Chapter II

DEVELOPMENT OF FEUDAL PSYCHE AND ITS

OPERATIONS

The previous chapter has given an outline of how the peculiar circumstances prevailing in Pakistan
have promoted feudal psyche. It has also been indicated that social environment prevailing in other
countries have cultivated a psyche that is unique to their social milieu. This and the next two
chapters will describe the development, operation and stabilization of feudal psyche under the
alternating governance systems in Pakistan. They will examine their impact on different
components of social environment, the manner in which they have been polluted, and the
emergence of class structure, rural poverty, bonded labour, and child labour, besides some of the
socially degenerate systems that have raised its entropy ad the Social Pollution Level.

The present chapter examines the ways in which feudal psyche has developed and how it guided
the operation of the network of the feudal system during different regimes. It describes the gradual
expansion and stabilization of the feudal infrastructure so that it can obtain a hold on all important
governing institutions, including civil and military bureaucracy, financial institutions, police as
well as associated departments of criminal investigation, judiciary and religious organizations.

Quaide Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah had, during the short tenure of his life in Pakistan,
emphatically observed that “the great victory of the Mussalmans in attaining Pakistan, was only
the means to the end and not the end in itself which was far nobler.” Achieving Pakistan was the
means of ensuring for the Muslims their socio-economic and political rights, in an environment
that gave nothing but deprivation at the hands of the majority, comprising the Hindu population of
British India. The gains of political reforms, leading to gradual transfer of authority by the British,
remained unfiltered to the Muslims in all spheres of activity, whether it concerned their majority
or minority areas. The Muslims had been driven to backwardness and were poverty stricken. The
transfer of authority at the provincial level under the British India Act of 1935 could not make
things any better for the Muslims; bulk of advantages being appropriated by the Hindu majority.

It should surprise no Human Rights activists to learn that the Muslims in British India were
marginalized to the extent that the Hindus alone could get the benefits from the new opportunities
of employment and in education or in other avenues, provided by the British rule. They were in
majority and were the first to approach the British and be approached by them. The latter were
more accessible to the Hindus than the inhibited Muslims, who had been pushed to the back seat.
The main purpose of achieving an independent state of Pakistan was to break away from the
ignoble misery of ignorance, poverty, and overall deprivation. The main purpose of creating the
Islamic state was to make equitable distribution of the bulk of advantages and have them reach all
sections and classes of the Muslim community.

The governance system for Pakistan was enunciated by the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr.
Liaquat Ali Khan, who had declared in January 1949, “Pakistan came into existence because we
wanted to create a society which is based on justice, equality and the brotherhood of man __ in
other words a society which has no inner conflicts, where a man gets a just reward for his toil, and
where there are no parasites existing on the labour of other __ unacceptable both in the eyes of the
God and man.”.1
1,
Excerpts from the speech delivered by the Prime Minister at the Convocation Ceremony of the Punjab University on January 22, 1949.
It is unfortunate that the words of Quaide Millat remained a rhetoric and the Provincial Assembly
of Punjab was dissolved and Governor’s rule was imposed soon thereafter. Many causes, it was
stated, contributed to the state of public affairs that led to the dissolution but the main one was “the
failure of the members of the Legislative Assembly to rise to the greater responsibility which
independence brings.” The step, it was stated by the Governor General in his communiqué, has
been taken in the interest of purity of public life after having viewed with growing concern, the
state of public administration.

Judged in this context, the development strategies in Pakistan, should have primarily focused on
cleaning up the society of the evil forces of social pollution that were likely to render all the efforts
futile on gaining a separate land for the Muslims of the sub-continent. It could be anticipated from
this single episode that the psychological frame of mind that was working at the Provincial level
in Punjab was not convergent with the national psyche, enunciated by the first Prime Minister.

This episode, on close examination also suggests that improving the quality of life of citizens of
the country, in general, and of improving the lot of the downtrodden, in particular was lower down
in priority in the agenda of the governance system. The steps taken by the governments that have
been coming in and going out during the first years after Partition, have unfortunately failed to
ensure the flow of benefits to lower segments of the population. The benefits of distribution of the
advantages, previously in the hands of the Hindu majority, are still not reaching the disadvantaged
majority, now comprising Muslims in the poor, and the middle class of the society. The lowest
stratum of the society in British India comprised the scheduled caste, untouchables and dalits; now
in Pakistan it includes the Muslim poor, manual labour called Kammies, Christian poor, Kohlis,
the Hindu migrant labour, and the poor peasant called haris and so on.

Such a situation has developed because the desired infrastructure for the delivery of social and
material services that are meant for upgradation of quality of life were simply not there to start
with and have still not been provided. Such infrastructure, if at all it was there, was in rudimentary
from and that too was designed to benefit only a few to whom the cause for the dissolution of the
Legislative Assembly was addressed viz. “the failure of the members of the Legislative Assmbly
to rise to the greater responsibility which independence brings”.

The people who were to be governed as the citizens of Pakistan after the partition of India,
comprised the Muslim communities viz. the Punjabis in Punjab, the Sindhis in Sindh, the Pathans
in NWFP, the Balochis in Balochistan, constituting West Pakistan and the Bengalese and Sylhetis
in East Pakistan. They were poorly organized on many counts; economically, educationally,
financially and politically. Unlike the national bourgeoisie of India, which incorporated in its ranks
patriots of every political persuasion, the Muslim middle class which formed Pakistan consisted
of heterogeneous and divergent elements.

The northern most area in Pakistan was inhabited by poverty stricken peasants having small rain-
fed land holdings. A large majority of them had entered the British army and the police force. The
districts of Rawalpindi, Gujranwala, Lahore, Amritsar, Batala and Ludhiana were the majority
areas of Muslim artisans operating their traditional crafts like cotton, woolen and silk cloth making,
iron and metal working, carpet weaving etc. They were also engaged in wholesale and retail trade,
contractual and government services, and professional affiliations of different kinds like teaching,
engineering, legal and medical services. The urban middle class of Punjab gave Muslim League
the platform for politics, sociology and ideology. A large number of persons belonging to this class
was educated during the period intervening the First and Second World War which provided the
manpower for the religious movements viz. Khilafat, Ahrar and Khaksar movements. A strong
agitation by the middle class, contributing to the Muslim League, was effective in forcing the
replacement of the Unionist Party and in bringing Punjab into the framework of Pakistan.
Incidentally it was this very class from which the industrialist’s class emerged.

Landlords of all communities of British India had earlier on joined hands to form the Unionist
Party in Punjab. Sir Fazl-i-Husain, the chief architect of the party, his followers Sir Sikandar Hayat
and Sir Khizer Hayat Tiwana remained most loyal to the British and the feudal landlords and in
that capacity the most loyal to the landlord class of Punjab. They were opposed to the creation of
Pakistan and Partition of Punjab. The role of both Sir Sikandar Hayat and Sir Khizer Hayat was
the most damaging since they formed a coalition government with the help of Congress and Akali
Dal and kept the Muslim League out of office.

Khizar Hayat Tiwana was among the two Muslim leaders who had acted according to the British
plan, the other being Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad, who as the President of All India Congress,
was the main architect of the Unionist Party-Congress-Akali Dal coalition in the Punjab. The
Punjab Muslim League had to launch a civil disobedience movement against this coalition since
in spite of being the largest party (the status that was attained subsequently), it was not invited by
the Governor to form the ministry.

Development of Feudal Psyche

The urban middle class worked for the Muslim League in the Muslim majority areas of India which
subsequently became West and East Pakistan, and had its influence exerted during the last decade
of the British rule, in particular after the Lahore Resolution of 1940. The Muslim here did not face
the same difficulties e.g. humiliation, as their brethren in the minority provinces. The reason was
not their majority, but that the feudal system was in many respects aiding the British. The soldiers
were, for instance, being provided from the Jhelum area. The system was also enjoying good
relations with the Hindus in agriculture and commerce. This is why the psychological frame of
mind of the feudal system of feudal psyche, was in favour of a status quo in the infrastructure
rather than facing a change in administration.

The 1937 elections had clearly shown that the leadership for Pakistan Movement was being
provided by the Muslim minority provinces while the Muslim majority provinces were not actively
involved in it. The Muslim League had won only 102 out of the maximum 482 Muslim seats in
the provincial Assemblies. The Congress, in that respect was also not a convincingly representative
party of the Indian voters since it secured only 706 out of the 1,771 seats and 26 of the 58 seats
that it contested for the Muslim seats.

This was the framework when Pakistan was not at a too distant sight. Khizer Hayat was more loyal
to the British than the Muslims and he helped them in keeping the Muslim League out of the
government. Khizer Hayat, according to his own statement, had resigned in the best interest of the
Muslims and the province. He said that he wanted to leave the field clear for the Muslim League
so that it could come to such arrangement with other parties as might be considered best in the
interest of the Muslims and the province. His resignation was a belated action because partition of
the province was already on the card on the basis of communal award. It nevertheless had a great
impact on the leadership i.e. on the landlords as an interest group.

Psyche of the leadership in the ranks of the landlords had sensed the formation of Pakistan and
perceiving the change in power balance, it directed them to join the Muslim League. Prominent
among those who joined the party before the elections of 1946 were Major Mubarak Ali Shah,
uncle of Syeda Abida Hussain; Firoz Khan Noon, Mian Iftikharuddin, Mumtaz Tiwana, Nawab
Muzaffar Khan and Syed Amjad Ali. Important personalities that had won the election against a
Unionist Party ticket but joined the Muslim League after winning were Khan Bahadur Faiz
Muhammad from Dera Ghazi Khan, Major Ashiq Husain Qureshi from Multan and Sardar Jamal
Khan Leghari, the grandfather of the former President Leghari. Moulana Daud Ghaznavi had won
against a Congress labour ticket but preferred to join the Muslim League. Muzaffar Ali Qizilbash
was a minister in the Khizar Hayat cabinet but he joined the League two months after Khizar Hayat
resigned.

Soon after the establishment of administrative structure, in whatever from, there was no one in the
Muslim majority Provinces to assume political leadership but the network with the feudal psyche.
The governance system was willingly structured around the feudal network for revenue collection
and governance. Islam was used by the influentials, whenever necessary, for exploitation of the
illiterate masses, as a slogan and not for fraternization at the political level among different ethnic
groups. No one, other than the landlord and his kins, could imagine to become the influential
personality of the area.

Since the bond of the fresh entrants with the Muslim League was largely for joining the
bandwagon, its break up was easy. Whereas opposition parties could be formed only gradually in
India, and those too by disillusioned Congressmen owing to differences in policy matter, the
opposition from the feudal network was immediately apparent in the folds of the ruling party in
Pakistan.

Development of the psyche of feudal system of governance in Sindh was an extension of the
Mughal empire i.e. through the feudal infrastructure. Its oppressive mode of operation is apparent
from the extermination of Sufi Inayat in Thatta towards 1718, when he offered protection to the
peasants. Those who executed him and his supporters were the Kalhoros who ruled Sindh until
their defeat by the British in 1843. The Kalhoros operated the feudal infrastructure by assigning
estate land to commanders of troops, aristocrats or on whom they depended for defence of their
borders during the Mughal period.

The landlords continued with their hold on the land and the subject in spite of the Kalhoros
becoming weak. The British did not find it necessary to make any amends in the system as long as
they were receiving the homage and the subject was faithful to the Sovereign. The Persian and
Afghan invasions and internal strife weakened the Kalhoro’s hold on the land and the
intermediaries exploited the situation, thereby putting the peasants to greater oppression since they
had to pay the tributes and levies to both the government and the landlords. The gulf between the
downtrodden and the landlords increased and the role of the intermediaries was firmly established,
allowing the feudal psyche to firm up in the meantime.
The landlords have been operating through the intermediaries or what are known as patharedars
or chief facilitators. The latter have continued to be counted among the notables of their area. They
have, since the times of the Iranian and Afghan invasions, been serving as the provider, protector,
patron of dacoits, criminals, cattle lifters, kidnappers, smugglers, and to keep the landlord safe
from the reach of the law revenue administrators, from the British time to the present. Being a very
influential person, he could not be arrested nor could any of his men be arrested by any party or
government agency, howsoever strong. As will be seen later, even the Martial Law Administration
could do nothing to dislodge the patharedar/facilitator network.

The majority of peasants in Sindh remained under serious debt burden and every facet of their life
was controlled and dictated by the landlords. The feudal network derived its power from the
intermediaries/facilitator system and was so intense and extensive that even independent
cultivators and owner-peasants were not free from exploitation and oppression.

The hierarchy of the governance system comprised the village chief as the head of a mechanical
aggregation of Goths and villages, which were inhabited by extended families. The peasants
belonging to the same clan as the landlord, depended heavily on him and had to side him and the
facilitators against external threat. Oppression by the aristocrats increased their dependence on the
landlord and the more the protection offered the greater was his control on the land, its produce
and the peasant himself.

The British took two major decisions in 1855, which although aimed at firming up their
colonization process, had a long term socio-economic impact on the subject of the area. One of the
decisions was to introduce the railways initially in Sindh and to subsequently stretch it to the
NWFP where the Pathans were very actively putting up resistance to foreign domination. They
implemented this decision immediately since it increased their mobility. They laid the railway line
which connected Karachi with Peshawar and provided the much needed infrastructure for the
defence of the land they were holding.

The second decision was related to the construction of the Lloyd Barrage across the river Indus at
Sukkur. This was aimed to relegate the status of Sindh to the position of an agricultural hinterland
which would supply foodgrains to the food-deficient areas of India and to supply cotton to the
textile mills of Ahmedabad in Gujrat and Bombay. The decision was agreed in principle but
implementation of the plan had to wait until 1932 when the Barrage was constructed and an
additional 3.5 million acres of irrigated land became available, bringing a total area of
approximately 8.0 million acres under cultivation.

Agriculture production increased many times as a result of extensive irrigation system comprising
1,650 km of main canals, 1,700 km of canal distributaries, and 8,300 km of water courses. It,
however, also brought about the settlement of farmers from Punjab. Both factors had an adverse
impact on the socio-economic character of the province. The impact was on the economics of crop
production in Sindh since it increased the role of money-lenders and mortgaging. It was such a
roaring business that by the time of Partition, almost one million hectares, MHa of valuable land
had passed on to Banias, the Hindu money lenders. The rural society of Sindh was in the meanime
polarized into a class of landlords and another of the sharecroppers or untenured tenants called
haris. There was at that time 27,000 large landowners in Sindh, who owned 54 percent of the total
cultivable land, and 256,000 owners of small landholdings or ten times as many, who owned only
22 percent.

Establishment of Pakistan, in the above backdrop of poverty, in what constituted the Muslim
majority Province of British India, came as a real blessing for the feudal landlords of the new
nation. They had tasted power during the British Raj and had, for attaining the ultimate objective
of ruling the new country, already taken steps to join and not to lick the forces of Pakistan
Movement. Independence gave them an opportunity to develop their psyche further and to
consolidate their hold on the governance system.

Operation of Feudal Psyche

The few case examples noted here and in the following Chapter (s) bear out the Hypothesis that
“An impoverished social structure breeds social pollution and allows a free hand to the operation
of negative forces to consolidate the gains of oppression and suppression of a governance system,
may be feudal or authoritarian.” In Pakistan components of Social Pollution network offered its
partners the opportunity to take advantage of the impoverishment of social structure that had been
degraded by poverty. The ethnic communities, which had earlier on concentrated in geographically
distinct regions, had developed a sense of isolation from the rest of the population and of
deprivation. Formation of such factions is known in physical sciences to increase the entropy of
the system and in social systems it implies rise in the level of Social Pollution. The majority
population of the area was too poor and subdued to have political affiliation with any side and that
included the shaping up of the Pakistan Movement at their hands.

The politicians and bureaucrats have had to work in collaboration in order to promote the
development of feudal psyche, to strengthen the unofficial, non-democratic infrastructure and to
render the official democratic framework fragile. If the politicians were somehow restrained from
doing so, for example by Martial Law, the bureaucracy took over control of the democratic
institutions and strengthened the non-democratic infrastructure. The feudal infrastructure is thus
so laid out as to consolidate its hold on as many facets, if not all, of the governance system as is
possible.

The feudal system, in order to operate the feudal psyche, cashes on the fragility of the democratic
infrastructure, and indeed it did so in Pakistan. It slowly developed an infrastructure for itself so
that it could place the kins of the landlords in the clan in important positions in institutions of the
governance system, including civil and military bureaucracy. The system that operated the
government in Pakistan has to be clan-oriented to promote cronyism for operating a patronage
network. The members of the clan, in having attained an enviable and commanding position, look
for allotment of landed property, bank loans, placement in a revenue earning department e.g.
customs department or revenue department. And they get the benefits, despite claims of the
politicians to the contrary. They get them because the rules and regulations are either modified or
rendered silent in such cases. The enforcement of rules is rendered spineless in order that the feudal
psyche can have a free hand to operate.

Democracy had started losing its position as an instrument of governance right at the inception of
the country but the negative forces of Social Pollution were not so dominant at the time of Partition
to be cause of major concern. Although there was so much of loot available as evacuee property
and there were so few to restrain the plunder, yet the colonial pattern of governance that was being
followed by the bureaucracy during the first decade, did not allow the entropy to rise and the
negative forces to take over and to allow social pollution in the form of corruption to be unbridled.
The system had certain checks and balances which did not allow everyone to raise the expectations.
People in general, were engaged in nation building activities and were still trying to live within
their means. The same is not true for the top stratum of the society, particularly the one belonging
to the higher echelons of the feudal network.

Starting from 1951, the country has had to bear sudden, unbearable and rude shocks which rocked
the nation by the roots. Each such shock raised the entropy of the system. While the tremors kept
rumbling for the next seven years, there was ample time for feudal psyche to develop its roots and
obtain an operational status. The first Prime Minister was assassinated in 1951. Hardly eighteen
months thereafter the Chief Minister of Punjab: Mian Mumtaz Daulatana rebelled against the
second Prime Minister: Khawaja Nazimuddin. The rebellion was manipulated by the feudal psyche
which was at this time being steered by Ghulam Mohammad, the Governor General in civil
bureaucracy, in collaboration with General Mohammad Ayub Khan, the network partner in
military bureaucracy. The Prime Minister was removed from office and Martial Law was imposed
in Lahore in 1953. The democratic infrastructure was shaken by the roots.

Operation of Feudal Psyche Under Martial Law

Much against the wish of Quaide Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah that the armed forces were
“servants of the people” and that they “do not make national policies, it is we, the civilians, who
decide these issues and it is your duty to carry out these tasks which you are entrusted with”, the
military bureaucracy joined hands with the civilians to become partners of the feudal network to
operate the feudal psyche and steer the governance system after the death of Quaide Azam. Its
neutrality became dubious at the time when Shaheede Millat Liaquat Ali Khan was killed.
However, its passion for power was unambiguous with the dismissal of Khawaja Nazimuddin as
the Prime Minister.

Khawaja Nazimuddin is on record to have said that he preferred to get out quietly lest Governor
General Ghulam Mohammad imposed Martial Law in connivance with the Commander in Chief.
It is said that Khawaja Nazimuddin wished to clip the powers of bureaucracy which was the force
behind the operation of feudal psyche at that time. Ghulam Mohammad as the Governor General,
being in an ideal position, did not lose the opportunity to subvert the plan. This and the subsequent
events clearly portray the passion of the military bureaucracy for power, although it still had to
come out from its position in the background.

It must be noted here that the transfer of power in 1953 from Khawaja Nazimuddin marked the
success of feudal psyche and the change of course in the system of governance from what was
intended by the leaders of Pakistan Movement. The system of governance deviated from providing
the maximum good to the maximum people and diverted the benefits to safeguard the interests of
the feudal infrastructure of which the civil and military bureaucracy formed the core. Later events
have shown that the self-interests led to an overall degeneration of the social fabric and the eventual
formation of Bangladesh.
The same Governor General intervened again in 1954 with a second coup d’etat by civil and
military bureaucracy, and ordered the formation of a new Cabinet, which included three bystanders
of power viz. General Mohammad Ayub Khan, General Iskandar Mirza and Chaudhary
Mohammad Ali who was till then the Secretary General of the Central Government. Feudal psyche
had, by this action, identified the main operators of the governance system that was to come.
General Iskandar Mirza became the Governor General when he replaced Ghulam Mohammad and
he also became the President of the country when the Constitution was passed in 1956.

It appears from the events that followed that the bureaucracy, both civil and military, was apt to
prove that the Constitution was not workable and that neither the political parties had the capability
to represent both the wings nor was there a coalescing force among the various parties, eleven of
which had been invited to form the Cabinet. Four Central Cabinets were formed during a period
of three years and seven prime ministers had taken oath of office in eleven years.

Iskandar Mirza and the bystanders patronized the members of bureaucracy who humiliated the
politicians and encouraged a campaign against their parties. The politicians were called corrupt,
inefficient and anti-state. Iskandar Mirza got the Republican Party, said to be his own, created out
of residuals of the political parties which he called inefficient. It is also said that he even bribed
some leaders to join his party and also punished those who did not. He had a peculiar system of
non-democratic governance system which worked through a group of civil and military
bureaucrats. The latter were represented temporarily by Iskandar Mirza and were instrumental in
stabilizing the power hungry gang in various clans. This is where the feudal psyche was given its
real mix of colours.

The real director was still in waiting. One can say so because although General Mohammad Ayub
Khan was to retire in June 1958, he was given (?) an extension in service. When everything was
set, General Mohammad Ayub Khan introduced the third military intervention with a true military
colour. He took advantage of his office to impose Martial Law, declaring Iskandar Mirza to be the
Chief Martial Law Administrator on October 8, and then deposing him to take charge of the office
on October 27, 1958.

The Martial law imposed by General Mohammad Ayub Khan in 1958, denied any chance that
democracy could get to flourish in Pakistan. The military bureaucracy had, by virtue of the powers
obtained by it to govern the affairs of the country during the Martial Law period, played a leading
role in inducing social pollution and translating feudal psyche into governance system. It marked
the end of the politician-bureaucracy collusion, if there was any. The politicians were relegated to
the position of persona non grata, while the civil and military bureaucrats both had a free ride in
the affairs of the government. Those were the days of the top bureaucrats who later on entered the
corridors of power. Much to the envy of the politicians, who were gradually being invited to the
corridors of power, the bureaucracy enjoyed complete confidence of General Ayub Khan, the
Chief Martial Law Administrator, CMLA.

General Ayub Khan successfully created a bourgeoisie in East Pakistan but very tactfully avoided
appointing them on sensitive or important posts. The East Pakistanis soon found out the
discrimination that was being inflicted on them. That became the source of tension and conflict
between bureaucracy and bourgeoisie of the two wings. Civil and military bureaucracy became so
strong that it attained the status of the only spokesmen of the administration with whom the
politicians had to deal with.

Martial Law was no law i.e. there was complete departure from democratic principles and the
Objectives Resolutions which aimed at providing maximum good to the maximum people. The
CMLA assumed the powers of a law maker as well as law dispenser. In that capacity he was very
fond of claiming that whatever he was doing or was likely to do was in ‘public interest’. He had
become a judge in his own cause. He got the 1956 Constitution abrogated although it had better
safeguards for public liberties than the one given by him in 1962. Since he was not answerable to
the public for his decision, being the CMLA, the public had to put with his system of governance.
There was a time in 1962 when there were strong rumours about the martial Law being lifted. The
military generals did not want this to happen and ganged up on General Ayub Khan to make it
clear to him that he, as the CMLA, would be ill-advised to lift the Martial Law on promulgation
of the Constitution. The president had to yield to the will of the Generals who wished the Martial
Law to continue for at least five years after 1962.

Things were not easy for the Martial Law to continue since the political parties had been annoyed
by it following the defeat of Mathere Millat Fatima Jinnah. They started agitation and the next five
years were a reign of terror let lose by the provincial Governors or Deputy Martial Law
Administrators, on the one hand and political partie on the other hand. The struggle for restoration
of democracy reached its climax in 1968 when people all over the two wings of the country rose
to overthrow the dictator under the leadership of the combined opposition parties and General
Ayub Khan had to step down in 1969.

The first political transition after the imposition of Martial Law in 1958 was initiated for political
liberalization by growing pressure from lower echelons of power. The pressure weakened the
existing forces and stripped the main actor viz. General Ayub Khan of the power held by him for
10 years.

Martial Law, however, continued with no transfer of power as per the Constitution, to the Speaker
of the National Assembly. The military bureaucracy saw the writing on the wall again and had
since prepared for the likely eventuality on termination of Martial Law. Its determination to
continue was duly conveyed to General Yahya Khan, who enjoyed the fruits of agitation staged by
the combined opposition comprising the political parties of both wings, The plea taken by the
military bureaucracy was that the governance system was incompetent to handle the general unrest
in the country; there were bloody riots in many cities, and there was no trust in the government to
the effect that it could put things right. There was therefore a strong case for imposing Martial Law
once again. General Yahya Khan obliged his comrades and there was a further military
intervention in 1969.

The one good thing done by Yahya Khan was to allow political liberalization from the top and to
signal the preparation for general elections. This kept the politicians quiet for a while. The
devastations caused by the Cyclone of November 13, 1970 in East Pakistan cast a gloom since the
elections were to be held in a few weeks time but Yahya Khan remained true to his words and
elections were held on December 7, 1970, as announced earlier.
The system of governance also did not change and the maximum good’ continued to be diverted
to the feudal infrastructure with the military bureaucracy holding the command. Martial Law
allowed power to be concerned into such hands that had selfish interests more than public interests.
It was realized that the game of give and take had much to offer to both and without collaboration
there would be confrontation and both will lose. It was also realized that biradri and quata system
were already the common denominators in their relationship and that they were benefiting te two
systems and also in strengthening the non-democratic infrastructure. Such a system of governance
of public affairs leads to higher entropy and to increase in the level of social pollution. Accordingly
the most corrupt management practices were introduced at this stage and Martial Law continued
from 1958 to 1971. This only firmed up the hold of civil and military bureaucracy on the financial
system of the country.

The military bureaucracy was already quite used to perquisites and when it saw so much laid on
the plate, it cashed whatever it could. It sought the help of the civil bureaucracy in stabilizing its
hold on the governance system, and in doing so it had to share certain privileges with the civilians
to show it the way to achieve the end.

The province of Sindh became part of One Unit or West Pakistan, and its micro-level governance
system through the local chief and provider/facilitator was unofficially transferred to the rest of
West Pakistan. The coming of Martial Law was accomplished by difficulties in getting things done
at the official level. This called for the establishment of a system of facilitators at almost every
public dealing office. The military bureaucracy made good use of the facilitators who had started
their regular business at the onset of Martial Law. During the 13 long years of Martial Law system
the law, the Constitution and its governance were all shattered by centralizing power into the
Administrators, who had nothing to do with democratic norms nor did they have any desire of
sharing power with civilians, as is required for governance of democratic principles.

The military bureaucracy had, by depoliticizing the democratic system of governance, effectively
suppressed public opinion so that no one could call a military or civil government servant corrupt
even if he was living beyond his means. The Annual Confidential Reports of such persons could
not record them corruptible’ for fear of their being subjected to the coercive forces that formed
part of the governance system. Every other person who was to make a public deal, played safe and
succumbed to the pressure of interest groups which were previously operative at low key level,
but had surfaced up in the meantime.

The military bureaucracy took the maximum advantage of the situation obtained by Martial Law
since it could displace the civil bureaucracy, particularly the first generation bureaucrats. Most of
these first generation bureaucrats were either close to aiding the Pakistan Movement or were in
some manner associated with it. They were the stumbling blocks for the negative forces of, and
were holding the fort against, social pollution from being widespread. They were removed by the
administrative reforms introduced in 1972-73. These bureaucrats could not reconcile with the
feudal psyche and did not care if they annoyed the feudal network partners with their honest
dealings which they could not avoid since that was part of their training during the colonial period.
It was here that the migrants from British India, who were the torch bearers of the Two Nation
Theory and Pakistan Movement were sidelined and even the fate of their descendants was sealed.
Heating of melting pot had since started and to add insult to injury Capitalist and Socialist
approaches were crossbred; the nationalization programme was launched to take over private
industries and hand them over to bureaucrats. Offsprings i.e. the second generation bureaucrats
acquired the worst genes of social pollution from parents of both approaches. The inefficiency and
red-tapism was acquired from the socialists system, while bribery and kickbacks were acquired
from the capitalist society. It was here that the doors to corruption were opened and favourites
were inducted as second generation bureaucrats through lateral entry’ or the Secretariat Group to
perform the functions of seasoned bureaucrats.

These second generation bureaucrats and members of military bureaucracy had little regard for
procedures for availing entitlements that they were asking for. Craving for perquisites and undue
favours became part of administrative systems throughout the country. Democratic norms that
were expected to have been followed by the protagonists of democracy in the 1970s, were trampled
under the feet. That called for massive demonstrations amounting to uprising by the rightist parties.
The demonstrations were followed by Martial Law from 1977 to 1985. There was no change in
the degree of social pollution in which the bureaucracy had indulged. The expectations that had
been raised during the 1972 to 1977 period, remained uncontrolled. The pace set to impoverish the
democratic infrastructure was accelerated, instead of being slowed down, since the civil
bureaucracy and police with all its vices had been joined by military bureaucracy. The non-
democratic infrastructure of social pollution, comprising feudal network partners viz. landlords,
facilitators and dacoits got a chance to interface with the civil and military bureaucracy and
politicians.

The shakeup had a negative impact on the expectations of the people. The aspirations were raised,
however, by the roti-kapra-makan (‘bread, clothing and shelter’) slogan and could not be contained
after the installation of the democratic system in 1972. The negative forces of social pollution were
let loose and the feudal psyche became fully operational.

Working with feudal psyche allowed the representatives at this stage to become so selfish that it
did not even care for the mandate given by the people of the electorate. They changed their
loyalties. This is what happened when the first elected parliament was installed. The loyalties were
changed under coercive forces and if they could not be changed, the opponents removed from the
scene. It gave a new look to the feudal psyche when an element of terrorism was introduced in the
system of its operation.

Operation of feudal psyche rendered the democratic infrastructure increasingly fragile with
increase in the level of social pollution. The democratic process lost their axis and greed of
representatives remained unbounded. No sooner they got a chance, they crossed the floor and made
themselves available for trading, more appropriately termed ‘horse trading’. This was the case
during Martial Law periods and also when proponents of democracy started to rule the country.
Development and operation of feudal psyche as the governance system, is reflected from the
following brief description of the socio-economic transitions through which the social structure
has passed through in Pakistan.

Operation of Feudal Psyche during the 1962-72 Transition Period: The system of governance
passed through a transition phase during the 1969-72 period and that reversed the growth
processes, bringing it almost to a grinding halt. Feudal psyche changed the stance and the landlord
who had, in the guise of politicians, got closer to the Martial Law regime in the early 1960s, took
advantage of the Basic Democracy system to politicize the successes during the period in defeating
Miss Fatima Jinnah in the Presidential election in 1964. It was from here onwards that people did
not believe in the Basic Democracy as a system of governance, which was openly being called a
mockery of democracy. It was an open secret that the feudal network had taken the military
bureaucracy in its fold and had taken advantage of the prevailing social pollution to open several
channels for corruption and the privileged few were getting securely entrenched for the loot.
General Ayub Khan’s Constitution of 1962 was particularly under attack and it was considered as
a putty which could be molded according to his wishes. The Constitution, it was generally argued,
needed a serious drafting by the elected representatives of the people in the National Assembly
and not the representatives elected by Basic Democracy units.

The Martial Law government claimed that it had to step in because the peoples’ representatives
were unable to govern democracy and democratic institutions and because Martial Law had the
capability to bring in a well ordered, dynamic, Islamic and democratic republic whose dream had
yet to come true. The country was on the other hand confronted with economic crisis due to War
in 1965 and consequent stoppage of aid by the USA. This created balance of payment difficulties,
and labour problems. Pressure was mounting in West Pakistan against the formation of One Unit,
while disparity between the economic status of the two wings of the country was being politicized
in East Pakistan by the Awami League, the majority party.

The end of 1968 saw a military solution being proposed for the labour unrest and coercive forces
being used against those agitating for the break-up of One Unit and for equitable distribution of
resources, revenue and opportunities between the units in the east and west. They all provoked a
formidable movement in 1968. The military dictator viz. General Ayub Khan had to step down,
yielding, however, to another dictator viz. General Yahya Khan. The Martial Law continued for
another three years and so did the hold of the civil and military bureaucracy on the system of
governance.

Proponents of feudal psyche were looking for strengthening the methods of governance to stabilize
the feudal infrastructure and were able to provide it a hold on all important governing institutions,
including the civil and military bureaucracy, the police and religious organizations during the
1969-72 period which proved to be the turning point for the governance system in Pakistan. This
period of three years may look short but to those who lived on, each hour was full of stress and
strain. This was the period when the melting pot was getting overheated and entropy of the system
was raised so high as to inflict irreversible damage to the system of governance.

The governance system that had kept two wings of the country together seemed to be heading
towards a virtual collapse from 1968 onwards. The Awami League in East Pakistan and Pakistan
Peoples Party, PPP in West Pakistan were blowing up the disparities in income distribution in the
structured society and distortions in aspirations of the people who had seen the benefits of
industrialization and urbanization as well as Green Revolution. Awami League was particularly
concerned with the disparities between the two wings of the country.
The people were, in the mean time getting anxious for a rapid change in the quality of life. They
could not control their impatience and had since started leaving their rural homes in search of
employment in urban areas while those in the urban areas were migrating to distant cities in distant
lands, since opportunities were getting limited locally with each passing day. Increasing economic
problems gave rise to migration to foreign countries in search of employment and the workers
started contributing to the improvement of quality of life of their kins, which the government had
failed to do during the previous years. The remittance from the workers increased from a mere
$20.17 million in 1964-65 to $100.90 million in 1969-70.

Very many faces of social pollution emerged as a result of realization of the goals of feudal psyche
and consolidation of the hold of the feudal infrastructure e.g. changes in aspirations of the people.
There was massive distortion in the living pattern of the haves and have-nots since the quality of
life of some persons changed while that of a lot many remained static. There were persons who
had improved their quality of life through remittances from their kins working abroad. There were
also those whose quality of life had changed without making much efforts. They were apparently
engaged in illegal trade, smuggling or drug traffic or corrupt practices which had taken roots in
the country. This led to the generation/accumulation of black money.

Major changes in the system of governance for the occurred and non-democratic forces operating
under the influence of feudal psyche were taking roots during the 1969-72 period. Industrial
activity was the bare minimum: almost 0.5% during this period. The labour problems became quite
acute and hence trade unions were banned by the military government. Political parties emerged
by the dozens and each one had a different agenda of manifesto to follow.

The PPP had a strange combination of landed aristocracy, labour leaders and leftists with socialist
inclinations ranging from pink to blood red. Democracy, Islam, socialism, power to the people
were some of the slogans of the party. The PPP even coined a term ‘Islamic Democracy’, without
realizing that there is no concept of the western type democracy in Islam, and that Islam requires
its adherents to follow the principles of Mushawarat/consultation. However, the slogan ‘Socialism
is our economy’ was the main enigma for the rightist parties. 113 of the top religious leaders
therefore issued a Fatwa or religious decree to the effect that socialism is ‘kufr’ to which the Party
General Secretary retorted by saying that the religious decree was the conspiracy of the Jewish
lobby. These developments were a pointer that the secular forces were taking active interest and
religious parties, which were part of the traditional system were offering stiff resistance.

The common denominator among heterogeneous group of PPP was hard to find but they all seemed
to gather around their leader who was trying to suggest through his at least 6 to 8 speeches a day
that he was working against the feudal system. Contrary to his statements, he was actually working
for the feudal system since all his proposed actions were aimed at consolidation and not
destabilization of the feudal network. The other party: Awami League, literally carrying the same
meaning as the PPP, had larger following in East Pakistan. These two parties together represented
a much greater section of population, compared with the other parties particularly the religious
parties. The latter were united against secular forces but were terribly divided among themselves.
The PPP was cashing on their division, but not the Awami League which had a solid following.
The first major step taken by General Yahya Khan during his short tenure was to undo / dismember
the One Unit but that took a year after its take over from General Ayub Khan in March 1969. This
was done through the West Pakistan Dissolution Order of March 1970 and West Pakistan as One
Unit ceased to exist since July 1, 1970.

The unity, that should have been forged as a result of the four provinces having remained under
one administrative unit designated as One Unit for ten years, was nowhere in sight. In fact the four
provinces were extremely divided, holding divergent views on the distribution of resources,
particularly water for which the Indus Basin Treaty had been signed with India. Sindh whose
leaders had turned against the Punjabis and Mohajirs, were charging them that they had altered the
social structure and language of the province, besides acquiring possession of precious agricultural
land. The system of governance of the four provinces, after the disintegration of One Unit had yet
to be evolved, and just could not be resolved.

The next step was the holding of general elections, which was one of the major commitments of
the Martial Law imposed by General Yahya Khan and also conceded to by political parties. The
monsoons had played havoc in 1969 and the floods had caused major damages all over the eastern
provinces. The elections were therefore fixed for December 1970. Cyclones with wind speed of
over 220 km per hour struck the coastal area of East Pakistan on November 12, 1970 and its storm
surges of 20 to 30 ft killed over half a million persons. The impact was so severe that it appeared
as if the elections may have to be postponed. They were, however, held on December 7, 1970 as
scheduled.

Immediately before the elections, General Yahya Khan issued a statement on December 3, 1970,
to make it clear that Martial Law is supreme, that elections were to be held under Martial Law,
that the new Constitution had to be drafted within the prescriptions of the Legal Framework Order
and if no Constitution was evolved within the prescribed time, Martial Law will continue.

There was brisk activity immediately before the elections and extravagant promises were made by
both the majority party leaders. There was no attempt on the part of the two party leaders to agree
on a formula to frame an acceptable Constitution and evolve a governance system that could hold
the two wings together and that could effectively get the armed forces out of politics. Feudal
psyche was ruling the minds of the parties, particularly those in West Pakistan and could not favour
the formulation that may strike a balance, since the military bureaucracy had joined hands and did
not, at any stage, want to disregard military solution.

3,500 persons filed their nominations to the 300 seats in West Pakistan and 2,121 in East Pakistan,
while there were 360 nominations for the 15 seats of Karachi. That was an indicator of the larger
appetite for public life by the people in West Pakistan and of the faith of the people of East Pakistan
in their leader due to which aspirations of the like of West Pakistanis were a contrast. Awami
League captured 167 out of 169 seats contested while PPP got 88 out of the 144 seats of West
Pakistan, showing clearly that Awami League being the largest single party should form the
government. However, Yahya Khan who was unaware of the finer points of the governance
system, blundered by leaving the voting process to elect the Prime Minister, to be determined by
the National Assembly.
It is not true that after holding the elections, the Martial Law Government was, for various reasons,
reluctant to hand over power to the majority party of the elected parliament. One of the Ministers
of the CMLA Cabinet, a military bureaucrat, resigned immediately after elections but it was
generally agreed that he was not trained in politics. The CMLA went to East Pakistan, undeterred
by the pressure exerted by the feudal psyche and met the majority leader there. After the conclusion
of his visit he made the statement in Dhaka on January 14, 1971, that the Awami League leader is
going to be the Prime Minister of the country. He also said that he had inherited a bad economy
and that he will be passing it on to the designated prime minister. After reaching West Pakistan he
fixed the National Assembly meeting for February 3 and afterwards changed it to March 25, 1971.
It is quite certain that the disruptive forces, dictated by feudal psyche and resulting from social
degeneration during the rule by military bureaucracy, were working against majority party of East
Pakistan in getting it an upper hand in the Parliament. The Martial Law regime seemed to be
divided, though not terribly, on the issue of handing over power to majority party. The faction that
was operating under the influence of the feudal psyche and the PPP leadership sensed the slippage
of power from their hands and proposed an equitable sharing of power between the majority parties
of both wings. When the PPP high command returned to Karachi after its meeting in Dhaka,
subsequent to the meeting between General Yahya Khan and Awami League leader, it had a blunt
statement to make that the latter has already dictated the Constitution. The East Pakistan press
retorted by saying that it was the West Pakistan leaders who were trying to secede from Pakistan.
The PPP leadership then went to the extent of raising the slogan idhar hum, udhar tum or we form
our cabinet here and you form yours there.

These instances were taken as resistance offered in handing over the power to the majority party.
That, however, was of political nature and mainly concerned the PPP leader. His stance was a
complete departure from the democratic norms, as against the Martial Law Authority who seemed
inclined to follow the principles closely. It was seemingly too much to expect from the elected
representatives, who were not representing the entire West Pakistan, but had a vested interest in
the governance of the country, to honour the democratic norms and allow the majority party leader
to form the government. Besides being undemocratic, they were certainly acting totally against the
Islamic principles which call for Mushawarat/mutual consultations.

The press and the leaders were getting impatient with regard to the delay in the transfer of power
to the majority party. This led to a series of statements and counter statements and also civil
disturbance in Eastern wing of the country, whose majority party was claiming the right to form
the government in Pakistan. The disobedience, as will be seen later, was crushed by military forces
in early 1971.

It may not be immediately obvious as to who initiated the crisis in East Pakistan, but it certainly
seems that it was the socially degenerate military bureaucracy guided by feudal psyche, that was
behind the debacle. It was a now or never situation for the military bureaucracy and it had to see
to it that the uprising is crushed with full force. According to the Martial Law authorities it was
their responsibility to keep the two wings of the country together. However, the solution was to be
sought by negotiation and not by use of force. For initiating a negotiated settlement, people in
Pakistan were relying heavily on the PPP leadership, despite the fact that it was not the chosen
majority party. The Awami League was insisting on its Six Points and none of those points needed
cessation and could be talked over. Feudal Psyche of West Pakistan leadership was more interested
in continuation of the hold of West Pakistan in the Parliament, otherwise a settlement among the
contestants was not impossible.

Political settlement could have frustrated these attempts but the obduracy of the self-centred PPP
leadership and the inexperience of military bureaucracy in political conflicts could not evolve a
system of governance to hand over power to the majority. It was otherwise more than likely that
by doing so, the might of the Awami League in having made extravagant promises could have
been put to test, and also the divisive forces, operating from across the border in India, might have
been identified. It, however, needed a statesman to understand these finer details and the
politicians in West Pakistan, were not statesmen.

The West Pakistan leadership, because of the influence of feudal psyche had its misgivings all the
time about the Six Point Programme because of the involvement of Awami League leader in the
Agartala Conspiracy and there were many who believed that he should not have been absolved of
the charges by General Ayub Khan. It was feared that the divisive forces in East Pakistan had since
consolidated their hold during the 1968-70 period and had actively organized an alliance with the
Indian Government. It was being argued at that time that political settlement or otherwise, the plan
to disintegrate the country had since been finalized; all that remained to be done was setting the
date for implementation, which was set for an occasion that was immediately after the election.

The divisive forces most likely comprised the ‘forward block’ of the Awami League but not the
League itself or its leader. It is a different matter that they had the blessings of the latter. It was
agreed between the divisive forces and the Indians that when the D-Day arrives India will cut off
the air and sea route from West to East Pakistan. As a prelude to this agreement, the ‘Ganga’ drama
was staged on January 30, 1971 in which Hashim Qureshi, an Indian agent hijacked a plane from
India and got it landed at Lahore. It was welcomed in Pakistan by no less a person than the PPP
leader on February 2. On February 3, the hijackers blew up the plane and in demanding
compensation for the loss of the plane on Pakistani soil, the Indian Government stopped the
Pakistani aircrafts from overflying its territory.

A crisis was created since the communication between the two wings was cut off and the Indian
designs became immediately obvious. The East Pakistani leadership, however, termed the
hijacking of the plane as expressly engineered to frustrate the transfer of power to the majority
party. The day of March 23 was observed in East Pakistan as Resistance Day and the Bangladesh
flag was hoisted. As if the military bureaucracy had known of what was lying ahead, it had General
Tikka Khan, known for his ruthlessness, posted in East Pakistan. The event of March 23 was taken
as mutiny; the rebellion was ordered to be crushed and the Awami League banned. It was massacre
all over. Pakistani estimates put the death toll at 30,000 while the Awami League claimed that the
dead exceeded hundred thousand persons. This was followed by a large influx of refugees into
India and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees estimates put it at 700,000 but the Indians
claimed was seven million.

The drama starting from the hijacking of the plane to the exodus of refugees in huge numbers, was
grabbed by India as an opportunity and it dared to set the stage for the 1971 war. The intervening
period was wasted by the military bureaucracy in trying to prepare for defence, although it was
known that it would be a losing battle, if staged by the armed forces on East Pakistan soil,
particularly since India was backing the divisive forces. What was needed was to enter into
negotiated settlement in response to the demands by the International community, including the
Americans. The events that took place bear testimony to the effect that the military bureaucracy
and the PPP both operating under the command of feudal psyche, were not inclined to reach a
negotiated settlement. Again, it needed a statesman, as against a group of politicians, to understand
the intricacies of the problem to arrive at a negotiated settlement.

The worst had to happen. The first major operation guided by feudal psyche, was made to yield
results. The luxuries of social pollution enjoyed by the civil and military bureaucracy and self-
centred politicians had to be paid for. Indian troops entered East Pakistan and also attacked the
West Pakistan borders. The West Pakistan majority party leader was sent to present the case to the
UN Security Council. However, when he arrived in New York, the debate was deliberately delayed
and to show the bitterness, the drama of tearing the sensitive papers was staged on the floor of the
Security Council. The debate in the Security Council was unduly prolonged as if it was waiting
for the fall of Dhaka. The eastern wing was dismembered and Bangladesh emerged on the map of
the world on December 16, 1971.

The missing links with regard to delays, though slight, in handing over the power to the majority
party by the military bureaucracy, the slogan: idhar hum udhar tum, the self-centred approach of
the PPP leadership, the delaying of presentation of a forceful resolution condemning India as the
aggressor, all of them being expressions of feudal psyche and social pollution, tied up with the
surrender of the army and taking over of the reigns of the country by the PPP leader as the CMLA.
They all indicated the connivance of ruling junta with the leftist political parties on the issue of
common interests of feudal psyche. It could only be this mode of transfer that could let the PPP in,
otherwise if it was a civilian government, to whom the power was to be transferred, fresh elections
would have been called for.

The loss of East Pakistan and surrender of the army troops in unprecedented number, and that too
without fighting, came to the West Pakistanis, but not the feudal network, as a rude shock. The
PPP leader was assigned to take over as the civilian CMLA. In his address to the Nation he tried
to say that he would pick up the threads and make attempts to restore the prestige of the Country.
Inside he must have been a happy man for if the Awami League leader had agreed to a negotiated
settlement he would have either been sidelined to oversee the affairs of West Pakistan as his deputy
prime minister or would have been sitting on the opposition benches.

The PPP leader, himself a feudal and part of the feudal network till the formation of the PPP, and
operating under the guise of a socialist, cannot be absolved of the blame for the dismemberment
of the country. He was in an ideal position to reverse the process of disintegration. The age old
maxim the ‘the last person who can avoid an accident and does not avoid the accident, is
responsible for the accident’, holds true. As said earlier the two party leaders could have worked
out a governance system to keep the two wings together. Together, they could have formulated a
plan to satisfy the demands of the provinces and the adjustments in or phasing of the Six Points
Programme. Knowing that the military bureaucracy was too incompetent to strike a political
solution, and that the International pressure was for a negotiated settlement, it was expected that
the PPP leader would rise above self and initiate the dialogue. The pressure of feudal psyche was,
however, at its peak and perhaps it availed the only chance offered to it to get the East Pakistan
out of contest, by not negotiating the settlement.

The required negotiated settlement, even at this belated stage, could have been ideally initiated by
a Statesman and not a politician. Only the former has the capacity to analyze critical issues and
has desired far sight to go deep into them. Leaders have to rise above self to resolve critical issues,
which politicians overwhelmed by feudal psyche have not. Statesmen are decent and polite to their
adversary, even under pressing circumstances. The PPP leader got a chance to prove himself a
Statesman and he may, like the other great Statesmen of the world, have gone in history books as
one who saved the country from falling apart. He, however failed to do so. Since he was the last
person who could undo the designs to dismember the Eastern wing, one can certainly hold him
responsible for the disaster, and history certainly will.

Operation of Feudal Psyche in the PPP Governance System: The PPP Government led by its
founder president and governed by politicians overwhelmed by feudal psyche took the reigns of
the country towards the end of 1971 and started translating the dreams of feudal psyche as well as
socialism under the grab of Islamic Socialism. Using Islam and introducing socialism through
socialistic dreams, plunged the country into the socialist model which marginalizes private
property. This was done in total disregard of the fact that the failure of the system had been proven
and the count down on socialism had started at the same time. The governance system thus far
followed by the Pakistan government had to yield to the new order. The private sector industries
had to be surrendered to government functionaries who enjoyed their sudden promotion to the rank
of managing directors of an industry. That added a new dimension to feudal psyche and a new
class of members to the non-democratic infrastructure of a socially and morally degenerate society
which had already paid a heavy cost for social pollution in its folds.

There was a class of socialists who thought that the mechanism for free market had not succeeded
in achieving the national goals of rapid economic expansion nor of equitable distribution of wealth.
They held the view that there was need for the adoption of a system that did not have an absolutely
planned economy i.e. one in which a balance is maintained between public and private ownership.
In Pakistan, it was not just this objective aiming at reforms, but was also a sort of vengeance
amounting to punishment, to “fix the industrialists” who were exploiting the poor masses, as the
founder President of PPP put it. He was very vocal against the 22 families who had amassed wealth
and had no regard for upgrading the lot of the poor and had done nothing at all for the equitable
distribution of wealth and opportunities. This again shows the lack of statesmanship on the part of
the head of the state who was unable to restrain his emotions.

It may be reiterated that the objective of public ownership is to supply cheap services, production
of essential commodities, regional economic expansion etc. Profit is not pronounced as the
objective of this type of economy. The structure of the market in which the public enterprises
operate and the pricing policies that they pursue have direct bearing on their profitability. The
public enterprises in planned economy are monopolistic and hence their efficiency cannot be
judged by profit alone.

Public outcry was increasing at the time for scrutiny of the role and performance of public sector
enterprises. It was being increasingly felt that it was time to re-examine the role of public
enterprises more than that of the private organizations. However, the founder President of PPP was
not the type who would retract. He undertook a whirlwind trip of Arab countries which had adopted
a socialist economy not too long ago, to see for himself the working and not the viability of
changeover of the system.

The governance system of an Islamic Society requires only such persons to be administrative head
who constantly look after the common interest of the community. He has to keep the welfare of
the people in mind when taking decisions, deciding disputes, making mediatory efforts, and
appointing persons to different positions or reverting them in public interest. An administrator can
do so only if he has a just disposition, shows adequate flexibility, has the knowledge of law,
customs and traditions of the country. Islam already has the elaborate system of public consultation
or Ijma or Mushawarat in the weekly Juma prayers, and other religious congregations, long before
the eastern democratic societies developed the idea of ‘Consensus’ or ‘Public will’. It is
accordingly imperative on the administrator to have the consensus since the person in the
administrator may not have the knowledge and experience in all matters of interest of the widely
varying communities. The administrator of the Islamic Socialism System was, on the other hand,
a feudal socialist who had nothing to do either with Socialism or Islam. By his actions he had
demonstrated his commitments to the demands of feudal psyche.

Using the Islamic Socialism slogan, the PPP started to put forward its own version of governance
system by socializing Islam. Unfortunately the leaders of the party lacked the wisdom to
understand the Islamic Principles. They were deriving their inspirations from such spoiled children
like Machiavelli who said “There are no permanent friends, no permanent enemies ___ only
permanent interests.” For them both Karl Marx and Hitler were heroes. Drafting a consensus
Constitution, based on Islamic principles by the PPP leadership, under influence of feudal psyche,
was therefore beyond its capacity.

The PPP, immediately after coming into power, went straight ahead with sweeping reforms aimed
at socialist governance viz. state intervention in key spheres of industrial, agriculture and
commercial activity to attain the desired rate of economic growth. It nationalized a large number
of industrial units producing engineering goods, industrial and agricultural chemicals, cement and
fertilizer factories, and oil refineries. It also nationalized the banks, schools and other educational
institutions. This brought down the private sector industries to a virtual collapse and reduced the
share of private investment in the industries to less than 30 percent.

The PPP government claimed to have evolved strategies to promote ideological, economic,
political and military affairs, to find means to develop them, and to monitor their accomplishment
and delivery system. It also claimed to have evolved a system to remove protection to mediocrity,
which had debarred and deprived the state of the capabilities of the meritorious persons. The
actions taken, however, belied the claims of giving a status to merit in the governance system while
preservation of morality remained a far cry.

The governance system of the PPP, working under the influence of feudal psyche, went for its own
version of democracy or socialism by creating public enterprises instead of optimizing the
production of the private industries and organizations, and adopting a system that had a planned
economy instead of one in which a balance is maintained between public and private ownership.
The PPP leadership, for that matter, could neither make the society a Socialist nor Islamic, but
created serious imbalance in its already disbalanced social structure.

The PPP government could not improve the lot of the people nor could it establish its Islamic
socialism as a way of life to preserve the morality, least of all transform the economy on socialist
lines. The reasons for voting the PPP to power were economic. What was needed was an economic
uplift. The people had believed in the extravagant promises and were thinking of miracles from
the PPP government. They were expecting bread, clothing and shelter at their door step. The people
soon realized that the PPP government could not fulfill its obligation and that its slogans were tall
claims, raised to divert attention of the public from the shortcomings in its system of governance.
The governance system of the PPP had to its credit the stabilization of the feudal network and
realization of the dreams of feudal psyche. Creation of Pakistan had only changed the general
scenario but was limited to replacement of exploiters of one type by the other: Hindu minority,
that was taking away the benefits by virtue of possession of resources, was replaced by feudal
landlords, who were only waiting for an opportunity to occupy the driving seat. They luckily
received the possession on a silver platter when India was partitioned and also got the advantage
of realizing the dreams of feudal psyche. The exploiters working under the command of feudal
psyche, were performing at the top level and also as middlemen or providers of the services. The
development strategies did not aim at either eliminating the role of the middlemen or at improving
the lot of the disadvantaged majority. On the contrary they were directed towards the already
prosperous few. This led to a heavy-top development which made the rich richer by concentrating
the wealth in their hands.

Successful operation of feudal psyche has increased the number of the richest families from 22 in
the first two decades to 330 as of now. There are at present 14 Pakistani ‘dollar billionaires’.
Having over one billion dollars deposited in foreign banks. Their names are, however, not
officially recorded as such since they did not collect the wealth legitimately. The increase in the
number of rich persons in the official and unofficial categories has occurred through a series of
socio-economic transitions, followed by a Continuum, comprising degeneration processes which
have now grossly polluted the social fabric. The transitions have taken place in four stages, each
stage being marked by economic crisis spread over two to three years, with the level of social
pollution rising and the feudal network getting stabilized at each stage.

The First Transition Period: The first transition was caused by the obduracy of the military
bureaucracy, which was an additional enforcement to the feudal psyche and network. The
transition was marked by the reversal of the gains of industrialization and green revolution, started
with the war with India in 1965, the stoppage of aid flow, labour problems and the loud
pronunciation of social imbalances in the region, and was easily noticeable in 1969. The industrial
activity slackened and there was a return to agriculture hereafter, as judged by the fall back to the
previous level of the labour force engaged in agriculture.

The Second Transition Period: The end of General Ayub Khan’s Martial Law and the ensuring
election activities, the political turmoil thereafter leading to dismemberment of East Pakistan,
accompanied by the loss of an established market there, and the massive devaluation of the rupee,
all brought about a second socio-economic transition and the worst crisis in 1971-72. There was a
major transformation in the society and it was noted that the number of industrial workers
decreased to the level of early sixties and a new trend of shifting to trading was observed hereafter.

The Third Transition Period: The country had hardly recovered from the shocks of the two
crises when it had to undergo another transformation, resulting from the global energy crises of
1973. The cost of industrial production increased as a result of devaluation of the rupee and the
rise in oil prices. While the country was still trying to adjust to the local and global crises,
nationalization of major private enterprises was announced. That was a shock to the business
community which had taken risks of investment in a few key industries. This marked the third
transition whose peak appeared in 1974. The business community was averse to transformation of
the economy from a free market system to centralized and private capital was shy from here
onwards. The level of labour force in agriculture and industry remained almost static at earlier
positions. The incremental labour force was being absorbed by the trading and construction sectors
and almost none by the industries, since very few could be set up under the circumstances.

The third transition and its aftermath was witness to the realization of the dreams of feudal psyche
and massive invasion of disruptive forces in a society whose expectations had been raised by
slogans. The transition was marked by changes in professional affiliations, increase in rural-urban
migration and increase in the number of persons employed abroad. There was, consequently, an
increase in the income of rural families and in home remittances from expatriates working abroad.
The latter accounted for 7.5 percent of the GDP. These changes dismantled the social structure in
that the prevailing pattern of resource consumption changed, severely affecting the income
distribution among different classes. It was marked by the low income group members of the
society becoming richer than those in the middle income bracket. The middle income group was
hard pressed and was exceedingly squeezed.

One of the significant features of this third transition phase of the society was that all known
elements of social pollution had had profound impact on the living pattern of the people. They
became disinterested in earning a living; they were more interested in short cut methods or
windfalls like real estate business, or smuggling. This is evidenced by the increase in construction
activity and trading and the movement of the labour force into these two sectors in preference to
industry whose growth had slowed down. Short cut methods were adopted even in the academic
institutions and cheating in examination centres became common. Getting educated was also not
found rewarding to the parents, since it hardly paid for their investment. An illiterate was noted to
be earning as much as, if not more than, the literate. Moreover the government did not seem to be
serious in giving quality education to the young ones. This was demonstrated by it when a whole
batch of students which was to write the examination in 1976 got through without facing the odds
of the examination system. The PPP government was celebrating its accomplishment during the
five years of having remained in power and was only too pleased not to burden the students and
teachers with preparing for the examinations.

Laissez faire attitude, similar to that adopted for education, was taken towards almost all the
sectors. Financial and industrial workers were given bonuses without earning them and to other
important sectors like sports, culture and tourism. The collective bargaining system was introduced
and this mode of trade union activity gave the feeling that benefits could be obtained by the
labourer without earning them. The traditional values were thus destroyed. It was here that the
value system of the society changed from remaining contented to hypocrisy, from hard earned
income to preference for windfall, and from production to distribution of what was not produced
locally. Transformation of the society during the third transition was thus profoundly debased.

The above changes in the social set up escalated the cost of production, marginalized the profits
of nationalized industries reduced the benefits of nationalization of institutions and cast serious
doubts on the process of socialization of economy. The planning process through the Five Year
Plans was suspended in favour of annual budgeting and formulation of yearly rolling plans. Efforts
were made to raise the level of public investment without initiating a process to raise the domestic
and foreign resources. Consequently an economic dislocation and slowdown in economic
performance became imminent by 1976. The rate of growth of GDP had fallen to 2.8%, making
the growth of the per capita GDP negative. The consumer prices soared by 11.8% during the
process of economic collapse. What was worse was that at the end of June 1977, the net foreign
assets of the banking system were negative by $57 million.

Contrary to the claims of having made remarkable achievements during the five years of PPP in
power, it had become apparent in 1977 that it was the degeneration processes in the society whose
foundations had been firmly laid. Irreversible damages had been done to the social structure of the
society since the feudal psyche had become operational. The second generation bureaucrats had
been placed in key positions which were in subsequent years to become the meeting grounds for
future operations. The beneficiary of the economic collapse and fall of PPP government during
this period was the feudal network which had been passivated by the imposition of Martial Law in
1977 and got the desired lease of life to firm up its position and capitalize on the gains during the
onslaught during the five years of intense activity.

The Fourth Transition Period: The fourth transition marked the prevalence of feudal psyche. It
occurred as a result of attempts to reverse the transformation that were being grounded during the
third transition stage. It, for example, had to bring in order and discipline in a highly undisciplined
society. As said earlier, irreversible damage had been done to the social structure and all attempts
at bringing in order in the disordered structure were at the most plastic surgery. Indiscipline was
visible in almost every walk of life and remarkably displayed during the electioneering process.
The social values and psyche of the governing hierarchy that determines the governance system,
got oriented almost exclusively towards feudal network. As a natural consequence, working for
short term gains and windfalls, and living beyond one’s means was no longer considered
contemptuous. The society had to put up with this type of degeneration at the national level during
and after the fourth transition in 1977, when Martial Law was imposed by General Ziaul Haq.

A number of reforms introduced by the PPP government during the third socio-economic transition
were given a halt or their implementation was slowed down after 1977. The damage done to the
social and economic structure, however, could not be reversed since the fourth transition marked
the beginning of deindustrialization. This is borne out by the increase in labour force engaged in
agriculture from 11 million in the early seventies to 12 million, stabilization of the one engaged in
industries at the level of 3.5 million, and a continuous increase in the labour force engaged in trade
and construction activities. There was, however, a slow revival of interest by the private sector and
a phase-wise reorientation towards a free economy by, its dolarizing in the first instance.

Reforms were introduced by General Ziaul Haq during the fourth transition to reinforce the Islamic
ideologies and to bring in Islamization of the society. This had virtually no impact on the society
and it did not become either more or less Islamic than before. The social degeneration of the third
transition phase had reached such low ebb that it was very difficult to correct with reforms alone,
particularly at the hands of the self-centered hypocrites. Consequently the fourth transition could
not effect any transformation in the society in terms of revival of Islam or reinvigorating the faith
in the religion.

The Continuum of Transitions: Subsequent to the fourth transition, jerks were felt and instead
of a transition, a continuum of instability leading to disaster prevails in the society since the mid-
1980s. The end of Martial Law in 1985, Restoration of democracy in 1986, change of governments
after dissolutions and elections in 1988, 1991, 1993 and 1997, and the declaration of emergency
followed by dedolerization of the economy subsequent to the successful atomic blast on May 28,
1998, were all changes caused by the full scale operation of the psyche of feudal system. The
feudal network comprising a large number of sub-system in the patharedar-wadera-dacoit-
bureaucracy system, with a role model assigned to each partner in the system had already shaped
the governing hierarchy.

The network had become fully functional and while operating under feudal psyche, was diverting
the benefits of development to the network partners, close to the dawn of the 1990s. It had achieved
the objective of taking over the reigns of the country and, guided by feudal psyche, was promoting
the unhindered growth of the underworld economy whose share in the GDP had been increasing
with each passing year and was placed at over 51% in 1998.

There were changes in the political parties but not in the governance system since the feudal psyche
remained a common denominator among them and the governing hierarchy was tuned to follow
it. There were ripple effects on the economy, sequel to the degeneration processes set firmly due
to realization of the dreams of feudal psyche. The frequency of ripple effects has increased during
recent times to the extent that the impact of one event is overlapping that of the other. They have,
however, by and large not caused a major transition in the already degraded economic
environment. Each of these jerks was due to the economic crises in which the adverse balance of
payment situation reached a critical level and a position of bankruptcy was rapidly approaching
the already gloomy horizon.

It is in the wake of persistent gloom that Moody’s, the credit rating agency has assigned a Caa 1
rating to the local currency denominated bonds. This reflects on the serious budgetary and external
payments constraints that the government is faced with. The Moody’s also fear that as a result of
weak investment spending, ongoing disputes with foreign investors in the power sector, war in
Kashmir and impaired domestic investor confidence, the structural problems of Pakistan will go
unaddressed for another year. The problems listed here are indicative of persistence of the
continuum. This, among other things, suggests the need to break the vicious circle to re-rail the
economy.