26.

)Beautifont vs CA #L-50141 29Jan1988

FACTS:

 P Aura Laboratories Inc and BeautifontInc are domestic corps engaged in manufacture
of cosmetic products and marketing/distribution of such.

 Both applied w/ Board of Investments for authority to accept permissible investments of

2 American-owned firms, Avon Products and Manila Manufacturing Co., filed in
accordance w/ RA 5455, Permissible Investments Law (requires approval by BOI of a
foreign natl in a local corp. w/c would exceed 30% outstanding capital)

 BOI prepared the notice of applications w/c was published in Official Gazette and
newspapers of GenCirc. (15d to oppose)

 Rustan Marketing Corp and Holiday Cosmetics opposed it: (1) would conflict with the
Retail Trade Nationalization Act; (2) would pose a clear and present danger of a
monopoly in the cosmetics industry; (3) would be made in an enterprise already
adequately exploited by Philippine nationals (4) were inconsistent with the Government's
Investment Priorities Plans as well as declared national policies; and (5) would not
contribute to a sound and balanced development of the national economy.

 Notice of hearing published, inviting all interested parties

 At the hearing, Rustan and Holiday (R) alleged fatal jurisdictional defect in proceedings:
violation by the BOI of Section 7 of RA 5455 in that instead of requiring and causing
publication of the applications themselves — which is what in their view the cited
provision directs — only notice thereof had actually been published and posted.

o officer of the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry also appeared to

oppose the applications

 Applications were eventually approved, Certificate of Authority issued  P accepted the

foreign equity investments and transfer of stock made.

 R filed w/ CFI Manila, petition for certiorari + preliminary injunction  later amended to
annul BOI resolution + prohibit them from approving the applications

 CFI denied the motion, filed MR but before MR resolution, R went to CA filing the same
petition for cert + PI.

 CA Issued the TRO so P went to SC, filed certiorari and PI vs CA and R

 R: administrative cognizance had been taken by the "Office of the President/Prime

Minister" of the P’s applications for authority to accept permissible investments, and
praying that because of this development, the proceedings be suspended. 
proceedings were actually suspended twice
  Pending SC ruling, Avon sought approval to find a Filipino buyer to sell 30% of its equity
to so the BOI decision can be affirmed. This was approved by Minister Tuvera and
opposed to by R as a “gratuitous conclusion” + President still waiting on NEDA
recommendation on the public hearings + reducing Avon’s holdings did not resolve the
economic issues they raised.

ISSUE:

1. WON BOI committed Gross abuse of discretion in overruling R’s objections?

 NO.

RULING:

 The legal presumption is that official duty has been duly performed

o a presumption respecting the correctness of the acts and determinations of

administrative agencies like the BOI, that the policy has been adopted for courts
not to interfere therewith unless there be a clear showing of arbitrary action or
palpable and serious error.

 Courts of justice will not generally interfere with purely administrative matters which are
addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies unless there is a clear
showing that the latter acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or when they
have acted in a capricious and whimsical manner such that their action may amount to
an excess or lack of jurisdiction

 Though prima facie, when all the facts were not yet laid out, the injunction may have
had basis, now there’s no basis for the injunction.

 Sec. 7: creates impression that actual application needs to be published, other parts of
the section make clear that it is the notice of the application that is meant to be so
published and posted.

o Sub-head or title clearly refers to Notice.

o Last sentence also mentions Notices

o Description of what’s needed: “the name of the applicant, the business in which
it is engaged or proposes to engage or invest, and such other data and
information as may be required by the Board of Investments" 
abstract/summary is what is needed (no need to itemize like this if it were the
actual application needed.

 While the notice DID leave out the business the corps are engaged in, is not serious
enough an omission to negate the notice completely
27.)Qualitrans Limousine vs. Royal Class Limousine #79886 22Nov1989

FACTS:

1. Qualitrans Limousine Service, Inc., was the grantee of a certificate of public convenience
issued by the defunct Board of Transportation to operate a "garage (tourist) air-conditioned
service" from Manila t any point in Luzon

2. A decision by the BOT amended the certificate for garage service into one for limousine
tourist service for the transportation of all outgoing passengers of the Manila International
Airport

3. A Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by private respondent with Transcare, Inc., a duly
licensed limousine service operator and likewise, a holder of a certificate of public convenience.

4. By virtue of said sale, the franchise granted to Transcare, Inc. for the use of 40 units of
tourist cars was sold to private respondent.

5. On December 27, 1985, upon application filed for the approval of aforementioned sale, an
Order was issued by the Land Transportation Commission granting a provisional permit in favor
of private respondent (Annexes C and 3, CA-G.R. SP No. 10049); Annexes B and 3 CA-G.R. No.
10370-SP). The prefatory portion thereof states: The application filed in this case is for the
approval of sale made by TRANSCARE, INC., in favor of ROYAL CLASS LIMOUSINE SERVICE of
the Certificate of Public Convenience issued in Case Nos. 81-4405 and 82-415 authorizing the
operation of a TOURIST CAR (AIR-CONDITIONED) SERVICE within the New Manila
International Airport and from said place to any point in the Island of Luzon accessible to motor
vehicle traffic and vice-versa, involving the right to operate forty (40) units authorized therein.
... (Emphasis supplied).

6. Petitioner argues that the application filed by private respondent was for the route from the
"New Manila International Airport to hotels and from said hotels to any point in Luzon
accessible to vehicular traffic and vice-versa", and not from the "New Manila International
Airport ... to any point in the Island of Luzon.”

7. Petitioner claims that respondent has been soliciting passengers from the New Manila
International Airport to transport them to any point in Luzon to the prejudice of petitioner's
business

8. Petitioner argued that the Land Transportation Commission denied them due process of law
because it advanced the time of hearing without the petitioner.

ISSUE: WON Petitioner is correct?

RULING:

The fact that Qualitrans had, meanwhile, commenced suit in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
does not oust the Commission of its jurisdiction. The Commission had a primacy of authority to
take cognizance of Royal Class 'inquiry. It is to be noted, indeed, that the very trial court, by its
order of September 8, 1986, denied the issuance of preliminary injunctive relief sought by
Qualitrans, in deference, precisely, to the Board's primal and preferential jurisdiction.

2. Of course, the Commission's action must have been preceded by due notice and hearing, and
precisely, it is Qualitrans' complaint that it had been deprived of due process for failure of the
transportation body to give it notice and hearing (in particular, of Royal Class' motion to lift
cease and desist order). The records show, however, that the decision of the Board is founded
on substantial evidence.Moreover, in administrative cases, notice" is not indispensable, but the
deprivation of opportunity to be heard. That is not the case here. The reality is that on October
1, 1986, Qualitrans opposed Royal Class' application for "declaratory relief." It cannot therefore
be heard to say that the Commission had acted without giving the petitioner an avenue to air its
side of the story.
28.)RP vs Migrino #89483 30August1990

FACTS:

Acting on information received by the New AFP Anti-Graft Board, which indicated the acquisition of
wealthbeyond his lawful income, private respondent Ret.Lt.Tecson was required by the Board to
submit hisexplanation/comment together with his supportingevidence. Private respondent was
unable to produce hissupporting evidence because they were allegedly in thecustody of his
bookkeeper who had gone abroad. TheBoard proceeded with its investigation and submittedits
resolution, recommending that private respondentbe prosecuted and tried for violation of Rep. Act
No.3019, as amended, and Rep. Act No. 1379, as amended. The case was set for preliminary
investigation by thePCGG. Private respondent moved to dismiss the caseon the following
grounds: (1) that the PCGG has no jurisdiction over his person; (2) that the action againsthim under
Rep. Act No. 1379 has already prescribed; (3)that E.O. No. 14, insofar as it suspended the
provisionsof Rep. Act No. 1379 on prescription of actions, wasinapplicable to his case; and (4) that
having retired fromthe AFP, he was now beyond the reach of Rep. Act No.3019. The Board opposed
the motion to dismiss. ThePCGG denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit.Private respondent
moved for reconsideration but wasdenied by the PCGG. Private respondent was directedto submit
his counter-affidavit and other controvertingevidence.Private respondent filed a petition for
prohibition withpreliminary injunction with the RTC. Petitioner filed amotion to dismiss and opposed
the application for theissuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on theprincipal ground that the
RTC had no jurisdiction overthe Board, citing the case of PCGG v. Pena. Privaterespondent
opposed the motion to dismiss. Petitionerreplied to the opposition. The court judge denied
petitioner’s motion to dismiss. The respondent judge granted the application for theissuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction, enjoiningpetitioners from investigating or prosecuting
privaterespondent under Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 uponthe filing of a bond in the amount of
Twenty ThousandPesos. Petitioner strongly argues that the privaterespondent’s case falls within the
jurisdiction of thePCGG. Hence, this petition.

Issues:

WON PCGG has jurisdiction over the case of privaterespondent

Ruling:

No. It will not do to cite the order of the PCGGChairman, creating the Board and authorizing it
toinvestigate the unexplained wealth and corruptpractices of AFP personnel, both retired and in
activeservice, to support the contention that PCGG has jurisdiction over the case of
private respondent

Applying the rule in statutory construction known asejusdemgeneris,the term “subordinate” as used
inE.O. Nos. 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys a closeassociation or relation with former Pres.
Marcos and/orhis wife, similar to the immediate family member,relative, and close associate in E.O.
No. 1 and the closerelative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nomineein E.O. No. 2. Clearly, this
alleged unlawfulaccumulation of wealth is not that contemplated in E.O.Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
29.) Guilles vs CA G.R. No. 77098 November 27, 1990

FACTS:

On September 2, 1980, the Director of Mines and Geo-Sciences rendered a decision declaring
and recognizing the preferential right of therein petitioner June Prill Brett to explore, develop,
exploit and lease the area covered by her "MAMAKAR" mining claims situated at SitioPalasaan,
Barrio Suyoc, Municipality of Mankayan, Benguet. This decision was appealed by private
respondents to the then Ministry of Natural Resources. On October 6, 1982, respondent Minister
of Natural Resources dismissed the appeal. From this dismissal, private respondent’s heirs of
John and Maria Guilles interposed an appeal on November 4, 1982 to the Office of the
President, docketed therein as MNR Case No. 5096, but failed to prosecute the same. Private
respondents later filed their respective motions for reconsideration which, however, proved to
be belated as the decision of respondent Minister had already become final and executory. The
finality of the decision notwithstanding, respondent Minister of Natural Resources rendered
another decision in the same MNR Case No. 5096 on June 25, 1984, reversing and setting aside
the decision of October 6, 1982 and declaring petitioner’s "MAMAKAR" claims as null and void
ab initio.

On July 25, 1984, petitioner sought the reconsideration of the decision and prayed for a status
quo order. The Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs of the Office of the Minister of Natural
Resources issued the status quo order on August 20, 1984 and directed the respondents to
answer the motion within five (5) days from receipt of the order. However, none of the
respondents complied therewith.

On July 25, 1984, petitioner sought the reconsideration of the decision and prayed for a status
quo order. The Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs of the Office of the Minister of Natural
Resources issued the status quo order on August 20, 1984 and directed the respondents to
answer the motion within five (5) days from receipt of the order. However, none of the
respondents complied therewith. On February 19, 1985, with the motion for reconsideration still
unresolved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for preliminary
injunction, before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 69937, for the nullification of the decision of
respondent Minister of Natural Resources dated June 25, 1984 and to restrain public respondent
from further proceeding in said case. Petitioner contended that respondent Minister acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in rendering said decision.

On February 27, 1985, this Court resolved to refer the case to the Court of Appeals (then
Intermediate Appellate Court) for determination. On March 7, 1985, respondent court initially
dismissed the petition for being premature inasmuch as petitioner had an unresolved motion for
reconsideration pending in the Office of the Minister of Natural Resources.

On March 27, 1985, petitioner prayed for the reconsideration of the dismissal and informed
respondent court that her motion for reconsideration had been denied by the Minister of Natural
Resources on January 31, 1985, notice of which she received only on February 25, 1985.
Petitioner also filed with this Court on March 1, 1985 an addendum to the petition giving the
same information, not knowing that said petition had been referred to respondent court.

On April 10, 1985, respondent court reconsidered its decision dismissing the petition.
Nevertheless, it thereafter ruled against petitioner, holding that petitioner failed to exhaust
administrative remedies and for which the petition must be dismissed. It cited Section 50,
Presidential Decree No. 463, as authority for its ruling, as follows:

"Sec. 50. Appeals. — Any party not satisfied with the decision or order of the Director may
within five (5) days from receipt thereof, appeal to the Secretary. Decisions of the Secretary are
likewise appealable within five (5) days from receipt thereof by the affected party to the
President of the Philippines whose decision shall be final and executory."

x x x

ISSUE:

WON the respondent Court erred in dismissing the petitioner’s original action
for certiorari on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies

RULING:

YES. It is true that in our jurisdiction, unless otherwise provided by law or required by public
interest, before bringing an action in or resorting to the courts of justice, all remedies of
administrative character affecting or determinative of the controversy at that level should first
be exhausted by the aggrieved party. It is likewise true, however, that the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule. Foremost among the
exceptions is when the assailed act, order or decision is patently illegal or was performed or
issued without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction.

In the case at bar, the SC’s opinion that the decision in question, dated June 25, 1984, is of
such a defective nature. The decision it superseded, dated October 6, 1982, was already final
and executory, the belated motions for reconsideration by all the private respondents in G.R.
No. 74223 being patently time-barred. Of course, the aforesaid heirs of John and Maria Guilles
did file a timely appeal but they likewise failed to prosecute the same. It is obvious and
indisputable, therefore, that respondent Minister Peña gravely abused his discretion in reversing
his original decision which precisely prompted June Prill Brett to forthwith invoke the jurisdiction
of the courts.

The circumstance that the June 25, 1984 decision was rendered without jurisdiction is itself
confirmed by respondent court in CA-G.R. SP No. 09349 which is the subject of our review in
G.R. No. 77098, to wit:

"The decision dated October 6, 1982 of the Minister of Natural Resources in MNR Case No. 5096
which the Heirs of Guilles received on October 25, 1982, became final on October 30, 1982
since it was not appealed to the Office of the President pursuant to Section 50 of P.D. No. 463,
which provides:

‘Sec. 50. Any party not satisfied with the decision or order of the Director may, within five (5)
days from receipt thereof, appeal to the Secretary. Decisions of the Secretary are likewise
appealable within five (5) days from receipt thereof by the affected party to the President of the
Philippines whose decision shall be final and executory. (P.D. 463)’

"Instead of pursuing their appeal in the Office of the President, the petitioners filed a belated
motion for reconsideration in the Ministry after Minister Peña had lost jurisdiction to review,
revise, or reverse his decision because it had already become final. Consequently, his amended
decision of June 25, 1984 was void for lack of jurisdiction."

Indeed, as therein petitioner June Prill Brett pointed out, the necessity of giving finality to
judgments that are not void is self-evident. The interests of society impose it. The opposing
view might make litigation more unendurable than the wrongs it is intended to redress. It would
create doubt, real or imaginary, and controversy would constantly arise as to what the
judgment or order was. Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional
errors, judgments of courts should become final and executory at some definite time fixed by
law; and this rule holds true over decisions rendered by administrative bodies exercising quasi-
judicial powers.

Going back to the subject of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, June Prill Brett’s failure
to appeal to the Office of the President from the decision of Minister Peña cannot also be
considered a violation of the rule as the latter is the alter ego of the President and, under the
doctrine of qualified political agency, his action is deemed to be that of the President.

All told, we hold that respondent court erred in dismissing June Prill Brett’s action
for certiorari for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.