Moday vs.
Court of Appeals
Petitioners: Percival Moday, Zotico Moday and Leonora Moday
Respondents: Court of Appeals, Judge Evangelisa Yuipco, and Municipality of Bunawan
Nature: Special civil action for the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals’s decision and
resolution and seeks declaration for nullity.
Facts: Moday is a private land ownet in the Bunawan, Agusan Del Sur. The Sangguniang Bayan of
the Municipality of Bunawan passed resolution No. 43-89, “Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to initiate
the expropriation of 1 hectare portion land of Percival Moday. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan
disapproved the resolution and returned it with a comment that the expropriation is unnecessary
considering that there are still available lots in Bunawan for the establishment of the Gov’t center.
Municipality files a petition for eminent domain in RTC and a motion to take the possession. RTC
granted the SB. It ruled the SPl failure to declare the resolution invalid leaves it effective. It added that the
duty of SPl id merely to review the ordinances and resoltuions passed by the SB Petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari before the CA. The latter affirmed the decision of the RTC. The Municipality had
erect 3 bldgs on the subject property namely: Assoc. of Brgy. Councils Hall, Mun. Motorpool and
Bunawan Mun. Gymnasium.
Issue: WON a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal resolution invoking
eminent domain.
Held: YES!
Ratio:
Eminent Domain, the power which the Bunawan exercised in this instant case is a fundamental state
power that is inseparable from the sovereignty. It is the government’s right to appropriate in nature of a
compulsory sale to the state, private property for public use or purpose. Provided, that there must be a just
compensation.
The Municipality’s power to exercise the right is not disputed as it is expressly provided for in BP 337,
The Local Gov’t Code in force at the time of the expropriation proceedings were initiated.
SPl disapproval of the said resolution without declaring it invalid is null and void. The law says:
Sec. 153, BP Blg. 337 grants the SPl the power to declare the municipal resolution invalid on the sole
ground that it is beyond the power of SB or Mayor to issue.
SC Ruling:
Petition denied
Masikip v. City of Pasig G.R. No. 136349, January 23, 2006
- the power of eminent domain is not inherent in LGU and must be expressly provided for by statute
FACTS:
Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land, which the City of Pasig sought to
expropriate a portion thereof for the “sports development and recreational activities” of the residents of
Barangay Caniogan. This was in January 1994. Masikip refused.
On March 23, 1994, City of Pasig sought again to expropriate said portion of land for the alleged purpose
that it was “in line with the program of the Municipal Government to provide land opportunities to
deserving poor sectors of our community.”
Petitioner protested, so City of Pasig filed with the trial court a complaint for expropriation. The Motion to
Dismiss filed by Masikip was dismissed by the rial court on the ground that there was genuine necessity to
expropriate the property. Case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed petition for lack of
merit.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N there was genuine necessity to expropriate the property
HELD:
Eminent domain is “the right of a government to take and appropriate private property to the public use,
whenever the public exigency requires it, which can be done only on condition of providing a reasonably
compensation therefor.” It is the power of the State or its instrumentalities to take private property for
public use and is inseparable from sovereignty and inherent in government.
This power is lodged in the legislative branch of government. It delegates the power thereof to the LGUs,
other public entities and public utility corporations, subject only to constitutional limitations. LGUs have
no inherent power of eminent domain and may exercise it only when expressly authorized by statute.
Sec. 19, LGC: LGU may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the
power of eminent domain for public use, purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and landless, upon
payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws.
Provided:
(1) power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously
made to the owner and such offer was not accepted;
(2) LGU may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of expropriation proceedings
and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least 15% fair market value of the property based on
the current tax declaration; and
(3) amount to be paid for expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair
market value at the time of the taking of the property
There is already an established sports development and recreational activity center at Rainforest Park in
Pasig City. Evidently, there is no “genuine necessity” to justify the expropriation. The records show that
the Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council which became the basis for the passage of
Ordinance No. 4, authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres
Compound Homeowner’s Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan.
Lagcao vs. Labra G.R. No. 155746 October 13, 2004 Eminent Domain
NOVEMBER 28, 2017
FACTS:
After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the lot only to discover that it was already
occupied by squatters. Thus a demolition order was issued. However, when the demolition order was
about to be implemented, Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote two letters] to the MTCC, requesting the
deferment of the demolition on the ground that the City was still looking for a relocation site for the
squatters. Acting on the mayors request, the MTCC issued two orders suspending the demolition for a
period of 120 days. Unfortunately for Petitioners, during the suspension period, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod (SP) of Cebu City passed a resolution which identified Lot 1029 as a socialized housing site
pursuant to RA 7279.
In this appeal, petitioners argue that Ordinance No. 1843 is unconstitutional as it sanctions the
expropriation of their property for the purpose of selling it to the squatters, an endeavor contrary to the
concept of public use contemplated in the Constitution. They allege that it will benefit only a handful of
people.
ISSUE:
What is Eminent Domain? Was this validly exercised in this case?
RULING:
It is where a local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance,
exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and
the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and
pertinent.
No, it has not been validly invoked in this case due to the fact that The foundation of the right to exercise
eminent domain should be a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of public character. Government
may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose which private property should be expropriated. In this case,
there was no showing at all why petitioners property was singled out for expropriation by the city
ordinance or what necessity impelled the particular choice or selection. Ordinance No. 1843 stated no
reason for the choice of petitioners property as the site of a socialized housing project.
It should also be noted that, as early as 1998, petitioners had already obtained a favorable judgment of
eviction against the illegal occupants of their property but Mayor Garcia requested the trial court to
suspend the demolition on the pretext that the City was still searching for a relocation site for the
squatters. However, instead of looking for a relocation site during the suspension period, the city council
suddenly enacted Ordinance No. 1843 for the expropriation of petitioners lot. It was trickery and bad faith,
pure and simple. The unconscionable manner in which the questioned ordinance was passed clearly
indicated that respondent City transgressed the Constitution, RA 7160 and RA 7279.
JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC. VS. MUNICIPALITY (NOW CITY) OF
PASIG, METRO MANILA, digested
Posted by Pius Morados on November 8, 2011
GR # 152230 August 9, 2005 (Constitutional Law – Eminent Domain, Expropriation, Valid and Definite
Offer)
FACTS: Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision of declaring respondent municipality (now
city) as having the right to expropriate petitioner’s property for the construction of an access road.
Petitioner argues that there was no valid and definite offer made before a complaint for eminent domain
was filed as the law requires (Art. 35, Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code).
Respondent contends that a letter to purchase was offered to the previous owners and the same was not
accepted.
ISSUE: Whether or not a letter to purchase is sufficient enough as a definite and valid offer to expropriate.
HELD: No. Failure to prove compliance with the mandatory requirement of a valid and definite offer will
result in the dismissal of the complaint. The purpose of the mandatory requirement to be first made to the
owner is to encourage settlements and voluntary acquisition of property needed for public purposes in
order to avoid the expense and delay of a court of action.
___________________________________________________________________________________
SAN ROQUE REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (through the Armed Forces of the Philippines), respondent.
G.R. No. 163130, September 7, 2007
Facts:
The subject parcels of land are located at Lahug, Cebu City. It was originally owned by Ismael D. Rosales,
Pantaleon Cabrera and Francisco Racaza. Subject parcels of land, together with seventeen (17) others,
were the subject of an expropriation proceeding initiated by the then Commonwealth of the Philippines
docketed as Civil Case No. 781. Judge Felix Martinez ordered the initial deposit of P9,500.00 as pre-
condition for the entry on the lands sought to be expropriated. On 14 May 1940, a Decision was rendered
condemning the parcels of land. However, the title of the subject parcel of land was not transferred to the
government.
Eventually, the land was subdivided and T.C.T. No. 11946 was cancelled and new titles were issued by
the Register of Deeds of Cebu. Two parcels covered by T.C.T. Nos. 128197 (Lot No. 933-B-3) and
128198 (Lot No. 933-B-4) were acquired by defendant-appellee. In 1995, defendant-appellee begun
construction of townhouses on the subject parcels of land.
Plaintiff-appellant filed the present case (Records, pp. 1-15) alleging that it is the owner of the subject
parcels of land by virtue of the 1938 Decision in the expropriation case, thus, T.C.T. Nos. 128197 and
128198 are null and void. It argued that defendant-appellee, had no right to possess the subject properties
because it was not its lawful owner.
In its Answer, defendant-appellee claimed that it was a buyer in good faith. It also claimed that there was
no valid expropriation because it was initiated by the executive branch without legislative approval. It also
alleged that the expropriation was never consummated because the government did not actually enter the
land nor were the owners paid any compensation.
The RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the Republic's complaint and upholding SRRDC's ownership
over the subject properties as supported by SRRDC's actual possession thereof and its unqualified title
thereto. It also found that there was no valid expropriation since the records are bereft of a showing that
consideration was paid for the subject properties.
Aggrieved, the Republic appealed the decision to the CA insisting on its absolute ownership over the
subject properties.
The CA reversed the RTC Decision on the finding that the appeal from the CFI Decision in the
expropriation case was never perfected by the original owners of the subject properties, and thus, the
expropriation of Lot No. 933 became final and binding on the original owners, and SRRDC, which merely
stepped into the latter's shoes, is similarly bound.
Issue:
WON the CA erred in holding that the (a)validity of the expropriation proceedings; (b) respondent had a
better right to the subject properties and (c) respondent is not guilty of laches
Ruling:
The CA disregarded relevant facts and ignored the evidence, noteworthy among which is that when the
Republic filed its complaint with the RTC, it alleged that the CFI Decision in Civil Case No. 781 had long
become final and executory. However, this assertion would compound the Republic’s predicament,
because the Republic could not adequately explain its failure to register its ownership over the subject
property or, at least, annotate its lien on the title. Trying to extricate itself from this quandary, the Republic
belatedly presented a copy of an Exception and Notice of Intention to Appeal dated July 9, 1940, to show
that an appeal filed by the original owners of Lot No. 933 effectively prevented the Republic from
registering its title, or even only annotating its lien, over the property.
The CA’s categorical pronouncement that the CFI Decision had become final as no appeal was perfected
by SRRDC’s predecessor-in-interest is, therefore, contradicted by the Republic’s own allegation that an
appeal had been filed by the original owners of Lot No. 933. Not only did the CA fail to resolve the issue
of the Republic’s failure to register the property in its name, it also did not give any explanation as to why
title and continuous possession of the property remained with SRRDC and its predecessors-in-interest for
fifty-six years. The CA ruling that disregards these established facts and neglects to reconcile the
contradiction mentioned above does not deserve concurrence by this Court.
In Republic v. Lim, Court emphasized that no piece of land can be finally and irrevocably taken from an
unwilling owner until compensation in paid.
Without FULL PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION, there can be no transfer of title from the
landowner to the expropriator. Thus, the Republic's failure to pay just compensation precluded the
perfection of its title over the lot sought to be expropriated. In fact, we went even further and recognized
the right of the unpaid owner to recover the property if within 5 years from the decision of the
expropriation court, the expropriator fails to effect payment of just compensation.
Time and again, we have declared that EMINENT DOMAIN cases are to be strictly construed against the
expropriator. The payment of just compensation for private property taken for public use is an
indispensable requisite for the exercise of the State's sovereign power of eminent domain. Failure to
observe this requirement renders the taking ineffectual, notwithstanding the avowed public purpose. To
disregard this limitation on the exercise of governmental power to expropriate is to ride roughshod over
private rights.
From the records of this case and our previous findings in the related case, the Republic manifestly failed
to present clear and convincing evidence of full payment of just compensation and receipt thereof by the
property owners. More importantly, if the Republic had actually made full payment of just compensation,
in the ordinary course of things, it would have led to the cancellation of title, or at least, the annotation of
the lien in favor of the government on the certificate of title.
The registration with the Registry of Deeds of the Republic's interest arising from the exercise of it's
power or eminent domain is in consonance with the Land Registration Act. There is no showing that the
Republic complied with the aforesaid registration requirement.
From the foregoing, it is clear that it was incumbent upon the Republic to cause the registration of the
subject properties in its name or record the decree of expropriation on the title. Yet, not only did the
Republic fail to register the subject properties in its name, it failed to do so for 56 years.
LACHES is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by
exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The general rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel or laches by the mistakes or errors of its
officials or agents. This rule, however, admits of exceptions. One exception is when the strict application
of the rule will defeat the effectiveness of a policy adopted to protect the public, such as the Torrens
system.
Very telling of the Republic's silence and inaction, whether intentional or by sheer negligence, is the
testimony of Infante, the Republic's witness in the proceedings before the RTC, testifying that several
surveys were conducted on a number of expropriated lots, which surveys showed that the subject lot was
still registered in the name of the original owners. As such, Infante recommended in his report that legal
action be taken. Yet despite aforesaid recommendation, title to subject lot remained registered in the name
of the original owners, ans subsequently, its transferees. This silence and unexplained inaction by the
Republic clearly constitute laches.
The trial court correctly held that title registered under the Torrens system is notice to the whole world.
Every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of its certificate of title and
the law will not oblige him to go beyond what appears on the face thereof to determine the condition of
the property.
An innocent purchaser for value is one who, relying on the certificate of title, bought the property from the
registered owner, without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in such property and pays
a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before ha has notice of the claim or
interest of some other person in the property.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED
Barangay San Roque vs Heirs of Pastor GR 138896 20 June 2000

Facts: Barangay San Roque of Talisay, Cebu filed a complaint to expropriate the property of Pator with
MTC. The MTC dismissed the Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that “The
principal cause of action is the exercise of the power of eminent domain. The fact that the action also
involves real property is merely incidental. An action for eminent domain is therefore within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.” This was then filed to RTC but was dismissed, holding
that an action for eminent domain affected title to real property; hence, the value of the property to be
expropriated would determine whether the case should be filed before the MTC or the RTC. The property
value was less than 20k and should be filed with MTC.

Issue: Whether or not eminent domain suit should be filed with MTC or RTC?

Decision: RTC. Petitioner cites Section 19 (1) of BP 129, which provides that RTCs shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction over “all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation” It argues that the present action involves the exercise of the right to eminent
domain, and that such right is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

If the nature of the principal action/remedy sought is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the
claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or
in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim.

If the nature of the principal action/remedy sought is other than the right to recover a sum of money, or
where the money claim is purely incidental to or a consequence of where the subject of the litigation may
not be estimated in terms of money, they are cognizable exclusively by CFI.

In the present case, an expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals
with the exercise by the government of its authority and right to take private property for public use.

The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of
eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends
with an order, if not of dismissal of the action.

The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of “the
just compensation for the property sought to be taken.” This is done by the Court with the assistance of not
more than three (3) commissioners.

The primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government or any of its
instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private property. Hence, the courts
determine the authority of the government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the observance of
due process. 1 In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the government’s exercise of eminent
domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.