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MMHKT CONSORTIUM
Doha Metro Pro¡ect
West Bay
Doha, State of Qatar.
Dear Sir,
Please find enclosed ISG JV's Electromagnetic (EMC) Hazard Analysis design report, ref. [1], for your perusal and
consideration in your designs. This report has been already shared with you informally.
We understand you will prepare and submit an ICF in order to close out the Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC)
-
interface (please refer to ER's Vol.5. Appendix A Responsibility lnterface matrix for Contractors Metro Phase 1)
shortly.
Yours si
¡$G JV
Massimo ceschi
Prqect Director & Contracto/s Representative
ISG Joint Venture
Enclosure: As stated
Cc: Mr. Daniel Leckel, The Engineer
Mr. Andrew McCracken, Engineer's Assistant
Mr. Kevin Dunning, PMC Deputy Pro¡ect Director (kdunninq pmc@qr.com.qa)
Mr. Colin Shepherd-Evans, PMC Engineering Manager (cshepherdevans pmc@qr.com.qa)
Mr. Robin Chen, QR Director Systems (rchen@qr.com.qa)
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SUPPORTED BY
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DESIGN PHASE: DETAIL DESTGI{ STAGE 2
DOCUMENTCODENO. I,|OO1-ISG-SSA'RPfÍ'34O29
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 4
1.1 PURPOSE ....................................................................................................................... 4
2 SYSTEM DEFINITION.......................................................................................................... 5
2.1 PROJECT OVERVIEW ....................................................................................................... 6
2.2 SYSTEM DEFINITION ........................................................................................................ 6
4 REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................... 10
4.1 CONTRACT DOCUMENTS ............................................................................................... 10
4.2 ISG J.V. DOCUMENTS ................................................................................................... 10
4.3 OTHER STANDARDS ...................................................................................................... 10
4.4 INPUT FOR EMC HAZARD ANALYSIS ................................................................................ 11
7 CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................................................................... 33
M001.UND.VOL4.699
M001.UND.VOL4.2124
1 INTRODUCTION
The operational railway environment requires careful consideration for the Electromagnetic
Compatibility (EMC) of the Electrical and Mechanical equipment installed with the other
equipment and facilities, with themselves, workers and passengers.
1.1 PURPOSE
In compliance with the Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) Plan: M001-ISG-SSA-PLN-
34015 [10] this document aim to identify the all sources of EMI likely to affect other systems
and the equipment that are sensitive to EMI disturbances. These hazards and the anticipated
consequences of the interference and proposed protective measures will be identified and
recorded in the EMC hazard log attached in 7Appendix A.
As a basis for the EMC Hazard Analysis will be also used the Preliminary EMC Hazard
analysis [17] which provides a preliminary high level assessment of the potential EMC issues.
In accordance with the Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) Plan: M001-ISG-SSA-PLN-
34015 Ref. [10] this EMC Hazard Analysis covers the following electromagnetic coupling
mechanisms:
Radiated (electric and magnetic radiation) in which the circuit structures act as
antennas transmitting and receiving energy;
Inductive, in which a varying magnetic field produced by a current in a circuit, links
with a victim circuit, inducing a voltage via mutual inductance;
Capacitive, in which the varying voltage in one circuit produces voltage changes in a
victim circuit via mutual capacitance;
Electrostatic, in which a charged body is discharged to a victim circuit;
Conductive, in which the source and the victim circuits share a common conduction
path;
This MEP EMC Hazard Analysis has been also developed considering the systems provided
by other (e.g. System Contractor) interfaced with the MEP systems.
The analyzed hazards include external events, hazards caused by the presence of people,
failures to subsystems or components of the transport system and failure of operating
procedures. All hazards have been identified taking into account the presence of passengers,
personnel assigned to operation and maintenance and third parties involved by the Red Line
North Underground.
This document is relevant for MEP (Mechanical-Electrical-Plumbing) System.
The process of the EMC hazard analysis has been developed starting with the Preliminary
EMC Hazard Analysis which constitute the DD1 analysis; the Preliminary EMC hazard
analysis had identified all the potential EMC interfaces while this EMC hazard analysis
constitute a more detailed analysis with the aim to identify only the real EMC interfaces.
Moreover this EMC hazard analysis is based on the DD2 M2 design thus constitute the DD2
EMC hazard analysis.
2 SYSTEM DEFINITION
The system and the related boundary of works under the D&B Contractor and MEP/ARCH
Subcontractor (Civil and MEP works) is described as follows.
The Works comprise part of the Doha Metro Red Line North Underground and starts north of
Msheireb Switchbox (out of work scope) and continues northwards to Al Bidda Station. From
Al Bidda Station it continues to Corniche Station (starting built-up area). West Bay and Doha
Exhibition and Convention Centre Station. Doha Exhibition and Convention Centre Station will
also be the future terminal station of the Blue Line. To the north of Doha Exhibition and
Convention Centre Station the line continues to Al Qassar Station, Katara Station, Legtaifiya
Station and then ends at the start of the ramp of the Red Line North Elevated & At Grade.
It must be noted that all the names of the station have been changed. The table below shows
the previous and actual names.
More details of System architecture and Mission profile are contained in the Contract
Document: “DESIGN & BUILD – RED LINE NORTH UNDERGROUND Volume 6 –
Employer’s Requirements, Design Specifications, RTC/038/2012”.
1) civil and architectural works including: site clearance and establishment, utility
diversions, ground treatment, tunneling, station structures, subways, tunnel ventilation
shafts within stations, subway links, road bridges, pedestrian bridges, link ways,
parking and other commuter facilities, emergency escape shafts and staircases
(including related surface structures), station entrances and canopies, architectural fit
out and finishes, signage, landscaping, highway works and reinstatement;
2) underground and above ground ancillary structures including ventilation shafts, plant
rooms;
3) auxiliary utilities systems for tunnels including lighting; emergency lighting and power
and connections to the station;
4) emergency and maintenance walkways and railings within tunnels and stations;
A brief description of the MEP systems/subsystems relevant for this report and within the
scope of work of ISG JV are shown in the table Table 2-1.
3.1 ACRONYMS
BACS Building Automation & Control System
EEC European Economic Community
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
EN European Standard (Europäische Norm)
EU European Union
FR Failure Rate
HA Hazard Analysis
EMC HL EMC Hazard Log
IEC International Electro technical Commission
MEP Mechanical, Electrical and Plumbing
RAMS Reliability, Availability, Maintainability, Safety
RBD Reliability Block Diagram
RIO Remote I/O
SIL Safety Integrity Level
SCADA System Control and Data Acquisition
UPS Uninterrupted Power Supply
VAC Ventilation, Air Conditioning
3.2 DEFINITIONS
Corrective maintenance (EN 50126): The maintenance carried out after fault recognition
and intended to put a product into a state in which it can perform a required function.
Failure rate: Number of failures per time unit
Hazard: A physical situation with a potential for human injury and/or impacts on railway
service (according to EN 50126).
Hazard Log: the document in which safety management activities, hazard identified,
decisions made and solutions adopted are recorded or referenced.
Hazard Severity: estimate of the consequences associated with a particular dangerous
situation.
Preventive maintenance (EN 50126): The maintenance carried out at pre-determined
intervals or according to prescribed criteria and intended to reduce the probability of failure or
the degradation of the functioning of an item.
Reliability: The probability that an item can perform a required function under given
conditions for a given time interval.
Risk: The probable rate of occurrence of a hazard (expressed in a time interval) causing
harm and the degree of severity (expressed in hazard severity levels) of the harm (according
to EN 50126).
Safety: Freedom from unacceptable risk of harm (according to EN 50126).
Safety Case: the documented demonstration that the product complies with the specified
safety requirements.
Safety integrity level: One of a number of defined discrete levels for specifying the safety
integrity requirements of the safety functions to be allocated to the safety related systems.
Safety Integrity Level with the highest figure has the highest level of safety integrity (EN
50126).
Safety Plan: A documented set of time scheduled activities, resources and events serving to
implement the organisational structure, responsibilities, procedures, activities, capabilities and
resources that together ensure that an item satisfies given safety-requirements relevant to a
given project or contract.
4 REFERENCES
[23] IEC TS 61000-3-4: Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) - Part 3-4: Limits - Limitation of
emission of harmonic currents in low-voltage power supply systems for equipment
with rated current greater than 16 A
[24] IEC 61000-4 Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) – Part 4: Testing and Measurement
Techniques
[25] IEC TR/TS 61000-5 Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) – Part 5: Installation and
mitigation guidelines
[26] 2004/108/EC EU Directive on EMC
[27] IEC 62305: Protection against lightning
[28] IEC 62040-2 Uninterruptible power systems (UPS) - Part 2: Electromagnetic compatibility
(EMC) requirements;
[29] EN 12015 Electromagnetic compatibility. Product family standard for lifts, escalators and
moving walks. Emission
[30] EN 12016 Electromagnetic compatibility. Product family standard for lifts, escalators and
moving walks. Immunity
[31] ITU-T K 27 Protection against interference – Bonding configurations and earthing inside a
telecommunication building
[32] IEC TR 61000-5-2 Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) – Part 5: Installation and
mitigation guidelines – section 2: Earthing and cabling
This EMC hazard analysis has been carried out taking as a basis the most updated MEP
packages available at the date of April 2016.
In particular rev. 1 of Corniche (ex Al Bidda station) MEP DD2.M2 has been used as a basis
for this analysis for the stations.
For the Trough Golf Course please refer to relatives design package.
Interfaces with the external/Existing EMC environment will be at the present stage not
analyzed. In fact considering the systems provided by ISG JV and the fact that the most
relevant systems are installed in the underground station, the interface with the external
environment is negligible for both conducted and radiated interferences. The assessment of
the external sources of disturbances might be done by the System Contractor who provide
the most critical system for the metro operation and considering that:
regarding the radiated interferences the System Contractor provides several radio
and telecommunication system for which a deeper assessment of the EMC with the
external environment would be required. Furthermore it has to be considered that the
equipment are installed in an underground station with a structure composed by
concrete reinforced with an electrically continuous rebar cage.
regarding the conducted interferences System Contractor will connect several system
to external systems (e.g. electrical network, telecommunication network).
However System Contractor will interface with Civil and MEP Contractor to highlight if any
criticism will be found with the external Electromagnetic environment.
Considering the above a description of the electromagnetic disturbancies which will be taken
into account in the hazard analysis is provided.
Center Track
Center Track
Zone A
Zone B
TPS
TPS
Zone A
Zone B
All equipment inside the yellow zone shall be compliant with the standard EN 50121, this
zone is defined as railway zone. However there are not safety-critical equipment installed in
the zone A at the TPS level of the Golf Trough. The equipment installed by the MSI in the
zone A are not considered in this document as will be part of the hazard analysis developed
by the MSI.
The equipment and name of the room are the same of the station.
The main difference is that in the Torugh Golf Course and Emergency Exit there are not the
following systems:
Fire Standpipe and sprinkler
Domestic Water System
Irrigation Water
Control Lighting System,
So they are not considered in the Analysis.
At this moment the Layout for the Emergency Exit is under review from ISG.
All the safety-critical equipment in the switchbox are installed inside the technical room which
is in Zone B. There are not safety-critical equipment in Zone A.
ROOM IN ZONE A
Room Code Room Name
UL18 TPS DC Room
UL04 Clean Agent Room
UL21 Corridor
Firefighting Elevator
SO01 opening
UL24 Lobby EE02
UL03 Clean Agent Room
UL20 Corridor
VAC Unit)
Fan Coil
FCU
Unit
Clean Agent
GSPA X X
panel
Clean Agent
Distribution
GSDW
valves
Electrical
Lift/Escalator/Movin Firefighting
X X X X
FFELE
g Walk elevator
IEC 61000-4-11 - EMC Testing and Measurement Techniques - Voltage Dips, Short
Interrupts and Voltage Variations Immunity Tests
Compliance with the above standards will cover the hazard of malfunctioning of the ATS
during emergency for both radiated and conducted interferences.
Regarding the Distribution Board and the inverter can be considered the same hazards
already analyzed for the normal power distribution with particular attention to the USMDB and
the UDB which supply safety critical loads where unwanted tripping of a circuit breaker can
also lead to loss of operation for the metro (signaling system).
Central battery contains rectifier and other non-linear component which may generate
harmonics in the distribution system thus system has to be compliant with the standard for the
UPS system IEC 62040-2. Installation of additional EMI filter can be evaluated.
The switchboard of the central battery system are susceptible to radiated and conducted EMI
as already analyzed for the normal and emergency switchboard (see section 6.5.1).
Escape route luminaries are equipped with electronic ballast which may generate harmonics;
compliance with standard IEC 61000-3-2 or IEC 61000-3-4 (depending on the applicability)
shall be ensured unless central battery isolate the load from the power supply.
will have to prove the compliance of the installation in the respective EMC environment also
by mean of compensatory measures.
6.5.8 BACS
The items analyzed for the BACS system are the following:
Telecommunication network;
BACS peripheral component;
BACS server/Main PLC;
Although the telecommunication network is done with fiber optic cables, several other
apparatus may be susceptible to both radiated and conducted EMI; in particular the network
switch to ensure interconnection of the network are considered susceptible to EMI.
Switch shall be supplied by the UPS system and installed in electromagnetically shielded rack
or cabinet in order to ensure full electromagnetic compatibility in the point of installation.
BACS peripheral component comprise the remote I/O and all those component and apparatus
installed inside the technical room and electrical room. The peripheral component are
electrically connected with field sensors and actuators which are installed in close proximity to
motors, fans, inverter and other electrical apparatus; field connection cables are exposed to
radiated and conducted interferences. To avoid interference to be conducted to the BACS
system the remote I/O will be installed in dedicated metallic EMC-shielded cabinet to ensure
compatibility with the electromagnetic environment.
Moreover cable connecting the remote I/O will be enclosed and shielded and the I/O modules
will have opto-isolated input/output.
6.5.9 VAC
Most of the VAC equipment, included the inverter driven, are supplied from the EMCC and
the interference arising from the inverter have already been considered in the EMCC.
However some VAC equipment such as the CRAC and the VRV external unit, are installed at
surface level and are more exposed to direct and indirect lightning strikes. To protect this
component and to avoid lightning disturbances to be picked up and carried into the low
voltage distribution system, installation of SPD shall be considered to protect the final circuit
of the VAC external unit.
Susceptibility and emission of the CRAC internal unit will be considered in section 6.6.
SENSITIVE ROOM
Room Code Room Name
CL12 Main Tel/IT Room
CL14 Tel/IT Room
CL27 SCR
UL02 Signalling Room
UL10 AC/DC Scada Room
UL11 AC/DC Scada Room
UL14 Tel/IT Room
UL15 Tel/IT Room
UL19 PSD Room
Using the table given in 7Appendix B it has been extracted the list of MEP equipment installed
within the sensitive rooms.
CRAC EMCC
(internal CRACINT BACS X X X X
Unit) EAB
Table 6-4 clearly shows that the CRAC internal unit can constitute a potential source of EMI in
the rooms identified.
CRAC internal unit contain inverter driven compressor which may, under certain conditions,
emit radiated interferences. The CRAC unit are installed also inside SCADA and
telecommunication room where sensitive equipment are installed.
The hazard will be recorded in the EMC hazard log in order to ensure the implementation of
the control measures. The control measure will include compliance with the IEC 61000-6-4.
As the CRAC unit are also installed inside the TPS room immunity has to be ensured for the
control system which contains micro-processor and others EMC sensitive component.
CRAC internal unit are supplied from the EMCC which is not supplying the equipment
installed in those EMC sensitive rooms; however attention will be paid with the earthing and
bonding connection which will be kept separated between the MEP equipment and the
signalling, telecommunication and SCADA earthing.
The Fig.3 shows potential source of EMC coming from MV cables to MEP Electrical System.
This issue has been mitigated with the distance (around 5 meter minimum) and any mutual
effect at this distance can be considered negligible.
At the top of the tunnel inside the cable tray will run the BACS System, near the space
provision for WI-FI Railway System. The BACS allows local and centralized control and
monitoring of the Tunnel system, included the emergency lighting which is considered the
most critical for safety reasons. The main BACS network running in the tunnel is made in
Optical Fibre cables thus there is not any risk for electromagnetic coupling.
However copper cables for BACS system will be installed to connect the BACS RIO (Remote
Input/Output) and the field equipment (distribution board, valve sensor, etc.) and this cables
will run inside the tunnel where they can be exposed to radiated fields.
Emission Susceptibility
System/Subsystem
Conducted Radiated Conducted Radiated
Electrical BACS X
Pressurization
System
Mechanical
Fire Stand
pipe
Drainage for
Plumbing
tunnel
7 CONCLUSIONS
This document represents the EMC Hazard analysis for the MEP system. The Analysis also
identify potential EMC issues with the Rail System Contractor scope.
The results of this activity are reported in Appendix A where the EMC Hazard Log is provided.
The template for the EMC hazard log is compliant with the template provided in the
Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) Assurance Plan - M000-QRC-SSA-PLN-00001 [7].
It is underlined that this is a live document that can be updated during the next phase of the
project if additional hazards are identified. It will be a target of the whole risk management
process of the MEP system demonstrating that the EMC mitigating actions have been
effectively taken into account during design and construction phases.
Control
Hazard Functional Mitigation
Source of EMI Victim of EMI Hazard Description Cause Safety impact Control Measure Measure
Id/ComplyPro ID consequences Measure Id.
Owner
Compliance with the IEC 61000-
EMC-CM-1 M001
6-4 for emission
Radiated emission Hazard has a safety Interface with the System
Signalling equipment, Radiated EMI from the Potential M001
during normal and impact if the EMC-CM-2 Contractor to ensure EMC with
Telecommunication/IT, CRAC unit to EMC malfunctioning of M010
EMC-HZ-1 CRACINT fault operation of malfunctioning in the MEP equipment
PSD room, AC/DC sensitive equipment for the signalling EMC bonding for sensitive
the CRAC internal signalling system is not
SCADA metro operation system equipment (e.g. signaling,
unit detected M001
EMC-CM-3 SCADA, BACS) in compliance
M010
with the ITU-T K27; IBN
configurations will be evaluated.
Control
Hazard Functional Mitigation
Source of EMI Victim of EMI Hazard Description Cause Safety impact Control Measure Measure
Id/ComplyPro ID consequences Measure Id.
Owner
Command cables from the clean
agent panel to the distribution
EMC-CM-6 valves will be shielded, twisted M001
or coaxial to avoid
electromagnetic interference
Excessive
Safety impact if failure
leakage current
EMI filters Residual Current Failure of power of power supply occurs
on the
EMC-HZ-3 installed on Device (RCD) inside Nuisance tripping of RCD supply to loads in on lighting system,
downstream If EMI filters are installed
apparatus the switchboard the station BACS and other safety-
circuit where EMI downstream of RCD verification
related loads EMC-CM-8 M001
filters are installed on the limit of the leakage
current will be carried out
RCD with reinforced continuity
will be installed to avoid
EMC-CM-11 nuisance tripping caused by M001
various disturbances on the
network
Transient leakage
Safety impact if failure
current caused by
External - Residual Current Failure of power of power supply occurs It will be evaluated installation of
overvoltage and
EMC-HZ-5 Common Mode Device (RCD) inside Nuisance tripping of RCD supply to loads in on lighting system, EMC-CM-10 RCD with non-actuating time M001
capacitance of the
Overvoltage the switchboard the station BACS and other safety- (delay time)
downstream
related loads
circuit
Control
Hazard Functional Mitigation
Source of EMI Victim of EMI Hazard Description Cause Safety impact Control Measure Measure
Id/ComplyPro ID consequences Measure Id.
Owner
RCD with reinforced continuity
will be installed to avoid
EMC-CM-11 nuisance tripping caused by M001
various disturbances on the
network
Control
Hazard Functional Mitigation
Source of EMI Victim of EMI Hazard Description Cause Safety impact Control Measure Measure
Id/ComplyPro ID consequences Measure Id.
Owner
Impact of the
harmonics is not VFD and inverter compliant with
EMC-CM-15 M001
relevant for functioning EN 61800-3
Harmonics Potential for of the main safety
caused by inverter malfunctioning on system (e.g. special
Inverter inside
Distribution board and for variable some equipment. ventilation and
EMC-HZ-8 the MCC and Harmonics
loads connected frequency drive Loose of firefighting). Safety load
EMCC
(VFD) for motors performance for sensitive to voltage
and fans motors. unbalances are
supplied by the UPS It will be considered installation
system which ensure EMC-CM-16 of harmonics filter for the VFD M001
power quality. and inverter
Control
Hazard Functional Mitigation
Source of EMI Victim of EMI Hazard Description Cause Safety impact Control Measure Measure
Id/ComplyPro ID consequences Measure Id.
Owner
Surge overvoltage
on the power Degradation of the External or internal Surge
External - Electronic LED driver Failure of the LED
EMC-HZ-12 supply line leading Failure of lighting illuminance level can EMC-CM-22 Protective Device (SPD) to M001
overvoltage for lighting lighting in public areas
to failure of LED have a safety impact protect the electronic driver f
driver
Potential for
malfunctioning on Driver for LED application
some equipment. compliant with IEC 61000-3-2
EMC-CM-23 M001
Electronic LED Loose of and IEC 61000-3-4 depending
Electronic LED Low Voltage Harmonics on the low
EMC-HZ-13 driver used for performance for on the applicability.
driver for lighting distribution network voltage power network
lighting system motors if the
disturbance
propagates in upper Installation of additional
level of the network EMC-CM-24 harmonics filters will be M001
considered if needed
Potential for
malfunctioning on
Central Battery System to be
Central Battery some equipment.
Central Battery Low Voltage Harmonics on the low compliant with the standard for
EMC-HZ-15 system emits Loose of EMC-CM-26 M001
System (CBS) distribution network voltage power network the EMC of the UPS systems
harmonics performance for
IEC 62040-2
motors if the
disturbance
Control
Hazard Functional Mitigation
Source of EMI Victim of EMI Hazard Description Cause Safety impact Control Measure Measure
Id/ComplyPro ID consequences Measure Id.
Owner
propagates in upper Installation of additional
level of the network EMC-CM-24 harmonics filters will be M001
considered if needed
Control
Hazard Functional Mitigation
Source of EMI Victim of EMI Hazard Description Cause Safety impact Control Measure Measure
Id/ComplyPro ID consequences Measure Id.
Owner
Control
Hazard Functional Mitigation
Source of EMI Victim of EMI Hazard Description Cause Safety impact Control Measure Measure
Id/ComplyPro ID consequences Measure Id.
Owner
Voltage variations
Inrush current of
Conductive interference - and transient may
the plumbing Considering installation of
Pumps of the voltage variations and propagate on the
Low Voltage pumps which is Softstarter or Variable
EMC-HZ-23 Station Plumbing transient on the low power network with EMC-CM-39 M001
distribution network caused by a Frequency Drives to supply the
system voltage distribution the consequence of
Direct Online plumbing pumps.
network loss of performance
starting system
of some loads
Control
Hazard Functional Mitigation
Source of EMI Victim of EMI Hazard Description Cause Safety impact Control Measure Measure
Id/ComplyPro ID consequences Measure Id.
Owner
Control
Hazard Functional Mitigation
Source of EMI Victim of EMI Hazard Description Cause Safety impact Control Measure Measure
Id/ComplyPro ID consequences Measure Id.
Owner
Appropriate segregation of
EMC-CM-42 BACS cables will be ensured in M001
accordance with EN 50174-2
Appropriate segregation of
EMC-CM-42 BACS cables will be ensured in M001
accordance with EN 50174-2
Control
Hazard Functional Mitigation
Source of EMI Victim of EMI Hazard Description Cause Safety impact Control Measure Measure
Id/ComplyPro ID consequences Measure Id.
Owner
Radiated
interference from
Radiated fields can
the MEP Malfunctioning of Operator to address the issue
MEP Equipment interfere with implantable
Staff with implantable equipment in No functional implantable devices on and avoid staff with implantable M017-
EMC-HZ-28 inside technical medical devices of staff EMC-CM-43
devices normal conditions consequences staff people can lead to medical devices to access Operator
room operating in the technical
and abnormal safety issues inside technical room
room
functioning (short
circuit)
CL08
CL09
NLUM
Radiated and conducted susceptibility is CL16
WH
related only to the circuit breaker installed CL51
HAND
inside the switchboard. Conducted CL52
Distribution Board DB DRYER X X
interference may trig the circuit breaker CL58
SOCKET
Low Voltage tripping and EMI filters can increase PL04
BACPC
Distribution - Station sensibility of RCD PL05
EAB
Normal Power UL07
ELE-LV-NP UL09
BACPC
EAB
Radiated and conducted susceptibility is
AHU
related only to the circuit breaker installed
VRVINT
Normal Motor Control inside the switchboard. Conducted CL02 MAIN
MCC FCU X X
Center interference may trig the circuit breaker CL03 SWITCHBOARD
DWPUMP
tripping and EMI filters can increase
IRPUMP
sensibility of RCD
GWPUMP
BWPUMP
To be noted that inverter are installed
Electrical
CL08
Radiated and conducted susceptibility is CL09
related only to the circuit breaker installed CL51
Emergency inside the switchboard. Conducted CL52 BACPC
EDB X X
Distribution Board interference may trig the circuit breaker PL04 EAB
tripping and EMI filters can increase PL05
sensibility of RCD UL07
UL08
Radiated and conducted susceptibility is UDB
PSD
related only to the circuit breaker installed CL08 TUNNEL
SIGNALLING
UPS Sub-Main inside the switchboard. Conducted CL09 MEP
USMDB SCADA X X
Distribution Board interference may trig the circuit breaker UL07 BACPC
TLC
tripping and EMI filters can increase UL08 BACSCR
SECURITY GATE
sensibility of RCD BACTLC
Radiated and conducted susceptibility is
related only to the circuit breaker installed
CL09
UPS Distribution inside the switchboard. Conducted KNX
UDB PL05 X X
Board interference may trig the circuit breaker BACTLC
UL08
tripping and EMI filters can increase
sensibility of RCD
EMCC
ATS (Automatic ESMDB MAIN
ATS UL01 X X
Transfer Switch) BACPC SWITCHBOARD
EAB
CL08
Radiated and conducted susceptibility is
CL09
related only to the circuit breaker installed
PL04 CBS
Central Battery inside the switchboard. Conducted
CDB PL05 CBCC X X
Lighting switchboard interference may trig the circuit breaker
UL07 CBLUM
tripping and EMI filters can increase
UL08
sensibility of RCD
SWITCH
EMC assessment will be carried out in a
CBS
later stage when the product will be CL08
Controller CBCC CBLUM
chosen. However the EMI interaction other
CDB
should be negligible for standard product
Escape route If luminaries are equipped with ballast CBCC
CBLUM other X
luminaries they can generate conducted interference CDB
LPS represent a source of conducted and
Lightning Protection Lightning Protection
LPS radiated EMI. The design will comply with other EAB X X
System System
the relavant standard (IEC 62305)
Elevators are operated by inverter. The
main electrical equipment (included the
ESMDB
inverter) will be located in the upper part Emergenc
Firefighting elevator FFELE BACPC X X X
of the elevator (Surface level). y Exit
EAB
Compliance with the standard EN 12015
and EN 12016 to ensure EMC.
Lift/Escalators/Moving
Elevators are operated by inverter. The
Walks
main electrical equipment (included the
inverter) will be located in the upper part SMDB
Station
Passengers elevator PAELE of the elevator (Surface level or BACPC X X X
public area
Concourse level). Compliance with the EAB
standard EN 12015 and EN 12016 to
ensure EMC.
CL12
CRAC internal unit may contain inverter CL16
driven compressor with considerable PL02
EMCC
power consumption. A deeper PL03
CRAC (internal Unit) CRACINT BACS X X X X
assessment has to be carried out if the PL06
EAB
unit is installed in room with sensitive PL07
equipment. UL02
UL18
Pumps for chilled Inverter driven pumps with considerable
CWPUMP AG06
water power consumption.
AG04
AG05
AG06
AG08
AG09
AG11
RL02
CL02
CL03
CL06
CL08
CL13
CL14
CL15
CL27
CL28
CL29
CL30
CL34
CL35
The AHU contain a low power fan which CL36 MCC
Fan Coil Unit FCU does not represent a source of EMI. CL38 BACS
Susceptibility to EMI is negligible. CL39 EAB
CL40
CL42
CL48
CL55
PL04
UL01
UL03
UL04
UL05
UL06
UL07
UL08
UL09
UL11
UL12
UL13
UL14
UL15
Internal CIO tracking and status--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
UL16
M001-ISG-SSA-RPT-34029.docx-CIO-2 Status: Approved VERSION:
UL19 2
A042788_Doha Metro, Red Line North/2-WIP/1-Coordination/04-System Assurance_RAMS/01-Doc/M001-ISG-SSA-
RPT-34029 - EMC Hazard Analysis 51/54
Doha Metro
Wayside equipment
Wayside equipment
Drainage for tunnel
System /Subsystem
Radio system
Train Control
Rolling stock
PA system
OTE/UPE)
(Tunnel)
(Tunnel)
SCADA
system
system
Switch
CCTV
Low Voltage Distribution System (Tunnel)
MEP Contractor Scope
CCTV
Security and Access control system
Ethernet Backbone Netw ork
Sw itch
Trackw ork
Stray current protection system
Rolling Stock Rolling stock