The conventional

military balance on the

Korean Peninsula

The International Institute for Strategic Studies www.iiss.org

This report has been prepared by the Director-General and
Chief Executive of the Institute and his staff. The IISS would
like to thank the various individuals who contributed their
expertise to the compilation of this report. The views expressed
herein do not, and indeed cannot, represent a consensus of
views among the worldwide membership of the Institute as
a whole. The report reflects the output of a workshop held
in Singapore in mid-2015, and incorporates commissioned
contributions from recognised subject experts. The IISS thanks
the Korea Foundation for its generous support for the research,
and the preceding workshop, that resulted in this publication.

Editors:
James Hackett and Mark Fitzpatrick

Contributors:
Joseph S. Bermudez Jr, James A. Lewis, Yu Yong-weon,
Daniel Pinkston, Mark Fitzpatrick, Michael Elleman,
Henry Boyd, Joseph Dempsey, Douglas Barrie, Sean Kanuck,
Tom Waldwyn

First published June 2018 by

The International Institute for Strategic Studies
©2018 The International Institute for Strategic Studies
The conventional
military balance on the
Korean Peninsula

Contents

Abbreviations................................................................................................................. 4

Introduction.................................................................................................................... 6

Chapter one
North Korea’s military power...................................................................................... 11

Chapter two
South Korea’s armed forces......................................................................................... 32

Chapter three
US armed forces in South Korea ................................................................................. 47

Chapter four
North Korea’s cyber capability.................................................................................... 64

Contents 3
ABBREVIATIONS

ABCT Armored Brigade Combat Team LPD Landing platform dock

ADA Air-defence artillery LPP Land Partnership Plan
AMS Air Mobility Squadron LR Long-range
AOEH Fast combat support ship with hangar L–SAM Long-range surface-to-air missile
APC (W) Armoured personnel carrier (wheeled) MANPAT Man-portable air-defense system
ARV Armoured recovery vehicle MARS Maritime Afloat Replenishment Ship
ASuW hel Anti-submarine-warfare helicopter MaRV Manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle
ASW Anti-submarine warfare MBT Main battle tank
AT Anti-tank Med tpt hel Medium transport helicopter
Atk hel Attack helicopter ML Minelayer
ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket System
AWACS Airborne Warning and Control MND Ministry of National Defense (ROK)
CFC Combined Forces Command MRBM Medium-range ballistic missile
CHGM Cruiser with anti-ship missile, hangar and SAM MRL Multiple-rocket launcher
COT-P Conditions-based Operational Control Transition Plan Msl Missile
C3I Command, control, communications, intelligence M–SAM Medium-range surface-to-air missile
C4ISR Command, control, communications, computers, NBC Nuclear, biological, chemical
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance n.k. Not known
DMZ Demilitarised Zone
NWIDC Northwest Islands Defense Command
DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
OPCON Operational control
EDPC Extended Deterrence Policy Committee
PACOM Pacific Command
EDSCG Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation
PCF Fast patrol craft
Group
PCO Patrol craft offshore
ESC Expeditionary Sustainment Command
PGM Precision-guided munitions
EW Electronic warfare
ROK Republic of Korea
FFGHM Frigate with anti-ship missile, hangar and SAM
ROKAF Republic of Korea Air Force
FGA Fighter/ground-attack aircraft
SAC State Affairs Commission
GPS Global Positioning System
SAM Surface-to-air missile
HEU Highly enriched uranium
SAR hel Search-and-rescue helicopter
HQ Headquarters
SCM Security Consultative Meeting
ICBM Intercontinental ballistic missile
IFV Infantry fighting vehicle SLBM Submarine-launched ballistic missile

INDOPACOM Indo-Pacific Command SLV Space-launch vehicle

SMA Special Measures Agreement
IRBM Intermediate-range ballistic missile
SOCKOR US Special Operations Command Korea
ISR Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
SOF Special-operations forces
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
SRBM Short-range ballistic missile
KAMD Korea Air and Missile Defense
SSG Guided-missile submarine
KIFV Korean Infantry Fighting Vehicle
SSK Attack submarine
KMPR Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation
TEL Transporter-erector launcher
KPA Korean People’s Army
THAAD Theatre High Altitude Area Defense
KPAF Korean People’s Air and Air Defense Force, formerly
Korean People’s Air Force UAV Uninhabited air vehicle
KPN Korean People’s Navy UNC United Nations Command
KRW Korean Won US United States
KWP Korean Workers’ Party USAG US Army Garrison
LCAC Landing craft air cushion USFK United States Forces Korea
LCT Landing craft tank USSOCOM US Special Operations Command
LHD Amphibious assault ship

4 The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula

 RUSSIA

CHINA

Chongjin

Punggye-ri
Hyesan nuclear test site

Kanggye
Tonghae satellite
launch station
NORTH KOR EA
Sinuiju Yongbyon nuclear
scientific research centre Hamhung

Sin-ni Sea of Japan

Sohae satellite
launch station
(East Sea)
Pyongyang Wonsan

Sariwon

Haeju
Chuncheon

Pyeongchang
Yeonpyeong Seoul
Island Incheon

Pyongtaek

S O U TH K O R EA
Yellow Sea/ Chungju
West Sea Taejon

Chonju
Daegu

Pusan
Gwangju

JAPAN
Demilitarised
zone
Northern Jeju
Limit Line
Introduction
As this publication was being prepared for press, it was
likely that the first-ever meeting was about to take place
between a serving president of the United States and
the leader of North Korea. Planned, in short order, to
take place in Singapore in June 2018, such a meeting
seemed inconceivable until the events of Spring 2018.
2017 had seen tensions on the peninsula rise further.
North Korea tested its largest nuclear device to date,
with its yield indicating that the North had – as claimed
– detonated a thermonuclear weapon. Pyongyang
also demonstrated an intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM) capability that, analysts assessed, brought the
continental US within reach. It also tested an array of
other missiles. Indeed, in his 2018 New Year speech,
Kim Jong-un said that the mainland of the United States
is now within range of his ICBMs ‘with thermo-nuclear
warheads’ and that he ‘always has the nuclear launch
button on his office desk’.1 This prompted a rapid
response from US President Donald Trump, saying that
his nuclear button was ‘bigger and more powerful’.2
Trump had earlier said, at the United Nations Security
Council in September, that ‘if the US was forced to
defend itself or its allies, we will have no choice but to
totally destroy North Korea’.3 Routinely in 2017, Kim
was, to Trump, ‘Little Rocket Man’. Kim, meanwhile,
called Trump a ‘dotard’ in an editorial in a North
Korean paper.4 Rhetoric ratcheted up through the year.
At the same time, sanctions on the North were tight-
ened. China in early 2017 suspended coal imports from
6 The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula
North Korea, hitting one of North Korea’s principal
cash-earning exports.5 The UN Security Council had
earlier – after North Korea’s fifth nuclear test – pressed
for states to more fully enforce the set of embargoes
in place against North Korea for its nuclear and bal-
listic missile activities. As part of its ‘maximum pres-
sure’ strategy, the US had in 2017 pursued increasingly
biting sanctions against North Korea and had also
‘worked across the world with a number of partners to
increase North Korea’s diplomatic isolation as well as
its economic isolation’.6 Given the difficulty of gather-
ing accurate economic data on North Korea it is difficult
to gauge precisely how much more the country has suf-
fered from this increased pressure. But it is clear that
North Korea has felt added pain. Indeed, in the New
Year 2018 speech, Kim Jong-un referenced the growing
pressure on his country by repeatedly mentioning ‘the
harshest-ever challenges’.7
North Korea’s opacity also means it is hard to draw
definite conclusions as to the motivations of its leader-
ship in seeking engagement in 2018 after years of prov-
ocations. While the New Year address pointed to the
challenges North Korea was facing, it seemed to contain
resolute messages about the value Pyongyang saw in its
nuclear capabilities. Nonetheless, the half year since has
witnessed significant events: the North–South meeting
at Panmunjom in April, North Korea blowing up tun-
nels it said had been used for nuclear tests, an absence
of ballistic-missile tests – after a year that had seen
accelerating capability developments, and the plan for
a Trump–Kim meeting in Singapore. North and South
Korea, in their Panmunjom declaration, ‘confirmed the
common goal of realizing, through complete denucleari-
zation, a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula’, and agreed to
actively pursue negotiations ‘with a view to declaring an
end to the War, turning the armistice into a peace treaty,
and establishing a permanent and solid peace regime’.8
Achieving durable outcomes from these talks will be
difficult. And they will take time. What, for instance, do
all sides mean by ‘denuclearisation’? And how would
this be verified? And what would North Korea ask of
the United States and its forces in Korea? As the US
defence secretary said in early June 2018, that rests on
discussions between South Korea and the US. It is not
on the table at Singapore.9 If all goes well, Singapore
will be the beginning of a process where many issues
will need to be discussed carefully over time. Certainly,
if the US continues to press for complete, verifiable and
irreversible denuclearisation, achieving this would take
time, even if North Korea were to accept the intrusive
inspections that would necessarily accompany any such
process. But while the prize is worth striving for, the
risks are real. There have been agreements with North
Korea in the past – the Agreed Framework in the 1990s,
the Six Party Talks in the 2000s, and the ‘Leap Day’ deal
of 2012 – and all have collapsed, within years, months
and, in the last case, days. And North Korea all the
while continued its pursuit of nuclear and ballistic-mis-
sile capabilities, and engaged in a range of aggressive
actions, such as the sinking of the Republic of Korea
(ROK) corvette Cheonan in 2010.
Amid this diplomatic turbulence, it is valuable to
analyse the range of military capabilities that North
Korea possesses, information that is of use in assess-
ing both the goals of diplomacy and the risks should
the current efforts fail and the region again become a
tinderbox for war. In 2017, Pyongyang’s missile and
nuclear tests had given rise to US consideration of a lim-
ited strike, to demonstrate resolve to push back North
Korean advances. As demonstrated in a New York Times
interactive op-ed that war-gamed the ensuing scenar-
ios, such a strike is unlikely to remain limited.10
Analyses of the military balance relating to North
Korea typically take as their point of departure
Pyongyang’s burgeoning nuclear capabilities and its
chemical weapons, as well as the expanding range of
ballistic-missile systems that could be used to deliver
these weapons.
IISS publications have similarly focused on the
strategic threats.11 Such attention has been warranted,
as any list of the most likely scenarios for nuclear use
includes a resumed Korean War with nuclear weapons.
The heightened pace and effectiveness of North Korea’s
nuclear and missile tests provide ample reason for con-
cern. The last Korean War led to the death of 1.2 million
soldiers and up to twice as many civilians, leaving hun-
dreds of thousands maimed or displaced. The hostilities
lasted from June 1950 to July 1953 and devastated much
of the peninsula, particularly in the north and in Seoul,
which changed hands four times. Current diplomatic
talks notwithstanding, a legal state of war continues
to this day, brokered by fitful armistice arrangements.
Should hostilities resume, now waged with modern
weapons, there might be even worse destruction.
Seoul, which lies within range of DPRK long-range
artillery, may not be turned into the ‘sea of fire’ as North
Korea has in the past threatened, but the heart of the
world’s 11th-largest economy (measured by nominal
GDP) would be debilitated. Meanwhile, the risk is that
such a war could escalate from the conventional to the
nuclear level if the North Korean regime perceived its
existence to be threatened. Indeed, if the seven-decade
global taboo against the use of nuclear weapons dur-
ing war were to be broken anywhere in the world, the
Korean Peninsula is one of the most likely places for
such a hellish occurrence.
Of course, noting the possibility of nuclear-weapons
use is not the same as predicting it as the most likely
outcome of renewed hostilities. Should a second Korean
War take place, it might be fought only with conven-
tional weapons. Such a war is itself unlikely to take
place. As has been the case for the past 65 years, small-
scale conflicts will probably be held in check. To date,
this has always been the case with border skirmishes
and provocations involving North Korea. That said, the
advent of more advanced military capabilities – as evi-
denced by North Korea’s nascent submarine-launched
ballistic-missile capability, and Seoul’s plan to acquire
ballistic and cruise missiles so as to enable a more rapid
Introduction 7
response in case of military escalation – heighten the
level of uncertainty over what effect military-modern-
isation programmes will have on the security dynamics
on the peninsula.
The IISS thus deems it opportune to contribute to the
policy debate a new publication examining the conven-
tional-forces balance on the Korean Peninsula. Prepared
with the financial support of the Korea Foundation, the
purpose of this online-only publication is to provide
an independent, measured and detailed analysis of the
security situation on the peninsula. The report focuses
on the defence policies and military capabilities of the
two Koreas and the US military forces stationed on
the peninsula, which can be brought to bear in a crisis.
While it principally focuses on conventional capabili-
ties, it does not ignore unconventional systems and also
discusses North Korea’s use of asymmetric cyber capa-
bilities. We hope this publication will better inform pub-
lic discussion by providing a comprehensive analysis
for the defence and security communities in concerned
countries, as well as the wider field of journalists, aca-
demics, politicians and members of the general public
who have reason to be interested in the subject.
Overshadowing all developments is the spectre of
uncertainty and risk posed by the North Korean leader
himself. It is not necessarily the case that Kim’s leader-
ship makes North Korea a more dangerous state. The
DPRK posed serious security challenges for more than
60 years during the reigns of his father and grandfather.
On numerous occasions from the 1960s–1980s, North
Korean provocations put the peninsula on the brink
of war through high-profile acts of terrorism directed
against South Korea and its US ally. Those decades saw
assassination attempts, the seizure of a US intelligence
ship and its crew, infiltrations by tunnel and mini-sub-
marine, the axe murder of two US officers, a bombing
that killed several ROK cabinet members in Rangoon
and an airplane bombing – to name just a few of the
incidents.
More recent provocations by North Korea have typi-
cally been less frequent and less lethal, with the excep-
tion of the March 2010 sinking of the ROK corvette
Cheonan, which resulted in the death of 46 sailors. What
makes North Korea more dangerous today, however, is
that it has nuclear capabilities and that these lie in the
8 The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula
hands of a young man of uncertain judgment and tem-
perament. After spending his teenage years in liberal,
wealthy Switzerland, returning in the role of a prince
who then had to compete with older brothers for his
father’s attention and approval as a successor must have
increased the pressure on Kim’s psychological develop-
ment; having a mother raised in Japan will have added
to this, in a country where all such foreign taint is suspi-
cious. Little wonder his decision-making is erratic and
his policies unpredictable.
When first thrust upon the stage, Kim was acclaimed
as a potential Gorbachev willing to risk Western-
style reforms. But the bloody purges he subsequently
launched showed him to be more akin to Stalin. Since
acceding to the leadership upon the death of his father
in December 2011, Kim has apparently consolidated
power by replacing most of the senior military and
party officials left from his father’s days. These per-
sonnel changes are not unusual when a new leader
comes to power, but two aspects of them add to for-
eign concerns. One is the rapidity and suddenness with
which personnel have been changed, with a range of
new appointees as defence minister and military chiefs
of the general staff since 2012. The other noteworthy
characteristic is the brutality with which Kim ended the
careers of many of his senior staff, including the mur-
der of his mentor and uncle (by marriage), Jang Song-
thaek, and the extravagant methods reportedly used
to execute other officials that have fallen from grace.
Such fear-instilling moves may temporarily inspire loy-
alty, but they could also lead to radicalism within the
defence forces.
Kim also supplanted his father’s ideological con-
struct of songun (military first) with his own slogan of
byungjin, meaning the simultaneous development of
nuclear weapons and the economy, saying in early 2018
that the nuclear element had been completed and that
the country would now focus on the economy. Kim also
sought to introduce fledging economic reforms in the
agricultural and industrial sectors. Meanwhile, he gave
personal attention to vanity projects such as a ski slope,
a dolphinarium and pleasure parks, thus wasting scarce
resources on non-productive showcases.
The conceit of such expenditures added to the
grist for foreign ridicule provided by North Korea’s
hermit-like oddness and Kim’s persona. He and his
country are the butt of many a joke in popular culture,
particularly on social media, throughout the world.
Such lèse-majesté can be a significant source of friction.
Indeed, two incidents that focused attention on North
Korean security challenges in recent years were both
sparked by insults to Kim. One was the December
2014 North Korean cyber attack on Sony Pictures
Entertainment, sparked by anger over a comedy film
featuring a fictional CIA plot to assassinate Kim involv-
ing two American talk-show journalists. The other was
an August 2015 announcement of war preparations
sparked by South Korean propaganda broadcasts dis-
paraging DPRK leadership failures. Following a land-
mine explosion in the inaptly named demilitarised
zone that maimed two South Korean soldiers, Seoul
turned on giant speakers along the border that had
been silent for 11 years.12 In this latter incident, North
Korea declared a ‘semi-war’ footing and threatened to
initiate military strikes. Given the inviolability of free-
dom of the press in most democracies, further such
attacks on the dignity of the DPRK are inevitable. Thus,
even amid handshakes and summits, there will con-
tinue to be reason for North Korea to take offence and
to cause it in return. An additional layer of complexity
has been added by the policymaking and pronounce-
ments of the Trump administration, meaning that the
North Korean leadership is now not the only one that
Notes
1 Ruediger Frank, ‘Kim Jong Un’s 2018 New Year’s Speech:
Self-Confidence After a Tough Year’, 38 North, 3 January
2018, https://www.38north.org/2018/01/rfrank010318/.
2 ‘North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un just stated that the
“Nuclear Button is on his desk at all times.” Will someone
from his depleted and food starved regime please inform
him that I too have a Nuclear Button, but it is a much big-
ger & more powerful one than his, and my Button works!’,
Tweet by President Trump, 2 January 2018, https://twitter.
com/realdonaldtrump/status/948355557022420992?lang=en.
3 ‘Trump at UN: North Korea’s ‘Rocket Man on sui-
cide mission’’, BBC News, 19 September 2017, http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-us-canada-41324670/
trump-at-un-north-korea-s-rocket-man-on-suicide-mission.
is hard to read and capable of following an unpredict-
able course.
* * *
This publication looks back at developments up to early
to mid-2018, and because of this has necessarily had to
be selective in its coverage. The publication expands
on the data and assessments in the IISS annual Military
Balance to paint a comprehensive and dynamic picture
of the military situation on the peninsula. Drawing on
the extensive IISS Military Balance+ database, it exam-
ines defence policies, policy priorities and recent mili-
tary developments. Four focused chapters, written by
pre-eminent experts in their field, provide detailed
analysis of defence-policy priorities, military devel-
opments and procurements, as well as more detailed
organisation and equipment data. Chapters one, two
and three assess the military capabilities of North
Korea, South Korea and US forces in Korea respectively.
These chapters also analyse the situational drivers of the
respective actors. Chapter four examines cyber-warfare
capabilities, primarily North Korea’s use of cyber attack
for asymmetric advantage. We hope that this publica-
tion will help readers assess the military component of
security challenges on the Korean peninsula, and that it
will also contribute to public discussion and policy for-
mulation to help prevent future conflict on the Korean
Peninsula from occurring at all.
4 Andray Abrahamian, ‘Kim Jong Un and the Place of Pride’,
38 North, 2 October 2017, https://www.38north.org/2017/10/
aabrahamian100217/.
5 Choi Sang-hun, ‘China Suspends All Coal Imports from
North Korea’, New York Times, 18 February 2017, https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/02/18/world/asia/north-korea-
china-coal-imports-suspended.html.
6 Alex Wong, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East
Asian and Pacific Affairs , ‘Briefing on the Indo-Pacific
Strategy’, US Department of State, 2 April 2018, https://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/04/280134.htm.
7 Rudiger Frank, ‘Kim Jong Un’s 2018 New Year’s Speech:
Self-Confidence After a Tough Year’, 38 North, 3 January
2018, https://www.38north.org/2018/01/rfrank010318/.
Introduction 9
8 ‘Full text of joint declaration issued at inter-Korean sum-
mit’, Yonhap News Agency, 27 April 2018, http://eng-
lish.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2018/04/27/0200000000
AEN20180427013900315.html.
9 Remarks by Secretary Mattis at Plenary Session of the
2018 Shangri-La Dialogue, US Department of Defense, 2
June 2018, https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/
Transcript-View/Article/1538599/remarks-by-secretary-
mattis-at-plenary-session-of-the-2018-shangri-la-dialogue/.
10 Mark Fitzpatrick, ‘Think Military Strikes Could Stop North
Korea? Try It and See’, New York Times, 24 May 2018, https://
10 The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/05/24/opinion/north-
korea-trump-military-strikes.html.
11 See detailed chapters in a IISS, North Korean Security
Challenges: A Net Assessment (Abingdon: Routledge for
the IISS, 2011); Jonathan Pollack, No Exit: North Korea,
Nuclear Weapons and International Security, Adelphi 418–19
(Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2011); and annual
updates in the IISS Military Balance and Strategic Survey.
12 In May 2018 South Korea began to dismantle some of these
speakers after the diplomatic developments of early 2018.
Chapter one
North Korea’s military power
North Korea is the most militarised state on earth, con-
sistently devoting the largest share of its resources,
both human and financial, to defence. With fewer than
25 million people, it has a standing army of around
1.2m and an additional 800,000 reserves plus paramili-
tary forces of some 5.7m. Experts assess that military
expenditures could account for as much as 22–24%
of national income. Its military forces are mainly for-
ward-deployed near the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ),
well suited for defence and in a position to launch an
invasion. Although North Korea’s armed forces are
equipped with a wide range of conventional military
systems, including large numbers of artillery pieces
and multiple-launch rocket systems, its conventional
forces have become weaker, compared with those of
South Korea and its US ally.
Aware of this qualitative inferiority, Pyongyang
has invested in asymmetric capabilities, particularly
the pursuit of nuclear weapons, and ballistic missiles
to deliver them. The missile programme made dra-
matic strides in the last two years, with successful test
firings of submarine-launched systems that could pre-
sent multiple new approaches for attack; land-based
solid-fuelled missiles that can be quickly launched
and potentially hit targets throughout northeast Asia;
and an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that
brought the US into range. Some tests took place
using tracked launch vehicles, which provide greater
off-road mobility than wheeled launchers, making
detection far more difficult. A ground test of a war-
head heat-shield simulated successful atmospheric
re-entry.
The claimed May 2017 introduction of a terminal
guidance capability on some systems could improve
missile accuracy and challenge some missile-defence
systems, particularly if integrated onto a broader
range of weapons and if North Korea is also able to
generate the supporting capacities relating to guid-
ance and targeting needed to make such a capability
effective.
Later, in November 2017, the launch of the
Hwasong-15 ICBM demonstrated more clearly the
growing missile capabilities of North Korea and poten-
tially brought the continental United States into range.
It capped a year of accelerating progress for North
Korea’s missile programme, which also included mul-
tiple launches of short- and intermediate-range ballis-
tic missiles. Other asymmetric capabilities include an
active chemical-weapons programme. This was alleg-
edly demonstrated in February 2017 by the assassina-
tion at Kuala Lumpur airport of Kim Jong-nam (Kim
Jong-un’s brother in law) using the nerve agent VX.
There is also a biological-warfare capability, cyber-
warfare units, oversized special operations forces, and
various means of inserting them behind enemy lines.
In short, the challenge to the international community
from North Korea’s military programmes remains
urgent and complex.
North Korea’s military power 11
Defence policy
North Korea’s defence policy is based on ensuring the
survival of the Kim regime and deterring foreign adver-
saries. North Korea’s stated policy also calls for use of
the armed forces to reunify the peninsula, although the
credibility of this goal is questionable. In addition to
these fundamental purposes, four overarching DPRK
ideologies or policies have influenced the country’s
defence posture: juche (self-reliance); Four Military
Lines; songun (military first) and, until recently byungjin
(parallel pursuit of nuclear weapons and the economy).
Juche: dating back to the 1950s, juche is based upon
post-Second World War Marxist–Leninist ideas of self-
reliance of the individual, the nation and its leadership.
This concept has been heavily ‘Koreanised’ over the
years, and has been reinterpreted by the leadership to
support almost any decision or policy that they set forth.
Four Military Lines: in December 1962, Kim Il-sung
presented his ‘Four Military Lines’ to the nation, which
called for ‘the arming of the whole people, the fortifica-
tion of the entire country, the training of all soldiers as
a cadre force, and the modernisation of arms’. It was
written into the DPRK constitution in 1992 and became
the foundation for all subsequent military policies. It
continues to exert strong influence on the country as a
whole and the Korean People’s Army (KPA).
Songun: although the songun (military first) policy
reportedly dates back to the early 1960s, it rose to prom-
inence in 1995 as a signature policy of Kim Jong-il. As
its name implies, this policy places the KPA and its lead-
ership at the centre of power and resource allocation
within the country. In the famine conditions that North
Korea experienced in the mid-1990s, songun ideology
provided the justification for giving the military prior-
ity over limited resources and emphasising the develop-
ment of military industries rather than consumer goods.
Byungjin: in March 2013, North Korean leader Kim
Jong-un built upon these principles, and apparently
moderated the songun policy when he articulated his
new byungjin (literally ‘in tandem’) policy line, which
ascribes equal importance to nuclear weapons and eco-
nomic development.
In April 2018, Kim Jong-un announced that the
byungjin strategic line had been completed. Analysts
suggested that Kim’s declaration of ‘victory on the
12 The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula
nuclear front’ would allow him ‘to justify a decisive
shift from a focus on the nuclear issue to concentration
on the economy’.1
The Korean People’s Army
Kim Jong-un’s regime is underpinned by the Korean
People’s Army (KPA). This force ranks as the fourth-larg-
est in the world, behind those of China, the United States
and India, and larger than that of Russia. Approximately
5%, or 1.2 million, of the estimated 24m people living in
North Korea serve as active-duty personnel. In a state
that releases little economic data, defence expenditures
are difficult to calculate. For a number of years, North
Korea has claimed that defence accounted for about
15.8% of the state budget. Most foreign analysts assess
that the number is far higher; well-informed South
Korean analysts have estimated that the military sector
(excluding the nuclear programme) has accounted for
22–24% of GNP (based on purchasing power parity).2
According to the South Korean defence ministry, up
to 70% of the KPA’s ground forces, 40% of its aircraft
and 60% of its naval forces are forward-deployed south
of a line that runs through Pyongyang to Wonsan, pro-
tected by a network of over 4,000 underground facilities
and hardened artillery sites.3 This forward deployment,
when viewed in combination with these hardened posi-
tions, would help the KPA should it be tasked with
launching an offensive against the ROK with minimal
preparation, or in conducting defence in depth of the
demilitarised zone (DMZ) and west coast.
Though these characteristics and capabilities may
be impressive, and though its asymmetric capabilities
have improved, the KPA’s overall conventional mili-
tary power has declined over the last 20 years. Yet the
KPA remains a potent, relatively well-trained, highly
disciplined and evolving military force. This is despite
challenges such as those created by significant resource
shortfalls and obsolescent hardware. It retains the capa-
bility to inflict serious damage on South Korea and, to
a lesser extent, on Japan and on US forces deployed in
East Asia.
Understanding its weaknesses, the KPA has tai-
lored itself to exploit asymmetric capabilities. The force
strives to acquire appropriate, rather than cutting-edge,
technology and offsets quality with quantity (often
relying on obsolete equipment). In so doing, it accepts
levels of reliability and readiness lower than that of
more modern states. It stresses self-reliance, and doing
what it can with the equipment it has, and prides itself
on supposed moral superiority and bravery in acting
unpredictably. The most significant areas of growth
within the KPA have been its ongoing doctrinal and
force-structure developments emphasising long-range
artillery and asymmetric capabilities, such as cyber-
warfare, ballistic missiles, special-operations forces and
nuclear weapons.
Military strategy
To achieve the core defence-policy principles, the KPA
has developed an offensive military strategy that con-
sists of ideological warfare, surprise attack and com-
bined, two-front warfare which blends the employment
of conventional and unconventional forces deployed in
South Korean rear areas with rapid and concerted oper-
ations to achieve victory. Its defensive military strategy
aims to deter aggression and, failing that, to destroy an
invasion force. This is achieved by ‘total mobilisation’
and ‘total war’ undertaken by the KPA in combination
with the general population. A key element of broader
North Korean military strategy is the threatened use of
ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons against South
Korea, Japan, and US facilities in East Asia, and against
the US itself.
On assuming power, Kim Jong-un initiated a com-
prehensive, ongoing review of the KPA’s military strat-
egy and capabilities. This reportedly included holding
two extended reviews with all senior officers and
Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) officials.4 This review
process continues and is thought to have emphasised
an asymmetric-warfare strategy that places particular
emphasis on cyber warfare, special-operations forces,
ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. In the realm of
ballistic missiles, this has focused on the development
of weapons capable of reaching the continental US, as
well as submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs),
in order to establish a more resilient and complex capa-
bility. The KPA’s nuclear-weapons strategy appears
to have moved beyond solely viewing them as politi-
cal tools, to strategic deterrent capabilities designed to
inflict unacceptable losses on attacking forces. Some
missile exercises suggest, experts say, possible views of
the wartime use of nuclear weapons in order to achieve
a range of strategic, operational and ‘battlefield’ (i.e. tac-
tical) effects.
Command and control
Kim Jong-un exercises supreme authority as first sec-
retary of the KWP, supreme commander of the KPA,
chairman of the State Affairs Commission (SAC) and the
chairman of the party’s Central Military Commission.
As stipulated in the constitution, the SAC is the princi-
pal organisation guiding national defence. It formulates
important national and defence policies, and exercises
direct control over the military and security forces.
Command and control extends from the SAC to
the Guard Command, the General Political Bureau,
the Ministry of People’s Security, Ministry of State
Security, Ministry of People’s Armed Forces (MPAF),
Reconnaissance General Bureau, and the General Staff
Department. The Guard Command is responsible for
Kim Jong-un’s personal security and that of other high-
ranking officials, working closely with the Ministry
of State Security and, to a lesser degree, Pyongyang
Defense Command. The MPAF exercises the authority
to administer military affairs including military diplo-
macy, logistics and military finance, and to represent the
military externally.5 It also exercises control of the KPA’s
Engineering Corps and Road Construction Corps. The
General Political Bureau is responsible for KWP organi-
sation and ideological education in the armed forces.
The power of the bureau extends to the lowest levels of
the KPA, via a separate chain of command.
The principal conduit for KPA command and control
extends from the SAC to the General Staff Department.
From here, as a unified armed force, command and
control extends across the ground forces’ commands,
bureaus and operational units, the Korean People’s
Navy (KPN) Command, and the Korean People’s Air
and Air-Defense Command.
Personnel and training
Military service is compulsory in North Korea. Though
there have been few publicly reported cases of draft
avoidance, anecdotal reports suggest that this has
begun to change. Years of severe treatment of soldiers
North Korea’s military power 13
 State Affairs
Commission
Ministry of
Guard People’s
Command Security
KPA General General
Political Staff
Bureau Department
Military
Security
Command
Pyongyang
Regular Mechanized XI ‘Storm’ Strategic
Defense
Corps (10) Corps (2) Corps Force
Command
Figure 1: Korean People’s Army – command and control6
by officers, and malnutrition, may have affected morale
to an unknown extent. Affected by malnourishment,
many of North Korea’s young soldiers look very young
indeed. ‘A breakdown in the public distribution sys-
tem, the institutionalised corruption that now pervades
North Korea and wider knowledge of far better living
conditions in China and South Korea may also nega-
tively affect troop morale in the lower ranks’.7
The legally mandated terms of service for conscripts
are 42 months for KPA ground forces and 48 months
for KPAF or KPN personnel. Yet these limits are often
ignored. Typically, male conscripts serve in the mili-
tary from the day of their enlistment until they are 30
years old (or, more typically, for ten years), while their
female counterparts serve until the age of 27. Those who
occupy critical positions in the air and air-defence force,
or the navy or special-operations forces frequently serve
past the age of 30. All soldiers may be kept on active
duty, regardless of age, if they are deemed necessary
to unit performance or security. Officers are usually
members of the politically reliable upper or educated
classes, and have similar legally mandated service peri-
ods. However, their service terms can vary dramatically
depending on personal political connections, career
track (inside or outside of the military), education and
the needs of their parent units.
With few exceptions, the KPA is an armed force
that is organised and focused primarily upon fighting
14 The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula
Reconnaisance
Ministry of General
State Security Bureau
Ministry of
People’s
Armed Forces
Road
Engineer Construction
Corps Corps
Air and Air
105th Tank Mechanized Artillery Navy
Defense
Division Divisions (4) Division Command
Command
a short, intensive war on the Korean Peninsula against
South Korean and US forces. Consequently its train-
ing system is designed to produce tough, intensively
trained troops who can travel farther and faster with
more equipment and less food than most of their coun-
terparts in other armies. These troops are mentally and
physically hardened, disciplined and taught to suf-
fer privations that would challenge cohesion in other
armies. Complementing this is a course of prolonged
political and ideological training designed to produce
well-indoctrinated soldiers who believe that because
of their ideological training and moral superiority they
can defeat a numerically and technologically superior
enemy. Combat training emphasises individual fight-
ing skills, mountain warfare, night combat, infiltration,
unconventional warfare and achieving assigned objec-
tives regardless of costs.
The training system presents itself as producing
a formidable force, but the KPA is undertrained and
unprepared for a modern conflict involving rapidly
changing tactical and operational situations, high
mobility, advanced technology and cross-domain war-
fare (all of which are central to operations executed
by the US and its allies). The KPA continues to suffer
from an over-reliance upon rote training and a lack of
extended, comprehensive and realistic training for most
ground forces. This is especially noticeable among its
mechanised and armoured forces. The only units for
which training seems to have resulted in improvements
to combat-efficiency appear to be the special-operations
forces and the Strategic Force.
There are some indications that the KPA leadership
has conducted systematic historical and operational
analysis to improve the KPA’s force structure, weapons,
tactics and doctrine. The Military Training Bureau car-
ries out research and analysis of foreign combat opera-
tions through a small number of research institutes and
think tanks. Apart from an underlying emphasis on
the lessons of the Korean War, this analytical process
focuses on the major conflicts involving the US since the
1960s, as well as those in the Middle East and South Asia.
These institutes have conducted extensive ‘lessons-
learned’ research on the Arab–Israeli conflict and the
Iran–Iraq War, as well as operations Desert Storm, Desert
Fox, Iraqi Freedom, Allied Force and Enduring Freedom.
The lessons learned have been incorporated into KPA
doctrine (e.g., increased importance placed upon asym-
metric warfare), organisation (prompting efforts such
as those to restructure mechanised, tank and artillery
corps) and operations (spurring initiatives such as those
for more realistic training for special-operations forces
and ballistic-missile units). These institutes, most likely
in cooperation with components of the Second Academy
of Natural Sciences, also conduct research into foreign
military science and the development of new weapon
systems, especially ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and
precision-guided munitions.
Ground forces
The KPA’s ground-force component, with just over
one million active-duty troops, is the largest of the four
main services. The size, organisation and capabilities
of the ground-force component provides North Korea
with substantial defensive and offensive capabilities.
The KPA ground-force component is assessed as being
capable of defending North Korean territory, conduct-
ing special operations against the South and Japan, and
maintaining internal security. Offensively, it is capable
of initiating an extremely destructive war against South
Korea with little warning. However, it is assessed that
the force lacks the capability to prosecute such a war for
an extended period for reasons including widespread
deficiencies in the storage of strategic food stocks and
petroleum, oil and lubricants; a rudimentary logistics
system; and inadequate command and control. KPA
strategists and planners will likely understand these
limitations, and have adapted their strategies and doc-
trines accordingly.
The ground-force component is subordinate to the
General Staff Department and consists of the following
major formations:
Ten (I, II, III, IV, V, VII, VIII, IX, X, XII (rear area))
infantry corps (sometimes identified as ‘regular’
corps)
Two (unit identities unclear) mechanised infantry
corps
The 91st Capital Defence Corps/Pyongyang
Defence Command
XI ‘Storm’ corps
One (105th) tank division
Four (108th, 425th, 815th, and possibly 806th)
mechanised infantry divisions
One artillery division
Six coastal-security brigades
Four border-security brigades
Seven independent tank regiments
One engineer river-crossing brigade
Between five and eight independent engineer
river-crossing/tracked amphibious regiments
While the corps level is generally considered to be the
highest-level organisation within the KPA, the General
Staff Department has also created a ‘Front Command’
and a ‘District Command’. District Command, head-
quartered in Wonsan, likely controls the three corps
and independent units deployed in Kangwon Province,
while the Southwestern Front Command, in South
Hwanghae Province, likely controls IV Corps and inde-
pendent units deployed in the province.
Although KPA ground units are deployed through-
out the nation, approximately 70% are forward-
deployed south of a line stretching from Pyongyang to
Wonsan, which provides the operational advantage of
proximity should Pyongyang decide to launch a sur-
prise attack.
The ground forces are equipped with just over 4,000
main battle tanks and light tanks, 2,500 armoured per-
sonnel carriers, 8,500 self-propelled and towed artillery
North Korea’s military power 15
 RUSSIA

Korean People’s Army

ground forces
CHINA
1 IX Corps
2 2 XII Corps
3 108th Division
4 VII Corps
5 VIII Corps
6 425th Division
7 91st Corps
3
8 III Corps
5
NORTH KOREA 9 X Corps
4 10 806th Division
6
11 I Corps
Sea of Japan
12 V Corps
(East Sea) 13 Artillery Division
Korea 14 815th Division
Bay 7 Wonsan
Pyongyang 9 15 105th Division
8
10 16 II Corps
17 IV Corps
13 11
15 14 12

16 Infantry corps

Mechanised infantry division

17

Armoured division

62 miles Seoul Artillery division

100 km SOUTH K OREA

Figure 2: North Korean ground forces – corps and division level8

PYEONGCHANG
pieces and mortars with calibres greater than 76 mm,
and over 5,000 multiple rocket launch systems (MRLs).
The KPA’s large artillery force includes 240-mm MRLs
and long-range 170-mm self-propelled guns, many of
which are deployed in hardened positions along the
DMZ and have no need to redeploy to threaten north-
ern regions of the South, including Seoul. A 300-mm
MRL system currently in test and development will
considerably extend the KPA artillery’s threat envelope
into central South Korea.9
Since the late 1990s, the KPA has focused its limited
resources on the development of asymmetric capabili-
ties, and, as a result, many of the ground-forces’ weapon
systems have grown obsolete. Despite facing economic
hardship during the last 20 years, the regime has under-
taken modest efforts to address this, including by mod-
ernising its tank and mechanised forces by upgrading
older main battle tanks like T-62s as Chonma, Pokpoong
and Songun-variant MBTs, and continued develop-
ment, production and deployment of long-range self-
propelled artillery systems, 240-mm and 300-mm
MRLs and improved fire-control systems. Pyongyang
has also undertaken organisational changes, such as
by restructuring at least three mechanised corps, one
tank corps and one artillery corps into divisions to pro-
vide for greater operational flexibility. North Korea
also restructured the Light Infantry Training Guidance
Bureau (responsible for special-operations forces) into

16 The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula

the XI Corps; converted regular army units into mecha-
nised/motorised light infantry brigades; and established
light infantry units. It also restructured the Ballistic
Missile Training Guidance Bureau. First this became
the Strategic Rocket Forces Command (subordinate to
the Operations Department), and then it transitioned
into the Strategic Force – a branch on the same level as
the ground forces, the navy and the air and air-defence
force.
Special-operations forces
South Korean and US military and intelligence sources
estimate that the KPA fields one of the largest special-
operations forces in the world, judged by the ROK to
comprise approximately 200,000 troops, though the
IISS assesses the dedicated Special Forces Command
to number around 88,000.10 The XI Storm Corps (for-
merly the Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau) is
the primary KPA organisation tasked with training and
conducting unconventional and special-warfare opera-
tions. During peacetime, the corps is believed to exer-
cise administrative control over all special-operations
units, including those of the Korean People’s Air and
Air-Defense Force (KPAF, formerly the Korean People’s
Air Force), the KPN and the Reconnaissance General
Bureau. During wartime, it will function as the pri-
mary headquarters coordinating all special operations.
Indeed, during the last 20 years, investment in special-
operations forces has been one of the few growth areas
for the KPA.
This force is broadly organised into three light infan-
try divisions; approximately 18 special-operations
brigades (comprising nine light infantry, three air-
borne brigades and six sniper brigades); two sniper
brigades under the control of the air force; two sniper
brigades under the control of the navy and around
eight reconnaissance battalions under the control of the
Reconnaissance General Bureau.
Special-operations troops are among the most politi-
cally reliable, best trained, best equipped, well fed and
highly motivated forces within the KPA. The KPA’s
doctrine views these troops as an essential element of
its asymmetric attack forces and a means to achieve
specialised political objectives. This perspective has
been strongly reinforced by the decline of the KPA’s
conventional capabilities relative to those of South
Korea and the US.
These troops’ primary missions include reconnais-
sance; establishing a ‘second front’ within the South’s
strategic rear areas; deep-strike destruction and disrup-
tion of South Korean and US command, control, com-
munications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (C4ISR) structure; assassination; and
neutralisation of major South Korean and US missiles.
These missions would likely include operations against
US bases in Japan. Navy sniper brigades also have the
mission of capturing South Korean islands along the
Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the Yellow Sea/West Sea
and conducting amphibious landings in the South’s rear
areas. Meanwhile, air-force sniper brigades are tasked
with neutralising air bases.
Elements of both the Reconnaissance General Bureau
and XI Storm Corps Bureau make use of specialised
high-speed semi-submersible infiltration landing craft,
Yugo-class and Yeono-class midget submarines, as well
as Sang-o-class coastal submarines and air-cushion
vehicles for seaborne infiltration. An-2 Colt/Y-5 trans-
ports, helicopters and ultra-lights are used for airborne
infiltration. A Reconnaissance General Bureau subma-
rine – possibly either a Yeono-class or Sang-o-class boat
– was likely responsible for the March 2010 sinking of
Table 1: Military reserve and paramilitary
force11
Reserve training 0.6m Consists of men (aged 17–50) and
units and women (aged 17–30) who have
maritime training been released from active service
units and organised into discrete military
units. They can be mobilised
immediately.
Red Guard Army 5.7m Consists of men (aged 17–60) and
(also known women (aged 17–30), many of
as the Worker- whom have served in the military.
Peasant Red They form local defence forces
Guard) when mobilised.
Red Youth Guard, 1m Paramilitary organisation
college training comprising high-school and
units and other university students (males and
organisations females aged 14–22).
Other non- 0.3m Comprises the Guard Command,
regular military the Ministry of People’s Security,
forces the Railroad Security Forces, the
Rear Services Bureau and other
organisations.
North Korea’s military power 17
the South Korean corvette Cheonan near Baengnyeong
Island in the Yellow Sea/West Sea, along the NLL.
Reserve forces
North Korea’s military-reserve and paramilitary force
comprises roughly 30% of its population, or approxi-
mately 7.62m troops between the ages of 14 and 60,
when fully mobilised, according to the South Korean
government.12
Reserve-force units are used to reinforce active KPA
units, form local defence units and serve as a replace-
ment pool for organised units. Reserve forces are gener-
ally equipped with weapons previously used by active
forces. Some analysts assess that recent annual winter
training exercises have included a longer period and
higher level of training for reserve-force units.
Navy
The Korean People’s Navy is the second-smallest of the
KPA’s four main services, with approximately 60,000
officers and enlisted personnel. It is primarily a coastal-
defence force, and it lacks the equipment and training
required to conduct operations outside the Sea of Japan
(East Sea), the Yellow Sea/West Sea and the East China
Sea. The force has only a limited capability to protect
the North’s territorial waters and to assist in infiltrating
special-operations forces into South Korea and Japan
during peacetime. It has an even more limited capabil-
ity to patrol and enforce the North’s claimed 200-nau-
tical-mile exclusive economic zone. The KPN has the
wartime capability to conduct limited short-term offen-
sive and defensive operations, including interdiction at
sea, minelaying and port interdiction. During the early
stages of a conflict, it could also attempt to conduct two
navy-sniper brigade-sized amphibious landings (one
on the west coast and one on the east coast) using hov-
ercraft alone. However, the KPN is unable to operate
in a modern electronic-warfare (EW) environment or
conduct a sustained defence of the North’s territorial
waters against a modern navy.
Organisation
The navy’s command headquarters and staff are based
in Pyongyang. There are two fleet headquarters (the
East Sea Fleet at Toejo-dong; the West Sea Fleet at
18 The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula
Nampo) and 13 navy commands. Other principal units
are two navy sniper brigades; a naval reconnaissance
unit; two coastal-defence missile regiments; and a num-
ber of coastal-defence radar companies.
Inventory
Estimates of the North’s maritime assets vary consider-
ably. South Korea, for instance, assesses that there are
approximately 800, comprising 430 frigates and patrol
vessels; 250 amphibious-warfare vessels; 40 support
vessels; and around 70 submarines, including those in
service with the Reconnaissance General Bureau.13
The amphibious-warfare vessels include land-
ing craft (some judged capable of high-speeds) and
approximately 135 hovercraft, but the vast majority of
the inventory comprises small, ageing high-speed mis-
sile boats, torpedo boats, patrol boats and gunboats.
The navy understands that its naval combatants are
obsolete, and in the last 15 years it has made limited
efforts to address this. These efforts have included
upgrades to select surface ships (such as the replace-
ment of old weaponry with new Gatling-gun systems
on a number of patrol vessels); continued construc-
tion of hovercraft; construction of a small class – with
three new sub-classes – of patrol vessels with stealthy
characteristics (one of these vessels conducted a test
launch of a Kumsong-3 (Kh-35 lookalike) anti-ship mis-
sile in early 2014); and the construction of three new
classes of very slender vessels for patrol and infiltra-
tion missions. The navy is also developing new cor-
vettes though it is unclear whether these vessels were
acquired or constructed domestically. The navy has
been undertaking more general modernisation efforts,
including improvements to its command and control
systems, while it has also been rebuilding some of its
naval bases and shipyards, constructing new and reno-
vating old navy sniper bases. Levels of maintenance
and training operations have also increased, with more
realistic training exercises.
The navy is testing a new experimental diesel-elec-
tric ballistic-missile submarine (SSB) – its one Gorae-
class boat – and is believed to be building a follow-on
SSB design. It also continues to build and maintain the
Sang-O-class and Sang-O II-class coastal diesel-electric
attack submarines, older Romeo-class boats, and various
 RUSSIA

Najin

CHINA Puam-dong

Toejo-dong

Sinpo Chaho (submarine base)

NORTH KOR EA Mayang-do (submarine base)

Tasa-ri
Mugyepo

Sea of Japan
Munchon (East Sea)
Korea
Bay Wonsan
Pyongyang

Pipa-got
(submarine base) Nampo Changjon
Primary naval base
Chodo
Fleet headquarters

Sagon-ni

62 Miles Seoul
100 Km SOUTH KO REA

Figure 3: North Korean naval forces14

Pyeongchang
midget submarines. Indeed, with its approximately
70 Gorae-, Romeo-, Sang-O- Yugo-, Yeono-, and several
unknown-class submarines, North Korea maintains
one of the world’s largest submarine forces. A number
of these vessels are under the operational control of the
Reconnaissance General Bureau but rely on logistical
support from the navy. Although this submarine force
is not technologically advanced, it has repeatedly dem-
onstrated its capability to successfully infiltrate South
Korea’s territorial waters on intelligence missions and
to conduct acts of aggression, such as the attack on the
Cheonan in 2010.
Although the navy has 13 primary naval bases,
numerous smaller patrol bases and six navy sniper
bases distributed along its coastlines, approximately
60% of its naval forces and 45% of its navy sniper units
are forward-deployed south of a line running through
Pyongyang to Wonsan. This provides the capabil-
ity to launch offensive operations with little warning,
although this operational advantage is somewhat offset
by the geographical separation between the East and
West fleets.
Air and Air Defense Force
The Korean People’s Air and Air Defense Force (KPAF,
formerly known as the Korean People’s Air Force), is
the second largest of the KPA’s four main services, with
approximately 110,000 officers and enlisted personnel.

North Korea’s military power 19

Its primary mission is air defence of the North and its
territorial waters. Secondary missions include recon-
naissance, transport and logistic support, covert infil-
tration of special-operations forces, strategic bombing,
and provision of tactical air support to the KPA’s
ground-force component and the navy. It has a mod-
erate capability to assist in the infiltration of special-
operations forces into the South during peacetime
and protect domestic airspace, but it has not demon-
strated a significant capability to patrol and enforce
the North’s claimed 200-nm exclusive economic zone.
During wartime, the force likely has the capability to
conduct a limited, short-term strategic and tactical
bombing offensive, and to launch a surprise attack.
During the early stages of a conflict, it is also likely
able to conduct strike missions against command-
and-control facilities, air-defence assets and industrial
facilities without rearranging or relocating its air-
craft. It is also possible that the North would look to
use An-2 Colt/Y-5 light transports and helicopters in
order to conduct a number of company- and battalion-
level airborne missions designed to infiltrate air-force
sniper brigade and airborne troops.
However, the air force is judged unable to operate in
a modern EW environment or, should it be required, to
defend national airspace against a combined air assault
by South Korean and US air forces. Because of this, and
the limited capability of its ageing aircraft, the air force
continues to heavily rely on ground-based air-defence
systems and a national policy of hardening strategic
facilities.
Organisation
The air and air-defence force is headquartered in
Pyongyang. There are four air-combat divisions in its
order of battle, which are responsible for defending
specific sectors of the country, along with two tactical-
transport brigades (formerly divisions); two air-force
sniper brigades; approximately 20 surface-to-air missile
(SAM) brigades; more than 50 early-warning and air-
defence radar installations; and an unknown number
of anti-aircraft artillery regiments. The KPAF controls
approximately 113 air bases, airfields and heliports of
various types and levels of usability within the DPRK.
These facilities include approximately 22 paved and 11
20 The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula
unpaved runways that comprise the KPAF’s primary
operating bases.
Inventory
Estimates of the number of aircraft in the KPAF vary
considerably, although South Korea estimates that it
has approximately 1,650, comprising approximately 820
combat aircraft, 30 reconnaissance aircraft; 330 trans-
port aircraft – with around 300 An-2 Colt/Y-5 aircraft
and a small number in service with the national car-
rier Air Koryo. Seoul also estimates that approximately
40% of the force’s combat aircraft are forward-deployed
at bases south of a line stretching from Pyongyang to
Wonsan. This provides the capability to launch surprise
offensive operations without rearranging or relocating
its aircraft, although these operational advantages are
partially offset by the fact that South Korea and the US
maintain an advanced and comprehensive air-surveil-
lance and air-defence system on and around the Korean
Peninsula.
In terms of establishment strength and inventory
numbers, the North’s air capabilities outweigh those
of South Korea and US air forces on the peninsula.
However, the North’s forces are qualitatively inferior or
obsolete in all aspects of combat capability and other
measures of effectiveness. Although it has secured lim-
ited spare parts and developed indigenous maintenance
and repair capabilities, it has been unable to purchase
new modern aircraft since the late 1980s due to interna-
tional sanctions.
North Korea’s most capable combat aircraft are its
MiG-29 fighters (of which inventory estimates range
between 18 and 35), 46 MiG-23 fighters, and just over
30 Su-25 ground-attack aircraft – all of which were
acquired in the 1980s. The remaining aircraft are older,
and less capable MiG-15s, MiG-17/J-5s, MiG-19/J-6s,
MiG-21/J-7 fighters and Il-28/H-5 light bombers, and
the level of availability of the older types in particular
is open to question. The obsolescence of the force has,
in the last 15 years, prompted Pyongyang to engage in
limited efforts to ameliorate this situation, including by
introducing a modern automated air-defence C3I sys-
tem, which provides overlapping coverage of the coun-
try, and developing the new Pongae-5 vertical launched
mobile SAM system and its associated radar. Work has
also taken place to deploy modernised radars and EW
equipment including GPS and AWACS radar jammers,
as well as – more broadly – expanded efforts in EW and
communications-intelligence and signals-intelligence
programmes.
North Korea has also either acquired or produced
a number of small and medium-sized uninhabited air
vehicles, with crashes in the South indicating that these
are being used operationally in an intelligence and sur-
veillance role. Other measures to mitigate the air force’s
qualitative inferiority include improved depot-level
maintenance, more frequent forward-deployment of
SOF-related assets (such as An-2s and the force’s Mi-2,
Mi-4 and MD-500 helicopters) and modernisation of a
number of air bases and the airports at Pyongyang and
Wonsan.
Broader modernisation efforts are also underway,
including attempts to improve personnel capacity by
enhancing the annual training cycle to include more
realistic training, and to increase joint training elements
(though it is unclear if flying hours have increased). The
number of jet-qualified female pilots has increased, with
some trained to fly MiG-21 aircraft, whereas women
had previously been limited to flying transports, heli-
copters and MiG-15/-17/-19 aircraft). Meanwhile, there
has been more frequent aircraft maintenance, and
upgrades, which have also seen greater application of
camouflage schemes, such as the An-2 Colt/Y-5 with its
SOF insertion mission.
Air defence
North Korea has a complex ground-based air-defence
network. The automated air-defence C3I system oper-
ates more than 50 ground-control-intercept and early-
warning radar facilities, which provide overlapping
coverage of the country. A significant number of the
strategic early-warning radar sites include hardened
underground facilities from which the radars are raised
on hydraulic lifts for operations, before being lowered
for protection and maintenance.
The relationship between the air and air-defence force
and the Pyongyang Anti-Aircraft Artillery Command is
unclear. This command is tasked with defending the
capital and its environs from air attack. Although it is
likely subordinated to the Operations Bureau, it works
closely with the Pyongyang Defense Command and is
integrated into the KPAF air-defence system.
The air-defence force consists of approximately 20
brigades of SA-2/-3/-5, and possibly Pongae-5, surface-
to-air missiles (SAM) with almost 350 launchers and an
unknown number of light, medium and heavy anti-air-
craft artillery regiments. The SAM brigades are subordi-
nate to the four air-combat divisions and are assessed to
each be equipped with a single type of system.
The Pongae-5 was first displayed during a 2010 mili-
tary parade in Pyongyang. It is judged by US analysts
as similar in external appearance to the Russian S-300 or
Chinese HQ-9 systems. It is possible that the Pongae-5
has entered KPAF service in limited numbers, while
the North claimed the system was operational follow-
ing further tests early in 2017.15 If this system is actually
in service, it could help mitigate the previous weak-
nesses of the North’s high-altitude air-defence system.
Additionally, ground forces deploy SA-7/-13/-14/-16
tactical SAMs, as well as a large number of anti-aircraft
artillery systems.
The KPAF has made modest progress in modernis-
ing its SAMs and associated radars since 2000, but it is
unclear how effective these efforts would be in a con-
tested modern EW environment.
Reconnaissance General Bureau
The Reconnaissance General Bureau, headquartered
in Pyongyang and directly subordinate to the SAC,
is a large and politically powerful militarised intel-
ligence organisation. It is the primary organisation
tasked with collecting foreign tactical and strategic
intelligence, and coordinating or conducting all exter-
nal special operations. It also exercises operational
control over agents engaged in military-intelligence
activities, and oversees the training, maintenance
and deployment of intelligence teams in South Korea
and Japan. The Reconnaissance General Bureau com-
prises at least six sub-bureaux charged with opera-
tions; reconnaissance; technology and cyber warfare;
foreign-intelligence collection; inter-Korean talks; and
service support. It oversees between five and seven
reconnaissance battalions; a small number of mother
ships and a small fleet of Yugo-class, Yeono-class and
Sang-O-class submarines.
North Korea’s military power 21
 RUSSIA

Sungam-ni

CHINA Orang HQ

Kuktong
Manpo
Kanchon

Hwangsuwon

Changjin-up
Panghyon Iwon
Uiju
Taechon HQ NORTH KOR EA
Toksan
Sonchon
Kaechon Sondok
Kwaksan

Pakchon Pukch’ang Sea of Japan

(East Sea)
Sunchon Kowon
Korea
Bay Pyongyang Kangdong
Wonsan
Pyongyang
Mirim
Onchon Chunghwa HQ
Kuum-ni
Koksan Fighter base
Kwail Hwangju HQ Hyon-ni
Transport base
Taetan
Nuchon-ni Helicopter base

Other airfield

HQ Headquarters
62 miles Seoul
100 km SOUTH K OREA

Figure 4: North Korean air force basing16

Pyeongchang
North Korea’s ballistic-missile programme
North Korea has aggressively pursued a diverse bal-
listic-missile-development programme since the late
1970s that has a national priority at least equal to that
of the nuclear programme. As a result of this, the ballis-
tic-missile programme has steadily progressed, despite
broader economic challenges, so that today North Korea
not only possesses the largest ballistic-missile force in
the developing world but has also made initial steps
into space exploration. In recent years there has been
an acceleration in missile developments with improve-
ments to range, reliability and technical sophistication
meaning that by mid-2017 North Korea was not only
testing ICBM and SLBM systems, but was also engaged
in a drive to improve its capacity to develop a nuclear
warhead for its missiles capable of surviving re-entry.
However, in the absence of a proven re-entry vehicle
and demonstrated penetration aids, such as manoeu-
vring warheads and decoys, they would remain vul-
nerable to correctly configured ballistic-missile-defence
systems.
Originally, North Korea’s missile programme was
based mainly on Soviet Scud missile technology, and
Pyongyang is believed to have developed an infrastruc-
ture for missile research and development, testing, and
production. This indigenous infrastructure has been
supplemented by imports of specialised material and
components.

22 The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula

 The primary motivation for North Korea’s missile
programme appears to be related to its continuing efforts
to establish and maintain robust military forces against
South Korea, Japan and US forces in the region. Ballistic
missiles are a key component of its asymmetric capabili-
ties and are intended as the primary delivery system for
nuclear weapons and, as such, a key deterrent against
any aggressive action by South Korea and the US. At
the same time, the export of missiles and missile-related
technologies to numerous customers in the Middle East
and South Asia for cash and barter has become an impor-
tant secondary consideration. The ballistic-missile pro-
gramme is also seen as a means of expressing national
pride.
In 2014, North Korea created a Strategic Force, and
elevated this to be the fourth, and smallest, of the
KPA’s four main services. The primary organisation
responsible for training and developing the KPA’s
ballistic-missile units, it had previously been known as
the Ballistic Missile Training Guidance Bureau before
being restructured into an operational command as the
Strategic Rocket Forces Command, then subordinate to
the Operations Department. The primary missions of
the Strategic Force are to provide a deterrent to South
Korea and the US. Failing that, the Strategic Force is
tasked with neutralising South Korean, US and allied
strategic assets (e.g., airbases, navy bases, ports, missile
forces, C3I facilities) on the Korean Peninsula and in East
Asia, and to threaten the US mainland. These missions
may include the use of nuclear or chemical warheads.
The Strategic Force operates from approximately 20
bases throughout North Korea, with short-range bal-
listic missile units, based closer to the demilitarised
zone, and longer-range missile units being deployed
in the central and northern sections of the country. In
addition to the permanent bases there are numerous
forward-operating bases and pre-surveyed launch posi-
tions throughout the nation. The majority of the main
bases and forward-operating bases are hardened with
extensive underground facilities. The primary space-
launch and long-range ballistic-missile test facilities are
the Sohae Satellite Launch Station (located on the west
coast) and the Tonghae Satellite Launch Station (located
on the east coast). These are sometimes referred to as
the Tongchang-ri and Musudan-ri Launch Facilities,
respectively.
The Strategic Force is estimated to include:
1-2 Missile Brigades with Scud
1-2 Missile Brigades with Nodong
1 Missile Brigade with Hwasong-10 (Musudan)
(formed but not operational)
1 Missile Brigade likely with Hwasong-14/15 (pos-
sibly forming but not operational)
North Korea’s short-range Hwasong-5/-6 missiles
(Scud-B/-C types) can reach targets throughout South
Korea, and its medium-range Nodong missiles can

Table 2: Principal North Korean ballistic-missile systems

System Estimated range Notes
Hwasong-5 (SS-1C Scud-B) SRBM 300–320 km
Hwasong-6 (SS-1D Scud-C) SRBM 500 km Est. fewer than 100 launchers
Scud-ER SRBM 950 km
Number of launchers not known (different tracked TEL;
Scud (MaRV) n.k.
with suspected terminal guidance capability
Nodong (mod 1/mod 2) MRBM 950 km+ At least 5017
Pukguksong-1 SLBM (MRBM) 1,200 km+ Solid-fuel
Pukguksong-2 MRBM 1,200 km+ Solid-fuel
Hwasong-10 (Musudan) IRBM* 3,000 km+ At least 10 and less than 50 launchers18
Hwasong-12 IRBM 4,500 km Number of launchers not known (utilises Musudan TEL)
Hwasong-13 ICBM** *** n.k. At least 6 launchers
Hwasong-13 (mod) ICBM** *** n.k. n.k.
Hwasong-14 ICBM* ** 6,000–9,000 km for a payload of 800–900 kg respectively
Hwasong-15 ICBM est. 13,000 km n.k.
* likely non-operational; ** likely common TEL vehicle; *** not flown; n.k. - not known

North Korea’s military power 23

reach targets across Japan. The exact size, disposition,
and armament of these North Korean missile forces
are unknown, although they are presumed to be mod-
elled on Soviet doctrine, and organised into launch bat-
talions with four to six mobile launchers per battalion
plus support vehicles. (Normally, four missiles would
be deployed with each launcher, one missile on the
launcher and three on a reload missile carrier.) Unlike
Hwasong-5/-6 missiles, which needed to be deployed
near the DMZ in order to reach their presumed targets,
Nodong and Scud-ER missiles can be deployed further
north.19
The ability of Nodong missiles to successfully attack
targets in Japan depends upon the survivability of
North Korean missile forces against offensive action, as
well as the ability of Nodong missiles to penetrate what-
ever missile defences they encounter. Given that Nodong
missiles could be armed with nuclear weapons, US and
allied forces are likely to make every effort to destroy
bunkers and facilities suspected of hiding these mis-
siles and their launch-infrastructure before they can be
mobilised and used. On the assumption that suspected
Nodong bunkers and launch sites would be a high pri-
ority target for US and allied forces in wartime, North
Korea is credited with taking a number of active meas-
ures – for example, the construction of decoy shelters
and redundant bunkers – to conceal the size and dispo-
sition of its missile force. There may also be undetected
Nodong hides.
The development of longer-range systems, designed
to generate reach capable of striking US territories and
the continental US, proceeded from the late 1990s and
the first North Korean attempts to develop multiple-
stage missiles. The August 1998 Taepodong-1 attempt
to place into orbit a small satellite failed overall, but
North Korea demonstrated the technical capability
to launch multiple-stage rockets. Other attempts to
develop this capability followed with Unha-2 in 2009
and Unha-3 2012, and Pyongyang was finally successful
in December 2012 when the Unha-3 deployed a small
satellite in orbit.
At an October 2010 military parade, North Korea
displayed a number of military systems, including
a new intermediate-range missile, called Musudan
(Hwasong-10). The parade was also noteworthy as the
24 The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula
first major public outing for Kim Jong-un as the des-
ignated successor to his father, Kim Jong-il, who was
to die a year later.20 Musudan is a liquid-fueled sys-
tem believed based on hardware from the Soviet R-27
Zyb (SS-N-6) submarine-launched ballistic missile.
There was also speculation as to whether North Korea
might also have obtained the 4D10 engine used on the
R-27; the more efficient propellant used in this system
would have given Musudan improved range compared
with North Korea’s inventory of Scuds and Nodongs
at that time. Musudan launches have generally failed,
bar a successful test in June 2016. Experts assessed
that photographs of the test released by North Korea,
provide ‘solid evidence, provided the photographs
are authentic, that the Musudan uses the 4D10 engine
originally designed and built for the Soviet R-27.’21 (The
Pukguksong-1 SLBM was suspected of initially utilis-
ing the 4D10 engine design (before switching to solid
propellant) and the untested Hwasong-13 ICBM designs
were suspected of using two (paired) 4D10s.)
It was perhaps unsurprising that North Korea would
try to produce a more survivable set of missile capabili-
ties, not least as this would improve its overall deter-
rence posture, so the move into submarine launch,
solid-fuel and improved road-mobile systems were
perhaps to be expected. However, the acceleration of
North Korea’s missile programme, and the sophistica-
tion of the systems and technologies employed, has not
only caused concern, but also raised questions over how
precisely North Korea was able to acquire the skills and
technologies to make such rapid progress.
In 2014, North Korea demonstrated a submarine-
launched missile, outwardly resembling the R-27 and
designated Pukguksong-1. A series of ejection tests fol-
lowed, and these in 2016 seemed to demonstrate a
switch from liquid- to solid-propellant. Meanwhile, ‘a
land-based modification of the  Pukguksong-2, which
also uses solid motors, was shown publicly for the first
time in a successful February 2017 test’.22 This system
indicated a continuing focus on survivability, with
the display of a tracked transporter-erector-launcher
vehicle, offering improved mobility off-road over the
wheeled launchers shown until then.
North Korea’s progress in developing longer-range
systems, however, significantly accelerated after 2016.
 Table 3: 2017 North Korea ballistic-missile test launches
Date (local) Type Classification Assessed outcome [1] Distance flown
29 Nov Hwasong-15 ICBM Successful ~1,000 km[2]
15 Sep Hwasong-12 IRBM Successful ~3,700 km
03 Sep 6th nuclear test
29 Aug Hwasong-12 IRBM Successful ~2,700 km
Unconfirmed SRBM Successful ~250 km
26 Aug Unconfirmed SRBM Successful ~250 km
Unconfirmed SRBM Failure n.k.
28 Jul Hwasong-14 ICBM Successful ~1,000 km[2]
04 Jul Hwasong-14 ICBM Successful ~930 km[2]
29 May Scud (MaRV) SRBM Successful ~400 km
21 May Pukguksong-2 MRBM Successful ~500 km[2]
15 May Hwasong-12 IRBM Successful ~800 km[2]
29 Apr Unconfirmed Unconfirmed Failure ~50 km
16 Apr Unconfirmed Unconfirmed Failure n.k.
05 Apr Unconfirmed Unconfirmed Failure ~60 km
22 Mar Unconfirmed Unconfirmed Failure n.k.
Scud-ER SRBM Successful
Scud-ER SRBM Successful
06 Mar ~1,000 km
Scud-ER SRBM Successful
Scud-ER SRBM Successful
12 Feb Pukguksong-2 MRBM Successful ~500 km[2]

2016 North Korea ballistic-missile test launches

Date (local) Type Classification Assessed outcome [1] Distance flown
20 Oct Unconfirmed IRBM Failure n.k.
15 Oct Unconfirmed IRBM Failure n.k.
09 Sep 5th nuclear test
Scud-ER SRBM Successful
05 Sep Scud-ER SRBM Successful ~1,000 km
Scud-ER SRBM Successful
24 Aug Pukguksong-1 SLBM Successful ~500 km[2]
03 Aug Nodong MRBM Successful ~1,000 km
Nodong MRBM Failure n.k.
Nodong MRBM
19 Jul Nodong MRBM Two successful; one failure 500–600 km
Hwasong-6 (Scud-C) SRBM
09 Jul Pukguksong-1 SLBM Failure ~10 km
Hwasong-10 (Musudan) IRBM Failure ~250 km
22 Jun
Hwasong-10 (Musudan) IRBM Successful ~400 km[2]
31 May Hwasong-10 (Musudan) IRBM Failure n.k.
Hwasong-10 (Musudan) IRBM Failure n.k.
28 Apr
Hwasong-10 (Musudan) IRBM Failure
23 Apr Pukguksong-1 SLBM Successful ~30 km
15 Apr Hwasong-10 (Musudan) IRBM Failure n.k.
Nodong MRBM Successful 800 km
18 Mar
Nodong MRBM Failure n.k.
Hwasong-6 (Scud-C) SRBM Successful ~500 km
10 Mar
Hwasong-6 (Scud-C) SRBM Successful ~500 km
07 Feb Unha-4 Satellite launch vehicle Successful n.k.
06 Jan 4th nuclear test
[1] Test objectives are unknown with published materials relating only to claimed successes. Outcomes are therefore an assessment of information released by, or reported from,
DPRK, ROK and US officials. [2] Lofted trajectory indicated.

North Korea’s military power 25

Systems designated Hwasong-13 and Hwasong-14 had
been known previously (Hwasong-13 had been shown
at military parades) and the DPRK had also carried
out a series of ground-based propulsion and re-entry
tests. In April 2017, a new missile was displayed that
appeared ‘to share a common heritage with the KN-08
ICBM’ though was smaller.23 Designated Hwasong-12,
this intermediate-range system was tested in May 2017
with the single-stage missile following a lofted trajec-
tory. If this missile had followed a normal flight path
it would, according to experts, have travelled between
4,000 and 4,500 km bringing Guam within reach.24
Subsequent tests overflew Japan, reaching ranges of
2,700 km and 3,700 km respectively. Two months later,
in July, North Korea twice tested the Hwasong-14, a
missile with the potential for intercontinental range.
Engine technology is believed key to the rapid progress
of both the Hwasong-12 and Hwasong-14. The liquid-
fuelled systems powering both these missiles indicates
that Pyongyang decided to pursue another engine as
an alternative to the 4D10 powering the Musudan and
other North Korean liquid-fuelled ballistic missiles. The
RD-250 engine produced in the former Soviet Union has
been assessed as a likely candidate.25 On 29th November
2017, North Korea successfully tested the Hwasong-15,
with the first stage comprising paired RD-250 engines.
Though this missile travelled only 1,000 km on a highly
lofted trajectory, experts assessed its potential range at
13,000 km, bringing within range the entire continental
United States. However, while the two rapid launches
of the Hwasong-14 in 2017 – together with that of the
Hwasong-15 – indicated a growing ICBM capability,
the DPRK’s re-entry vehicle technology has yet to be
proven.26
In addition to the above missile systems, the KPA
ground forces includes the following long-range rocket
artillery and short-range ballistic missile systems, sub-
ordinate to the General Staff Department’s Artillery
Bureau.
Table 4: Rocket artillery and SRBMs
System Launchers Estimated range
FROG-3/-5/-7* Fewer than 25 45–70 km
Toksa 120 km
(SS-21 Scarab) (mod)
Fewer than 50
*possibly not in service
26 The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula
Nuclear, chemical and biological
programmes
Since the 1960s, the DPRK has pursued the develop-
ment of nuclear and chemical weapons, seeing these as
a deterrent against possible US and South Korean action
and as a way of offsetting the qualitative decline of its
conventional forces. North Korea also has a biological-
weapons capability, but there is no proof that it has an
active programme. Furthermore, the sale of equipment
and technologies – including from North Korea’s bal-
listic-missile programme – has since the 1980s become
a fundamental component of the North’s efforts to
acquire foreign currency, then used, in part, to fund
further weapons-related research and development.
The development of these capabilities – along with bal-
listic missiles and battlefield rockets, special operations
forces and a cyber-attack capability – has constituted a
significant area during the last quarter century where
KPA capability has grown.
Nuclear weapons
For more than half a century, Pyongyang has pursued
a nuclear-weapons programme – to the point that it
now has all the requisite technologies, personnel and
infrastructure to produce armaments that are, at a
minimum, comparable to first- or second-generation
US nuclear weapons. North Korea is capable of using
ballistic missiles to deliver these weapons across the
Korean Peninsula and Japan and now also has an ICBM
that may soon enable it to strike the continental US with
a nuclear weapon.
Nuclear-weapons research, development and pro-
duction are the responsibility of the Second Academy
of Natural Sciences, with the director of this group also
a member of the National Defense Commission. North
Korean defectors report that these organisations coop-
erate with each other, as well as the KPA’s Nuclear–
Chemical Defense Bureau. Components of the Academy
of Sciences provide support to these organisations.
North Korea has followed two paths for its nuclear-
weapons programme, aimed at producing fissile mate-
rial from both highly enriched uranium (HEU) and
separated plutonium. In 2010 Pyongyang revealed to
visiting US scholars led by Siegfried Hecker a centri-
fuge uranium-enrichment facility at Yongbyon (North
Korea’s principal nuclear research facility) that it had
built using technology acquired from the A.Q. Khan net-
work during the 1990s. At the time, Pyongyang claimed
that this facility was for producing fuel for a new exper-
imental light-water reactor (LWR) under construction
at Yongbyon. According to Hecker, the stated enrich-
ment capacity would be sufficient to produce about
2.5 tonnes of low enriched uranium in the form of UF6
[uranium hexafluoride] a year. If the centrifuges were
reconfigured, he judged they could produce 30–40 kg
of HEU annually.27 It has been argued that North Korea
has at least one further, undisclosed enrichment facility,
which could significantly increase North Korea’s capa-
bility to produce HEU.28
In 2013 North Korea announced its intention to both
restart and refurbish the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon.
Two years later, Pyongyang said that a 5-MWe pluto-
nium-production reactor that had been shut down
since 2007 had been restarted.29 Analysis published in
early 2018 concluded that activity at this reactor indi-
cated signs of operation, though definitive conclusions
over the nature of the activity were hard to reach.30 This
5-MWe reactor could in theory produce up to 7.5 kg of
weapons-grade plutonium a year if operating at full
power for 300 days, although 6 kg a year is a more accu-
rate figure.31 Meanwhile, the LWR at Yongbyon has also
seen progress. Some analysts assess that this appears
close to be coming on line and, while it was primar-
ily designed as a prototype for an electricity-produc-
ing LWR, it could be used to make plutonium and/or
tritium.32
Estimates of the DPRK’s nuclear-weapons inventory
vary from source to source; they are based on the level
of the country’s weapons technology and the quantity
of fissile material available. Plutonium production is a
little easier to estimate than HEU stockpiles, as reac-
tor operating times and reprocessing campaigns can
be observed more readily using imagery analysis, in
contrast to the difficulty in making judgements about
HEU – due, for instance, to uncertainty over undis-
closed facilities. Plutonium production has been esti-
mated, using the above method, to be between 33–60 kg
and, assuming an average 4  kg used in each of North
Korea’s tests (some estimates say 6 kg, while the North
Koreans have reportedly said their first test used 2 kg)
would lead to a current stockpile of about 20–40  kg,
which generally corresponds with Hecker’s estimate
at the end of 2017.33 Hecker estimates that North Korea
has 250–500 kg of HEU, based on what he saw, logical
assumptions, and ‘probabilistic analysis of the import
and production of key materials and components’.34
Other reports place the total higher still. As a result of
these judgements of fissile materials stocks, and while
there are higher estimates of how many nuclear weap-
ons North Korea might have, in September 2017 David
Albright put the ‘realistic’ range as 23 to 39, growing by
three to five a year.35
While there are discussions of how many kilograms
of fissile material North Korea may have expended in
its six nuclear tests to date, and these are important in
judging how much may be left and how many weapons
the North might retain, it is evident from its tests that
North Korea has progressed to the stage where it has
developed a thermonuclear weapon. North Korea con-
ducted its first underground nuclear test on 9 October
2006, near Punggye-ri, north of the eastern city of Kilchu,
having announced in early 2005 that it had manufac-
tured a nuclear weapon. It conducted additional tests in
2009 and 2013. Estimates of the yield of these early tests
ranged from 1–14 kilotonnes. The North claimed that
a fourth test in January 2016 was of a hydrogen bomb,
although most experts doubted this. ‘Instead, the device
is assessed to have been ‘boosted’ by way of a hydro-
gen isotope that undergoes partial fusion and increases
the power of a standard fission nuclear weapon. While
this enhances the explosive effect, it does not produce a
yield on a thermonuclear scale’.36 Nonetheless, the test
‘left open the possibility that progress had been made
in miniaturising a nuclear device, thereby making it
more deliverable’.37 North Korea’s fifth nuclear test took
place in September 2016, with some experts assessing
the yield at around 10  kt and others placing a higher
estimate at 20  kt, arguing that the test took place at a
deeper location.38 The sixth nuclear test, in September
2017, indicated yet more progress and, ‘judging from
the large yield’ (estimated at 140–250 kt) tended to cor-
roborate North Korea’s claim that ‘it was a two-stage
thermonuclear (hydrogen) bomb’.39
In May 2018, after months of surprising political
developments on the peninsula, and a month after a
North Korea’s military power 27
summit between the leaders of North and South Korea
at Panmunjom at which both ‘South and North Korea
confirmed the common goal of realizing, through com-
plete denuclearization, a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula’,
North Korea blew up tunnels at Punggye-ri that it had
used for its nuclear tests, so closing off – in theory at
least – some parts of the tunnel complex as a potential
site for future tests.40 While North Korea invited foreign
journalists to observe the destruction, no international
inspectors or technical experts were invited, and out-
side analysis suggested that parts of the tunnels may
still be serviceable.41 Given North Korea’s previous his-
tory of evasion and secrecy over its nuclear programme,
any agreement that may be reached with North Korea
over denuclearisation – particularly if the United States
maintains its focus on ‘CVID – complete, verifiable, irre-
versible denuclearization’ – will require North Korean
access and cooperation of a level far beyond anything
yet seen.42
Chemical weapons
North Korea has neither signed nor acceded to the
Chemical Weapons Convention, and has repeatedly
stated that it was a victim of chemical warfare during
the Korean War. Yet there is a large body of evidence
– from defector reports to statements by South Korean,
US and Japanese officials – that North Korea has a long-
standing chemical weapons programme, and maintains
a large and relatively comprehensive chemical-warfare
capability.
South Korean and US sources report that chemical
agents being studied by the KPA or in its inventory
include, but are not necessarily limited to, adamsite
(DM), chloroacetophenone (CN), chlorobenzylidene
malononitrile (CS), chlorine (CL), cyanogen chloride
(CK), hydrogen cyanide (AC), mustard gas (H, HD or
HL), phosgene (CG and CX), sarin (GB), soman (GD),
tabun (GA) and V-agents (VM and VX). Defectors have
alleged that North Korea produces 20 different chemi-
cal agents for use in weapons. It is unclear whether the
KPA has binary chemical agents.
The Munitions Industry Department and its Second
Academy of Natural Sciences and Second Economic
Committee are responsible for chemical-weapons pro-
duction, while the Nuclear–Chemical Defense Bureau
28 The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula
oversees offensive and defensive chemical operations.
Although precursor chemicals are produced at a num-
ber of facilities throughout the country, chemical weap-
ons and agents are reportedly produced at facilities
in Kanggye and Sakchu, while chemical-defence and
-decontamination equipment is produced at Factory
279 in Pyongwon.43 After production, the munitions
are moved to national-level depots and subordinated
to the Equipment Department of the Nuclear–Chemical
Defense Bureau. From there, they are distributed to spe-
cial depots of the KPA’s corps deployed along the DMZ
or to special depots of the air and air-defence force.
Defectors allege that the KPA would employ chemical
weapons during the early stages of a new conflict.
According to the 2016 South Korean Defense White
Paper, the KPA had an inventory of 2,500–5,000 tons of
chemical agent.44 In other estimates one expert argued
that the North may have the potential to annually pro-
duce 4,500 tons of chemical agent in peacetime and
12,000 tons in wartime. Production estimates may now
have to be raised, with the reported modernisation of
the Namhung Youth Chemical Complex.45
The KPA has the capability to effectively employ sig-
nificant quantities and varieties of chemical weapons on
the Korean Peninsula, East Asia and, to a lesser degree,
worldwide using unconventional methods of delivery.
The primary means of delivery on the Korean Peninsula
would be to employ multiple rocket launchers, artillery,
air-launched ordnance and long-range artillery rockets
and ballistic missiles. As part of their annual exercise
schedule, major KPA units train for operations on a
contaminated battlefield. The assassination, in February
2017, of Kim Jong-un’s half-brother Kim Jong-nam dem-
onstrated, many allege, North Korea’s chemical weap-
ons capability. Kim Jong-nam was murdered at Kuala
Lumpur International Airport by the direct application
of VX nerve agent.
Biological weapons
Although it is a signatory to the Biological and Toxic
Weapons Convention, and despite public statements
to the contrary, North Korea likely has the capability
to produce large quantities and varieties of biological
weapons. It is possible that the KPA would have the
capability to employ such weapons both on the Korean
Peninsula and, to a lesser degree, worldwide using
unconventional methods of delivery.
The Munitions Industry Department and its Second
Academy of Natural Sciences and Second Economic
Committee are responsible for biological-weapons
research, development and production. These organisa-
tions likely cooperate with the KPA’s Nuclear–Chemical
Defence Bureau.
Using biological agents could be problematic for
the KPA as, once employed, their unpredictability
means that they could cause greater danger to the force
that employs them than to any potential enemy. This
Notes
1
See Robert Carlin ‘Kim Jong Un’s New Strategic Line’, 38
North, 23 April 2018, https://www.38north.org/2018/04/
rcarlin042318/.
2
Sung Chae-Gi, ‘The Current Status of North Korean Military
Economy and People’s Economy’, presented at a seminar on
‘Kim Jong-il’s Military First Politics and Prospects of North
Korean Economy’, at the Institute for National Security
Strategy, Seoul, 26 October, 2009, p. 27; see also Sung
Chae-Gi, ‘North Korea’s Capabilities for Military Build-up’,
Gukbang Journal , no. 445, January 2011, p. 22.
3
Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, ‘2016
Defense White Paper’, http://www.mnd.go.kr/user/mndEN/
upload/pblictn/PBLICTNEBOOK_201705180357180050.pdf;
experts estimate that there are over 14,000 underground
facilities nationwide.
4
For example see ‘Kim Jong Un Guides Combat Flight
Contest among Air Commanding Officers’, Korean Central
News Agency, 10 May 2014, and ‘N.Korea hosts O Jung
Hup military conference for first time in decade’, NKNews,
4 August 2016.
5
‘Ministry of People’s Armed Forces’, North Korea
Leadership Watch, 17 March 2018, http://www.
n k l e a d e r s h i p wa t c h . o r g / d p r k - s e c u r i t y - a p p a r a t u s /
ministry-of-the-peoples-armed-forces/.
6
IISS correspondence with Joseph S. Bermudez Jr; Republic
of Korea Ministry of National Defense, ‘2016 Defense White
Paper’, p. 28.
7
IISS, North Korean Security Challenges: A net assessment
(London: IISS, 2011), p. 54.
8
Derived from a map orginally published in US Department
weakness is exacerbated by the North’s oft-demon-
strated inability to respond to outbreaks of infectious
diseases in a timely and comprehensive manner, due to
its antiquated medical and public-health system. In the
last ten years, for example, the DPRK has been forced to
depend on international assistance to address outbreaks
of foot-and-mouth disease, avian influenza, SARS,
MERS and other such diseases. Overall, though, there is
not adequate information to assess whether Pyongyang
‘has progressed to the level of agent production and
weaponisation, although North Korea is most likely
capable of both’.46
of Defense, ‘Report to Congress on Military and Security
Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea’, 12 February 2016, p. 18, https://www.defense.
gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Military_and_Security_
Developments_Involving_the_Democratic_Peoples_
Republic_of_Korea_2015.PDF. Unit identities assessed by
the IISS.
9
It is likely that this is the equipment referred to in the latest
(2018) US Department of Defense document on North Korean
military capability. This report said that ‘North Korea pub-
licized multiple tests of the KN-SS-X-9 CRBM [close-range
ballistic missile], the most recent occurring in March 2016,
after which Kim Jong Un declared it ready for deployment.
If added to the North’s ground forces, this system with a
range of 118 miles could extend North Korea’s long-range
artillery and rocket threat to points south of US Garrison
Humphreys’. See US Department of Defense, ‘Report to
Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’, May 2018, p. 11,
https://media.defense.gov/2018/May/22/2001920587/-1/-1/1/
REPORT-TO-CONGRESS-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-
DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-DEMOCRATIC-
PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-KOREA-2017.PDF.
10
IISS, The Military Balance 2018 (Abingdon: Routledge for the
IISS, 2018), p. 275.
11
Data derived from Republic of Korea Ministry of National
Defense, ‘2016 Defense White Paper’, p. 32.
12
Ibid., p. 31; IISS assessments in The Military Balance 2017
and 2018 are lower as they exclude the 1m (14–16 year-old)
Youth Guards from the overall paramilitary force total. See
North Korea’s military power 29
 IISS, The Military Balance 2018, p. 277.
13
Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, Republic
of Korea, 2016 Defense White Paper, p. 30.
14
Derived from US Department of Defense, ‘Military and
Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea’, 12 February 2016, p. 18.
15
Ankit Panda, ‘North Korea declares KN-06 missile opera-
tional following successful test’, Diplomat, 29 May 2017,
http://thediplomat.com/2017/05/north-korea-declares-kn-
06-surface-to-air-missile-system-operational-after-suc-
cessful-test/; the US Department of Defense’s latest report
on military and security developments in North Korea
released in May 2018, said that North Korea had ‘most
recently tested this system in May 2017’, perhaps indicat-
ing that the system was yet to fully enter service. See US
Department of Defense, ‘Report to Congress on Military
and Security Developments involving the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea’, May 2018, p. 18.
16
US Department of Defense, ‘Military and Security
Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea’, 12 February 2016, p. 19.
17
US Air Force Defense Intelligence Ballistic Missile
Analysis Committee, ‘The Ballistic and Cruise Missile
Threat’, 2017, http://www.nasic.af.mil/Portals/19/
images/Fact%20Sheet%20Images/2017%20Ballistic%20
and%20Cruise%20Missile%20Threat_Final_small.
pdf?ver=2017-07-21-083234-343.
18
Ibid.
19
Drawn from ‘North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Programmes’,
in IISS, North Korean Security Challenges: A net assessment,
pp. 129–60.
20
Catherine Love, Stephanie Lieggi and Melisa Hanham,
‘Missiles, Maneuvers and Mysteries’, James Martin Center
for Nonproliferation Studies, 2 November 2010, http://
www.nonproliferation.org/missiles-maneuvers-and-mys-
teries-review-of-recent-developments-in-north-korea/.
21
Michael Elleman, ‘North Korea’s Musudan mis-
sile effort advances’, IISS Voices, 27 June 2016,
http://www.iiss.org/en/iiss%20voices/blog-
sections/iiss-voices-2016-9143/june-2c71/
north-koreas-musudan-missile-effort-advances-5885.
22
Joseph Dempsey, ‘Testing times ahead with North Korea’,
IISS Military Balance Blog, 3 April 2017, https://www.
iiss.org/en/militarybalanceblog/blogsections/2017-edcc/
march-f0a5/testing-times-ahead-with-north-korea-736f.
30 The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula
23
John Schilling, ‘North Korea’s Latest Missile Test: Advancing
towards and Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)
While Avoiding US Military Action’, 38 North, 14 May
2017, https://www.38north.org/2017/05/jschilling051417/.
24
Michael Elleman, ‘The secret to North Korea’s ICBM suc-
cess’, IISS Voices, 14 August 2017, http://www.iiss.org/
en/iiss%20voices/blogsections/iiss-voices-2017-adeb/
august-2b48/north-korea-icbm-success-3abb.
25
Ibid.
26
Michael Elleman, ‘Video Casts Doubt on North Korea’s
Ability to Field an ICBM Re-entry Vehicle’, 38 North, http://
www.38north.org/2017/07/melleman073117/.
27
Siegfried S. Hecker, ‘What I found in North Korea’,
Foreign Affairs, 9 December 2010, https://www.for-
eignaffairs.com/articles/northeast-asia/2010-12-09/
what-i-found-north-korea.
28
David Albright, ‘On the Question of Another North Korean
Centrifuge Plant and the Suspect Kangsong Plant’, Institute
for Science and International Security, 25 May 2018,
http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/
Kangsong_25May2018_final.pdf.
29
‘North Korea Yongbyon nuclear site “in operation”’, BBC
News, 15 September 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-asia-34254634; ‘North Korea’s Yongbyon plutonium
site likely reactivated, says IAEA’, BBC News, 7 June 2016,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-36466247.
30
Frank V. Pabian, Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and Jack Liu,
‘North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Complex: 5 MWe
Reactor is Likely Operating, New Military Encampment
Established’, 38 North, 5 March 2018, https://www.38north.
org/2018/03/yongbyon030518/; Chaim Braun et al., ‘North
Korean Nuclear Facilities After the Agreed Framework’,
Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford
University, 27 May 2016, p. 12, http://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/
sites/default/files/khucisacfinalreport_compressed.pdf.
31
‘Assessing North Korea’s Nuclear and Ballistic Missile
Capabilities’, a joint project by The International Institute
for Strategic Studies and the Center for Energy and Security
Studies (forthcoming).
32
David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, and Allison Lach,
‘On-Going Monitoring of Activities at the Yongbyon
Nuclear Site’, Institute for Science and International
Security, 13 February 2018, http://isis-online.org/isis-
reports/detail/on-going-monitoring-of-activities-at-the-
yongbyon-nuclear-site.
33
Chaim Braun et al., ‘North Korean Nuclear Facilities After 39
the Agreed Framework’, p. 42; Siegfried S. Hecker, ‘What
We Really Know About North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons’,
Foreign Affairs, 4 December 2017, https://www.foreignaf-
fairs.com/articles/north-korea/2017-12-04/what-we-really-
know-about-north-koreas-nuclear-weapons. 40
34
Siegfried S. Hecker, ‘What We Really Know About North
Korea’s Nuclear Weapons’.
35
‘Testimony of David Albright, President of the Institute for
Science and International Security, before the Monetary 41
and Trade Subcommittee of the Committee on Financial
Services; Hearing Title: “A Legislative Proposal to Impede
North Korea’s Access to Finance”’, 13 September 2017,
https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-
115-ba19-wstate-dalbright-20170913.pdf.
36
‘Types of Nuclear Weapons’, Preparatory Commission
for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Organization,
https://www.ctbto.org/nuclear-testing/types-of-nuclear-
weapons; David Albright, ‘North Korea’s 2016 Nuclear 42
Test’, Institute for Science and International Security, 6
January 2016, http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/
documents/North_Koreas_2016_Nuclear_Test_final_2.pdf. 43
37
‘DPRK Proves Successful in H-bomb Test’, Rodong, 7 44
January 2016.
38
Matthew Cottee, ‘North Korea’s fifth nuclear test: time 45
to take its nuclear status seriously?’, IISS Voices, 9
September 2016, https://www.iiss.org/en/iiss%20voices/
blogsections/iiss-voices-2016-9143/september-5517/
north-korea-fifth-nuclear-test-3219. 46
Matthew Cottee, ‘Nuclear test reinforces North
Korean capabilities’, IISS Voices, 4 September
2017, https://www.iiss.org/en/iiss%20voices/blog-
sections/iiss-voices-2017-adeb/september-ac39/
nuclear-test-reinforces-north-korean-capabilities-9eec.
‘Full text of joint declaration issued at inter-Korean sum-
mit’, Yonhap News Agency, 27 April 2018, http://eng-
lish.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2018/04/27/0200000000
AEN20180427013900315.html.
Barbara Starr and Zachary Cohen, ‘Kim’s tunnel explo-
sions a goodwill gesture? No so fast ...’, CNN, 1 June
2018, https://edition.cnn.com/2018/06/01/politics/north-
korea-nuclear-test-tunnel-gesture-propaganda/index.
html; Frank V. Pabian, Joseph S. Bermudez Jr and Jack
Liu, ‘The Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site Destroyed: A Good
Start but New Questions Raised about Irreversibility’, 38
North, 31 May 2018, https://www.38north.org/2018/05/
punggye053118/.
US Department of State, ‘Briefing on Secretary Pompeo’s
Meeting with Chairman Kim Yong-chol’, 30 May 2018,
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/05/282872.htm .
Author interview with North Korean defector.
Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, ‘2016
Defense White Paper’, p. 34.
Joseph S. Bermudez Jr, ‘North Korea’s Namhung Youth
Chemical Complex: Seven Years of Construction Pays Off’,
38 North, 10 April 2014, http://www.38north.org/2014/04/
jbermudez041014/.
IISS, North Korean Security Challenges: A net assessment, p.
169.
North Korea’s military power 31
Chapter two
South Korea’s armed forces
The defence policy and military posture of the
Republic of Korea (South Korea or the ROK) is domi-
nated by the security challenge from North Korea.
Pyongyang’s nuclear tests (it conducted its sixth in
September 2017), and the persistent and worrisome
development of its ballistic-missile capability have in
recent years both unnerved Seoul and strengthened
its resolve to acquire more advanced military capabili-
ties. Pyongyang’s provocations have also led Seoul to
bolster cooperation and coordination with US forces
based in South Korea. They have also led Seoul to con-
sider developing defence policies focused on deter-
rence and response, and generating capabilities that
could engage swiftly and early in any contingency,
notably through the development of its own ballistic
missiles and air-launched weapons. Although there is
speculation about the direction of Seoul’s defence poli-
cies in light of 2018’s diplomatic activity, South Korea
is still, as part of its policy and capability response, pri-
oritising a three-pronged defence strategy: Kill Chain,
the Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) system,
and the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation
(KMPR) strategy. In its 2016 White Paper, the Ministry
of National Defense (MND) says that this ‘Korean
triad system’ is being ‘established for effective deter-
rence and decisive retaliation against North Korea’s
provocation’.1
32 The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula
North Korean provocations: South Korean
defence-policy responses
South Korea’s defence-policy priorities and capabil-
ity programmes are elaborated in a series of guiding
strategy and policy publications, including national-
security, defence- and military-policy papers. Recent
South Korean defence White Papers have highlighted
three principal national defence objectives, aimed at
‘protecting the nation from external military threats
and attack, supporting a peaceful reunification of the
Korean peninsula’, and ‘contributing to regional stabil-
ity and world peace’.2 In addition, the MND highlights
four ‘focal points’ in its defence policy, including to
establish a ‘multi-directional’ defence posture across all
domains (land, sea, air, space and cyberspace); improve
new-generation defence capabilities; strengthen the
ROK–US alliance; and deepen international defence
cooperation’.3
Following the death of Kim Jong-il in 2011, South
Korea’s defence policy has been dominated by the
need to maintain readiness in case of conflict (and as
a consequence, the requirement to reinforce training);
the growth in asymmetric threats from North Korea,
such as its nuclear and ballistic-missile capability; and
the delay to the transfer of wartime operational control
(OPCON) from US to South Korean forces. But other
factors are important too. Some recent initiatives by
the Moon Jae-in administration, for instance, have been
concerned with issues around ‘force health’, in order to
improve conditions for personnel, as well as introduc-
ing more advanced military capabilities.4
Nonetheless, South Korea’s defence policy, and
operational concepts, have been dominated by North
Korea’s track record of military provocations. In par-
ticular, the breadth and tempo of North Korea’s missile
tests have, together with its nuclear ambitions, proven
an enduring stimulus. But certain incidents have also
prompted significant change, notably the torpedo
attack against the South Korean corvette Cheonan on
26 March 2010 and the artillery fire directed from the
North against Yeonpyeong Island later that year on 23
November. Incidents like these led the South to exam-
ine its readiness and rules of engagement (ROE), as well
as its military capabilities.5 South Korea’s ROE were
revised in light of these events (and others, including
North Korean provocations along the Northern Limit
Line), to include the possibility of launching an air attack
as a ‘self-defence’ measure.6 US forces have reportedly
urged calm, particularly after the Yeonpyeong inci-
dent, due to concern about the possibility of escalation.7
Nonetheless, former national-security chief and defence
minister Kim Kwan-jin said in 2014: ‘Should North
Korea provoke again, ROK will strike supporting forces
and commanders, not to mention the origin of provoca-
tion itself.’8
Since Kim Jong-un came to power in 2011, South
Korea’s armed forces have been closely watching trends
in North Korea’s military capability development.
Not surprisingly, they have focused on the North’s
increased emphasis on asymmetric threats, including
special-operations training, cyber power, more nuclear
tests and improvements in Pyongyang’s ballistic-missile
capability. The latter was demonstrated most recently in
2017, with the launch of an ICBM, solid-fuelled missiles
and demonstration of new tracked launch vehicles (see
p. 24). Earlier examples exist too. Between February and
July 2014, Pyongyang carried out seven ballistic-missile
launches. In four out of the seven, the transporter-
erector launchers (TELs) were covertly deployed tens
of kilometres inland from existing missile sites – one of
the launches took place only 20 km north of the demili-
tarised zone (DMZ). According to South Korean media
sources, these launches went undetected by ROK–US
military authorities.9
Kill Chain
The 2014 launches may, according to some South Korean
analysts, have been intended to demonstrate North
Korea’s potential to neutralise the South’s Kill Chain.
Kill Chain is a strategy designed to detect a possible
missile launch in real time and deliver strikes (includ-
ing, possibly, pre-emptively) intended to neutralise
North Korea’s ballistic-missile threat – all within a lim-
ited time window in cases where assessments indicate a
likely launch. Even in South Korea, however, there are
doubts over Kill Chain’s ability to detect in near real
time well-concealed and camouflaged TELs and pre-
prepared launch sites, coupled with a high probability
of intercepting most of the missiles.10 These launches,
some conducted covertly away from existing missile
sites, also highlighted Pyongyang’s wish to develop a
more survivable missile force. This quest for surviv-
ability, amid awareness of its relative conventional mili-
tary inferiority, has driven Pyongyang to pursue other
missile technologies, including solid- as well as liquid-
fuel missiles, and more off-road mobility in its TELs, as
well as a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)
capability.
There was speculation within South Korea’s intelli-
gence community that North Korea would use the Gorae-
class submarine to test its developing Pukguksong-1
SLBM, and perhaps that North Korea would load only
a single missile on each submarine. This was borne
out by observation of a Gorae-class boat (as well as a
submerged barge) used for trials of this SLBM, with
the missile housed in the sail. Media reports in South
Korea indicated that, in response to these fears, South
Korea’s armed forces were developing a three-phase
‘Underwater Kill Chain’ to address the North Korean
SLBM challenge. The first phase would be to strike the
SLBM-equipped submarine(s) while in or shortly after
leaving port; the second phase would be to detect and
strike a boat infiltrating South Korean waters while
submerged; and the third phase would be to detect
and intercept the SLBM itself immediately after it is
launched. Any strike would be most effective – the
South Korean armed forces believe – while a submarine
South Korea’s armed forces 33
 NORTH KOREA SOUTH KOREA

1 Reconnaissance
2 UAV

Reconnaissance
satellite
4
Fighter Stri
ke o
rde 3
r

Operations-control Strike
orde
centre r

er
Threat system

ord
4

ike
Str
4
KDD-II/KDD-III Aegis-equipped vessels

1 & 2 Space and air systems used to find, fix and track potential targets

3 Command centre determines most effective platform and weapon engagement

4 Threat systems engaged from air-, sea- or ground-launched weapons

Figure 5: The Kill Chain concept11

is in port, potentially using ballistic missiles, or cruise
missiles such as the Hyeonmu-III either ground-, sea- or
submarine-launched, or using stand-off air-to-ground
missiles launched from F-15K or other combat air-
craft. Should one of these submarines set sail, finding it
would be harder, but the boat would open itself to pos-
sible detection and engagement by either South Korean
anti-submarine warfare (ASW) assets at sea or in the air,
or those operated by US forces.12
This ‘Underwater Kill Chain’ faces significant chal-
lenges, not least including whether a pre-emptive strike
is ideal for engaging a submarine force that has demon-
strated the capacity carry to out covert patrols. At the
same time, South Korea has – certainly since the Cheonan
attack – looked to boost its detection, defence and ASW
capabilities according to the 4D operational concept
(‘defence, detect, disrupt, and destroy’) to address
North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, coined in
2013 by then-commander of US forces in Korea, General
Curtis Scaparrotti. But more broadly, Kill Chain forms
just one aspect of the ‘proactive deterrence’ strategy
that emerged in the early part of the decade as a key
part of South Korea’s defence policy; it might be further
modified in response to North Korean actions.
Other strategies: air and missile defence;
punishment and retaliation
Following North Korea’s 2010 provocations, a reform
plan submitted to the MND by the Presidential
Committee for the Advancement of National Defense
looked to include ‘an efficient deterrence against North
Korean security threats’ as an objective of South Korea’s
defence reforms.13 A key element of the ‘proactive deter-
rence’ strategy as it was then conceived was to deter
threats (including nuclear attack, regional provocation
and psychological warfare) by generating a retaliatory
capability comprising flexible deterrent and response
systems, asymmetric responses and an adaptable tar-
geting policy.
In terms of flexible military responses, the MND
envisaged that retaliatory and proactive attacks should
take place alongside defensive measures. While a pre-
emptive strike is central to this concept, there is also
emphasis on retaliatory attacks. Furthermore, South
Korea should also be free to respond asymmetrically.
South Korean analysts understand this to refer to weap-
ons selection, such as high-explosive or precision-guided
ammunition, or penetrating guided bombs, depending
on the volume and nature of targets to be engaged.

34 The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula

 Flexible and adaptable targeting, meanwhile, would
enable a target-selection process dependent on the scale
and characteristics of any North Korean action. For
instance, should Pyongyang undertake a large-scale
provocation, such as in the 2010 Yeonpyeong incident,
South Korea’s armed forces need to be able to retaliate
against a North Korean port or military base; if a South
Korean naval vessel is attacked, a North Korean vessel
(such as a cargo ship in military use) could be attacked
in response. And should the occasion demand, the
South Korean armed forces need to be able to destroy
key symbols of the North Korean regime or conduct a
‘decapitation strike’ against individuals responsible for
the provocations.14 Indeed, South Korean experts have
openly floated the idea of decapitation operations tar-
geting figures at the top of the North Korean hierarchy.
As Kill Chain, or KAMD, may not be able to address
Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile threats effectively,
the discussion of potential decapitation operations is
intended to deter North Korea by cautioning that even
Pyongyang’s principal decision-makers could be tar-
geted if Seoul felt there was imminent risk of military
attack. Although the South Korean government and
armed forces have avoided open discussion of the idea,
Figure 6: The Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) concept16
NORTH KOREA SOUTH KOREA
Midcourse
phase
Atmosphere
Ascent
phase
Upper tier
Lower tier
North Korean TEL
they are understood, according to South Korean ana-
lysts, to be contemplating the strategy.15
The proactive deterrence strategy was officially
included in the South Korean ‘National Defense Reform
Basic Plan (2014-2030)’ published in 2014. This docu-
ment indicated that the core concept of South Korea’s
military strategy has switched from ‘active deter-
rence’ to ‘proactive deterrence’,17 a reference that also
appeared in the 2014 defence White Paper.18 This said
that South Korea’s military structure would ‘transform
into an elite force structure which has the proper capa-
bility to simultaneously respond against North Korean
asymmetric threats, local provocations and aggression
threats [sic]’.19 It remains unclear how much the 2014
references to proactive deterrence differ from the con-
cept previously proposed in 2010 by the Presidential
Committee for the Advancement of National Defense,
although Kill Chain’s emphasis, by mid decade, on pre-
emptive strikes, would indicate a degree of divergence.
If anything, however, these developments indicate
that South Korea intends its defence policy to remain
flexible not only in response to changing security
dynamics on the peninsula, but also, and more spe-
cifically, to capability improvements in North Korea.
Terminal
phase
Operations-control
centre Long-range
surface-to-air
missile Medium-range
(L-SAM) surface-to-air
Early-warning
radar missile Patriot
(M-SAM)
KDD-II/KDD-III Aegis-equipped vessels
South Korea’s armed forces 35
Indeed, the accelerating pace and scope of North
Korean actions in 2016–17 only heightened South
Korea’s focus on scrutinising its defence planning in
order to create more adaptable and precise options to
tackle the North Korean challenge. These responses
encompass the military developments pursued after
2010, notably Kill Chain and KAMD, but also – after
the North’s fifth nuclear test in 2016 – include a con-
cept now referred to as the Korea Massive Punishment
and Retaliation (KMPR) strategy. This, in effect, formal-
ised and bolstered the proactive deterrence plan as it
developed since 2014, and means that the South is now
effectively pursuing a ‘triad’ of military concepts, and
associated capabilities, with which it aims to counter
North Korea’s military power.
The Korea Massive Punishment and
Retaliation (KMPR) strategy
The KMPR strategy envisages a suite of current and
emerging capabilities in order to target key North
Korean decision-makers and facilities, through the
‘deployment of missiles capable of simultaneous,
massive-scale precision strikes, and special operations
units’.20
Figure 7: The Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) strategy 23
NORTH KOREA SOUTH KOREA
Ballistic missile
Pyongyang
High command Special-
operations
forces
36 The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula
The KMPR concept would reportedly involve the
creation of ‘special units tasked to neutralize [North
Korea’s] leadership and key facilities in case of contin-
gencies’.21 It would also include the possible use of a
range of weapons, such as existing ballistic and cruise
missiles, and the development of a ‘new optimized
missile launch system and large-capacity, high-perfor-
mance warheads’.22
South Korea’s armed forces currently operate a range
of weapons that could be utilised as part of any proactive
deterrence strategy, including non-nuclear, precision-
guided munitions (PGM), a range of launch platforms
and C4ISR assets deployed on ground, air and sea (both
surface and sub-surface).24 Precision-strike packages
include: ground-launched Hyeonmu-II ballistic missiles
(with a range of 300 km); the 500-km-range Hyeonmu-
IIB; the US-manufactured Army Tactical Missile System
(ATACMS), with a range of up to 300 km; the Hyeonmu-
III family of cruise missiles, with ranges estimated
between 500–1,500 km; the surface- and submarine-
launched Hae Sung-II/-III cruise-missile family (based
on the Hyeonmu-III, with ranges of up to approximately
1,000 km); the AGM-84H/K SLAM-ER air-launched
cruise missile, with a range of under 300 km; and the
Air-to-ground
missile
Fighter
Cruise missile
Cruise missile
KDD-II/KDD-III Aegis-equipped vessels

Combined ROK–US missile launches, ATACMS and Hyeonmu-II, 5 July
2017 (US Army/Sinthia Rosario)
Taurus KEPD cruise missile, with an estimated range of
500 km.25
Delivery platforms for these PGM include ground-
based TELs, F-15K combat aircraft and, from around
2020 when it enters operational service with the air
force, the F-35A. Naval platforms are also possible
launch platforms, such as the KDD-III Aegis-equipped
Sejong-class cruisers, the KDD-II Chungmugong Yi Sun-
Sin guided-missile destroyers and new submarines.
The Asia-Pacific has in recent years seen many nations
procure increasingly advanced submarine capabilities,
and South Korea is no exception. In 2012, the govern-
ment signed a contract with Daewoo Shipbuilding and
Marine Engineering (DSME) to build two 3,000-tonne
KSS-III submarines with a six-cell vertical-launch system
(VLS). Seoul ultimately plans to order up to nine boats in
this programme, and while the first three will constitute
Batch I, it is intended that the next Batch II boats will
contain more vertical-launch systems. (Hyundai Heavy
Industries is also building KSS-III boats.) It is likely that
the first KSS-III boat will be introduced after 2020. Some
Korean analysts have long-argued the 3,000-tonne class
submarine should be nuclear-powered,26 and in August
2017 it was reported that the defence minister was
‘ready to review’ the plans to build nuclear-powered
submarines.27 However, a number of hurdles lie in the
way of developments in this area, including the signifi-
cant cost and infrastructure requirements should Seoul
decide on this path.
At the same time as its Hyeonmu and ATACMS bal-
listic missiles, and its Hyeonmu-III cruise missile, South
Korea’s armed forces are pursuing a Hyeonmu-IIC var-
iant, possibly with a range of 800 km. The test of the
Hyeonmu-IIB had taken place on 3 June 2015 in front of
then-president Park Geun-hye at a test facility operated
by South Korea’s Agency for Defense Development
(ADD), the body in charge of South Korean weapons
development. The missile was successfully launched to
a range of some 500 km into the Yellow Sea/West Sea.28
The 2012 revision of the ROK–US missile guidelines
(a set of bilateral measures relating to South Korea’s bal-
listic-missile production capability agreed between the
US and South Korea) enabled Seoul to extend its ballis-
tic-missile ranges from 300 km to 800 km. These meas-
ures were further adapted in late 2017, which resulted
in the removal of payload restrictions on South Korea’s
ballistic missiles.29
Transferring wartime operational control
(OPCON): Seoul’s view
North Korea’s increased focus on developing asym-
metric capabilities has also affected the planned trans-
fer of wartime operational control (OPCON) to South
Korean forces. Following the 46th ROK–US Security
Consultative Meeting (SCM), held in Washington DC
in October 2014, the defence ministers of both countries
agreed to indefinitely delay the plan. The long-standing
debate over OPCON transfer started during the Roh
Moo-hyun administration (his term ran from 2003-
08). Roh was critical that the commander of Combined
Forces Command (CFC) – a US general – had OPCON
over South Korean forces, and during the ROK–US
defence ministerial talks in February 2007 pushed for
OPCON transfer by April 2012. Conservative groups in
South Korea, meanwhile, argued that the CFC was ‘the
most efficient and powerful combined command on the
globe’. After President Lee Myung-bak assumed power,
these groups contended that the OPCON transfer should
be delayed. In June 2010, a delay until December 2015
was announced which was further extended in 2014.
Increased uncertainty over the security environment
on the peninsula, resulting from Pyongyang’s third
nuclear test in 2013 and further long-range missile tests,
rekindled arguments that the OPCON transfer should
again be delayed, this time indefinitely. Although for-
mer president Park Geun-hye promised during her
election campaign that the plan to transfer OPCON in
2015 would be carried out, she and then US president
Barack Obama noted in April that year, that ‘the trans-
fer timeline and conditions can be re-examined’.
South Korea’s armed forces 37
 Both the US and South Korea share three prereq-
uisites concerning the transfer of OPCON to South
Korea. Firstly, a security environment on and around
the Korean Peninsula that enables a stable transfer.
Secondly, that the South Korean armed forces possess
the right mix of capabilities to lead combined ROK–US
forces after the transfer takes place. Thirdly, that the
South Korean armed forces possess capabilities that can
address North Korean nuclear and missile threats in the
early stages of a regional provocation or conflict.
The indefinite delay in the transfer of OPCON con-
firms that the CFC will retain its strong deterrence
posture against North Korea. That said, it will prove a
challenge for South Korea’s armed forces to maintain
the level of readiness that they had generated in antici-
pation of the 2015 OPCON transfer.
South Korea’s armed forces have clarified that they
aim to complete the OPCON transfer in the mid-2020s
when Kill Chain and KAMD (at least) are planned to
be in place. When the delay was announced, the justi-
fication led some analysts to consider questions as to
whether, with the OPCON transfer ‘virtually indefi-
nitely’ delayed, the South Korean government would
fully invest the sums needed for Kill Chain and KAMD.30
As of early 2018, the transfer of OPCON remained
‘conditions-based’, with US and South Korean defence
ministers agreeing ‘to consider the timing and the con-
ditions on the conditions-based OPCON transition’.31
Armed forces
South Korea’s armed forces operate under the com-
mand and control of the minister of national defence.
Military authority is exercised through the ROK
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Headquarters and
Operations Command of the army, air force, navy and
marine corps. The JCS commands and supervises those
units mainly tasked with carrying out combat missions,
as well as joint units (designated for joint and com-
bined operations). The JCS leadership comprises one
vice-chairman, four chief directorates (chief directorate
of the Korean Defense Intelligence Agency, and chief
directorates of operations, military support and stra-
tegic planning) and five offices (of the chairman, judge
advocate, public affairs, inspector general, and analysis
and experimentation). In order to build South Korea’s
38 The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula
independent war-fighting capability in preparation for
the transfer of OPCON, the JCS plans to improve capa-
bilities and training and further develop and enhance
collaboration with US forces in Korea.
The regular army is composed of around 490,000
troops, the majority of whom are conscripts undertaking
a 21-month period of mandatory military service. The
bulk of this force is forward deployed along the DMZ
in order to deter and, if necessary, defeat a full-scale
invasion by the Korean People’s Army (KPA), or at least
delay enemy advances until reinforcements arrive. The
eastern part of the DMZ is covered by three corps (II, III
and VIII) of the 1st Field Army, with eight regular infan-
try divisions and two armoured brigades. The western
part of the DMZ, including the approaches to Seoul
(where the terrain is more favourable for mechanised
operations) is the responsibility of the 3rd Field Army’s
five corps (I, V, VI, VII and Capital) with eight regular
infantry divisions, six mechanised infantry divisions and
three armoured brigades. Most of the mechanised divi-
sions are held under the command of VII Corps to form
a mobile reserve to the north and east of Seoul, anticipat-
ing that the KPA would push towards the capital in the
event of large-scale conflict. Each corps includes organic
artillery and engineer brigades for support.
Of the 18 remaining reserve divisions, more than half
would be deployed under the command of the two field
armies or the Capital Defense Command, responsible
for the defence of Seoul, upon activation. The remainder
would perform rear-area duties in the south of the pen-
insula, under the command of the Second Operational
Command (the former 2nd Army).
Armoured units in the regular army operate the rela-
tively modern and indigenous K1 and K1A1 main bat-
tle tanks. South Korea’s army has about 1,500 of these
in its inventory. The army is also introducing more
of the locally designed, and more modern, K2 MBT.
Mechanised infantry units are still largely equipped
with the K200 KIFV infantry fighting vehicle, a suc-
cessor to the American M113, but at least three of the
mechanised divisions have now been re-equipped with
the more modern K21. The 20th Mechanized Division
has also taken delivery of the first tranche of the new
indigenous K2 main battle tank. The 3rd Armoured
Brigade in the 1st Army sector remains equipped with
 NORTH KOREA
Cheorwon-gun
3rd Infantry Division
Gwanin-myeon
6th Infantry Division
Dongducheon-zi
28th Infantry Division
Nam-myeon
25th Infantry Division
Gungpyeong-ri
Paju-si 5th Infantry Division
1st Infantry Division
Yangju-si
Gapyeong-gun
Goyang-si 26th Mechanized
Capital Mechanized
9th Infantry Division Division
Division
Goyang-si
30th Mechanized Division Seoul
Incheon
17th Infantry Division 20th Mechanized Division
Suwon
Figure 8: ROK ground forces: dispositions at brigade level and above
T-80U main battle tanks and BMP-3 infantry fighting
vehicles, which were acquired from Russia in lieu of
debt payments in the 1990s. The reserve infantry divi-
sions still operate variants of the ageing American M48
Patton main battle tank, although given the relative lack
of modernisation in the KPA armoured fleet, these may
well still be qualitatively superior to their adversaries.
Reflecting the importance of artillery on the penin-
sula, not least in terms of potential counter-battery fire as
well as strike capacity, South Korea fields around 5,000
tracked and towed artillery pieces and multiple-launch
rocket systems. The majority of these are older US sys-
tems, but significant numbers of indigenous pieces have
entered service in recent years, including the K9 Thunder
155-mm self-propelled howitzer and the Chunmoo mul-
tiple rocket launcher. The 58 US-manufactured M270/
M270A1 multiple rocket launchers in the inventory
serve as launch platforms for the army’s MGM-140A/B
ATACMS short-range ballistic missiles.
More specialised commands, with a greater role to
play in efforts to counter North Korea’s asymmetric
capabilities, report directly to army headquarters. Since
2014, the army’s Missile Command is responsible for the
Hyeonmu-II ballistic-missile family and the Hyeonmu-III
cruise-missile family, both central to the Kill Chain and
KMPR concepts. The 2016 defence White Paper declared
Bongo-ri Bangsan-myeon
15th Infantry Division 21st Infantry Division
Goseong-myeon
22nd Infantry Division
Buk-myeon
Pungsan-ri
12th Infantry Division
7th Infantry Division
Sanae-myeon Yongha-ri
27th Infantry Division 2nd Infantry Division
Nogok-ri
8th Mechanized Division
Gangneung
Hongcheon
11th Mechanized Division
Yangpyeong Samcheok
23rd Infantry Division
SOUTH KOREA
that there were 60 surface-to-surface missile launch-
ers in service with the South Korean armed forces, but
did not break this figure down between ballistic- and
cruise-missile launchers.
The army now operates over 90 attack helicopters,
reinforcing their previous 60 AH-1F/J Cobra’s with 36
new AH-64E Apache’s delivered between 2016 and 2017.
Given the country’s challenging topography, multi-role
and transport helicopters are numerous, with 175 multi-
role helicopters (130 Hughes 500D and 45 MD-500); 301
transport helicopters, comprising 31 heavy helicopters
(CH-47D Chinooks); 152 medium helicopters (65 KUH-1
Surions and 87 UH-60P Black Hawks); and 112 light util-
ity helicopters, comprising around 100 Bell 205 (UH-1H
Iroquois) and 12 Bo-105 helicopters).
The Special Warfare Command comprises six air-
borne brigades modelled on United States Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM), and a single bat-
talion tasked with counter-terrorism operations. One of
these brigades, the 13th, was officially converted into
the 13th Special Mission Brigade in December 2017. It is
intended that this brigade will gain more firepower and
new special-operations-relevant equipment – including
MH-47 helicopters – as part of this move, and will now
reportedly be tasked with operations against leadership
targets inside North Korea in the event of war.32
South Korea’s armed forces 39
 South Korea’s naval organisation comprises Navy
Headquarters, Naval Operations Command, Marine
Corps Headquarters, Northwest Islands Defense
Command (NWIDC), and other supporting units. The
Marine Corps HQ is composed of two divisions, one bri-
gade and a special-operations regiment, with the prin-
cipal mission of leading wartime landing operations.
The NWIDC was established (out of the Marine Corps
Headquarters) in June 2011 to patrol and defend the
north-western islands in peacetime. The naval order of
battle consists of approximately 70,000 service members
including 29,000 marines; around 200 vessels including
principal combatants like the Aegis-equipped KDD-III
Sejong-class cruisers and submarines including the new
Type-214 boats; landing craft; mine countermeasures
ships; auxiliary vessels; and around 50 utility, search-
and-rescue (SAR) and anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
helicopters. The navy also operates 16 P-3 anti-subma-
rine aircraft. The Sejong-class cruisers are particularly
noteworthy. South Korea’s three vessels in this class are
equipped with the Aegis Baseline 7 battle-management
system. Each has two quadruple slant-launchers with
the RGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missile and locally-built
Hae Sung-I. The vessels also carry a 48-cell Mk-41 VLS
with the Standard Missile-2 (Block IIIA/B) surface-to-
air missile (SAM) and ASROC (anti-submarine rocket),
one 32-cell Mk41 VLS with the SM-2 (Block IIIA/B) SAM
and ASROC; and one 48-cell K-VLS with capability to
carry the Hae Sung-II (a Hyeonmu-III variant) cruise mis-
sile and the Red Shark anti-submarine missile.
The Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) comprises
65,000 personnel, and is well-equipped and trained in
meeting its primary roles of defending Korean airspace,
countering any air threat from North Korea, and pro-
viding air support to South Korea’s ground forces. The
ROKAF also has a central role in Seoul’s Kill Chain strat-
egy to address Pyongyang’s ballistic-missile inventory,
providing elements of the intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR) capacity, as well as combat aircraft
and air-to-surface weaponry.
The ROKAF headquarters in Gyeryongdae directs
an Operations Command, a Logistics Command and
an Education and Training Command. The Operations
Command includes Air Combat Command, Air
Mobility and Reconnaissance Command, Air Defense
40 The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula
Missile Command, and Air Defense and Control
Command. Air Combat Command and Air Mobility and
Reconnaissance Command were reorganised out of the
previous Northern and Southern Combat Commands
respectively in 2015–16, in order to generate organisa-
tions more focused on capability provision rather than
specific geographic-areas.
The air force’s combat-aircraft fleet is built around
the F-15K, the F-16 and the F/A-50. This capability,
even without the air assets of deployed US forces (see
p. 57) overmatches the (for the most part obsolescent)
combat aircraft operated by North Korea (though there
are a small number of comparatively ‘modern’ MiG-29
Fulcrum A and Fulcrum C operated by the DPRK). In
March 2017, the air force saw its first F-35A rolled-out in
the US; it has 40 on order and the type is anticipated to
enter service in the early 2020s. When operational, the
F-35 will constitute the air force’s primary air-to-surface
platform capable of operating in contested airspace.
The air force operates three F-15K and ten F-16C/D
squadrons. It also continues to field a small number
of the F-4 as well as six squadrons of the F-5. These
types are in the process of being withdrawn from ser-
vice. Airborne early-warning and control capability is
provided by four Boeing 737s, while the Hawker 800 is
used as a signals intelligence platform. The air force also
provides tactical transport, operating the C-130H and
C-130J Hercules as well as the CN-235 light transport.
Chinook and Black Hawk helicopters are used for search
and rescue.33
Personnel reduction plans
Following the National Defense Reform Basic Plan
(2014-2030), strategies emerged to reduce personnel
numbers and to reform command structures and unit
organisations. It is hoped that this reform process will
lead to armed forces that are better prepared for the
Table 5: Personnel reductions: 2016–22
Service 2016 2022
Army 490,000 365,000
Navy 41,000 41,000
Marine Corps 29,000 29,000
Air Force 65,000 65,000
Source: ROK 2016 Defense White Paper
34
prospective Korean battlespace, and the joint opera-
tional requirements that will likely be needed in the
future. The plan is for the armed forces to reduce stand-
ing personnel numbers from 630,000 in late 2014 to
500,000 by 2022. It is currently envisaged by the Moon
Jae-in administration that the army will see the largest
reductions, reducing to 365,000 troops by 2022.35
At the same time, the MND is re-examining the plan
to mobilise both troops and munitions supply in war-
time. The plan is to set up an Army Mobilization Force
Command to compensate for the shortage of active-duty
troops, which will result from the reduction of service
personnel, by using trained reserve forces.36 This organ-
isation is also intended to improve training for forces
judged to be critical to the opening phase of any contin-
gency. However, with the national birth rate continuing
to decline, prompting a fall in potential candidates for
conscription, some analysts posit that the armed forces
may find personnel recruitment a challenge in the near
future.37
Budgeting and major programmes
In April 2015, the MND unveiled its ‘National Defense
Mid-Term Plan 2016–2020’. Mid-term plans are intended
to chart a path for armed forces’ development over a
five-year period, including by acquiring new weap-
ons; they are renewed each year. The recent ‘2017-21
Defense Mid-term Force Enhancement Plan’, forecast
investments directed primarily at pursuing the Kill
Chain and KAMD procurement programmes. Earlier,
key programmes noted in the 2016 defence White Paper
included the K-2 main battle tank, the F-X and KF-X
(indigenous) combat aircraft; high-altitude UAVs and
air tankers and, in the maritime domain, the 3,000-tonne
submarine programme and Sejong-class cruisers.
Budgetary outlays rose from KRW37.5trn (US$33.2bn)
in 2015 to KRW40.6trn (US$35.7bn) in 2017, of which
over a quarter was allocated for force improvement.38
According to a 2017 report by the Korea Institute for
Table 6: South Korea: defence spending41
2010 2011 2012 2013
Non-procurement 69.4% 69.3% 70.1% 70.7%
Procurement 30.6% 30.7% 29.9% 29.3%
Defense Analyses, the North’s missile and nuclear
activities have ‘reemphasized the desperate need to
expedite the early deployment of the Kill-Chain and
the KAMD, which resulted in additional KRW 100 bil-
lion than the original budget proposal. This includes an
R&D budget for a Medium Altitude Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle (MUAV), core weapons systems for Kill-Chain
and KAMD, as well as a new budget for acquisition of
Ballistic Missile Early Warning Radar-II.’39 The budget
ratio allocated for ‘force improvement’ (procure-
ment) has remained relatively constant since 2010, as
South Korea continues to prioritise new capabilities in
response to the security challenge from North Korea, as
well as the financial draws resulting from the drive to
implement Kill Chain, KAMD and now KMPR. Indeed,
the proportion rose to 30% under the 2017 defence
budget.
Kill Chain envisages the acquisition of a range of
assets, some of which are already in service or in active
development. These include, among others, a multi-
purpose KOMPSAT-6 satellite, which is understood
to be scheduled for launch in 2019–20, the high-alti-
tude UAV requirement noted in the 2016 White Paper
(Northrop Grumman is fulfilling an order for four RQ-4
Global Hawk aircraft),40 a locally-developed medium-
altitude UAV, the long-range KEPD Taurus cruise mis-
sile and a medium-range air-to-ground missile.
Meanwhile, KAMD projects include PAC-2 upgrades,
PAC-3 missiles, upgrades to the medium-range surface-
to-air missile (M-SAM), and a ballistic-missile early-
warning radar. It is planned that KAMD will expand by
2023 to a multi-tier missile defence system incorporat-
ing the L-SAM (long-range SAM) requirement. While
the South Korean armed forces hope to acquire THAAD
– or SM-3 missiles onboard Aegis-equipped vessels –
though the official position had been that ‘we have no
plans to acquire these systems’, in 2016 the government
and USFK agreed that the THAAD system should be
deployed in the south. This decision was taken in order
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
70.7% 70.8% 70.2% 69.9% 68.8%
29.3% 29.2% 29.8% 30.1% 31.2%
South Korea’s armed forces 41
Table 7: Land sector: major orders42
Equipment Type Quantity Value US$ Prime contractor Order date Notes
K2 MBT 100 n.k. Hyundai Rotem 2007 Completed contract
K2 MBT 100 856.16m Hyundai Rotem Dec 2014 Signed contract
K21 IFV 500 est. 1.67bn Hanwha Defense Oct 2008 Completed contract
Systems
K21 ARV n.k. 119.19m Hanwha Defense Dec 2013 Signed contract
Systems
K806 APC (W) n.k. 26.68m Hyundai Rotem Dec 2016 Signed contract
K808
Hyeongung MANPAT n.k. 219.69m LIG Nex1 Dec 2016 Signed contract

Table 8: Shipbuilding sector: major orders

Equipment Type Quantity Value US$ Prime contractor Order date Notes
Son Won-il (GER Type- SSK 9 4.5bn est. Daewoo Shipbuilding 2000 Signed contract
214) and Marine
Engineering (DSME)
KSS-III Batch I SSG 3 2.06bn DSME Dec 2012 Signed contract
KDD-3 Batch II CGHM 15.9m Hyundai Heavy Jun 2016 Signed contract (R&D)
Industries (HHI)
Incheon FFGHM 6 n.k. STX Offshore & Dec 2008 Completed contract
Shipbuilding
Daegu (Incheon Batch II) FFGHM 4 1.2bn est. DSME Dec 2013 Signed contract
Nanpo ML 1 n.k. HHI n.k. Signed contract
Cheonwangbong (LST-II) LPD 1 n.k. Hanjin Heavy Nov 2010 Completed contract
Industries &
Construction (HHIC)
Cheonwangbong (LST-II) LPD 1 124.58m HHI Dec 2013 Completed contract
Marado (Dokdo mod) LHD 1 396.5m HHIC Dec 2014 Signed contract
Cheonwangbong (LST-II) LPD 1 142.46m HHI Nov 2014 Signed contract
Cheonwangbong (LST-II) LPD 1 n.k. HHI n.k. Signed contract
Soyangham AOEH 1 n.k. HHI n.k. Signed contract
LSF-II (US LCAC LCAC 2 132.68m HHIC Dec 2016 Signed contract
derivative)
Chamsuri II (PKMR) PCF 8 466.19m est. HHIC Nov 2014 Signed contract
500t Patrol Craft PCO 5 138.34m HHIC Nov 2016 Signed contract (Coast
Guard)
LCU LCT 3 29.43m HHIC Jul 2017 Signed contract
Incheon Batch III FFGHM n.k. n.k. HHI Dec 2016 Signed contract (R&D)

to try and improve capabilities to tackle North Korea’s
ballistic-missile threat, and provide an extra layer of
defensive capacity on top of Patriot and M-SAM and the
L-SAM systems under development.
The MND requested a budget of KRW43.7trn
(US$38.4bn) for 2018, spurred by the tensions height-
ened in 2017 by the North’s actions. Of that, KRW13.5tr
(US$121bn) was reportedly due to be allocated to ‘vari-
ous projects aimed at improving the military’s fire-
power, up 10.5 percent’ from the 2017 budget.43
Defence industrial base
South Korea is home to three firms listed in the Defense
News top 100 defence industry companies: Korean
Aerospace Industries (KAI), Hanwha and LIG Nex1.
However, overall production by the local defence indus-
try is still limited when compared to other major indus-
trial sectors. Indeed, some local analysts have said that
the foundation for South Korea’s defence industries is rel-
atively weak, with most core components imported and
only limited involvement by small and medium-sized
enterprises. However, with the local market dominated

42 The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula

Table 9: Aerospace sector: major orders
Equipment Type Quantity Value US$ Prime contractor Order date Notes
F-35A Lightning II FGA 6 n.k. Lockheed Martin Sep 2014 Signed contract
F-16C / D Fighting FGA 134 est. 1.2bn Lockheed Martin Nov 2016 Signed contract (upgrade
Falcon and modernisation)
A330 MRTT Tanker/ 4 1.32bn Airbus Defence and Jun 2015 Signed contract
transport Space
AH-64E Apache Atk hel/ 36 1.61bn Boeing May 2013 Completed contract
Guardian / ASM
AGM-114 Hellfire
AW159 Wildcat ASuW hel 8 n.k. AgustaWestland Jan 2013 Completed contract
KUH-1 Surion med tpt hel 24 562.25m Korea Aerospace Dec 2010 Completed contract
Industries (KAI)
KUH-1 Surion med tpt hel 60 1.55bn KAI Dec 2013 Signed contract
F-15K Slam Eagle FGA n.k. Boeing Mar 2017 Signed contract
(maintenance and support)
MUH-1 Surion med tpt hel n.k. KAI Jul 2013 Completed contract (R&D)
KUH-1 Surion med tpt hel 30.39m KAI Aug 2014 Completed contract (R&D)
KUH-1 Surion SAR hel 2 n.k. KAI Dec 2016 Signed contract (Coast
Guard)
KUH-1 Surion med tpt hel 70 1.36bn KAI Dec 2016 Signed contract
MUH-1 Surion med tpt hel 30 550.91m KAI Dec 2016 Signed contract

by the industry’s principal customer (the South Korean
armed forces), there is a strong drive to pursue export
markets. There have been notable export successes such
as: the T-50 (a fighter/ground attack (FGA) aircraft and
combat-capable trainer in service with Iraq, Thailand, the
Philippines and Indonesia, as well as South Korea); the
K-9 howitzer (in service with South Korea and Turkey,
and on contract with Finland, India and Norway); three
attack submarines being built for Indonesia; and the
Military Afloat Reach and Sustainability (MARS) pro-
gramme (under which replenishment ships were built
for the United Kingdom’s Royal Navy; a similar design
is being built for Norway). While prospects for signifi-
cant sales remain limited, South Korea is contending
for some potentially lucrative projects, such as the T-50
light trainer’s position in the bid for the US T-X train-
ing aircraft contract. KAI has teamed with Lockheed
Martin for the T-X bid, offering the T-50A. Success in
the T-X requirement would be a notable success not just
for Lockheed Martin, but also South Korea’s aerospace
industry; a decision on the project was expected to be
made by the US Department of Defense in 2018.
Major shipbuilding firms include Samsung, STX,
Hyundai Heavy Industries, and Daewoo Shipbuilding
and Marine Engineering (DSME). However, South
Korea’s shipping industry was heavily affected by the
crisis in the shipbuilding sector more broadly.44 Indeed,
DSME was almost delisted from the Korean Exchange in
2016. In a bid to regain financial health, DSME planned
to spin off its defence activities in 2017, though by early
2018 this had yet to take place. DSME manufactures
the Type-214 KSS-II and KSS-III classes of submarines.
While DSME faced challenges, the Hanwha group fared
better, undertaking a consolidation process and acquir-
ing various other defence companies. In summer 2015,
Hanwha acquired Samsung Techwin (manufacturer of
the K-9 howitzer and aircraft engines, among others)
and Samsung Thales (defence electronics).45 In spring
2016, Hanwha bought Doosan DS (manufacturer of
the K21 infantry fighting vehicle).46 Later, in September
2016, Hanwha then purchased a 30% stake in Pratt &
Whitney’s Singaporean subsidiary.47As a result of these
various acquisitions, Hanwha has become the principal
defence-equipment manufacturer in South Korea, with
activities ranging from the fabrication of missiles and
ammunition, uninhabited systems, maritime systems,
artillery pieces and military aircraft engines, to C4ISR
systems and military vehicles.48

South Korea’s armed forces 43

Notes
1 Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, ‘2016
Defense White Paper’, p. 44, http://www.mnd.go.kr/
user/mndEN/upload/pblictn/PBLICTNEBOOK_
201705180357180050.pdf. With the unexpected diplomatic
progress in 2018 on the peninsula, observers watched
for any signs that South Korean defence activities would
modify in response to the diplomatic climate. A major ROK–
US exercise was shortened and slightly modified, after a
pause in exercises during the Winter Olympics, and it was
reported that South Korea might readjust purchases relating
to its principal programmes, such as the plan to buy MH-47
helicopters for special forces. However, only a month or
so earlier, Seoul was reported to have signed a contract for
more Taurus KEPD 500 missiles, indicating that significant
procurements for its major programmes continue.
2 Ibid., p. 41.
3 Ibid., pp. 39–40.
4 See, for instance, Lee Yeong-sun, ‘Pushing for “Defense
Reform 2.0” to support the responsible defense of peace
and prosperity‘, Republic of Korea Ministry of National
Defense, 17 May 2018, http://www.mnd.go.kr/user/
boardList.action?command=view&page=1&boardId=O_472
61&boardSeq=O_191200&titleId=null&siteId=mndEN&id=
mndEN_020100000000.
5 Defense Reform Plan 307, launched by the administration
of Lee Myung-bak a year after the Cheonan attack focused
on, inter alia, a ‘re-priorization of force improvements’
including ‘improved anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
capabilities, counter-artillery measures, capabilities to
combat North Korean weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), and acquiring next-generation capabilities like
the fighter program (F-X) and early deployment of the
global hawk’. See, for instance, Chun In-bum, ‘Korean
defense reform: history and challenges’, Brookings
Institution, 31 October 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/
research/korean-defense-reform-history-and-challenges/;
Hwee Rhak Park, ‘South Korea’s Failure to Implement
“Defense Reform 2020”’, The Korean Journal of International
Studies, vol. 12, no. 2, December 2014, pp. 379–401, http://
kaisnet.or.kr/resource/file/kjis/South_Korea%E2%80%99s_
Failure_to_Implement_%E2%80%9CDefense_
Reform_2020%E2%80%9D.pdf.
6 See Kim Deok-hyun, ‘S. Korea to toughen rules of
engagement against N. Korean attack’, Yonhap News
44 The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula
Agency, 24 November 2010, http://english.yonhapnews.
co.kr/national/2010/11/24/86/0301000000AEN2010112401
2200315F.HTML, Chico Harlan, ‘Island attack boosted S.
Korea’s will to strike back against North’, Washington Post,
14 April 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
asia_pacific/island-attack-boosted-s-koreas-will-to-strike-
back-against-north/2013/04/14/5d6a8a8c-a4d9-11e2-9c03-
6952ff305f35_story.html?utm_term=.9f4749d28997.
7 Lee Jeonghun, ‘Why President Lee Did Not Budge that
Day’, Donga, 17 March 2014, https://web.archive.org/
web/20140408104238/http://blog.donga.com/milhoon/
archives/3552.
8 Kim Hojun, ‘Kim Kwan-Jin to Step Up as the New Security
Chief’, Yonhap News Agency, 1 June 2014, http://news.
naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=100
&oid=001&aid=0006937737.
9 Yu Yongweon, ‘How Not to Lose Vigilance in Face of North
Korean Threats’, Chosun-ilbo, 16 January 2015, http://news.
chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2015/01/15/2015011504140.
html.
10 Yu Yongweon, ‘Around 100 North Korean TELs
Pose Obstacles in Preemptive Strike’, Chosun-ilbo, 14
February 2013, http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_
dir/2013/02/14/2013021400253.html
11 Derived from Republic of Korea Ministry of National
Defense, ‘2016 Defense White Paper’, p. 70, http://
www.mnd.go.kr/user/mndEN/upload/pblictn/
PBLICTNEBOOK_201705180357180050.pdf.
12 Yu Yongweon and Yang Seungshik, ‘Three-Phase
Underwater Kill Chain Discussed to Defeat North Korean
SLBM’, Chosun-ilbo, 13 May 2015, http://news.chosun.com/
site/data/html_dir/2015/05/13/2015051300324.html.
13 See, for instance, Bruce Klinger, ‘South Korea: Taking the
Right Steps to Defense Reform’, The Heritage Foundation,
19 October 2011, https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/
south-korea-taking-the-right-steps-defense-reform.
14 Kim Taewoo, ‘Strengthening the Combined Readiness
Posture to Deter North Korea’, paper presented to a
seminar on ‘Korea’s Way Ahead in Defense’, organised by
the Saeniru Party and held at the South Korean National
Assembly, 5 February 2015, pp. 48–49.
15 Interview by author with a senior ROK military official,
Seoul, May 2014. See also Choe Sanh-Hun, ‘South Korea
Plans “Decapitation Unit” to Try to Scare North’s Leaders,
 New York Times, 12 September 2017, https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/09/12/world/asia/north-south-korea-
decapitation-.html.
16 Derived from Republic of Korea Ministry of National
Defense, ‘2016 Defense White Paper’, p. 71, http://
www.mnd.go.kr/user/mndEN/upload/pblictn/
PBLICTNEBOOK_201705180357180050.pdf.
17 Kim Jeongwook, ‘ROK Military Explains Proactive
Deterrence as a By-All-Means Approach if an All-Out
War is Indicated’, News 1, 6 March 2014, http://news1.kr/
articles/?1572958.
18 Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, ‘2014
Defense White Paper’, p. 83.
19 Ibid.
20 Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, ‘2016
Defense White Paper’, p. 71.
21 ‘S. Korea Revises Long-Term Defense Plan,’ Yonhap News
Agency, 9 February 2017, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/
search1/2603000000.html?cid=AEN20170209010600315.
22 Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, ‘2016
Defense White Paper’, p. 72.
23 Derived from Republic of Korea Ministry of National
Defense, ‘2016 Defense White Paper’, p. 72.
24 Kim Taewoo, ‘Strengthening the Combined Readiness
Posture to Deter North Korea’, paper presented to a seminar
on ‘Korea’s Way Ahead in Defense’, 5 February 2015, p. 49.
25 See ‘Military: training took place with Hyeonmu-2,
Hae Sung 2 and Spice six minutes after North Korea’s
provocation’, Yonhap News Agency, 29 November 2017,
http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2017/11/29/02000
00000AKR20171129013851014.HTML and Yu Yongweon,
‘Armed Forces Day: Hyeonmu-3, Haesung 2/3’, Chosun.
com, 3 September 2013, http://bemil.chosun.com/nbrd/bbs/
view.html?b_bbs_id=10040&num=75121#none.
26 Jeong Choongshin, ‘Nuclear Powered Submarine Is a
Necessity’, Munhwa-ilbo, 29 May 2015, http://www.munhwa.
com/news/view.html?no=2015052901033830114001.
27 Choi Yeon-jin, ‘Seoul to Review Building Nuclear-
Powered Submarine’, Chosun-ilbo, 1 August 2017,
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_
dir/2017/08/01/2017080101190.html?Dep0=twitter.
28 Park Suchan, ‘500km-Range Ballistic Missile Launched’,
Segye-ilbo, 3 June 2015, http://www.segye.com/content/
html/2015/06/03/20150603003633.html?OutUrl=naver.
29 White House, ‘Joint Press Release by the United States of
America and the Republic of Korea’, 8 November 2017,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-
press-release-united-states-america-republic-korea/; US
Department of Defense, ‘Joint News Conference with
Secretary Mattis and South Korean Defense Minister Song
Young-moo in Seoul, South Korea’, 27 October 2017, https://
www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/
Article/1356752/joint-news-conference-with-secretary-
mattisand-south-korean-defense-minister-s/.
30 Yu Yongweon, ‘Practical Defense Benefits over Nominal
Autonomy: OPCON Transfer Finally Found a Resolution in
8 Years’, Chosun-ilbo, 24 October 2014, http://news.chosun.
com/site/data/html_dir/2014/10/24/2014102400254.html.
31 US Department of Defense, ‘Joint News Conference with
Secretary Mattis and South Korean Defense Minister Song
Young-moo’.
32 ‘What kind of unit is the ‘first strike’ Special Mission
Brigade’, Yonhap News Agency, 17 January 2017, http://
www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2017/01/17/02000000
00AKR20170117077600014.HTML. After initial moves
emerged towards a possible summit between US and
DPRK leaders in mid-2018, the plans for acquiring
enhanced-capability MH-47s, as well as other capability
enhancements, were placed in some doubt.
33 Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, ‘2016
Defense White Paper’, p.51; data also derived from the
ROK entry in IISS, Military Balance+ database, milbalplus.
iiss.org.
34 Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, ‘2016
Defense White Paper’, p. 104.
35 Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, ‘2014
Defense White Paper’, pp. 78–80. Author’s conversations
with Korean experts, May 2018.
36 See ‘South Korea’s Army to Create Reserve Forces
Command’, Yonhap News Agency, 6 April 2018,
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/search1/2603000000.
html?cid=AEN20180406002400315.
37 For an indication of the reduction in births in South
Korea, see: ‘S. Korea’s Childbirth Rate Continues to Slide
in December’, Yonhap News Agency, 28 February 2018,
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/search1/2603000000.
html?cid=AEN20180228002400320; Kim So-youn, ‘2016
Saw Lowest Number of Births Ever Recorded in South
Korea’, Hankyoreh, 23 February 2017, http://english.hani.
co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/783928.html.
South Korea’s armed forces 45
38 Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, ‘Defense
Budget’, http://www.mnd.go.kr/mbshome/mbs/mndEN/
subview.jsp?id=mndEN_030900000000.
39 Cho Nam Hoon, ‘Status of the 2017 ROK Defense Budget and
Its Implications’, KIDA Defense Angle, issue 147, 19 January
2017, http://www.kida.re.kr/frt/board/frtPcrmBoard.do?se
archCondition=&searchKeyword=&pageIndex=2&depth=4
&sidx=366.
40 Northrop Grumman, ‘Korean Manufacturers Deliver
First Global Hawk Components’, 28 April 2016, https://
news.northropgrumman.com/news/releases/korean-
manufacturers-deliver-first-global-hawk-components.
41 Ministry of Strategy and Finance, ‘South Korea 2018
Budget’, see http://www.mosf.go.kr/pl/policydta/pblictn.
do?menuNo=5020300. ‘Non procurement’ includes
recruitment, maintenance and military administration;
‘procurement’ includes improvements to overall national
defence capabilities.
42 All data drawn from IISS, Military Balance+ database,
defence procurements section. article/64055/hanwha-techwin-to-acquire-stake-in-pratt-
43 ‘S. Korea’s Defense Budget to Rise 6.9 Pct in 2018’,
Yonhap News Agency, 29 August 2017, http://english.
yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2017/08/28/0200000000
AEN20170828013400315.html.
46 The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula
44 See, for instance, ‘The Daily Chart: The Global Shipping
Industry’s Woes’, The Economist, 9 September 2016, https://
www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/09/daily-
chart-6; and Akrur Barua and Anshu Mittal, ‘Shipping:
Sailing in Troubled Waters’, Global Economic Outlook, Q1
2017, Deloitte Insights, 14 February 2017, https://www2.
deloitte.com/insights/us/en/economy/global-economic-
outlook/2017/shipping-industry-crisis.html.
45 Jung Sung-Ki, ‘Hanwha Emerges as South Korea’s
Defense Giant’, Defense News, 26 July 2015, http://
www.defensenews.com/articles/hanwha-emerges-
as-south-koreas-defense-giant.
46 Jon Grevatt, ‘Hanwha Completes Acquisition of
Doosan DST’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 1 June 2016, http://
www.janes.com/article/60863/hanwha-completes-
acquisition-of-doosan-dst.
47 Andrew MacDonald, ‘Hanwha Techwin to Acquire Stake
in Pratt & Whitney’s Singapore Subsidiary’, Jane’s Defence
Industry, 23 September 2016, http://www.janes.com/
whitney-s-singapore-subsidiary.
48 Jon Grevatt, ‘Hanwha Group restructures defence activities
following acquisitions’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 19 October
2016, http://www.janes.com/article/64753/hanwha-group-
restructures-defence-activities-following-acquisitions.
Chapter three
US armed forces in
South Korea
Though much has changed in Northeast Asia since the
Korean Armistice Agreement was signed in July 1953,
US–North Korean enmity has endured despite efforts
to improve and normalise bilateral relations. Moreover,
and notwithstanding the meeting planned between the
US and North Korean leaders in June 2018, there is a
risk that relations between Washington and Pyongyang
could worsen and escalate into military conflict, given
the North’s policy orientation and strategy under leader
Kim Jong-un and the Trump administration’s hardline
posture.
Having come to South Korea’s aid in 1950 to repel the
North Korean invasion, US forces have remained on the
peninsula under a bilateral treaty signed at the end of
the war in 1953.1 The alliance has endured for over six
decades and, while there have been periodic episodes of
disagreement, it remains robust.2
The South Korea–US alliance these days is reinforced
by common democratic values3 and immediate con-
cerns of the alliance have recently focussed on North
Korean provocations, its ballistic-missile programme
and its development of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile,
South Korea is increasingly a contributor to interna-
tional security. Seoul has a vital interest in the security
of global trade and, as its capacity and military capabili-
ties have developed, has started to contribute a greater
share to international-security efforts, in collaboration
with the US and other partners.4 The alliance also has
become more credible through bilateral economic ties,
enhanced since the ratification of a bilateral free trade
agreement in November 2011.5
Around this time, the Obama administration was
unveiling plans for a ‘rebalance’ to Asia. Coming as
the US was drawing down its military presence in
Afghanistan and Iraq, the administration said the US
would ‘of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific
region’.6 US economic and security interests were, it
said, ‘inextricably linked’ to Asia.7 Since the end of the
Second World War, US engagement with East Asia has
been a consistent bipartisan objective, so the rebalance
was designed to build upon established foundations.8 It
was welcomed by those nations that had become con-
cerned about China’s growing military capabilities and
ambitions regarding the resolution of maritime territo-
rial disputes.
In Northeast Asia, the rebalance was intended to sig-
nal US resolve and the credibility of US alliance com-
mitments. However, unease in Japan and South Korea
was not completely assuaged because much of the
rebalance’s military component, in the form of naval
redeployments and agreements to pre-position assets,
was focused on Southeast Asia.9 In particular, the rebal-
ance called for the US Navy to deploy 60% of its assets
to the Pacific and Indian Ocean area,10 and for the Air
Force to increase its intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance capabilities in the region. Furthermore,
the Marine Corps will maintain about 2,500 personnel
on a rotational basis at Darwin, northern Australia as
US armed forces in South Korea 47
part of a rapid deployment Marine Air-Ground Task
Force.11
Recently, US President Donald Trump has been the
latest US leader to exhort US allies, in Europe as well
as East Asia, to do more for burden-sharing within alli-
ances. However, for some time, budget constraints and
political considerations have led the US to consider
ways of reducing the costs for forward deployments,
without undermining extended deterrence.
The result has been fewer of the permanent basing
arrangements that had long been the model for US
forces in Japan and South Korea, and more tempo-
rary ‘rotational’ deployments that coincide with joint,
combined, and multinational exercises. However,
this model ran counter to the intentions of the senior
command of United States Forces Korea (USFK) to
‘normalise’ deployments and increase the number of
family members accompanying personnel for two or
three years.12 A longer presence enhances interopera-
bility, but supporting families in South Korea of course
increases costs for the US. These costs are not offset by
South Korean contributions under the Special Measures
Agreement (SMA), under which South Korea has been
providing financial support for basing US forces in the
South.13 Amid pressure from the Trump administration
for greater burden-sharing over US overseas deploy-
ments, evident in relation to Europe as well as Asia,
negotiations began in March 2018 for the 10th Special
Measures Agreement, which is due to come into force
in 2019.14
On the other hand, costs can be reduced by consoli-
dating bases. This has the added benefit of helping to
alleviate friction with local civilians. In March 2002, the
US and South Korea signed, and subsequently amended,
the Land Partnership Plan (LPP) to reduce the number
of US military installations, returning some to Seoul for
civilian use. The LPP was designed to relocate US forces
based in locations between Seoul and the Demilitarised
Zone (DMZ) – essentially the 2nd Infantry Division
(2ID) – south to Pyeongtaek.15
Transferring Wartime Operational Control
In 2003, Seoul asked Washington to undertake a study
on transferring wartime operational control (OPCON)
of the ROK armed forces from the US to South Korea.16
48 The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula
The following year, both sides agreed to reduce the
number of US military personnel stationed in South
Korea from 37,000 to 25,000 by 2008.17 In 2007, they
agreed to implement the transfer of wartime OPCON
in 2012.18 In the early years of the Bush and Roh admin-
istrations, the interests of then-US defence secretary
Donald Rumsfeld and South Korea’s President Roh
Moo-hyun converged, even though the overall bilateral
relationship had become unsteady. Rumsfeld was seek-
ing greater flexibility to fight the ‘Global War on Terror’
while Roh wanted greater flexibility to engage with
North Korea and avoid any potential entrapment in US
conflicts.19
However, Rumsfeld’s planned reduction of US forces
in Korea was halted in 2008 by his successor, Robert
Gates. This left the number of military personnel at
around 28,500.20 Plans for base relocations and OPCON
transfer continued under the Obama administration,
although there were repeated delays over construction
costs and burden-sharing.21 The most visible element
of the base-reduction and consolidation effort is the
planned return of US Army Garrison (USAG) Yongsan,
which is located in the centre of Seoul. Once complete,
the relocation will have transferred about 9,000 US mili-
tary personnel to USAG Humphreys in Pyeongtaek,
approximately 65 kilometres south of Seoul. The plan
is to create two major USFK ‘hubs’ in Osan/Pyeongtaek
and Daegu, and five ‘enduring’ or permanent sites:
Busan Naval Base, USAG Humphreys, Kunsan Air
Base, Osan Air Base, and USAG Daegu.22
As plans were moving forward for OPCON transfer
and base consolidation, USFK commanders General
Burwell B. Bell (2006–08) and General Walter Sharp
(2008–11) believed the new basing facilities would ena-
ble more family members to accompany military per-
sonnel on longer deployments. General Sharp argued
that the accompanied tours would enhance the percep-
tion of US resolve and therefore strengthen the cred-
ibility of extended deterrence because the continual
presence of US citizens would make a US response to
any North Korean aggression virtually automatic.23
However, it was estimated that the number of depend-
ents and support personnel would increase to around
50,000 at USAG Humphreys alone, and the Senate
Armed Services Committee raised concerns over the
costs of the arrangement.24 Furthermore, some US sena-
tors and analysts have been concerned that clustering
military members and their families at two or three
large installations raises the risk of significant casualties
should conflict erupt, particularly given North Korea’s
increasingly accurate ballistic and cruise missiles.25 As
a result, in 2011 the Senate Armed Services Committee
declined to fund the ‘normalised’ three-year accompa-
nied tours envisioned by General Sharp.
Events in 2010 increased fears that deterrence
might fail, bringing the return of high-intensity con-
flict to the Korean peninsula. The sinking of the South
Korean corvette Cheonan in March and an artillery
attack against Yeonpyeong Island in November led
Seoul and Washington to reassess rules of engage-
ment, deployments, training, and strategies and tactics
for dealing with North Korean provocations.26 In June
2010, President Lee Myung-bak formally asked the US
to postpone the scheduled 2012 transfer of OPCON,
and President Obama agreed to a new target date of
December 2015.27 The two allies continued efforts to
meet the criteria required for the transfer of wartime
OPCON, but following the North’s third underground
nuclear test on 12 February and President Park Geun-
hye’s inauguration 13 days later, Seoul was having
second thoughts. Throughout 2013–14, there were per-
sistent rumors that the South would ask for another
postponement. The Park administration eventually
made a formal request, and the two sides agreed to an
indefinite postponement at the 46th US–South Korean
Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in October 2014.28
At the next SCM, in November 2015, both sides agreed
to a ‘Conditions-based Operational Control Transition
Plan’ (COT-P).29 In 2017 discussions proceeded on COT-
P, particularly relating to the organisational structure of
the future combined command. Once the transfer takes
place, a US officer will serve as deputy commander
of the combined command and as well as remaining
commander of United Nations Command (UNC) and
USFK.30 Current USFK commander, General Vincent
Brooks, also said – reflecting South Korea’s defence-
modernisation drive – that the ‘Alliance is prepared to
accelerate OPCON transition as South Korea continues
to develop and acquire the critical capabilities required
for the Alliance’s wartime success’.31
Reassuring South Korea
Rising threat perceptions pushed Seoul and Washington
to establish the Extended Deterrence Policy Committee
(EDPC) at the 42nd SCM in October 2010.32 The institu-
tionalisation of the EDPC, intended to discuss responses
to provocations from the North, has been instrumental
in reassuring South Korean officials when the North’s
nuclear developments prompted increased calls from
some South Koreans either for the US to redeploy tacti-
cal nuclear weapons to the peninsula, or for Seoul to
acquire its own nuclear deterrent.33
Further reassurance was provided when Seoul and
Washington signed a bilateral ‘counter-provocation
plan’ in March 2013. Although the details of the plan
are classified, it reportedly enables the South to respond
in self-defence to small-scale attacks such as the artillery
attack against Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010.34
South Korean officials have repeatedly said that mili-
tary attacks will be met with a robust kinetic response
against the source of the attack and possibly against
supporting units and command centers.35 However,
some US analysts privately worry whether some in
the South Korean armed forces might be over eager in
responses to provocations by the Korean People’s Army
(KPA); indeed, concerns have been privately expressed
within USFK over possible responses that might drive
escalation.36
The US also periodically provides security assur-
ances in the form of declaratory policies announced
during bilateral summits or other high-level meetings.
For example, at the 42nd SCM, Washington declared
that extended deterrence included ‘the full range of mil-
itary capabilities, to include the U.S. nuclear umbrella,
conventional strike, and missile defense capabilities’.37
The US envisions an increasing threat from ballistic
missiles and ‘weapons of mass destruction’ that could
give adversaries such as North Korea greater freedom
of action in attempts to undermine US security com-
mitments.38 The US has been looking to develop bal-
listic-missile defence (BMD) policy in the region based
around an integrated, ‘phased adaptive approach’
that addresses current missile threats and phases in
new BMD assets and capabilities as threats grow and
new BMD technologies become available.39 However,
Washington recognises that ‘regions differ in the range,
US armed forces in South Korea 49
volume, and technical sophistication of the existing and
potential threat’, a fact that has ‘important implications
for how phased adaptive approaches to missile defense
are applied in each regional context’.40 Implementing
the phased adaptive approach in each region will mean,
in effect, an approach that is ‘tailored to the threats
unique to that region’.41
On the Korean Peninsula, the US seeks to fulfil its
defence treaty obligations, to dissuade and deter mis-
sile attacks against US forces and allies, and to defeat
adversaries if deterrence fails. To achieve these objec-
tives on the peninsula and elsewhere, Washington
seeks cooperation with allies to reduce missile threats
through various means such as diplomacy and treaty
negotiations, sanctions and deterrence, while ‘partners
should be encouraged to invest in their own air and
missile defense capabilities that are interoperable with
[those of the US]’.42 In response to the North’s growing
nuclear and missile threats, the then-USFK commander
General Curtis Scaparrotti in June 2014 recommended
the deployment to South Korea of a Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile-defence bat-
tery.43 Seoul was reluctant to engage in a discussion
over THAAD due to concerns that such talks would
alienate China, which is South Korea’s largest trading
partner. (China had expressed opposition to the deploy-
ment on a number of occasions.) The US and South
Korea eventually began bilateral talks in March 2016
and in July, Seoul and Washington announced that a
THAAD battery would be deployed to Seongju County
THAAD missile-defence launcher trucks arrive at Osan Air Base in South Korea, 7 March 2017 (US DoD)
50 The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula
in North Gyeongsang Province, drawing protests from
local residents.44
An accelerating number of missile tests, and addi-
tional nuclear tests, by North Korea in 2017 led to fur-
ther US measures designed both to deter the North
and to reassure South Korea. Increasingly sharp rheto-
ric and threats were traded between Washington and
Pyongyang during the year. US President Donald
Trump deployed a number of stark warnings to North
Korea and its leadership over its missile and nuclear
activities, while more measured – though still robust
– language was also used by senior US military and
diplomatic leadership. Defence secretary Mattis repeat-
edly stressed that the US preferred a diplomatic solu-
tion, though complete and verifiable denuclearisation
of the peninsula was the overall objective. At the same
time, however, Mattis was saying that ‘I cannot imag-
ine a condition under which the United States would
accept North Korea as a nuclear power’.45 “Make no
mistake…’, Mattis said in October 2017, ‘…any attempt
on the United States or our allies will be defeated’, he
added. ‘Any use of nuclear weapons by the North will
be met by a massive military response – effective and
overwhelming.’46 Overflights and training activities by
advanced combat aircraft and bombers displayed both
US military strength and interoperability with ROK
forces; these included B-1 bombers and F-22 and F-35
combat aircraft. (For example, the latter two types flew
with ROK aircraft as part of the Vigilant Ace exercise
in December 2017.)47 In October 2017, the Ohio-class
guided missile submarine USS Michigan docked at
Busan, with the submarine displaying aft of the sail
what appeared to be dry deck shelters.48 Meanwhile, it
was announced in March 2017 that Gray Eagle weapons-
capable uninhabited air vehicles (UAVs) would be per-
manently deployed to Kunsan air base.49
That same month also saw the first elements of the
THAAD system arrive in South Korea. The general
level of South Korean political support for the THAAD
deployment remained modest for a year after agree-
ment to deploy the system was first reached. (China
remained opposed to the deployment, citing concerns
it had long expressed that the THAAD associated radar
system could be directed to monitor Chinese, instead of
North Korean, missile capabilities.) Indeed, the Moon
government halted the deployment of the last four out
of the system’s six THAAD launchers, citing the need
for an environmental impact study.
More missile launches by North Korea, particularly
the July 2017 launch of the North’s first ICBM, changed
the climate. This launch prompted a joint firing of
US ATACMS short-range ballistic missiles and South
Korean Hyeonmu II missiles, to demonstrate to the
North the precision-strike capabilities available to the
US-ROK alliance.50 North Korea’s ICBM launches (there
were two in July and one in November 2017), combined
with continuing high tension in mid-to-late 2017, led
to two important developments. The first was the deci-
sion to introduce the remaining four THAAD launch
vehicles to complete the system deployed in Seongju.51
(An environmental-impact assessment is understood
to still be underway, as of mid-2018.) The second was
the revision made to ROK–US ballistic-missile guid-
ance, agreed at the 49th Security Consultative meeting
in October 2017, which relaxed the restriction on Seoul
to only develop ballistic missiles with a range of 800 km
and a payload of 500 kilograms.
While there is much focus on land-based missile-
defence systems, sea-based systems also offer signifi-
cant capability. A principal capability resides in the US
Seventh Fleet’s Ballistic Missile Defense capabilities
based around its Ticonderoga cruisers and Arleigh Burke
destroyers. Both types house the Aegis battle-manage-
ment system and carry Raytheon Standard Missile inter-
ceptors. SM-3 missiles are capable of tackling short-,
CHINA
RUSSIA
NORTH
KOREA
SOUTH
KOREA
JAPAN
© IISS
Figure 9: Notional radar fan for THAAD missile-defence
system in the ROK. This details the range for a target having
a radar cross-section of one square metre. (An average human
body is about 1 m2; a warhead can vary from 0.03–1 m2,
depending on aspect angle.)
medium- and intermediate-range ballistic-missile threats,
while SM-2 interceptors (which is being replaced with
the more capable SM-6 models) are designed to defeat
aircraft, cruise missiles and short-range ballistic missiles.
Sea-based missile-defence assets are also held by Japan,
with its Kongou-class destroyers equipped with Aegis and
SM-3, as well as South Korea’s Sejong-class cruisers, with
Aegis and SM-2 (Block III A/B) interceptors.
Washington has called upon its allies in East Asia,
particularly Tokyo and Seoul, to cooperate in address-
ing the North’s growing missile capabilities.52 In
December 2014, despite domestic pressures and a
downturn in bilateral relations, Japan and South Korea
finally signed bilateral agreements with Washington
under which the three sides could share intelligence
on North Korean nuclear and missile capabilities.53 The
agreements are consistent with US efforts to enhance
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)
capabilities necessary to better address potential secu-
rity challenges through cooperation with multinational
partners.54 For the US, sufficient ISR capabilities are
necessary to conduct US–South Korean ‘comprehensive
US armed forces in South Korea 51

21
22
20
Figure 10: US dispositions in the Indo-Pacific – see following page for key
alliance counter-missile operations’, which are based
on a ‘4D strategy’ to detect, defend (against), disrupt,
and destroy the North’s missiles.55 ISR was first on the
list of General Brooks’s four capability challenges in
his 2017 testimony to Congress. The alliance counter-
missile posture also will depend upon Seoul’s devel-
opment and deployment of its Korean Air and Missile
Defense (KAMD) system (see p. 34) over the next dec-
ade. However, it is uncertain whether Seoul will be suc-
cessful in meeting development timelines, and if not,
whether the US will provide sufficient ISR, notwith-
standing the fact that overall missile-defence capability,
and associated systems including radar, increased in
2017 with the arrival of THAAD.
Meanwhile, November 2016 saw the first meeting
of the chiefs of defence of Japan, South Korea and the
US take place in Washington. In terms of this trilateral
defence relationship, missile defence – particularly
52 The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula
8
1314 18
16 6
17 15 10 11
7
Hawaii 12
9 (position not
shown on map)
24
23
26
5
25
19
information sharing and tracking – has in recent years
proven an area of progress. With its Pacific Dragon mis-
sile-defence exercises, for instance, the US Navy has
‘successfully exchanged data with Allied units from
Japan and the Republic of Korea’.56 Trilateral video con-
ferences now take place regularly, particularly in the
wake of North Korean military provocations. Indeed, as
these have increased in tempo there has been greater
urgency in bilateral efforts and ‘North Korean provo-
cations have resulted in greater consultation, missile
defense cooperation, and intelligence sharing between
Seoul and Tokyo’.57 In November 2016, Seoul and
Tokyo agreed to boost intelligence cooperation when
they signed a General Security of Military Information
agreement which, according to the US, will ‘expand the
information South Korea has available when respond-
ing to North Korean threats and will make significant
contributions to both Korean and Japanese security’.58
US dispositions in the Indo-Pacific – see map on previous page
Republic of Korea (28,500) Japan (47,250)
US Army 19,200 Yongsan Garrison USFK HQ (Yongsan, moving to Camp US Army (2,750) Camp Zama 6 I Corps (Fwd) HQ; 1 spec ops gp; 1 tpt hel bn;
13 , Camp Red Humphreys). 8th Army HQ at Camp 1 SAM bn; 2 BMD radar unit
Cloud/Casey Humphreys; 2ID HQ at Uijongbu: 1 armd bde US Navy (12,500) Sasebo NB 7 ; HQ US 7th Fleet at Yokosuka; 1 CVN; 3
14 , Camp 1 MRL bde; 1 MRL bn; 1 sigs bde; 1 int bde; Yokosuka NB 6 CGHM; 7 DDGM (2 non-op); 2 DDGHM; 4
Stanley, Camp 1 log bde; 1 hel bde; 1 atk hel bn; 1 AD bde; MCO; 1 LCC; 1 LHD; 1 LPD; 2 LSD;
Humphreys 1 THAAD bty NAF Atsugi: 1 FGA sqn (F/A-18E); 1 FGA sqn
US Navy 250 Busan naval 1 fleet activities HQ (F/A-18F); 2 ASW hel sqn (MH-60R); 1 hel
base (NB) 15 sqn (MH-60S)
US Air Force Osan air base 7th Air Force HQ (Osan AB); 1 atk sqn (Osan MCAS Iwakuni: 2 FGA sqn (F/A-18E); 1 EW
8,800 (AB) 16 ; Kunsan AB – A-10C); 2 FGA sqn (Kunsan AB – sqn (EA-18G); 1 AEW&C sqn (E-2D);
AB 17 F-16C/D); 1 FGA sqn (Osan AB – F-16C/D); 1 Misawa AB: 1 EW sqn (EA-18G); 2 ASW
ISR sqn (Osan AB – U-2S) sqn (P-8A);
US Marine Corps Camp Mujuk Marine Forces Korea Kadena AB: 1 ASW det (P-3C)
(USMC) 250 18 US Air Force Yokota AB 6 ; 5th Air Force HQ (Yokota AB): Misawa AB: 2
(12,000) Misawa AB 8 ; FGA sqn (F-16C/D)
Kadena AB 9 Kadena AB: 2 ftr sqn (F-15C/D); 1 tkr sqn
Thailand (320) (KC-135R); 1 AEW&C sqn (E-3B); 1 CSAR sqn
Joint Bangkok 21 Joint US Military Advisory Group Thailand (HH-60G); 1 spec ops sqn (MC-130H); 1 spec
ops sqn (MC-130J);
Yokota AB: 1 tpt sqn (C-130J-30); 1 tpt sqn
British Indian Ocean Territory (350 Joint, incl Army and Marines) (C-12J/UH-1N); 1 spec ops sqn (CV-22)
Strategic Forces 1 Spacetrack Optical Tracker at Diego USMC (20,000) MCB Camp 3rd Marine Division HQ (Camp Courtney);
Garcia; 1 ground based electro-optical deep Smedley D. 4th Marine Regiment HQ; 12th Marine
space surveillance system Butler 9 ; MCAS (Artillery) Regiment HQ; 1 recce bn; 1 mne
US Navy Naval Support 1 MPS sqn (MPS2) with 2 AKRH, 3 AKR, 1 Futenma 9 ; bn; 1 amph aslt bn; 1 arty bn;
Facility 1 AKEH, 1 ESD MCAS Iwakuni MCAS Iwakuni: 1 FGA sqn (F-35B); 1 FGA
US Air Force Incl. 730th AMS/Det 1 10 ; CATC Camp sqn (F/A-18D); 1 FGA sqn (F/A-18D); 1 tkr sqn
Fuji 11 (KC-130J);
MCAS Futenma: 2 tpt tilt-rotor sqn (MV-22B)
Singapore (200 Joint incl. Army and Marines)
US Navy Port of Singapore Authority Sembawang 20 ; Marshall Islands (20 Joint)
HQ Commander Logistics Group Western Pacific
(COMLOGWESTPAC/CTF 73); Military Sealift Command Far Strategic Forces Kwajelein Atoll 1 detection and tracking radar
East; Military Sealift Fleet Support Command Ship Support 19
Unit Singapore; Fleet Industrial Support Center, Detachment
Singapore; Changi NB 20 , most recent rotation of 2 littoral Guam (6,000)
combat ships completed in November 2017
US Army (1,250) 1 THAAD Bty; 1 ARNG Inf Bn
US Air Force Paya Lebar AB 20
Incl 730th AMS/Det 2; 497th Combat Training Squadron US Navy (2,000) Guam NB 5 4 SSGN; 2 AKRH; 4 AKR; 1 ESD; 1 AKEH;
Andersen AB: 1 hel sqn (MH-60S)

Hawaii (46,000) (not shown on map) US Air Force Andersen AB 5 1 expeditionary bbr sqn (B-52H); 1
US Army 22,000 US Army Pacific HQ (Fort Shafter); 25th Infantry (2,750) expeditionary tkr sqn (KC-135R); 1 ISR UAV
Garrison-Hawaii Division HQ (Schofield Barracks); 2 inf bde; det (RQ-4A)
12 1 engr bde; 1 sigs bde; 1 int bde; 1 log bde;
1 hel bde; 1 ARNG inf bde(-); 1 USAR cbt
Philippines (100 Joint)
spt bde
US Navy (8,500) JB Pearl Harbour HQ Pacific Fleet; 2 SSN; 16 SSGN; 1 CGHM; Agreed bases The Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (ECDA, April
- Hickam 12 3 DDGM; 6 DDGHM; MCAS Kanehoe Bay: 1 2016) allowed for permanent logistics facilities at Antonio
ASW trg sqn (P-3C); 1 USNR tpt sqn (C-20G); Bautista AB 22 , Basa AB 23 , Fort Magsaysay 24 , Lumbia
1 ASW hel sqn (MH-60R) AB 25 , Mactan-Benito Ebuen AB 26 to support rotational
deployments
US Air Force 1 tpt sqn (Hickam AB – C-37A/C-40B); 1 tpt
(8,000) sqn (Hickam AB – C-17A) w/ ANG associate US Air Force Since 2016, various US aircraft have deployed to Clark Air Base
sqn; 1 ANG ftr sqn (Hickam AB – F-22A) w/ for varying tasks, including A-10s, EA-18Gs and P-8s. A-10s
active associate sqn; 1 ANG tkr sqn (Hickam deployed again early in 2018 for Exercise Balikatan.
AB – KC-135R) w/ active associate sqn
USMC (7,500) Camp H.M Smith, 1 mne regt (one bn on rotation to Okinawa Australia (1,700)
MCB Hi 12 as at May 2018); 1 arty bn; 1 EW bn; MCAS
Strategic Forces Pine Gap 2 ; 1 SWES at Pine Gap; 1 SIGINT stn at Pine
Kanehoe Bay: 1 atk hel sqn ( AH-1Z/UH-1Y);
Naval Comms Gap; 1 detection and tracking radar at Naval
1 tpt hel sqn (CH-53E); MCB Hawaii: 1 UAV
Centre Harold E. Communication Station Harold E. Holt
ISR sqn ( RQ-7/RQ-21A)
Holt 3
USMC Darwin 4 1 marine bn(+); 1 aviation sqn(+)
Abbreviations

AD Air defence ARNG Army National Guard int Intelligence SIGINT Signals intelligence
AEW&C Airborne early warning & bbr Bomber LCC Amphibious command ship sigs Signals
control bde Brigade LHD Amphibious assault ship spt Support
AKEH Dry cargo/ammunition ship bn Battalion log Logistic sqn Squadron
AKR/H Roll-on/roll-off cargo ship/ bty Battery MCAS Marine Corps Air Station tkr Tanker
with hangar
cbt Combat MCO Mine countermeasures trg Training
AMS Air Mobility Squadron ocean
ESD Expeditionary transport USAR US Army Reserve
ANG Air National Guard dock recce Reconaissance USNR US Navy Reserve
armd Armoured

US armed forces in South Korea 53

 Bilateral consultative mechanisms within the US–
ROK alliance framework include the Security Policy
Initiative, the EDPC and the Conditions-based OPCON
Transition Working Group, which are organised in the
context of the Korea–US Integrated Defense Dialogue.59
Until 2015, the bilateral Counter-Missile Capability
Committee coordinated bilateral BMD policy details
in a working-group format, until it and the EDPC were
merged to form the Deterrence Strategy Committee.
Other bilateral forums established in recent years
include the Cyber Cooperation Working Group, set
up in 2013, and the Defense Technology Strategy and
Cooperation Group, which first met in July 2016.60
December 2016 saw the first meeting of the Extended
Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG).
The meeting gauged, among other factors, ‘how to bet-
ter leverage the full breadth of national power – using
diplomacy, information, military, and economic ele-
ments’ in order to better deter North Korea.61 In 2017,
Trump and Moon agreed that the EDSCG would meet
annually.
In general, the alliance’s long history and institutional
depth provide a foundation to sustain it into a future
that will be influenced by China’s rise, possible Korean
reunification, and other geopolitical shifts in the region.
If the region’s security architecture is transformed into
a multilateral framework, Washington’s alliance with
Seoul and other regional partners could place the US in a
good position to play an influential role in the new secu-
rity architecture. The surprising decision in early 2018 by
North Korea to diplomatically engage with the US and
South Korea has had little impact on US forces in Korea,
apart from a suspension of bilateral exercises during
the 2018 Winter Olympics, held in South Korea and to
which North Korea sent a delegation. However, reports
that Trump had in early 2018 requested options for with-
drawing some of the US troops in South Korea indicated
that much could change for the US military presence in
South Korea, even though analysts detected in this move
Trump’s oft-expressed concern that host nations should
meet more of the cost of US deployments.62
USFK Priorities
In April 2015, then-head of USFK General Curtis
Scaparrotti testified before Congress and expounded
54 The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula
on USFK priorities for the year.63 Scaparrotti’s top four
priorities, repeated in Congress in February 2016 (just
before he departed to lead US European Command)
were to:
1. sustain and strengthen the US–South Korea
alliance;
2. maintain the armistice;
3. transform the alliance; and
4. sustain the force and enhance the UNC/Combined
Forces Command (CFC)/USFK team.
General Scaparrotti said that the alliance had been
strengthened by the establishment of a combined
ROK–US division.64 This division was activated in June
2015 and will be headquartered at Camp Red Cloud
north of Seoul until moved to USAG Humphreys as
part of base relocation plans.65 To enhance deterrence,
the USFK seeks to build and maintain strong relation-
ships with its South Korean counterparts that allow
it to fulfil its motto to ‘be ready to fight tonight’. In
his 2016 testimony, Scaparrotti gave further informa-
tion. The 2nd Infantry Division, long based in South
Korea, was now a combined division, ‘integrating
over 40 ROK Army officers into the 2ID headquarters
… in addition, a ROK Army mechanized brigade will
habitually train with the Combined Division’s units
to develop shared capabilities’.66 In fact, there is a sig-
nificant amount of combined military training across
all capability areas.
USFK’s second priority, which is dependent on the
first, is to maintain the Korean War armistice. The armi-
stice is not a peace treaty but a ceasefire agreement
between the commanders of the UNC, the KPA, and the
Chinese People’s Volunteers. In July 1953, the armistice
signatories recommended that political representatives
from both sides meet within three months to resolve
peacefully the issues surrounding national division and
the war. However, to date little political progress has
been made, so peace and stability depend for the time
being on the balance of military forces and extended
deterrence. USFK will deploy assets and train personnel
so that deterrence can be tailored to respond to specific
contingencies, including small-scale provocations and
limited military engagements.67
 Broadly speaking, these priorities remain in place.
However, North Korea’s activities in 2016 and 2017,
particularly its nuclear tests and accelerating missile
developments in 2017 prompted a change in tone and
emphasis from USFK commanders. In his 2017 testi-
mony, General Brooks said that the North’s actions had
prompted a review. While the US–ROK alliance had
proven strong, he said, US deterrence activities aimed
at the North had ‘proven insufficient to deter the broad-
ening threats (particularly intermediate and intercon-
tinental ballistic missiles, and a weaponized nuclear
capability) to our northeast Asian allies, South Korea
and Japan, as well as the U.S. homeland and territo-
ries’. He highlighted a series of high-profile US military
moves, including strategic-bomber overflights, carrier
battle group and submarine deployments and bolstered
US missile defences, as sending a ‘persistent, deter-
rent message to the North while assuring our allies of
our committed presence and our extended deterrence
beyond the forward presence’.68 These exercises have
included a growing range of advanced US military
equipment, including on occasion fifth-generation F-22
and F-35 combat aircraft, intended as a deterrent mes-
sage to North Korea.
As the base-relocation plans move forward and the
US armed forces acquire a smaller ‘footprint’ that makes
deployments more politically sustainable, USFK is
introducing more rotational deployments. The previous
arrangement was to station units permanently in Korea
and to assign individuals for one-to-two-year tours.
Now USFK rotates entire units from the US, where they
have already developed and maintained unit cohesion.
A prime example of this model was the deactivation of
the 2ID’s 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT)
in July 2015 and its immediate replacement with the 1st
Calvary Division’s 2nd ABCT from Fort Hood, Texas.69
This unit was then replaced in February 2016 by the 1st
ABCT from the same division and it was announced in
late 2017 that the next rotation would be of the 1st ABCT
from the 3rd Infantry Division (3ID).
USFK Order of Battle and Chain of
Command
In accordance with the US constitution and statutes,
the military chain of command runs from the president
to the secretary of defense, and then to the Unified
Combatant Commands.70 USFK is a sub-unified com-
mand of US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM),
until recently named Pacific Command (PACOM) and
headed by Admiral Harry Harris.71 This command’s
area of responsibility stretches from the Pacific Ocean to
the eastern Indian Ocean.72 USFK Commander General
Vincent Brooks reports to Harris’s successor, Admiral
Philip Davidson. However, the USFK Commander also
is the commander of the Combined (US–South Korean)
Forces Command (CFC) and the United Nations
Command (UNC). The UNC Commander can bypass
the commander of Indo-Pacific Command and report
directly to the secretary of defence, if necessary, to deal
with UNC-related multinational issues.73
US Forces Korea is the joint headquarters for all US
military operations in Korea. Traditionally, the com-
mander is a four-star army general with a US Air Force
three-star general as his deputy. The commander is
supported by assistant chiefs of staff, organised in the
familiar Western functional areas of:
J1 – Personnel and Manpower
J2 – Intelligence
J3 – Operations
J4 – Logistics
J5 – Strategic Plans and Policy
J6 – Command, Control, Communications and
Computers/Cyber
J8 – Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment
Engineering
However, USFK organisation differs from that
traditionally seen in the US armed forces, with the
staff organisation including an assistant chief of staff
engineer instead of an assistant chief of staff (J7) for
Operational Plans and Joint Force Development.
US Army
All US Army forces in Korea – numbering just over
19,000 – fall under the command of the US Eighth
Army. Headquarters relocated to USAG Humphreys
from USAG Yongsan in Seoul in July 2017 as part of
the relocation plan. The Eighth Army’s principal units
are:
US armed forces in South Korea 55
 2nd Infantry Division (2ID)
19th Expeditionary Sustainment Command (19th
ESC)
1st Signal Brigade
35th Air Defense Artillery Brigade
501st Military Intelligence Brigade
US Eighth Army
The 19th ESC, headquartered at USAG Daegu, pro-
vides logistic support to the Eighth Army. It maintains
14 logistics sites in the south of the country, and in
case of conflict would coordinate the evacuation of US
non-combatants and begin the reception, staging and
onward movement of incoming personnel.
Figure 11: US Eighth Army order of battle (May 2018)
2ID is the last US Army division to be permanently
deployed abroad. Its headquarters is at Camp Red Cloud
in Uijongbu, about 20 km north of Seoul. Its principal
installations include Camp Red Cloud, Camp Casey,
Camp Hovey, and Camp Stanley, which together con-
stitute USAG Red Cloud/Casey. Other 2ID installations
are K-16 (Seoul Air Base) on the southeastern outskirts
of Seoul, and USAG Humphreys.
The division’s principal units are:
Div HQ – Camp Red Cloud
HQ 1st ABCT, 3rd Infantry Division (3ID), (USAG
Red Cloud/Casey)
5-7th Cavalry (Camp Hovey)
3-69th Armor (Camp Casey)
1-64th Armor (Camp Humphreys)

US EIGHTH ARMY
HQ

2 ID HQ 1 501 MI 65 35
P

P
2-1 ADA
19
3ID
1 ABCT 2 210
(Rotational)
6-52 ADA

A 2 T
5-7 CAV 4-2 ARB 6-37 FA D Bty 2-ADA
M (THAAD)

R 6-6 CAV
3-69 ARM (Rotational) 1-38 FA

HQ MI

U
1-64 ARM 2-2 AHB Headquarters Military Signals Medical
M 2-20 FA intelligence
(Rotational)

U
2-7 INF 3-2 GSB
M Combat service
SP artillery Artillery Rocket
launcher support

SPT
CBT
1-41 FA 602 ASB

Air defence Armoured Armoured Combat

infantry reconnaissance engineer
CBT
10 BEB
SPT BSB

Helicopters Fixed-wing Transport Support Brigade support

aircraft and supply battalion
BSB 3 BSB

Army Corps Division Brigade Bty/coy Battalion

56 The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula

 2-7th Infantry (Camp Casey)
1-41st Field Artillery (Camp Casey)
10th Brigade Engineering Battalion (Camp Casey)
3rd Brigade Support Battalion (Camp Casey)
2nd Combat Aviation Brigade (HQ USAG
Humphreys)
• 602nd Aviation Support Battalion (USAG
Humphreys)
• 4th Aerial Reconnaissance Battalion (Attack),
2nd Aviation Regiment (USAG Humphreys and
K-16, Seoul Air Base)
• 2nd Battalion (Assault), 2nd Aviation Regiment
(USAG Humphreys and K-16, Seoul Air Base)
• 3rd General Support Aviation Battalion (USAG
Humphreys)
• 6-6th Cavalry Squadron (Rotational Unit, to
USAG Humphreys)
• Unspecified unit with Gray Eagle UAVs, at
Kunsan Air Base.74
2nd Sustainment Brigade (Camp Carroll)
210th Field Artillery Brigade (Camp Casey)
• 1-38th Field Artillery Regiment (Camp Casey)
• 6-37th Field Artillery Regiment (Camp Casey)
• 2-20th Field Artillery Regiment (Rotational)
• 70th Brigade Support Battalion (Camp Casey)
23rd Chemical Battalion (Camp Stanley)
35th Air Defense Artillery Brigade ence in South Korea with only about 250 permanently
• D Battery, 2nd Air Defense Artillery Battalion,
equipped with THAAD.
• 2-1st Air Defense Artillery Regiment (Patriot)
(based out of Camp Carroll)
• 6-52nd Air Defense Artillery Regiment The 6-52
ADA comprises Patriot units based out of Suwon
Air Base, with the exception of E Battery, which
is equipped with the Avenger short-range air-
defence system, is based out of Camp Casey and
is attached to the 210th Field Artillery Brigade.75
US Air Force
The US 7th Air Force has nearly 9,000 personnel, mostly
stationed at Osan Air Base and Kunsan Air Base. Osan
Air Base is the home of the 7th Air Force Headquarters
element and the 51st Fighter Wing, which is the most
forward deployed permanent US Air Force unit. The
51st Fighter Wing has 24 primary assigned aircraft,
7 AF HQ
8 FW Kunsan AB 51 FW Osan AB
35 FS (F-16C/D) 25 FS (A-10C)
80 FS (F-16C/D) 36 FS (F-16C/D)
For key see Figure 11
5 RS (U-2)
Figure 12: US 7th Air Force order of battle
including F-16C/D Fighting Falcon fighter/ground-
attack (FGA) aircraft and A-10 Thunderbolt II close-air
support and ground-attack aircraft. The wing’s 36th
Fighter Squadron operates the F-16 and the 25th Fighter
Squadron operates the A-10. Meanwhile, the 8th Fighter
Wing at Kunsan Air Base is home to the 35th Fighter
Squadron and the 80th Fighter Squadron: both of these
units operate F-16C/D FGA aircraft.
US Navy
US Naval Forces Korea (USNFK) have a small pres-
assigned personnel. The headquarters are currently at
Busan Naval Operations Base, where they are co-located
with South Korean Fleet headquarters.
US Marine Corps
US Marine Corps Forces Korea (MARFORK) have a
small presence in South Korea with one installation and
about 250 Marines permanently assigned. US Marine
Corps Base Camp Mujuk is located just outside the port
city of Pohang in North Kyongsang Province, about
100 km north of Busan.
Special Forces
The USFK commander has operational control of US
Special Operations Command Korea (SOCKOR), which
is a Sub-Unified Command under US Special Operations
Command (USSOCOM). USSOCOM delegated opera-
tional control of SOCKOR to the USINDOPACOM
US armed forces in South Korea 57
 Korea
Bay

NORTH KORE A

1 2
Chunchon
3
4
GANGWON
5
INCHEON
Yellow Sea/ Seoul 6 Pyeongchang
West Sea GYEONGGI

7 Sea of Japan
NORTH
Major US bases in South Korea 8 Pyongtaek (East Sea)
CHUNGCHEONG
1 Camp Casey (Dongducheon)
2 Camp Hovey SOUTH SOUTH KOREA
CHUNGCHEONG
3 Camp Red Cloud (Uijongbu)
SEJONG
4 Camp Stanley Chungju
5 Yongsan Garrison (Seoul) DAEJEON
NORTH KYONGSANG
6 K-16 (Seoul Air Base)
Taejon
7 Osan Air Base (Osan) 10

8 Humphreys Garrison (Pyeongtaek) 9 DAEGU 14

11 12
9 Kunsan Air Base (Kunsan) Chonju 13 Daegu
NORTH
10 Camp Carroll (Waegwan) JEOLLA
11 Camp George (Daegu) ULSAN

12 Camp Walker (Daegu) SOUTH KYONGSANG

13 Camp Henry (Daegu) BUSAN
Gwangju
14 Camp Mujuk GWANGJU 15 Busan
16
15 Chinhae Navy Base
16 Busan Navy Base SOUTH
JEOLLA
US Army 2nd Infantry Division Bases

Korea Strait

62 miles

100 km

Figure 13: Major US bases in South Korea

commander who in turn delegated operational control near K-16 (Seoul Air Base). SOCKOR and the SWC have
to the USFK commander. SOCKOR trains with South established a Combined Unconventional Warfare Task
Korea’s Special Warfare Command (SWC), which is Force to train, plan, and assess needs for combined spe-
headquartered in the southeastern outskirts of Seoul cial-forces operations should conflict break out.

Notes
1 The ‘Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea’ was signed on 1 October 1953 and

58 The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula

 ratified by the US Senate on 17 November 1954. The treaty
commits both parties to collective defence in case either
comes under armed attack.
2 For example, the Kennedy administration viewed the short-
lived Second Republic under Chang Myon as inept and
Kennedy was uncomfortable dealing with Park Chong-hui
because Park came to power through a military coup d’état.
Park resented the Johnson administration’s failure to retali-
ate against North Korea for the capture of the USS Pueblo
and the Blue House raid in January 1968. When President
Richard Nixon announced his Guam Doctrine to reduce the
role of US manpower in its alliances and to increase the bur-
den-sharing of allies, Park initiated programmes to develop
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. In the Carter years,
the bilateral relationship was strained by human-rights
abuses during the Park era. During the 1980s, the Gwangju
uprising, South Korea’s failure to democratise, and trade
friction caused bilateral turbulence. Relations improved
in the 1990s, but the alliance was tested when friction
emerged between the administration of George W. Bush
and the governments of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Mu-hyun.
Polling released in 2014 showed nearly the highest ever
support in South Korea for the alliance. See Choi Kang et
al., ‘South Korean Attitudes on the Korea-US Alliance and
Northeast Asia’, 24 April 2014, Asan Institute for Policy
Studies, http://en.asaninst.org/contents/asan-report-south-
korean-attitudes-on-the-korea-us-alliance-and-northeast-
asia/. Meanwhile, two years later, in a 2016 poll, South
Korea recorded ‘the highest net percentage […] favouring
the positive influence of the United States in the region’:
see Simon Jackman et al., ‘The Asian Research Network:
Survey on America’s role in the Asia-Pacific’, United States
Studies Centre at the University of Sydney, June 2016,
http://en.asaninst.org/wp-content/themes/twentythirteen/
action/dl.php?id=38365.
3 In 2009, the Lee Myung-bak administration articulated
bilateral values and interests, as well as the global scope
of South Korea’s national security strategy. In his Berlin
speech of 6 July 2017, and in the summit declaration at
Panmunjom in April 2018, President Moon Jae-in set high
goals for the future of the peninsula, and he has also care-
fully navigated alliance relations with the US, not least in
order to keep the June 2018 summit on schedule.
4 In particular, South Korea has begun to play a greater
role in the following areas: UN peacekeeping operations,
nonproliferation and counter- proliferation, counter-terror-
ism, counter-piracy, climate change, and sustainable devel-
opment. Daniel A. Pinkston, ‘Korea’s Capacity Building
and Support for International Security Cooperation’, in
Republic of Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Korea in
the World: Promoting Mutual Understanding and Global
Partnerships’, 2014, http://www.geschkult.fu-berlin.de/e/
oas/korea-studien/files/2015/Korea-in-the-World-Final-
Document.pdf, pp. 83–104. To illustrate this, South Korea
maintained from 2014–18 over 600 personnel on UN peace-
keeping deployments, principally to UNIFIL in Lebanon
and UNMISS in South Sudan. See UN statistics at https://
peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors.
5 The bilateral free-trade agreement (FTA) entered into force
in March 2012, although the agreement was revised in
March 2018 following concerns expressed by US President
Donald Trump. Greater economic integration raises the
cost of conflict since any outbreak would negatively affect
the gains from trade and investment. Therefore, economic
integration can enhance the credibility of alliance commit-
ments. Joanne Gowa, Allies, Adversaries, and International
Trade (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).
For details on the ROK-US free trade agreement, see
Brock R. Williams et al., ‘The U.S.-South Korea Free Trade
Agreement (KORUS FTA): Provisions and Implementation’,
Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report RL34330, 16
September 2014.
6 ‘We’re back: America reaches a pivot point in Asia,’ The
Economist, 19 November 2011, https://www.economist.
com/node/21538803.
7 US Department of Defense, ‘Sustaining U.S. Global
Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,’ Defense
Strategic Guidance, January 2012, p. 2, http://archive.
defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf.
8 Mark E. Manyin, Stephen Daggett, Ben Dolven, Susan V.
Lawrence, Michael F. Martin, Ronald O’Rourke, and Bruce
Vaughn, ‘Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s
“Rebalancing” Toward Asia’, CRS Report R42448, 28 March
2012.
9 For reference to this ‘unease’, see Jeffrey W. Hornung,
‘Tokyo’s View of the U.S. Rebalance’, Asia-Pacific Center
for Security Studies, 9 April 2014, http://apcss.org/
editorial-tokyos-view-of-the-u-s-rebalance/; Dingding
Chen, ‘4 Reasons Why Japan (Still) Doubts US Security
US armed forces in South Korea 59
 Assurances’, Diplomat, 29 April 2014, http://thediplomat.
com/2014/04/4-reasons-why-japan-still-doubts-us-security-
assurances/; Kang Choi, ‘Advice from a Good Friend: A
South Korean View on the US Rebalancing’, Global Asia,
vol. 7, no. 4, Winter 2012; Brad Glosserman and Scott A.
Snyder, The Japan–South Korea Identity Clash (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2015). Some observers ques-
tioned Washington’s commitment to the rebalance in the
shadow of US domestic politics that included the failure
to pass a national budget, a ‘government shutdown’, and
defence budget cuts triggered by the Budget Control Act
of 2011 mandating austerity measures or ‘sequestration’;
see US Department of Defense, ‘Quadrennial Defense
Review 2014’, p. 27, http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014_
Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf.
10 Jim Garamone, ‘Carter Discusses U.S. Rebalance to Asia-
Pacific Region’, 6 April 2015, http://www.defense.gov/
News-Article-View/Article/604414/.
11 US Department of Defense, ‘Quadrennial Defense Review
2014’, p. 34.
12 Unaccompanied military personnel normally serve one-
year tours in Korea, which has led to criticism that new-
comers need to be trained every year to become used to
mission requirements: see Ashley Rowland, ‘“Tour nor-
malization”’ begins in South Korea’, Stars and Stripes,
11 December 2008, https://www.stripes.com/news/
tour-normalization-begins-in-south-korea-1.86114.
13 South Korea provides financial support for the basing of US
forces in Korea under Special Measures Agreements (SMAs),
which are designed to cover most of the local costs – such as
utilities and salaries – for South Korean civilian employees
at US military bases. South Korean critics have asserted that
the funds could be diverted for other uses, while US critics
claim the South’s financial support is insufficient and has
not kept pace with rising military costs. Mark E. Manyin
et al., ‘U.S.-South Korea Relations’, CRS Report R41481, 24
June 2014, p.  17. According to General Brooks’ testimony
before the House Armed Services Committee in February
2018, ‘the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) provided
[in 2017] approximately $830 million in support of USFK
activities that would have otherwise been paid by the U.S.
Treasury, and the ROK Government recently approved a
1.9 percent increase to the SMA for 2018. South Korea is
also funding 92 percent of the total costs for the expansion,
construction and relocation effort into U.S. Army Garrison
60 The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula
Humphreys in the city of Pyeongtaek’. See ‘Statement of
General Vincent K Brooks, Commander, United Nations
Command; Republic of Korea and United States Combined
Forces Command and United States Forces Korea, in
Support of Commander United States Pacific Command,
Testimony Before the House Armed Services Committee’,
14 February 2018, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/
AS00/20180214/106847/HHRG-115-AS00-20180214-SD002.
pdf.
14 US Department of State, ‘U.S.-Republic of Korea Special
Measures Agreement Consultations’, 5 March 2018, https://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/03/279031.htm.
15 US Department of State, ‘Agreement between the United
States and the Republic of Korea Amending the Agreement
between the United States and the Republic of Korea for the
Land Partnership Plan of March 29, 2002,’ 26 October 2004,
http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/95890.
pdf.
16 As the two sides began to review the issue of OPCON trans-
fer, the US transferred 10 military missions to South Korea
in 2003 to begin the process. James M. Minnich, ‘The Year
2012: South Korea’s Resumption of Wartime Operational
Control,’ Military Review, May-June 2011.
17 Manyin et al., ‘U.S.-South Korea Relations’, p. 17.
18 During the Korean War, South Korea and the allied troop
contributing countries placed their personnel under the
operational control of the United Nations Command
(UNC) commander, an American four-star general, in order
to maintain unity of command. Until the transfer of war-
time operational control (OPCON), if the armistice were
to collapse, the South Korean and US armed forces would
conduct operations under the command of the Combined
Forces Command (CFC) led by an American four-star gen-
eral and his South Korean four-star deputy commander.
19 South Korea has upheld its end of the mutual-defence
treaty with the US in the past by sending combat troops to
Vietnam, and President Roh agreed to send military forces
(subject to National Assembly approval) to Iraq to join the
coalition that toppled Saddam Hussein in 2003. However,
the Bush doctrine of preemption increased South Korean
fears of entrapment, leading Roh to issue a controversial
statement regarding his desire for South Korea to play the
role of a ‘balancer in Northeast Asia’.
20 Manyin et al., ‘U.S.-South Korea Relations’, p. 15.
21 The original plan was to relocate USAG Yongsan to
 Pyongtaek by 2008, but the target date was revised to 2012.
Construction costs at USAG Humphreys have surpassed
US$10 billion and construction continued in early 2018.
See Kim Gamel, ‘US Forces Korea plans to dedicate new
headquarters in late June’, Stars and Stripes, 16 April 2018,
https://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/us-forces-korea-
plans-to-dedicate-new-headquarters-in-late-june-1.522341.
22 US Naval Forces Korea had been located in Chinhae, but
moved to a new facility in nearby Busan by mid-decade.
Manyin et al., ‘U.S.-South Korea Relations’, p. 15.
23 Ashley Rowland, ‘“Tour normalization” begins in South
Korea’.
24 Manyin et al., ‘U.S.-South Korea Relations’, p. 16.
25 Travis J. Tritten, ‘Senate panel blocks funding for major
military projects in Pacific,’ Stars and Stripes, 15 June 2011;
‘Senators Throw Cold Water on USFK Normalization Plan’,
Chosun-ilbo, 20 June 2011.
26 International Crisis Group, ‘North Korea: The Risks of
War in the Yellow Sea,’ 23 December 2010, https://www.
crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/korean-peninsula/
north-korea-risks-war-yellow-sea.
27 Lee Chi-dong, ‘Obama gives political “gift” to Seoul, may
hope for trade deal in return’, Yonhap News Agency, 26
June 2010, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/n_northkor
ea/2010/06/27/25/4301000000AEN20100627002500315F.
HTML.
28 ‘Joint Communiqué: The 46th ROK-U.S. Security
Consultative Meeting’, 23 October 2014, http://english.yon-
hapnews.co.kr/news/2014/10/23/37/0200000000AEN201410
23004900315F.html.
29 US Forces Korea, ‘Full text of 47th ROK-U.S.
Joint Communique‘, 1 November 2015, http://
www.usfk.mil/Media/News/Article/626859/
full-text-of-47th-rok-us-joint-communique/.
30 ‘Statement of General Vincent K. Brooks’, 14 February 2018.
31 Ibid.
32 Kwon Hyuk-chul, ‘S. Korea–U.S. to organize a joint com-
mittee for extending nuclear deterrence’, Hankyoreh,
9 October 2010, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/eng-
lish_edition/e_northkorea/443035.html; Cheon Seong
Whun, ‘The Significance of Forming a ROK-US Extended
Deterrence Policy Committee’, Korea Institute for National
Unification, November 2010, http://repo.kinu.or.kr/bit-
stream/2015.oak/1686/1/0001447606.pdf; Jeffrey Lewis,
‘Extended Deterrence Policy Committee’, Arms Control
Wonk Blog, 19 October 2010, http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.
com/archive/3057/extended-deterrence-policy-committee.
33 On the debate over South Korea’s options in this regard, see
Mark Fitzpatrick, Asia’s Latent Nuclear Powers: Japan, South
Korea and Taiwan, Adelphi 455, (Abingdon: Routledge for the
IISS, 2016), pp. 17–63.
34 Ashley Rowland, ‘US, South Korea agree on response plan
if North Korea attacks’, Stars and Stripes, 24 March 2013,
http://www.stripes.com/news/us-south-korea-agree-on-
response-plan-if-north-korea-attacks-1.213210.
35 Vincent A. Manzo, ‘After the First Shots: Managing
Escalation in Northeast Asia’, Joint Force Quarterly, no.
77, April 2015, p. 94; ‘Defense chief Han vows retaliation
against N. Korean provocations’, Yonhap News Agency, 29
June 2015, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2015/06/
29/0200000000AEN20150629002800315.html.
36 Author interviews.
37 Ian E. Rinehart, Steven A. Hildreth and Susan V. Lawrence,
‘Ballistic Missile Defense in the Asia-Pacific Region:
Cooperation and Opposition’, CRS Report R43116, 3 April
2015, pp. 1–2, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43116.
pdf.
38 US Department of Defense, ‘Sustaining U.S. Global
Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense’, January
2012, p. 3 http://archive.defense.gov/news/Defense_
Strategic_Guidance.pdf.
39 Rinehart, Hildreth and Lawrence, ‘Ballistic Missile Defense
in the Asia-Pacific Region: Cooperation and Opposition’,
p. 2. The phased adaptive approach is not unique in its
application to the Korean Peninsula; it is also the terminol-
ogy applied to the missile-defence architecture in Europe,
deployed to tackle extra-regional threats from actors in the
Middle East.
40 US Department of Defense, ‘Ballistic Missile Defense
Review Report’, February 2010, p. 25, http://archive.defense.
gov/bmdr/docs/BMDR%20as%20of%2026JAN10%200630_
for%20web.pdf.
41 US Department of Defense, ‘Ballistic Missile Defense
Review Report’, p. 23. In May 2017, Secretary of Defense
James Mattis directed the Department of Defense to begin
a new Ballistic Missile Defense Review. Due to run concur-
rently with the administration’s Nuclear Posture Review,
the new BMDR had not yet emerged as of June 2018. See
US Department of Defense, ‘Pentagon Announces Start
of Ballistic Missile Defense Review’, 5 May 2017, https://
US armed forces in South Korea 61
 www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1174502/penta-
gon-announces-start-of-ballistic-missile-defensereview/.
42 US Department of Defense, ‘Ballistic Missile Defense Review
Report’, p. 26; US Joint Chiefs of Staff, ‘Joint Integrated Air
and Missile Defense: Vision 2020’, 5 December 2013, pp. 3,
5, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/
JointIAMDVision2020.pdf.
43 ‘U.S. troop leader in South Korea wants deploy-
ment of new missile defense against North’, Reuters,
2 June 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
southkorea-missile-idUSKBN0EE09120140603.
44 Shannon Tiezzi, ‘It’s Official: US, South Korea Begin
Talks on THAAD’, Diplomat, 5 March 2016, https://the-
diplomat.com/2016/03/its-official-us-south-korea-begin-
talks-on-thaad/; Jack Kim and Ju-min Park, ‘South Korea
chooses site of THAAD U.S. missile system amid protests’,
Reuters, 13 July 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-northkorea-southkorea-thaad-idUSKCN0ZT03F.
45 Jim Garamone, ‘Mattis: U.S. Will Not Accept Nuclear-Armed
North Korea’, US Department of Defense, 28 October 2017,
https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1356734/
mattis-us-will-not-accept-nuclear-armed-north-korea/.
46 Ibid.
47 Staff Sgt. Alex Fox Echols III, ‘Exercise Vigilant Ace 18
Kicks Off’, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, 4 December 2017,
http://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/
Article/1387631/exercise-vigilant-ace-18-kicks-off/.
48 Dry deck shelters like these have been linked with capabili-
ties including for special forces operations.
49 United States Forces Korea, ‘Gray Eagle Unmanned Aerial
System company comes to Korean Peninsula’, 12 March
2017, http://www.usfk.mil/Media/News/Article/1110584/
gray-eagle-unmanned-aerial-system-company-comes-to-
korean-peninsula/.
50 Terri Moon Cronk, ‘U.S., South Korea Conduct Exercise
Following North Korean Missile Launch’, US Department
of Defense, 5 July 2017, https://www.defense.gov/News/
Article/Article/1237914/us-south-korea-conduct-exercise-
following-north-korean-missile-launch/.
51 ‘Moon orders more THAAD launchers to
deployed‘, Yonhap News Agency, 29 July 2017, http://
english.yonhapnews.co.kr/search1/2603000000.
html?cid=AEN20170729001251315.
52 Rinehart, Hildreth and Lawrence, ‘Ballistic Missile Defense
in the Asia-Pacific Region: Cooperation and Opposition’,
62 The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula
pp. 9–14.
53 The agreement was signed on 23 and 26 December 2014,
and it provides for information sharing on DPRK nuclear
and missile threats. ‘S.Korea, Japan, US intelligence-shar-
ing pact takes effect’, China Daily, 29 December 2014.
54 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, ‘Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance: Joint Force 2020’, June 2014, http://www.
jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/cjcs_wp_
isr.pdf?ver=2017-12-28-162054-447.
55 US Forces Korea, ‘Strategic Digest 2015’, pp. 21–24,
http://www.usfk.mil/Portals/105/Documents/Strategic_
Digest_2015_Eng.pdf.
56 Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation,
US Department of Defense, ‘FY 2016 Ballistic Missile
Defense Systems, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (aegis
BMD)’, http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY2016/pdf/
bmds/2016aegisbmd.pdf.
57 ‘Statement of General Vincent K Brooks, Commander,
United Nations Command; Republic of Korea and United
States Combined Forces Command and United States
Forces Korea, in Support of Commander United States
Pacific Command, Testimony Before the Senate Armed
Services Committee’, 27 April 2017, p.5, https://www.
armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2017%20
USFK%20Posture%20Statement%20FINAL%20SASC_04-
27-17.pdf.
58 Ibid, p. 7.
59 ‘Joint Communiqué: The 46th ROK-U.S. Security
Consultative Meeting’. The Security Policy Initiative was
established in 2004 to facilitate high-level security consul-
tations, at the same time as agreement was reached on the
relocation of US forces in Korea. The Extended Deterrence
Policy Committee was institutionalised in 2010, at the 42nd
ROK–US Joint Security Consultative Meeting, in order to
‘serve as a cooperation mechanism to enhance the effec-
tiveness of extended deterrence’. ‘S. Korea – U.S. to organ-
ize a joint committee for extending nuclear deterrence’,
Hankyoreh, 9 October 2010, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/
english_edition/e_northkorea/443035.html.
be 60 US Department of Defense, ‘First Republic of Korea-U.S.
Defense Technology Strategy and Cooperation Group
(DTSCG) High-Level Talks Joint Press Release’, 26 July
2016, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/
pubs/DTSCG_High_Level_Talks_Joint_Press_Release.pdf.
61 US Department of State, ‘Joint Statement on the
 Inaugural Meeting of the Extended Deterrence Strategy
and Consultation Group (EDSCG)‘, 20 December 2016,
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/12/265886.
htm.
62 Mark Landler, ‘Trump Orders Pentagon to Consider
Reducing U.S. Forces in South Korea’, New York Times, 3
May 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/03/world/
asia/trump-troops-south-korea.html.
63 ‘Statement of General Curtis M. Scaparrotti, Commander,
United Nations Command; Commander, United States-
Republic of Korea Combined Forces Command; and
Commander, United States Forces Korea before the
Senate Armed Services Committee’, 16 April 2015,
https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Scaparrotti_04-16-15.pdf.
64 Ibid.
65 Ashley Rowland, ‘US, South Korea activate 1st-ever com-
bined division’, Stars and Stripes, 3 June 2015, https://
www.stripes.com/news/pacific/korea/us-south-korea-acti-
vate-1st-ever-combined-division-1.350251. According to
General Brooks in his March 2018 testimony to the Senate,
following the relocation of Eighth Amy HQ to Camp
Humphreys in 2017, ‘relocation of most remaining units
to that garrison – USFK, UNC, U.S. Marine Forces Korea
and the 2nd Infantry Division Headquarters – is slated for
completion in 2018’. See ‘Statement of General Vincent K
Brooks, Commander, United Nations Command; Republic
of Korea and United States Combined Forces Command
and United States Forces Korea, in Support of Commander
United States Pacific Command, Testimony Before the
Senate Armed Services Committee’, 14 March 2018, p. 13,
https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Brooks_03-15-18.pdf.
66 ‘Statement of General Curtis M. Scaparrotti Commander,
United Nations Command; Commander, United States-
Republic of Korea Combined Forces Command; and
Commander, United States Forces Korea before the Senate
Armed Services Committee’, 23 February 2016, p.5, http://
www.usfk.mil/Portals/105/Documents/23%20FEB%20
2016_Posture%20Statement_Senate.pdf.
67 ‘Statement of General Curtis M. Scaparrotti Commander,
United Nations Command; Commander, United States-
Republic of Korea Combined Forces Command; and
Commander, United States Forces Korea before the Senate
Armed Services Committee’, 16 April 2015, pp. 6-7, 12.
68 ‘Statement of General Vincent K Brooks’, 14 March 2018, p.
4.
69 Michelle Tan, ‘End of an era: Iron Brigade to deactivate
in Korea’, Army Times, 6 November 2014, https://www.
armytimes.com/news/your-army/2014/11/06/end-of-an-
era-iron-brigade-to-deactivate-in-korea/; Ashley Rowland,
‘“Iron Brigade” inactivates after 50 years in South Korea’,
Stars and Stripes, 2 July 2015, https://www.stripes.com/iron-
brigade-inactivates-after-50-years-in-south-korea-1.355904.
70 There are ten combatant commands; six are based on geo-
graphic area of responsibility and four have functional
missions (special operations, cyber, strategic forces, and
transportation).
71 In early 2018, Harris was nominated to be the US
Ambassador to Australia, with Admiral Philip Davidson,
then-head of US Fleet Forces Command, nominated as his
successor. Later, Harris was instead nominated for the post
of US ambassador to South Korea.
72 Indo-Pacific Command covers the largest geographic
area of the Combatant Commands and is headquartered
in Honolulu. Traditionally, the commander is a four-star
admiral.
73 This is unusual but not unprecedented. The US armed
forces frown upon bypassing the chain of command, and
senior military officers have been socialised to avoid doing
so. However, there reportedly have been rare occasions
when the UNC commander or his staff have communicated
directly with the Office of the Secretary of Defense when
there has been a disagreement between the commanders of
USFK and (previously) PACOM.
74 Ashley Bunch, ‘Gray Eagle drone system to be permanently
stationed at Kunsan’, Army Times, 13 March 2017, https://
www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2017/03/13/gray-
eagle-drone-system-to-be-permanently-stationed-at-kun-
san/.
75 Capt. William Leasure, 35th ADA Brigade Public Affairs,
‘Avengers and Patriots partner for Air Defense Exercise’,
US Army, 16 February 2016, https://www.army.mil/
article/194581/ https://www.army.mil/article/162471/
avengers_and_patriots_partner_for_air_defense_exercise.
US armed forces in South Korea 63
Chapter four
North Korea’s cyber capability
The remote manipulation of computer networks to
cause harm has created a new military capability. Many
countries, including the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) have developed such
‘cyber’ capabilities. Determining what a cyber attack
involves, and how much it should be feared, is of grow-
ing importance in assessing the politico-military bal-
ance among potential state competitors.
Nations have employed cyber attacks for several
decades. These began as primitive disruptions and
have since increased in sophistication. From this record
of experience, analysts have drawn conclusions that
can help shape analysis of this new military capability.
Firstly, countries use cyber attacks in a manner consis-
tent with their larger national strategies. Secondly, the
physical damage they cause is easy to overstate: a cyber
attack is not a ‘weapon of mass destruction’. Thirdly,
while cyber attacks can produce effects similar to
kinetic weapons, there is an informational aspect that is
equally important. Some analysts consider cyber attack
as a tool of asymmetric warfare, but this can obscure
important operational distinctions in its use. A cyber
attack does not require ‘an act of violence to force the
enemy to do our will’.1 Violence through cyber means
is possible, but its more common effect is to manipulate
information, create uncertainty and shape opinion.
Cyber attacks are attractive in that they offer vary-
ing degrees of concealment and their treatment under
64 The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula
international law remains ambiguous: it is unclear
whether they qualify as an ‘armed attack’ that would
make retaliation legitimate.2 Public data suggests that
multiple countries,3 including North Korea, have used
some form of cyber attack. Pyongyang has developed
a range of unconventional military capabilities, to the
extent that its limited economic and technological
resources allow, but cyber attack has a special place
in that it is ‘operational’ and the North has used cyber
attacks against the regime’s opponents.
Cyber capabilities can serve to provide adversaries
with a degree of parity in what may otherwise be an
unequal contest. North Korea seeks to avoid confronta-
tion with the opponent’s main force. It is useful to note
the similarities between North Korea’s behaviour and
that of Iran: both are developing asymmetric capabili-
ties such as cyber weapons and ballistic missiles – and,
at least in the North’s case (following Iran’s decision in
2013 to largely shelve its nuclear-weapons research and
in 2015 sign the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action),
nuclear weapons – because of similarities in their strate-
gic thinking. Both states wish to deter a powerful oppo-
nent and maintain an operational space in which they
can still conduct offensive action, even if those actions
provide only symbolic effect aimed at a domestic audi-
ence. Cyber attacks give these countries a means to take
action against what they perceive to be their primary
opponent.

Cyber attack as a source of advantage
Under Kim Il-sung – the regime’s founder and grand-
father of current leader Kim Jong-un – North Korea’s
military strategy was intended to achieve forced reuni-
fication with the South by employing surprise, speed
and overwhelming firepower.4 By Kim Il-sung’s final
years, it was clear that this was no longer realistic.
Invasion would greatly harm the South, but it would
be suicidal for the North. Efforts by Pyongyang to com-
pensate for the growing military imbalance, by devel-
oping alternatives to conventional military forces, were
first intended to support reunification by force. Since
then, the rationale for acquiring these capabilities has
changed significantly.5
North Korea’s armed forces provide a variety of ben-
efits to the regime, but a realistic option for conquer-
ing the South is not one of them, even when reinforced
by other asymmetric capabilities. Assuming that this is
acknowledged by North Korea, this would influence the
development of cyber capabilities. The North’s military
goals are now to deter invasion or aggression, maintain
internal security and provide coercive capabilities that
support the regime’s broader political and economic
goals. As such, its efforts to develop military capabili-
ties will focus on strengthening deterrence, coercion
and political effect.
Asymmetric capabilities are developed in order to
circumvent an opponent’s areas of strength and attack
Kim Jong-un at
the KPA Exhibition
of Arms and
Equipment (Rodong
Sinmun)
areas of relative weakness. Combining new technolo-
gies and novel tactics – such as in blitzkrieg – can pro-
vide unexpected advantage, but it is easy to overvalue
this. Asymmetric capabilities are rarely decisive (nuclear
weapons, given their destructiveness, are unique). Their
effect lies in shifting the direction of warfare, strategy and
tactics, and in accommodating new technologies.
North Korea has developed a range of military
technologies to compensate for its conventional weak-
nesses, including cyber attack, chemical weapons,
electronic warfare, nuclear weapons and ballistic mis-
siles, but these efforts are hampered by its relative tech-
nological backwardness. Its uninhabited air vehicles
(UAVs), for example, are still rudimentary models, and
the North has no real precision or stealth capabilities.
While it does have weapons of mass destruction, their
use would face severe political constraints, even for the
North.6 Of all the new military technologies that might
provide advantage, cyber attack poses the lowest ‘cost
of entry’ in both resource and political terms.
However, it is a mistake to interpret cyber-attack
capabilities solely from the perspective of kinetic mili-
tary action. Advanced cyber attacks can produce results
equivalent to kinetic attack, but the manipulation of
software, data, knowledge and opinion to degrade
performance and produce political or psychological
effect is equally important. For instance, introducing
uncertainty into the minds of opposing commanders or
North Korea’s cyber capability 65
political leaders is a valuable outcome, as is manipulat-
ing public opinion to damage an opponent’s national
or international legitimacy and authority with both
domestic and international audiences. Like other
nations, North Korea is exploring how best to both pro-
duce and benefit from cyber effects, within the frame-
work of its own military and strategic doctrine.
North Korea began to develop cyber capabilities
in the mid-1990s, initially stemming from efforts in
the area of electronic warfare (EW).7 Pyongyang sent
Koreans overseas for training in programming and
began to acquire computer technology, both legally and
illicitly. Some of the motivation was economic, part of
an effort to revitalise and expand the country’s flagging
economy. Kim Jong-il made it a goal to create a national
information-technology industry. But it is likely that
acquiring new espionage tools and military capabilities
also drove North Korean efforts. China was building a
military cyber capability at the same time and this may
have had some influence on North Korean thinking.
North Korea uses its cyber-attack capabilities in three
principal ways: for ‘coercive diplomacy’, for state-spon-
sored criminal acts to acquire hard currency, and to pre-
pare for disruptive actions in the South (and perhaps
the United States), in the event of a major conflict. These
goals reflect broader changes in North Korean strategy.
The North appears to have given up on forced reunifi-
cation of the peninsula, although it is important for its
strategy to continue to emphasise the threat of conven-
tional assault against the South. Indeed, in comparison
to the era of Kim Il-sung – who actively pursued reuni-
fication thorough the use of force – North Korea is on
the defensive strategically. Its goals are to deter US and
South Korean military action, prevent absorption by
South Korea, preserve the rule of the Kim family, and
also improve negotiating positions and influence over
the future of Korea. These goals and other trends sug-
gest that the use of cyber-attack capabilities for coercive
purposes will remain an attractive option for the North
– one that it may exercise when it judges the risk of
retaliation to be acceptable.8
The risk from cyber attack needs to be put in the con-
text of North Korean provocations, the most important
being the 2010 sinking of the corvette Cheonan and the
shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. Both incidents resulted
66 The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula
in fatalities – 46 in the case of the Cheonan, and four (two
of whom were civilians) in that of the artillery attacks.
While the North has used cyber attacks (as opposed to
espionage) a number of times, including Wannacry and
the Bangladesh bank heist, none rose to the levels of
these earlier incidents in terms of effect.
The dilemma in this is the risk of miscalculation by
North Korea’s leaders, who may take action to gain
influence with the assumption that they can manage
escalation. However, there is a lack of reliable and pub-
licly available insight into the North’s strategic thinking
or decision-making processes. North Korea is a xeno-
phobic state for which South Korea is an increasingly
alien culture. Conditioned by decades of propaganda
and with limited information filtered through thick
ideological lenses (what analyst Joseph Bermudez has
called the ‘lens of self-deception’), a provocation that
appears manageable to the North may in fact prove
unacceptable and lead to an expanded conflict.
North Korea’s cyber attacks
Like many statistics on North Korea, publicly avail-
able estimates of its cyber capabilities are imprecise
and prone to exaggeration.10 The Reconnaissance
General Bureau, a relatively new intelligence organisa-
tion formed through the consolidation of several North
Korean intelligence agencies, likely has between 1,800
and 3,000 cyber operators, although some South Korean
press sources put the figure as high as 5,900.11
The first known North Korean use of cyber tech-
niques for coercive purposes occurred in 2009, but
the state’s use of cyber-espionage techniques predates
this. The 2009 incident saw unsophisticated denial-of-
service attacks against 27 US and South Korean govern-
ment agencies. Little damage resulted, and the attack
failed against many targets. The perpetrators were not
identified and no one has claimed responsibility. Other
denial-of-service attacks against South Korean targets,
including Incheon International Airport, took place
between 2009 and 2011, and were attributed to North
Korea by South Korean sources.
In April 2011, a cyber attack on the National
Agricultural Cooperative Federation (Nonghyup Bank)
left customers unable to use ATMs or online services for
several days. The attack also destroyed data and deleted
 Figure 14: Significant reported cyber attacks reported from North Korea, 2016–1713
REPORTED ORIGIN OF ATTACK: NORTH KOREA
Target Attack
Computer users in over 
Computers worldwide
150 countries 
Individual ransoms of US$300 in Bitcoin
Billions reported in damages
South Korea’s military 
Classified information stolen
cyber command
South Korean firms and  than 140,000 computers attacked
More
government agencies  than 40,000 defence-related
More
materials stolen
Banks in Bangladesh, the 
Monetary theft
Philippines and Vietnam 
Bangladeshi bank, US$81m
Vietnamese bank, US$1m
customer accounts and files, while removing evidence
of the attack from the bank’s computers.12 April is sig-
nificant for the North, being the month in which the
deified Kim Il-sung was born – leading to what appear
to be commemorative attacks on South Korean targets.
Similar attacks took place against banks and media
outlets in March 2013, likely in response to a perceived
slight against Kim Jong-un, with data erased and ser-
vices disrupted. Despite these cyber actions, life in
Seoul continued normally and there was no panic over
cyber attacks. When asked about the attacks, one senior
South Korean official said this was a normal practice for
the North to signal a desire to negotiate.14
The 2014 attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment
appears to have been a special case, prompted by per-
ceived insults to Kim Jong-un, but the effects – disrup-
tions and data destruction – were similar to the 2013
incident, with the added bonus of leaks of embarrassing
executive emails. The North probably regards the Sony
episode as a success.
The Sony attack is an interesting case. It was an effort
by North Korea to use a disruptive cyber attack against
the US in a manner similar to the coercive measures it
has repeatedly used against the South. This was itself a
first and helps explain the US reaction in publicly nam-
ing the perpetrator, intended to warn Pyongyang and
others not to repeat the act. The attack was a clandes-
tine DPRK national security action that it hoped would
not result in kinetic retaliation. In comparison, around
the same time Iran also engaged in similarly coercive
Date reported Technique
May 2017 Malware that exploited file sharing
protocols, locking files for ransom
December 2016 Malware-contaminated intranet
server
June 2016 Malicious code planted under a
(began 2014, long-term strategy
detected Feb 2016)
May 2016 Rare malware used, similar to that
(attacks date back in the Sony Pictures Entertainment
to Feb 2016) hack in 2014
cyber actions against American companies, while China
engaged in economic espionage, suggesting not coor-
dination but that all three were engaging in measured
cyber operations against US targets with the hope of
avoiding retaliation.
Sony was likely an unpleasant surprise for the North
Koreans, as they had assumed a high degree of – if not
anonymity – plausible deniability. Advances in US
attribution capabilities stripped this away. Pyongyang
likely underestimated Washington’s ability to deter-
mine the source of the attack. The hope was that this
would influence the likelihood of such an incident being
repeated, leading North Korea to recalculate the risk of
more action against the US driven not only by concern
over possible US retaliation but also over Chinese dis-
pleasure at destabilising actions that would affect its
interests.15 A wholly successful US response to the Sony
attack would have changed the basis on which North
Korea made such decisions, by demonstrating that the
leadership in Pyongyang had underestimated the risk
(at least the risk of detection and attribution) involved
in actions against the US and US-based entities. North
Korean attacks would still be possible, but the threshold
for deciding to carry them out would likely be higher.
However, North Korea had changed the rationale for its
cyber operations, turning the capabilities it had devel-
oped for intelligence purposes to a new task: cyber
crime. In December 2017, the US and international
partners publicly ascribed the ‘Wannacry’ ransomware
cyber attacks that spread in May that year to North
North Korea’s cyber capability 67
Korea. Allegations were also made that North Korea was
behind the theft of funds from banks in Bangladesh, the
Philippines and Vietnam. So, Pyongyang had continued
its efforts to develop its cyber capabilities, including
seeing them now as a useful revenue-raising tool.16
Command and control in cyberspace
Most leading armed forces are experimenting with
how to organise, train and equip their forces to pros-
ecute cyber attacks. There is no doubt that the addition
of cyber-warfare capabilities produces military advan-
tage, and will increasingly be as vital for survival and
success in combat as the deployment of EW capabilities.
The most basic step is to create a specialised unit. This is
adequate for intelligence collection and limited opera-
tional use. More advanced approaches embed cyber
operators into tactical formations. Some models copy
the organisation of special-operations forces, which
is in part the model for the cyber mission teams used
by the US. Another approach keeps elements of cyber
capability in an intelligence agency (such as the United
Kingdom’s General Communications Headquarters
(GCHQ) or Russia’s Federal Security Service) that is
then used to support the armed forces.
Countries could simply adapt existing approaches to
electronic warfare to manage and plan military cyber
capabilities. North Korea, however, seems to have
separated EW and cyber for operational purposes,
with the Korean People’s Army having lead responsi-
bility for EW, while cyber actions are undertaken by
the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), the intelli-
gence agency responsible for both espionage and covert
action,17 and with a history of paramilitary operations
against the South.18 Currently, North Korea’s organisa-
tional approach seems to be to create a single, large unit
for cyber actions under the auspices of the RGB, but it
remains to be seen if cyber units will appear in opera-
tional elements of the Korean People’s Army (KPA).
Any decision to launch a cyber attack is likely made
by Kim Jong-un. This would be consistent with North
Korea’s strategic culture and its centralised and com-
partmentalised decision-making structure. It is also
consistent with the practice in other nations where, as
far as we know, attacks require the consent of the head
of state (in contrast to cyber-espionage activities, which
68 The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula
are usually carried out under a blanket authorisation
from political leaders). North Korea’s cyber attacks are
carefully orchestrated to fit its larger political and diplo-
matic agenda and, although this may be opaque to out-
siders, these involve rational decisions about risk and
rewards in the North’s strategic context and culture.
That there have not been more cyber attacks against
South Korea can in some way be explained by improve-
ments in the South’s cyber-defences. It is also possible
that the North faces the trade-off that confronts all cyber
powers, in deciding when the loss to cyber-espionage
collection will outweigh the benefits of an attack. It may
also be the case that Chinese remonstrations about the
destabilising effect of such actions could check North
Korea’s cyber ambitions.19 These factors, combined with
uncertainty over US attribution capabilities, may have
reshaped the North’s calculus in relation to cyber attack,
but the pace of cyber attack (and the best predictor) is
dictated by what the North sees as the requirements of
its international agenda – and, until it renounces provo-
cation as a diplomatic tool, cyber attacks will likely con-
tinue when required. 
All of these attacks, it should be noted, take place
against a backdrop of Pyongyang’s threats to incinerate,
annihilate, or otherwise obliterate the US and/or South
Korea, in retaliation or deterrence. This propaganda is
not persuasive to Western audiences and is more likely
aimed at North Korea’s own population. This may also
be the case with cyber attacks; largely symbolic actions
whose effects may be pleasing to Pyongyang, but are
also overestimated by it. The psychological advantage
gained from these actions may not be in weakening the
South but in strengthening the North’s view of itself.
Understanding the objectives of Pyongyang’s cyber
attacks is important in predicting the likely trajectory of
its cyber activities. If the goal is to go beyond signalling
directed at South Korea and to apply real coercive pres-
sure, the North may be tempted to escalate the pace or
intensity of its attacks, since the current level of sporadic
cyber incidents is tolerable for Seoul. Conversely, if the
primary objective is to stage symbolic acts of defiance
aimed at a domestic audience, then there is little need
to increase their scope, duration or effect beyond what
has already been seen. This suggests that the North
will continue to engage in cyber actions, driven by its
 JULY 2009 APRIL–MAY 2012 NOVEMBER 2014 JANUARY 2016
Series of attacks on:  GPS signal jamming  Attack on Sony Pictures  South Korea claims
 Presidential, defence and affects several hundred Entertainment unspecified new attacks
bank websites in South Korea ships and aircraft
 The White House and
Pentagon in the US

JULY 2010 MARCH 2013 DECEMBER 2014 APRIL 2016

 Series of attacks on South  Master Boot Record  Series of attacks on  GPS signal jamming,
Korean government and attack closes down 32,000 Korea Hydro & Nuclear ongoing for three days
private-sector websites bank and media agencies’ Power, which runs
computers 23 nuclear power plants

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

2010–14
 ROK National Intelligence
Service reports 75,472 cyber
attacks against government
and state agencies

Figure 15: Reported North Korean cyber and electronic attacks, 2009–1621

diplomatic and internal political needs, but not pursue
action so provocative as to risk the regime.
However, this assumes that the North is able to accu-
rately calculate this risk threshold, a point on which
many experts are uncertain.20 It also assumes a degree of
rationality in the North’s calculations. There are scenar-
ios in which a more aggressive use of cyber tools could
be attractive to North Korea where it may have mis-
calculated the risk of escalation, and other scenarios in
which desperation may make dramatic action an attrac-
tive choice. China’s ability to exert effective control of
the situation is probably overstated, while observers
also likely underestimate the dilemmas and challenges
that confront Kim Jong-un. This broader political envi-
ronment may encourage the North to overplay its hand.
Potential wartime use
North Korea’s armed forces still possesses enormous
firepower, and a surprise conventional attack against
the South would lead to immense damage before it
was defeated. North Korea’s special-operations forces
are so numerous that they too would cause significant
damage if employed. Long-range missiles and artillery
would inflict significant harm, as would ‘weapons of
mass destruction.’ But an attack against the South, with
or without cyber action, makes sense only in a few des-
perate scenarios, since it would lead to the fall of the
Kim regime.
US and South Korean defence agencies assume that
the North will, in the event of major conflict, use cyber
attacks against South Korean critical infrastructure and
command-and control networks. A March 2015 cyber
attack against Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power – which
operates all of 23 South Korea’s nuclear plants – led to
the exfiltration of technical blueprints and employee
information, and was attributed to North Korea by the
South. However, the hackers were unable, despite sev-
eral attempts, to gain access to – or compromise – plant
operating systems.
Gaining control of these facilities in peacetime would
temporarily increase uncertainty in the South and sat-
isfy North Korea’s leadership, but the strategic value of
such penetrations is limited – making it resemble more
of a demonstration activity or preparation for a war that
may never come. Seoul alleged in March 2016 that hack-
ers from the North had tried to access the email accounts
of South Korean railway workers, in an attempt to
attack the transport system’s control network.22 The fact

North Korea’s cyber capability 69

remains that South Koreans have demonstrated con-
siderable resilience in the face of continued Northern
provocations. Indeed, attempting to compromise South
Korean critical infrastructure in peacetime could be
counterproductive for Pyongyang if it leads Seoul to
harden its defences.23
While there is no evidence of coordinated or joint
activity by the North’s cyber units and special-opera-
tions forces, this cannot be discounted. That said, the
most plausible cyber-relevant use of these special-oper-
ations forces would be peacetime infiltration to gain
covert physical access to telecommunications infra-
structure, in order to enable penetration by the North’s
cyber operators.
Obtaining the full military value of a cyber-attack
capability requires its integration into operations, tac-
tics and equipment. It requires realistic training and
rehearsal. Unless the North obtains assistance from
a country with more advanced armed forces, such as
China, in how to take advantage of cyber capabilities,
its capacity to gain military advantage from cyber attack
could be limited. While China has been willing to toler-
ate North Korean cyber operations from within its ter-
ritory, it is unlikely to have provided active assistance.
With the US, the North faces an adversary prepared
for much more capable opponents in cyberspace. The
US may not be able to fully defend itself against cyber
actions from China or Russia, but its preparations for
cyber conflict with these opponents will reduce the
effectiveness of North Korean cyber attacks.
Nor do cyber attack capabilities improve the North’s
asymmetric and strategic deterrent. Cyber attack is not
a nuclear weapon. In a military context, it produces tac-
tical effect and has become an essential component of
effective military action, but by itself it does not guar-
antee victory; nor does North Korea’s acquisition of
cyber capabilities change the fact that its armed forces
continue to decline in relation to those of the South and
the US. The North will continue to invest in improving
cyber-attack capabilities, if only to slow the decline in
military parity between it and the South, and it clearly
believes, judging from propaganda videos and media
statements, that there are political and diplomatic
advantages to possessing cyber-attack capabilities.
70 The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula
War-fighting scenarios
Several scenarios can be used to test the hypothesis
that cyber attacks would have limited military value
for the North. These scenarios assume complete suc-
cess for the North in disrupting networks and criti-
cal infrastructure, and indicate the resulting military
effect. If the North could shut down every connected
computer in South Korea, this would damage economic
performance for the duration of the crisis and degrade
the South’s military capabilities, but this would not
leave Seoul incapable of military operations. The South
would lose the benefits of networked coordination and
information superiority, but this would not prevent the
operation of tanks, aircraft, artillery – these systems
simply would not perform as well. The North would
also need to simultaneously disrupt US military com-
puter networks, a task that lies beyond the North’s cur-
rent capabilities. A more sophisticated opponent than
Pyongyang might be able to degrade the operation of
advanced weapons systems but without external assis-
tance, this would require a level of espionage and tech-
nical expertise that the North has not demonstrated.24
If the North could cause extensive physical damage
to or destroy critical infrastructure using cyber attacks
(itself not an easy task) or special-operations forces, it is
possible that the South’s access to electricity, telecom-
munications, or financial services might be severely
tested. Attacks on nuclear facilities, meanwhile, could
perhaps even trigger a crisis at nuclear power plants.
The North might hope that this would produce a crip-
pling effect, but physical damage to critical infrastruc-
ture would not necessarily degrade the performance of
South Korean military forces in a conflict that would be
unlikely to last for months. The destruction of physical
infrastructure on a strategic scale using cyber capabili-
ties poses immense challenges in terms of coordina-
tion and implementation. The North might intend such
attacks to create panic among the South Korean popula-
tion, and if there was a conventional invasion it is likely
that refugees would clog roads as they streamed south.
Experience shows, however, that attacks intended to
create panic instead often create hostility and strengthen
resistance.
The North could hope to disrupt South Korean
or Combined Forces Command (CFC) systems,
complicating command and control, creating uncer-
tainty among commanders and reducing effectiveness.
This kind of effect is a reasonable goal for a cyber attack,
but it may be of limited value given the geographic char-
acteristics of the Korean Peninsula. Any attack has to
move from north to south. The mountainous terrain and
frequent ridgelines running (roughly) east to west cana-
lise attacks and could serve to ease the task of defence.
Six decades of experience operating in South Korea,
including one major war and numerous attempts at
infiltration and guerrilla operations, provide the North
with a significant base of knowledge, but a repetition
of the 1950 blitzkrieg by the North’s forces is no longer
possible, even if augmented by cyber attack.25
Using cyber intrusions or attacks to disrupt US and
South Korean air operations would be a significant
challenge for the North. Pyongyang’s forces could not
expect to establish air superiority, and the Western
experience in Afghanistan shows that a combination
of special forces, aircraft stationed at remote bases and
precision-guided weapons will generally be able to
operate independently of critical infrastructure, making
a cyber attack of limited value in stopping air attacks
against ground forces.
At best, Pyongyang could hope to prolong any con-
flict and inflict greater harm on the South, but it could
not expect to prevail with cyber attack – or, indeed,
with any asymmetric effort that did not involve the
use of nuclear weapons or perhaps other ‘weapons of
mass destruction’. There is no doubt that the addition
of cyber-attack capabilities produces military advan-
tage, but all of these scenarios overestimate effect and
underestimate operational difficulties (such as ‘fric-
tion’ and the fog of war) and defensive resilience. If the
North’s chances of victory are not increased by cyber
attacks that were guaranteed success in shutting down
computer networks or destroying critical infrastructure,
cyber capabilities have not fundamentally changed the
military balance on the peninsula.
Limits of ‘hybrid warfare’
‘Hybrid warfare’ is an elastic and contested term that
includes the use of unconventional warfare, covert
action, cyber operations and political manipulation to
achieve strategic goals without triggering a military
response. (It can even include the use of conventional
capabilities, though perhaps masked by deception and
deniability.) In essence, it is a term applied to a col-
lection of tactics designed to circumvent deterrence
and avoid military retaliation. There are similarities
between the ‘hybrid warfare’ applied to Russian activ-
ity of this sort and North Korea’s willingness to under-
take provocative actions with destabilising intent, but
geographic and political constraints mean that ‘hybrid
warfare’ of the sort practised by Russia is not an option
for the North.
North Korea has many of the elements needed to
prosecute this type of activity, including an authori-
tarian regime, a well-oiled propaganda machine, cyber
capabilities and extensive special-operations forces.
Despite this, there are too many obstacles for the
North to successfully employ ‘hybrid warfare’. There
is no large population of North Korean sympathisers
in the South. A peninsula divided by a heavily fortified
demilitarised zone (DMZ) is not conducive to intro-
ducing across the border deniable forces like the ‘little
green men’ seen in Crimea in 2014, even if the North
has in the past succeeded in small-scale and short-
lived infiltration operations. Also, the North’s peculiar
ideology sharply limits its ability to favourably shape
opinion in the South or in the rest of the world; this is
a major goal for Russia’s information operations. The
North, like Russia, has agents who engage with chat
rooms and the comments sections of South Korean
media outlets to disseminate disinformation, such as
positive statements about the North (or criticism of the
South), but these have a limited effect on South Korean
public opinion and no effect on the opinion of on those
who do not read Korean. As such, the hybrid playbook
some have applied to Russia is not readily transferable
to the Korean Peninsula.
Provocation and challenge, but continued
inferiority
North Korea has developed a range of unconventional
military capabilities in its efforts to retain a credible
military force. Provocative actions remain a core ele-
ment of its strategy and cyber attacks, in this regard,
are an attractive choice. But asymmetric warfare or
cyber-attack capabilities do not make up for the relative
North Korea’s cyber capability 71
qualitative inferiority of Pyongyang’s armed forces.
Nor, in fact, do they determine an asymmetric advan-
tage for the North or decisively expand its deterrent
capabilities.
North Korea’s asymmetric capabilities serve a politi-
cal agenda, and their utility in this task is not dimin-
ished by the fact that most of the world may regard
such coercive tactics as illegitimate in modern state-
craft. Indeed, North Korea, along with Russia, Iran and
others, would say that the US itself uses coercion and
threats to serve its interests, and this justifies its actions.
This suggests that provocations will occur when North
Korea’s leader believes they will serve his diplomatic
agenda or are necessary to meet domestic political
requirements.
Understanding the objective of its cyber attacks is
important in predicting North Korea’s cyber activities.
If the objective is to apply coercive pressure, the North
may be tempted to escalate. Conversely, if the intent is
to undertake an act of symbolic defiance or to signal
some diplomatic concern, the North will continue to use
cyber attacks with limited effect.  North Korean decisions regarding cyber attacks against
The concern is that the North will miscalculate
the risk of provocation: that it may feel a degree of
Notes
1 Clausewitz’s definition of war. See Carl von Clausewitz,
On War, ed and trans. by Peter Paret and Michael Howard
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 90.
2 Under Article 51 of the UN Charter, which recognises states’
inherent right to self-defence.
3 China, the DPRK, Iran, Israel, Russia, the UK and the US.
4 Homer T. Hodge, ‘North Korea’s Military Strategy’,
Parameters, vol. 33, no. 1, Spring 2003, http://strategicstud-
iesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/03spring/
hodge.pdf.
5 Axel Berkofsky, ‘North Korea’s Armed Forces: All
Dressed Up, with Places to Go?’, ISN, Center for Security
Studies, ETH Zurich, 7 February 2013, https://www.
files.ethz.ch/isn/188453/ISN_158779_en.pdf; Bruce
Bechtol, Jr, ‘Maintaining a Rogue Military: North Korea’s
Military Capabilities and Strategy at the End of the
Kim Jong-il Era’, International Journal of Korean Studies,
vol. 31, no. 1, Spring 2012, http://icks.org/n/bbs/content.
72 The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula
invulnerability in undertaking such actions, in the belief
(perhaps with some reason) that South Korea or the US
will not risk a wider conflict. It could be argued that the
US and South Korea cannot deter cyber provocations by
the North. Perhaps the North believes it can deter retali-
ation for provocative actions that stay below a threshold
estimated from past incidents that have not provoked a
punitive response.
There is a reluctance to accept that some actions are
difficult to deter. North Korean cyber attacks against
South Korea are among these actions. The last few years
have seen a string of failures for US efforts to deter
actions against its interests, including in Crimea, Syria
and against domestic electoral processes as well as, on
a lesser scale, the cyber attacks on Sony, Sands Casino
and Github. The demonstration of improved US ability
to attribute an attack may have made the North (and
others, such as Iran and China) more cautious in consid-
ering cyber attacks on US targets, as well as impelling
them to improve the sophistication of their operations.
However, it is unlikely to have had a similar effect on
the South; it may also have reinforced the North’s desire
to further sharpen its own cyber capabilities.
php?co_id=SPRING_SUMMER_2012&mcode=40&smcode=
40b0.
6 Duk-ki Kim, ‘The Republic of Korea’s Counter-Asymmetric
Strategy: Lessons from ROKS Cheonan and Yeonpyeong
Island’, Naval War College Review, vol. 65, no. 1, Winter 2012.
7 Joseph S. Bermudez Jr, ‘SIGINT, EW, and EIW in the
Korean People’s Army: An Overview of Development and
Organization’, in Alexandre Y. Mansourov (ed.), Bytes
and Bullets: Information Technology Revolution and National
Security on the Korean Peninsula (Honolulu, HI: Asia-Pacific
Center for Security Studies, 2005), pp. 234–75.
8 Victor D. Cha, ‘Korea: A Peninsula in Crisis and Flux’, in
Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (eds), Strategic Asia 2004–
E. 05: Confronting Terrorism in the Pursuit of Power (Washington
DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005), pp. 139–64.
9 US Department of Defense, ‘Military and Security
Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea’, 2012, http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/
 Documents/pubs/Report_to_Congress_on_Military_and_
Security_Developments_Involving_the_DPRK.pdf.
10 In interviews, some senior South Korean officials have sug-
gested that assessments of DPRK capabilities leaked to the
press are often intended to shape budget debates in the
South, rather than to accurately describe the North.
11 Egle Murauskaite, ‘North Korea’s Cyber Capabilities:
Deterrence and Stability in a Changing Strategic
Environment’, 38 North, 12 September 2014, http://38north.
org/2014/09/emurauskaite091214/; US Department of
the Treasury, ‘Recent OFAC Actions – August 30, 2010’,
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/
OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20100830.shtml.aspx; Joseph
S. Bermudez Jr, ‘A New Emphasis on Operations against
South Korea?’, 38 North, 11 June 2010, https://www.38north.
org/2010/06/a-new-emphasis-on-operations-against-south-
korea/.
12 Chico Harlan and Ellen Nakashima, ‘Suspected North
Korean cyber attack on a bank raises fears for S. Korea,
allies’, Washington Post, 29 August 2011, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/suspected-
north-korean-cyber-attack-on-a-bank-raises-fears-for-s-
korea-allies/2011/08/07/gIQAvWwIoJ_story.html.
13 ‘North Korea “hacks South’s military cyber command”’,
BBC News, 6 December 2016, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-asia-38219009; Nicole Perlroth and Michael Corkery,
‘N Korea could be linked to cyber-attacks on banks, secu-
rity firms says’, BBC News, 27 May 2016, https://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/world-asia-36394986; ‘North Korea linked to
Digital Attacks on Global Bank’, 26 May 2016; New York
Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/27/business/
dealbook/north-korea-linked-to-digital-thefts-from-global-
banks.html; in IISS, ‘Military Cyber Capabilities in the Asia-
Pacific’, in IISS, Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment
2017: Key developments and trends (London: IISS, 2017),
pp. 125–40 (p. 127).
14 Conversation between author and South Korean officials in
Seoul, April 2013.
15 James A. Lewis, ‘North Korea and Sony: Why So Much
Doubt and What about Deterrence?’, 38 North, 7 January
2015, http://38north.org/2015/01/jalewis010715/.
16 See White House, ‘Press Briefing on the Attribution of the
WannaCry Malware Attack to North Korea’, 19 December
2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/
press-briefing-on-the-attribution-of-the-wannacry-mal-
ware-attack-to-north-korea-121917/, and Ellen Nakashima,
‘The NSA has linked the WannaCry computer worm to
North Korea’, Washington Post, 14 June 2017, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-nsa-has-
linked-the-wannacry-computer-worm-to-north-korea/2
017/06/14/101395a2-508e-11e7-be25-3a519335381c_story.
html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.3373924a38e5. Cyber-
enabled revenue-raising attempts linked to North Korea
have been reported before, see David E. Sanger, David D.
Kirkpatrick and Nicole Perlroth, ‘The World Once Laughed
at North Korean Cyberpower. No More’, New York Times,
15 October 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/15/
world/asia/north-korea-hacking-cyber-sony.html.
17 See Park Sung Kook, ‘Tasks of the General Bureau of
Reconnaissance’, Daily NK, 7 May 2010, http://www.dai-
lynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk02900&num=6341.
18 Bermudez, ‘SIGINT, EW, and EIW in the Korean People’s
Army’.
19 China is concerned about the stability and survivability
of North Korea. See Julian Ryall, ‘China Plans for North
Korean Regime Collapse Leaked’, Telegraph, 5 May 2014,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/
northkorea/10808719/China-plans-for-North-Korean-
regime-collapse-leaked.html; Jane Perlez, ‘Chinese
Annoyance with North Korea Bubbles to the Surface’,
New York Times, 20 December 2014, http://www.nytimes.
com/2014/12/21/world/asia/chinese-annoyance-with-north-
korea-bubbles-to-the-surface.html; and Richard C. Bush,
‘China’s Response to Collapse in North Korea’, Brookings
Institution, 3 January 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/
research/speeches/2013/11/14-china-north-korea-collapse-
bush. Nonetheless, reports emerged in late 2016 alleg-
ing that North Korean cyber operators had penetrated
South Korean military networks and, according to some
reports, had exfiltrated information including on opera-
tional plans. See ‘N. Korea likely hacked S. Korea cyber
command: military’, Yonhap News Agency, 6 December
2016, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/search1/2603000000.
html?cid=AEN20161205010451315, ‘North Korea ‘hacks
South’s military cyber command,’ BBC News; Choe Sang-
Hun, ‘North Korean Hackers Stole U.S.-South Korean
Military Plans, Lawmaker Says’, New York Times, 10 October
2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/10/world/asia/
north-korea-hack-war-plans.html.
20 In early 2014, the author was cautioned by a senior Chinese
North Korea’s cyber capability 73
 intelligence analyst not to underestimate the erratic nature
of the North Korean regime.
21 Jenny Jun, Scott LaFoy and Ethan Sohn, ‘North Korea’s
Cyber Operations, Strategy and Reponses’, Center for
Strategic and International Studies, December 2015, https://
csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/
publication/151216_Cha_NorthKoreasCyberOperations_
Web.pdf; ‘N.Korea sending GPS jamming signals for 3rd day:
Seoul’, Korea Herald, 2 April 2016, http://nwww.koreaher-
ald.com/view.php?ud=20160402000056; ‘South Korea says
suspects North Korea may have attempted cyber attacks’,
Reuters, 27 January 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-northkorea-southkorea-cyberattacks-idUSKCN0V50CE;
‘North Korea launched cyber attacks, says south’, Guardian,
11 July 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/
jul/11/south-korea-blames-north-korea-cyber-attacks; ‘S.
Korea accuses North of cyber-attacks on nuclear plants’,
Phys.org, 17 March 2015, https://phys.org/news/2015-03-
skorea-accuses-north-cyber-attacks-nuclear.html; Ryan
Sherstobitoff, Itai Liba and James Walter, ‘Dissecting
Operation Troy: Cyberespionage in South Korea’, McAfee
White Paper, July 2013; IISS, ‘North Korea’s Threat to
Regional Security’, in IISS, Asia-Pacific Regional Security
74 The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula
Assessment 2016: Key developments and trends (London: IISS,
2016), pp. 107–28 (p. 112).
22 ‘North Korea Tried to Hack South’s Railway System: Spy
Agency’, Reuters, 8 March 2016, http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-northkorea-southkorea-cyber-idUSKCN0WA0B6.
23 US Department of Defense, ‘Military and Security
Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea’, 2015.
24 Ellen Nakashima, ‘Confidential report lists U.S. weap-
ons system designs compromised by Chinese cyber-
spies’, Washington Post, 27 May 2013, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/con-
fidential-report-lists-us-weapons-system-designs-
compromised-by-chinese-cyberspies/2013/05/27/
a42c3e1c-c2dd-11e2-8c3b-0b5e9247e8ca_story.html; Caitlin
Dewey, ‘The U.S. weapons systems that experts say were
hacked by the Chinese’, Washington Post, 28 May 2013,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/
wp/2013/05/28/the-u-s-weapons-systems-that-experts-say-
were-hacked-by-the-chinese.
25 Daniel P. Bolger, ‘Scenes from an Unfinished War: Low
Intensity Conflict in Korea, 1966–1969’, Leavenworth Papers,
no. 19, 1991.
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