesmen's arrived, India argued that the Maharaja must complete
negotiations to cede Jammu and Kashmir to India in exchange for military aid.
The subsequent cession agreement was signed by the Maharaja and Lord
Mountbatten of Burma.
 In Jammu and Kashmir, National Conference volunteers worked with the Indian
Army to drive out the Pakistanis.

 The Instrument of Accession of Kashmir to India was accepted by Viceroy Louis

Mountbatten, 1st Earl Mountbatten of Burma.
 The resulting First Kashmir War lasted until 1948, when India sought resolution of
the issue at the UN Security Council.
 Sheikh Abdullah was not in favour of India seeking UN intervention because he
was sure the Indian Army could free the entire state from invaders.
 Following the set-up of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan
(UNCIP), the UN Security Council passed Resolution 47 on 21 April 1948. The
measure imposed an immediate cease-fire and called on the Government of
Pakistan 'to secure the withdrawal from the state of Jammu and Kashmir of
tribesmen
 It also asked Government of India to reduce its forces to minimum strength, after
which the circumstances for holding a plebiscite should be put into effect 'on the
question of Accession of the state to India or Pakistan.'
 However, both India and Pakistan failed to arrive at a truce agreement due to
differences over interpretation of the procedure for and the extent of
demilitarisation.
 One sticking point was whether the Azad Kashmiri army was to be disbanded
during the truce stage or at the plebiscite stage

END OF WAR
 In November 1948, although both the Indian and Pakistani governments agreed
to hold the plebiscite, the failure of Pakistan to withdraw its troops from Kashmir
was a violation of the agreed conditions for holding it and the process stalled.
 Furthermore, the Indian Government distanced itself from its previous
commitment to hold a plebiscite.
 India then proposed that Pakistan withdraw all its troops first, calling it a
precondition for a plebiscite.
 Pakistan rejected the proposal on the grounds that the Kashmiris would be unable
to vote freely in the presence of the Indian army and in the light of the friendship
between Sheikh Abdullah and Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru.
 However, Pakistan proposed simultaneous withdrawal of all troops followed by a
plebiscite under international aegis, which India rejected.

UN SECURITY COUNCIL:
 As a result Pakistani forces did not unilaterally withdraw.Over the next few years,
the UN Security Council passed four new resolutions, revising the terms of
Resolution 47 to include a synchronous withdrawal of both Indian and Pakistani
troops from the region on the recommendations of General Andrew McNaughton.
 To this end, UN arbitrators put forward 11 different proposals for the
demilitarisation of the region.
 All of these were accepted by Pakistan, but rejected by the Indian government.
 The resolutions were passed by the United Nations Security Council under
Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter and as such are considered non-binding
with no mandatory enforceability, as opposed to resolutions passed under
Chapter VII.

Sino-Indian War
 In 1962, troops from the People's Republic of China and India clashed in territory
claimed by both. China won a swift victory in the war, resulting in Chinese
annexation of the region they call Aksai Chin and which has continued since then.
 Another smaller area, the Trans-Karakoram, was demarcated as the Line of
Control (LOC) between China and Pakistan,
 Although some of the territory on the Chinese side is claimed by India to be part
of Kashmir. The line that separates India from China in this region is known as
the "Line of Actual Control"

1965 and 1971 Wars

 The Indian forces intruded into Pakistani area in the Rann of Kutch in April 1965.
In a sharp and short conflict, the Indian forces were ejected. Both the armies had
fully mobilized, with eyeball to eyeball contact. Pakistan proposed cease-fire,
India accepted. An agreement was signed: the forces disengaged.
 The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 resulted in the defeat of Pakistan and the
Pakistani military's surrender in East Pakistan, leading to the creation of
Bangladesh.
 The Simla Agreement, signed in 1972 between India and Pakistan, allowed both
countries to settle all issues by peaceful means through mutual discussion within
the framework of the UN Charter.

1989 popular insurgency and militancy

 In 1989, a widespread popular and armed insurgency started in Kashmir. After
the 1987 state legislative assembly election, some of the results were disputed.
 This resulted in the formation of militant wings and marked the beginning of the
Mujahadeen insurgency, which continues to this day
 India contends that the insurgency was largely started by Afghan mujahadeen
who entered the Kashmir valley following the end of the Soviet-Afghan War.
  Yasin Malik, a leader of Huriyat party of the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front, was
one of the Kashmiris to organise militancy in Kashmir, along with Ashfaq Majid
Wani and Farooq Ahmad Dar (alias Bitta Karatay).
 Since 1995, Malik has renounced the use of violence and calls for strictly peaceful
methods to resolve the dispute. Malik developed differences with one of the
senior leaders, Farooq Siddiqui (alias Farooq Papa), for shunning demands for an
independent Kashmir and trying to cut a deal with the Indian Prime Minister.
 This resulted in a spilt in which Bitta Karatay, Salim Nanhaji, and other senior
comrades joined Farooq Papa.
 Pakistan claims these insurgents are Jammu and Kashmir citizens, and are rising
up against the Indian army as part of an independence movement.
 Amnesty International has accused security forces in Indian-controlled Kashmir of
exploiting the Public Safety Act that enables them to "hold prisoners without
trial".
 India claims these insurgents are Islamic terrorist groups from Pakistan-
administered Kashmir and Afghanistan, fighting to make Jammu and Kashmir a
part of Pakistan.
 The Pakistani government calls these insurgents "Kashmiri freedom fighters", and
claims that it provides them only moral and diplomatic support, although India
believes they are Pakistan-supported terrorists from Pakistan Administered
Kashmir.
 In October 2008, President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan called the Kashmir
separatists "terrorists" in an interview with The Wall Street Journal. These
comments sparked outrage amongst many Kashmiris, some of whom defied a
curfew imposed by the Indian army to burn him in effigy

1999 Conflict in Kargil

 In mid-1999, insurgents and Pakistani soldiers from Pakistani Kashmir infiltrated
Jammu and Kashmir.
 During the winter season, Indian forces regularly move down to lower altitudes,
as severe climatic conditions makes it almost impossible for them to guard the
high peaks near the Line of Control.
 The insurgents took advantage of this and occupied vacant mountain peaks in the
Kargil range overlooking the highway in Indian Kashmir that connects Srinagar
and Leh. By blocking the highway, they could cut off the only link between the
Kashmir Valley and Ladakh.
 This resulted in a large-scale conflict between the Indian and Pakistani armies.
 Fears of the Kargil War turning into a nuclear war provoked the then-United
States President Bill Clinton to pressure Pakistan to retreat.
 The Pakistan Army withdrew their remaining troops from the area, ending the
conflict. India reclaimed control of the peaks, which they now patrol and monitor
all year long.

2000s Al-Qaeda involvement

 Allegations of support system in Pakistan for Osama bin Laden
In a 'Letter to American People' written by Osama bin Laden in 2002, he stated
that one of the reasons he was fighting America was because of its support for
India on the Kashmir issue.
 While on a trip to Delhi in 2002, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
suggested that Al-Qaeda was active in Kashmir, though he did not have any hard
evidence.
 An investigation by a Christian Science Monitor reporter in 2002 claimed to have
unearthed evidence that Al-Qaeda and its affiliates were prospering in Pakistan-
administered Kashmir with tacit approval of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence
agency (ISI)
  In 2002, a team comprising Special Air Service and Delta Force personnel was
sent into Indian-administered Kashmir to hunt for Osama bin Laden after reports
that he was being sheltered by the Kashmiri militant group Harkat-ul-Mujahideen.
 US intelligence analysts say Al-Qaeda and Taliban operatives in Pakistan-
administered Kashmir are helping terrorists trained in Afghanistan to infiltrate
Indian-administered Kashmir.
 In 2006 Al-Qaeda claim they have established a wing in Kashmir, which worried
the Indian government.
 Indian Army Lieutenant General H.S. Panag, GOC-in-C Northern Command, told
reporters that the army has ruled out the presence of Al-Qaeda in Indian-
administered Jammu and Kashmir.

Indian view:

 India holds that the Instrument of Accession of the State of Jammu and
Kashmir to the Union of India, signed by Maharaja Hari Singh (erstwhile ruler
of the State) on 25 October 1947and executed on 27 October 1947 between
the ruler of Kashmir and the Governor General of India was a legal act and
completely valid in terms of the Government of India Act (1935), Indian
Independence Act (1947) as well as under international
 India does not accept the two-nation theory that forms the basis of Pakistan's
claims and considers that Kashmir, despite being a Muslim-majority state, is
in many ways an "integral part" of secular India.
 The state of Jammu and Kashmir was provided with significant autonomy
under Article 370 of the Constitution of India.
 All differences between India and Pakistan, including Kashmir, need to be
settled through bilateral negotiations as agreed to by the two countries under
the Simla Agreement signed on 2 July 1972.[88]
 The Government of India has repeatedly accused Pakistan of waging a proxy
war in Kashmir by providing weapons and financial assistance to terrorist
groups in the region.
 Pakistan is trying to raise anti-India sentiment among the people of Kashmir
by spreading false propaganda against India.
 According to the state government of Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistani radio
and television channels deliberately spread "hate and venom" against India to
alter Kashmiri opinion.
 The UN Chapter VII resolution that makes it mandatory for member states to
not provide active or passive support to terrorist organisations
 Specifically, it has pointed out that the Pakistani government continues to
support various terrorist organisations, such as Jaish-e-Mohammad and
Lashkar-e-Taiba, in direct violation of this resolution.
 Karan Singh, the son of the last ruler of the princely state of Kashmir and
Jammu, has said that the Instrument of Accession signed by his father was
the same as signed by other states.
 He opined that Kashmir was therefore a part of India, and that its special
status granted by Article 370 of the Indian Constitution stemmed from the
fact that it had its own constitution.
In 2008, the death toll from the last 20 years was estimated by Indian
authorities to be over 47,000.

Pakistani view:
 Pakistan's claims to the disputed region are based on the rejection of Indian
claims to Kashmir, namely the Instrument of Accession.
  Pakistan insists that the Maharaja was not a popular leader, and was regarded as
a tyrant by most Kashmiris.
 Pakistan maintains that the Maharaja used brute force to suppress the
population.
 Pakistan claims that Indian forces were in Kashmir before the Instrument of
Accession was signed with India,
 and that therefore Indian troops were in Kashmir in violation of the Standstill
Agreement,
 From 1990 to 1999, some organisations reported that the Indian Armed Forces,
its paramilitary groups, and counter-insurgent militias were responsible for the
deaths of 4,501 Kashmiri civilians. During the same period, there were records of
4,242 women between the ages of 7–70 being raped.
 The popular Kashmiri insurgency demonstrates that the Kashmiri people no
longer wish to remain within India. Pakistan suggests that this means that
Kashmir either wants to be with Pakistan or independent
 According to the two-nation theory, one of the theories that is cited for the
partition that created India and Pakistan, Kashmir should have been with
Pakistan, because it has a Muslim majority.
 India has shown disregard for the resolutions of the UN Security Council and the
United Nations Commission in India and Pakistan by failing to hold a plebiscite to
determine the future allegiance of the state.
 Pakistan was of the view that the Maharaja of Kashmir had no right to call in the
Indian Army, because it held that the Maharaja of Kashmir was not a hereditary
ruler and was merely a British appointee, after the British defeated Ranjit Singh
who ruled the area before the British conquest.
 Pakistan has noted the widespread use of extrajudicial killings in Indian-
administered Kashmir carried out by Indian security forces while claiming they
were caught up in encounters with militants.
 Human rights organisations have strongly condemned Indian troops for
widespread rape and murder of innocent civilians while accusing these civilians of
being militants.
 The Chenab formula was a compromise proposed in the 1960s, in which the
Kashmir valley and other Muslim-dominated areas north of the Chenab river
would go to Pakistan, and Jammu and other Hindu-dominated regions would go
to India.
 A survey carried out across both Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan-occupied
Kashmir by London-based thinktank Chatham House, its author claims 'is the
first ever of its kind', shows that only 2% of the respondents on the Indian side
favour joining Pakistan

Chinese view

 China states that Aksai Chin is an integral part of China and does not recognise
the inclusion of Aksai Chin as part of the Kashmir region
 China did not accept the boundaries of the princely state of Kashmir and Jammu,
north of Aksai Chin and the Karakoram as proposed by the British.
 China settled its border disputes with Pakistan under the 1963 Trans Karakoram
Tract with the provision that the settlement was subject to the final solution of
the Kashmir dispute

Cross-border troubles (Siachen Conflict)

 The world's highest battleground, the Siachen Glacier, is a part of this difficult-to-
man boundary.
 The Siachen glacier is the highest battleground on earth, where India and
Pakistan have fought intermittently since April 13, 1984. Both countries maintain
permanent military presence in the region at a height of over 6,000 metres
 (20,000 ft). More than 2000 people have died in this inhospitable terrain, mostly
due to weather extremes and the natural hazards of mountain warfare.
 The conflict in Siachen stems from the incompletely demarcated territory on the
map beyond the map coordinate known as NJ9842. The 1972 Simla Agreement
did not clearly mention who controlled the glacier, merely stating that from the
NJ9842 location the boundary would proceed “thence north to the glaciers.” UN
officials presumed there would be no dispute between India and Pakistan over
such a cold and barren region.
 The Government of Pakistan has repeatedly claimed that by constructing a fence
along the line of control, India is violating the Shimla Accord. India claims the
construction of the fence has helped decrease armed infiltration into Indian-
administered Kashmir.

Line Of Control Conflicts:

 The border and the Line of Control separating Indian and Pakistani Kashmir
passes through some exceptionally difficult terrain.

Water dispute
 Another reason for the dispute over Kashmir is water. Kashmir is the source of
many rivers and tributaries in the Indus River basin.
 This basin is divided between Pakistan, which has about 60 percent of the
catchment area, India with about 20 percent, Afghanistan with 5 percent and
around 15 percent in China (Tibet autonomous region).
 The river tributaries are the Jhelum and Chenab rivers, which primarily flow into
Pakistan, while other branches—the Ravi, Beas, and the Sutlej—irrigate northern
India.
 The Indus is a river system that sustains communities in India and Pakistan. Both
have extensively dammed the Indus River for irrigation of their crops and hydro-
electricity systems.
 In arbitrating the conflict in 1947, Sir Cyril Radcliffe, decided to demarcate the
territories as he was unable to give to one or the other the control over the river
as it was a main economic resource for both areas.
 The Line of Control (LoC) was recognised as an international border establishing
that India would have control over the upper riparian and Pakistan over the lower
 In 1948, Eugene Black, then president of the World Bank, offered his services to
solve the tension over water control. In the early days of independence, the fact
that India was able to shut off the Central Bari Doab Canals at the time of the
sowing season, causing significant damage to Pakistan's crops. Nevertheless,
military and political clashes over Kashmir in the early years of independence
appear to have been more about ideology and sovereignty rather than over the
sharing of water resources. However, the minister of Pakistan has stated the
opposite.
 The Indus Waters Treaty was signed by both countries in September 1960, giving
exclusive rights over the three western rivers of the Indus river system (Jhelum,
Chenab and Indus) to Pakistan,
 and over the three eastern rivers (Sutlej, Ravi and Beas) to India, as long as this
does not reduce or delay the supply to Pakistan.
 India therefore maintains that they are not willing to break the established
regulations and they see no more problems with this issue.
 Proposed Options for Resolution of the Dispute
Over the past fifty years, besides the UN resolutions, observers and intellectuals
have proposed various other options for resolving the Kashmir dispute time and
again at the UN fora and at the bilateral India-Pakistan levels. These proposals
are examined below.

United Nation’s Plebiscite

First Prime Minister of Inida Mr. Jawahar Lal Nehru said, in a detailed statement to the
Constituent Assembly of India, that the will of the Kashmiris should be fulfilled under the
supervision of the United Nations. On December 31, 1947, India filed a complaint against
Pakistani aggression with the United Nations. The U.N. passed resolutions asking for the
withdrawal of Pakistani troops from the occupied territory in Kashmir, for the reduction in the
number of Indian troops in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, and finally for a plebiscite to
ascertain the wishes of the people of Kashmir with regard to their political affiliations.1In this
regard UN established UNCIP and UNMGOIP. But since then no plebiscite could be held
because of the lack of cooperation by both sides. India says that Pakistan should first
withdraw its forces from Azad Kashmir and Pakistan holds India responsible for not allowing
Kashmiris to ascertain their will. After so many years UN resolution is still seeking its
implementation, which has very less prospects in near future to be implemented in its lateral
spirit.

One another drawback of this resolution is that it doesn’t give Kashmiris an option to decide
for their independent state and for this reason it is not wrong to claim that under current
circumstances the solution of UN Plebiscite has lost its importance and can no more be
considered as a viable solution to the problem. Because, if according to the current resolution
a plebiscite would be held, It will only ask for the accession with either Pakistan or India,
which is not going to be accepted by the either side, if the decision goes against one of them.
In this regard, it is important to include option of independence in the current UN resolution,
only then it could be considered as a plausible solution.

United Nation’s Trusteeship Option

“There is a proposal that to resolve the issue of Kashmir for some time the territory may be
placed under control of trusteeship of United Nations and after a period of ten to fifteen years
the matter may be referred to the people for the final verdict with regard to future status of
the State. This arrangement will provide a face-saving arrangement for India, and will also give
Kashmiris, on both sides of Line of Control, enough time to decide their future without any
pressure or compulsion from any country or group”.2

But this option is not workable until both India and Pakistan agree to withdraw their forces
from the occupied areas. Secondly India has outrageously and repeatedly refused the
 involvement of any third party and always argues that this is a bilateral issue and only India
and Pakistan should solve it. On the other hand it would be difficult for Pakistan to dismantle
all the military establishments and especially the militant groups would not agree to the
presence of any International forces because then they have to disarm and stop militancy. So
this option doesn’t look practical under current situation.

Independence

The idea of Independent Kashmir is not new at all. Sheikh Abdullah was dismissed by Jawahar
Lal Nehru on expressing his views in favour of Independence way back in 1953. However, it is
a view which has found favour with a large number of Sunni Muslims in the Kashmir valley.
Over the last 63 years political manipulations, Human rights abuses, rigging of elections and
corrupt Government has created a sense of alienation among Kashmiri population and they
have become more defiant and assertive.3 But one important thing is that there is a divide on
this option among the political parties, militant groups in Kashmir and people from different
regional, religious and ethnic background who make up the state of Jammu and Kashmir.
Some political parties like Hurriat Confernce (Ali Gillani Group) and Hizbul-Mujhahideen
(militant group) demands accession with Pakistan and hence would not buy this idea of
independence but on the other hand some Political parties like Jammu and Kashmir Liberation
Front (JKLF) and Hurriyat Conference (Mir Wais Group) are in favour of independence.
Therefore there is no consensus on this option, which makes it difficult to adopt.

But even if Kashmir gets independence, it would be difficult to survive as a sovereign state
because of its land locked territory and would be dependent on Pakistan and India for trade
and other resources. Moreover, it has very strategic position, Main water sources are coming
from Kashmir and there would be again a competition to install a pro Pakistani or pro Indian
Government in order to secure their strategic interests. Under these circumstances, it is
difficult to envisage a viable and sovereign state. The Hindu minority, which already feels
threatened by militants would not favour the independence and would like to remain with
India.

The Partition Option

Regarding the option of the partition of Jammu and Kashmir, this has largely been an academic
debate and various scholars have suggested different proposals. The first is a division-related option
for Jammu and Kashmir, based on the holding of regional plebiscites. This proposal was first given by
UN Representative, Sir Owen Dixon, in his report of 1950-51. Called the ‘Dixon Report’, it proposed
the idea of holding regional plebiscites, instead of a general plebiscite as proposed in the UN
resolutions.81 The Owen Dixon Plan proposed the division of the State of Jammu and Kashmir into
four main regions: Jammu, Ladakh, the Vale of Kashmir including Muzaffarabad, and Gilgit-Baltistan.
According to his plan the district of Poonch was to remain with Pakistan. He proposed that of the
four regions, Jammu and Ladakh should go uncontested to India and the Northern Areas to Pakistan.
He concluded that in the Valley a plebiscite might be held to decide about its future. Pakistan, did
not outrightly reject the proposal, but was in favour of a general plebiscite in the whole of Jammu
and Kashmir. India on the other hand regarded Jammu and Kashmir as a unit of the Indian
Federation and thus was not in favour of any regional plebiscite.82
The second partition proposal is an option based on a ‘Trieste-type’ solution. The Trieste issue,
between Italy and Yugoslavia, arose as a result of the two World Wars. After World War I, Trieste
and the adjoining areas, including the whole valley of the Adige river and Istria, went to Italy, but in
1945 it was claimed by Yugoslavia on the grounds that Italy was guilty of aggression against
Yugoslavia. However, Trieste and its environs and the Gorzia region to the northwest (Zone A)
remained under Anglo-American control and the southern portion (Zone B) was under the control of
the Yugoslav troops. Finally, in 1954, Italy and Yugoslavia agreed to a partition and Zone A (including
Trieste) was given to Italy and Zone B to Yugoslavia. Italy agreed to maintain a free port at Trieste.
Later, the agreement was given a de jure status by the 1975 Treaty of Osimo between Italy and
Yugoslavia.

The ‘Trieste’-type option for Jammu and Kashmir proposes that the Valley along with some adjoining
parts of Jammu and the Pakistani side of Kashmir (Azad Kashmir), be made an autonomous units,
under India and Pakistan, respectively. The LoC would be a soft border between the two
autonomous units. The remaining areas on both sides of the LoC may be merged with India and
Pakistan, respectively. India and Pakistan would be required to withdraw their forces under UN
supervision.83 Again, this proposal lacks viability, as it does not address either the genesis of the
dispute, nor the complexities that have accumulated since then to date. The struggle in Jammu and
Kashmir is not for autonomy of any one region but for the right of self-determination to be
expressed by the Kashmiris, as granted to them under UN resolutions. Also, India and Pakistan being
parties to the dispute will continue to have a clash of interests in the proposed autonomous regions;
therefore, this would certainly not result in any stability in the region. Moreover, the option implies
that the existing Line of Control (LoC) may serve as the line of division. The LoC remains the UN-
recognised ceasefire line (CFL) and was not drawn with any basis for serving as a permanent border,
but with the intention of bringing about cessation of military hostilities.

The third partition proposal considers the conversion of the Line of Control (LoC) into an
international border. This means maintenance of the prevailing status quo. This option is in principle
supported by India. If it were accepted, India would take additional advantage by then propagating
that it had conceded Indian territory to Pakistan and would try to emerge as a peacemaker in the
region. As assessed by Robert Wirsing, ‘by asserting the primacy of actual military control over
punitive legal entitlement, it tacitly acknowledges India’s dominant political standing in the region.
By requiring Pakistan to relinquish its claim of the coveted Valley of Kashmir and the Kashmiri
separatists their claim of independence, while at the same time entailing little or no detachment
from India of territories now in its possession, it leaves existing political and economic arrangements
essentially undisturbed. Thus, of the several conceivable forms of partition, it is clearly among the
most generous to India.’84

However, the ‘the LoC as a border’ option has to take into account the fact that the LoC is merely a
ceasefire line, as well as take stock of the struggle for the right of self-determination that is going on
in the Indian-held Kashmir. Moreover, Kashmiris do not recognise the LoC. Prof. Mrs. Shamim Shawl,
a Kashmiri scholar from Srinagar, has argued that ‘the proposal of division is in contravention of the
basic principle that Jammu and Kashmir is an indivisible entity. It also violates the fundamental fact
that the Kashmir problem is basically the problem of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. It is not a
bilateral problem between India and Pakistan. Nor is it a territorial dispute.’85 Secondly, the present
LoC is an altered ceasefire line, whereby India acquired territory through military aggression in 1971.
Therefore, accepting LoC would mean legitimising Indian military aggression. Thirdly, the LoC as
accepted by both Pakistan and India at Simla in 1972 does not exist anymore. Indian incursion into
Siachen in 1984 has destroyed the sanctity of the ceasefire line.

Fourthly, some Western scholars have proposed the partition of Kashmir along ethnic/cultural,
religious, and linguistic lines. For example the Kashmir Study Group, a US-based group comprising
academics and diplomats from various countries as members, 86 has made various proposals along
these lines in its report entitled, Kashmir: A Way Forward (September 1999). The proposals
suggested are as follows:

(a) Two hypothetical sovereign entities, self-governing in all aspects, established on both sides of the
Line of Control on cultural and linguistic grounds. According to the study, ‘On the Indian side of the
LOC every tahsil in Kashmir proper and in Doda district in Jammu, and Gool Gulab Ghar tahsil in
Udhampur district in Jammu would seek incorporation in the proposed state. All these areas are
imbued with “Kashmiriyat” or interact with Kashmiri speaking people. On the Pakistani side it is
conceivable that the whole of Azad Kashmir would opt to have a sovereign status. This is
predominantly Punjabi-speaking, wholly Muslim area’;

(b) A new sovereign state on the Indian side of LoC with no territorial exchange between India and
Pakistan. The state would include ‘within its maximum potential area the whole of Kashmir proper as
well as adjoining areas in which Kashmiri is either the majority language or that of a plurality of the
population’;

(c) Desirable territorial changes along and beyond the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir.
Viewing that ‘LoC is dysfunctional and has been violated innumerable times’, it proposes that a new
state be created with territorial exchanges between India and Pakistan. However, it proposes that
Pakistan gives almost twice as much area (7,366 sq. km) to India, than India ceding territory (4,501
sq. km) to Pakistan. The rationale given for such an exchange is ‘ overall, the territorial adjustments
should not be excessively disruptive of the established order and yet should appear significant and
be of such a nature as to allow all parties to claim a victory.’87

The above proposals are again not viable solutions, as they tend to complicate the situation in
Jammu and Kashmir and result in a further division of the region, rather than leading to a stable
solution. Moreover, the ‘Kashmir Study Group’s’ proposals make no provision for the right of self-
determination of the people of Kashmir to which presently a military struggle is underway by the
Kashmiris in Indian-occupied Kashmir.

Musharaf Four point solution:

This four-point solution to Kashmir issue which includes demilitarization and “self-governance with
joint supervision mechanism”. The four-point formula of Musharraf included

a) Kashmir should have the same borders but free movement across the region be allowed for
people on both side of LoC;

b)There should be self-governance or autonomy but not independence

c)Region should be demilitarized i-e phased wised withdrawal of troops from the region.

d) and a mechanism should be devised jointly so that the road map for Kashmir is implemented
smoothly.

Thus Pakistan’s President, Pervez Musharraf, had diluted the Pakistani position significantly.
Musharraf 4 point formula brought five major shifts in Pakistan decades long stand on Kashmir.
These five major changes are :

1) setting aside the U.N.’s resolutions on plebiscite;

2) self-governance substation for self-determination;

3) forsaking religion as a criterion;

4) Pakistan advise to Kashmiris to talk to New Delhi; and

5) accepting the Line of Control (LoC) provided it is combined with joint management, an issue pre-
eminently liable to compromise.

The Irish Model

Recently, various scholars have suggested the Irish model, based on the ‘Good Friday Agreement’
signed in April 1998 between the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the Government of Ireland, as a possible option for resolving the Kashmir dispute
between India and Pakistan.

The main features of the ‘Good Friday Agreement’90 are: (a) it recognises the consent principle: that
change in the status of Northern Ireland can only come about with the consent of the majority of its
people. It acknowledges that while a substantial minority in the North and a majority on the island
want a united Ireland, the majority in the North currently wishes to maintain the Union. However, it
says that if that situation changes, there is a binding obligation on both governments to give effect
to whatever wish the people of the North express; (b) it recognises ‘the birthright of all the people of
Northern Ireland’ to identify themselves and be accepted as Irish, British or both; (c) it proposes
concrete legislative and constitutional changes; such as, the Government of Ireland Act , claiming
British jurisdiction over all of Ireland is to be replaced, future polls in the North on its status are to be
held on the order of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Such polls must be at least seven
years apart; (d) it proposes a 108- member Assembly elected by proportional representation; (e) it
establishes a North-South Ministerial Council under legislation at Westminister and the Oireachtas,
to bring together ministers from the North and the Republic; (f) it establishes a British-Irish Council
consisting of representatives of the British and Irish Governments, devolved in situations in Northern
Ireland, Scotland and Wales, the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands; (g) it establishes a new British-
Irish Conference; (h) reaffirms commitment to the total disarmament of all paramilitary
organisations, and confirms intention to work constructively with the Independent Commission on
Decommissioning; and, (i) establishes an independent commission to make recommendations for
future policing arrangements in the North.91

Based on the Irish model, some Indian scholars have made suggestions supporting autonomy for
various regions of Jammu and Kashmir. For example, Amit A. Pandya, an Indian scholar, has
proposed the following steps: (1) An India-Pakistan commission to discuss boundary issues in Jammu
and Kashmir, and to engage in joint monitoring of the LOC; (2) Phased demilitarisation at the LOC,
contingent first on substantial cessation of ‘cross-border’ terrorism; (3) Three-way (Indian, Pakistani,
Kashmiri) commission on internal law and order. Kashmiris to be chosen from Pakistan-occupied
Azad Kashmir and all Indian-occupied segments—Valley, Jammu and Ladakh. (4) Indian and Pakistani
commitments to proceed with a scheme of local government reform and strengthening of local
institutions and local autonomy in respective areas of Kashmir. (5) Issue-specific consultative bodies
(water, power, tourism, finance) comprising such local units, and Indian Jammu & Kashmir State and
Azad Kashmir governments. (6) Regularly scheduled and publicity-free consultative mechanism for
Indian government’s talks with all parties, and with non-party civil society institutions, within Indian
Kashmir on political issues. (7) Corresponding mechanism for Azad Kashmir. (8) Consultative
mechanism for talks among all parties on ethnic and religious minority protections. (9) Consultative
mechanism for dialogue between these processes on the Indian and Pakistani side of the LOC. (10)
Indian commitment to allow free access, consistent with security requirements, to independent and
credible Indian human rights monitoring organizations, and to Indian, and Pakistani press.
Corresponding commitment by Pakistan for Azad Kashmir. 92

Another Indian scholar, Professor Sumantra Bose, basing his suggestions on the Irish model proposes
three dimensions. Dimension one: the New Delhi-Islamabad axis, involving the ‘establishment of a
permanent India-Pakistan Intergovernmental Conference to promote the harmonious and mutually
beneficial development of the totality of relationships between the two countries.’ As suggested by
Professor Bose, this body is to be chaired by the respective prime ministers, and its twice-yearly
meetings to be rotated between Indian and Pakistani cities. Dimension two: the New Delhi-Srinagar
and Islamabad-Muzaffarabad axis, here the ‘objective in Kashmir would be the gradual, incremental
normalisation of politics within Kashmir in both Indian-and Pakistani-controlled zones, and the
devising and implementation of political frameworks which can foster a working degree of internal
accommodation and cooperation between the representatives of communities holding radically
different basic political allegiances.’ Dimension three: the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad axis, proposes
‘along with the progressive normalisation of the overall framework of India-Pakistan relations and
the gradual normalisation of life and politics in both sides of the Kashmir border’, that there is
greater need to make the border porous. He further suggests ‘the establishment of a cross-border
Jammu and Kashmir Council for Cooperation, with representatives from inclusive, elected and
autonomous governments from both sides of the line of control.’93

These Indian proposals, selectively use the Irish model, but basically support autonomy for the
regions of Jammu and Kashmir under the supervision of India and Pakistan. The central aspects
focusing on self-determination and total disarmament after implementation of the agreement are
ignored. The Indian proposals are similar to the idea of a condominium with dominant Indian
influence. Also, the LoC has been proposed as the dividing line and a soft border. This is against the
genesis of the Kashmir dispute, which is not for greater autonomy or ‘self-government’, as proposed,
but for the right of self-determination to be expressed by the Kashmiris. However, as Dr. Mazari has
suggested, 94 it is the central aspects of the Irish model, which are relevant in case of the Kashmir
dispute and could be used as guiding principles for a resolution of the conflict. For instance the
underlying principle is recognition of the right of the people as of Northern Ireland to choose their
political future through a referendum. Also, the principle of deweaponisation is linked to it, as
following the implementation of the Agreement.