Republic ofthe Philippines

Sandi ganb ay an
Quezon City
***

SEVENTH DIVISION

MINUTES ofthe proceedings held on 16 November 2017.

Present:
Hon. MA. THERESA DOLORES C. GOMEZ-ESTOESTA Chairperson
Hon. ZALDY V. TRESPESES Associate Justice
Hon. BAYANIH JACINTO Associate Justice^

Thefollowing resolution was adopted:

Crim, Case No.SB-17-CRM-0923-People V5. Celso G. Regencia

This resolves the following:

1. Accused Celso G. Regencia's "MOTION TO QUASH" dated

19 October 2017;^ and

2. The prosecution's "COMMENT/OPPOSITION (re: Motion

to Quash)" dated 26 October 2017.^

Before this Court is the Motion to Quash filed by accused Celso G.

Regencia(accused)premised on the following grounds:

1. The Information does not conform to the prescribed form as it

does not state the acts or omissions ofthe accused constituting
the offense and the approximate date of its commission. Thus,
the Information violates his constitutional right as an accused
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him; and

2. The officer who filed the Information had no authority to do

so.

Accused's Motion

In his motion, accused rehashes his arguments in his motion for bill of
particulars. He claims that the period stated in the Information within which
'Per Administrative Order No.284-2-17 dated 18 August 2017.
^ Rollo, Vol.2, pp. 33-40.
Ud. at 20-25.

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 Minute Resolution
People vs. Celso G. Regencia
SB-17-CRM-0923
Page 2 of8
X X

he is alleged to have committed the offense charged (i.e., "in November

2015, sometime prior or subsequent thereto") does not conform to the
prescribed form. He alleges that, as phrased, the Information includes the
entire lifetime of the accused or all of the. period in which he served as
Mayor ofIligan City.

Accused further complains that the phrase in the Information describing

the acts constituting the offense [i.e., "feloniously perform acts or functions
pertaining only to another person in authority or public officer, such as:
issuing directives and memoranda; signing checks and vouchers; and
appointing certain persons to various positions in the city government,
despite not being lawfully entitled to do so and under pretense that he has
the authority as Local Chief Executive ofIligan City, when he did not have
such authority as he was then validly incarcerated and, therefore, legally
incapacitated to perform his functions pursuant to Section 46(a) of R.A. No.
7160(Local Government Code)"] is likewise vague.

Accused claims that, meanwhile, he had issued numerous memoranda,

signed countless checks and vouchers and appointed several officials and
employees in the course of his service as Mayor ofIligan City from 30 June
2013 until the present. For this reason, he is not in a position to intelligently
formulate his defense or to respond knowingly to the Information because of
the vagueness ofthe Information.

On the second ground, accused alleges that he was absolved of the

criminal charge of Usurpation of Authority or Official Functions and the
administrative charge of Grave Misconduct in the 17 May 2016 Resolution
of the Ombudsman in OMB-M-C-15-042. Hence, Section 7, Rule III of the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman (Administrative Order
No. 7, 10 April 1990)^^ prevents him from being charged again with Grave
Misconduct and Usurpation of Official Functions.

Accused concedes that complainant Marzo filed a motion for

reconsideration of the said Resolution, and that the Ombudsman granted the

^ Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. - Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in
case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than
one month, or a fine equivalent to one month's salary, the decision shall be final, executory and
unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition
for review under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 ofthe Rules of Court, within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the Motion for
Reconsideration.
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or
removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive
suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the
suspension or removal.
A decision ofthe Office ofthe Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of
course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly enforced and
properly implemented. The refusal or failure by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of
the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure shall be a ground for
disciplinary action against said officer.

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Minute Resolution
People vs. Celso G. Regencia
SB-17-CRM-0923
Page 3 of8
X X

same in its 29 March 2017 Resolution. However, accused contends that the
said resolution only held accused guilty of grave misconduct and imposed
the penalty of removal as city mayor and perpetual disqualification to hold
public office. It did not direct or authorize the filing of a criminal charge for
usurpation of official functions or any other criminal offense against
accused. Hence, the last issuance of the Ombudsman on the criminal aspect
of OMB-M-C-15-042 was its 17 May 2016 Resolution absolving accused of
the charge of usurpation of official functions or any criminal offense.

Thus, accused concludes, there is no resolution by the officer who

conducted the preliminary investigation that authorizes the filing of a
criminal charge against the accused, contrary to the requirement of Section
4, Rule II ofthe Rules ofProcedure ofthe Ombudsman.^

Prosecution's Comment/Opposition

In its Comment/Opposition, the prosecution noted that the accused

merely rehashed the issue he had raised in his Omnibus Motion dated 31
July 2017, which was passed upon by this Court in its Resolution dated 19
September 2017.
^ Section 4. Procedure - The preliminary investigation of cases falling under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan and Regional Trial Courts shall be conducted in the manner prescribed in Section 3, Rule
112 ofthe Rules ofCourt,subject to the following provisions:
a)If the complaint is not under oath or is based only on official reports, the
investigating officer shall require the complainant or supporting witnesses to execute affidavits to
substantiate the complaints.
b) After such affidavits have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching
thereto a copy of the affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the respondents to submit,
within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits and controverting evidence with proof
of service thereof on the complainant. The complainant may file reply affidavits within ten (10) days
after service ofthe counter-affidavits.
c) If the respondent does not file a counter-affidavit, the investigating officer may consider the
comment filed by him, if any, as his answer to the complaint. In any event, the respondent shall have
access to the evidence on record.
d)No motion to dismiss shall be allowed except for lack ofjurisdiction. Neither may a motion for
a bill of particulars be entertained. If respondent desires any matter in the complainant's affidavit to be
clarified, the particularization thereof may be done at the time of clarificatory questioning in the manner
provided in paragraph (f)ofthis section.
e) If the respondents cannot be served with the order mentioned in paragraph 6 hereof, or having
been served, does not comply therewith, the complaint shall be deemed submitted for resolution on the
basis ofthe evidence on the record.
f) If, after the filing of the requisite affidavits and their supporting evidences, there are facts
material to the case which the investigating officer may need to be clarified on, he may conduct a
clarificatory hearing during which the parties shall be afforded the opportunity to be present but without
the right to examine or cross-examine the witness being questioned. >^ere the appearance ofthe parties
or witnesses is impracticable, the clarificatory questioning may be conducted in writing, whereby the
questions desired to be asked by the investigating officer or a party shall be reduced into writing and
served on the witness concerned who shall be required to answer the same in writing and under oath.
g)Upon the termination ofthe preliminary investigation, the investigating officer shall forward the
records of the case together with his resolution to the designated authorities for their appropriate action
thereon.
No information may be filed and no complaint may be dismissed without the written authority or
approval ofthe Ombudsman in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, or ofthe proper
Deputy Ombudsman in all other cases.

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 Minute Resolution
People vs. Celso G. Regencia
SB-17-CRM-0923
Page 4 of8

The prosecution thereafter claims that accused's allegation that the

officer who filed the Information had no authority to do so, is misleading. It
pointed out that the Office of the Ombudsman isSued an Order dated 6
December 2016 finding probable cause that accused committed usurpation
of authority or official functions and directing the filing ofthe corresponding
Information before the appropriate court. The prosecution further contends
that contrary to accused's claim, there is no legal requirement that the
finding of probable cause and the directive to file an Information be
embodied in a document captioned as a "Resolution" for it to be valid and
effective.

Our Ruling

We deny the motion to quash for lack of merit.

Accused's present motion is objectionable on several levels.

First, as correctly observed by the prosecution, accused's basis for his

motion (i.e., vagueness in the date/period of commission of the offense and
in the description ofthe offense for which he is charged) is a mere rehash of
the same objection to the Information that he had earlier raised in his
Omnibus Motion^ which the Court received on 4 August 2017.

The Court has already passed upon this matter in its Resolution dated
19 September 2017.^

The subject Information reads:

That, in November 2015, sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in

Iligan City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused CELSO G. REGENCIA, a high-ranking public officer, being the
Mayor of Iligan City, Philippines, in such capacity and committing the
offense in relation to office, with deliberate intent, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously perform acts or functions pertaining
only to another person in authority or public officer, such as: issuing
directives and memoranda; signing checks and vouchers; and appointing
certain persons to various positions in the city government, despite not
being lawfiilly entitled to do so and under pretense that he has the authority
as Local Chief Executive ofIligan City when he did not have such authority
as he was then validly incarcerated and, therefore, legally incapacitated to
perform his functions pursuant to Section 46(a) of R.A. No. 7160 (Local
Government Code).^

® Rolio, Vol. 1, pp, 298-304. ^

'Rollo, Vol.2, pp. 3-11. r
®/?o//o, Vol. 1, p. 1.

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Minute Resolution
People vs. Celso G. Regencia
SB-17-CRM-0923
Page 5 of8
X X

As held in our 19 September 2017 Resolution, the above Information is

valid. It sufficiently states a cause of action, and does not suffer from the
defect of vagueness imputed by the accused, thus:

The rule in seeking a bill of particulars is contained in Section 9, Rule

116 ofthe Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides:

Sec. 9. Bill of particulars. - The accused may, before

arraignment, move for a bill of particulars to enable him
properly to plead and prepare for trial. The motion shall specify
the alleged defects of the complaint or information and the
details desired.

In Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court explained that

the above rule "merely requires the information to describe the offense with
sufficient particularity as to apprise the accused of what they are being
charged with and to enable the court to pronounce judgment." The
description of the offense in the Information is sufficiently particular if
persons of ordinary intelligence may immediately know therefrom what the
charge is. If the complaint, while not very definite, nonetheless already
states a sufficient cause of action, a motion for bill of particulars will not be
granted.

In the present case, a reading of accused's own motion readily makes

it apparent that he has a clear grasp of the charge against him, including the
pertinent period when he allegedly committed usurpation of official
functions by performing acts pertaining to the local chief executive ofIligan
City when he had no authority to do so.

-Moreover, the Information did not only allege that he committed the
crime "in November 2015, sometime prior or subsequent thereto," it further
particularized that he committed the crime at the time "when he did not have
such authority as he was then validly incarcerated and, therefore, legally
incapacitated to perform his functions pursuant to Section 46(a)ofR.A. No.
7160(Local Government Code)."

Further clarity in the Information on the dates when accused allegedly

committed the charged offense might be desirable. However, it is not
necessary to comply with the requirements of due process.

We therefore rule that the Information is sufficient to enable the

accused to intelligently answer the charge and prepare for his defense.^

Second, accused violates the Omnibus Motion rule in filing the present
Motion to Quash.

Under the Omnibus Motion rule, embodied in Rule 15, Section 8, ofthe
Rules of Court, "(^) motion attacking a pleading or a proceeding shall
include all objections then available, and all objections not so included shall
be deemed waived."

Rollo, Vol. 2, pp. 7-8.

Minute Resolution
People vs. Celso G. Regencia
SB-17-CRM-0923
Page 6 of8
X X

Accused's Motion to Quash is essentially based on an objection

(vagueness of the allegations in the Information) which was already
available at the time he filed his earjier Omnibus Motion. Hence, his failure
to include his Motion to Quash the Information in his previous Omnibus
Motion results in the waiver thereof.

Third, accused contradicts himself when he filed the current Motion to

Quash after previously filing his Omnibus Motion (which includes a Motion
for Bill ofParticulars).

In Enrile v. People}^ the Supreme Court explained the difference

between a motion for a bill of particulars and a motion to quash as follows:

A bill of particulars presupposes a valid Information while a motion to

quash is a jurisdictional defect on account that the facts charged in the
Information does not constitute an offense.

xxxx

If the information does not charge an offense, then a motion to quash

is in order.

But if the information charges an offense and the averments are so

vague that the accused cannot prepare to plead or prepare for trial, then a
motion for a bill of particulars is the proper remedy.

Thus viewed, a motion to quash and a motion for a bill of particulars

are distinct and separate remedies, the latter presupposing an information
sufficient in law to charge an offense. (Footnotes omitted.)(Underscoring
supplied.)

Going back to the present case, when accused filed a motion for a bill
of particulars (as part of his August 2017 Onmibus Motion), he thereby took
the position that the subject Information is sufficient in law to charge an
offense, but that the averments therein are so vague that he could not
properly plead to prepare for trial. After admitting the Information's
sufficiency, accused now, volte-face, files the present Motion to Quash,
effectively claiming that the subject Information is invalid and does not state
a cause of action.

On the second ground for the Motion to Quash, we rule that there is
likewise no merit in accused's argument that the officer who filed the
Information had no authority to do so.

Accused's argument is based on his claim that the last issuance of the
Ombudsman on the criminal aspect of the case was its 17 May 2016

G.R. No.213455,11 August 2015. >

Y' %
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 Minute Resolution
People vs. Ceiso G. Regencia
SB-17-CRM-0923
Page 7 of8
X X

resolution absolving the accused of the usurpation charge. Since said

resolution did not direct or authorize the filing of a criminal charge for
usurpation of official functions or any other criminal offense against
accused, he concludes that the officer who filed the subject Information had
no authority to do so.

Accused's argument is misleading and baseless. The facts, as yielded

by the records and found by this Court in its 19 September 2017 Resolution,
is that:

On 17 May 2016, the Office of the Ombudsman(0MB)issued a Joint

Resolution dismissing both the criminal(OMB-M-C-15-0422 for usurpation
of official functions) and administrative (OMB-M-A-15-0514 for grave
misconduct)complaints against accused.

However, on 6 December 2016, 0MB issued an Order reversing the

criminal aspect of its Joint Resolution. It found probable cause to charge
accused with usurpation of official functions. Consequently, an Information
against the accused was filed with this Court on 21 April 2017.

Thereafter, in an Order dated 29 March 2017,0MB also reversed the

administrative aspect of its Joint Resolution, and found accused guilty of
grave misconduct, with the penalty of dismissal from service and perpetual
disqualification from government service.^'

The 29 March 2017 Resolution did not order the filing of the
Information because it only resolved the motion for reconsideration of the
administrative aspect of the charges against accused. The resolution of the
criminal aspect of the motion for reconsideration was resolved by the
Ombudsman earlier, in its 6 December 2016 Order.

Clearly, the public officer who filed the subject Information was
authorized to do so by the Order dated 6 December 2016,^^ which was duly
approved by the Ombudsman, Conchita Carpio Morales. The dispositive
portion ofthe said Order clearly read:

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of complainant is

GRANTED. Accordingly, this Office's Resolution dated 17 May 2016 is set
aside, there being probable cause against Mayor Celso 0. Regencia ofIligan
City for Usurpation of Authority or Official Functions. Let the
corresponding Information be filed before the appropriate court.

SO ORDERED.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion to Quash filed

by accused Celso G. Regencia is DENIED for lack of merit.

"Rollo, Vol. 2, p. p.4. \

Vol. 1, pp. 11-15. j
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Minute Resolution
People vs. Celso G. Regencia
SB-17-CRM-0923
Page 8 of8
X X

so ORDERED.

Approved:

GOMEZ-ESTOESTA,J., Chairperson

TRESPESES,J.

JACINTO,J.