FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

CASE DIGEST : Sanidad Vs Comelec

G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976 PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner, vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents. G.R.
No. L-44684. October 12,1976 VICENTE M. GUZMAN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. L-44714. October 12,1976 RAUL M. GONZALES, RAUL T. GONZALES, JR., and ALFREDO
SALAPANTAN, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COMMISSION ON SELECTIONS and HONORABLE
NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents. MARTIN, J,:

Facts: On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT
FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted into law. The Commission on Elections, by
virtue of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), said R.A. 6766 and other
pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution No. 2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic
Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. In a petition dated November 20, 1989, herein petitioner Pablito V.
Sanidad, who claims to be a newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a
weekly newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 of
Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which provides: Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers.
— During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on the plebiscite day, no mass media columnist,
commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the
plebiscite issues It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is void and unconstitutional because it violates the
constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press enshrined in the Constitution.

Issue : WON the said Section 19 of resolution No 2167 is unconstitutional

Held: it is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was the power to
supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of
transportation or other public utilities, media of communication or information to the end that equal
opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public
information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured Neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor
Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to
supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite
periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise
holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of
Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis. While the limitation does not absolutely bar petitioner's freedom
of expression, it is still a restriction on his choice of the forum where he may express his view. No reason was
advanced by respondent to justify such abridgement. We hold that this form of regulation is tantamount to a
restriction of petitioner's freedom of expression for no justifiable reason. Plebiscite issues are matters of public
concern and importance. The people's right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision
would be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the issues, including the forum. The people affected
by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the
right to expression may be exercised. Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a forum for expression
but they do not guarantee full dissemination of information to the public concerned because they are limited to either
specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or television times

ADIONG v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 103956
March 31, 1992

FACTS: On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by
the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws. Section
15(a) of the resolution provides:

Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. — The following are lawful election propaganda:

(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals… Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized
posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.
Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:

Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda.

It is unlawful:…

(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether public or
private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards…

Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections assails the COMELEC’s
Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in “mobile” places like cars and other moving
vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a)
of Republic Act No. 6646.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places, public or
private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.

HELD: The petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution No. 2347 of the COMELEC
providing that “decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f)
of Section 21 hereof” is DECLARED NULL and VOID. The COMELEC’s prohibition on posting of decals and
stickers on “mobile” places whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself
is null and void on constitutional grounds. The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen’s fundamental right of free
speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the
questioned prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the
freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree
with him.

Also, the questioned prohibition premised on the statute (RA 6646) and as couched in the resolution is void for
overbreadth. The restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses
even the citizen’s private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle (The provisions allowing
regulation are so loosely worded that they include the posting of decals or stickers in the privacy of one’s living room
or bedroom.) In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be
violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without
due process of law. (The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of regulation but when this right is joined
by a “liberty” interest, the burden of justification on the part of the Government must be exceptionally convincing and
irrefutable. The burden is not met in this case.)

Additionally, the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal opportunity to inform the
electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to
Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private
vehicles. It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other
moving vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen becomes crucial in
this kind of election propaganda not the financial resources of the candidate.

In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places whether public or private except in the
authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution.

THE DIOCESE OF BACOL OD VS COMELEC (2015)

26 Nov 2017

[G.R No. 205728, January 21, 2015] Constitutional Law| Bill of Rights| Freedom of Speech| Freedom of Religion| Freedom of
Expression

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, represented by the Most Rev. Bishop Vicente Navarra
vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
On February 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within the compound of San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was
approximately 6×10 in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view.

The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No.
10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates
as either “(Anti-RH)/ Team Buhay” or “(Pro-RH)/Team Patay”.

The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the
law were classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay”:

TEAM BUHAY TEAM PATAY

Estrada, JV Angara, Juan Edgardo
Honasan, Gregorio Casiño, Teddy
Magsaysay, Mitos Cayetano, Alan Peter
Pimentel, Koko Enrile, Jackie
Trillanes, Antonio Escudero, Francis
Villar, Cynthia Hontiveros, Risa
*Party List Legarda, Loren
Party List Buhay Gabriela, Akbayan, Bayan Muna, Anak Pawis Party List Ang Pamilya
Respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, as Election Officer of Bacolod City, issued a Notice to Remove Campaign Materials addressed to
petitioner Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra, otherwise, COMELEC will be constrained to file an election offense against the
petitioners.

ISSUE:
Whether the act of the COMELEC infringes the Freedom of Religion and Freedom of Speech.

HELD:
On Freedom of Religion. As aptly argued by COMELEC, the tarpaulin, on its face, “does not convey any religious doctrine of the
Catholic church.” That the position of the Catholic church appears to coincide with the message of the tarpaulin regarding the RH Law
does not, by itself, bring the expression within the ambit of religious speech. On the contrary, the tarpaulin clearly refers to candidates
classified under “Team Patay” and “Team Buhay” according to their respective votes on the RH Law.
On Freedom of Speech. Embedded in the tarpaulin, are opinions expressed by petitioners. It is a specie of expression protected by our
fundamental law. There are several theories and schools of thought that strengthen the need to protect the basic right to freedom of
expression.
First, this relates to the right of the people to participate in public affairs, including the right to criticize government actions.
Speech that promotes dialogue on public affairs, or airs out grievances and political discontent, should thus be protected and encouraged.
Second, free speech should be encouraged under the concept of a market place of ideas.
Third, free speech involves self-expression that enhances human dignity.
Fourth, expression is a marker for group identity.
Fifth, the Bill of Rights, free speech included, is supposed to “protect individuals and minorities against majoritarian abuses
perpetrated through [the] framework [of democratic governance]. ”
Lastly, free speech must be protected under the safety valve theory. In order to avoid this situation and prevent people from resorting to
violence, there is a need for peaceful methods in making passionate dissent. Free speech must, thus, be protected as a peaceful means
of achieving one’s goal, considering the possibility that repression of nonviolent dissent may spill over to violent means just to drive a
point.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the
preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority “gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not
permitting dubious intrusions.”

The Diocese of Bacolod, Represented by the Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra
and the Bishop Himself in his Personal Capacity v. Commission on Elections and
the Election Officer of Bacolod City, Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon
GR No. 205728

SUMMARY OF THE PETITION

FACTS:

Petitioner Diocese of Bacolod is a Roman Catholic diocese and is represented in this

petition by its Bishop, the Most Rev. Vicente M. Navarra. Petitioner Bishop Navarra is
also filing this petition in his individual and personal capacity as the questioned
orders are personally directed at him and also as a concerned citizen, as the issues
raised herein are matters of paramount and transcendental importance to the public
which must be settled early given the far-reaching implications of the
unconstitutional acts of the respondents.

Named as respondents are the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and its Election
Officer of Bacolod City Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon.

On 21 February 2013, the petitioners have caused to be placed on the front wall of
the Bacolod Cathedral two sets of Tarpaulin, each sized 6x10 feet, with the
message Conscience Vote (Team Buhay/Team Patay (Team Patay Tarpaulin).
The Team Patay Tarpaulin contained the names of both Anti- and Pro-Reproductive
Health Law senatorial candidates.

In their special civil action for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, petitioners sought the nullification of the 22 February 2013 order issued by
respondent Atty. Majarucon, which orders them to remove the supposed
oversized Team Patay Tarpaulin of the Diocese of Bacolod. They also sought to nullify
the 27 February 2013 order issued by the COMELEC, through its Law Department,
which orders the immediate removal of the Team Patay Tarpaulin and threatening
the petitioner Bishop of Bacolod with the filing of an election offense if he fails to
cause its immediate removal.

On March 5, 2013, the Supreme Court En Banc issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the respondents COMELEC and Atty. Majarucon from removing the Team
Patay Tarpaulin.

ISSUES/GROUNDS:

1. Respondents’ orders directives to remove or cause the removal of the

subject Team Patay Tarpaulin are unconstitutional and void for infringing on
petitioners’ right to freedom of expression on their own private property.
2. Respondents’ orders/directives to remove or cause the removal of the
subject Team Patay Tarpaulin are unconstitutional and void for violating the
principle of separation of Church and State enshrined in Section 6 of Article II
of the 1987 Constitution.

ARGUMENTS/DISCUSSIONS:

1. The assailed Orders/Directives to remove or cause the removal of the

subject Team Patay Tarpaulin are not electoral campaign materials and that
the mention of the candidates in the infringes on the petitioners’ right to
freedom of expression on their own private property:
o the subject Team Patay Tarpaulins “are not electoral campaign
materials,” stressing that the mentioning of candidates’ name in the
second tarpaulin was merely incidental to the petitioners’ campaign
against the RH Law, which they have firmly campaigned against even
when it was just a bill being deliberated in Congress;
 o subject Team Patay Tarpaulins are “covered by the broader
constitutional guaranty of freedom of expression and of conscience
and not by the more narrow and limited election laws, rules, and
regulations”;
o petitioners “have the constitutional right to communicate their views and
beliefs by posting the subject Team Patay Tarpaulins on the Bacolod
Cathedral, a private property owned by the Diocese of Bacolod”;
o the RH Law and the candidates and party-lists running in the 2013
National Elections who supported and who opposed its passage into a law
are matters of public concern and a legitimate subject of general interest
and of discussion;
o citing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in Chavez v. PCGG (G. R. No.
130716, December 9, 1998), the petitioners’ argued that that public
concern “…embraces a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may
want to know…”
o citing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in Adiong v. COMELEC ( G. R.
No. 103956, March 31, 1992), the petitioners’ further argued that
“debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide
open.”
o the content and the message of the subject Team Patay
Tarpaulin “plainly relates to broad issues of interest to the community
especially to the members of the Catholic community” and that the
subject tarpaulin “simply conveys the position of the petitioners on the
RH bill and the public officials who supported or opposed it as it gains
relevance in the exercise of the people’s right of suffrage” in the
advent of the 2013 polls;
o considering the petitioners’ message, through the Team Patay Tarpaulin,
was a matter of public concern, the message being conveyed and the
mode used for its communication and expression to the public is entitled
to protection under the Free Expression clause of the Bill of Rights of the
1987 Constitution;
o not being candidates or political parties, the freedom of expression
curtailed by the questioned prohibition, using the logic of the Supreme
Court in Adiong v. COMELEC, is not so much that of the candidate or the
political party;
o there is no compelling and substantial State interest that is endangered
or which will be endangered by the posting of the subject Team Patay
Tarpaulin which would justify the infringement of the preferred right of
freedom of expression.
2. The assailed orders/directives to remove or cause the removal of the
subject Team Patay Tarpaulin are unconstitutional and void for violating the
principle of separation of Church and State enshrined in Section 6 of Article
II of the 1987 Constitution:
o petitioners’ petition against the RH Law “is not only a matter of exercise
of its freedom of expression and of conscience but is also a matter of
Catholic faith, morals, belief, and of duty”;
o the Diocese of Bacolod has taken on the issue of the RH Law as part of
her mission as part of its continued advocacy and obedience to the
Catholic Church’s teachings;
 o in line with what they believe to be their duty in the faith, the
petitioners have declared the RH Law as being anti-life, anti-morals, anti-
family, anti-marriage, and contrary to the teachings of the Catholic
Church. Consequently, petitioners have called on its members and
followers not to support any candidate who is anti-life, and to support
those who are pro-life;
o considering that the views and position of the petitioners on the RH Bill is
inextricably connected to its Catholic dogma, faith, and moral teachings,
the posting of the subject Team Patay Tarpaulin has already gone beyond
mere exercise of freedom of expression and of conscience, but also of the
right and privilege of the Church to propagate and spread its teachings
which should be insulated from any form of encroachment and intrusion
on the part of the State, and its agencies and officials;
o section 6 of the Article II of the 1987 Constitution monumentalizes the
principle of separation of Church and State;
o at the core of its advocacy against the RH Bill is the Gospel of Life which
is a matter of Catholic doctrine, creed and dogma;
o the petitioners believe, as a matter of faith, that in these times when
there is a great conflict between a culture of death and a culture of life,
the Church should have the courage to proclaim the culture of life for the
common good of society;
o the questioned orders are unpardonable intrusion into the affairs of the
Church and constitute serious violations of the principle of separation of
Church and State which the State and its officials, including the herein
respondents, are bound to respect, observe, and hold sacred.

PRAYER:

 Petition be given due course;

 Issue a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
restraining respondents from further proceedings in enforcing their orders for
the removal of the subject Team Patay Tarpaulin;
 Declare the questioned orders of respondents as unconstitutional and void and
permanently restrain the respondents from enforcing them or any other similar
orders; and
 Issue other reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable under the premises.

THE ISSUES TO BE ARGUED AS PER ADVISORY OF THE COURT EN BANC DATED

MARCH 12, 2013

1. Whether or not the 22 February 2013 Notice/Order by Election Officer

Majarucon and the 27 February 2013 Order by the COMELEC Law Department
are considered judgments/final orders/resolutions of the COMELEC which would
warrant a review of this Court via a Rule 65 Petition.

(a) Whether or not petitioners violated the hierarchy of courts doctrine and
jurisprudential rules governing appeals from COMELEC decisions;
 (b) Assuming arguendo that the aforementioned Orders are not considered
judgments/final orders/resolutions of the COMELEC, whether there are
exceptional circumstances which would allow this Court to take cognizance of
the case.

2. Whether or not it is relevant to determine whether the tarpaulins are “political

advertisement” or “election propaganda” considering that petitioner is not a
political candidate.
3. Whether or not the tarpaulins are a form of expression (protected speech), or
election propaganda/political advertisement.

(a) Assuming arguendo that the tarpaulins are a form of expression,

whether or not the COMELEC possesses the authority to regulate the
same.

(b) Whether or not this form of expression may be regulated.

4. Whether or not the 22 February 2013 Notice/Order by Election Officer

Majarucon and the 27 February 2013 Order by the COMELEC Law
Department violate the Constitutional principle of separation of church and
state.
5. Whether or not the action of the petitioners in posting its tarpaulin violates the
Constitutional principle of separation of church and state.

OSG COMMENT: DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, et al. vs. COMELEC, et al.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not petitioners availed of the proper remedy in assailing

respondents’ notice and letter ordering the removal of the subject tarpaulin.
2. Whether or not the assailed order and notice issued by respondents are valid
and constitutional considering that the same allegedly violate the petitioners’
right to freedom of expression and the principle of separation of Church and
State enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.

ARGUMENTS/DISCUSSION:

1. A petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
filed before this Honorable Court is not the proper remedy to question the
subject notice and letter of respondents.
o Petitioners filed the petition before the Honorable Court, claiming that
they have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to assail the
notice and letter issued by the respondents. Contrary to their claim, prior
resort to the COMELEC constitutes a plain, speedy and adequate remedy
that bars the petitioners from directly asking relief from the Honorable
Court from the alleged injurious effects of the subject letter and notice.
o In filing the instant suit, the petitioners violated the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Before a party is allowed to seek intervention of
the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the
means of administrative processes afforded him. Petitioners should have
 first brought the matter to the COMELEC En Banc or to any of its Divisions
before going directly to the Supreme Court via petition for certiorari and
prohibition.
o The letter and notice issued by the respondents are not subject to review
by the Supreme Court, as the power of the Court to review the decisions
of the COMELEC is limited only to final decisions, rulings and orders of the
COMELEC en banc rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial power (citing Ambil Jr. vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 143398 October
25, 2000). Considering that the assailed letter and notice are not final
orders of the COMELEC En Banc rendered in the exercise of its
adjudicatory and quasi-judicial functions but mere issuances of Atty.
Marjucom and the COMELEC Law Department, the same are not
reviewable by the Honorable Court but by the COMELEC itself.
o Granting that the assailed notice and letter are subject to review by the
Honorable Court, petitioners must be able to show that respondents
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the same. Petitioners have not shown facts
essential to prove that the assailed notice and letter were issued in a
“whimsical, arbitrary or capricious” manner or the abuse of discretion is
so “patent and gross” to amount to grave abuse of discretion. The
respondents issued the notice andletter pursuant to the COMELEC’s
mandate to regulate and supervise the use of mass media during election
period as embodied in the 1987 Constitution.
2. The subject tarpaulin is an election propaganda subject to regulation by
respondent COMELEC pursuant to its mandate under Section 4, Article IX-C of
the 1987 Constitution. Hence, respondent’s notice and letter ordering its
removal for being oversized are valid and constitutional.
o In furtherance of COMELEC’s mandate to supervise and regulate
elections, Congress enacted RA 9006 (the Fair Elections Act), giving the
COMELEC power to promulgate its own rules and regulations. Pursuant to
this, COMELEC promulgated Resolution 9615 (Rules and Regulations
Implementing RA 9006, in connection to the 13 May 2013 National and
Local Elections, and Subsequent Elections). Resolution 9615 defines the
following terms:
 Election Campaign or Partisan Political Activity- “an act designed to
promote the election of defeat of a particular candidate or
candidates to a public office, and shall include, among others, the
act of directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges of support for
or against any candidate”
 Political Advertisement or Election Propaganda- “ any matter
broadcasted, published, printed, displayed or exhibited, in any
medium, which contain the name, image, logo, brand, insignia,
motif, initials,and other symbol or representation, that is capable
of being associated with a candidate or a party, and is intended to
draw the attention of thepublic or a segment thereof to promote or
oppose, directly or indirectly, the election of the said candidate or
candidates to a public office”
 From the definitions, the subject tarpaulin is a form of election
propaganda subject to regulation by the COMELEC pursuant to its
mandate under Section 4, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution.

o The subject tarpaulin contains the message “CONSCIENCE VOTE” and

classifies the candidates into two groups, “Team Buhay” (with a check
mark) and “Team Patay” (with a cross mark). The check mark on “Team
Buhay” and the cross mark on “Team Patay” convey to the public that
those belonging to the “Team Buhay” should be voted while those under
“Team Patay” should be rejected. On its face, it is obvious that the
tarpaulin is petitioners’ way of endorsing those candidates who voted
against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for the said law.
Petitioner also admitted in their petition that they “have called on its
members and followers not to support any candidate who is anti-life, and
to support those who are pro-life”. These declarationsconfirm that they
put up the tarpaulin not merely to promote the Church’s position on the
RH Law but to express their support for or against the candidates listed
therein, depending on who they voted on the RH Law.
o Section 6 of Resolution 9615 sets the size limit for campaign posters to
two feet by three feet. This is also embodied in section 82 of the
Omnibus Election Code. The subject tarpaulin has the estimated size of
six feet by ten feet, which is beyond the maximum allowable size for
campaign posters for private properties. In ordering the removal of the
tarpaulin, Atty. Marjucom, in her capacity as election officer, merely
enforcedsection 6 of Resolution 9615 and section 82 of the Omnibus
Election Code. Similarly, in issuing the assailed letter, the COMELEC Law
Department only acted pursuant to COMELEC’s regulatory and supervisory
functions under the 1987 Constitution.
o Petitioners cannot claim that their right to freedom of expression has
been violated. Petitioners are completely free to express their support
for or against any candidate through the use of campaign posters and
other forms of propaganda, provided they comply with the limitations
provided by law as regards their size.
o The assailed notice and letter are not forms of censorship. The only
reason that the respondents sought the removal of the tarpaulin is that it
failed to comply with the maximum allowable size provided by law.
o Assuming that the assailed notice and letter amount to infringement of
the petitioners’ right to freedom of expression, such encroachment is
authorized by the Constitution itself. The supervisory and regulatory
powers of the COMELEC under the Constitution set to some extent a limit
on the right to free speech during the election period. By ordering the
petitioners to comply with the size requirement, the COMELEC was
exercising its supervisory and regulatory authority for the purpose of
ensuring equal opportunity for candidates for political office.
o The assailed notice and letter do not intrude into purely religious and
ecclesiastical matters. They do not seek to regulate the content the
subject tarpaulin, but only the size, which respondents found to be in
violation of Resolution 9615 and the Omnibus Election Code. On its face,
the subject tarpaulin does not convey any religious doctrine of the
 Catholic Church. Rather, it is an election propaganda. The fact that the
tarpaulin did not comply with Resolution 9615 and the Omnibus Election
Code gave respondents reason to order its removal, consistent with
COMELEC’s mandate to regulate and supervise all form of media
communication and information during election period. Thus, respondents
did not violate the principle of separation of Church and State provided in
the Constitution.

PRAYER: The Petition should be dismissed for lack of merit.

ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp v. COMELEC

ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp v. COMELEC
January 28, 2000

FACTS:

COMELEC issued a Resolution approving the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS CBN or
any other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting exit surveys. The Resolution was
issued by
the Comelec allegedly upon "information from a reliable source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has
prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections and to make an exit
survey of the vote during the elections for national officials particularly for President and Vice
President, results of which shall be broadcasted immediately.” The electoral body believed that such
project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the
National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not authorized or deputized
ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.

Two days before the elections on May 11, 1998, the Court issued the Temporary Restraining
Order prayed for by petitioner ABS-CBN. The Comelec was directed to cease and desist, until further
orders, from implementing the assailed Resolution or the restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if
any. In fact, the exit polls were actually conducted and reported by media without any difficulty or
problem.

ISSUE: W/N the Comelec, in the exercise of its powers, can absolutely ban exit polls

ABS-CBN: The holding of exit polls and the nationwide reporting of their results are valid
exercises of the freedoms of speech and of the press

LEC:

1)The issuance thereof was "pursuant to its constitutional and statutory powers to promote a clean,
honest, orderly and credible May 11, 1998 elections"; and "to protect, preserve and maintain the
secrecy and sanctity of the ballot."

2)It contends that "the conduct of exit surveys might unduly confuse and influence the voters," and
that the surveys were designed "to condition the minds of people and cause confusion as to who are
the winners and the losers in the election," which in turn may result in "violence and anarchy."
3)"exit surveys indirectly violate the constitutional principle to preserve the sanctity of the ballots," as
the "voters are lured to reveal the contents of ballots," in violation of Section 2, Article V of the
Constitution and relevant provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. It submits that the
constitutionally protected freedoms invoked by petitioner "are not immune to regulation by the State
in the legitimate exercise of its police power," such as in the present case.

4) "[p]ress freedom may be curtailed if the exercise thereof creates a clear and present danger to the
community or it has a dangerous tendency." It then contends that "an exit poll has the tendency to
sow confusion considering the randomness of selecting interviewees, which further make[s] the exit
poll highly unreliable. The probability that the results of such exit poll may not be in harmony with the
official count made by the Comelec x x x is ever present. In other words, the exit poll has a clear and
present danger of destroying the credibility and integrity of the electoral process."

SUPREME COURT: The COMELEC Resolution on exit polls ban is nullified and set aside.

1) Clear and present danger of destroying the integrity of electoral processes

Speculative and Untenable. First, by the very nature of a survey, the interviewees or
participants are selected at random, so that the results will as much as possible be representative or
reflective of the general sentiment or view of the community or group polled. Second, the survey result
is not meant to replace or be at par with the official Comelec count. It consists merely of the opinion of
the polling group as to who the electorate in general has probably voted for, based on the limited data
gathered from polled individuals. Finally, not at stake here are the credibility and the integrity of the
elections, which are exercises that are separate and independent from the exit polls. The holding and
the reporting of the results of exit polls cannot undermine those of the elections, since the former is
only part of the latter. If at all, the outcome of one can only be indicative of the other.

2) Overbroad
The Comelec's concern with the possible noncommunicative effect of exit polls -- disorder and
confusion in the voting centers -- does not justify a total ban on them. Undoubtedly, the assailed
Comelec Resolution is too broad, since its application is without qualification as to whether the polling
is disruptive or not.[44] Concededly, the Omnibus Election Code prohibits disruptive behavior around
the voting centers.[45] There is no showing, however, that exit polls or the means to interview voters
cause chaos in voting centers. Neither has any evidence been presented proving that the presence of
exit poll reporters near an election precinct tends to create disorder or confuse the voters. Moreover,
the prohibition incidentally prevents the collection of exit poll data and their use for any purpose. The
valuable information and ideas that could be derived from them, based on the voters' answers to the
survey questions will forever remain unknown and unexplored. Unless the ban is restrained,
candidates, researchers, social scientists and the electorate in general would be deprived of studies on
the impact of current events and of election-day and other factors on voters' choices.

3) Violation of Ban Secrecy

The contention of public respondent that exit polls indirectly transgress the sanctity and the
secrecy of the ballot is off-tangent to the real issue. Petitioner does not seek access to the ballots cast
by the voters. The ballot system of voting is not at issue here.

The reason behind the principle of ballot secrecy is to avoid vote buying through voter
identification. Thus, voters are prohibited from exhibiting the contents of their official ballots to other
persons, from making copies thereof, or from putting distinguishing marks thereon so as to be
identified. Also proscribed is finding out the contents of the ballots cast by particular voters or
disclosing those of disabled or illiterate voters who have been assisted. Clearly, what is forbidden is
the association of voters with their respective votes, for the purpose of assuring that the votes have
been cast in accordance with the instructions of a third party. This result cannot, however, be
achieved merely through the voters' verbal and confidential disclosure to a pollster of whom they
have voted for.

In exit polls, the contents of the official ballot are not actually exposed. Furthermore, the
revelation of whom an elector has voted for is not compulsory, but voluntary. Voters may also choose
not to reveal their identities. Indeed, narrowly tailored countermeasures may be prescribed by the
Comelec, so as to minimize or suppress incidental problems in the conduct of exit polls, without
transgressing the fundamental rights of our people.##

An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified individuals or groups of individuals for the purpose of determining
the probable result of an election by confidentially asking randomly selected voters whom they have voted for, immediately after they have
officially cast their ballots. The results of the survey are announced to the public, usually through the mass media, to give an advance overview
of how, in the opinion of the polling individuals or organizations, the electorate voted. In our electoral history, exit polls had not been resorted
to until the recent May 11, 1998 elections.