Pathfinder Vol 1

Air Power Development Centre
CANBERRA
© Copyright Commonwealth of Australia 2005
This work is copyright. Apart from any use as permitted under the Copyright
Act 1968, no part may be reproduced by any process without permission from
the publisher.
Disclaimer
The views expressed in this work are those of the contibutors and do not
necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of
Defence, the Royal Australian Air Force or the Government of Australia. This
document is approved for public release; distribution unlimited. Portions of
this document may be quoted or reproduced without permission, provided a
standard source credit is included.
ISBN 1 920800 05 0
Edited by Chris Clark and Sanu Kainikara

Cover design based on the painting Better Late Than Never by Steven Heyen
Layout and design by Michelle Lovi
Published and distributed by:

Level 3, 205 Anketell Street
Tuggeranong ACT 2900
Australia
Telephone: +61 2 6266 1433

Facsimile: +61 2 6266 1041
E-mail: airpower@defence.gov.au
ii
FOREWORD
In June 2004 the Air Power Development Centre commenced

publication of a fortnightly bulletin called Pathfinder. The purpose
of the new bulletin was to canvas issues of current interest to the
community involved with air power and RAAF history. In addition to
alternating historical and contemporary topics, the format adopted—
1000 words, or two sides of an A4 sheet of paper—was expressly
intended to ensure that the contents of each bulletin was easily read
and digested over a cup of coffee.
The Pathfinder title was chosen as a tribute to the World War II

Pathfinder Force that operated within RAF Bomber Command from
August 1942, forming an elite navigational group which preceded
each raid and accurately illuminated the target area with incendiaries
to permit visual bombing by the main force. The emblem adopted was
the ‘Fiery Mo’ insignia that unofficially adorned the Hudson aircraft of
No 6 Squadron, RAAF, in New Guinea during 1943.
Since its appearance, Pathfinder has maintained its steady rate of

appearance, and gained a surprising and steadily widening readership
around the Air Force and among air power specialists. Now, nearly
18 months on, it is felt that the time has come to put the collected
bulletins into a more permanent format for ease of reference. It is
hoped that the bulletins, or at least a significant proportion of them,
thereby maintain their relevance and ongoing interest. To that end, a
collected edition will continue to be produced at regular intervals.
Group Captain Mike Bennett

Director
iii
THE AIR POWER DEVELOPMENT CENTRE
The Air Power Development Centre, formerly the Aerospace Centre,

was established by the Royal Australian Air Force in August 1989,
at the direction of the Chief of Air Force. Its function is to promote a
greater understanding of the proper application of air and space power
within the Australian Defence Force and in the wider community. This
is being achieved through a variety of methods, including development
and revision of indigenous doctrine, the incorporation of that doctrine
into all levels of RAAF training, and increasing the level of air
and space power awareness across the broadest possible spectrum.
Comment on this publication or inquiry on any other air power related
topic is welcome and should be forwarded to:
The Director
Level 3
205 Anketell Street
Tuggeranong ACT 2900
Australia
Telephone: +61 2 6266 1355

Facsimile: +61 2 6266 1041
E-mail: airpower@defence.gov.au
iv
CONTENTS
AIR POWER PAGE NO

The Changing Face of Air Power (2)* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
There is no Substitute for Air Power (10) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
The Ongoing Debate – Why an ‘Air First’ Approach? (16) . . . . . . 11
The Shape of Things to Come (18) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Air Power in Urban Operations (20) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Which Air Power Capability is Most Important? (6) . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Ten Air Power Pointers From Iraq 2003 (12) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Precision – The Coming of Age of Air Power (15) . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
The Coarse Art of Air Force Experimentation (26) . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Air Force Experiment Headway – Some Insights (28) . . . . . . . . . . 39
Enablers – The Critical Factor (32) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Cruise Missiles – A Double-Edged Sword (24) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Are Uninhabited Combat Air Vehicles Coming of Age? (8) . . . . . . 51
Uninhabited Combat Air Vehicles – Challenges for the Future (36) . 55
Aerospace? Don’t You Mean Air and Space? (4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Space Power and the RAAF (22) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Future Space Capabilities (30) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Weapons in Space? (34) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
* Number in brackets denotes the original issue number of Pathfinder in which each article appeared
v
HISTORY PAGE NO
Iraq – The First Time Around (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Looking a Gift Horse in the Mouth (25) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
The RAAF in Antarctica (19) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
The Difference One Man Makes (11) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Why the Red Centre Vanished (27) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Chindits – A Reappraisal (14) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Bomber Command Memorial (7) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Airborne Forward Air Control – A First for the RAAF (5) . . . . . . 109
Defeating Germany’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (33) . . . . . . 113
Aerial Torpedoes – A Weapon System Failure (3) . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Australian Contibution to D-Day Operations (13) . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
A Family of ‘War Loan’ Beaufighters (17) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
The RAAF Experience of National Service (21) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
Meteors Versus MiGs (9) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
Exploring the Nuclear Option (29) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
Butterworth: The RAAF’s Only Overseas Base (35) . . . . . . . . . . 141
Phantoms of the Past (23) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
Award Winning Heritage (31) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
List of Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
vi
AIR POWER
National safety would be endangered by an Air Force whose

doctrine and techniques are tied solely on the equipment and
process of the moment. Present equipment is but a step in progress,
and any Air Force which does not keep its doctrine ahead of its
equipment, and its vision far into the future, can only delude the
nation into a false sense of security.
– General Henry H. (“Hap”) Arnold, USAAF, 1945

PATHFINDER COLLECTION VOLUME 1
2
THE CHANGING FACE
OF AIR POWER
I t is certain that even the most ardent exponent could not have
envisaged the rapid progress that aviation would make in a little
over a century from the first manned flight. The words of Rudyard
Kipling, ‘We are at the opening verse of the opening page of the chapter
of endless possibilities’, were indeed prophetic. In a little less than a
decade, aviation was converted to military use heralding the advent of
air power. From humble beginnings, when firepower was restricted to
the carriage of small arms in the cockpit, air power now is capable of
bringing to bear devastating and accurate firepower under all weather
conditions.
This unprecedented and rapid improvement in capabilities is unique to

air power when compared with other means of force projection. Such
rapid changes can be advantageous, but if not carefully harnessed can
also become a liability. Currently, the characteristics of enhanced reach
and rapid, precise and overwhelming response have made air power
the weapon of ‘first choice’ in most contexts. While considered and
appropriate employment of air power will more often than not achieve
the desired aim, there are a number of factors that, if not cohesively
appreciated, will be inordinately detrimental to the success of not only
a particular mission, but also the entire campaign.
The primary ethos that must be the corner stone in the application of
air power is the unchanging basic principle of its employment—the
need to gain and continuously maintain control of the air throughout
the duration of the campaign. This factor has to be addressed
3
comprehensively before any campaign plans are formulated. It is

worthwhile noting here that ever since World War II, the forces of
the United States (unarguably the most potent military force in the
world today) have not engaged in combat without the assurance of
absolute control of the air. Historically, it is seen that whenever control
of the air has been contested, even to a minor extent, the restrictions
placed on all operations have been dramatic. Ever since the first Gulf
War, control of the air has been a constant in the planning process of
all campaigns. Any unforeseen contest by the adversary will therefore
likely put the planning process in disarray.
Control of the air is the fundamental factor that has to be borne in mind
when any campaign planning is undertaken by air forces around the
world. There can be no reason to believe that control of the air will be
uncontested even when smaller air forces are involved in the conflict.
So the basic dictum of air power, the need to gain and then fight to
maintain control of the air, remains unquestioned as a universal truth
even today.
If the basics have remained unchanged over a century, what changes

have taken place? It is indeed a fact that the absolute necessity to
control the air made it the primary role of air power. Technology has,
however, conspired with air power’s inherent competencies to move
it to a place of primacy in the hierarchy of military capabilities. This
observation is not made with any intention to lessen the importance of
other forms of force projection, but to emphasise the absolute need, in
all types of conflicts, for adequate and timely air power capabilities to
be made available.
The changes in air power capabilities have been revolutionary. The

doctrinal and theoretical developments have, however, been such that
the changes in air power application have been subtle and evocatively
evolutionary.
4
AIR POWER
The entire spectrum of air power roles can now be encapsulated in

four major groupings: strike, command of the air, airlift and enabling
operations. This doctrinal change has been made possible with the
gradual acceptance of air power as the primary repository of strike
capabilities at least in the initial stages of a conflict. Strike as the primary
role of air power could not have been envisaged as a conclusive air
power responsibility even in the late 1980s. The rapid and incremental
technological improvements that have been made available in the
past decade have catapulted air strike capabilities to the forefront of
considerations in conflict. However, the downside of such changes has
been twofold.
Firstly, air power at its optimum high-tech form has become far too
costly for the less industrialised nations to obtain and maintain. This
has forced a number of nations to rethink, in a realistic manner, the
level of air power that they can afford. As a result some nations have
reluctantly accepted the inevitable decline of their indigenous air
power capabilities. Secondly, there is now a clear distinction that can
be observed when a holistic view is taken of air power capabilities—
that there are two types of air power: that of the United States, and the
rest of the world!
These two factors at times tend to overshadow the entire spectrum of air
power and its development. It is, therefore, important to understand the
implications of resource constraints and the technological background
required to enhance the growth of indigenous air power. The drawbacks
can be ameliorated by a robust overview that combines a high level
strategic outlook with a clear underpinning at the operational level and
adequate tactical understanding. The need is to recognise important
core competencies and supporting technologies and to develop
doctrinal changes accordingly.
Air power competencies, capabilities and roles have evolved over time
while remaining fundamentally the same in a number of core areas. The
changes have taken place in such a short span of time that it is clearly
5
visible even to a casual observer of military matters. It is incumbent

on the practitioners of military art to clearly fathom these changes so
that they do not falter in the application of this extremely sophisticated
force projection capability. Only a concise and articulated doctrine
that is amply supported by closely studied theory, innovative practice
and high-end technology can ensure cost effective optimisation of this
scarce yet critical warfighting capability.
6
There is no substitute
for air power
T he end of the Cold War saw a period of time when military power
was employed in half-hearted ways to achieve objectives that were
not always clearly defined. Most of the developed world resorted to
arbitrary military budget cuts that left the armed forces with strategies
that the emerging force structures were unable to sustain. The imbalance
between force structure and force requirements was the greatest at this
time. Then came the events of September 11.
The military imperatives of the global war on terrorism are now

being considered as the primary capability driver. This is an incorrect
assessment. The capabilities required to combat terrorism have
to be catered to in addition to, not as a substitute for, capabilities
identified and embedded in the defence forces earlier. The first use
of air power against terrorist threats, in Afghanistan, painted a wrong
picture—it was presumed that all future military actions would be
against technologically inferior adversaries with limited warfighting
capabilities.
In Afghanistan, circumstances permitted the unhindered and effective

use of legacy fighters and Cold War era bombers. This situation will not
repeat itself. Declining defence budgets and shrinking force structures
have eroded the technological advantage that traditionally assured
success in air power missions. The need to shore-up the technological
advantage has never been greater.
7
Warfighting is in the process of being radically changed, brought about

primarily by the explosion in information technology and the advent
of long-range precision strike capabilities. The combination of these
two capabilities is epitomised in the holistic application of air power to
achieve national security goals. It also provides the decision-makers at
the highest level with a viable alternative to the attrition model of war
characterised by the clash of large scale conventional military forces
and the resultant heavy loss of life on both sides.
Although the assured reduction in loss of life as a concept should

receive whole-hearted support, incredibly there is more than token
resistance to it. Concepts such as effects-based operations that
underpin the new way of thinking are greatly resisted by those with
vested interest in traditional forms of warfare. These groups accuse air
power proponents of claiming that air power can win wars by itself.
Nothing could be further from the truth. No claims are being made
that air power can win wars all on its own! However, it has to be
accepted that the relative burden in warfare has clearly shifted. Air
power carries much more of the total load than it ever did before and it
can no longer be automatically assumed that the land battle is, or will
ultimately become, the focal point in winning the war.
When carefully optimised, close integration of air and space power

with land and maritime forces provides the greatest combat capability
to a nation. Strategies that rely on single dimensions are not only
inflexible, but in a wider perspective too risky to be applied in support
of national security imperatives. While accepting that it may not
always be possible to achieve complete victory by the employment
of air power alone, it is also necessary to emphasise that victory of
any kind will prove to be elusive without adequate air assets. It is
now a reality that time sensitive precision targeting and long range
systems make it increasingly possible to achieve the effects of mass
and concentration of force without the actual massing of forces within
the range of enemy firepower.
8
AIR POWER
In the past two decades space has emerged as yet another dimension to
be considered in warfighting. There is now a clearer understanding and
acceptance of space power than in the past. Clearly discernible trends
strongly indicate the migration of more and more military missions to
space. The functions of information, surveillance and reconnaissance
are now increasingly conducted by space-based assets and space
systems are already extensively used to support and accentuate military
operations on earth. It is only a matter of time before other missions
will also be routinely conducted from space.
Within the foreseeable future, command of space will become as

critical as command of the air is today. It can also be safely assumed
that when the security of the nation is threatened by actions originating
from or using the medium of space, the defence forces will be expected
to counter it. Command of space in the years ahead will have to stem
from seminal work that should be done today. Although air and space
are independent mediums, there is a sense on continuum between them.
It is therefore imperative that air commanders and air power strategists
look to addressing the pros and cons of the application of space power
to military missions on a regular basis.
The war on terrorism is at the forefront of the current global strategic

scenario. The modus operandi of the adversary does not permit
foolproof defence of one’s own assets, even within home territory. The
strategy that is thus being advocated is to fight on the adversary’s turf
in order to neutralise enemy assets. This is almost completely reliant
on situational awareness, mobility and long-range precision strikes,
capabilities that form core competencies of air power. It is apparent
that air power would have to be the lead in all such endeavours.
The arena of national security is more complex than ever before and needs
rapid response capabilities at times of crises. Such rapid and appropriate
responses can only be effectively achieved by constantly striving to have
total situational awareness, adequate resources to provide the necessary
reach and well-trained and reactive force projection capabilities.
9
Superiority in air and space becomes a prerequisite for the nurturing of

these capabilities. It is therefore obvious that these are the forces that
the nation will look to first when faced with a threat. Other forms of
force projection will always be second level options when time critical
action is of paramount importance.
There is no substitute for air and space power!
10
THE ONGOING DEBATE – WHY
AN ‘AIR FIRST’ APPROACH?
E nough has been written, discussed and analysed about the 1991
Gulf War, on how that campaign exorcised the ghosts of Vietnam
for the United States armed forces (and by implication for all other
Allied forces); on how it was a vindication of bold planning; how
the theories of air power long derided as wishful thinking came to be
validated; and how the entire world now saw the invincibility of Allied
(read American) military power.
The reality is that, while all of the above may be true, the most
important factor to be recognised is that it fundamentally changed
the way in which we approach the conduct of war. In the theory of
warfare, it has been an age-old paradigm that land operations, by
virtue of capturing the enemy assets, determine the outcome of major
wars. By a straightforward logical extension, this can then be further
developed to the theory that, since the outcome of land operations are
almost completely determined by the Army, the Army will determine
the outcome of all major wars. At the conceptual level the 1991 Gulf
War challenged this premise. At the operational level it graphically
highlighted the primacy of air power in combat operations who can
forget the widely transmitted image of the impact of a precision
weapon on a hardened shelter that became the symbol of the ‘new’
air power? The fall-out was the dismissal of the notion that the air and
maritime elements of the defence forces were intended fundamentally
to ‘support’ land forces.
11
From this turning point in the history of warfare, air power has
continued to evolve into a holistic force projection capability, able
to create a number of effects that have both strategic and immediate
tactical impact. The conduct of recent conflicts is instructive in
demonstrating this newfound confidence in air power capabilities. In
Operation Allied Force, NATO forces brought about the surrender of
the Milosevic regime in Yugoslavia purely by air attacks on strategic
targets. The Yugoslav army suffered very little damage and was not the
centre of gravity. The NATO ground forces were never employed, since
a ground invasion of Kosovo would have been politically untenable.
In addition, although it took 78 days of gradual escalation, air power
achieved NATO’s political objectives.
Yet again in Afghanistan, air power supported by Special Forces and

other control units removed the Taliban from power in a very short
time. It was only in March 2002 that conventional land forces were
deployed in actual combat missions, in order to mop up the remnants
of the Taliban and also to support the new regime.
Of course, the success or otherwise of air power employment will always

be highly contextual. There would have to be clear understanding of the
specifics of the situation, which in turn will determine the tactics that
could be utilised. The underpinning lesson is that air power was used
in a fundamentally different way each time and with great success.
Operation Falconer (Iraqi Freedom) was a sort of summing up of the

lessons learned from the employment of air power in 1991 and since.
In the first instance, some Allied land forces deliberately manoeuvred
in such a way as to draw out Iraqi forces into the open so that they
could then be destroyed by air power—a great example of the synergy
of land and air forces acting in conjunction. Almost like a replay, air
power was also used in a similar manner to Afghanistan in the Kurdish
area north of Baghdad to destroy Iraqi strongholds with the help of
indigenous and Special Forces. The third example was the use of
extremely sophisticated technology resident within air power to inflict
12
AIR POWER
severe damage (estimated as high as 86 per cent) on Iraqi Republican

Guard divisions that were relocating under cover of a sandstorm. The
common denominator and success-enabler for all the operations that
have been discussed above is the ability to deliver precision-guided
munitions at will to complete the cycle of reconnaissance, target
identification and assured target destruction within a span of time that
does not degrade the tactical or strategic importance of the target.
So, what are the reasons for this sudden reliance on air power to achieve
aims and goals from the tactical to the political? The capability of air
power to find targets, process information and carry out devastating
attacks with precision has been steadily growing. The improvement
in the quality of the information and its processing, as well as the
precision that is achievable, has been paralleled by the risk-averseness
of senior leadership, both political and military. The primary reason
for an ‘air first’ decision is therefore the propensity to avoid risking
land forces when the same result could be achieved with precision
strikes. As a corollary, even if the political or operational aims are not
achieved by air strikes and the involvement of land forces become
imperative, precision strikes would have greatly reduced the enemy
capacity to resist.
Secondly, the potential difficulties that are faced by multinational

coalitions in obtaining unhindered access to staging areas and base
facilities make the choice of employing air power, in the opening
stages at least, an attractive proposition. This is further reinforced
in the current strategic environment when ‘coalitions of the willing’
may not have international approval. The advantages of long-range air
power are thus re-emphasised.
With the improved accuracy that air power now has, it may not be
necessary for the land forces to engage in direct-fire encounters with
enemy armour, especially in open terrain. The old saying that the best
weapon against a tank is a tank is no longer valid; the best weapon
against a tank now is coordinated air power. The chances of any
13
land force having to engage any armour opposition that has not been
severely degraded by air power is very remote.
Air power has outgrown the cliché of having to provide indirect fire
support to land forces in manoeuvre warfare. Conceptually, it has now
transformed into wielding the sword, rather than being the shield! This
is the key point: the effective employment of air and space power has
to do not so much with airplanes and missiles and engineering as with
thinking and attitude and imagination.
14
THE SHAPE OF THINGS TO COME
T here is a very clear commonality in the thinking of all air power

theorists, starting from the pronouncements of Douhet and
Mitchell, leading to the assertions of Warden and others in recent
times. The commonality is their implicit belief in the capabilities of
air power and what it can provide to the larger aims in a war. Theories
of air power have usually transcended national boundaries and
implementation of these ideas was within the capabilities of several
nations, as witnessed by the strategic bombing campaign during
World War II. This trend has carried on and now perhaps there is even
greater global consensus about air power theory. However, air power
capabilities now encompass a large and divergent spectrum such that
it is necessary to qualify air forces with appropriate adjectives like
‘emergent’, ‘small’ etc., to ensure that it is correctly understood within
the context of a discussion.
Even with these limitations, air power has become accepted

internationally as an instrument of national policy, but its effectiveness
is dependent on a number of factors. The level of national technological
literacy, resource availability (both the ability and inclination of the
government to allocate it), industrial base and the size of the standing
air force itself will directly affect the capability that it can bring to bear.
Currently, only the USA excels in all the above conditions and even
a very cursory look at some of the other modern air forces around the
world will indicate the overwhelming pre-eminence of US air power.
Even with a clear understanding that the complete spectrum of

capabilities may be well beyond their grasp, nations continue to nurture
different levels of air power capabilities. This is because the basic
15
attributes of speed, flexibility, reach and the ability to transcend natural

barriers make air power a principal element in any multi-dimensional
strategy, if carefully nurtured and optimally employed. These basic
attributes are now complemented by accuracy of weapon delivery,
stealth, network centricity, and space-based capabilities. Essentially
this combination of inherent characteristics and evolving technology
enhances air power’s already large envelope of operational utility.
So what does the future hold for air power? As with any prediction,
one way to gauge the future of a capability is by analysing the trends
that are clearly apparent now and then projecting them further into
the required timeframe. Since air power is very clearly reliant on
technology for its competence, evolutionary changes taking place in
the field of aviation-related technologies would give a clear indication
of the probable way forward. Looking at the history of aviation, it
has also to be accepted that technology also produces revolutionary
changes that sometimes have disruptive fallouts at the strategic
conceptual level of air power employment. Fortunately such instances
have been few and have happened only at irregular intervals.
Crystal gazing within the currently available indications provides a

fairly easily understandable future progression for air power. It can
safely be assumed that air power will soon be thought of as air and space
power. This has resource and technological capability implications for
all air forces. Space equipment is expensive to obtain and maintain
and also needs a fairly advanced technological base for sustenance.
But there is also a discernible trend of commercial assets being made
available for military purposes, even though they may not have the
ideal security and bandwidth. Irrespective of the resource implications,
air power will become steadily more reliant on space-based assets for
its communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance as
well as electronic warfare capabilities. The inescapable truth is that
only air forces with ready and secure access to space capabilities will
be able to perform to the required level in a modern battlespace.
16
AIR POWER
The second evolution that is already under way is the increased

employment of Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and their
weaponisation to make them combat capable. The nations on the
forefront of this process are also the ones that have a great aversion
to accepting own casualties. The advantages of Uninhabited Combat
Air Vehicles (UCAVs) are fairly simple to understand. Along with
these advantages, their employment will also bring with it challenges
to international bodies that try to regulate the use of armed forces
in operations other than war. The use of UCAVs in anti-terrorism
operations and their legality is already being debated. Despite the
legal implications, UCAVs will make their operational debut sooner
rather than later and will enter the armoury of nations that have the
technological capability to produce them or the resources to procure
them. Integrating these combat assets into the spectrum of air power
will prove to be interesting.
An air force of consequence will need to be networked in more ways

than one. It is already an accepted fact that response to threats will
have to be multifaceted and multi-pronged. Under these circumstances,
instantaneous communications and dissemination of information
become war-winning capabilities. By virtue of their inherently larger
perspective, air power assets are the best suited to become nodes as
network enablers at all levels. The latest combat aircraft that are being
fielded have built-in capabilities to switch from being purely combat-
capable platforms to becoming the nodal communication points for a
networked and data-linked ensemble of platforms. This transformation
can take place even while the basic combat capabilities are still being
effectively utilised. Essentially the requirement is to make sure that
the commanders (at all levels) see first so that they can decide first and
thereby ensure that they act first. Air power is and will continue to be
the biggest enabler of this process.
So, the future air force will be networked not only within itself, but
to all national security agencies, and will then be able to provide
appropriate and instant response to emerging threats. These responses
17
could extend from deterrence at one end of the spectrum to the lethal
application of force, if necessary, at the other. The essence of air power
in the future will be speed for rapid response and precision-lethality
for adequacy of response to threats on a global scale.
18
AIR POWER IN URBAN
OPERATIONS
T here is a prevalent thought that the zenith of air power glory

has been achieved, and that now the capabilities that made it so
pertinent in combat have lost their effectiveness. This has come about
because there is pervasive evidence that threat trends have changed
over the past few years and that a conventional or traditional conflict
is highly unlikely to occur. It is generally agreed that today a nation’s
security forces will be faced with challenges emanating from adversaries
employing unconventional methods to neutralise and counter
traditional advantages that a regular defence force enjoys—irregular
threats. The security situation becomes extremely complex when these
threats combine with the disruptive challenges that an adversary’s use
of advanced and breakthrough technologies may bring about. Under
these circumstances security imperatives almost completely move out
of the overarching umbrella of traditional combat power.
It is gradually becoming apparent that these threats are more likely to

manifest in urban areas rather than in areas that are more traditional
battlegrounds. Dealing with the complexity of applying judicious
military force in a complex urban environment while ensuring
minimum or no collateral damage is a daunting prospect. There is a
school of thought within the strategists that this basic requirement rules
air power out of the equation completely. But recent developments
have proved otherwise.
In theatres of ongoing conflict it is seen that air power, when employed

in an innovative manner, is capable of carrying out missions that only
19
a few years ago would have been fully undertaken by land forces.
Within the urban context air power is now used effectively for anti-
infiltration and curfew enforcement duties. The very use of air power
capabilities in low intensity conflicts challenges the traditional notions
of ground warfare. This could not have happened even a decade ago. It
is a combination of factors that have brought about this evolution.
Urban combat, even against a traditional adversary, is fraught with

complications. When the adversary relies more on terrorist and guerilla
tactics, the problems are amplified by a magnitude. Three elements
combine to enable air power to assist and relieve the burden so far
shouldered almost entirely by ground forces. They are:
• the increasing availability of advanced technology that provides
the wherewithal to have adequate ISR capabilities, C2 networks and
precise, responsive, lethal strike capabilities;
• unique operational concepts that bring together the responsive
characteristics of air power to produce significant effects; and
• the seamless coordination of the process of intelligence collection,
collation and dissemination.
In the case of low intensity conflicts, the biggest advantage that the
use of air power bestows is that it overcomes the need for prolonged
occupation of neutral or adversary territory by ground forces.
International opinion currently does not approve of such an action,
even if it is accepted as a necessity from a security perspective, since
the legitimacy of positioning ground forces in foreign territory is
questionable.
The key to success in urban operations is the ability to have an

almost unlimited loiter time to observe and react to emerging threats.
Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles, both unarmed as well as armed, are
ideally suited for this purpose. By having uninterrupted reconnaissance
capabilities and combining them with time-sensitive strike options, air
power brings a completely new dimension to the conduct of urban,
20
AIR POWER
asymmetric warfare. The escape route for irregular threat perpetrators,

that of merging into the complex terrain, is almost completely blocked
if this concept is effectively employed in conjunction with high calibre
intelligence. In this manner it is possible to close many loops in a
matter of minutes or even seconds and successfully prosecute extremely
elusive targets.
The principal contribution of air power to urban conflict is the greatly

improved perspective that it brings to the arena. Air power is able to
‘see’ more with greater clarity, analyse and understand the evolving
threat faster and strike more rapidly and precisely at a far greater range
than with the use of only ground forces. This enhanced perspective
makes air power a winning element in operations against irregular
threats in complex terrain.
Long-range strike capabilities of air power produce significant strategic

deterrent effects even when ground forces do not occupy the area of
operations. In reality, when these capabilities are optimally merged
with other air and space power capabilities, maritime capabilities and
ground force projection (where it is a viable option), threats in complex
urban terrain can be effectively contained. Theorists are already coining
terms such as ‘Environmental Air Control’ and ‘Envelope Force’ to
encapsulate this forward-thinking concept.
From a security perspective, the world is going through changes at a

pace faster than ever before. Internationally, it is now an age where
society has become so sensitive to loss of human life that it does not
look kindly on any nation that does not minimise collateral damage and
avoid casualties. This is also a period of rapidly altering security threat
scenarios wherein entire defence forces may be forced to reconstitute
themselves in ways never tried before, to ensure the achievement of
national security paradigms.
It is also a fact the world over that defence forces are being pushed
to do more, at further ends of the conflict spectrum, within stringent
21
resource allocations. Air power has always been a dynamic concept! It

has always been the harbinger of change and has been at the forefront
of positively innovative concept development. Today, air power
is in the process of embracing new ideas and is once again proving
its flexibility by effectively adapting to a fast-changing warfighting
environment.
22
WHICH AIR POWER CAPABILITY
IS MOST IMPORTANT?
W hich air power capability is most important? Take 1: Control of

the Air. As argued in Issue 2 of Pathfinder, control of the air is
an essential prerequisite for all other military endeavours. If we fail
to achieve and maintain control of the air, the adversary’s air power
could pick off our forces at will. Not only would this nullify friendly
air power, such as our own strike, information and mobility aircraft,
but also all friendly land and maritime forces. Our military bases,
population centres, and industrial facilities would also be easy targets
for adversary air power. We would thus be unable to achieve anything,
and must surely be defeated.
So the most important air power capability is clearly that which is an

essential prerequisite to the success of all other military endeavours:
the most important air power capability is control of the air. Without
control of the air, we are naked.
Which air power capability is most important? Take 2: Strike. An

effects-based approach to warfare stresses that our ultimate aim is to
achieve effects on the adversary that result in a cessation of unacceptable
behaviour. From a military point of view, only the threat or use of
force can directly achieve such effects. (Other actions may be taken
that may be successful in achieving the same ultimate effect, but the
use of force is the only action that is solely a military responsibility.)
Strike is overtly offensive. Is it right to adopt an offensive capability

as our highest priority? We must consider whether a conflict could
23
actually be won using purely defensive means. This is akin to trying to

win a football match by using all of our players to guard our own half
of the field, but having nobody who is able to score. We could certainly
make it hard for the opposition to score, but we could never score.
Unless our defence was perfect, the opposition would still manage to
sneak through occasionally, so we would be guaranteed of a loss. So
it is only through an offensive capability that we have a chance of
success. And the only offensive air power capability is strike.
So the most important air power capability is clearly that which

actually achieves a useful effect directly on the adversary and gives us
the means to prevail: the most important air power capability is strike.
Without strike, we are toothless.
Which air power capability is most important? Take 3: Information.

We are in the information age. The ADF’s adoption of Network Centric
Warfare (NCW) reflects the criticality of information to the modern
way of warfighting. Without accurate and timely information, we
could not achieve control of the air because we could not know where
the threats are. Neither could we achieve useful effects through strike
because we could not know about target importance, location, defences,
and so on. And we could not coordinate our operations without the
effective communication of information between all relevant forces
and decision-makers.
Air power can contribute very significantly to the ADF’s information

requirements. It is able to undertake surveillance and reconnaissance
over great distances and at high speeds. With AEW&C, we will be
able to process such information and control aspects of the battle with
greater alacrity. So the most important air power capability is clearly
that which allows us to make smart use of the other capabilities: the most
important air power capability is information. Without information,
we are blind and ignorant.
24
AIR POWER
Which air power capability is most important? Take 4: Mobility. We

cannot expect adversaries to mount their attacks where it would be
most convenient for us. Even if that were their plan, it would be safer
for us to confront the adversary at some distance from our population
centres and industrial assets. Australia’s interests also involve us in
off-shore operations with increasing frequency.
Therefore, we must be an expeditionary force. Most, if not all, of our

combat and information aircraft cannot perform their roles from their
home bases. Nothing useful can happen until they, and their support,
have been relocated to appropriate expeditionary air bases. Once there,
regular resupply is necessary to keep them going. The need for rapid
mobility is equally important for the deployment and sustainment of
land forces.
Due to its speed, reach and capacity, air power can provide a quality of
mobility that cannot be achieved by any other means.
So the most important air power capability is clearly that which puts
our other capabilities where they can be most efficiently used: the most
important air power capability is mobility. Without mobility, we are
legless.
Which air power capability is most important? Take 5: Combat

Support. All of the air power capabilities described above require air
bases. Without secure and functional air bases, nothing could leave
the ground. Our aircraft could not move forward, and there would be
nowhere to move them to. Our ability to acquire information would
be severely hampered, we could not achieve control of the air, and we
could not strike.
So the most important air power capability is actually that which never
leaves the ground: the most important air power capability is combat
support. Without combat support, we have no feet.
25
Which air power capability is most important? Take 6: none of the

above—or all of the above. Without any one of the capabilities, air
power cannot succeed in warfighting. Various arguments can be used
to assert one capability over the others; for example, strike is what
actually wins the war, or combat support has to happen before anything
else. It is often helpful to consider which capabilities support which
other capabilities; for example, mobility obviously supports control
of the air. However, such dependencies actually tend to be circular;
for example, without adequate control of the air, there can be no
mobility. In general, we find that all capabilities depend on all other
capabilities.
What does this mean? It means that we must strive for a balanced
force, with sufficient individual capabilities to allow the others to be
fully utilised. If we try to maximise one capability at the expense of
the others, we could actually end up with an overall deterioration in
total capability.
Of course, we should ask, ‘balanced for what?’ The capability

proportions required for warfighting are quite different to those
required for peacekeeping or natural disaster relief. By considering the
contribution of each capability to each of the ADF’s responsibilities,
we can optimise our capability balance and thus maximise our air
power.
26
TEN AIR POWER POINTERS
FROM IRAQ 2003
I n the aftermath of a campaign, attempts to analyse its events can

be useless unless the correct pointers are drawn from it for use in
future operations. Iraq 2003 is no different, but the urgency to learn
from the conflict is reinforced by the rapid technological changes that
are in turn altering the concepts of operations themselves. In addition,
the context of employing air power in an ambiguous battlespace makes
the understanding of its complexities much more important for future
applications.
Iraq is perhaps the precursor of a new and emerging battlespace

where the entire spectrum of conflict, from high intensity warfare
to peacekeeping operations, will be carried out in close proximity to
each other, both geographically and in terms of timeframe. The entire
campaign will be one of dynamic changes in intensity, location and
complications. Historically, air power has responded to such challenges
by rapidly adapting to the evolving situation, more often than not by
leveraging emerging technologies.
Even in this changing scenario, a few air power pointers can be clearly
discerned.
Pointer 1. In the past five decades Western forces have usually

operated with almost complete control of the air. The fact that such
control was very easily obtained in all cases has injected a notion into
the thinking process of a number of planners that one does not have
to fight to obtain and maintain control of the air. Developments in
27
surface-to-air missile technology that permit the targeting of airborne

platforms at ranges in excess of 350 kilometres will change the
equation drastically. The challenge will be to ensure control of the air
under these circumstances.
Pointer 2. Air power has normally been employed in the ‘centralised

command and decentralised execution’ concept. The advantages of
network centric forces cannot be fully exploited if this command
and control structure becomes too rigid. A basic minimum fluidity in
centralised control will have to be built-in to optimise the effectiveness
of air power assets. Complex rules of engagement and the increasing
need to prosecute timesensitive targets further emphasise the need for
flexible command and control functions.
Pointer 3. The indelible, but invisible link between command and

control and tempo of operations was underlined in Iraq 2003. The
impact of air power in clearly moving away from traditional attrition
to a more effects-based approach, even while applying lethal force,
now becomes fundamental to future operations. The effectiveness of
such an approach will determine the tempo of operations and depends
directly on air power’s capabilities to neutralise identified critical
vulnerabilities of the enemy. This in turn is a function of an assertive
yet flexible command and control structure.
Pointer 4. The ability to generate and then sustain the required tempo
of operations is also facilitated by air power assets. Higher tempo of
operations normally involve higher risks, but air power can mitigate
much of the risk involved in generating high tempos of operation that
spike at irregular intervals. The ability of air power to regulate the
tempo with minimal risk was demonstrated in the campaign.
Pointer 5. The battlespace in Iraq was and continues to be without

clearly demarcated front lines, enemy areas and comparatively safe
rear areas. This necessitates the development of accurate, adequate
and timely intelligence as well as the capability to disseminate it.
28
AIR POWER
Training of the personnel involved in these activities, even though

they are not at the ‘sharp end of the spear’ assumes great importance,
more so in situations wherein the information is collected, collated and
analysed in a short time-span. Realistic and collective training of the
entire team, especially in the employment of air power for efficiency,
when operating in complex battlespaces and to avoid the pitfalls of
fratricide, was prominently demonstrated.
Pointer 6. Air power assets will have to be truly multi-role capable, with
the ability to data link between assets and employ precision firepower
capabilities. Technology of tomorrow will have to be harnessed today
to ensure the effectiveness of weapon systems in an ongoing manner
and to avoid short-term redundancy. Capability acquisition of the
future will need to take these factors into account to avoid having to
go into battle with already outdated technology.
Pointer 7. The nature of war is changing, making it very difficult for

planners to forecast weapon capability and quantity requirements.
This situation is further complicated in the case of air power because
the precision weaponry is very expensive because of its extreme
complexity in design and manufacture. Realistic usage rates of these
in different types of operations will be difficult to ascertain and may
become a limiting factor.
Pointer 8. Sustainability of air operations in far-flung theatres will

become more difficult in terms of positioning the support infrastructure
like fuel, ammunition, spares etc. Fuel particularly will become a
constraining element. Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia was
using 4.5 million gallons of aviation fuel per day and there was no fuel
available for even one more aircraft. The impact, in operational terms,
if further effort is required is self-explanatory.
Pointer 9. Contrary to some of the ideas being floated about regarding

the efficacy of ‘unmanned robotic air warfare’, it is certain that
moral compulsions and legal considerations within the international
29
community will restrict their usage even if technology does not. The
need will still be for a ‘person’ in the loop, for fool-proof identification
of each target and for the ability to abort a mission at the last possible
minute. Robotic warfare is still not a reality.
Pointer 10. Close Air Support in urban areas will become even more
complicated as requirements for assessing the legality of targets, and
limiting the ensuing collateral damage increase. Iraq 2003 illustrated
the need for urban CAS, but it equally demonstrated the need for
integrating this firepower with other elements of the combat force.
At the strategic level, Iraq once again demonstrated that Effects-Based

Approach to a conflict is still an evolving science. The identification of
the centres of gravity will continue to be the weak-link in an otherwise
admirable concept that utilises the unique characteristics of air power
to achieve laid down objectives.
30
PRECISION – THE COMING
OF AGE OF AIR POWER
S trike capabilities of air power took a hard knock during the

Vietnam War, when the ‘high-tech juggernaut’ that was the US Air
Force could not avoid humiliation by a low-tech opponent. During this
war, a number of technology-led innovations dramatically increased
the effectiveness of aerial strikes, none more prominently than the
so-called ‘smart bomb’. Although portrayed as some sort of a ‘magic
weapon’, and the answer to all problems of accuracy in air attacks,
there was really nothing very complicated about them.
As early as mid-1945 American scientists were working on a number

of guided-bomb projects. In fact, other than for laser and navigational
satellites, every other means that would eventually be used to guide
weapons was already being trialed. Radio-steered bombs were
successfully used in Burma and subsequently in Korea, both times to
destroy bridges that were vital to enemy operations. However, with the
nuclear standoff that developed immediately after the Korean War, the
need for precision to be measured in dozens of feet was pushed to the
background.
Although laser-guidance was stunningly effective in the Vietnam

War, the necessary budgetary approval to progress further was not
forthcoming. The Paveway series of bombs, of which the American
forces dropped 28,000 in Vietnam, cost only US $8000 a-piece but
were as effective as 25 unguided bombs of equivalent weight. The most
famous success of Paveways was the destruction of the Thanh Hoa
bridge, which carried the only railroad and principal highway across
31
the Song Ma River south of Hanoi. After 871 sorties had already flown
against the bridge, with 11 aircraft lost but no tangible damage done,
on 13 May 1972, 14 fighters carrying 2000 and 3000-pound Paveways
attacked and destroyed it completely.
The overall success rate of the Paveways was very close to a one
bomb–one kill ratio, and also permitted attacks on targets that were
off-limits for fear of collateral damage and repercussions. For the first
time, precision capability nullified what had from the earliest days of
the concept of strategic bombing been its most profound limitation: the
public opinion backlash of unintended civilian casualties. Even then
the revolutionary implications of precision guidance were lost in the
realignment of political forces and the review of defence and foreign
policies that saw the curtailment of the development of advanced
conventional weapons systems.
During the 1970s and 80s, 80–90 per cent of budgets were spent on
developing higher quality aircraft and only the remainder used for
weapons research. The potential of advanced weapons was readily
apparent to only a few people who appreciated that precision guidance
meant that an aircraft would have to make fewer passes over heavily
defended targets, and also that weapon release could be accomplished
from greater distances and altitudes, keeping the aircraft out of harms
way. In the early 1980s it was calculated that 100 fighters carrying
precision weapons could destroy as many as 800 tanks per day,
more than ten times the number that could be achieved by a force of
2500 World War II bombers. Fortunately, several new developments
reinvigorated research into precision weapons.
The foremost impetus was Soviet numerical superiority in the

European theatre that seemed to assure a ‘nuclear escalation’ if there
was a conflict, since NATO forces would be forced to use tactical
nuclear weapons to stop the Soviet advance, and hence risk provoking
nuclear retaliation. The NATO doctrine that emerged incorporated
conventional tactical air strikes into Army doctrine as never before.
32
AIR POWER
The F-117 stealth fighter was the result of this rethinking and, in the
words of RAND analyst Benjamin Lambeth, in retrospect it proved to
be ‘one of the most pivotal contributions of the 1980s to the revolution
in lethality and effectiveness of American air power’.
Two other technological developments underscored the connection

between precision strike and accurate intelligence for targeting. One
was the introduction of the Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting
Infra-Red by Night (LANTIRN) external pods that gave fighter aircraft
the capability to autonomously carry out precision attacks at night.
The other was the testing of an ambitious concept to locate real-time
targets in the battlefield, the prototype of which system was named
JSTARS. Throughout the 1980s these two projects were strapped for
resources so that on the eve of the 1991 Gulf War there were only
two prototype JSTARS and a handful of LANTIRN pods in the USAF
inventory.
The First Gulf War demonstrated vividly and graphically the new
meaning that technology gave to the concept of precision. The image of
a precision-guided weapon plunging down the airshaft of a government
building in Baghdad, impacting precisely in the crosshairs of an infra-
red targeting system, became emblematic of air power. Precision
guidance made it possible to destroy 41 of the 54 road and rail bridges
between Baghdad and Kuwait in just 450 sorties and brought about
the almost complete destruction of the Iraqi military (at the start of the
conflict, numerically the world’s fourth largest).
Precision attack in the Gulf War changed the perceptions and reality
of air strikes. It made air power the weapon of choice not only to
prepare the battlefield for the ground advance, but to destroy more
than 50 per cent of the enemy’s equipment. Although the victory for
air power in this campaign was unprecedented, thereby exorcising
the ghosts of Vietnam, it also made the task of air power even harder
by creating an incredibly high expectation of perfection in its strike
capabilities.
33
There was also the worry in air force circles that the abnormally low
casualty rate would once again put air power into unsavoury situations
with higher than deliverable expectations. This worry seemed to be
coming true in the peculiar air war that was fought over Serbia in 1999.
Although, in the end, the effect required the capitulation of Milosevic
was achieved with minimal civilian casualties, the use of air power
in this campaign was less than optimum. From a purely precision
attack perspective, however, the campaign once again proved the new
capabilities brought on by a new generation of guided weapons. The
Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) had a 30-foot accuracy, had
a steering system that was launch-and-leave and could be fed target
coordinates up to moments before release, and had all-weather day and
night capability.
The combination of such precise weaponry with real-time targeting

capability provides air power with the ability now to conduct a new
kind of warfare in which it can locate engage and destroy enemy ground
forces across the entire spectrum of operations. Tactical application of
such awesome power has also kept pace with capabilities and thereby
increased the efficacy of air power. Douhet and Mitchell had predicted
that air power would eradicate entire battle fronts: their prophecy has
indeed come true. Air power had always to bear the brunt of ridicule
for the passion with which advocates predicted its capabilities while
its actuality fell short. New technologies in precision guidance and
information dissemination have finally laid to rest these objections.
34
THE COARSE ART OF AIR FORCE
EXPERIMENTATION
I n recent times a new term has entered the ADF’s lexicon—

Experimentation. Like most new terms it is often misunderstood
and misused and therefore, there is a perceivable need to de-mystify it
by explaining what it means from a RAAF perspective.
Viewed in a very generic manner, experimentation can be used to

support almost every phase of a concept-led or -informed force
development process, from the initial formulation of conceptual ideas
through to the development of detailed descriptions of the processes,
organisations, systems and equipment needed for their application.
Because of its extreme utility, Military Experimentation is rapidly

becoming entrenched as a vital part of the ADF’s concept-led capability
development process. Military experimentation can be defined as, ‘the
application of the principles of experimental science to the process of
exploring innovative methods of operation, especially to assess their
feasibility, evaluate their utility and determine their limits’.
CDF’s ‘Force 2020’ vision statement makes it clear that experimentation

will be crucial in ‘turning the vision into reality’, and that single-
Service experimentation has a key role to play in that process. Within
the ADF, experimentation is used to support concept and capability
development by using methods that integrate professional judgement,
mathematical modelling and historical experience. It is a means of
gathering evidence when situations, organisations and technology to
35
support a concept do not yet exist and provides an independent test and
audit process.
In practise, experimentation is used in conjunction with a number of

other tools and information sources to develop a consolidated picture
of future capability requirements. Some of the tools and information
sources, which compliment experimentation, include project-related
studies, Rapid Prototype Development and Evaluation (RPDE),
Concept Technology Demonstrators (CTDs), technology reviews and
intelligence assessments.
In keeping with ‘Force 2020’, the role of experimentation is also

highlighted in the Air Force Plan 2005, where it is described as a ‘key
factor’ in ‘building a seamless, integrated and networked air and space
force to fight and win’. The Plan goes on to assert that ‘Air Force will
continually aim to reshape the future force through actions such as
experimentation, concept development and strategic planning’.
RAAF experimentation contributes to the concept-led force

development process in two main ways. Firstly, it forms part of Air
Force’s internal concept development process, where it is used to
inform, test and evaluate air and space power concepts emanating from
the Air Power Development Centre (APDC). Once ‘validated’ through
experimentation, these concepts can be used to provide context and
guidance to the capability developers. Secondly, Air Force experiments
can provide a means of assessing the suitability of planned force
structures and organisations, thereby identifying possible capability
gaps and further opportunities for exploitation.
To achieve these aims, Air Force experiments are always conducted

in a Joint Force context, generally set 10 to 15 years into the future.
These experiments can take many forms, with their exact nature being
governed by the issue(s) being examined and the questions being
posed. However, there are a number of basic principles that should
36
AIR POWER
be adhered to and limitations that must be carefully considered in the

design and conduct of any experiment.
An experiment is generally designed to establish cause-and-effect

relationships between the ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’ of a process.
This is achieved by systematically varying selected inputs and
observing changes in the outputs. However, the nature of military
experimentation demands some relaxation in the strict principles of
classical experimental science.
Military operations are essentially human endeavours that take place in a

chaotic and constantly changing environment. The number of variables
that may have a significant effect on outcomes is innumerable, and
many will be uncontrollable. The situation is further complicated by
the fact that many of the variables could be interdependent. While it is
possible to introduce plausible simplifying assumptions to bring some
of these factors under control, there is a limit to which this can be done
without undermining the validity and credibility of the experiment. In
addition, many of the observations and performance measurements will
be subjective in nature, thus affecting the replication of the experiment
and confounding attempts to produce statistically significant samples.
These limitations must be borne in mind throughout all phases of

the experiment, from initial problem definition through to the way
in which the results are interpreted and used. The aim of Air Force
experimentation is therefore not to produce scientific certainty, but to
reduce uncertainty when making force development decisions. Under
these circumstances, a more pragmatic approach to experimentation
becomes acceptable.
Of necessity, the nature of most RAAF experiments will be either be

exploratory or hypothesis-based. An exploratory approach is employed
when the process being examined is not well understood and the likely
outcome cannot be predicted. It is used to answer questions of the
form ‘what happens if...?’. Observations and data collection from
37
this type of experiment have to be broad based, and assessment of

the outcomes will be generic in nature. The technique has particular
utility in military experimentation, which is characterised by having to
contend with highly complex situations that are influenced by a vast
range of possible variables.
An exploratory experiment can be used to gain a better appreciation

of the main factors and influences, which govern the outcome of a
particular process. Follow-on work will then be able to concentrate on
examining the precise influence of these factors. For this reason, an
exploratory experiment will normally be conducted as a pre-cursor to
hypothesis-based activities.
Most issues to be examined through experimentation will be too

large and complex to be adequately addressed through a single
experiment. The general philosophy in the RAAF therefore is to
develop experimentation campaigns comprising an integrated set of
experiments, with each activity designed to provide part of the overall
answer.
The current focus for RAAF experimentation is a four-year campaign

with the theme of ‘Networking the Air Force’. The main aim is to
examine the Planned Force to assess its suitability for NCW under
representative operational conditions. This in turn will assist in
identifying any capability gaps and also in the development of
appropriate Air Force concepts for exploiting the capabilities provided
by the networked force.
Over the coming weeks, follow-on Pathfinders will describe some of the
insights that have been gained through the Air Force experimentation
process.
38
AIR FORCE EXPERIMENT
HEADWAY – SOME INSIGHTS
T he first formal Air Force experiment, Headway 03/1, took place

over the period May–July 2003. The experiment was designed as
a preliminary investigation into the characteristics required of a future
Australian Defence Force strike capability, with particular emphasis
on assessing whether the planned Air Force of 2020 is likely to possess
the necessary attributes to mount an effective strike campaign.
The experiment comprised a series of workshops aimed at identifying

the more important characteristics for an ADF strike capability. These
were then tested in a seminar war game to determine the characteristics
with the greatest utility.
The nature and objective of strike operations are changing. Even though
a ‘deep strike’ capability to attack targets of strategic importance will
be needed well into the future, the most likely form of ADF strike
campaign will be a ‘shaping’ operation to set the pre-conditions in
the battlespace for follow-on action by surface forces. Future strike
operations will not only have to contend with high-end active defence
systems but also counter the greater emphasis placed on passive
defences. In the future, adversary forces will use techniques such as
dispersion, mobility and signature management to operate close to or
below our battlespace awareness threshold, making it more difficult
for air and space assets in particular to detect, identify, track and target
the adversary. Furthermore, the adoption of an effects-based approach
to operations will require us to expand our understanding of the range
39
of possible strike targets and the spectrum of effects we may wish to

create.
These developments have a direct impact on the characteristics required

of an effective strike capability.
In the future, good reach will continue to be an essential characteristic

of an ADF strike capability. Our geography demands it. However, there
is a change in the conduct of strike operations. Until now the strike
platform was required to penetrate to the target, deliver its weapons
and vacate the battlespace as quickly as possible. In the future, it will
more commonly be necessary for at least some elements of the strike
system to persist in the battlespace for extended periods since the
adversary will provide only fleeting opportunities for detection and
engagement. Both battlespace awareness and engagement assets will
have to be on-call in the target area to ensure optimum response to these
opportunities. This requirement also implies that all platforms operating
in this hostile environment must have adequate survivability.
The range of potential strike targets, coupled with the spectrum

of effects that may need to be generated, will require battlespace
awareness and engagement systems to be highly flexible, and will place
a high demand on the capacity of the force to generate and sustain the
required rate of effort.
Finally, generating the desired effects against an adversary intent on

blending into complex physical and human environments will increase
the need for precision in terms of target discrimination and avoidance
of collateral damage.
Despite their changing nature, strike operations still lend themselves

well to the application of air power. Air Force is therefore likely
to remain the main provider of both the battlespace awareness and
engagement elements of the strike capability. Naval forces could
provide a useful adjunct to Air Force’s engagement capabilities by
40
AIR POWER
providing increased capacity and creating additional effects. The ability

of adversaries to hide from air and space based sensors also indicates
the increasing importance of human intelligence to provide targeting
information. This issue is further compounded by the vulnerability of
many battlespace awareness assets to ground fire.
The experiment found that the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter should be able
to provide the ADF with a highly capable strike platform, which will
possess most of the required characteristics. However, its flexibility and
precision may be impaired by limitations in available weapon options.
The effects generated through the application of ‘soft kill’ options are
difficult to assess and led to this option not being considered to be
sufficiently effective. The availability of alternate platforms for strike
operations, such as the multi-mission maritime aircraft, was largely
limited due to concurrent tasking requirements.
Long-range stand-off weapons have excellent utility against large fixed

targets but lack the flexibility for use against a wide range of targets
and their time-offlight limits their effectiveness against fleeting targets
of opportunity presented by a highly mobile, dispersed adversary.
Their prime purpose is as a ‘first strike’ weapon that will make the
battlespace more accessible to other platforms and weapons.
General purpose, direct attack munitions such as the small diameter

bomb are likely to find the greatest utility in future strike campaigns,
particularly in urban environments. Indeed, an even smaller weapon
that would enable greater numbers to be carried by the JSF may have
even further utility.
The air force strike capability of the future will have greater reach and
persistence, particularly in the realm of battlespace awareness, with
the advent of long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicles. However,
the ability of the engagement elements to meet the persistence and
reach criteria will often be contingent on the Air Force’s ability to
mount high intensity combat operations from an off-shore forward
41
operating base—even with support from air-to-air refuelling. This type

of operation will have implications for combat support, logistics and
force protection that need careful examination.
Lack of adequate capacity was seen as the greatest weakness of the

future ADF strike force. The adversary could employ strategies that
attempt to extend the duration of the operation, to test the ADF’s
sustainability. Of course, this implies that the adversary would have
the capacity to sustain operations for the period required.
In conclusion, although some weaknesses were highlighted throughout

the experiment, it was found that with sufficient effort in realignment
of capacities and strategies, Air Force of 2020 will be able to deliver
the necessary strike capability.
42
ENABLERS –
THE CRITICAL FACTOR
A lthough the youngest of force projection capabilities, air power

has carved a distinct niche for itself not only as a purely military
capability but also as an asset that can be brought to bear in disparate
situations in support of national policy. This rise to prominence, in
a short span of a century, has been made possible because of two
complimentary factors. First, the continuous push by the commercial
scientific community to enlarge the envelope of technology that provide
air power with its operational capabilities and second, the willingness
of the practitioners of air power to experiment with emerging
technology in order to refine such capabilities. The combination of
these two factors has created a cascading enhancement of air power
capabilities, especially in the past few decades.
There is also a downside to this success story. As technology has

continued to enhance air power capabilities and provide planners with
increased options for its application, the cost factor has also surged, at
times in a disproportionate way. This has resulted in a balanced force
of high-end air power capabilities moving beyond the reach of even
comparatively rich nations. Capabilities ranging from the benign use of
airlift in humanitarian assistance to the forceful application of precision
strike have become far too expensive to procure and maintain. The
outcome has been the selective maintenance of particular capabilities
by most of the air forces around the world. Maintaining the complete
suite of capabilities in adequate measure is now prohibitively expensive
and governments around the world are questioning the need for such
expenditure.
43
While the core function of air power remains force projection in a

military sense, in this scenario, capabilities that have been traditionally
viewed as supporting the core function assume critical importance.
These support capabilities are known variously as ‘force multipliers’
and ‘enablers’. Irrespective of the designation, what they achieve is a
tangible improvement in capabilities while ensuring that the number
of assets remains within the resource availability thereby achieving a
great deal of cost-effectiveness. These enablers are more technology
reliant than most air power applications. The major enablers are space-
based assets, early warning devices, electronic warfare assets and air-
to-air refuelling capabilities.
Space-based assets cover a large swath of capabilities. Currently the

majority of surveillance and reconnaissance functions are done from
space and this leads to targeting functions. Another area where space
assets are almost omnipresent in their usage is communications. From
being sparingly used even a decade ago, space communications have
become the centrepiece of all military communication systems. It can
be said without any doubt that military operations of any magnitude are
now heavily reliant on space-based communications for their success.
From an air power perspective, these communications in conjunction
with navigational systems like the Global Positioning System (GPS)
are vital to the success of any mission. Further, the accuracy of targeting
and the precision of weapon strike are both direct functions of these
enablers. The exactness of air power application, which has become
its signature and the primary reason for its preference as a force of
first choice and a tool of political deterrence, is achieved through the
appropriate application of space-based assets.
Even when air power is not being employed in an offensive or coercive

manner, there is a need to deploy adequate defensive capabilities. The
improvements in Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C)
capabilities now provide a measure of assurance to air defence
capabilities and greatly enhance offensive applications. Some form
44
AIR POWER
of AEW&C is now considered a baseline requisite for effective air

control, even when such control is delineated in time and space.
The advent of such capabilities is based on the availability of advanced

technology and therefore Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities have
assumed increased importance. Effective EW can create a zone of
complete silence that can be exploited to great advantage by an efficient
adversary. The need to have sufficiently capable EW and also the
capability to counter enemy action in the EW sphere is a necessity in
the modern battlefield. Appropriate application of EW can make even a
large force blind and ineffective. The importance of EW assets will only
increase in the future with reliance on communications and other space-
based assets becoming a prerequisite for effective air power application.
Historically range and reach have been a weak link in the employment
of air power. The advent of air-to-air refuelling (AAR) has neutralised
this perceived disadvantage. With AAR air power now has truly global
reach. The outcome is the capability for a force to project air power
anywhere and deliver the necessary force, whether it is the deployment
of Special Forces or a direct strike on some centre of gravity. The
rapidity with which air power can achieve such a strike has greatly
increased the flexibility in its employment in support of national
security requirements.
While the major enablers discussed above have become critical to the
successful employment of air power, it must also be borne in mind that
all of them by themselves are expensive capabilities to obtain, maintain
and operate. Their cost-effectiveness is apparent in the enhancement
of air power capabilities that they bring about and is a comparative
assessment. The quantum of enablers needed and the types that an air
force should aspire to acquire will be a direct function of the role that
air force is expected to play in the pursuit of national security. The
only hard fact is that without adequate enablers, no air force can be
expected to deliver air power in a cost-effective manner for any given
time.
45
Joint Air-to-Surface Stand-off Missile in flight.
CRUISE MISSILES –
A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD
I n the past few years, air forces around the world have expressed
increasing interest in the potential of cruise missiles. In the past,
cruise missiles were almost exclusively the prerogative of ‘super
powers’. This was not so much a reflection of the complexity of the
technology involved in the weapon itself but the limited availability of
adequate navigational and targeting data. The reason for the increased
interest is the availability of commercial imagery with sufficient
accuracy at affordable prices to make the employment of cruise
missiles a distinct possibility for a larger number of countries.
‘Cruise missile’ is a generic term for self-propelled guided weapons

that fly like normal aircraft for much of their flight. In military terms,
they are comparatively cheap, simple to build and can be launched
in large numbers from sea, land and air. Cruise missiles are designed
for use against high-value, hardened targets that are located in well-
defended areas, where the risk to aircrew would be untenable. They
have been used in a number of operations in the recent past with great
success, being extremely accurate and effective. In the 2003 Iraq
conflict some targets of high importance were attacked by two missiles
from different directions consecutively with devastating effect.
Conventionally, cruise missiles are carried on board fighter/bomber

aircraft and are used as stand-off weapons, but initiatives are being
taken by a number of air forces to integrate them with non-penetrating
platforms like the Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) and even
standard airlifters. This will greatly increase the utility of the missiles
47
while giving an added operational envelope to these aircraft. The

versatility of these missiles in their capability to do both land attack
and anti-ship missions makes them an attractive option to military
planners.
The latest cruise missile program in the United States is the Lockheed
Martin AGM-158 JASSM (Joint Air-to-Surface Stand-off Missile).
This has a 450-kilogram warhead and uses imaging Infra-Red (IR)
guidance. The missile has a range of over 460 kilometres even in its
low-cost version and is expected to be compatible with all US fighters
and bombers except the F/A-22. The JASSM also has the capability
for retargeting and impact assessment through dedicated datalink.
Improvements being made in the engine and fuel carrying capacity
are likely to give the JASSM-Extended Range (ER) missile a range in
excess of 1100 kilometres.
Currently the only combat-proven new generation cruise missile is

MBDA’s long-range cruise missile produced as Storm Shadow for the
UK, Italy and Greece; SCALP-EG for France; and Black Shaheen for
the United Arab Emirates. The importance attached to the possession
of proven cruise missiles has been a crucial factor in the selection of
aircraft such as the Mirage-2000 by some of the air forces since the
US was unwilling to integrate Storm Shadow with the F-16. The Storm
Shadow has a range in excess of 250 kilometres at low levels and is all
weather capable. The weapon is basically stealthy and is designed to
be operational for 25 years.
The RAAF is expected to select a new cruise missile, the follow-on

stand-off weapon (FOSOW), under the Air 5418 project by the end
of 2005. The three short-listed contenders are the Boeing AGM-84K
SLAM-ER (Stand-off Land Attack Missile Extended Range), EADS/
Saab Bofors Taurus and the AGM-158 JASSM.
While legitimate forces around the world are in the process of

acquiring these sophisticated weapon systems, there is also a looming
48
AIR POWER
security problem associated with these missiles. The low cost cruise
missile, which can be assembled with minimum technology and
which would provide a fair modicum of accuracy, would have to be
viewed as a potential terrorist weapon. Even if the range were only
100–150 kilometres, the missile would be extremely difficult to detect
and destroy. The implications are very clear.
The term ‘cruise missile’ conjures up images of high-tech, expensive

Tomahawk type missiles graphically shown on television sets across
the globe during Desert Storm, and several times thereafter. However,
the essential fact is that it is nothing but an uninhabited aircraft that
carries out a one-way mission. In fact it can be low, slow flying,
simple, effective and affordable. Therein lies the worry for military
tacticians and strategists. The open availability of GPS has dramatically
simplified the major problem that restricted the proliferation of these
missiles so far.
However, the proliferation and use of cruise missiles has to be taken

for granted. The inherent casualty aversion of political decision-makers
ensures that cruise missiles will always be looked at as a preferred first
option in any kind of conflict. The assured accuracy of the missile also
makes it an option to be used in deterrent action as a warning of further
intent.
From an air force perspective, cruise missiles have the potential

to disrupt their activities by targeting air bases and making them
unavailable for crucial periods of time. The difficulties in neutralising
these missiles give them a disproportionately high capability in this
role. Even if they do not achieve actual destruction of air assets, their
nuisance value would more than adequately create the desired effect of
disruption and could deter forward deployment.
What planners must now contend with is the certainty that any air
power deployment would have to cater for unforeseen cruise missile
attacks on bases and other infrastructure from undetectable positions.
49
The current passive and few active defence measures that are being
practiced will not provide the necessary assuredness of protection. This
will add to the already complex scenario and give the adversary an
extra option in terms of asymmetry. The time has perhaps come to look
at cruise missiles as a system entity rather than yet another weapon in
order to develop a cohesive and practical concept of operations as well
as an effective defence.
50
ARE UNINHABITED COMBAT AIR
VEHICLES COMING OF AGE?
I n late November 2002, a Predator Uninhabited Air Vehicle (UAV)

created history of sorts. This UAV—armed with two Hellfire
missiles; controlled by commanders in Saudi Arabia; fed data from
Washington; piloted from the ground in French-garrisoned Djibouti;
cued by observers on the ground—attacked and killed a top Al Queda
leader and four of his aides as they drove along an isolated road in
north-west Yemen. Does this indicate the beginning of a radical shift
in the way aerial attacks on targets of opportunity will be carried out?
Although the term Uninhabited Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV) was

coined barely a decade ago, a great deal of work is being poured into
its further development. The largest single effort is the Pentagon-led
Joint Unmanned Combat Air System (J-UCAS), budgeted at more than
US$4 billion over the next five years.
The original concept of the UCAV was of a small aircraft, stealthy by

virtue not only of its shape but also its size, and inexpensive enough
to be expendable in high-risk missions. The employment concept was
one of being airlifted into theatre from long-term storage for use as
the ‘first day of the war’ assault equipment in short-duration missions,
aimed at breaking down enemy air defences to ensure survivability of
manned aircraft that would follow.
Recent experiences have impacted on these concepts, mainly because

of the difficulty in obtaining convenient air bases. This situation
necessitated the UCAVs being designed to have long range and
51
endurance to be able to provide the required persistence over the

target area. The classic design feature of small size to enhance stealth,
and cost-effectiveness to the extent of it being expendable, were both
somewhat diluted in this effort. In addition, UCAVs are also being
considered for electronic attack missions, which further increases the
overall weight while making them some of the most sophisticated air
vehicles—inhabited or uninhabited.
Boeing is working on the X-45C and the X-45CN (US Navy derivative)
and Northrop Grumman is developing the X-47B. Both the vehicles are
scheduled for their maiden flights in 2006, with operational assessments
to commence in 2007. The X-45C is a 16,300 kilograms flying-wing
vehicle with a wingspan of 15 metres, powered by a General Electric
F404-GE-102D engine, and capable of carrying a weapon load of just
over 2000 kilograms. The X-47B is larger, with a 19,050 kilogram
gross weight and a Pratt & Whitney F100 engine.
An interesting concept that is common to almost all UCAV development

is that they do not carry any defensive sensors, active countermeasures
or decoys. They are designed for range and endurance rather than
speed and agility, and are completely dependent on stealth for their
survival. There are technological difficulties in enhancing stealth in
small vehicles, especially with the positioning and design of inlet and
exhaust systems. Another potential problem that is being addressed
is in-flight refuelling of UCAVs, because the fidelity (accuracy and
responsiveness) of the automatic flight control systems in use with
UCAVs is not as good as in manned aircraft. In-flight refuelling tests
are not expected to commence before 2007–09.
Currently there are no plans that have been disclosed by any non-US
defence agency to produce UCAVs, but in mid-June this year Dassault
and EADS have announced plans to collaborate in the development of a
European UCAV demonstrator to be named Neuron. Saab and Hellenic
Aerospace Industries have also signed agreements with Dassault to
be part of the program. While the technological developments are
52
AIR POWER
proceeding at a reasonably fast pace, there are some philosophical and

moral problems that operational deployment of the UCAVs will bring
out.
From a warfighting perspective, it can be seen that a UCAV will produce

data and images that are at the tactical level—live, but at the ‘small
world’ lowest level. There will be an inherent problem of determining
how high the data should be allowed to flow upward, considering the
purely tactical resonance of the information. Conversely, there will
also be a tendency for senior commanders to interfere with the lower
levels and operate ‘down in the weeds’. This is a philosophically
difficult dilemma that will need to be clearly addressed.
From a moral perspective, the first requirement is to be able to assess

the proportionality of an attack in accordance with the Law of Armed
Conflict (LOAC), which is currently done by the human being at the
end of the delivery chain. This basic necessity may place a natural
limit to the uninhibited independent development of UCAVs as well
as their operational employment. The basic question that needs very
clear articulation is the quantum of human oversight that is required
for the unhindered operational employment of a UCAV, and how this
can be achieved.
The commander of today is perpetually wrestling with ambiguity,

despite the increased situational awareness that is provided to him by a
plethora of sensors. Conflict has moved on to become a complex arena
requiring constant human interference and interface with artificial
intelligence. This is ever more important in offensive missions. The
level of human interaction required with UCAVs may be different,
dependent on the mission vis-a-vis its basic defensive and offensive
content. Answers have to be found to both the philosophical as well as
the moral issues that will come up with the increased use of UCAVs.
Another human factor issue that designers are grappling with is how
to allow one operator to control several vehicles, rather than having
53
multiple people to one vehicle as is the current situation. The legal

factors associated with determining the onus of responsibility for
misdirected attacks are yet another unresolved debating point. Speeding
up the kill-chain while reducing the analysis of available information
may have very serious repercussions.
With the enormous amount of resources being made available for

developmental work on UCAVs, some of these problems may be
solved in the near-term. But a majority of them will take several years
to be ironed out, and even then some may continue to be contentious
in the operational employment of these vehicles.
54
UNINHABITED COMBAT
AIR VEHICLES – CHALLENGES
FOR THE FUTURE
C urrently there are a number of programs being pursued by a

host of countries to demonstrate the technical feasibility of an
Uninhabited Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV) to effectively prosecute
lethal strike missions with an acceptable level of autonomy, within the
existing and possible future battlespace. Even though they apply force,
these systems are being envisioned more as force enablers to the core
force providers at least for the next two decades and are then expected
to evolve into the broader range of combat missions, dependent on the
maturation of emerging technologies.
Although the UCAVs operationally fielded to date are only the

first-generation, their advent into the combat arena has initiated
a subtle transformation in the conduct of operations not only in
the air environment but also of the entire military force. However,
this transformation is neither fully apparent nor is it clearly charted
in terms of the end state, mainly because there is a great deal of
uncertainty regarding the delineation of the roles and missions that
can be performed by these systems. The current thinking indicates that
UCAVs would be allocated missions that are categorised as ‘the dull,
the dirty and the dangerous’.
Unmanned airborne systems have been traditionally used as

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets; their
performance envelope being constantly improved with breakthroughs
55
in sensor technology. Even though they still have some serious

limitations to overcome, it is now acknowledged that these systems have
primacy in the ISR role over manned and space-based assets. Sensor
technology is very advanced, but it still has not developed sufficiently to
facilitate the autonomous conduct of complex battlespace management
functions, and therefore manned systems still have the core role to
play. Since manned systems are very costly and need self-protection
measures to assure their safety, affordability and expendability become
the two main factors that support further development in sensors
to increase effectiveness of unmanned systems. However, there are
lingering doubts and problems regarding the employment of these
vehicles in a completely autonomous manner.
Based on the success of a few time-sensitive strikes, a definitive role

that has emerged for the UCAVs is that of Suppression of Enemy Air
Defences (SEAD), although these are not time-sensitive targets in
the normal sense unless they are mobile defences. The improvements
in surface-to-air missiles in the recent past have made the SEAD
role almost suicidal for manned aircraft and UCAVs are seen as the
panacea for this situation. However, it has also to be borne in mind
that attrition of the UCAV could be considered acceptable only when
the alternative is the loss of a manned aircraft, since they are expensive
assets to be considered totally expendable. This situation argues for
the development of a more sophisticated SEAD strategy that should
incorporate low-cost decoys to make the location of air defences
simpler, followed by the use of stand-off weapons, manned aircraft
and/or UCAVs for the strike. The bottom line is that even in this most-
dangerous role, the UCAV still cannot operate autonomously with the
desired effectiveness.
It is not difficult to imagine this strike role of the UCAV being

enlarged to Counter Air missions, once again in a combined strike
package that will have the benefit of a manned platform to make
the complex decisions and intuitive changes needed to successfully
lead and complete complicated multi-aircraft missions. Once again
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AIR POWER
the challenge is for technology to answer the need to have adequate

decision-making capability built into the UCAV to permit it to operate
with the desired level of autonomy. Development of decision-making
artificial intelligence has been ongoing for a number of years, but it
has still not reached sufficient maturity, and there is no indication of
the time needed to field it operationally. However, this is the key to
autonomous performance of UCAVs.
There is a great deal of speculative debate regarding the use of UCAVs

in the air superiority role necessitating their employment in air combat
missions. This will have to remain in the realm of futuristic thought at
least for the next few decades since it requires a number of elements
that artificial intelligence currently does not possess and is unlikely to
develop cohesively anytime soon.
Yet another factor that inhibits the autonomous employment of UCAVs,

even in strike missions, is the reluctance of the political and military
leadership to leave the final ‘kill’ decision to artificial intelligence. To
let a machine make the decision to kill a human is an inherent anathema
to human authority. The prospect of even a single such strike going
awry would almost completely negate the granting of such autonomy
for the foreseeable future. Therefore, command and control of UCAVs
will always rest with a manned element within the mission package. If
this is the case, then the question begs to be asked as to whether or not
more emphasis should be placed on further development of decision-
making artificial intelligence or whether the emphasis should be on
developing the wherewithal for seamless interoperability between
manned and unmanned systems.
UCAVs are a reality and there is no doubt that their mission envelopes
will continuously be pushed outwards. It is also a reality that, although
a great amount of research and development is currently being
undertaken in this field, the fidelity required for independent decision-
making using artificial intelligence will not be available in the near
future. There is also no certainty regarding the timeframe within which
57
the necessary fidelity would be developed. This uncertainty provides

the only certainty that can be deduced from this analysis: that a manned
system will continue to form the nucleus in command and control of
the battlespace as well as in hard combat situations wherein instinctive
and intuitive decision-making will be the winning factor.
58
AEROSPACE? DON’T YOU MEAN
AIR AND SPACE?
‘A erospace’ is a popular word in the RAAF these days. From

relative obscurity ten years ago, it has become ubiquitous
throughout RAAF publications of the past decade. Our single-Service
doctrine now describes us as proponents of aerospace power rather than
just air power. We have directorates that are charged with aerospace
development. Operational doctrine now describes aerospace battle
management in place of air defence and airspace control.
So when did ‘aerospace’ become the most accurate word to use in

describing our doctrine, who we are and what we are hoping to achieve?
What has changed such that aerospace is in fact a better word to use
rather than air or aeronautical? In many instances the simple answer
seems to be ‘not much.’ We seem to have chosen to use ‘aerospace’
simply because it sounds more exciting and technologically advanced—
or to put it in somewhat less subtle terms, because it sounds sexier.
Sexier, yes, but what does ‘aerospace’ actually mean? There certainly
is an implied connection with space. In fact the Macquarie dictionary
states that ‘aerospace’ is ‘the earth’s envelope of air and the space
beyond.’ Thus by the use of ‘aerospace’ a direct link to space is
established, along with all the trappings associated with space
operations—big budgets, high risks and cutting edge technology.
Small wonder then that aerospace has greater appeal than the term
‘aeronautical’ or just plain old ‘air’.
59
The term ‘aerospace’ apparently first came into use in the late 1950s
when applied by US Air Force senior leadership. The term was used
as a means of presenting air and space as a seamless continuum, thus
supporting the claim of the USAF for operational primacy in space
over and above the growing claims of the US Army and US Navy.
Specifically, USAF leadership actively propounded that ‘air and space
are not two separate media to be divided by a line... They are in truth a
single indivisible field of operations.’ And thus, goes the implication,
should be the responsibility of a single service—the USAF.
In essence, it appears that ‘the “aerospace” idea’ was advanced by past

USAF leadership ‘almost entirely by fiat, with little serious analysis
or prior systematic thought given to it’ in order to fight a turf war.
Despite this somewhat questionable origin, the word ‘aerospace’ has
survived and prospered, fostering a growing mindset that air and space
can actually be viewed as one environment. The RAAF seems to have
adopted this view wholeheartedly, doctrinally stating that the aerospace
is the ‘third dimension... above the surface of the earth’.
While technically defensible—air and space certainly represent the

third dimension above the earth—this single environment view is
inappropriate. A comparison of the environmental characteristics of
air and space clearly indicate that space is a distinct environment, as
different from the air environment as the air environment is from land
or sea. These differences drive fundamental dissimilarities between
operations carried out in the two environments. Put simply, the laws
of aerodynamics govern operations in the air environment, whereas
orbital mechanics govern operations in space.
Definitions aside, does the presentation of the ‘aerospace’ as a single

continuum really matter? The answer unfortunately is ‘it depends.’ In
general usage, for all its inappropriate application, no, the use of the
term aerospace does not seem to represent the source of any major
problems.
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AIR POWER
When used by a military organisation to describe roles and

responsibilities, however, as has been done by the RAAF, the use of
‘aerospace’ must be viewed more critically.
Current RAAF attempts to use the aerospace-as-a-single-continuum

construct appear to be driving a belief that one doctrine can adequately
account for the physical differences between air and space. This flies
in the face of conventional practices. Military forces that operate in
different environments have always had fundamentally different
characteristics and thus different doctrines. This is reflected in the
current structure of the ADF, comprising the three distinct services,
with each service focused on the development of operational expertise
in one given environment.
Traditionally, the single Services have existed in order to develop

environment specific expertise and capabilities. Specifically, the Navy
is the maritime environment expert, the Army is the land environment
expert and the Air Force—at least in the past—was the air environment
expert. The services accordingly have developed doctrine to support
operations in their specific environments. Current Navy and Army
single-Service doctrine publications, titled ‘Australian Maritime
Doctrine’ and ‘The Fundamentals of Land Warfare’ respectively, reflect
this single environment focus. Previous editions of RAAF doctrine
likewise focused on a single environment, air, with this focus implicit
in the title of ‘The Air Power Manual’.
With the release of the fourth edition of AAP1000 the RAAF seems to
have attempted to maintain this single domain focus, but has chosen to
define its environmental responsibility as the ‘aerospace’, rather than
the air environment. The real danger of this approach is that, by failing
to recognise space as a distinct environment, existing air power doctrine
may then be inappropriately applied to the space environment.
Inappropriate doctrine will always handicap the employment of current

competencies and any attempts to develop capabilities for the future.
61
Recognising this fact, the USAF seems to have now acknowledged

the error of its original aerospace construct, stating that ‘Attempts to
combine space and air operations—the aerospace philosophy—have
served to retard the development of space doctrine.’
Without the acknowledgment of space as a separate environment, the

RAAF will never be able to develop meaningful space power doctrine
and capabilities. With this in mind the RAAF must acknowledge that
‘aerospace’ does in fact mean ‘air’ and ‘space’, and move to develop
doctrine and capabilities accordingly.
62
SPACE POWER AND THE RAAF
T hese are interesting times in the evolution of space power within

the RAAF. While the space environment is distinct from air, space
systems enable or improve many air capabilities. The capabilities of
space systems are continually increasing, so the value of space to the
RAAF is increasing commensurately.
Space power can be described as the use of space capabilities to

enable the pursuit of national objectives. Although military power is
only one element of national power, the part that the RAAF has to play
in furthering Australian economic and military objectives through the
use of space is steadily growing.
Compared to land, sea or air systems, the primary advantage offered

by space systems is improved perspective. A space vehicle has a field
of view of a large portion of the Earth, and can be viewed from large
areas on the Earth. It is costly and reasonably difficult to send physical
objects into orbit or recover them, but it is cost effective to use space
systems to gather, relay or distribute information over broad areas. Thus
the current space systems are predominantly information systems.
From the point of view of air forces, the value of space is in force
enhancement to improve air capabilities. Force enhancement can
be divided into the following four activities: surveillance and
reconnaissance, precision navigation and timing (PNT), environmental
observation and communications. Environmental observation is
the least well understood activity; it provides meteorological data,
digital terrain elevation and land usage data. During Operation
Iraqi Freedom, space provided allied combat forces with a range of
63
products that improved and in some cases combined the basic force
enhancement activities. Global Positioning System (GPS) accuracy
reports included analysis of jamming and interference to allow the
best use of precision guided munitions. Satellite reconnaissance
advanced notification reporting provided information on friendly and
other satellite overflights. The combination of digital terrain elevation
data with other satellite imagery provided a means for route planning,
target detection, and mission rehearsal. The combination of PNT and
satellite communications provided support to friendly force tracking,
which reduced fratricide. Ballistic missile warning added to the
protection of friendly forces. Space capabilities bring so much military
advantage that adversaries will inevitably challenge them. Indeed,
during Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraqi forces tried to jam GPS.
Apart from the military advantages described earlier, space systems are
now vital to Australia for civil and commercial reasons. For example,
mobile telephone network infrastructure relies on PNT for timing
synchronisation, and many financial transactions rely on satellite
communications for authorisation. Space control consists of measures
to allow friendly freedom of action to effectively utilise space, while
denying such freedom of action to adversaries. Space control to protect
both military and civil national interests is an ADF concern. Space
control is analogous to air control. It requires situational awareness of
an adversary’s space capabilities and surveillance of adversary space
systems to enable counterspace operations. The RAAF’s heritage in air
control will stand us in good stead to adapt to this new role.
Future space systems will bring both opportunities and threats. The
number of nations with space capabilities is growing due to the
increased use of existing systems and the proliferation of relatively
inexpensive small satellites. Surveillance and reconnaissance is
advancing rapidly through the deployment of more Synthetic Aperture
Radar (SAR) satellites and improved imagery intelligence satellites.
PNT will improve as the US upgrades its GPS, Russia completes its
Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) constellation and
64
AIR POWER
Europe deploys its Galileo system. Communications satellites are

increasing in capacity with on-board switching and laser links. Some
space-like capabilities will be provided at a much lower cost by near-
space systems operating above 65,000 feet. All of these developments
will make space more versatile and more important to ADF operations.
The RAAF is the logical custodian of such capabilities.
The RAAF approach to the opportunities and challenges of space

has several aspects. Firstly, the process of improving our use of
existing space systems continues with activities such as integrating
GPS and datalinks into aircraft. Secondly, the RAAF readily engages
with the Directorate of Defence Space (DDS) which allows input to
Defence Space policy. Thirdly, various units within the RAAF support
specialist space education and training (in addition to DDS funded
space courses). Finally, the RAAF actively supports the development
of space power doctrine. Consideration of the current and future
situation in an academic sense replaces intuitive understanding with a
conceptual framework.
One area that could be further improved is the integration of space

capabilities at the operational level. Consider the case of the US,
where space capabilities are incorporated very well. A space specialist
is embedded in every team within the Air and Space Operations Center
(AOC) staff to advise the Joint Force Air and Space Component
Commander (JFACC) and other staff regarding the use of space to
enhance air operations. The space staff also serve as a conduit to the
Fourteenth Air Force AOC, commonly known as the ‘Space AOC’,
which directs space operations in all theatres and conducts combat
planning and space-strategy development.
Within the RAAF Air Operations Centre (AOC), specialist teams reach
out to external organisations in order to use space force enhancement.
However, the RAAF AOC does not have a space specialist in each
team, although some staff have coincidental space experience.
Consequently, not all systems are fully exploited. For example, GPS
65
accuracy prediction is conducted routinely by the USAF and yet is

not a standard procedure in the RAAF AOC. If we wish to better
integrate current force enhancement or utilise new capabilities, then
it is necessary to embed at least one space specialist within the RAAF
AOC staff.
The AOC concept is relatively new for the RAAF and will undoubtedly
mature. Space will continue to increase in importance with the
introduction of new capabilities, and so the role of space in the AOC
will evolve significantly. AOC function and manning will reflect this
change, bringing benefits in operational-level interoperability. By
becoming a knowledgeable and valued partner at the operational level,
the RAAF could engage the US and other allies in dialogue on how
to legally and ethically wield what will be an impressive and growing
source of military power.
66
FUTURE SPACE CAPABILITIES
A s space systems develop, their utility in enabling or improving

air capabilities will inevitably increase. In the coming decade
the RAAF will make better use of space data to improve situational
awareness, apply effects precisely, and attempt to ensure our use of
space systems while denying their use to adversaries. Other nations
will attempt to do the same things. Non-state actors will also be able
to access many space capabilities commercially. Our challenge is to
ensure that the RAAF gains more than our potential adversaries do
from future space system capabilities.
In order to understand future space capabilities, we should examine

other nations’ advances in the space power roles of space support,
space control, and force enhancement. Force application by ballistic
missiles transiting through space is not a role being pursued by the
RAAF and so will not be discussed further. Space support comprises
activities to deploy and sustain space systems. Other nations are trying
to produce responsive launch systems that can quickly launch satellites
on demand, including some proposals to air-launch small satellites
from fighter aircraft. More ground stations will be established, as
delivery of space data much closer to the end user will contribute to the
tactical use of assets that were previously considered to be strategic.
A developmental ‘on-orbit servicing’ capability will soon be fielded,
which will extend the service life of satellites in a way similar to how
air-to-air refuelling extends aircraft endurance.
Space control consists of measures to allow friendly freedom of action

to effectively utilise space, while denying such freedom of action to
adversaries. The foundation is space situational awareness—knowing
67
where space objects are and what they are doing. Research in this
area includes terrestrial and space-based radars and telescopes to not
only detect but also image orbiting objects. The resulting knowledge
of the orbital parameters and missions of spacecraft operated by
other agencies allows defensive or offensive counterspace measures
to be taken. Operational prototypes of deployable systems are being
fielded that can jam satellite communication and navigation systems
temporarily. Systems are also being developed to detect and geolocate
jamming or unintended interference so countermeasures can be used.
Research continues into the means to permanently deny the use of
space systems to adversaries, including a variety of anti-satellite
weapons. Anti-ballistic missile systems are being developed to counter
adversary force application by intercepting ballistic missiles in the
boost, mid-course or terminal phase.
Force enhancement describes space power activities that improve or

enable military capabilities. Technological advances are influencing
a number of these activities such as environmental observation,
surveillance and reconnaissance, precision navigation and timing, and
communications.
Environmental observation includes meteorological, terrain elevation

and land usage data from satellites. Meteorology is always vital to air
operations, and the ADF currently gets its meteorological data from
Japanese, Chinese and US satellites. The instruments being fielded
on meteorological satellites are continually improving our knowledge
of factors such as sea and land surface temperatures, and cloud and
aerosol density profiles, allowing better weather prediction.
Surveillance and reconnaissance systems are improving due to

advances in sensor technology. In 2008, a commercial service will place
a satellite in geostationary orbit to collect a moving real-time colour
image covering 40 per cent of the earth—from India to Hawaii—with
great benefit for maritime surveillance and meteorological reporting.
Research into extremely large electronically scanned antennas in
68
AIR POWER
space is likely to eventually bring vast improvement in the sensitivity

of space-based electronic intelligence and synthetic aperture radar
(SAR). A constellation of radar satellites could offer frequently
updated SAR imagery and ground moving target indicator (GMTI)
detection. Hyperspectral sensors allow the visible and infra-red
radiation components in each pixel of a scene to be separated into over
30 frequency bands, and in some systems over hundreds of bands,
giving objects that may look similar to the eye unique signatures.
Military applications include detecting and classifying camouflage
nets, and in future detecting certain chemical vapours such as those
emitted by explosives or chemical weapons.
Precision navigation and timing (PNT) will continue to become more

accurate and more reliable. The Global Positioning System (GPS) is
being progressively upgraded, as each new satellite launched into the
constellation is more capable than the one it replaces. Galileo, the
European global navigation satellite system (GNSS), will be deployed
within five years or so, offering another source of PNT information.
Dual system GPS/Galileo receivers are likely to enter ADF service
within a decade, giving redundancy if one system is jammed. Russia
is striving to complete GLONASS, its own independent GNSS
system, which will be another potential source of data. Many nations
are deploying land and space based augmentation systems that will
improve the accuracy and reliability of GNSS data. GPS is already
widely used within the RAAF, but assured GNSS service will become
absolutely vital with the introduction of GPS guided weapons. The
ADF must strive for adequate navigation warfare capability—the
capacity to preserve our ability to use GNSS and deny its use to
adversaries.
Satellite communication systems are currently undergoing a period

of transformation led primarily by an increase in processing power.
Mainbeam anti-jam signal processing and coding help improve
performance in hostile electronic warfare environments. The new
generation of satellites use onboard switching of user signals to
69
continuously reallocate bandwidth to each link on a basis of need,

maximising efficiency. In legacy systems, transmissions over very
long distances require the signal to pass through multiple satellites
and ground stations. Laser links directly between satellites will vastly
reduce this ‘multi-hop’ burden on radio frequency uplink and downlink
bandwidth. Laser uplink and downlink should become feasible for some
applications, further boosting capacity and minimising the chance of
intercept or interference.
Many of the advances listed above will also be applicable to near-

space platforms that give some space-like capabilities at much lower
cost. Near-space platforms operate in the little used altitude band
between 65,000 feet and approximately 325,000 feet (100 kilometres).
Possible designs include balloons, airships, or solar powered fixed wing
aircraft. These options offer a persistent, cost-effective and responsive
presence for surveillance and reconnaissance, communications or
perhaps carrying weapons. While largely invulnerable to current anti-
air weapons, a counter to near-space platforms will inevitably arise;
yet their low cost means they can be considered ‘semi-expendable’.
Given their capability and low cost compared to satellites, near-space
capabilities warrant consideration by the RAAF.
The future space capabilities discussed will not be readily apparent to

most RAAF personnel. To a large extent the space services already in
use, and possibly taken for granted, will simply become more effective.
Space technology will inevitably improve. It would be a wise military
that took maximum advantage of that improvement.
70
WEAPONS IN SPACE?
I n August 2004, the US Air Force released its doctrine document

2-2.1 - Counterspace Operations. In the foreword to the document
the Chief of Staff of the USAF, General John P. Jumper, stated
‘Counterspace operations have defensive and offensive elements, both
of which depend on robust space situational awareness.’
Chapter five of the document very clearly enunciates Offensive

Counterspace Operations, in which the use of direct methods to destroy
space systems of the enemy is briefly enumerated. Does this mean that
the only Super Power of the world will weaponise space in order to
maintain the unassailable military advantage that it currently enjoys
that mainly stem from the optimum use of space based assets?
The international community dealing with arms-control has already

raised the alarm, since the document is the air force’s blueprint for the
use of space-based weapons systems to deny an adversary the use of
space for any purpose. This has greater implications than the benign use
of force, if there can be such a possibility, to thwart military intentions
of a potential enemy. Since the threat perceptions have radically
changed in the past five years, this assertion of the intent to deny the
use of space could also mean that purely commercial satellites that
provide communication capabilities to unconventional adversaries
could also be targeted for neutralisation. The implications in terms
of international freedom as well as sovereignty of the owner-nations
would be very convulsive.
The US Air Force has gone to great lengths to explain the offensive
counterspace activities as being almost completely reliant on terrestrial-
71
based weapons that could create reversible, temporary effects, in a

reiteration of effects-based operations. However, the official acceptance
of this new mission is itself indicative of the conceptual developmental
process within the US military establishment of the need to place some
kind of weapon in space, even if it is meant for use as a last resort. The
fall-out is almost certain to be the crossing over of the rest of the space-
capable nations to accepting the need for space combat capabilities. Is
this the beginning of another arms race, this time in space?
The factor that worries arms-control experts is not so much the concept of
taking human combat into space, but the dangers that such a move would
have on the myriad of peaceful applications of space. The international
economy, and through it almost all national security imperatives, has
been increasingly globalised and is now almost completely reliant
on secure communications for its robustness. This communications
system is almost completely space-based. Any deterioration in the
capacity, both quality and quantum, of communication would have
disastrous consequences in a number of different fields—security
issues being the most affected. Considering that space debris of even
one centimetre diameter can cause catastrophic damage to a satellite,
the destruction of space systems with the attendant scattering of debris
could well prove to be untenable in the larger global context.
This view of the absolute need to keep space as an arena of global

peace and goodwill has already been negated by the use of satellites as
integral parts of the warfighting machinery. Although the two thought
processes are somewhat in disconsonance, there is perhaps consensus
within the debate for the need to protect these assets both in times of
war as well as in peace. It is the means to achieve this central aim that
makes it almost impossible to contain the placement of weapons in
space.
Undoubtedly the United States is the leading nation in the exploitation

of space. Combined with its inherent and basic doctrine of absolute
and overwhelming dominance of the battle area it is almost certain
72
AIR POWER
that, irrespective of the international community’s misgivings, the US

would deploy weapons in space to ensure that a space attack is not
perpetuated on it.
Currently there are no ‘rules’ or multilateral treaties that govern the

conduct of military space activities. It is the fervent hope of arms-
control advocates that space can be spared the spectre of human
combat and war. The reality, however, seems to be less promising. The
United States is the world’s leading ‘space-faring’ nation and it would
not want to lose this clear advantage. Therefore, it is certain that it
would not wait for a disruptive attack on its systems before putting in
place counterspace measures. The situation now is more likely to be
of when, not if.
The United Nations may be the only agency that could effectively
bring the space nations to a discussion, but unfortunately its powers
of persuasion has been steadily declining in the past decade. The
UN’s Conference on Disarmament (CD) has been almost completely
gridlocked since 1999, with the United States and China not willing to
compromise on separate issues. There is a committee within the CD
called the Prevention of an Armed Race in Outer Space (PAROS) that
has not been able to even have a formal exchange of ideas between the
space nations. All resolutions regarding space that have been passed at
the UN have been non-binding and are therefore unlikely to be of any
value other than academic.
Where does this leave the world community of nations? The answer
is complex. It will certainly lead to a situation wherein the greatest
military and economic power to straddle the world for the past half
century will be forced to take unpalatable steps to ensure its ascendancy
and place weapons in space. The complexity will emerge from the less
predictable repercussions from other space-capable nations, which
could be both covert and overt. There are clearly no direct answers,
nor are there likely to be any clear winners.
73
International Space Station: how long before the weaponisation of space?
Whispering Death by Lindsay Stepanow:

Art First Prize, 2005 Heritage Awards.
Wedgetail AEW&C aircraft in 2 Squadron colours.
F/A-18 Hornets dropping ordnance during training.

MQ-9 Predator with GBU-12.
X-45A UCAV on test flight, December 2002.

RAAF Dakota employed in Antarctica in 1959–61.
F-4E on display in RAAF Museum.

SAS passing wrecked Iraqi aircraft at Al Asad airbase.
Aerial refueling of RAAF Hornet during Iraq operations.

HISTORY
For good or ill, air mastery is today the supreme expression of

military power. And fleets and armies, however necessary and
important, must accept subordinate rank. This is a memorable
milestone in the march of man.
– Winston Churchill, 1949

80
IRAQ – THE FIRST TIME AROUND
A ustralia’s off-and-on military involvement in Iraq over the past

decade or so has given that country a focus in public awareness
that it never had before, yet 2003 (or even 1991) was not the first
time that Australian Defence personnel had an active role in warlike
operations there. In fact, Iraq was the scene of the very first campaign
undertaken by Australian airmen nearly 90 years ago.
Back in 1915, Iraq was known as Mesopotamia and the country was
under the control of Turkey, a German ally in World War I. After
British forces seized Basrah to secure the oil pipeline terminal there,
authorities in India planned to mount an invasion to drive the Turks out
of Baghdad. Because the home government in London was preoccupied
with the Western front, raising and equipping such an expeditionary
force would have to be done locally. For this reason Australia and
New Zealand were asked to assist in raising an aviation unit.
Although Australia had recently opened a military flying school,

it then had only a few qualified pilots and no aircraft to spare. It
nonetheless agreed to supply a contingent of four officer pilots and
41 other ranks, including 18 mechanics. On arrival at Basrah in May
1915, this group—dubbed the ‘Mesopotamian Half Flight’—joined an
18-strong party of Indian Flying Corps personnel (just two pilots), and
the sole pilot sent by New Zealand. Thus the ‘Mesopotamian Flight,
Royal Flying Corps’ came into being.
The aircraft initially available to get the unit airborne were three frail and
under-powered Maurice-Farman biplanes suitable for reconnaissance
work, but little else. A month later came two Caudron aircraft, which
81
had bigger engines but were only marginally more reliable. Later still
(August), the Flight received single-seat Martinsyde scouts—still not
much better—and was designated ‘No 30 Squadron, RFC’. Some
Short 827 seaplanes also arrived, forming a separate flight for artillery
spotting. Not until the long-promised delivery of four BE2c machines at
the end of October did the squadron finally possess effective aircraft.
During a long advance up the Tigris River that by October brought the
British expeditionary force to within 50 kilometres of Baghdad, the
Australian pilots flew repeated reconnaissance missions. On some of
these a limited bombing role was added, as during the battle of Qurna
(31 May–1 June), when 2-pound hand-bombs were thrown out over
the side to cause panic among the enemy. When 20-pound (9 kilogram)
bombs were duly received, it was found that the bomb-racks supplied
were useless, so that on later occasions bombs were generally dropped
through a hole cut in the cockpit floor.
Ground-fire proved to be a lesser danger to the airmen than the heat

and sand-laden winds, which created constant risk of engine failure.
Forced landings behind the Turkish lines resulted in the capture of
several pilots, including one Australian on 16 September. An earlier
such incident, on 30 July, resulted in the death of another Australian
and his New Zealand colleague at the hands of hostile Arabs near
Abu Salibiq. Yet another Australian was captured on Baghdad’s
north-western outskirts on 13 November, during a daring mission that
involved landing to blow up the main telegraph line out of the city.
Landing accidents also reduced the number of aircraft that were

available to keep check on enemy movements and map their positions.
By the time the British made the attempt to turn the Turks out of
Ctesiphon on 22 November, just two serviceable aircraft remained.
When the British attack failed, the expeditionary force was obliged
to fall back to Al Kut where the bulk of it was duly surrounded by
more numerous Turkish columns. After the town had been invested, all
82
HISTORY
undamaged aircraft were ordered away; one of the two remaining land
planes that left on 7 December was flown by the last Australian pilot,
Captain H.A. Petre. Left behind were several pilots and observers,
and 44 NCOs and men of No 30 Squadron—including nine Australian
mechanics.
Throughout the siege, attempts were made to keep the garrison

resupplied by air, despite the limited payload possible with the available
aircraft. Captain Petre was among the pilots who flew such missions,
and the air bridge was ably supported by the Australian mechanics back
at the Basrah base who made linen parachutes for the safe dropping of
medical supplies and other breakables. One Corporal also worked out
how to mount multiple machine-guns to an aircraft undercarriage, an
arrangement which became especially important after German Fokker
machines appeared from the end of December and helped tighten the
Turkish stranglehold.
Kut surrendered in April 1916, after a five-month siege. Only two of

the nine Australians who fell into Turkish hands there survived their
ordeal, which was as bad as anything endured by a later generation
of prisoners on the Siam-Burma railway. Indeed, of the 13,000 troops
who went into captivity at Kut, only 2000 were eventually recovered
alive. Both officer pilots captured before the fall also made it home to
Australia after the war.
Early in 1916, while the Kut siege was still underway, the Australian
mechanics at Basrah were sent—with Petre—to Egypt to join a new
unit of the Australian Flying Corps that had been raised for operational
service. The Mesopotamian campaign continued, without any further
Australian involvement in air operations, but with the presence
of Australian Army signallers. These ensured that the number of
Australians who served in the theatre during World War I eventually
reached around 670.
83
The trials of the Mesopotamian Half Flight have since entered the
annals of the Royal Australian Air Force, principally on account of its
members who subsequently achieved senior rank in the new air service
formed in 1921—men such as the future Sir Thomas White (a RAAF
group captain and federal government minister) and Air Vice-Marshal
G.J.W. Mackinolty. In a sense, the experiences of No 75 Squadron in
Iraq during 2003 is a modern replay of the Air Force’s first operational
deployment.
84
LOOKING A GIFT HORSE
IN THE MOUTH
W orld War I ended abruptly when an armistice halted fighting in

November 1918. Until then, allied planners had been expecting
that German resistance would prolong hostilities into 1919, possibly
even 1920. In Britain, industrial output supporting the war effort
had accordingly continued at full pace, which meant that there was
suddenly a vast accumulation of surplus war stocks. The Royal Air
Force alone had more than 22,000 aircraft on strength; many more
were in storage awaiting delivery.
It was in this climate that, in June 1919, the Imperial authorities

offered a gift of 100 aircraft (sufficient for four service squadrons) to
the governments of Britain’s dominions—India, Canada, South Africa,
Australia and New Zealand—to assist each in establishing a viable air
force of their own. During negotiations which followed, it seems that
Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Williams, who would soon head the new
air service in Australia, suggested to British colleagues that aircraft on
their own were of little value without the spares and other equipment
needed to actually form units.
Williams’ argument was accepted, with the result that what became
known as the Imperial Gift of 1920 ended up entailing a huge array
of items valued at £1 million (perhaps $35 million at today’s value).
From the end of March 1921, shipments arrived in Melbourne every
10–14 days, each consisting of 500–700 packages. At the end of
12 months some 19,000 cases had been delivered, many weighing
two or three tonnes; as many as 30,000 different kinds of articles,
85
running to hundreds of thousands of individual items, were received.

Included were 258 motor vehicles, 191 aircraft engines and spare
parts, workshop plant, hangars, instruments, armaments, clothing and
many other items.
Amongst the gift equipment were actually 128 aircraft, the additional
machines being replacements for aircraft purchased through public
and private subscription in Australia and ‘donated’ to the war effort.
The total finally comprised thirty-five Avro 504K trainers, thirty-five
SE5A fighters, thirty DH9A and twenty-nine DH9 day bombers (an
additional bomber having been added to the tally to replace a DH9A
lost in September 1920).
There is no doubting the value of the Imperial Gift to Australia, or that

the Royal Australian Air Force which came into being during 1921
was kept supplied with machines until nearly the end of the decade.
This not unreasonably raises the question: would there have been a
RAAF without the Imperial Gift? In fact, it is clear that Australia
was intent on maintaining some form of air arm within its defence
forces long before the end of the war, and such a development would
probably have occurred irrespective of whether the Imperial Gift was
ever made.
Australian authorities had been taking an active interest in aviation for

military purposes even before World War I, having set up the Central
Flying School at Point Cook in 1913 and commenced flying operations
there in March 1914, nearly six months before the war began. The
school continued throughout the war, using a miscellany of aircraft
types. Early in 1919 a number of the school’s well-worn machines
were sold off, in anticipation of these being replaced by newer types—
twenty Avro 504Ks and twelve Sopwith Pup Scouts—ordered by the
Defence Department late in 1918. These aircraft reached Melbourne
during the first half of 1919, and became the primary equipment of
the Australian Air Corps; an Army unit set up at Point Cook from
January 1920.
86
HISTORY
When the RAAF was formed 15 months later, it simply took over the
aircraft holdings of the AAC—or rather, what was left of them. During
the brief period of the AAC’s existence, seven of the Avros had been
written off (most in crashes during two Peace Loan campaigns), along
with one of the Sopwith Pups. Also at Point Cook was a Bristol Scout,
sole survivor of the wartime CFS’s equipment, and the Vickers Vimy
heavy bomber in which the Smith brothers made their epic England–
Australia flight in 1919. The reality was that it was the 26 aircraft
passed across from the Air Corps that were the initial mainstay of the
infant RAAF. Added to this number were six Fairey IIID floatplanes
that the RAN had purchased in 1920 for use with its warships; when
these arrived in November 1921, they also went to the RAAF.
Although a small number of each aircraft type in the Imperial Gift

were uncrated and assembled for use, the bulk of the gift machines
stayed in storage until required. Official statements in July 1922 make
clear that 101 machines were still being stored at that time in wheat
sheds at Spotswood, Melbourne, rented from the Victorian Railways.
The often repeated claim that at its birth the RAAF was in the
extraordinary position of having more aircraft than men—149 officers
and men (some sources say 151) as against 154 aircraft—is true only
in a technical sense.
The chief benefit of having the gift aircraft lay in the fact that the
Australian government was able to defer the expense of purchasing
new or additional machines for the RAAF for a good number of years.
Apart from a few locally constructed Avro 504s bought in 1922–23 as
an incentive to local manufacturers, no new types were ordered until
1925; there were only nine of these anyway, three of which were non-
combat types, while six were Seagull III flying boats to meet Navy
needs. If anything, the gift proved to be an impediment to the technical
development of the Air Force. Only when it was discovered that the
machines still in storage had deteriorated, to such an extent that they
were effectively unsafe to fly, could the government be convinced to
find money for new combat types delivered in 1929.
87
Not only is it clear that the RAAF had never been dependent on the
Imperial Gift to function, but it also seems certain that the RAAF
owed its creation to factors other than simply aircraft availability. The
evidence suggests that it was the desire of the Australian government
in September 1920 to establish an air mail service across the continent
that provided the final impetus towards setting up a separate air force.
Delays in establishing trials for such a service, using the aviation
resources of the Defence Department, finally compelled the issuing
of instructions on 3 February 1921 for ‘the immediate establishment
of an Air Force, and to initiate an experimental aerial mail service’.
Fortunately, the new force was quickly relieved of the need to carry the
mail and allowed to shift its focus to meeting defence requirements.
88
THE RAAF IN ANTARCTICA
T he Royal Australian Air Force has operated in a wide range of

geographical areas and climatic conditions in both peace and war.
Given the current international situation, operations in and over desert
terrain are prominent and readily identifiable. However, it is a little
known fact that the Air Force has been involved in operations in the
Antarctic and sub-Antarctic area for over 50 years.
The Air Force has had an important role in assisting with defining
Australia’s territorial and scientific aspirations in the Antarctic. On
13 January 1930, Sir Douglas Mawson claimed the area of land between
73 degrees east longitude and 47 degrees east longitude in the name
of King George V. Two RAAF pilots, Flying Officer S.A.C. Campbell
and Sergeant G.E. Douglas, were present at this historic event. They
had been seconded from the RAAF as pilots of the Moth floatplane
that Mawson had insisted on being part of the expedition equipment.
The little aircraft was used for ice reconnaissance, photographic and
geographical survey flights.
The same two RAAF fliers (Douglas now a pilot officer) joined
Mawson’s next expedition in November 1930, undertaking a large
program of exploration and coastal survey during January–February
1931 despite constant bad sailing and flying weather. On 27 January
Douglas and Mawson suffered a mishap while preparing the Moth
for lifting back on board the expedition’s ship. An unexpected roll of
Discovery in the swell left the Moth bumping into the ship’s side at
the end of the lifting cradle, with both occupants dangling from it.
Fortunately no one was hurt and the aircraft was repairable.
89
Late in 1935 Douglas was selected to lead a six man RAAF party
to accompany an expedition sent south to assist in the rescue of
American explorer Lincoln Ellsworth and his English pilot, after
they were presumed to have gone missing while attempting to fly
across Antarctica. Douglas’ second in command was Flying Officer
Alistair Murdoch, later to become Chief of the Air Staff in 1965–70.
Accompanying the airmen in Discovery II were two machines this time:
a Wapiti and a DH60X Gipsy Moth floatplane. On 15 January 1936 the
mission succeeded in locating Ellsworth, who—despite insisting he
was neither lost nor in need of rescuing—returned in Discovery II as a
guest of the Australian government.
After World War II, Campbell was appointed director of the Australian
National Antarctic Research Expedition (ANARE) and influenced the
decision to involve the RAAF in the Australian return to Antarctica.
In 1947 a Vought Kingfisher was embarked in HMAS Wyatt Earp
(Ellsworth’s former support ship), and a Walrus aircraft aboard HMAS
Labuan, to assist with survey, photographic and reconnaissance tasks.
The Walrus was destroyed in a gale at Heard Island on 5 January 1948.
Incidentally, after being recovered and rebuilt, the aircraft is now on
display at the RAAF Museum, Point Cook.
The value of aircraft in such an environment was well recognised. In

1955 the Antarctic Flight was formed with two Auster Mk 6 aircraft.
This flight deployed with the annual ANARE expedition (with the
exception of 1961) until 1963. During this period the flight supported
scientific parties and flew survey missions that added to the geographical
knowledge of the continent. Until 1959–60 the flight remained on the
continent with the ANARE members, but that season a Dakota was
lost during cyclonic winds and that practice ceased. During 1962
and 1963 two DHC Beaver floatplanes were embarked on the annual
ANARE resupply vessels to fly communications, photographic and
survey tasks.
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HISTORY
The RAAF commitment to the ANARE was significant. (In 1959

consideration was even given to the development of an airfield, capable
of handling heavy four-engine transport aircraft, adjacent to the station
at Davis.) Logistic support was supplied through RAAF sources so
that a total of one Kingfisher, one Walrus, two Auster Mk 6, four
Beavers and a Dakota were operated by RAAF airmen in the Antarctic.
The savage natural conditions in which they operated are exemplified
by the material losses: the Walrus, one Auster, three Beavers and the
Dakota all fell victim to the harsh conditions. This was a significant
impact on the RAAF, but there was another factor that affected the
military role on the continent.
The Antarctic Treaty was signed by representatives of Argentina,

Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway,
South Africa, United Kingdom, the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1959. The Treaty came into
effect in 1961, with Poland and West Germany becoming additional
signatories during 1977 and 1981 respectively. Parties to the Treaty
agreed to drop all territorial claims to Antarctic territories for a 30-year
period and to ban the use of the continent for the testing of nuclear
weapons or the storage of radioactive waste. Additional environmental
safeguards were implemented that protected a wide variety of species
and feeding grounds.
The Antarctic Treaty attempted to depoliticise the continent and

adjacent waters. Seven nations, including Australia, have made
territorial claims to areas of the Antarctic continent. National pride,
scientific study, and the potential benefits of exploiting Antarctica’s
natural resources combined to fuel claims and raise issues that may
result in contention and political tension between nations. By defining
the area below 60 degrees south latitude a demilitarised zone, the
Antarctic Treaty limits the impact of military aviators.
It must be noted that the Antarctic Flight was a formal RAAF unit, and
that the aircraft that it operated were obviously military aircraft. They
91
were all painted with the RAAF roundel (except the Beavers, which
were painted with the ‘Boxing Kangaroo’, not the official ‘Kangaroo in
Motion’ image) and had military serial numbers. This may also explain
why the deployments of 1962 and 1963 were not long-term, nor were
visits made by Hercules aircraft at McMurdo Sound in 1978 or the
annual resupply missions to Macquarie Island by Hercules until the
mid-1980s. Anecdotal evidence that these flights were curtailed due to
environmentalist pressure, based on the path of the aircraft overflying
a penguin colony on Macquarie Island, also suggest an Australian
commitment to environmental protection in the area.
Australia has declared a 200-mile economic resource zone about

the Australian continent and the sub-Antarctic islands, Heard and
Macquarie. In addition, Heard, Macquarie and the McDonald islands,
and 1362 hectares of the Australian Antarctic Territories, have been
declared as protected areas due to their unique geography, flora and
fauna. These declarations have placed a legal responsibility on Australia
to monitor and protect them against any environmental deprecations
or illegal economic exploitation. The dramatic interception of the
Uruguayan fishing boat Viarsa 1, which was illegally harvesting
Patagonian Toothfish adjacent to Heard Island during October 2003,
is an example of the importance Australia places on its obligations in
this field.
RAAF Orion aircraft, with long range, endurance and sensor fit, could
be deployed to monitor, report and coordinate action against any similar
incursions. In the future, long range UAVs could be economically
deployed in this role. However, the international legalities of military
action in such areas are moot. The geographic location of the sub-
Antarctic islands could result in a merging of the demilitarised zone
and economic resource zone that may further complicate national
economic aims and the spirit of the international agreement.
92
THE DIFFERENCE
ONE MAN MAKES
I nevitably, air forces ‘lose’ people in the course of their activities—

either to combat in war, or to accidents in the air and on the ground
at other times. One of the most unusual fatalities ever suffered by the
RAAF was Squadron Leader William Palstra, who perished in the
1930 crash of the British airship R101. His death was not only unique
but carried profound consequences for his service back in Australia,
albeit a fact little realised at the time or long afterwards.
The R101 was one of a pair of giant new rigid-frame lighter-than-

air craft with which British hoped to answer the challenge of airship
development programs being undertaken by Germany and the United
States for international trade. It was making the inaugural flight of
a new air service from England to India when, shortly after 2am on
5 October, it ploughed nose first into the Beauvais Ridge in northern
France and exploded in a hydrogen fireball. Only eight of the 52 people
on board were spared. Among the dead were Britain’s Secretary of State
for Air, Lord Thomson, and the Director General of Civil Aviation, Air
Vice-Marshal Sir Sefton Brancker.
At the time, the RAAF had been in existence barely ten years and
comprised less than 100 officers and little more than 700 other ranks.
The loss of one of its members in such high profile and sensational
circumstances not unnaturally sent shock waves around the service,
and indeed the country. But in a sense that was surprising, since
Palstra himself was not a very well-known figure—even to his fellow
officers.
93
The reality was that Palstra only joined the RAAF in August 1925 and
had spent nearly all of the next three years at RAAF Headquarters in
Melbourne, rather than at any of the service’s three airbases. From the
end of 1928 he had been out of the country, attending the yearlong
course at the RAF Staff College at Andover, and on finishing that he
was posted to the staff of Australia House in London as the air liaison
officer (ALO) to the British Air Ministry.
In fact, though, Palstra deserved to be better-known around the RAAF,

because he was plainly a man destined for bigger and better things.
The staff appointments he held at headquarters, even in the junior
ranks of flying officer and (from March 1927) flight lieutenant, were
the important posts of Deputy Director of Personnel Services (or
Director of Manning as it was renamed in March 1928) and Director of
Personnel Services. From April 1927 until June 1928 he was also Staff
Officer to the Chief of the Air Staff, Group Captain R. Williams.
Reports on Palstra’s performance make clear that he was a highly

capable officer whose abilities deeply impressed his superiors. Perhaps
this ought not to have been the source of any surprise, since he came
to the RAAF with an educational and administrative background
unmatched at the time within the service. He was, for a start, the first
(and, for several years, only) university graduate in the officer ranks,
having received a BA degree from the University in Melbourne in
December 1924. During the period that he was studying from 1920,
he had also been employed as an assistant to the university’s Registrar
and assisted the future Professor Sir Douglas Copland in establishing
the Commerce Faculty at Melbourne.
Combined with these superior credentials, Palstra also possessed two

other qualifications which were critical for any ambitious officer in
Australia’s air force of the period: pilot training, and war service.
During World War I he had enlisted as a private in the 39th Battalion,
AIF, and by early 1917 had been commissioned. In the Battle of
Messines he not only survived (being the only officer left in his unit,
94
HISTORY
apart from the CO and adjutant, when it was relieved), but also won the
Military Cross and was twice mentioned in dispatches. Later that year
he transferred to the Australian Flying Corps, and by September 1918
was flying R.E.8s in the corps reconnaissance role with 3 Squadron,
AFC, over the Western Front.
With everything going so strongly for him, Palstra probably knew his
prospects in the RAAF were outstanding. In 1928 he was selected
for the prestigious and career-enhancing course at Andover, without
having to sit the obligatory entrance examination. The other RAAF
officer selected to attend the 1929 course there was Squadron Leader
George Jones, who noted rather sourly in his 1988 autobiography
From private to air marshal that Palstra had been exempted from this
requirement as a ‘special case’—one presumes on the basis that his BA
had already established his capacity to handle the educational side of
the Staff College course.
Palstra’s rapid progress nearly came unstuck at this point, however,

when a question arose over whether or not he was a British subject.
Although his father was English-born (Yorkshire), he himself had
been born at Zwolle, Holland, in 1891—as a consequence of his father
being a prominent figure in the Salvation Army who moved around
while running that organisation’s operations in various countries.
Young ‘Bill’ had accordingly lived for five years in Belgium, followed
by nine years in Transvaal (South Africa) and three years in England,
before finally arriving in Melbourne in October 1914. Although he had
taken a New Zealand-born wife in 1920, and had three children born in
Victoria, it was to clarify his nationality that Palstra hurriedly sought
and was granted British nationality in November 1928.
Ironically, as part of a program of industry visits by Staff College

students, during the last months of 1929 Jones and Palstra had toured
the Royal Airship Works at Cardington where R101 and its sistership
R100 were being built. On completion of their course, it was usual
for the new graduates to stay in Britain for another year of duty. In
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Jones’ case this meant a series of training appointments to RAF units,

while Palstra went to the ALO job with promotion to squadron leader
rank in July 1930. It was while here that the question arose of him
accompanying the R101 on its maiden flight to India.
According to Williams, this was a decision in which he had played

some part as CAS. In his 1977 autobiography These are facts, Williams
recorded that because the new air service was planned to be extended
to Australia he was prompted to suggest ‘that our liaison officer in
London, ... Palstra, travel on the first flight. It is possible that we were
offered a place in it but I cannot remember this with certainty.’ For his
part, Jones was greatly miffed by this, and wrote in his autobiography
that he (Jones) ‘fully expected to be chosen since I was the senior
officer in England at the time’.
That Jones was not aboard the R101 when it struck the French hillside
was his great fortune. He went on to become a famous figure in RAAF
history, retiring in 1952 as an air marshal after ten years as CAS—a
term only second to Williams’ own record in the post; he was knighted a
year later. Whether Jones deserved such a distinguished part in history,
and whether his legacy for the air force was worthwhile, will long be
debated. But at least he lived to fulfil his potential—unlike Palstra.
Although it is impossible to know to what heights Palstra might have

risen, it seems clear that he had the capacity to reach the top ranks of
his service. This is not to say that he might have become CAS instead
of Jones, but of one thing there is no doubt. If it had been Jones who
died in the R101 instead of Palstra, the history of the RAAF from the
1940s might have been very different indeed.
96
WHY THE RED CENTRE VANISHED
O n 26 June 1942, a Catalina flying boat of 11 Squadron RAAF was

about to alight on Havannah Bay, New Hebrides (now Vanuatu),
to refuel. The ‘Cat’ had called in there on its way to bomb Tulagi in
the Solomon Islands, and was then on the return flight to Noumea
having completed its mission. Despite its presence being expected,
the American ground control at Havannah Bay had, as a precautionary
measure, ordered a US Marine Wildcat fighter into the air to identify
the incoming aircraft.
Geoff Pentland, in his book RAAF Camouflage & Markings 1939–45

– Vol. 1, takes up the story:
This the US pilot did, but though the shape of the Catalina was
no doubt disturbingly familiar, the red in the upper wing roundels
[national insignia] seemed to him so distinct—as he later said—that
he mistook them for Japanese markings and immediately attacked.
Bullets passed through the Catalina’s main crew compartment,
fuel tanks, and ailerons, but fortunately no one was hurt and the
aircraft was able to land safely.
Flying Officer Robert Seymour and his crew were undoubtedly

shaken by this close call, but the incident had a more far-reaching
consequence. It was decided that operational and second-line RAAF
aircraft were henceforth to have the large red centres of their upper-
wing roundels painted out in white. This was formalised in Aircraft
General Instruction C11, Issue 4, dated 31 July 1942. Within a few
months, the order was extended to all roundels on all RAAF aircraft.
97
Ironically, the Americans had already foreseen the problem. Firstly,

prior to Pearl Harbor and again in 1943, the US national insignia was
deleted from the upper right and lower left wing surfaces in a similar
attempt to differentiate its aircraft from Japanese (the latter displaying
the red Hinomaru disc on all four wing surfaces). It was believed that
the position of a marking could be the first indicator of friend or foe.
However, in practice, colour appears to have been the more important

signifier. From a distance, red can be seen more easily than other
colours—often, in fact, before other details of a marking can be made
out. Cases of mistaken identity led, in March 1942, to the red disc
inside the US national star being deleted. On 27 March the operations
diary for 13 Squadron RAAF reported:
Orders issued by the US Air Staff to the effect that the red circle
in the American insignia on all United States aircraft was to be
immediately painted white to avoid mistakes in recognition,
particularly by ground troops.
Considering the above, one might ask why red was still in use on
RAAF aircraft six months into the Pacific War. Perhaps the RAAF
was simply reluctant to distinguish its roundel from that of the RAF.
The British red, white and blue roundel had been used on Australian
Flying Corps aircraft during World War I, and the adoption ‘without
difference’ of the RAF Ensign (which included the roundel) for the
RAAF had been recommended by the RAF Chief of Air Staff and
accepted in 1922. This decision presumably had some bearing on the
fact that the roundel was still in use when World War II began.
However, even after the red centre had been removed, American aircrew
continued to have trouble identifying RAAF aircraft. A year after the
Catalina incident, a US Navy Liberator bomber based at Guadalcanal
shot down a RAAF Beaufort, a type that was ‘out of home waters’ in
the Solomons area. The US crew had earlier sighted what they believed
to be a Japanese Betty bomber. The Beaufort then appeared and, at
98
HISTORY
just 100 feet above the sea, reportedly turned towards them before
both aircraft began firing at 1000 yards. The Beaufort was hit from
the Liberator’s upper and bow turrets, and soon ditched in the sea.
It was only when crewmen emerged that the Liberator crew realised
they were ‘white men’ (whom they assumed to also be Americans),
and dropped a life raft and supplies. On closer examination, they
thought the floating Beaufort to be a Mosquito. Tragically, the crew
subsequently perished in a storm.
With the war’s end, the reason for deleting the red centre no longer
existed, and it saw a brief return. During the Korean War, RAAF and
RAN aircraft went into action with red-centred roundels.
Then, on 2 July 1956, Australia followed the lead of Canada and South
Africa in replacing the red centre with a national emblem. Designs
submitted for consideration included the Southern Cross, a boomerang,
and a sprig of wattle. It was decided that the ‘kangaroo in motion’ was
the most distinctively Australian symbol.
As an aside, Qantas aircraft had sported the red kangaroo as depicted

on the penny coin since World War II, and even the present RAAF
kangaroo roundel had seen an earlier incarnation: as an unofficial unit
insignia on the Mosquito night fighters of 456 Squadron RAAF in
Europe.
99
CAC Boomerang with WWII blue and white roundel.
CHINDITS – A REAPPRAISAL
T he 1942–45 campaign in Burma was a complex amalgam of

political priorities between the Allied participants: Great Britain,
the United States of America, China and India. It is also a striking
illustration of the way in which all military campaigns since the
20th century have become critically dependent upon air power.
Exemplifying this point are two operations undertaken in February
1943 and March 1944, which bear critical analysis. Both were carried
out by troops trained in jungle raiding and guerilla tactics known as
Chindits—Chindit being a corruption of Chinthe, the Burmese name
for the griffon-like lions that protect Buddhist temples—under their
charismatic commander, Charles Orde Wingate.
The concept behind both operations was simple: the insertion of a mobile
force, supplied by air, behind enemy lines to disrupt communications.
Described as Long Range Penetration (LRP), it was a type of warfare
devised in the Western Desert. To implement his idea in Burma, in
1943 Brigadier Orde Wingate took 3000 troops of 77 Brigade overland
from the Imphal Plain to operate between the Chindwin and Irrawaddy
rivers. The force was organised in various columns with the object
of cutting the Japanese north-south railway between Myitkyina and
Indaw. The railway was demolished near Bonchaung on 6 March, and
the columns operated behind enemy lines until May. But the cost in
personnel was high. Of the 2182 survivors, 600 never recovered to be
fit for further active duty.
For political, publicity and morale reasons, the efforts of 77 Brigade

found the approval of the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill,
and the newly appointed Commander-in-Chief of South-East Asia
101
Command, Lord Louis Mountbatten. As a consequence of this

patronage, and decisions taken at the Quadrant conference held in
Quebec, Canada, in August 1943, Wingate was promoted to major
general and his command expanded to a 23,000-strong formation
called Special Force.
Wingate began planning Operation Thursday, involving a refinement

of his original concept. On 5 March 1944 six columns from Nos 3, 23
and 77 Brigades were inserted by air beyond the Chindwin River. A
seventh column, Brigadier Bernard Fergusson’s 16 Brigade, marched
overland from Ledo. Six ‘strongholds’ (codenamed Broadway,
Piccadilly, Blackpool, Aberdeen, White City and Chowringhee) were to
be seized and developed as secure bases from which the columns could
launch attacks aimed at severing the enemy lines of communication
and neutralising focal points between Myitkyina and Mandalay. It was
imperative that an airfield capable of operating Dakota aircraft was
constructed within each secure perimeter.
Statistics over the first six days of the 1944 fly-in indicate Special
Force’s dependence on air support: 579 Dakota and 74 glider sorties
delivered 9052 troops, 1359 animals and 254 tonnes of supplies and
equipment. Ironically, Wingate was himself killed when the aircraft
carrying him crashed near Imphal during a storm on 14 March. The
Special Force operation he had set in train continued under Brigadier
Walter Lentaigne.
In planning for Thursday, Wingate had been aware that success

depended on Allied aerial supremacy, and that Special Force would
be reliant on No 1 Air Commando—a specialised USAAF unit that
had been established under the command of Colonel Phil Cochrane
to support his operations. Each column had with it a RAF Section,
comprising an officer and two radio sergeants. The role of the officers
(many of whom were Australian) was to arrange for air supply, and
act as forward air controllers for Cochrane’s Mustang and Mitchell
aircraft that provided the Special Force with close air support. Another
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HISTORY
important role involved the use of light aircraft for casualty evacuation,
and it was during this campaign that a helicopter (the force had ten
Sikorskis) was first used for such work.
Despite Wingate’s faith, in many respects he expected too much from

air power—especially given the other factors (weather, unreliable
communications) involved. Believing that aircraft could deal with
any targets that needed to be engaged, he sent in his columns without
organic artillery (apart from four 25-pounder guns deployed for the
defence of each stronghold). Wingate is quoted as telling his units:
‘The planes are our artillery. They will bomb and destroy the targets
you produce.’
While there is no doubt that most targets could usually be successfully

hit from the air, unfortunately this did not always prove to be the
case. The classic example was in late April when a column cut the
Burma Road at Nalong, 45 miles south of Myitkyina, trapping an
accumulation of more than 300 enemy vehicles. Pleas for a strike
against this massive target—perhaps the outstanding prize thrown up
during the whole operation—went unanswered, and the ground troops
lacked the firepower to destroy it themselves.
While Thursday was undoubtedly a military innovation, questions

remain as to whether it was necessary or worthwhile. The Special
Force insertion coincided with the Japanese Assam offensive, but there
is little evidence that the presence of Wingate’s force diverted any
effort from the enemy attacks on Imphal and Kohima. It took Special
Force eleven days to cut the rail and road communications south of
Myitkyina, after Brigadier Mike Calvert’s 77 Brigade destroyed a
Japanese garrison at Mawlu and established the stronghold known as
White City.
It might even be argued that Special Force operations were a misuse of

air resources. The 1944 campaign was one in which an Army formation
was given strategic mobility, but suffered from tactical immobility.
103
The bulk of Special Force was inserted 200 miles behind enemy lines
in a matter of hours. Once the strongholds had been consolidated,
however, the tactical deployment of the men was restricted by a
reliance on mules and the physical fitness and sustainability of the
troops. To provide essential sustenance, four Dakota squadrons had to
be diverted from the Assam fighting to supply the logistic requirements
of Special Force.
On balance, perhaps it would have been more efficient and economical

to send only small parties behind enemy lines to conduct long-range
reconnaissance, leaving it to Cochrane’s Mustangs and Mitchells to
destroy targets that these identified. It is argued that the dislocation
of enemy lines of communication in Burma could have been achieved
just as well by intelligent targeting by the Allied air forces as it was by
special operations.
104
BOMBER COMMAND MEMORIAL
D uring World War II, thousands of young Australians joined the

RAAF and served with squadrons in the Royal Air Force in the
United Kingdom. The vast majority served in Bomber Command.
The strategic bombing offensive carried out by Bomber Command in

Europe played a significant role in the Allied victory over the Axis
powers, Germany and Italy. Bomber Command gave Britain the
capacity to strike directly at industrial centres and other strategic points,
inflicting devastating damage to the enemy’s war-making capacity.
Although these heavily defended targets were attacked predominantly
under cover of darkness, the Bomber Command crews suffered
fearsome losses. At the peak of the bombing campaign, up to 1000
heavy bombers would attack on any one night, but up to ten per cent of
aircraft and crews could fail to return from such operations.
So high was attrition during 1943-44 that crews had less than a
50 per cent chance of surviving a ‘tour’ of 30 operations. The men
of the RAAF who fought with Bomber Command amounted to fewer
than two per cent of all Australians who enlisted in World War II, yet
the 3486 who died accounted for almost 20 per cent of all Australian
deaths in combat. Many others were wounded. The RAAF’s most
distinguished heavy bomber unit, No 460 Squadron, alone lost 1018
aircrew—meaning that, in effect, the entire squadron was wiped out
five times over.
Australian airmen flew in every major operation. Most of the aircrews

who trained under the Empire Air Training Scheme in Australia
and Canada were posted to Bomber Command. There were five
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main RAAF squadrons: No 460 Squadron (flying Wellingtons, then

Lancasters), Nos 463 and 467 Squadrons (Lancasters), and Nos 462
and 466 Squadrons (Halifaxes). Other squadrons were also part of
Bomber Command for a time, including Nos 455 (Hampdens), 458
(Wellingtons) and 464 (Venturas).
Many of the Australians in Bomber Command logged up tens of

thousands of operations and sorties in non-RAAF units. Two such
men were awarded the Victoria Cross after performing outstanding
acts of courage. They were: Flight Sergeant Rawdon Middleton, who
in November 1942 lost his life captaining a crippled Stirling bomber
of No 149 Squadron, RAF, all the way back to England from a raid
on Turin, Italy; and Wing Commander Hughie Edwards, who had
completed pilot training at Point Cook in 1936 before transferring to
the RAF, and in July 1941 led a near-suicide mission by Blenheim light-
bombers of No 105 Squadron against the German port of Bremen.
The idea for a memorial to the RAAF personnel who served with
Bomber Command dates back to the early 1990s. However, it was not
until 1997 that a formal process was commenced which resulted in
the development of a design. An advisory committee representing the
Bomber Command Association and the Australian War Memorial was
established, and a design brief was developed. In September 1998, the
Minister for Veterans’ Affairs made an initial pledge of $100,000 to
support the development and construction of a suitable memorial. This
funding allowed a design competition to proceed in 1999.
The advisory committee unanimously recommended that a design

proposal by the noted New Zealand sculptor, Neil Dawson, be adopted
for the memorial. Mr Dawson’s design was selected because of its
aesthetic and artistic merit, the cost effectiveness of the construction
and installation of the sculpture, the suitability of the siting in the
Memorial’s grounds and a reasonable length of time for completion.
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HISTORY
The design and development of the memorial has been approved by

the Australian War Memorial Council and the RAAF Association.
‘In principle’ approval also has been given by the National Capital
Authority. The total cost of the project, covering design, fabrication,
transport and installation is in the order of $550,000. To date, donations
totalling over $500,000 have been received, including $250,000
provided by the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs.
The Bomber Command Memorial will be a very dramatic sculpture,

located prominently in the grounds of the Australian War Memorial.
It will be one of the first commemorative elements encountered by
most visitors as they walk from their cars to the main entrance to the
Memorial. It will also be illuminated at night, and very visible from
the major traffic routes that pass the Australian War Memorial.
Neil Dawson’s design for the Bomber Command Memorial

commemorates the service and sacrifice of those who served as
aircrew and also the dedicated work of the ground support personnel.
Specifically, the design incorporates:
• a symbolised searchlight beam comprising a perforated stainless steel

column, 16 metres high with a circumference of 90 centimetres at the
base, expanding to 1.2 metres at the top;
• representations of the air and ground crew as silhouetted figures in

uniform, in the form of a 2 metre high screen wall;
• a frosted glass plate at the base of the searchlight beam with brass
stencils of seven of the aircraft flown by Bomber Command—Halifax,
Wellington, Lancaster, Mosquito, Stirling, Blenheim and Whitely; and
• paving and a granite element surrounding the base of the sculpture,

incorporating an engraved reflective text outlining the memorial’s
commemorative purpose.
107
The Bomber Command Memorial is to be fabricated in New Zealand,

where the sculptor, Neil Dawson, lives and works. It is anticipated
that the perforated stainless steel column will be manufactured as
one piece and then transported to Australia. Work on the sculpture
has already started and current plans are for it to be dedicated and
unveiled in May 2005. Confirmation of the actual date and details of
the dedication ceremony will be publicised by the RAAF Association
and the Australian War Memorial closer to the date.
108
AIRBORNE FORWARD AIR
CONTROL – A FIRST FOR
THE RAAF
I n early February 1943 during the battles around Wau in northern

Papua, No 4 Squadron RAAF carried out what is essentially the
first recorded Forward Air Control (FAC) mission in the history of
military aviation. On the ground at Wau, troops of the Australian 2/6th
Battalion and 2/5th Independent Company had contacted a significant
Japanese force. Air support was requested and in response Nos 4 and
30 Squadrons RAAF were tasked by No 9 Operational Group RAAF
to carry out an attack on the enemy.
No 4 Squadron was a specialist Army Cooperation squadron trained in

land reconnaissance, artillery spotting, message dropping, ammunition
resupply and other general support tasks. The squadron flew the
Wirraway aircraft, which was ideal for ground reconnaissance and
observation. The Wirraway’s very low stall speed gave it the ability
to fly so slowly that it could almost hover over the battlefield. The
Wau task was recorded as a land reconnaissance mission, though a
new term—tactical reconnaissance—was created for future missions
of this type.
No 30 Squadron was to supply the striking power with its Beaufighter

aircraft. Each Beaufighter was equipped with four 20mm cannons and
six .303 machine guns that produced a heavy volume and weight of
fire. The Beaufighter was one of the fastest aircraft at very-low levels,
in contrast to the slow Wirraway. While high speed was an advantage in
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many tactical situations, it was a disadvantage when trying to visually

acquire ground targets for attack. The concept of how this problem
could be overcome, and the attack carried out, was contained in the
tasking order sent to 30 Squadron.
WAR.42 3 FEB. 9OG/C1/3. ‘Flight Beaufighters rendezvous with

Wirraway over Wau at 1430L/3 FEB. Follow Wirraway who will
indicate target by firing tracers into it. Beaufighters will follow
Wirraway in and straffe [sic].’
At 1320 hours the Australian Army personnel at Wau saw the

4 Squadron Wirraway circling overhead their location, and indicated
their positions to the aircraft by firing flares. Once the Wirraway had
determined the relative positions of friend and foe it departed and
returned at 1439 with three Beaufighters in company. The Wirraway
then indicated the target area to the Beaufighters by firing tracer rounds
into the enemy positions and the Beaufighters then delivered their
attack to the same area.
All the essential elements of the FAC role were present in this
mission—communication with the local ground forces, acquisition of
friendly and enemy locations, and finally, the indication of the target
to the attacking aircraft.
The renowned American air historian, Richard P. Hallion, referred to

this pioneering work of the RAAF in his 1989 book Strike from the Sky
when discussing international efforts to more effectively control close
air support missions.
The Australians went further, and developed airborne strike

coordinators and controllers, anticipating the post-World War II
forward air control system utilized in Korea and Southeast Asia.
Using two-seat Commonwealth Wirraway tactical reconnaissance
and liaison aircraft, Royal Australian Air Force pilots and
observers led strike flights to ground targets. Subsequently, the
RAAF introduced the Commonwealth Boomerang, a specialized
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HISTORY
army cooperation and ground support fighter which operated like

a ‘fast FAC’ over the edge of battle, leading strikes and marking
targets for attacking aircraft.
After Wau this style of mission became a feature of the operations of

Nos 4 and 5 Squadrons, the RAAF’s two army cooperation units in the
South-West Pacific Area. The skills acquired by these two squadrons in
this specialised role resulted in the RAAF possessing the world’s most
advanced method of providing accurate and safe close air support.
In May 1944 the Americans in Italy would develop a similar method

of controlling close air support missions. In that theatre a light aircraft,
the Piper L-5, was used to locate and indicate targets to strike aircraft.
The codename ‘Horsefly’ was given to this type of operation. The
marking method usually involved the dropping of a smoke bomb on
the target from the Horsefly’s operating altitude of 3000–4000 feet.
Horsefly techniques were also used in the invasion and subsequent
operations in southern France, continuing until the end of the war in
Europe.
The FAC role had to be rediscovered in the Korean conflict in 1950.

Strike aircraft speeds had significantly increased since World War II,
and a way had to be found to accurately mark targets. L-5 and AT-6
Texan aircraft were modified to replicate the Horsefly operations of
World War II. A new radio call sign resulted in these FAC flights being
called ‘Mosquitoes’. The Korean conflict also saw the introduction
of specialised smoke rockets as target markers and these became the
primary tool of FACs in Korea and for the future.
The FAC role figured prominently in the training given to the

Vietnamese Air Force in the period 1960 to 1965. The use of FAC
grew considerably with the introduction of American combat forces
to South Vietnam in 1965 and over the ensuing years. One of the most
intense periods of FAC operations centred on the Battle of Khe Sanh in
1968. During the battle 1600 FAC sorties were used to control 25,000
111
tactical sorties which dropped 95,000 tonnes of ordnance. It is the

American use of FAC in Vietnam that usually comes to mind when the
term FAC is used.
Although the American use of FAC on such a large scale dominates

the history of this important air power role, it is instructive to
remember where it originated. The innovativeness, ingenuity, skills,
and resourcefulness of RAAF personnel in an under-resourced
and overlooked theatre of World War II produced a new concept of
operations that was used for the first time with great efficacy.
112
DEFEATING GERMANY’S
WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION
T he search for weapons of mass destruction is not a new

phenomenon. Some of the most important individual targets
attacked during the strategic bombing offensive of World War II were
those associated with the German V-weapons program. This program
included the German Army’s V-2 rocket (known initially as the A-4)
and the Luftwaffe’s V-1 Flying Bomb. The V stood for Vergeltungswaffe
or retaliation weapon—a somewhat hypocritical title considering that
design work on the V-2 first started in 1936, well before the war. The
V-2 was capable of being launched from a mobile platform from any
hard surface, and had a maximum speed of 3600 miles per hour (or
Mach 4) and a range in excess of 220 miles. The rocket had greater
destructive potential than the V-1, due to its speed on impact and the
effect of its bow wave.
Unlike their modern-day counterparts, British Intelligence had

irrefutable evidence that German scientists were carrying out
developmental and research work on these weapons. In May 1943
Flight Officer Constance Babington-Smith, a Women’s Auxiliary
Air Force photo interpreter, noticed a black shadow on a photograph
of Peenemunde on the German Baltic coast. She interpreted the
shadow as a ramp with a cockpitless airplane on it. Agents in France
had also confirmed the existence of launching sites at Watten in the
Pas de Calais. As if any further proof was required, on 15 June 1943
the Germans launched a flying bomb offensive in earnest, with London
113
as the main target. Of 244 missiles fired, 45 exploded on or just after

take-off destroying nine of the launching sites; however, 73 got through
to Greater London. On 2 August 1943, the Germans launched their
heaviest attack with 97 flying bombs exploding in the London area.
Plans were in hand for the production of 2000 V-1s per month by the
end of 1943.
After the attacks began, radar stations were used to track the flying
bombs and for controlling intercepts by Tempests and Spitfire XIV
fighters. On 1 July 1944, Flying Officer G.P. Armstrong, an Australian
airman in 165 Squadron, RAF, closed on a flying bomb after his fire
appeared to be without effect. He was at a distance of only 50 yards
when the missile suddenly exploded, covering his Spitfire with a
sooty substance and partly burning away its elevators and rudder.
Analysis of successful intercepts showed that damage from a flying
bomb exploding in mid-air was negligible at ranges over 150 yards,
and at least 638 V‑1s were shot down by fighter intercepts. Australian
fighter pilots Flight Sergeant H.J. Bailey and Flight Sergeant D.J.
Mackerras serving with No 3 (Tempest) Squadron each accounted for
11 missiles.
Another intercept method known as ‘Tip and Run’ was based on the
premise that the V-1 could be upset by the airflow over the top of
the wing. The method involved a fighter formating alongside and
sliding the wing tip of the aircraft underneath that of the missile.
Understandably, pilots had to have nerves of steel to crab towards the
flying bomb while maintaining speeds of 380 miles per hour until the
wing of the V-1 lifted and it heeled over in a dive earthwards.
Until the attacks started, the expected speed and heights of the bombs
were a matter of speculation. Speeds were obtained by analysing film
and plotting pictures taken at a time interval of 20 seconds, making
corrections for changes in azimuth and the wind. Heights were
more difficult to obtain. Radar gave no measurements, as the flying
bombs were too low, so the bulk of information on heights came
114
HISTORY
from the Royal Observer Corps. The tracks of flying bombs were
also analysed to determine their points of origin in occupied France.
Photo-reconnaissance was also carried out, and if launching sites were
detected they were put on a list of targets to be attacked by heavy
bombers.
A force of 597 heavy bombers from RAF Bomber Command took

off on the evening of 17 August 1943 to attack Peenemunde. Two
Australian Squadrons participated in the attack, with No 460 squadron
contributing 24 Lancasters and No 467 Squadron ten Lancasters. The
operation set back the V-2 experimental program and resulted in a
reduction in the scale of production of the V-1s. Ten days later, on
27 August 1943, the US 8th Air Force mounted the first of more than
a dozen attacks on Watten. On 19 June, Bomber Command attacked
Watten for the first time. This was followed up with round-the-clock
attacks on a number of V-sites in northern France during the following
months.
In all, 2340 V-1 flying bombs reached London and 5475 people were
killed. Fortunately, the development of V-2 rockets was curtailed by
the bombing raids on launching sites by the RAF and the US 8th Air
Force. Nonetheless, between 8 September 1944 and 17 March 1945,
1054 rockets fell on British soil, about half of these in the London
region. The worst attack occurred on 26 January 1945 when 13 rockets
landed. The destructive power of a single V-2 was evidenced by an
attack on 8 March 1945 when 173 houses were destroyed in a housing
estate in Ilford. The suffering of those made homeless was made worse
by the harsh winter of 1944–45. Despite these setbacks, Londoners
were still able to enjoy themselves under fire. On 29 July 1944, the
RAF and Army were playing cricket at Lord’s when a flying bomb cut
out overhead, dived and threatened to land near the pitch. Fortunately,
it carried on a little further and exploded on a nearby road. The players
and umpires picked themselves up and play resumed. The last attack
was carried out on 30 March 1945.
115
The targets were chiefly in enemy occupied territory and it was

essential that precision bombing was carried out so that bombs did not
scatter among surrounding houses. The success of the bombing raids
and fighter intercepts kept production of the flying bombs and rockets
to a minimum and hampered further scientific research. Planning and
execution was enhanced by sourcing reliable and accurate intelligence
and making sound analytical decisions based on fact and not
speculation. Indeed, it is not too much to argue that good intelligence
was the key to success in the campaign to destroy these first weapons
of mass destruction.
116
AERIAL TORPEDOES –
A WEAPON SYSTEM FAILURE
O n 4 December 1943, six Beaufort torpedo bombers of

No 8 Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force, attacked Japanese
shipping in Blanche Bay, Rabaul harbour. As the aircraft piloted by
Squadron Leader N.T. Quinn (the unit’s commanding officer) was
tracking to release its torpedo, it hit either a ship’s mast or a cable
and crashed. Quinn and his observer survived, but both were taken
prisoner. This was the 19th—and last—operation undertaken by the
RAAF torpedo strike force. Why was it that the aerial torpedo had
failed as a weapon system?
The RAAF had devised a theoretical basis for the development of its
torpedo bomber strike force, in a 1936 Air Staff Memorandum that
presented rudimentary operational-level doctrine. Despite this, no effort
was made to establish a torpedo bomber organisation for some years.
Australia had committed itself in mid-1939 to local manufacture of the
Beaufort general reconnaissance aircraft, and torpedo bombing was
one of the secondary roles that had been considered in the design. But
it was only in June 1941—just two months before the first Australian-
built Beauforts were delivered—that the intention of fitting the type
with a torpedo, as an alternative to a semi-armour piercing bomb, was
made known.
In the meantime, no steps had been taken to allow any RAAF personnel
to acquire expertise in maritime strike operations. Even after it was
decided to create an Australian torpedo bomber strike force, it was
only in late January 1942 that Nowra, New South Wales, was selected
117
for development as the site for training of this arm. It was not until
29 August that 15 crews from No 100 Squadron commenced training in
the torpedo bomber role. On 7 September they undertook the first RAAF
torpedo bomber attack in the South-West Pacific Area, at Milne Bay.
Given the short time between the commencement of training and the
first operational employment of the torpedo bomber force, it was no
surprise that the Beauforts had little success. Their initial showing,
however, highlighted two of the inherent weaknesses in the deployment
of the force—training and the weapon system itself.
Although aircrew training was undertaken at Nowra, it was not until

June 1943 that a dedicated Operational Training Unit was formed.
Three squadrons (Nos 7, 8 and 100) were converted to torpedo bomber
units, but No 7 never flew in the role. At least 13 per cent of the 145
pilots and their crews who attended courses were subsequently posted
to other than torpedo bomber units. Even where trained aircrew went
to one of the two operational torpedo bombing units, only 30 per cent
actually participated in one or more missions. Within the operational
squadrons themselves, priority was given to reconnaissance and
ordinary bombing tasks—a clear indication of the unsuitability of
the torpedo weapon system against small, shallow draught Japanese
vessels in the theatre, as well as the commander’s lack of faith in the
efficacy of the torpedo bombing role. On these statistics, aircrew would
also have been hard-pressed to remain current in the skills required of
an effective torpedo bomber force.
The other facet of the training question was that of producing

technicians that were capable of maintaining the weapon. Over 450
students graduated as Fitter Torpedo and Aircrafthand (Torpedo) from
the base Torpedo Unit at Nowra between May 1942 and June 1944—
forming a specialist trade group with restricted promotion and posting
prospects. The torpedo was technically complex, and required many
man-hours to maintain. It was not a weapon that could be deployed
effectively to the rudimentary airfields from which the RAAF operated
118
HISTORY
in New Guinea. To help overcome this operational restriction, Mobile

Torpedo Sections were raised to support squadrons in the field, and
thereafter fought an ongoing battle to protect their sensitive charges
from the insidious effects of tropical heat, mud, rain, and humidity.
The major reason for the ineffectiveness of RAAF torpedo bombers

was the weapon system itself. The Beaufort had been designed to
carry the British 18-inch Mk XII torpedo, but when British suppliers
could not meet a RAAF order for 360 of these weapons, Australia was
forced to make a costly resort to local manufacture. The decision to
build a million-pound facility was taken in 1941, but it was not until
September 1943 that the first Australian torpedoes were delivered.
In the meantime, the RAAF was forced to turn to the American Mk XIII
torpedo, which was not fully compatible with the Beaufort, being larger
in circumference than the British version. The bomb bay doors of the
Beaufort therefore could not be fully closed, which increased drag and
degraded the aircraft’s performance. Apart from this, the American
torpedo performed erratically, and there were still supply problems
associated with its provision from US Navy sources.
In addition to the physical difficulties with the weapon system one must
look at the intangible factors of mind-set and experience. Both the RAAF
commanders intimately involved with the Beaufort torpedo bomber
operations, Group Captain W.H. Garing (Air Commander, Milne Bay)
and Air Commodore J.E. Hewitt (AOC No 9 Operational Group), were
well versed in maritime operations, but neither was knowledgeable in
strike operations. Equally, the torpedo was not the weapon of choice of
American air commanders in the South-West Pacific.
A lack of understanding and the operational imperatives that prevailed

in 1942 combined to ensure that the aerial torpedo was put into
Australian service and deployed prematurely. At the operational level,
the incompatibility of the American Mk XIII with the aircraft system,
combined with its unsatisfactory performance, was the major reason
119
for the failure of the weapon system failure. However, the lack of
foresight and intellectual rigour when introducing the system led to
the concept itself failing at the strategic level.
There is a stark lesson that can be drawn from this episode in the
development of the RAAF, which is valid even today. For a weapons
system to be effective, it is necessary to have a clear vision for its
operational use, guaranteed supply of all essential components, and
a well considered training program that is economic and ensures the
flexible use of available manpower.
120
AUSTRALIAN AIR CONTRIBUTION
TO D-DAY OPERATIONS
A fter two years of planning and preparation, the Allied invasion

of northern France on 6 June 1944 returned ground forces to
European soil from where they had been ignominiously ejected in
1940. ‘Operation Overlord’ involved the landing of five infantry
divisions on the first day, at Normandy beaches adjacent to Varreville
and Ouistreham codenamed (from west to east) Utah, Omaha, Gold,
Juno and Sword. To ensure that the lodgement of these forces would
not be seriously impaired by enemy reinforcements, a combined air
campaign was launched to isolate the battlefield. Although no ships of
the Royal Australian Navy or formed units of the Australian Army took
part in the great invasion effort, the story was very different in the air.
During the early morning of 6 June, seven Australian ‘Article-XV’

squadrons contributed to the Bomber and Fighter Command attacks
on various targets on the Normandy beaches and surrounding areas.
Two formations of 13 Lancaster aircraft from 460 Squadron each
attacked Fontenay-Crisbecq and St Martin de Varreville, while 463
and 467 Squadrons struck at gun emplacements at St Pierre du Mont
that covered the Omaha beach. Thirteen Halifax bombers from
466 Squadron bombed a German battery at Maisy. The Spitfire-
equipped 453 Squadron undertook 43 sorties in support of the
landing forces on the first day. The Mosquito night fighters of 456
Squadron flew 18 sorties on the night of 5/6 and 6/7 June, and shot
down a German He-177. The other Mosquito squadron, 464, mounted
20 sorties on the night of 5/6 June that successfully interdicted enemy
rail and road communication, bridges, and enemy troop convoys.
121
Other Australian airmen serving in RAF squadrons are known to have

played a part in the various operations that supported the landing.
Some were involved in deceptions undertaken as part of the aerial
‘cover’ plan, while others jammed enemy early-warning radar. At least
one Australian pilot from 139 Squadron was involved in Mosquito
‘Intruder’ operations to secure the eastern flank of the landing operation
from enemy air interference. Many more transport crews with Nos 38
and 46 Groups, RAF, took part in the large-scale airdrops that also
occurred on 5/6 June. Still others were in RAF squadrons of Bomber
Command flying alongside the nominally ‘Australian’ units in the
attack on Maisy, and against similar targets at La Pernelle, Longues
and Mont Fleury.
Even after the Allied beachhead was secured, 453 Squadron was
intimately involved in follow-on operations. From 11 June the squadron
staged through an advanced landing ground in newly captured territory,
before occupying another known as ALG B.11 a fortnight later. On
25 June the Spitfires flew 35 sorties. The next day, two patrols engaged
in combat with German FW-190 fighters, resulting in the squadron
claiming two FW-190s probably destroyed and five damaged. When
not preventing incursions by German fighters, the unit flew armed
reconnaissance missions and attacked enemy motor transport. During
June, 453 Squadron flew 720 operational sorties in which it destroyed
three, probably destroyed three and damaged five enemy aircraft. As
a result of ground strafing operations it claimed the destruction of one
tank, one armoured car, and 16 enemy motor vehicles. It also had some
success against maritime targets—a merchantman and a flak ship were
damaged.
Air operations continued at a similar tempo during July. In support

of both ‘Operation Goodwood’ (the failed British attempt on 18 July
to advance from Caen) and ‘Operation Cobra’ (the American Army
breakout from the lodgement area at St Lo scheduled for 20 July),
the Allied strategic bombing force attacked enemy tactical positions.
The Australian squadrons with Bomber Command participated in this
122
HISTORY
effort. Twenty 460 Squadron Lancaster and 14 Halifax aircraft from

466 Squadron attacked Caen on 7 July. From 18 July, 463, 466 and
467 crews were included in the formation of over 200 aircraft that each
bombed Colombelles, Mondeville and Cagny during ‘Goodwood’.
The Australian Spitfire squadron remained based in the continent until

29 September, when it departed from Deurne, near Antwerp, bound for
Coltishall. The squadron had operated from various landing grounds in
support of the northern thrust of the Allied armies, which had forced
the German forces to retreat to the Dutch-Belgian border, where a
combination of logistic deficiencies and discussion on strategy halted
the advance. The bold attempt to break the strategic impasse—the
landing of the American 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions at
Eindhoven and Nijmegen and the British 1st Airborne Divison at
Arnhem, to seize and hold bridges over the Rhine and establish an
axis of advance that the British 30 Corps could exploit to cross into
Germany—was supported by the Tactical Air Force squadrons.
Australian Squadrons based in Great Britain were also involved after the
D-Day landing. The two Coastal Command anti-submarine squadrons,
10 and 461, operated to prevent any interference by the German Navy.
The anti-ship strike squadron, 455, attacked German E and R boats
that were a threat to the naval force deployed off the beachhead, as
well as enemy convoys. In addition, the Mosquito intruders of 464
Squadron targeted German rail traffic and communication facilities.
Official figures indicate that, all told, there were 986 Australian aircrew
in the ten RAAF squadrons operational on D-Day, while a further
1816 Australian aircrew were assigned to RAF squadrons involved
in the invasion campaign. Even if not all of these 2800 Australians
flew in operations on 6 June or immediately after, most would have
participated in the campaign in some way. Although not numerically
large, Australian airmen nonetheless made a significant contribution to
the success of D-Day and subsequent operations.
123
War loan Beaufighter and crew at Morotai, 1944.
A FAMILY OF ‘WAR LOAN’
BEAUFIGHTERS
A ustralia produced thousands of aircraft for the RAAF during

World War II to complement those supplied by Britain and
the USA. The Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation started with the
Wirraway, and later expanded its production lines to include the
indigenous Boomerang. De Havilland Australia produced Tiger Moths,
then Mosquitoes. The Department of Aircraft Production set up its
Beaufort Division to build an Australian version of Britain’s Bristol
Beaufort bomber, and then in 1944 put its resources into producing
a more potent Bristol offspring: the heavily-armed, agile Beaufighter
attack aircraft.
How did the Curtin Government pay for this massive undertaking,
bearing in mind Australia’s small population and the infancy of its
aircraft production industry? Apart from tax-funded revenue, a large
contribution came from the war loans scheme, whereby Australians
were encouraged to buy war bonds which would mature with interest
after the war. War loan (also known as the liberty loan and, from 1944,
victory loan) drives became a part of life, with people regularly being
asked to ‘dig deep’ to help fund the war effort.
The connection between war loans and flying was not entirely new.
During World War I, a number of Australian Flying Corps ‘presentation’
aircraft were ‘paid for’ by communities and organisations, earning each
group the right to have its name painted prominently on the side of the
aircraft. War loans were organised to include touring aircraft crewed
by prominent airmen who gave rousing speeches at each stopover.
125
People were asked to give up some of their comforts in consideration

of the men in the trenches.
During World War II, the Commonwealth War Loan Office was
established to administer the scheme. Many communities had a war
loans committee to ensure that its population met its quota, and to
handle local administration such as publicity visits.
The Beaufighter—the ‘whispering death’ which had the look of potency

about it—was a popular aircraft on which to focus war loan drives. In
June 1945, over 20 towns had their names recorded on the nose of
newly built Beaufighters, in recognition of having met or exceeded
their subscription quota. One such town was Narromine, in central
NSW, whose residents reportedly subscribed a record number of bonds
per head of population to purchase one of the first ‘war loan’ aircraft.
In recognition of this, and as a publicity opportunity, a Beaufighter was
flown up from its Melbourne factory for a town ceremony in October
1944.
After taxiing along the highway from Narromine Aerodrome, the

aircraft (serial no A8-19) was driven down the main street under its
own power, to the amazement of locals. Mayoress Mrs Tancred was
called upon to christen it Miss Narromine with a bottle of champagne
broken over its propeller hub. According to some reports, an engine
overheated during the long taxi back to the aerodrome, and had to be
replaced; then a tyre burst on takeoff, delaying its departure to the war
zone by a couple of days. Its crew, at least, enjoyed their extra time by
touring the local sights.
Miss Narromine was met at Coomalie Creek, Northern Territory,

by Squadron Leader Rob Bowman—a No 31 Squadron pilot from
Narromine who had also instructed at the RAAF flying school
there. Bowman wrote to Narromine’s mayor to ‘thank the people of
Narromine for their generous contributions to the victory loan, which
126
HISTORY
made it possible for us to have an aircraft in this squadron named after

the town’.
Bowman and his navigator, Flight Sergeant Johnny White, took Miss
Narromine to Morotai from where they flew it on a number of strike
missions against Japanese positions. As luck would have it, it lasted
less than two months in action before suffering an undercarriage
collapse on landing at Morotai, and was converted to spare parts.
The townspeople of Narromine, understandably, were not told of the
ignominious fate of Miss Narromine until after the war, but Bowman
souvenired the control wheel to bring home with him.
There is, however, a detailed record of the brief operational life of

Miss Narromine. Squadron Leader Bowman records that it made a
dozen attacks before the accident-missions reflecting the Beaufighter’s
versatility. Varied ordnance including 25- and 60-pound underwing
rockets, 300-pound high-explosive bombs, 500-pound fragmentation
bombs, and 20mm cannon were used against buildings, huts,
installations, airfields, anti-aircraft batteries, jetties, stores and enemy
personnel in the Celebes region. Even depth charges were carried, for
use against water targets.
In January 1945, Bowman named Beaufighter A8-32 Miss Narromine II.

Its career involved 16 strike missions, but its life was shorter than that
of its sibling. On 1 February, A8-32 was bombing Tomohon in the
Celebes when it was shot down by enemy anti-aircraft fire. For three
days extensive searches were made, but the Beaufighter was not found.
Post-war, it was revealed that its navigator, Flight Sergeant Alan Lewis,
died in the crash, and its pilot, Warrant Officer Bill McGuigan, survived
being shot down only to be bayoneted to death by the Japanese some
months later. A Navy passenger aboard, Alec Hill, was presumed to
have also been executed.
That month, February 1945, was a bad month for 31 Squadron, with
nine Beaufighters either lost or crash-landed. However, many missions
127
had been successfully carried out. Claims against the enemy included
seven small ships destroyed, 25 damaged, 11 buildings and two fuel
dumps destroyed.
A8-32’s replacement, A8-68 Miss Narromine III, made 26 strikes and

was ‘still going strong’ by the time Squadron Leader Bowman left
the squadron at the end of June. It, at least, survived the war, but in
September suffered the same fate as its first sibling. It was crashlanded
at Morotai, and converted to components.
The story of the ‘Miss Narromines’ casts light on a number of aspects

of the wartime RAAF in the air war against Japan. First, it tells us of
the public contribution of funds for war production, and the resulting
benefits for publicity and morale when an aircraft could be claimed by
a community as its own. Secondly, it highlights the effectiveness of
the RAAF’s tactical ground attack force in ‘mopping up’ the enemy
positions in the Celebes during the final year of the war. Lastly, we see
graphically how dangerous those operations were, with one of these
three aircraft shot down and a second written off in a crash-landing.
128
THE RAAF EXPERIENCE OF
NATIONAL SERVICE
A ustralia has used compulsion to help fill the ranks of its armed
services on four occasions during its history: in 1911–1929 (the
universal military training scheme); 1940–45 (wartime conscription),
1951–57 (the first national service training scheme) and 1965–1973
(the second national service scheme). Of these, only the third occasion
involved the Royal Australian Air Force.
In 1950 it was proposed, largely in response to a deteriorating

international situation, that 15,000 Australian men aged 18 would be
trained annually for the Army, along with 1000 for the Royal Australian
Navy and 5000 for the RAAF. It was not envisaged, however, that this
scheme would be implemented before 1 January 1952. The government
was actually preparing to withdraw its forces involved in the occupation
of Japan since 1945, to help provide the regular instructors needed for
the new training scheme, when the Korean War began in June 1950.
The RAAF already had a transport unit assisting Britain to deal with
the Malayan Emergency, and indeed a fresh commitment of a bomber
squadron was made to that theatre at the same time as No 77 Squadron
joined the fighting in Korea. Despite the pressures this created in terms
of finding an adequate supply of training staff, during September 1950
the decision was made to bring forward the start-date for introducing
the National Service scheme to 1 May 1951, in line with government
fears that Australia faced the prospect of becoming involved in a third
world war within three years.
129
The National Service Act 1950 establishing the scheme required all
18-year-old males who were British subjects resident within Australia
to register for National Service in one of the three armed services.
Trainees could nominate in which service they wished to do their
training, but those going to the RAN or RAAF had to volunteer to
serve outside Australia if necessary. Initially, trainees were obligated to
undertake an active training commitment of 176 days, and those joining
the RAN or RAAF had to complete this in one continuous block. After
their initial training period, all trainees would be transferred to the
Reserve of their chosen service for five years after their call-up date.
The scheme underwent several adjustments after its commencement.

In September 1953, the total period of training was reduced to 154
days for the RAN and RAAF, and 140 days for Army trainees. In May
1957 compulsory training for the RAN and RAAF was discontinued,
while the Army’s annual intake was more than halved and drafts were
decided by a ballot system based on random selection of birth dates.
Those actually called-up into the Army received only 77 days full-time
training initially, and were then required to serve three years in the
Citizen Military Forces.
By the time the scheme ended in 1959, some 227,000 young

Australian men had passed through the services—the great majority
of these through the Army. It is not possible from surviving records to
determine the precise number who performed their National Service
in the RAAF. Calculations that the RAAF’s two intakes annually
produced only about 3300 trainees once the scheme reached maturity
suggests that the figure would not have exceeded 20,000. Based on the
number of intakes, and the fluctuating size of these, the actual number
was more likely between 15,000 and 18,000.
And what did the National Service experience mean for the RAAF
as a whole? The declared objectives of the scheme were twofold: to
contribute to the defence of Australia by providing a resource of trained
manpower for the armed services; and to develop national discipline
130
HISTORY
and physical fitness as part of a wider preventative and remedial health

strategy. Commendably ‘humanistic’ as the second objective was, it
patently had little to do with the primary role of any of the services.
Did the scheme contribute significantly to the efficiency and readiness

of the armed services? Probably not in the case of the RAAF, which—
like the RAN—had greater need for technically-trained personnel
rather than simply men in the ranks. Five or even six months was too
short a period to usefully impart skills to new trainees, let alone reap
any economical return from their training in terms of useful service.
Roughly 20 per cent of trainees in each intake might have been third or
fourth year apprentices with sufficient prior training to be employed at
aircraft depots, or had first aid experience sufficient to become medical
or dental orderlies, or the necessary aptitude and academic qualifications
to be considered for pilot training. (It is claimed that each year up to
175 National Servicemen were trained to private pilot licence standard
at RAAF expense at selected aero clubs.) The rest, however, were
rated as general hands—virtually unskilled recruits—and employed in
a variety of menial and non-productive activities, like painting kerbs,
stripping down obsolescent aircraft, or digging firebreaks. Many found
themselves allocated to aerodrome defence, where they were used as
the equivalent of the Army’s basic infantryman.
The question of employment quickly became a significant problem

area. One CO even took to ordering ‘nashos’ on his base to stencil
silver stars on the back of their blue overalls—so that he could identify
at a distance an idle permanent airman from an idle nasho (it being
okay, of course, for the latter to be caught being idle). This deficiency
in the NS scheme very quickly attracted adverse publicity for the
RAAF, with press reports appearing in May 1953 of trainees ‘wasting
their time’ and being ‘left to idleness’, denied even organised sport to
improve their physical fitness. The RAAF leadership had little to say
in the face of this onslaught, hinting only that the solution lay with
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government policy makers. It was not surprising, though, that major

changes were instituted within a few months.
Not only was the length of the initial commitment of continuous

training reduced in September 1953, but the conduct of this training
in the RAAF—previously carried out within existing base units—was
transferred to newly created National Service Training Units. Five
such units were raised in November–December 1953, at Amberley
(No 1), Canberra (3), Laverton (5), Point Cook (6) and Pearce (7);
two more—at Richmond (No 2) and Wagga Wagga (4)—followed in
March and May 1956. All closed in the last days of June or first week
of July 1957.
The reality was that the scheme posed a significant drain on the RAAF,
which was already a relatively small service (15,200 in 1958) heavily
stretched with maintaining its operational commitments, and with little
in the way of compensating benefits. For example, it was found that
few RAN or RAAF trainees joined the permanent forces as a result
of their experience. Because the RAAF simply could not find all the
extra 850 bodies needed to train and administer the National Service
scheme, some of the instructional work had to be sub-contracted out
to civilian entities in Sydney and Melbourne. Small wonder, then, that
the scheme was quietly buried in favour of increasing the ceiling for
the regular forces and lifting recruitment by improving conditions of
service.
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METEORS VERSUS MIGS
D uring the Korean War, the RAAF’s No 77 Squadron was the

sole unit within the United Nations Command which operated
the British-built Gloster Meteor Mk 8 jet fighter. In April 1951 the
squadron withdrew its P-51 Mustangs from operations to re-equip
with the Meteor, returning to Korean skies in July, and remaining
until the armistice was signed on 27 July 1953. During this period,
the Meteor flew in the air-to-air, bomber escort, combat air patrol and
ground attack roles. Its performance in the air-to-air role, in which it
was pitted against the Russian-built MiG-15 flown by the Chinese Air
Force, is a controversial subject that bears critical assessment.
Before the Australians flew their first combat mission in the new
aircraft, comparative (but not extensive) trials had been undertaken at
Iwakuni, the RAAF base in Japan, between the Meteor and the USAF
F-86 Sabre. These trials indicated that, under certain circumstances,
the Meteor was equivalent in performance to the American fighter. As
the F-86 was proving to be effective in combat with the MiG-15, when
the first Meteor fighter sweep departed from Kimpo on 29 July 1951,
the pilots had high expectations of how their aircraft would perform.
Expectations and reality did not coincide.
In the first three combats, between 29 August and 26 September, a

single MiG-15 was claimed as damaged, for the loss of one Meteor and
three others damaged. This was taken to show that the RAAF aircraft
was outclassed in the fighter combat role. A further large-scale clash
on 1 December 1951 appeared to reinforce this belief: the success
ratio was 3:2 in favour of the MiG-15. The next day, after discussions
between the CO of 77 Squadron and the Director of Operations, USAF
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Fifth Air Force, the aircraft was withdrawn from fighter sweeps into
‘MiG Alley’ and reassigned to bomber escort and combat air patrol
over Allied fighter-bombers.
This decision has been the basis of considerable contention ever since,
with even some of the pilots concerned later asserting that the change
was made with undue haste and that, if the combat pilots had been
given the standard of fighter combat instruction that was later applied,
the Meteor could have been more successful in the air-to-air role.
In the context of the fighter pilot training scenario of the early 1950s,
those making such criticisms appear to have a point. In the years
immediately following World War II the RAAF had paid little attention
to air combat training, and it was not until March 1952 that No 2
Operational Conversion Unit was raised to address training shortfalls
that were recognised in Korea.
Pilots posted to 77 Squadron flew about 45 hours in Mustangs and

single-seat Vampires before arriving in Japan and converting to the
Meteor at Iwakuni. There they were expected to complete 20 training
procedures: six sorties to gain familiarity with the aircraft, three
ground control radar recoveries, three instrument flying sorties, and the
remainder aimed at formation flying. Only two exercises were related
to air-to-air combat, and one pilot who arrived in April 1952 recalls
that none of these involved firing the Meteors’ guns. The unit did not
have any fighter combat instructors in those days to impart tactics to
newcomers, and it does not appear that pilots who began the initial
conversion to Meteors in April 1951 received any better preparation.
Also appearing to support the contention that the RAAF might have
been too quick to bail out of the air-to-air role with the Meteor are the
final shoot-down statistics. These show that in total 77 Squadron only
lost four Meteors to the MiG-15, all of them on or before the aircraft
was pulled from unrestricted air combat on 1 December 1951, against
five MiGs confirmed as destroyed—all after that same date.
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HISTORY
One 77 Squadron pilot who actually accounted for a MiG-15 later

had the opportunity to practice in the Meteor against Sabres while
on exchange with the RAF in Europe. Based on his observations, he
remains convinced to this day that at lower altitudes (up to 6000 metres)
an aggressively flown Meteor could out-turn and out-accelerate the
Sabre. Another 77 Squadron pilot had earlier expressed the view that
the Meteor’s manoeuvrability meant that no RAAF pilot should have
been shot down by a MiG-15 below 9000 metres unless he made a
mistake.
Lack of air combat training and tactics quite probably did limit the
ability of 77 Squadron pilots to initially achieve success against the
MiG-15. But the contention that extra time spent in the air-to-air role
would have enhanced the ability of the pilots still seems questionable.
The operational lessons and a critical assessment of the performance
of the Meteor and MiG-15 make it obvious that an unacceptably high
attrition rate in aircraft and pilots could have been expected if air-to-
air operations had continued.
Compared to the Meteor, the MiG-15 was far superior in performance.

The initial climb rate of the Russian aircraft was 2900 feet per minute
faster than the Meteor, and it was 73 miles per hour faster in level flight;
the comparative power to weight ratio (based on empty weight) was
1.76:1 for the MiG-15 and 1.45:1 for the Meteor. These latter figures
support the assumption that the MiG-15 would have faster acceleration
than the Meteor. Another performance figure that clearly identifies the
difference between the two fighters was their critical Mach number.
The Meteor was rated at 0.87, after which it developed compressibility
problems, a phenomenon that was not so evident in the MiG-15.
The basic difference between the two aircraft was that the Mark 8
Meteor was the ultimate single-seat fighter development of an
obsolescent design incorporating the technology of the early 1940s,
while the MiG-15 belonged to an entirely new generation of design
considerations. The Meteor’s twin-engine layout recognised the low
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power of the pioneer turbojet engines with which it was fitted, and its
wings were straight and thick, whereas the MiG-15 (and the Sabre)
incorporated later German thin swept wing technology.
The MiG-15 formations tactically controlled air combat over Korea.

They initiated combat on their terms, and the performance of the MiG-
15 enabled them to break contact in a like manner. No matter how
well trained the Australian pilots may have been, the performance of
the Meteor always placed it at tactical disadvantage in the air-to-air
role. Analysis of the individual actions when MiGs were shot down
by Meteors strongly suggest that these were simply situations where
Chinese pilots made the mistakes.
The lesson of Korea was therefore twofold—pilots must be trained

to the highest possible standard to give them the personal ‘edge’, but
the aircraft they fly must be at least comparable in performance to
potential adversaries.
136
EXPLORING THE
NUCLEAR OPTION
F or a time during the 1950s, the RAAF explored the idea of

becoming a nuclear force. The move to acquire nuclear weapons
did not last long, barely two years, and ultimately resulted in the
service remaining a conventional force. But the episode is informative
for showing the RAAF wrestling with the problem of defining its role
in the turbulent and confusing period that followed the end of World
War II, and trying to ensure that it possessed capabilities that were
relevant and meaningful.
Since 1952 the government led by R.G. Menzies had been supporting
Britain’s nuclear weapons program by allowing testing to be carried out
on Australian territory, partly in the belief that such cooperation would
get Australia a foot in the door when it came to acquiring weapons that
the RAAF would eventually need. By 1956 the Minister for Air, Athol
Townley—no doubt acting on the advice of the Chief of the Air Staff,
Air Marshal Sir Frederick Scherger—believed that the moment had
arrived to transform the RAAF into a nuclear force.
The stimulus for this initiative stemmed from belated realisation that
the fleet of Canberra jet bombers that Australia acquired from 1953 was
actually a limited defence asset. There were only 48 of these aircraft in
the RAAF inventory and—considering their small bomb load, the small
radius of effect of high-explosive bombs, and the large margin of error
resulting from bombing operations at medium and high altitude—it
dawned on RAAF planners that an impossibly high number of sorties
137
would have to be mounted to achieve any worthwhile results in real

strike operations.
At the time that the Canberra was evaluated for acquisition by the
RAAF, it had been noted that the type was capable of carrying either
a conventional bomb load or a single ‘special’ (ie. nuclear) device of
between 2300 and 4500 kilograms. It was not unreasonable, therefore,
for Townley to propose to his Cabinet colleagues in September that
arming the Canberra with a tactical nuclear weapon was one way of
increasing the effectiveness of the bomber force. He also suggested
that the RAAF’s Sabre jet fighters might be fitted to carry nuclear
bombs, too, for use in the ground attack role.
Since it would be years before Australia was in a position to build its

own nuclear bombs, it was obvious that any such weapons would have
to be acquired from its allies: Britain or the US. An overture to the
Americans was forestalled by a policy announcement by Washington
that it was willing to supply allies with nuclear-capable systems, such
as aircraft, but intended to keep control of weapons themselves in
American hands. Accordingly, Townley was authorised to approach
Britain instead, on an ‘exploratory, non-committal basis’.
This invitation was taken up by Air Marshal Scherger, who wrote

to his RAF counterpart to explore the likely response to an official
Australian request to ‘purchase some atomic bombs in the kilotonne
range’. Scherger was personally enthusiastic about the idea, seeing it
as an important step towards keeping the RAAF at the leading edge
of air power technology. He had also been trying to convince the
government to supplement the RAAF’s Canberras with a squadron
of British-built Vulcan strategic bombers, preferably nuclear-armed,
which he envisaged would form part of a Commonwealth deterrent
force in South-East Asia.
During 1957, Menzies declared that his government’s immediate plans

for defence remained in the ‘conventional field’ only, but there were
138
HISTORY
nonetheless further discussions about the nuclear option during a visit

to Australia by Britain’s PM, Harold Macmillan, early the next year.
Menzies was not persuaded that Australia needed to enter the strategic
nuclear arena, but he did accept that eventual acquisition of some
tactical weapons was probably ‘inescapable’. It was on this basis that
he subsequently wrote to Macmillan, seeking assurance that Britain
would, if the need arose, provide Australia with a nuclear capability,
by supplying either ready-made weapons or else manufacturing data
to enable local production. Even so, his preference was that the RAAF
stay conventional for as long as possible, if only out of concern at the
likely costs of making it a nuclear force.
Notwithstanding Menzies’ reservations, when Scherger visited Britain

in September 1958 he was authorised to continue discussions with
British defence officials. It was only at this stage that some of the
practical problems of the proposal began to emerge. For a start, the
dimensions of the only tactical weapons that the RAF had to offer
were far too big for carriage on a Sabre. Moreover, these bombs
produced a 15–20 kilotonne blast, equal to those dropped on Japan in
1945, which meant they were not ‘tactical’ weapons at all. Finally, at
a cost of £500,000 per bomb, acquisition was clearly going to be very
expensive. (The budget for the entire RAAF in 1962/63 amounted to
only £67.5 million.)
This appears to have been the end of the RAAF’s nuclear ambitions,
since by 1960 the tide was swinging decidedly against Australia
exercising the nuclear weapon option. Changes in geo-strategic
circumstances were causing even the existing Western nuclear powers
to have doubts about the viability of employing tactical nuclear
weapons in any showdown with communist opponents. By June 1961
Australia’s Chiefs of Staff Committee formally agreed that there was
no immediate need for an independent nuclear capability. The RAAF
was accordingly obliged to refocus on improving its conventional
capabilities. For the Canberra fleet this meant a shift in thinking from
strategic to tactical roles, especially army cooperation tasks.
139
Mirages overfly service housing near Butterworth.
BUTTERWORTH: THE RAAF’S
ONLY OVERSEAS BASE
D uring its 84-year history, the RAAF has frequently had units
based overseas on operational deployments, but only once has
it had a permanent or long-term base outside Australia that it ran and
administered as a RAAF station. This was at Butterworth, on the north-
west coast of the Malayan peninsula opposite the island of Penang.
Formerly a Royal Air Force airfield, the base was handed over to the
RAAF in 1955 on free loan from the British government, which then
administered Malaya as a colonial possession.
Australian airmen actually had an association with Butterworth

stretching back to 1941, when the base—then being used for care and
maintenance purposes—provided respite for a day for the RAAF’s
21 Squadron (equipped with Brewster Buffalo fighters) as it fell back
before advancing Japanese forces. Japan took control of the base for
the duration of the war, but the RAF reclaimed it after the surrender
of enemy forces in 1945. Butterworth thereafter became an important
refuelling point for RAF aircraft deployed to Singapore, and was
essential to the maintenance of the imperial lines of communication.
During the Malayan Emergency of 1948–60, the base went onto an
operational footing and hosted a variety of RAF units launching attacks
against communist terrorists in their jungle camps as part of Operation
Firedog.
In the mid-1950s Britain, Australia and New Zealand agreed to set

up a ‘Commonwealth Strategic Reserve’ on the Malayan peninsula
with the primary aim of countering a growing communist threat
across South-East Asia. It was the reserve, rather than the need for
141
additional forces to support ‘Emergency’ operations, that prompted the

British government in 1955 to offer Australia the use of Butterworth.
Accordingly, 2 Airfield Construction Squadron (accompanied by
478 Maintenance Squadron) was deployed that year to refurbish
facilities, and further prepare the base for jet operations.
On 15 January 1958 the RAAF Butterworth Base Squadron was

formed at Amberley. It commenced duties in Malaya on 1 May despite
the fact that work was still being undertaken on the construction of the
control tower. The RAAF formally took control of the base on 30 June.
Shortly thereafter a headquarters, 114 Mobile Control and Reporting
Unit, 78 Wing (Sabre fighters) and 2 Squadron (Canberra bombers)
were deployed. These units would enjoy a much longer, and fortunately
less harrowing stay at Butterworth than did the first RAAF users of the
base. The only operational experience the squadrons would gain while
there came, in fact, by way of four Firedog missions undertaken by
2 Squadron in the second half of 1958.
The importance of Butterworth particularly emerged in the 1960s.

It provided aircraft and maintenance personnel in support of the
deployment of 79 Squadron to Ubon in Thailand, along with medical
and transport support facilities during the Vietnam War (in which
2 Squadron was also committed from 1967). The base became especially
crucial between 1963 and 1966, during the period of ‘Confrontation’
with Indonesia over the creation of Malaysia. Not only did it give both
the RAAF and RAF the capacity to conduct air defence operations,
it would have been essential in the mounting of offensive operations
against Indonesia had that become necessary.
The end of Confrontation allowed the British government to announce

plans shortly thereafter for the withdrawal of its forces from the east
of Suez. In line with an earlier Anglo-Malayan agreement, ownership
of Butterworth was transferred to the Malaysian government in 1970,
but the RAAF was immediately given joint control over the base. After
a change of government in London it was decided that some units
142
HISTORY
from Britain, Australia and New Zealand should remain in Malaysia/

Singapore following the signing of a ‘Five Power Defence Agreement’
(FPDA). The RAAF contribution to this arrangement would remain
largely unchanged from the previous 15 years, although 78 Wing (now
composed of 3 and 75 Squadrons) had recently been equipped with the
Mirage IIIO. Because the new agreement emphasised air defence, there
was no need for 2 Squadron’s Canberras to re-deploy to Butterworth
on the unit’s return from the Vietnam War.
Despite the fact that Butterworth was of less strategic importance than
in the previous two decades, the base reached its peak strength during
the 1970s. The number of personnel at Butterworth in this period was
approximately 1200, excluding some 3500 dependants accompanying
the RAAF servicemen. Another 1000 local Malay, Indian and Chinese
employees also worked on base at this time. The recreation/support
facilities for servicemen and their families—including a school, hostel
(the hostie), radio station (RAAF Radio Butterworth) and hospital
(No 4 RAAF Hospital)—were a central feature of life at the base. The
latter was particularly important in view of the fact that it reportedly
facilitated the delivery of 150 babies in one year.
But the continued economic and political stabilisation of the region

partly removed the requirement for a permanent RAAF detachment
at Butterworth. On 31 March 1979 the base was transferred to the
Royal Malaysian Air Force, although it continued to be controlled
through Headquarters Operational Command situated at Glenbrook,
Australia. In 1983 both 75 Squadron and 478 Squadron were withdrawn
from Malaysia (the latter being disbanded), while three years later
3 Squadron was transferred to Williamtown. The same composite
unit that was deployed to Ubon in 1962 also returned to Butterworth
in 1986, but was equipped with only eight pilots and ten Mirages
formerly belonging to 3 Squadron—which was then converting to the
F/A-18A/B Hornet. The end of the RAAF association with Butterworth
was sealed the following year with the release of a new White Paper
that stressed defence of Australia over forward defence.
143
For the next year and a half the base was progressively drawn down.
The hospital was closed on 1 July 1987, followed six months later by
the celebrated RAAF Radio Butterworth. The Mirages of 79 Squadron
completed their deployment in May 1988, and the following month
both the headquarters and base squadron at Butterworth departed.
But that was not the end of the RAAF presence in Malaysia. A
detachment from 92 Wing remains to conduct maritime patrols, along
with 324 Combat Support Squadron and some Army sub-units, while
regular deployments of other RAAF aircraft are made as part of the
Australian commitment to the FPDA.
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PHANTOMS OF THE PAST
A fter 15 years of service, the Canberra bombers of 82 Wing’s

1 and 6 Squadrons at Amberley, Queensland, were retired in
late 1970. However, the plan to replace the Canberra with the F-111C
encountered an obstacle when serious technical problems in the USA
delayed the timely introduction of the new type. As a stopgap, two
dozen F-4E Phantoms were ferried to Amberley. To date, it was the
RAAF’s only use of an ‘interim’ strike aircraft.
In addition, the F-111C was a ‘hybrid’ version specifically tailored to

RAAF requirements, and needed a long gestation period. In fact, the
US had foreseen delays and earlier suggested the six-engined B-47
Stratojet as an interim RAAF bomber—an offer which was declined.
At the time the F-4s arrived, it was by no means certain how long
they would be needed. No one could be sure how soon the F-111C’s
problems would be solved, nor whether new ones might arise. The F-4
lease arrangement included an option to purchase, should the F-111C
program be cancelled. As events transpired, 82 Wing flew the Phantom
for two and a half years.
As early as 1963, the F-4C had featured among five aircraft types being
considered by the RAAF as Canberra replacements. Interest switched
to the emerging F-111, but it was not long before the problems with
its cutting-edge technology began to appear. A series of crashes and
in-flight failure of its world-first ‘swing wing’ grounded the US Air
Force’s F-111 fleet. The cause turned out to be weaknesses in the wing-
box structure. The problem was eventually solved (although more
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wing problems were to emerge in later years), in part by Australians

working with the Americans, but that is another story.
The then Minister for Defence, Malcolm Fraser, met with US Defence
Secretary Melvin Laird in early 1970 to plan the way ahead for a
solution. The Fraser–Laird agreement outlined a ‘recovery program’
for the F-111Cs, which had already been signed over to Australia and
were held in USAF storage; now they had to go back to the factory
for modifications. The agreement also provided for the loan of 24
Phantoms in the interim.
An F-4 training program for RAAF air and ground personnel

commenced at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. Deliveries of the
brand-new Phantoms came just three months after the deal was
announced by Fraser and Senator Tom Drake-Brockman, Minister for
Air, in June 1970, and they were operational almost immediately. The
arrangements, and the subsequent air-refuelled flights from the USA,
were hailed by the senator as an example of the RAAF’s efficiency and
flexibility. While in some respects not meeting RAAF needs as fully
as the F-111C would, he said, the F-4 ‘will make a most significant
contribution to air defence capability’.
The F-4 was arguably the premier multi-role fighter of its time. In
US service it flew in many guises: high-altitude interceptor, attack
platform for conventional (and, potentially, nuclear) weapons, and
reconnaissance. In the close air support role it carried a wide variety
of bombs and missiles, and as ‘wild weasel’ carried out suppression of
enemy air defence systems. After operational experience had shown
the folly of not fitting a gun to the Phantom, the USAF installed a
20mm cannon—firstly on the F-4C in an underslung pod, and then as
a fixture in the F-4E beneath its nose radar unit. Surprisingly, US units
were still flying the Phantom in Iraq in 1996—38 years after the type’s
first flight.
146
HISTORY
In the RAAF, though, the Phantom’s role was that which was intended
for the F-111C: ground strike. Crew skills were honed at Evans Head
bombing range, New South Wales, and on day and night exercises
with Mirages and Navy Skyhawks. With RAF Vulcans they formed
an integral component of the strike force which ‘attacked’ Darwin in
1972’s Exercise Top Limit.
The F-4E’s level of technology, between that of the Canberra and

F-111, also made for a useful transition between the two. It was not
overly complex, but did introduce a modern radar system. It also
suffered its share of accidents and technical problems, some minor and
some more worrying, such as fatigue cracks in control surfaces.
The Phantom was a real crowd pleaser during its brief RAAF career.
In seven public air shows packed into a month during the Air Force’s
golden jubilee year, 1971, formation fly-pasts of Phantoms and Mirages
heightened public awareness of the RAAF’s potency in the strike and
air superiority roles.
Despite an Australian assessment of the F-4 as superior to both

the Mirage and Skyhawk, a US offer to sell the loaned aircraft to
the RAAF was turned down. Late in 1972, when the arrival of the
F-111Cs seemed imminent, half of the F-4 force returned to the USA.
The following June, before a crowd of 3000, the first six F-111Cs
finally touched down at Amberley, and the last of the Phantoms were
soon gone. (In fact only 23 of the 24 delivered were returned, one
unfortunately having been lost with its crew off Evans Head in 1971.
The problem of how to pay for a leased aircraft was solved when the
US government agreed to write it off against a P3 Orion.)
Today, the RAAF Museum displays an F-4E in kangaroo roundel

markings, though not one of the original RAAF examples, as a
reminder of our ‘interim’ strike aircraft. The Phantom could well have
seen much longer RAAF service than it did, as the F-111C program
came close to cancellation during its decade-long incubation. In a
147
speech at Amberley commemorating the 25th anniversary of the first

F-111C delivery, the former RAAF project manager Group Captain
Milt Cottee (retired) said, ‘I suppose if that had happened, you may
still be operating F-4s.’
The Vietnam experience

1970 did not mark the start of RAAF experience with the F-4, as several
Australians had already flown the aircraft with the USAF in Vietnam.
Wing Commander Lyall Klaffer served as an operations officer for a
RF-4C reconnaissance squadron there in 1965. Squadron Leader Alan
Reed made 100 reconnaissance missions, including some into North
Vietnam—a strict ‘no-go’ zone for the other four Australian F-4 pilots
who later flew in the offensive air support role with US 12th Tactical
Fighter Wing. The Australian government policy of allowing only in-
country (ie. South Vietnam) operations was ‘at best inhibiting, and
at worst unworkable’, recalled Group Captain Lindsay Naylor at the
1998 RAAF History Conference. However on occasions, he continues,
‘only after plotting the positions in mission debriefs did [the pilots]
realise they had been on the ‘wrong side’ of the border’.
148
AWARD WINNING HERITAGE
S ince 1987 the RAAF has awarded prizes for works in the fields of
arts, literature and photography, which have furthered appreciation
and recorded knowledge of the Service’s history and heritage. By virtue
of the Heritage Awards Scheme, a substantial body of artworks and
photographs has been added to the catalogued collection of the RAAF
Museum at Point Cook, although normally displayed around Air Force
Headquarters in Canberra. Winners of the Literature category, and
some runners-up, have made their way into print as part of the RAAF
Heritage Series of books.
After a one-year gap, during which competition was in abeyance

while the scheme’s goal and success was reviewed and assessed, the
Heritage Awards were again held in 2005. The Chief of Air Force and
his committee of judges and advisers decided to make no award for
Photography this year, but in addition to the normal first and second
prizes in the Art category, a special award was made to another
outstanding entry in the Literature section in addition to the major
prize winner. Both manuscripts will be published in the Heritage Series
over the next 12 months.
While each of the prize-winning entries in all categories has a story to

tell with regard to their subjects, often there is an equally interesting
tale that surrounds the circumstances in which the works were created
and why, and by whom.
Heritage Art Winners

For instance, the winner of First Prize in the Art category is Lindsay
Stepanow from Ballarat, Victoria. Although he is a semi-professional
149
artist, he is also a pilot who owns a Victa Airtourer and has worked as
an aircraft engineer. In his art, Stepanow specialises in abstract aerial
landscapes, but ‘dabbles’ in aircraft too. His entry titled Whispering
Death is a superb watercolour featuring two Beaufighters during a
ground strike on Japanese positions in the South-West Pacific in 1943.
He has no special connection with this aircraft type, but was impressed
by its appearance and wartime exploits, and thought it would make a good
aircraft to illustrate speed at low level. The painting was meticulously
planned using sketches to perfect the composition. Stepanow has
previously won a RAAF Heritage Award, for Photography in 1992.
Multi-award winning Sydney artist Steven Heyen won Second Prize

with an elegant oil painting titled Better Late than Never. This work
depicts two Short Sunderland flying boats, A26-1 and A26-3, overflying
Sydney’s North Head on 12 March 1944, after a 45-day delivery flight
from England via Africa and America. Aircraft of this type had been
first ordered by Australia in 1939, but were detained in Britain on
anti-submarine and patrol duties with No 10 Squadron, RAAF, until
six were finally released late in the European War. In their new role
with No 40 Squadron, the Sunderlands transported troops and supplies
around Australia and New Guinea.
Working exclusively now in oils and with a focus on traditional

Australian landscape as well as wildlife and aviation, Heyen has been
a regular entrant in the Heritage Awards over the years; he has taken
prizes on five occasions, including First Prize in 2003 and Second Prize
in 2002. His interest in aviation art derives from having a father who
was a commercial pilot and an artist mother. Also a pilot, he was one
of the founding members of the Australian Society of Aviation Artists,
and is a member of the American society. He is represented in art
galleries in Sydney and Victoria, and has been published in Australian
Artist magazine in their Master Painters section. His works can also be
found in collections in New Zealand and the USA.
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HISTORY
Heritage Literature
The winner of the main prize for Literature was Adelaide author
A.J. (‘Jack’) Brown for his manuscript Kata Kana Man. This is an
account of his war service in 1942–46 with the RAAF’s top secret
wireless units (WU), which worked on intercepting coded Japanese
radio transmissions for Central Bureau, General MacArthur’s signals
intelligence outfit based in Brisbane for most of the Pacific War.
Beginning his work as a kana operator (katakana being symbols in
the Japanese alphabet or syllabary representing Japanese and Chinese
sounds) with No 1 WU at Townsville, Brown moved to New Guinea
in 1943, serving at Port Moresby and subsequently Nadzab, Biak and
then Hollandia. In October 1944 he joined the nucleus of a new unit,
No 6 WU, which was headed to the Philippines and the Leyte
landings.
Battling ill health after the war, Brown took a sales job with Harris
Scarfe Ltd. before moving into the plastics business and eventually
into wholesale jewellery. It became a matter of sore grievance for
him that there was little official recognition given within Australia to
the major contribution made by Allied signals intelligence to helping
to win the war or at least shorten its duration. In part this occurred
precisely because of the highly secret nature of the work in which
the WUs (with Australian and American Army signals units) had been
engaged, which meant that little documentation had found its way into
the records.
Specially Commended in 2005 (and awarded a special prize of $2000)

was Jeffrey Pedrina of Brisbane, who wrote about his 12 months’
service with Caribou transports in Vietnam during 1966–67 in his
entry titled Wallaby Airlines. The RAAF Transport Flight Vietnam was
the first Australian air unit committed to the war, in 1964, and only
changed its name to No 35 Squadron in June 1966 at the time that the
Australian Task Force arrived. Pedrina had made his career in the air
force eight years before he went to Vietnam, following in the footsteps
of his father, Squadron Leader W.A. Pedrina, DFC, who joined in 1938
151
but was killed by ground fire in a Hudson making a low-level supply

drop near Buna, New Guinea, in December 1942.
In Vietnam, Jeff Pedrina flew 1200 hours in Caribous including a record

total in March 1967 and was awarded a mention-in-dispatches. He left the
RAAF in 1973 and joined the Department of Civil Aviation as an airways
surveyor, serving with the department and its successor organisations
until 1989. After flying with Ansett Airlines for two years, he ran an
independent aviation consultancy in 1991–2001 and also lectured in
aviation management at Griffith University in Queensland.
The Heritage Awards continue to provide a significant avenue for

recording the rich history of the RAAF across the diverse spectrum
of its service to Australia over 84 years, in both peace and war. The
entries in all categories cover a range of subjects and eras, and provide
an excellent cross-section of the service of the men and women who
are or have been its members. The next Awards competition will be
in 2007.
152
CONTRIBUTORS
154
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
Ashton, Mr Luke – 35
Brent, Wing Commander Keith – 7
Briese, Squadron Leader Stuart – 22
Clark, Dr Chris – 1, 11, 21, 29, 31
Kainikara, Mr Sanu – 2, 8, 10, 12, 15, 16, 18, 20, 24, 32, 34, 36
Lacey, Wing Commander Neil – 26, 28
McLennan, Wing Commander Peter – 6
Miller, Wing Commander Chris – 30
Nelmes, Mr Mike – 17, 23, 27
Post, Squadron Leader Alex – 5
Sims, Squadron Leader Dominic – 4
Whiting, Wing Commander Mary-Anne – 33
Wilson, Dr David – 3, 9, 13, 14, 19, 25
155
156
INDEX
158
INDEX
aerial refueling, 42, 44, 45, 78 Fokker, 83

FW-190, 122
aerospace, 59
Halifax, 106, 121
Air power: Hampden, 106
characteristics, 3, 15, 30; Hercules, 92
capabilities, 3-5, 8, 12‑13, 15, Hornet F/A-18, 75, 78, 143
17, 19-20, 23-6, 39, 43 Hudson, iii
Airborne early warning & Lancaster, 106, 115, 121
control (AEW&C), 24, 44-5, 75 Liberator, 98
Martinsyde, 82
Aircraft (types): Maurice-Farman, 81
Auster Mk 6, 90-1 Meteor, 133-6
Avro 504K, 86 MiG-15, 133-6
BE2c, 82 Mirage IIIO, 140, 143-4, 147
Beaufighter, 109-10, 124, Mirage 2000, 48
125‑8, 150 Mitchell, 102
Beaufort, 98, 117-19, 125 Mosquito, 121, 125
Betty, 98 Mustang, 102, 133-4
Blenheim, 106 Orion P-3, 92, 147
Boomerang, 100, 110, 125 Phantom F-4E, 77, 145-8
Brewster Buffalo, 141 Piper L-5, 111
Bristol Scout, 87 Sabre F-86, 133, 138-9, 142
Canberra, 137-9, 142-3, SE5A, 86
145, 147 Seagull III, 87
Caribou, 151 Short 827, 82
Catalina, 97 Sikorski helicopter, 103
Caudron, 81 Skyhawk, 147
Dakota, 77, 90-1, 102, 104 Sopwith Pup, 86
DH9, 86 Spitfire, 114, 121
DH9A, 86 Stirling, 106
DH60X Gipsy Moth, 90 Sunderland, 150
DHC Beaver, 90-2 Tempest, 114
F-16, 48 Texan AT-6, 111
F-22, 48 Tiger Moth, 125
F-35 JSF, 41 Vampire, 134
F-111, 145-8 Ventura, 106
F-117, 33 Vickers Vimy, 87
Fairey IIID, 87
159
Vought Kingfisher, 90-1 Basra, 81, 83

Vulcan, 138, 147
Bomber Command (RAF), iii,
Walrus, 90-1
105, 115, 122
Wapiti, 90
Association, 106
Wedgetail, 75
Memorial, 105-8
Wellington, 106
Wildcat, 97 Bowman, Squadron Leader
Wirraway, 109-10, 125 Robert, 126-8
airlift, 5 Brancker, Air Vice-Marshal Sir
Sefton, 93
Afghanistan, 7, 12
Britain, 85, 93, 98, 119, 125,
Amberley, 142, 145, 147
138, 141-3
Antarctica, 77, 89-92; Treaty, 91
Brown, A.J. (Jack), 151
Armstrong, Flying Officer G.P.,
Burma, 31, 101-4
114
Butterworth, 140, 141-4
Arnold, General H.H., 1
Assam campaign, 103-4
Calvert, Brigadier Mike, 103
asymmetric warfare, 21
Campbell, Flying Officer S.A.C.,
Australian Air Corps, 86-7
89-90
Australian Army, 129-30
Canada, 85, 99, 102, 105
Australian Defence Force, 24,
Central Bureau, 151
26, 35, 39, 41-2, 61, 64-5, 69
Central Flying School, 86-7
Australian Flying Corps, 95, 125
Chindits, 101
Australian National Antarctic
Research Expedition, 90 Chinese Air Force, 133, 136
Australian War Memorial, 106-7 Churchill, Winston, 79, 101
close air support, 30
Babington-Smith, Flight Officer Cochrane, Colonel Phil, 102, 104
Constance, 113 Cold War, 7
Baghdad, 33, 81-2 combat support, 25-6
Bailey, Flight Sergeant H.J., 114
160
INDEX
command of the air, 5, 23, 26, 27 Edwards, Wing Commander

Hughie, 106
Commonwealth Aircraft
Corporation, 125 effects-based operations, 8, 30,
39-40
Commonwealth Strategic
Reserve, 141 electronic warfare, 44, 45
communications, 44, 63 Ellsworth, Lincoln, 90
Confrontation, 142 Empire Air Training Scheme, 105
Coomalie Creek, 126 enablers, 17, 43-5
Cottee, Group Captain Milton, enabling operations, 5
148
Evans Head, 147
counter air missions, 56
experimentation, 35-8, 39-42
cruise missiles, 47-50
types:
AGM-84K SLAM-ER, 48 Forward air control, 109-12
AGM-158 JASSM, 46, 48 Fergusson, Brigadier Bernard,
Storm Shadow, 48 102
Taurus, 48
Firedog (Operation), 141-2
Five Power Defence Agreement,
Dawson, Neil, 106-8 143-4
De Havilland Australia, 125 force multipliers, see enablers
Department of Aircraft France, 111
Production, 125
Fraser, Malcolm, 146
Discovery (ship), 89
Discovery II (ship), 90
Galileo system, 65, 69
Douglas, Pilot Officer G.E.,
89‑90 Garing, Group Captain W.H., 119
Douhet, General Giulio, 15, 34 Germany, 81, 85, 93
Drake-Brockman, Senator Tom, Glenbrook, 143

146 Global Navigation Satellite
System (GLONASS), 64, 69
161
Global Positioning System Khe Sanh (battle), 111-12

(GPS), 44, 49, 64-5, 69
Klaffer, Wing Commander Lyall,
guided bombs, 31 148
Gulf War (First), 4, 11, 33, 49; Korean War, 31, 99, 111, 129,
(2003) 27, 47, 63 133-4, 136
Kosovo, 12
Hallion, Richard P., 110 Kut (siege), 82-3
Havannah Bay, 97
Headway 03/1 (experiment), 39 Labuan, HMAS, 90
Heard Island, 90, 92 Laird, Melvin, 146
Hewitt, Air Commodore J.E., 119 Lambeth, Benjamin, 33
Heyen, Steven, 150 Law of armed conflict, 53
Hill, Alec, 127 Lentaigne, Brigadier Walter, 102
Lewis, Flight Sergeant Alan, 127
Imperial Gift, 85-88
India, 85, 93 Mackerras, Flight Sergeant D.J.,
114
Indian Flying Corps, 81
Mackinolty, Air Vice-Marshal
intelligence, 16, 20-1, 24, 28-9,
G.J.W., 84
36, 55
Macmillan, Harold, 139
Iraq, 12-13, 27, 47, 63, 78, 81-4
Macquarie Island, 92
Italy, 106, 111
Malayan Emergency, 129, 141-2
Malaysia, 142-3
Japan, 98, 133-4, 141
Mawson, Sir Douglas, 89
Jones, Air Marshal Sir George,
95-6 McGuigan, Warrant Officer W.,
127
Jumper, General John P., 71
McMurdo Sound, 92
Menzies, R.G., 137-9
162
INDEX
Mesopotamia, see Iraq Palstra, Squadron Leader W.,

93-6
Middleton, Flight Sergeant
Rawdon, 106 Pathfinder Force, iii
Milne Bay, 118-19 Paveway bombs, 31-2
Milosevic, Slobodan, 12, 34 Pedrina, Jeffrey, 151-2
Mitchell, General W. (“Billy”), Pedrina, Squadron Leader W.A.,
15, 34 151-2
mobility, 25-6 Peenemunde, 113, 115
Morotai, 124, 127-8 Petre, Captain H.A., 83
Mountbatten, Lord, 102 Philippines, 151
Murdoch, Air Marshal Sir Point Cook, 86, 106
Alistair, 90
precision munitions, 32-4, 40
Narromine, 126-7
Qantas, 99
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty
Quinn, Squadron Leader N.T.,
Organisation), 12, 32
117
National service, 129-32
Qurna (battle), 82
NS Training Units, 132
Naylor, Group Captain Lindsay,
148 R101 (airship), 93, 95-6
navigation, 63-4, 69 Rabaul, 117
networked operations, 17, 24, reconnaissance, 16, 20, 44, 55,
28, 38 63, 68
New Guinea, iii, 109-10, 151-2 Reed, Squadron Leader Alan,
148
New Zealand, 81-2, 85, 108, 141,
143 robotic warfare, 29-30
Normandy invasion, 121-3 Royal Air Force, 85, 105, 122-3,
141
Nowra, 117-18
Nuclear weapons, 137-9
163
Royal Australian Air Force, 35, 114 Mobile Control and

48, 59-62, 63, 65-7, 70, 84, 86-8, Reporting Unit, 142
89-91, 93, 105, 109-12, 117, 129- 453 Squadron, 121-2
32, 137-9, 141-3 455 Squadron, 106, 123
Association, 107-8 456 Squadron, 99, 121
Heritage Awards, 149-52 458 Squadron, 106
roundel, 92, 97, 100 460 Squadron, 105-6, 115,
Units: 121, 123
1 Squadron, 145 461 Squadron, 123
1 Wireless Unit, 151 462 Squadron, 106
2 Airfield Construction 463 Squadron, 106, 121, 123
Squadron, 142 464 Squadron, 106, 121, 123
2 Operational Conversion 466 Squadron, 121, 123
Unit, 134 467 Squadron, 106, 115, 121,
2 Squadron, 75, 142 123
3 Squadron, 143 478 Maintenance Squadron,
4 Hospital, 143-4 142-3
4 Squadron, 109-11 Air Operations Centre, 65-6
5 Squadron, 111 Air Power Development
6 Squadron, iii,145 Centre, 36
6 Wireless Unit, 151 Antarctic Flight, 90-1
7 Squadron, 118 Butterworth Base Squadron,
8 Squadron, 117-18 142, 144
9 Operational Group, 109, 119 Museum, 77, 90, 147, 149
10 Squadron, 123, 150 Torpedo Unit, 118
21 Squadron, 141 Transport Flight Vietnam, 151
22 Squadron, 97
Royal Australian Navy, 40, 87,
30 Squadron, 109
129-30, 132
31 Squadron, 126-7
35 Squadron, 151 Royal Flying Corps, 81-3, 98
40 Squadron, 150 Royal Malaysian Air Force, 143
75 Squadron, 84, 143
77 Squadron, 129, 133-5 Royal Observer Corps, 115
78 Wing, 142-3
79 Squadron, 142-4
82 Wing, 145 satellites, 64, 67, 69
92 Wing, 144 Saudi Arabia, 29, 51
100 Squadron, 118
164
INDEX
Scherger, Air Chief Marshal Sir Townley, A.G., 137-8

Frederick, 137-9
Turkey, 81
sensors, 41, 56
Serbia, 34
Ubon, 142-3
Seymour, Flying Officer Robert,
uninhabited aerial vehicles
97
(UAV), 17, 20, 51-8
South Africa, 85, 99 types:
Neuron, 52
Soviet Union, 32
Predator, 51, 76
Space power, 9-10, 16, 44, 60-1,
uninhabited combat air vehicles
63-6, 67-73, 74
(UCAV), 17, 51-8
Special Force, 102-4 types:
special forces, 12, 45, 78 X-45C, 52, 76
X-47B, 52
Stepanow, Lindsay, 74, 149-50
United Nations, 73, 133
strategic bombing, 15, 32
United States of America, 4, 5,
strike, 5, 8, 20-1, 23-4, 26, 39- 11, 15, 31, 51, 60, 71, 73, 93,
42, 44, 55 97‑8, 111, 119, 125, 138, 145-6
suppression of enemy air urban operations, 19, 21, 30
defences, 56
sustainability, 29
V-1 rocket, 113-15
synthetic aperture radar, 64, 69
V-2 flying bomb, 113, 115
Viarsa I (fishing boat), 92
Taliban, 12
Victoria Cross, 106
technology, 5, 7-8, 16, 20, 29-30,
43, 56 Vietnam War, 11, 31, 33, 111-12,
142-3, 148, 151-2
tempo of operations, 28
Terrorism, war on, 7
War loans, 124, 125-6
Thomson, Lord, 93
Warden, Colonel John, 15
Torpedo attack, 117-20
Wau, 109-10
165
Watten, 113, 115

White, Flight Sergeant J., 127
White, Sir Thomas, 84
Williams, Air Marshal Sir
Richard, 85, 94, 96
Williamtown, 143
Wingate, Major General Charles
Orde, 101-3
Wyatt Earp, HMAS, 90
Yemen, 51
Yugoslavia, 12
166

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Air Power Development Centre

Edited by Chris Clark and Sanu Kainikara

Published and distributed by:

Telephone: +61 2 6266 1433

In June 2004 the Air Power Development Centre commenced

The Pathfinder title was chosen as a tribute to the World War II

Since its appearance, Pathfinder has maintained its steady rate of

Group Captain Mike Bennett

The Air Power Development Centre, formerly the Aerospace Centre,

Telephone: +61 2 6266 1355

AIR POWER PAGE NO

Iraq – The First Time Around (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

List of Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

National safety would be endangered by an Air Force whose

– General Henry H. (“Hap”) Arnold, USAAF, 1945

This unprecedented and rapid improvement in capabilities is unique to

comprehensively before any campaign plans are formulated. It is

If the basics have remained unchanged over a century, what changes

The changes in air power capabilities have been revolutionary. The

The entire spectrum of air power roles can now be encapsulated in

visible even to a casual observer of military matters. It is incumbent

The military imperatives of the global war on terrorism are now

In Afghanistan, circumstances permitted the unhindered and effective

Warfighting is in the process of being radically changed, brought about

Although the assured reduction in loss of life as a concept should

When carefully optimised, close integration of air and space power

Within the foreseeable future, command of space will become as

The war on terrorism is at the forefront of the current global strategic

Superiority in air and space becomes a prerequisite for the nurturing of

There is no substitute for air and space power!

Yet again in Afghanistan, air power supported by Special Forces and

Of course, the success or otherwise of air power employment will always

Operation Falconer (Iraqi Freedom) was a sort of summing up of the

severe damage (estimated as high as 86 per cent) on Iraqi Republican

Secondly, the potential difficulties that are faced by multinational

T here is a very clear commonality in the thinking of all air power

Even with these limitations, air power has become accepted

Even with a clear understanding that the complete spectrum of

attributes of speed, flexibility, reach and the ability to transcend natural

Crystal gazing within the currently available indications provides a

The second evolution that is already under way is the increased

An air force of consequence will need to be networked in more ways

T here is a prevalent thought that the zenith of air power glory

It is gradually becoming apparent that these threats are more likely to

In theatres of ongoing conflict it is seen that air power, when employed

Urban combat, even against a traditional adversary, is fraught with

The key to success in urban operations is the ability to have an

asymmetric warfare. The escape route for irregular threat perpetrators,

The principal contribution of air power to urban conflict is the greatly

Long-range strike capabilities of air power produce significant strategic

From a security perspective, the world is going through changes at a

resource allocations. Air power has always been a dynamic concept! It

W hich air power capability is most important? Take 1: Control of

So the most important air power capability is clearly that which is an

Which air power capability is most important? Take 2: Strike. An

Strike is overtly offensive. Is it right to adopt an offensive capability

actually be won using purely defensive means. This is akin to trying to

So the most important air power capability is clearly that which

Which air power capability is most important? Take 3: Information.

Air power can contribute very significantly to the ADF’s information

Which air power capability is most important? Take 4: Mobility. We

Therefore, we must be an expeditionary force. Most, if not all, of our

Which air power capability is most important? Take 5: Combat