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G.R. NO.

141857 : June 9, 2004

RODSON PHILIPPINES, INC., EURASIA HEAVY INDUSTRIES, INC.,


AUTOGRAPHICS, INC., and PETER Y. RODRIGUEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
the EASTAR RESOURCES (ASIA) CORPORATION

FACTS:

On July 19, 1990, petitioners Rodson Philippines, Inc., Eurasia Heavy Industries,
Inc., Autographics, Inc. and Peter Y. Rodriguez, filed a Complaint 2 for damages against
respondent Eastar Resources (Asia) Corporation with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, Branch 7, then presided by Judge Generoso A. Juaban. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. CEB-9224.

After the presentation of witnesses, the petitioners filed their formal offer of evidence on
September 3, 1993. The petitioners rested their case after their documentary evidence
was admitted by the court. The respondent then presented one witness, Mary C.
Maquilan. On March 29, 1994, the respondent prayed for time to make their formal offer
of evidence. The court granted the respondents motion and gave it a period of fifteen (15)
days to do so. The court then granted the petitioners a period of ten (10) days from service
of the said formal offer within which to file their comment thereon.

The petitioners declared in open court that they would be presenting rebuttal evidence,
and prayed that the hearing for the said purpose be set at 9:00 a.m. of May 4, 1994. 4 The
case was reset to June 1, 1994.

The petitioners changed their original counsel and retained a new one, Atty. Purita
Hontanosas-Cortes, the sister of their original counsel.5

In the meantime, the respondent filed its formal offer of evidence and sent a copy thereof
to the petitioners on June 1, 1994. When the case was called for the presentation of the
petitioner’s rebuttal evidence on the said date, the new counsel for the petitioners
manifested her desire to recall the respondent’s witness, Mary Maquilan, for further cross-
examination. She reasoned that she was not satisfied with the cross-examination of the
previous counsel, and asked for time to file the necessary motion. The court granted the
same, and gave her fifteen (15) days to do so. The court also gave the respondent a
period of ten (10) days from receipt thereof within which to file its comment or opposition.
The court held in abeyance the resolution of the respondents formal offer of evidence
until such time that the petitioners motion to recall Maquilan for further cross-examination
was resolved. On June 24, 1994, the petitioners filed their motion to recall Maquilan as a
witness for further cross-examination.6

In the meantime, Judge Juaban retired from the government service. Acting Presiding
Judge Andres C. Garalza, Jr. issued an order giving the respondent a final period of seven
(7) days from notice within which to file its written comment on the petitioner’s motion to
recall Maquilan.
Thereafter, Judge Martin A. Ocampo was appointed presiding judge of the RTC of Cebu
City, Branch 7. The hearing of the petitioner’s motion to recall the witness was set for
hearing on March 26, 1996. During the hearing, the counsel for the petitioners called the
attention of the court to the fact that they had not yet filed their comment on the
respondent’s formal offer of evidence because of the pending incident. The court, for its
part, declared that a formal offer of evidence was premature, precisely because of such
pending incident.

After the hearing, the court issued an order denying the petitioners motion to recall
Maquilan as witness for additional cross-examination, without prejudice to the petitioners
recalling the latter as a hostile witness on the presentation of its rebuttal evidence.

In the meantime, the petitioners failed to file their comment on the respondents formal
offer of evidence. The court, likewise, failed to resolve the said incident despite the denial
of the petitioner’s motion to recall Maquilan for additional cross-examination.

On April 1, 1996, the trial court sent a subpoena ad testificandum to Maquilan, requiring
her to appear before the court and to testify as a hostile rebuttal witness for the petitioners
at 9:00 a.m. on June 17 and 18, 1996. The respondent filed its urgent motion to quash
the subpoena on the ground that the witness was a resident of Quezon City, which was
more than fifty (50) kilometers away and, as such, could not be compelled to testify under
Section 9 of Rule 23 of the Revised Rules of Court.9

During the hearing on June 17, 1996, the trial court expressed doubts as to whether it
could compel Maquilan to appear before the court, considering that she was a resident of
Quezon City which is more than fifty (50) kilometers from the venue of trial. 10 cralawred

Because of the adverse rulings they had been receiving from the trial court, the petitioners
manifested that they would file a motion to inhibit the judge from further hearing the case,
and to have the case re-raffled to another branch.The court welcomed such motion, if
only to put the petitioners mind at rest.11

In its Order12 dated August 19, 1996, Judge Martin A. Ocampo inhibited himself from
further hearing the case and ordered the transmittal of the records of the case to the
Office of the Executive Judge for re-raffle.

The case was re-raffled to the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 11, presided by Judge Isaias P.
Dican. After a review of the records, the trial court discovered that the petitioners motion
to recall Mary Maquilan had already been denied; that the petitioners had not yet filed
their comment on the respondents formal offer of documentary evidence; and, that the
said formal offer of evidence had not yet been resolved by the court. On July 17, 1997,
the trial court issued an Order13 admitting the respondents documentary evidence for the
purposes they were offered. The court also set the continuation of the trial for the
presentation of the petitioner’s rebuttal evidence to 8:30 a.m. of August 27, 1997. 14
On August 25, 1997, the petitioners filed a Motion to Defer the Hearing Set on August 27,
1997,15 and prayed that they be given a chance to file their written objection to the formal
offer of evidence filed by the respondent. The trial court denied the motion, per its Order
dated August 27, 1997.The trial court ruled that the ten-day period given to the petitioners
per its Order of March 29, 1994 had long since elapsed. It emphasized that the order
holding in abeyance its ruling on the respondents formal offer of evidence did not toll the
ten-day period for the filing of the petitioners comment thereon.

The petitioners filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order. The trial court denied
the said motion in an Order dated October 29, 1997.

ISSUE:

WAS THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE PETITIONERS TO DUE


PROCESS OF LAW GROSSLY AND BLATANTLY VIOLATED BY THE QUESTIONED
DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
DATED OCTOBER 22, 1999 AND JANUARY 31, 2000, RESULTING TO A SERIOUS
MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE?

RULING:

The petition is not meritorious. We note that the petitioners failed to append to their
petition at bar a copy of their motion for reconsideration of the July 17, 1997 Order of the
trial court, admitting the documentary evidence offered by the respondent. The said
pleading is very relevant in this case, because we could there discern if the petitioners
had prayed for a chance to file their comment on or opposition to the admission of the
respondents documentary evidence, and incorporated therein their objections to the said
motion, if any. The petitioners are required, under the second paragraph of Section 1,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to append to their petition a copy of the said motion for
reconsideration. Under Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, the petitioners failure to
comply with the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 65 shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal of the petition.

Even considering the merits of the case, the petition must still fail.

The trial court did not commit a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess of or
without jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders. By grave abuse of discretion is meant
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction,
and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically.
For certiorari to lie, there must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power,
the very antithesis of the judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil law
and common law traditions.

Irrefragably, the petitioners had until June 12, 1994 within which to file their comment on
the respondent’s formal offer of evidence. The ten-day period within which to file such
comment was not suspended by the filing and, thereafter, the pendency of the petitioner’s
motion to recall Maquilan as a witness for additional cross-examination. What was merely
suspended by such motion was the trial courts resolution of the respondent’s formal offer
of evidence. The petitioners failed to file their comment within the period therefor.

Indeed, Judge Martin Ocampo erred in declaring that the respondent’s formal offer of
evidence was prematurely filed, and that the petitioners need not yet file their comment
thereon because of the petitioners unresolved motion.The respondent had already
presented its lone witness, Maquilan, who already testified on direct and cross-
examination. Hence, the respondent was obliged to formally offer its documentary
evidence as provided by Section 35, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence:

SEC. 35.When to make offer. As regards the testimony of a witness, the offer must be
made at the time the witness is called to testify.

Documentary and object evidence shall be offered after the presentation of a party’s
testimonial evidence. Such offer shall be done orally unless allowed by the court to be
done in writing.

Assuming for the once that the petitioners believed in good faith the declaration of Judge
Ocampo that they could file their comment after the trial court had resolved their pending
motion to recall Maquilan for further cross-examination, the records show that the court
denied the said motion on March 26, 1996. It then behooved the petitioners to file their
comment on the respondents formal offer of evidence after receipt of the said order, or
soon thereafter. The petitioners failed to do so. It was only, after receiving the trial courts
Order dated July 17, 1997, admitting the documentary evidence of the respondent, after
the lapse of more than one year that the petitioners awakened and complained of having
been deprived of their right to file their comment on such formal offer of evidence. Even
then, the petitioners could have filed a motion for the reconsideration, appending thereto
their comment/opposition to the respondents documentary evidence.The petitioners did
not do so. If they had appended such opposition to their motion for reconsideration, the
trial court could have reviewed the same, and, thereafter, even reconsider its July 17,
1997 Order. A denial thereon could then have been raised before the Court of Appeals,
as the appellate court would be able to determine whether or not the trial court, in denying
such motion for reconsideration, committed a grave abuse of its discretion.

The petitioners complain that, with the trial courts admission of the respondents
documentary evidence in the absence of their comment thereon, they are apt to
lose P29,000,000 on the respondents counterclaim. They contend that such loss would
be a grave injustice to them. Hence, the petitioners argue that the CA should have granted
their petition.

We do not agree. It bears stressing that the petitioners still have the right to adduce
rebuttal evidence to controvert or overcome the probative weight of the respondents
documentary evidence. Moreover, since the petitioners were aware that the respondent
had a counterclaim of P29,000,000, it behooved them to observe diligence and vigilance
in filing their comment without delay. However, by their own negligence, the petitioners
failed to file the said comment. As such, the petitioners are not entitled to a writ
of certiorari to shield themselves from their own omission and negligence.It must be
stressed that he who comes to court for equitable relief must do so with clean hands.

G.R. Nos. 109279-80. January 18, 1999.


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. OCTAVIO MENDOZA y
LANDICHO, Accused-Appellant.

FACTS:

On November 11, 1988, Accused-appellant, his wife Cecilia Mendoza, and their then
10-year-old daughter attended a birthday party wherein the mother and daughter came
home without the former because the accused-appellant went out of the venue alone.
The accused-appellant who was drunk later went home. While in her room, Charmaine
heard her parents quarrelling over the issue of Cecilia and Charmaine having left
accused-appellant at the party. Thereafter, Charmaine suddenly heard three gunshots.
Running out of her room, Charmaine saw her mother Cecilia down on the floor of their
living room, bleeding profusely. Charmaine saw accused-appellant hiding a gun under
the bed in her parents’ room.

Accused-appellant subsequently called his brother-in-law, Sgt. Antonio Gabac, and


told him that Cecilia had been shot and is already dead. When Gabac finally arrived, he
and accused-appellant carried the lifeless body of Cecilia into accused-appellant’s car
and brought her to the Perpetual Help Hospital.

Cecilia Mendoza was pronounced dead on arrival.

Cecilia’s father, Alipio Eusebio, having been informed of his daughter’s death, and
that valuables were being taken out of his daughter’s house, decided to remove, together
with his sons, the remaining pieces of property therein, including accused-appellant’s
personal effects.

From the aforestated personal effects of accused-appellant, Alipio found Mission


Order No. 86-580-893 dated November 7, 1986 issued to accused-appellant by Col.
Eladio Gonzales, PAF (GSC), Acting Wing Commander, 580th Aircraft Central Warning
Wing, Villamor Airbase, Pasay City, which authorized accused-appellant to carry a Colt
Revolver, .38 Caliber with Serial No. 41001 from November 15, 1986 to December 15,
1986. There was also a Memorandum Receipt for Equipment, dated November 10, 1986,
approved by Captain Luis L. Salanguit of the Philippine Air Force and Lt. Col. Ramon
Bandong and issued to one Octavio L. Mendoza, Captain, PAF, Assistant Director for
Personnel which described the firearm as "One Colt Revolver SN 41001".
ISSUE:

Whether or not the procuring of the personal effects of the accused-appellant


specifically the Mission Order No. 86-580-893 dated November 7, 1986 and
Memorandum Receipt for Equipment, dated November 10, 1986 was a grave violation of
the accused’s constitutional right to privacy of communication and papers, and/or his right
against unreasonable search and seizure.

HELD:

The Solicitor General is correct in explaining that such right applies as a restraint
directed only against the government and its agencies. The case in point is People v.
Marti (193 SCRA 57 [1991]) where this Court had the occasion to rule that the
constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the
immunity of one’s person from interference by government and it cannot be extended to
acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged
unlawful intrusion.

In the instant case, the memorandum receipt and mission order were discovered by
accused-appellant’s father-in-law Alipio Eusebio, a private citizen. Certainly, a search
warrant is dispensable.

Republic v. Sandiganbayan GR. No. 152154 July 15, 2003 EN BANC Corona, J.
“The President—Privileges and Salary”

FACTS:
Republic (petitioner), through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture
before the Sandiganbayan pursuant to RA 13791 a declaration of the aggregate amount of US$
356M deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. The funds were previously held by 5
account groups, using various foreign foundations in certain Swiss banks. In addition, the
Republic sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in treasury notes which
exceeded the Marcos couple's salaries2 3 4 5, other lawful income as well as income from
legitimately acquired property. The treasury notes are frozen at the Central Bank of the
Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, by virtue of the freeze order issued by the PCGG.
Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental
Agreement dated December 28, 1993 were executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG
Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets of the Marcos family. The
General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements sought to identify, collate, cause the inventory of
and distribute all assets presumed to be owned by the Marcos family under the conditions
contained therein. The General Agreement specified in one of its premises or "whereas clauses"
the fact that petitioner "obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal on December 21,
1990, that the Three Hundred Fiftysix Million U.S. dollars (US$356 million) belongs in principle to
the Republic of the Philippines provided certain conditionalities are met x x x."
Hearings were conducted by the Sandiganbayan on the motion to approve the
General/Supplemental Agreements.
In a resolution dated 31 January 2002, the Sandiganbayan denied the Republic's motion
for summary judgment. o "The evidence offered for summary judgment of the case did not prove
that the money in the Swiss Banks belonged to the Marcos spouses because no legal proof exists
in the record as to the ownership by the Marcoses of the funds in escrow from the Swiss Banks.
The basis for the forfeiture in favor of the government cannot be deemed to have been established
and our judgment thereon, perforce, must also have been without basis."
The Republic filed the petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner Republic was able to prove its case for forfeiture in accordance with the
requisites of Sections 26 and 37 of RA 1379.
HELD:
RA 1379 raises the prima facie presumption that a property is unlawfully acquired, hence
subject to forfeiture, if its amount or value is manifestly disproportionate to the official salary and
other lawful income of the public officer who owns it. o The following facts must be established in
order that forfeiture or seizure of the Swiss deposits may be effected: (1) ownership by the
public officer of money or property acquired during his incumbency, whether it be in his name or
otherwise, and (2) the extent to which the amount of that money or property exceeds, i. e., is
grossly disproportionate to, the legitimate income of the public officer. (3) that the said amount is
manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful
income and the income from legitimately acquired property.
The Republic was able to establish a prima facie case for the forfeiture of the Swiss funds
pursuant to RA 1379. o Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were public officers. Ferdinand and Imelda
Marcos had acquired and owned properties during their term of office, as evidenced by their
admittance regarding the ownership of the Swiss accounts. The Swiss accounts of the Marcoses
had balances amounting to US $356 million, a figure beyond the aggregate legitimate income of
$304,372.43.
The Petition was granted.
The Swiss deposits which were transferred to and are now deposited in escrow at the
Philippine National Bank in the estimated aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of January
31, 2002, plus interest, are hereby forfeited in favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines.
RATIO DECIDENDI: (1973 CONST)
Article VII, Sec. 4(2) – The President and the Vice-President shall not, during their tenure,
hold any other office except when otherwise provided in this Constitution, nor may they practice
any profession, participate directly or indirectly in the management of any business, or be
financially interested directly or indirectly in any contract with, or in any franchise or special
privilege granted by the Government or any other subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government owned or controlled corporation.
Article VII, Sec. 11 – No Member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel before
any court inferior to a court with appellate jurisdiction, x x x. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly,
be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by
the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof including any government
owned or controlled corporation during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter
before any office of the government for his pecuniary benefit.
Article IX, Sec. 7 – The Prime Minister and Members of the Cabinet shall be subject to the
provision of Section 11, Article VIII hereof and may not appear as counsel before any court or
administrative body, or manage any business, or practice any profession, and shall also be
subject to such other disqualification as may be provided by law.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN, MAJOR -GENERAL


JOSEPHUS Q. RAMAS AND ELIZABETH DIMAANO
407 SCRA 10
July 21, 2003

Petitioner: RP
Respondent: Sandiganbayan, et al.
Ponente: J. Carpio
Nature of Action: Petition for review on certiorari

FACTS:

The PCGG (Presidential Commission on Good Government) created an AFP Anti-Graft Board
tasked to scrutinize the reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by any AFP
personnel (active or retired). The AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged “ill-gotten”
wealth of respondent Maj. Gen. Josephus Ramas. Along with this, the Constabulary raiding team
served a search and seizure warrant on the premises of Ramas’ alleged mistress, Elizabeth
Dimaano. The Board then concluded that Ramas be prosecuted for violating the “Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019)” and “Forfeiture of unlawfully Acquired Property (RA 1379)”.
Thereafter, they filed a petition for forfeiture against him before the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan dismissed the case on several grounds one of which is that there was an illegal
search and seizure of the items confiscated.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the PCGG has the authority to investigate Ramas and Dimaano
2. Whether or not the properties and other belongings confiscated in Dimaano’s house were
illegally seized which will consequently make it inadmissible

HELD:
The petition was dismissed. Even in the absence of a Constitution, the right against unlawful
seizure can be found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Nevertheless, even during the interregnum, the Filipino
people under the Covenant and Declaration continued to enjoy almost the same rights found in
the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution. As stated in Article 2(1) of the Convenant, the State
is required “to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant.” Further, under Article 17(1) of the
Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure that “[n]o one else shall be
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence.”

The Declaration also provides in its Article 17(2) that “[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of
his property.” The Court has taken into consideration the Declaration as part of the generally
accepted principles of international law and binding on the State. Hence, the revolutionary
government was also obligated under international law to observe the rights of individuals under
the Declaration, because it didn’t repudiated either the Covenant or the Declaration during the
interregnum.

PICOP v. Asuncion Case Digest


PICOP v. Asuncion, 307 SCRA 253) (1999)
FACTS: On January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search
warrant before the RTC of Quezon City, stating: 1. That the management of Paper Industries
Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP compound, is in possession or ha[s] in [its] control
high powered firearms, ammunitions, explosives, which are the subject of the offense, or used or
intended to be used in committing the offense, and which . . . are [being kept] and conceal[ed] in the
premises described; 2. That a Search Warrant should be issued to enable any agent of the law to
take possession and bring to the described properties. After propounding several questions to
Bacolod, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued the contested search warrant. On February 4, 1995,
the police enforced the search warrant at the PICOP compound and seized a number of firearms
and explosives. Believing that the warrant was invalid and the search unreasonable, the petitioners
filed a “Motion to Quash” before the trial court. Subsequently, they also filed a “Supplemental
Pleading to the Motion to Quash” and a “Motion to SuppressEvidence.” On March 23, 1995, the RTC
issued the first contested Order which denied petitioners’ motions. On August 3, 1995, the trial court
rendered its second contested Order denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: WON the search warrant issued was valid
HELD:
The requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such presence is
determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce
are personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant and
the witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes
the place to be searched and the things to be seized. In the present case, the search warrant is
invalid because (1) the trial court failed to examine personally the complainant and the other
deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who appeared during the hearing for the issuance of the
search warrant, had no personal knowledge that petitioners were not licensed to possess the subject
firearms; and (3) the place to be searched was not described with particularity.

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