BENGZON VS.

DRILON

GR. 103524 (APRIL 15, 1992)

FACTS:

The retired justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of

Appeals who currently receiving pensions under RA 910 as amended
by RA 1797. President Marcos repealed the section 3 (a) of the RA
1797 which authorized to the adjustment of the pensions of retired
justices and officers of the enlisted members of the AFP. He eventually
issued PD 1638 which automatically readjusted the pensions of the
officer’s enlisted men restored while the retired justices were not.
During the time of President Aquino the RA 1797 was restored
however the advisers of the President gave the wrong information to
her regarding the 1992 GAA were an attempt to overcome her earlier
veto.

It turns out that the Presidential Decree 644 which repealed RA

1797 never became a valid law with the absence of its publication
thus, there was no law. It follows that RA 1797 was still in effect and
HB 16297 was superfluous because it tried to restore the benefits
which were never taken away validly. The veto of HB 16297 did not
produce any effect.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Veto of the President of certain provisions in

the GAA of FY 1992 relating the payment of the adjusted pensions of
retired Justices is constitutional and valid.

RULLING:

No, it is unconstitutional and not valid. The Judiciary has fiscal

autonomy and the Justices of the Court have vested rights to the
accrued pension that is due to them in accordance with the RA 1797.

The President has no power to set aside or override the decisions

of the Supreme Court neither the President have the power to enact
and amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to
repeal of existing laws.

The veto is unconstitutional, the power of the president to

disapprove any items in the GAA does not grant the authority to veto
the part of that item and to approve the remaining portion of the said
item.
 PHILCONSA VS. ENRIQUEZ

GR 113105 (August 19, 1994)

FACTS:

House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994

(GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by both houses of Congress
on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and
limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget
previously submitted by the President. It also authorized members of
Congress to propose and identify projects in the “pork barrels” allotted
to them and to realign their respective operating budgets.

Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills

as prescribed by the Constitution, Congress presented the said bill to
the President for consideration and approval.
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law,
and declared the same to have become Republic Act NO. 7663,
entitled “AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO
DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the
President delivered his Presidential Veto Message

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 7663 is violative of Article VI, Section 25 (5)

of the 1987 Constitution.

RULING:

Yes, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the

legislative process. There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the
presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on those
questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of
the Constitution.The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly
an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing
Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt payment policy.In the
veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue
discrimination when the President vetoed said special provisions while
allowing similar provisions in other government agencies. The veto of
the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the
DPWH is unconstitutional. The Special Provision in question is not an
inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not
alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other
hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended — 70% by
administrative and 30% by contract.

The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of

medicines by the AFP should strictly comply with the formulary
embodied in the National Drug Policy of the Department of Health is an
“appropriate” provision. Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3,
prohibiting the use of the Modernization fund for payment of the
trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which have been
contracted for by the AFP, is violative of the Constitutional prohibition
on the passage of laws that impair the obligation of contracts (Art. III,
Sec. 10), more so, contracts entered into by the Government itself.
The veto of said special provision is therefore valid.The Special
Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment
the pension fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement
and Separation Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5) and
29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution.
Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find anything
in the language used in the challenged Special Provision that would
imply that Congress intended to deny to the President the right to
defer or reduce the spending, much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU
members all at once in 1994. But even if such is the intention, the
appropriation law is not the proper vehicle for such purpose. Such
intention must be embodied and manifested in another law considering
that it abrades the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and there are
existing laws on the creation of the CAFGU’s to be amended.
On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions
relating to appropriations to the Supreme Court, constitutional
commissions, the NHA and the DPWH, there is less basis to complain
when the President said that the expenditures shall be subject to
guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be
determined whether they are proper or inappropriate. Under the
Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take
“necessary and proper steps” to carry into execution the law. These
steps are the ones to be embodied in the guidelines.
 KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAGLILINGKOD SA PAMAHALAAN NG
PILIPINAS, INC., HERMINIGILDO C. DUMLAO, GERONIMO Q.
QUADRA, and MARIO C. VILLANUEVA vs. HON. BIENVENIDO
TAN
G.R. No. 81311. June 30, 1988

FACTS:

The consolidated cases that questions the validity of the VAT

(Executive Order 273) for being unconstitutional in its enactment is
not allegedly within the powers of the President. As
The four consolidated cases questions the validity of the VAT
(Executive Order 273) for being unconstitutional in that its enactment
is not allegedly within the powers of the President; that the VAT is
oppressive, discriminatory, regressive, and violates the due process
and equal protection clauses and other provisions of the 1987
Constitution.

The Solicitor General prays for the dismissal of the petitions on

the ground that the petitioners have failed to show justification for the
exercise of its judicial powers. He also questions the legal standing of
the petitioners who, he contends, are merely asking for an advisory
opinion from the Court, there being no justiciable controversy for
resolution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not VAT is unconstitutional.

RULING:

No. First, the Court held that the President had authority to issue
EO 273 as it was provided in the Provisional constitution that the
President shall have legislative powers.

Second, petitioners have failed to show that EO 273 was issued

capriciously and whimsically or in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility. It appears that a
comprehensive study of the VAT had been extensively discussed by
this framers and other government agencies involved in its
implementation, even under the past administration.

Lastly, petitioners also failed to prove that EO 273 is oppressive,

discriminatory, unjust and regressive, in violation of the equal
protection clause. Petitioners merely rely upon newspaper articles
which are actually hearsay and have evidentiary value. To justify the
nullification of a law. there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication. As the
Court sees it, EO 273 satisfies all the requirements of a valid tax.

In any event, if petitioners seriously believe that the adoption

and continued application of the VAT are prejudicial to the general
welfare or the interests of the majority of the people, they should seek
recourse and relief from the political branches of the government. The
Court, following the time-honored doctrine of separation of powers,
cannot substitute its judgment for that of the President as to the
wisdom, justice and advisability of the adoption of the VAT. The Court
can only look into and determine whether or not EO 273 was enacted
and made effective as law, in the manner required by, and consistent
with, the Constitution, and to make sure that it was not issued in
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
and, in this regard, the Court finds no reason to impede its application
or continued implementation.
 PROVINCE OF ABRA VS. JUDGE HERNANDO
GR L-49336 August 31, 1981
Fact:

First, there was a denial of a motion to dismiss an action for

declaratory relief by private respondent Roman Catholic Bishop of
Bangued desirous of being exempted from a real estate tax followed
by a summary judgment granting such exemption, without even
hearing the side of petitioner, wantonly violated the rights of petitioner
to due process, by giving due course to the petition of private
respondent for declaratory relief, and thereafter without allowing
petitioner to answer and without any hearing, adjudged the case; all in
total disregard of basic laws of procedure and basic provisions of due
process in the constitution, thereby indicating a failure to grasp and
understand the law, which goes into the competence of the Honorable
Presiding Judge.” It was the submission of counsel that an action
for declaratory relief would be proper only before a breach or violation
of any statute, executive order or regulation. Moreover, there being a
tax assessment made by the Provincial Assessor on the properties of
respondent Roman Catholic Bishop, petitioner failed to exhaust the
administrative remedies available under Presidential Decree No. 464
before filing such court action. Further, it was pointed out to
respondent Judge that he failed to abide by the pertinent provision of
such Presidential Decree.

Issue:

Whether or not the Tax exemption is presumed in favor of the

claimant?

Ruling :

No, Respondent Judge would not have erred so grievously had

he merely compared the provisions of the present Constitution with
that appearing in the 1935 Charter on the tax exemption of “lands,
buildings, and improvements.” There is a marked difference. Under the
1935 Constitution: “Cemeteries, churches, and parsonages or convents
appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used
exclusively for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be
exempt from taxation.”
The present Constitution added “charitable institutions,
mosques, and non-profit cemeteries” and required that for the
exemption of “:lands, buildings, and improvements,” they should not
only be “exclusively” but also “actually and “directly” used for religious
or charitable purposes. The Constitution is worded differently. The
change should not be ignored. It must be duly taken into
consideration. Reliance on past decisions would have sufficed were the
words “actually” as well as “directly” not added.
There must be proof therefore of the actual and direct use of the
lands, buildings, and improvements for religious or charitable purposes
to be exempt from taxation. According to Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Guerrero: “From 1906, in Catholic Church v. Hastings to
1966, in Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. v. Acting Commissioner of
Customs, it has been the constant and uniform holding that exemption
from taxation is not favored and is never presumed, so that if granted
it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. Affirmatively put,
the law frowns on exemption from taxation, hence, an exempting
provision should be construed strictissimi juris.” In Manila Electric
Company v. Vera, a 1975 decision, such principle was reiterated,
reference being made to Republic Flour Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue; Commissioner of Customs v. Philippine Acetylene
Co. & CTA; and Davao Light and Power Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of
Customs.