Pakistan's Search for a Foreign Policy After the Invasion of Afghanistan

Author(s): W. Howard Wriggins

Source: Pacific Affairs, Vol. 57, No. 2 (Summer, 1984), pp. 284-303
Published by: Pacific Affairs, University of British Columbia
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 Pakistan'sSearch for a Foreign
PolicyAfterthe Invasion of
Afghanistan*
W. Howard Wriggins

TN DECEMBER 1979, Soviet troops crossed into Afghanistanand in-

Istalled a leader of Moscow'schoice in place of HafizullahAmin. It was
the firsttimeSoviettroopshad been committedoutside the Warsaw Pact
area, and itinvolvedthemin a countrywhichforover a centuryhad been
recognized as a bufferstate between the Russian realm and the powers
of South Asia. The geostrategicsituationin the region had already been
dramaticallydisruptedby the revolutionin Iran, whichejected the Shah
and brought in a band of religious zealots who quicklydismantled the
Shah's proud armyand statestructure.Now, the superpowernearestthe
subcontinenthad leapt the Hindukush, the natural barrier historically
considered the dividing line between the steppes to the north and the
subcontinentto the south.
While the U.S. reacted promptlyto these events, the nations most
directly affected-India and Pakistan-moved more cautiously. In
Washington's eyes, Pakistan overnight became a "front line" state,
sharinga thirteen-hundred mile frontierwitha countrythe SovietUnion
now sought to control.' As the U.S. presidentsaw it, Soviet success in
Afghanistanwould pose a greatdanger to "the region as a whole." Some
years earlier, Washington had quietly acquiesced in the British with-
drawal fromthe Gulf.Withthe collapse of the Shah and the Soviet move
intoAfghanistan,however,PresidentCarterdeemed the Persian Gulf to
be of "vital interest"to the U.S., and he committed the country to
employingmilitaryforce to defend it, if necessary.2
What impact did the Soviet invasionhave on Pakistan'ssituation?In
one sense, the changes seemed slight indeed. Perception counts for
* This articleis a revisionof a paper prepared for a Southern Asian Instituteseminar
on "South Asia afterAfghanistan."Thanks go to the Ford Foundation forits past support
of the Institutionand the PakistanCenter,and its more recentgrantfor workon security
policiesof South Asia. Zalmay Khalilzad, Ainslie Embree,and Philip Oldenburg have read
and criticizedan earlydraft,and J.C. Hurewitzand Richard Bullietthave assistedin other
ways. They are in no way responsiblefor the end result.
'Thomas P. Thornton, "Between the Stools?: U.S. PolicytowardsPakistanduring the
Carter Administration," Asian Survey,vol. 22, no 10 (October 1982), p. 969.
2JimmyCarter,KeepingtheFaith (New York: Bantam, 1982), pp. 471-2, 483.

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 Pakistan'sForeignPolicyAftertheInvasionofAfghanistan
much in South Asian internationalpolitics-as it does everywhere-and
a notable aspect of the post-invasionperiod was the persistence of
perceptionswhich had been commonplace twentyyears before.3Initial
Indian reactions,for instance,suggested a returnto the 1950s; to New
Delhi's foreign-policyestablishment,itappeared to make littledifference
whetherRussian troopswerestationedon theAmu Darya or the Khyber.4
Pakistaniand Indian troop dispositionschanged verylittle;and well into
1982, privateconversationsin both Islamabad and New Delhi sounded
all too familiar,echoing sentimentsexpressed over the past twenty-five
years.5
In another sense, however, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan
dramaticallytransformedPakistan's geostrategicsituation. Instead of
being bufferedby the mountains,deserts,and ravinesof Afghanistan-
whichforso long had separated Russia fromthe subcontinent-Pakistan
now faced the specter of Soviet troops virtuallyeverywherealong the
thirteen-hundred-mile frontier.The shadow of Soviet power hung over
the entiresubcontinent,as never before.Withinmonthsof the invasion,
Pakistan was inundated by a flood of refugees. And Soviet aircraft
periodicallyviolated Pakistani airspace, occasionally "buzzing" refugee
camps well withinits borders.
What considerationslay behind Islamabad's approach to this new
situation?What were its options, however limited? To whom could it
turn for support? How could it best deal with the Afghan freedom
movement,the refugees, and the Soviet Union? This article seeks to
reconstructthe Pakistan government'sperceptionsof its foreign-policy
situationfollowingthe Soviet invasion. Necessarilyspeculative, it con-
siders the constraintsunder whichthe Pakistanishave operated-as well
as theirlimitedoptions-in theirsearch for an effectiveresponse to the
Soviet invasion. To American observers,Islamabad's actions have often
seemed half-hearted. But one can argue that its policy of "limited
liability"has made the most of a much worsened securitysituation-
which at the outset its neighborsdid littleto improve.

THE BHUTTO FOREIGN-POLICY LEGACY

Following the dismembermentof Pakistan in 1971, then-President

ZulfikarAli Bhutto activelysought intimateties with the states of the
Gulf and Middle East, and associated his countrywiththe Non-Aligned
nations and the Group of 77 at the U.N. By hostingthe Islamic Con-

3 Robert Jervis,Perceptionand Misperception in InternationalPolitics(Princeton, New

Jersey:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1976), ch. 1.
' Reported by Giralal Jain at a seminar at Columbia University,November 1982.
5 The writerinterviewedpolicy-makersand publicistsin Islamabad and New Delhi

during the summer of 1982.

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 PacificAffairs
ferencein Lahorein 1972,byproviding specializedassistancetovarious
GulfStates,and byadoptingpro-Arabpositionson Arab-Israeliissues,
he demonstrated Pakistan'sutilityto theArabstates.At thesame time,
Bhuttomaintained closerelationswiththeShah.In fact,hisproblemsin
Baluchistanwerein parttheresultof havingfollowedtheShah'sadvice
to bear down hard on the NAP government in Baluchistanand the
NorthwestFrontierProvince.He obtainedfromTeheran an explicit
commitment of securityassistancein case of need, as well as price
concessionson Iranianoil.6He also welcomedIranianhelp in trying to
resolvePakistanidifferences
withAfghanistan overthestatusofPukhtun-
istan.For suchgains,Bhuttohad to suppresshisearlierenthusiasm for
ColonelQadaffi;buthe clearlyconsidereditworthwhile. Finally,while
hiszeal fordevelopingPakistan'snuclearcapability alienatedWashing-
ton, the downgradingof his connectionwiththe U.S. enhancedhis
statureamongtheNon-Aligned.
WithChina,Pakistanhad enjoyedprofitable relationssincethemid-
1960s. Not onlyhad the PakistanisbenefitedfromChina'sdiplomatic
supportat theU.N. and elsewhere, butIslamabadbelievedthatitstiesto
BeijingservedtodeterpossiblepressuresfromIndia. Chinawithheld its
recognitionofBangladeshuntilIndia releasedthePakistanis beingheld
as POWs. And a modestflowof Chinesemilitary assistancehelpedslow
Pakistan'sgradualdeclinein comparisonto India's growingcapability.
DuringBhutto'syears,the "China connection"was carefullynursed.7
UnderBhutto,Pakistan'srelationswithIndia also improvedto some
extent.FollowingtheSimlaAgreement of 1972,Indo-Pakistani relations
becamegenerallyless acerbicthanbefore.Once theparametersof the
newrelationship werestakedout,inconspicuous efforts wereundertaken
toreducefrictions:India reassuredPakistanthatitwasnotencouraging
disruptive in Baluchistan
activities and theNorthwest FrontierProvince;
and Pakistanappeared almostreadyto abandon its hopes regarding
Kashmir.A flurry of freshdiplomatic accompaniedtheaccession
efforts
oftheJanatagovernment in 1977,and seriouseconomicexchangeswere
negotiatedforthefirsttime.8
By thetimeof Bhutto'soverthrow bythemilitary in 1977,Pakistan's
foreignpolicyhad becomemorediversified and farlessconfrontational
6 Zubeida Mustafa,"Pakistanand the Middle East,"PacificCommunity, vol. 7, no. 4 (July
1976), pp. 608-20; Khalida Qureshi, "Pakistanand the Middle East," PakistanHorizon,vol.
19, no. 2 (1966); M.G. Weinbaum and Gautam Sen, "Pakistan Enters the Middle East,"
Orbis,vol. 22, no. 3 (Fall 1978), pp. 595-612; Shirin Tahir-Kheli, "Iran and Pakistan:
Cooperation in an Area of Conflict,"Asian Survey,vol. 17, no. 5 (May 1977), pp. 474-90;
Zalmay Khalilzad, "The Superpowers and the NorthernTier," International Security, vol. 4,
no. 3 (Winter 1979-80), pp. 6-30.
7 For details of the China connection,see Y. Vertzberger,The EnduringEntente:Sino-
PakistanRelations,1960-1980 (The WashingtonPapers, no. 95) (New York: Praeger, 1983).
8 Lawrence Ziring,ed., The Subcontinent in WorldPolitics(New York: Praeger, 1982),
p. 43.

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 Pakistan'sForeignPolicyAftertheInvasionofAfghanistan
against India. And its relations with Afghanistanwere improving as
well.9 With the Shah's encouragement,Daoud had been persuaded to
drop his agitationon behalf of Pukhtunistan,and he and Bhutto had
exchanged visits.In March 1978, a monthbefore the bloody coup that
overthrewDaoud, Bhutto's successor,Zia ul-Haq, welcomed Daoud to
Rawalpindi to dramatize Pakistan'sintentto continue to reduce friction
between the two countries.
With the overthrowof Daoud in April 1978, however, the new
leadershipof Afghanistanquicklytook up the old Pukhtunistancryonce
more-a sure sign of troubleahead.'0 And the collapse of the Shah less
than a year later, in January 1979, dramaticallyworsened Pakistan's
securitysituation. Instead of having a stable, well-armedconservative
power to the west,playinga moderatingrole in Indo-Pakistanirelations
and providingpresumptivesupport in the event of trouble,Islamabad
could only watchhelplesslyas authoritydisintegratedin Teheran. Now,
even conceivableU.S. backingthroughthe "Teheran connection"was no
longer available. Iran was rapidly falling under the domination of
puritanical religious enthusiasts. The Khomeini revolution not only
destroyedthe Shah's regime as an asset to Pakistan's security,but also
threatenedto provoke religiousdisorderswithinPakistan itself.

THE SOVIET INVASION

In December 1979, Soviet troops moved into Afghanistan.Closer

than manyothergovernmentsto developmentsin thatpartof the world,
Pakistanwas well aware of the growingresistanceagainstthe Taraki and
Amin regimes. They were, therefore,less surprised than most at the
Soviet move. But Pakistaniopinions were divided on the implications.
The optimistsconsidered the Soviet move to be a response to the
deterioratingcondition of the Amin government,and an essentially
defensive effortto retain Afghanistanwithinthe Soviet "scientificso-
cialist"sphere. Otherssaw itin more ominous light,as a major step in the
"known"long-runSoviet"plan" to penetrateBaluchistanand advance to
the Arabian sea." Those concerned about ethnic tensions in Pakistan
were wary of Soviet and Afghan effortsto organize Baluch dissidents,
resentfulthat Baluchistan was not being given its due recognitionas a
full-fledgedprovince of Pakistan. The external threat was thus com-

9 A.T. Chaudri, "Handshake across the Durand Line," Pakistan Times,October 14,
1977; see also Pervaiz Igbal Cheema, "The AfghanistanCrisis and Pakistan's Security
Dilemma," Asian Survey,vol. 23, no. 3 (March 1983), pp. 227-43, esp. p. 227.
10 Ibid.
"Interviews in Washington(spring 1980), and in New York, Islamabad, and Lahore
(summer 1982).

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 Pacific Affairs
pounded by internal ethnic politics to complicate Pakistan's security
problem.12
As thousands of refugees sought sanctuaryin Pakistan fromSoviet
air raids, Islamabad was able to evoke strongproteststhroughthe U.N.
fromvirtuallyall non-alignedmembersand all the major powers. More
significantly, in Pakistanieyes,theIslamicConference,meetingin Islama-
bad in January1980, protestedwithalmostone voice; only Syria,Libya,
and South Yemen dissented.'3 Given Pakistan's geo-politicalsituation
and inherentconstraints,however,Islamabad could shape no prudent
policy withoutextensiveconsultationswith neighboringand more dis-
tantstates.Accordingly,PresidentZia's principalforeign-policyadvisor,
Agha Shahi, undertook promptconsultationin many capitals. How was
Pakistan to respond to the situation?

MAJOR ALTERNATIVES

MendingFenceswithIndia: InitialEfforts
One logical option available to Pakistanwas to tryto mend its fences
with India. Indo-Pakistanirelationshad worsened since Zia had seized
power. The Indian governmenthad long expressed its preferencefor
representativegovernment in Islamabad, and had appealed to the
generals to spare Bhutto's life. Some Pakistanistrategistsfeltthat now
was the time to seek closer association with India. It was folly,they
believed, to tryto defend the subcontinentfrom Soviet encroachment
withoutIndia's cooperation. It was necessarynow to restrainthe chau-
vinistsin Pakistan'sPunjab-who allegedly persistedin seeing India as
the major enemy-and more activelyseek an acceptable accommodation
withthe Indians.'4
On the other hand, fear of Indo-Soviet collusion had long prevailed
among Islamabad's militaryplanners and many public figures.India's
1971 venture against East Pakistan,launched withinmonths after the
conclusion of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship,lent substance to
that fear. Moreover, India had never been able to propose a long-run
relationshipwhich both assumed an Indian preeminence in the region
and was acceptable to Pakistan.'5

12 For an analysisemphasizing ethnicdivisionswithinPakistan,see Selig Harrison, In

Afghanistan'sShadow:Baluch Nationalismand SovietTemptations (New York: Carnegie En-

dowment for InternationalPeace, 1981).
13 For meetings,see Keesing'sContemporary Archive,May 9, 1980, p. 30241; August 1,
1980, p. 30385.
14 See G.M. Khar's argumentto thiseffectin The LondonEconomist, October 31, 1981.
While he was no longer part of the rulinggroup, his viewsmay well have found sympathy
among some thoughtfulmembersof the Pakistan establishment.
15
Interviewsin Islamabad, Lahore, and New York, 1980 and 1982.

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 Pakistan'sForeignPolicyAftertheInvasionofAfghanistan
Although a serious public debate was beginning in India when he
visitednew Delhi in January 1980, Agha Shahi reportedlyfound little
evidence that India's rulers shared Pakistan'sapprehensions regarding
eitherthe Shah's collapse or the Soviet invasionof Afghanistan.Indeed,
during theJanuarydebate at the U.N., the new Indira Gandhi govern-
mentwentso faras tojustifyRussia's move as a defensiveresponse to the
activitiesof "certainforeignpowers,"implyingAmerican and Pakistani
responsibilityfor the Soviet venture. This surprisingposition shocked
many of India's non-aligned friends. India's initial position may have
been more a quasi-automaticresponse of a regime whose leaders were
exhausted from an electoral campaign, and less the result of reasoned
analysis. Indeed, by the end of February New Delhi was publiclycriti-
cizing the Soviet governmentfor its presence in Afghanistan.
Be that as it may, the Gandhi government did little to reassure
Islamabad in its worsened securitysituation.To some extent,experi-
enced Pakistaniofficialsunderstood India's reluctance.Afterall, over 70
per cent of India's armamentsstillcame fromRussia; foryears,Moscow
had regularlysupported New Delhi's positionsin various international
forums; and Indo-Soviet trade relations were importantas well. For
India to acknowledge a markedlychanged geo-strategicsituationwould
raise serious questionsabout itsown futuresecurity-policy.India was not
likelytojeopardize itsrelationshipwiththe Soviet Union for the sake of
standing shoulder to shoulder with its traditionalregional opponent.
Moreover, India ratherlikelypreferreda "secular" Afghanistanunder
Soviet control to a religiouslyzealous Afghanistanwhich mightexcite
Muslims throughoutSouth Asia.
In New Delhi, PresidentCarter's abrupt volte-faceof offeringmili-
taryassistanceto Pakistan looked, at first,like an attemptto revive the
close Pakistani-Americanrelations of the mid-1950s. This obviously
called for strong public protestsin New Delhi designed to make both
Washington and Islamabad think twice. Indeed, it seemed that the
hypotheticalreturn of the Americans to South Asia was of greater
urgencyto New Delhi than the veryreal presence of the Soviet Union in
Afghanistan.Some even argued that a renewed American connection
with Pakistan would justify India in welcoming the Russian move: a
Soviet presence on Pakistan's eastern frontiermightbe the best guar-
antee against Pakistanirevanchism.16 In the lightof such reactions,it is
not surprisingthat a number of Pakistanisbegan to fear the worst-an
Indo-Soviet collusion to take all of Azad Kashmir at the propitious
moment.
Nevertheless,while India complained vigorouslyand publiclyabout
the American offerto help Pakistan,it did protestdiplomaticallyto the
16
Interviewsin New Delhi.

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 Pacfic Affairs
SovietUnionaboutitsinvasion.In themeantime, Indianand Pakistani
officials
maintainedan inconspicuousdialogue,the one hoping New
Delhi mightcome to be more helpful,the otherhopingto dissuade
Pakistanfromrepeatingits earlierstrategy
of goingtoo far withthe
Americans.
SeekingAmericanAssistance:
InitialEfforts
Anotherobviousalternative forPakistanwas to seekthehelp of the
UnitedStates.Pakistan's senseofweaknessvis-ai-visIndia had alwaysled
it to seek balancingassistancefromthe outside.The U.S. had greatly
improvedPakistan'smilitary in themid-1950s,
capability and perhapsit
mightbe helpfulagain.'7The day aftertheinvasion,PresidentCarter
telephonedPresidentZia and offeredhis help.18Elementsof the Paki-
stan militarywere enthusiastic about the possibilityof renewingthe
Americanconnection.For thosewithlong memories,Carter'ssubse-
quentsweepingcommitment inhisStateoftheUnionMessagetodefend
theGulfseemedto presagean end to America'sapparentdisinterest in
the affairsof South Asia. It also suggestedthat the U.S. mightbe
preparedto liftits virtualquarantine,firstimplementedbecause of
Bhutto'snuclearprogram,and subsequently intensifiedbecauseof the
Zia government's dubioushuman-rights record.'9
The professionals in Pakistan'sForeignMinistry,however,wereless
enthusiasticthanthemilitary. Theywereawareof theprofounddoubts
in Washington aboutonceagaingetting involvedin SouthAsia.Pakistan
was unlikelyto become the Carteradministration's favoriteoverseas
partner,and opinionin Washingtonwas dividedon the wisdomof
becomingtoodependenton thatcountry.20 TherewerethoseinPakistan
withdifferent longmemories, whosawtheUnitedStatesas fundamen-
tallyunreliable.TheyfeltthattheU.S. had "letPakistandown"in both
its1965and 1971warswithIndia,despitetheagreement of 1959(which
theU.S. had alwayssaidwasdirectedonlyagainsttheSovietthreat, while
Pakistanoftenunderstooditto applyto theIndiancontingency as well).
Politicalfiguressuchas AsgharKhan and spokesmenforthe Pakistan
People'sPartywarnedagainstforgingunreliableties.2'
WhentheAmericansmadetheirofferof$400 millionin February, it
confirmedthe viewof specialistsin Islamabadthatthe UnitedStates
shouldnotbe takenseriously.Even thoughWashington said the $400
millionwas onlya firstinstallment, who could be sure? Whyshould
"7W. Howard Wriggins,"The Balancing Process in Pakistan's Foreign Policy," in
Lawrence Ziring, et al., eds., Pakistan: The Long View (Durham, North Carolina: Duke
UniversityPress, 1977), pp. 301-40.
18 Thornton, "Between the Stools?" p. 969.
19Ibid,passim.
20Ibid,p. 969.
21
Interviewsin New York and Lahore, 1982.

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 Pakistan'sForeignPolicyAftertheInvasionofAfghanistan
Pakistan run the risk of associating with the U.S., thereby inviting
criticismfromthe radical left,religiouscriticismfromthose inspiredby
the Iranian revolution,and perhaps diplomatic or even direct cross-
border pressure fromMoscow, when the U.S. was simplyoffering"pea-
nuts"? Understandably,then, Zia rejected the American offer;and for
the next nine monthshe pursued a policyof engagingin verbalboldness
at the U.N. and among his Islamic brethren,whileexercisingcaution on
the frontier.
In retrospect,one wonders whether a real opportunitywas not
missed during those nine months.A very differentconjuncture might
have developed on the subcontinent.Zia's rejection of the American
offermighthave been seen in New Delhi as proofthatIslamabad was not
about to drag the U.S. back into South Asia, as Ayub was accused of
havingdone in the mid-1950s. Quiet but firmreassurancebythe Gandhi
government-such as some visibletroop redeploymentsaway fromthe
Pakistani frontier-and some expression of sympathyfor Islamabad's
new situation,could have given public confirmationthat New Delhi
understood Pakistan's worsened securityposition, and underlined In-
dian goodwill.Such moves need not have disturbedIndia's relationswith
Moscow, but theymighthave made a substantialimpact on Islamabad.
To be sure, such policy flexibility
is difficultwhen domestic opponents
are ready to pounce on any sign of concern for the worries of an old
antagonist.Bureaucracies oftenmissopportunities;militarymen dislike
the inconveniencesbroughtabout by diplomaticconsiderations.More-
over, the signals fromIslamabad were somewhatmixed as well. Never-
theless,there was enough time to reconsider old policies; but the op-
portunitypassed.
In view of India's unwillingnessto be helpful,and the vulnerability
resultingfromthe Shah's demise and the Soviet invasion,the Pakistanis
could not help but wonder aloud-especially withinearshot of Ameri-
cans-just how long they would be able to stand firmagainst Soviet
blandishmentswithoutsubstantialsupportfromotherpowers. In Wash-
ington,the Pakistanisargued that only a formalmutual securitytreaty
(requiring Senate concurrence) could induce Pakistan to become an
active partner in the new U.S. containmenteffort.Knowledgeable Pa-
kistanis must have realized that such an American commitmentwas
highly unlikely at that time-the "Vietnam syndrome" was still very
much in evidence; Pakistan's nuclear ambitions and dubious human-
rightsrecord simplymade the Carteradministration'stasksall the more
difficult.22
Moreover,therewas some concernthatsuch intimacywiththe
U.S. might require a radical increase in Pakistani assistance to the
22 Thornton, "Between the Stools?" pp. 970-1;
author's interviewsin Washington
(spring 1980) and Islamabad (1982).

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 Pac/ifcAffairs
mujahadeen, a step thatSoviet Foreign MinisterGromykowarned against
during his visit to New Delhi in February 1980. It would also risk
alienatingnon-aligned nations and the importantmoderate Arabs who
had spoken so forthrightly and voted so overwhelmingly
withPakistanat
the Islamic Conference and in the U.N.

ObtainingSupportfromtheMiddleEast
But Pakistanhad otheralternatives.In the Islamic world of the Gulf,
Zia had sources of support that had not been available to his predeces-
sors Ayub and Yahya. After 1973, the states of the Gulf-particularly
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates-were able to
provide a level of financialassistance hithertounimaginable. And the
dependence of westernEuropean statesas well as the U.S. on Gulf-State
energy resources provided the oil producers withdiplomatic influence
theyhad previouslylacked. As pointed out above, the Zia government
has some major assets in the Middle East. A number of senior Pakistani
financialofficialsand administratorshave served in the Gulf region, as
have Pakistanimilitaryofficers,pilots,aircraft-maintenance teams, and
logisticalspecialists.(Zia himselfwas stationedin Jordan at the time of
the expulsion of the PLO in 1970, and was a staunch supporterof King
Hussein.) Pakistanisbolsterthe police forcein Bahrain and Oman.23 As
non-Arabs, they are trustedfor their detachment from Arab politics,
unlike the Egyptians,Palestinians,or even the Lebanese-who, it is said,
can never leave politicsalone. Over one millionPakistanicitizenshave
labored in the Gulf region and sent home annually over $2 billion in
remittances-which now constitutesPakistan's largest single source of
foreignexchange.
From the point of view of many Gulf States, a stable Pakistan is in
itselfa valuable asset. Compared to the seven millioncitizensin Saudi
Arabia and the minisculeEmirates,Pakistanlooms as a major regional
power. So long as it copes withits own domesticand securityproblems,
Pakistancan be a reliable and predictableforce on the eastern marches
of the Gulf. On the other hand, disintegrationin Pakistan would pro-
foundlyworsen the politico-strategic environmentin the Gulf, an area
already destabilized by the Iranian revolutionand the Soviet intrusion
into Afghanistan.
Of its various relationswith Middle Eastern powers, Pakistan's ties
withSaudi Arabia are, at one and the same time,the most obscure and
likelythe most important.It is widelybelieved that Saudi assistance is
substantialin the form of funding for arms purchases on the inter-
national market, in concessional credits for petroleum imports, for
developmental investmentin Pakistan itself,and through construction
23 See fn. 6.

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 Pakistan'sForeignPolicyAftertheInvasionofAfghanistan
and other contractopportunitiesfor Pakistanifirmsin Saudi Arabia.24
It is also assumed that Riyadh stronglysupported Pakistan's case in
Washingtonas the aid package was being assembled and debated.
The Saudi connection has its problems, however. For one thing,
decisions can take an excruciatinglylong timeto emerge fromRiyadh-
as can the steps to implementthem. The Saudi systemmoves by con-
sensus involvinga number of senior family-leadersand top administra-
tors. The decision-makingprocess is highly secretive and reportedly
hard to influence from the outside.25Moreover, Saudi subsidies and
assistance transfers,though large when they come, reportedlydo not
followa regular patternand arrivesporadically,in a way thatcannot be
counted on and sometimesonly when specificbudgetary items are at
their most acute stage. On the other hand, the entire process has the
virtue of being highlydiscreet and inconspicuous; there is no public
embarrassmentsuch as is nearlyinevitablewhen dealing with the U.S.
over major arms-purchases.26
For Pakistan,of course, the Islamic Middle East comprisesmore than
Saudi Arabia and the Emirates;Iran is also important.In the wake of the
Iranian revolution,it has been hard to maintain constructiverelations
withboth Riyadhand Teheran. Nevertheless,Zia has attemptedto retain
his connectionswiththe Teheran leadership,difficult and unpredictable
as theyare. Reportedly,therehave been contactsregardingproblemsin
Baluchistan; there may also have been exchanges of informationon
securitymatters,on developmentsin Afghanistan,and on the indirect
Pakistani-Sovietnegotiations.
At the same time, Zia's popular support at home has remained
limited,and religiousagitationinspiredby eventsin Iran could verywell
erupt in Pakistan. The Shia Muslims comprise between ten and twenty
per cent of the total population (more have appeared since the Iranian
revolution than were evident before), and some key figures in the
Pakistan establishmenthave Shia affiliations.But the bulk of the estab-
lishment-the bureaucracy, the army, and business community-are
Sunni religiousmoderates.The mosques have been centersof agitation
on behalfof "Islamic values" and the pious life.In Pakistan,as elsewhere,
the religiouslyzealous oftenhave closer relationshipswiththe rural and
urban poor thanhave thebureaucrats,thebusinessmen,and theofficers.
To criticizethe secular tendenciesof Bhutto's regime was easy enough.

24 See, for instance,ShirinTahir-Kheli and W.O. Staudenmaier, "The Saudi-Pakistan

MilitaryRelationship: Implications for U.S. Policy,"Orbis,vol. 26, no. 1 (Spring 1982),
pp. 155-71.
25 Interviewsin Riyadh, Islamabad, and Washington(1982).
26 For background, see William Quandt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980s: ForeignPolicy,
Security,and Oil (Washington,D.C.: Brookings, 1981); and Adeed Dawisha, "Internal
Values and External Threats: The Making of Saudi Foreign Policy,"Orbis,vol. 23, no. 1
(Spring 1979), pp. 129-43.

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 PacificAffairs
More difficult has been the shaping of a consensus on whatconstitutesa
trulyIslamic polityfor the 1980s. Satisfyingthe foreigncriticsin Iran
mightalienate Riyadh,and vice versa; and respondingto the urgingsof
either could alienate-or mobilize-important groups at home. More-
over, diverse shades of Islamic opinion, if activated, could provoke
serious disorders as theycontend for public support. Shia demonstra-
tions against Zakat obligationsin 1981 were a vivid object lesson.27
The intricaciesof Gulf-Statepolitics have presented President Zia
with both opportunitiesand risks. When war between Iran and Iraq
broke out, Zia happened to be presidentof the Islamic Conference; in
this capacity,he immediatelysought to mediate an end to the conflict
thatwas splittingthe oil producers,threateningpeace in the Gulf region,
distractingattentionfromtheArab-Israeliconflict,and potentiallyopen-
ing Iran to Soviet penetration.So long as negotiationsare underway,the
process of mediation usually enhances the statureof the mediator-as
the U.S. discovered afterthe 1973 Arab-Israeliwar. But the process can
also backfireon the mediator: both sides may grow angry should the
effortfail; or one partymay become embitteredshould the mediator's
weightbe seen to bear more heavilyin favorof the other.
Mediation itselfis a difficultenough task; it becomes even more
difficultwhen a number of heads of stateare engaged together-as was
the case at the startof the Islamic Conference'seffort.28
To go along with
Iran's territorialclaimsagainstIraq's unilateraleffortsto change themby
force would seem to acquiesce in the Iranian religious agitationwithin
Iraq, and imply approval of Shia religious agitation in neighboring
countries.Yet, in any way to question Iranian religiousagitationin Iraq
riskedalienatingIran, and could even have touched offreligiousturmoil
within Pakistan itself. Zia managed to emerge from the mediation
process relativelyunscathed, having enhanced his standing among the
Gulf States-despite the fact that the resultsof mediation were rather
meager.

SeekingHelpfromChina

From the timeof Ayub'soverturesto China, as we have seen, Beijing

had provided a great deal of diplomatic assistance to Islamabad. In
effect,China's presence balanced India's, and obliged New Delhi to
devote substantial effortsto developing its border road-systemand
maintainingsubstantialforcesalong the northernand eastern frontiers.
China had supplemented Pakistan's American equipment in the late
1960s and, as the American arms-embargo persisted, it became an
27 For background, see Anwar Hussain Syed, Pakistan: Islam, Politicsand National
Solidarity
(New York: Praeger, 1982).
28 Interviewsin Riyadh and Jidda (1982).

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 Pakistan'sForeignPolicyAftertheInvasionofAfghanistan
increasinglyimportantarms-supplier.By the late 1970s, Pakistan had
received more than 1,000 Chinese T-59 tanks (constituting75 per cent
of itstank force),and some 300 Chinese aircraft(perhaps 65 per cent of
its airforce). Of the Chinese-supplied aircraft,144 were MIG-19/F-6's
which, together with French Mirage 3's and Mirage V's, formed the
backbone of Pakistan's airforce.29The Chinese constructed a tank-
rebuild factory,and improveda light-armsplant and a repair facilityfor
the MIG- 19/F-6'sat Kamra near Taxila. They also undertooksubstantial
road-buildingeffortsin the Sinkiang/Karakoramarea, opening up the
remarkableKarakoram Highway over the Kunjerab Pass.
But, should Pakistan come into conflictwith Soviet forces on the
Afghan border, could it reallydepend on China? Would the latterrisk
engagingthe Soviet Union in Sinkiangin order to divertSovietresources
fromAfghanistanand the Pakistanfrontier?Verylikelynot. In any such
confrontation,China, being the weaker power, would probably play a
cautious hand. Some have noted that both the Chinese and Russians
usually make threateningnoises on behalf of their respective South
Asian clients, only when the danger of involvementhas manifestly
passed. Moreover, Chinese policy has had the worrisome quality of
veering sharplyfromone extreme to another; the breathtakingswitch
fromMao's culturalrevolutionto Deng Xiaoping's opening to the West
could one day be reversed.
From China, therefore,Pakistan could expect quiet support, with
a continuing flow of militaryresources commensurate with China's
technologicaland productivecapabilities.Since China's leadership did
not need to win public support froman elected congress,theymightbe
steadierthanthe U.S. in a crisis.And itwould no doubt continueto stand
by Pakistan at the U.N. and in other diplomatic arenas. By itself,
however,China would not be likelyto initiatethe use of forceagainstthe
Soviet Union, even in the face of possible Soviet intrusionsinto the
NorthwestFrontierProvince,Gilgit,or Hunza.

U.S. Assistance:
Seeking LaterEfforts
The resultsof the U.S. presidentialelectionof November 1980 eased
Zia's problems considerably.The newly-electedReagan administration
was clearly less concerned than its predecessor over the character of
Pakistan's domestic politics; and nuclear non-proliferationwas consid-
erablylower on the new administration'sprioritiesthan was the bolster-
ing of Pakistan'smilitarycapability.
The F-16 deal and $3 billion aid-package would make an excellent
case-studyof how to negotiatewiththe U.S. froma positionof weakness.
Having played "hard-to-get"during the Carter administration,the Zia

29 For details,see Vertzberger,EnduringEntente.

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 PacificAffairs
governmentwas in a strongpositionvis-a'-vis itssuccessor.Moreover,the
Reagan administrationfeltit was urgentto signal to Moscow and others
that,unlike its predecessor,it could make tough securitydecisions and
get on with the business of supporting its friends. Early on, Pakistan
announced itsrequirementforthe mostup-to-dateaircraftwitha usable
lifeof twentyyears. The cheaper, less versatile,and less advanced F-5G
simplywould not do: even thoughitmightbe more usefulin the Afghan
arena, it was not versatileenough to cover all possible contingencies.30
Meanwhile, U.S. senatorial legislationregarding non-proliferationfo-
cussed much of the congressionaldebate on the question of how to deal
withPakistan'seffortsto develop a reprocessingfacility,ratherthan on
the meritsof the sale of the F-16's or on the substanceof the aid package
itself.In the end, the administrationwas authorized to sell Pakistanthe
F-16's for cash; commercialcreditswere to be guaranteed for the $1.5
billion worthof other militaryequipment; and a $1.5 billion balance in
economic assistancewas also approved.
The implicationsof these arrangementsfor U.S. relationswithIndia
were part of the congressional debate, though hardly central. At the
same time,it was clear thatany serious attemptto defend Pakistanmust
involve the cooperation of India. Early in the course of discussions
between the U.S. and Pakistan,it became apparent to both parties that
a return to the old and intimatealliance of the 1950s was out of the
question. Neither the Americans nor the Pakistaniswere willingto go
that far. Pakistan'sforeignminister,Agha Shahi, neatlyepitomized the
new relationship as "a handshake not an embrace."3' It implied a
readiness to cooperate on specificissues and to face together certain
understood contingencies.It permittedthe large distantpower to pro-
vide some support withoutdisturbingthe recipient'sown balance of
interestsand alternativeoptions. It carried few of the implicationsof
unquestioning support over a range of unspecifiedcontingenciesthat
had so misled both participantsin the 1950s.
Once these limitswere understood, the worst fears of the Indian
governmentwere somewhat allayed. Previously,as we have seen, New
Delhi had recoiled from the prospect of a renewed U.S.-Pakistani al-
liance reminiscentof the 1950s. When it became clear that such a
scenario was mostunlikely,the Indian governmentmade no attemptto
stand in the wayof Pakistanreceivingthe aid package. Indeed, both the
Reagan administrationand the Gandhi governmentnow recognized the
wisdom of improvingrelations. In August 1982, Mrs. Gandhi visited
Washington and gave a clear impression of wishing to diversifyher
options. The contentiousissue of nuclear fuelswas passed to the French.

30 For an analysis,see RodneyJones,"Mending RelationswithPakistan,"in Washington

vol. 4, no. 2 (Spring 1981), pp. 17-29.
Quarterly,
31 At a Lahore seminar,June 30, 1981.

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 Pakistan's Foreign Policy AftertheInvasion of Afghanistan
Moscow's sensitivityto this new flexibilitywas quickly demonstrated
when Defense MinisterUstinov and thirty(!) generals rushed to New
Delhi with freshoffersof defense collaboration,32and enhanced trade
arrangements.New Delhi picked up some of the Soviet offers,but Mrs.
Gandhi appeared determinedto maintaina more diversifiedpolicy.

MendingFenceswithIndia: LaterEfforts

It has proved no easier since 1980 than before to assess the trend in
relations between India and Pakistan. As pointed out previously,one
view of geostrategiclogic holds that both countries' positions on the
subcontinentwould be well served through closer collaboration in the
face of Soviet presence in Afghanistan.Yet, one observer notes, even
afterthe invasion,"Pakistan remained aggravatinglypreoccupied with
the historicthreatfromthe east to the detrimentof common effortvis-
a-vis the more real Soviet danger."33 The same could be said about
India's persistingconcernabout Pakistan'sreal intentions.To be sure, as
the Soviet occupation persisted,Pakistan and India appeared to move
haltinglytoward at least more regularized consultation.But the move-
ment looked not unlike an all-too-familiarminuet.
In the autumn of 1981, for example, Zia took the initiativeand
offereda "no war" pact to India, a virtualreplica of an Indian proposal
firstofferedin 1949, repeated numerous timesthereafter,and regularly
rejectedby Pakistanas meaningless.Zia's offercould have been intended
as an attemptto meet India more than half-way,by initiatingwhat had
been an Indian proposal in the firstplace. But under the circumstances,
it was considered in New Delhi as a clever ploy to put Pakistanin a good
lightwith the U.S. Congress, which was then gearing up to debate the
Pakistan aid package. India countered with a proposal for a treatyof
peace, friendship,and cooperation-a phrasing more in keeping with
India's agreementswithother states.
The twostatesthenswapped textsin a search forlanguage thatwould
reflect the differentemphases each desired-conveying expressions
of reassurance and goodwill, without implyingspecific commitments
that might inhibiteither party'sfreedom of action. When New Delhi
expressed understandableanxietyabout Pakistan'snuclear program,Zia
counteredwithan offerto establisha nuclear-freezone. It was a proposal
once espoused by India in an effortto inhibitChina; but it was certainto
be rejected now, for it would require that India open its facilitiesto
internationalinspection.

32 Thomas P. Thornton, "The U.S.S.R. and Asia in 1982: The End of the Brezhnev

Era," Asian Survey,vol. 23, no. 1 (January1983), pp. 11-25, esp. p. 20.
33 Thornton, "Between the Stools?" p. 971.

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 PacificAffairs
Periodically,impatientPakistanispubliclybringup "theunfinished
business"of Kashmir.The IndianshaveprotestedthattheSimlaAgree-
mentredefined thatissueas one tobe dealtwithbilaterally,and thatany
publicairingoftheissuerunscountertosuchsolemnundertakings. Yet,
at a timewhentheZia government was facingseveredisordersin Sind,
itcould hardlyhavebeen seenas helpfulin IslamabadforMrs.Gandhi
tobe commenting on India'spreference
publicly fordemocratic govern-
mentsin Pakistan.
Indeed,it is as iftheprincipalson bothsidessimplycannotrefrain
fromtouchingeach other'sraw nerves-ratherlike siblingswho have
livedtoolongin crampedquarters.Whetherthedifficulties derivefrom
the bitterness of yearsof inter-communal suspicion,fromthirty-five
yearsofconflict-ridden interstate or fromtheimperative
relations, need
of hard-pressed leadersto evokepublicsupportby callingup reliable
xenophobicemotions,it is hardto say.
Regardlessof thesubstantive of thesevariousproposals,
limitations
however,each requireda quiet,inconspicuous follow-up.And out of it
all has emergedat leasta joint Indo-PakistaniCommission, designedto
institutionalizeregularconsultations to facilitatetrade,cultural,and
press exchanges,and pilgrimagetravel.Thus, fromrathergrandilo-
quentproposalsmaycomesomeconcretemeasuresto ease thefrustra-
tionsofindividuals and groupswhosepolitically innocentactivities
have
been blockedforyears.

POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIETS IN AFGHANISTAN

Bearingin mindPakistan'sassessment of itsinternationalassetsand

and
constraints, itsdealings withthe U.S., the Gulf States,
China, and
India,letus nowturnto thedebatewithinPakistanon howto deal with
theSovietpresence.Regionaland distantfriendsare important, and itis
well to minimizeantagonismof a large neighborif possible.But the
questionhasbeenwhatpolicytofollowtowardtheconflict
reallydifficult
in Afghanistan.Viewshavediffered.34
Some have arguedthatto act likea "frontline state"can be risky.
Accordingto thisview,the Russiansare clearlythereto stay;Pakistan
should,therefore, returnto thepoliciesof thelate 1960sand seeksome
kindof accommodation withMoscow.Not onlywould thiscourse of
actionlikelyreduce the threatto Pakistanof the Sovietpresencein
Afghanistan,itmightalsostrengthen Islamabadin itsdealingswithNew
Delhi,sinceMoscowmightwelldowngradeitsrelationship withIndia in
orderto lurePakistan.Insteadof seekingto balancethepowerof India
and Russia withuncertainsupportfromoutsiders,in other words,
perhapsit wouldbe betterto climbon the regionalbandwagon.The
14 G.M. Khar considers these options; see fn. 14.

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 Pakistan's Foreign Policy AftertheInvasion of Afghanistan
Russians have offeredto recognize the Durand Line and promised that
the governmentin Kabul willdo the same-a move whichcould exorcize
the Pukhtunistanissue from Pakistan's internal politics.And the Rus-
sians suggestthatsuch an accommodationcould open the way to linking
Pakistan into a larger South Asian economic network.
Criticsreplythat such a move would lock Pakistan irretrievably into
a Soviet-dominatedtrade and securityarea; and, with Moscow's ally in
Delhi immediatelyto the east, Pakistan would trulybe cornered. An
alternativecourse of action called for more vigorous assistance to the
Afghan freedom-fighters. This school argued that only if the Russians
were trulyhard-pressed in Afghanistanwould the costs of remaining
there ultimatelyoutweigh the advantages. The Russians could put up
indefinitelywith the level of resistancethey encountered during their
firstthree years of occupation. While it was true that Soviet forces
controlledonlythe citiesand the arteriesbetweenthem,whilethe restof
the countryremained in the hands of the freedom-fighters, their pe-
riodic raids into mujahadeenstrongholdscould bring heavy casualties to
the population. Over a five-yearperiod, young Afghans would either
leave or die; the Russians could stay the course quite long enough in
effectto win. Only if the resistancereceived outside materialassistance,
thisline argued, would the costto Moscow become steep enough to drive
them out.
The latteralternative,of course, carriedthe riskof bringingPakistan
into direct confrontationwith the Soviet Union. And past experience
suggested that, should its own activitiesprecipitate such a conflict,
Pakistanmightwell have to bear thebruntalone. The U.S. would be very
unlikelyto take on the Russians so far fromitsown borders in order to
rescue the Pakistanisfroma crisisof theirown making.
Having considered itsvariousoptions,the governmentof Zia ul-Haq
chose to pursue a course of limited liability.Pakistan's current policy
regardingSoviet presence in Afghanistanhas four major elements.
(1) StrongPublic Condemnation. As we have seen, Pakistan has man-
aged to rallythe overwhelmingsupport of non-alignedas well as OECD
membersof the U.N. in its public condemnationof Soviet actions. Even
more important,however, has been the virtuallyunanimous protest
lodged by members of the Islamic Conference. Heretofore, the Soviet
Union has been able to make muchof AmericantieswithIsrael in itsown
bid forsupportamong countriesof the MuslimMiddle East. Now almost
the whole Muslimworld-even includingmostof Moscow's more radical
Arab friends-have spoken out against its invasion of a fellow Muslim
country.Surely it must be disconcertingto the Soviet leadership to be
publiclyand universallyreminded thatits forcesare on the wrong side
of freedom fighters.More than incidentally,the condemnations have
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 PacificAffairs
given heart to the mujahadeen.(Although successive meetings of the
Islamic Conferencehave continuedto condemn Soviet actions,therehas
been an increasing stress on the desirabilityof finding a "political
solution.")
(2) Formal Refusal to be a Conduit.Pakistan's openly antagonistic
posture,however,has been moderated by itsformaland explicitrefusal
to act as a conduit for militarysupplies to the mujahadeen.35
No convoys
are to be seen transportingammunitionand militaryequipment to the
frontier.The mujahadeen,say the Pakistanis,receive the bulk of their
equipment fromthe Russian occupiers themselves,eitherby capture or
thanks to the defection of Afghan troops. Pakistani tribesmen have
always been known for their skill in manufacturingfrom scrap highly
sophisticatedcopies of the more simple advanced weapons. No doubt,
some equipment filtersin via the China-KarakoramHighway; and there
are unconfirmedpress reports the Egypt is -supplyingSoviet weapons
and the Saudis are payingthe bill.36But the Pakistangovernmentdenies
any responsibilityfor such activity,pointingout thatit would be impos-
sible to control its permeable border with Afghanistan.Pakistan's cur-
rent policyclearlyis not to serve as a conduit.
(3) AllowanceforAfghanPoliticalActivityin Pakistan.A thirdelement
relates to the Afghans now in Pakistan. The governmentcontinues to
receive refugees and care for them as best it can. It also welcomes
representativesof the mujahadeen,and has even allowed them to set up
political officesin Peshawar. While it has tried to induce the various
refugee groups (six, eight, twenty,or however many there may be) to
collaborate,neverthelessthe governmentconfrontsa genuine dilemma
in this regard. For decades, the Pukhtun majorityin Afghanistanhas
agitated among the 7-10 million Pushtu speakers in the Northwest
FrontierProvince,callingforgreaterautonomy,and even secession.The
2.8 millionrefugees now in Pakistanare mainlyPukhtuns; if theywere
to become consolidated into a strongpoliticalmovementwithan eye to
effectiveconcerted resistanceto the Russian occupation, an unwanted
by-productcould be renewed agitationwithinPakistan itself.Since the
refugee"leaders" safelylodged in Peshawar are not likelyto carrymuch
weightback home should the Russians be driven out, theymighteven-
tuallybecome a real forcewithinPakistan.At the same time,should the
movementbecome solidifiedand go all out against the Russian occu-
pation, that mightbe the surestrecipe for a directSoviet attackagainst
Pakistan;and some fear thatIndia mightseize thatmomentto incorpo-
rate Azad Kashmir. To refugee leaders, Pakistan'ssupport seems half-

35 Pervaiz Cheema, "AfghanistanCrisis,"p. 236.

36
For a rare published reference,see Leslie Gelb, The New YorkTimes,May 4, 1983.

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 Pakistan'sForeignPolicyAftertheInvasionofAfghanistan
hearted and at timeseven divisive.Yet, theyrecognizethattheirpolitical
activities,however ineffectual,could not continue without Pakistan's
consent; so theyremain acquiescent.
(4) Willingnessto Talk WithinLimits.A fourth element of Pakistan
policy became more prominent in 1982 and the spring of 1983-
exploring through "arm's-length"negotiations a political settlement
whichmightlead to the departureof SoviettroopsfromAfghanistan.In
August 1981, Secretary Firyubin firstvisited Pakistan and proposed
three-corneredtalks between Teheran, Kabul, and Islamabad. The
Pakistanisrejected that idea, perhaps with encouragement from both
Riyadh and Teheran. Later in 1981, Pakistan encouraged the U.N. to
appoint a representativeto explore the problemof the Sovietoccupation
of Afghanistan.Moscow initiallyopposed the idea, but eventuallyac-
quiesced in February 1982 in view of the near-universalsupport the
initiativereceived.
Perez de Cuellar, the U.N. secretarygeneral's special representative,
took preliminarysoundings and proposed talks among Afghanistan,
Pakistan,and Iran, in order to stressthe shared regional interestin a
settlementof the Afghan struggle.Islamabad agreed to indirecttalks,
makingclear that communicationthroughthe secretarygeneral's good
officesin no way implied recognitionof the Soviet-implantedKarmal
regime.Perez de Cuellar's successor,Diego Cordovez, made a numberof
visitsto Kabul, Islamabad, and Teheran, usually stoppingin Moscow at
the end of each round on his way back to New York.
In June 1982, and again in April and June 1983, there were "third
party" discussions in Geneva. Four principles were eventuallyagreed
upon among the parties: (1) a withdrawalof Soviet troops; (2) an end to
"outside interference"in Afghanistan'saffairs;(3) a safe returnof the
refugees; and (4) internationalsupervisionand guarantees of the final
settlement.While it is considered "progress"to definesuch a formulaas
a basis for negotiations,37 by the autumn of 1983 there was stilla long
way to go.
The governmentof Pakistanmustmaneuverwithinnarrowmargins.
On the one hand, the Russians are in occupation of Kabul and most
othercities,and are not likelyto leave unless a regimeacceptable to them
is to remain in place. Yet, both Muslim fundamentalistsand refugeesin
Pakistan are likelyto turn against the Zia regime if it shows insufficient
zeal in defending their interests-which involves both a Soviet with-
drawal and a change of regime in Kabul. Furthermore,if there is no
Soviet withdrawal,the refugees will probably remain in Pakistan as a
source of politicalunrest. While the bulk of refugees are in the North-

37 W.I. Zartman and M.R. Berman, ThePracticalNegotiator

(New Haven, Connecticut:
Yale UniversityPress, 1982), esp. ch. 4.

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 PacificAffairs
west FrontierProvince,in Baluchistanas well the refugeeinfluxis
fundamentally alteringtheethnicbalance.
On the otherhand,as was pointedout before,a sharpincreaseof
supportto thefreedom-fighters, withan eyeto speedingthedeparture
of theSoviettroopsbyraisingthecostof itsoccupation,risksinvolving
Pakistanin directconflictwiththeSovietUnion.This coulddestroythe
veryintegrity of Pakistanitself.Even if the resultswerenotso dire,it
couldlead to Pakistanonceagainbecomingundulydependentupon the
U.S.-a development whichwouldcarryitsownliabilities.
Periodically,talksresume;and, as longas theycontinue,theymini-
mizethechancesof military confrontation, holdingout promiseto the
different
groupsconcernedthatsomeacceptablesolutionmayeventually
be found.EveniftheRussiansdo notwithdraw, Pakistanwillhavebeen
seentohavedone itsbesttoinducethemtoleave.The burdenofhaving
refusedto compromise willbe on Moscow,notIslamabad.

CONCLUSIONS

In summary,Pakistanhas thusfar followedan adroitand multi-

facetedpolicy.As a stateon theAfghanfrontier, ithasfacedunavoidable
risks;but it has minimizedtheserisksby broadeningits international
supportand dealingwithbothIndia and theSovietUnionwithsubtlety
and minimum provocation.It has notlostitscredibility
amongthenon-
aligned,even as it has receivedsubstantial commitments of economic
assistanceand military equipmentfromtheU.S. By callingon itsSaudi
and Gulf-StateIslamicconnections, it has been able to obtainthese
armaments on termsthatminimize boththerealityand theappearance
of Americanleverageon itsfreedomof action.
At thesame time,it has takenstepsto allayIndian fears.By main-
taininga certaindistancefromWashington, Pakistanhasmadeclearthat
it is not seekingto involvethe U.S. in regionalaffairs-asit did in the
1950s.By theautumnof 1983,thequietdialogueestablishedby India
and Pakistancontinued, and bothpartieswereexploringwaysofdealing
withspecificareasof difference and distrust. Bothstatesnowseemable
toaccepttheother'srelationship withtheU.S. withsomegood grace.No
doubt,Washington's acceptanceof Pakistan'spolicyof limitedliability
has contributed to thisresult.But,in thefaceof theSovietpresenceat
the door to the subcontinent, it would appear thatleaders in both
Pakistanand India are themselves beginningto changetheirsenseof
priorities. Age-oldethnichostilities yearsof independent
and thirty-five
existenceand mutualconflict cannotbe overcomeso easily.Yet,forthe
firsttimein manyyears,India and Pakistanare dealingsomewhatmore
constructively withtheirancientfearsand suspicions.
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 Pakistan's Foreign Policy AftertheInvasion of Afghanistan
All in all, Pakistan'sachievementshave been quite impressive.It has
vigorouslyand effectively marshalled world opinion against the Soviet
presence; it has avoided responsibilityfor the militarysupplies that slip
undetected across its permeable frontierto the mujahadeen;it has both
encouraged and restrained political activitieson the part of refugee
"representatives"in Peshawar; and it has participated in third-party
consultationsunder U.N. auspices, to see if some way can be found to
induce the Russians to leave. In short,Pakistan'sleaders have made the
best of a verycomplicated-and unenviable-situation.

ColumbiaUniversity,
U.S.A., November
1983

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