Bixler v. Scientology: Motion To Compel Arbitration Against Jane Doe 2

Electronically FILED by Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles on 01/06/2020 07:25 PM Sherri R.
Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk of Court, by K. Hung,Deputy Clerk
SCHEPER KIM & HARRIS LLP

1 WILLIAM H. FORMAN (State Bar No. 150477)
wforman@scheperkim.com
2 DAVID C. SCHEPER (State Bar No. 120174)
dscheper@scheperkim.com
3 MARGARET E. DAYTON (State Bar No. 274353)
pdayton@scheperkim.com
4 800 West Sixth Street, 18th Floor
Los Angeles, California 90017-2701
5 Telephone: (213) 613-4655
Facsimile: (213) 613-4656
6
Attorneys for Defendants CHURCH OF
7 SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL AND
CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY CELEBRITY
8 CENTRE INTERNATIONAL
JEFFER MANGELS BUTLER & MITCHELL LLP
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10 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

11 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CENTRAL DISTRICT
12 CHRISSIE CARNELL BIXLER; CEDRIC CASE NO. 19STCV29458
BIXLER-ZAVALA; JANE DOE #1; MARIE Assigned to Hon. Steven J. Kleifield,
13 BOBETTE RIALES; and JANE DOE #2, Dept. 57
14 Plaintiffs,
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO
15 v. COMPEL RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION
AGAINST JANE DOE #2 AND FOR STAY
16 CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY OF LITIGATION; MEMORANDUM OF
INTERNATIONAL; RELIGIOUS POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
17 TECHNOLOGY CENTER; CHURCH OF SUPPORT THEREOF
SCIENTOLOGY CELEBRITY CENTRE
18 INTERNATIONAL; DAVID MISCAVIGE; [Concurrently filed with Declarations of Lynn
19 DANIEL MASTERSON; and DOES 1-25, R. Farny and Margaret Marmolejo; and
[Proposed] Order]
Defendants.
20 Hearing Date: March 25, 2020
Time: 8:30 a.m.
21 Dept.: 57
22 RESERVATION NO.: 934155920815
23 Action filed: August 22, 2019
Trial date: Not yet set
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DEFS. CSI AND CC’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AGAINST JANE DOE #2
1 TO ALL PARTIES HEREIN AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT on March 25, 2020, or as soon thereafter as the matter
3 may be heard in Department 57 of the above-entitled Court, located at 111 N. Hill Street, Los
4 Angeles, California 90012, Defendants Church of Scientology Celebrity Centre International
5 (“CC”) and Church of Scientology International (“CSI”) will and hereby do move the Court for an
6 order compelling Plaintiff Jane Doe #2 to comply with her written agreements, which require
7 Plaintiff to resolve “any dispute, claim or controversy” that may arise between them. Those
8 agreements require Plaintiff to litigate the causes of action she alleges in this lawsuit against CC and
9 CSI, if at all, through a religious arbitration. CC and CSI also seek an order staying this matter
10 pending final conclusion of those proceedings. This Motion is made pursuant to the Federal
11 Arbitration Act and California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.2, et seq., on the grounds
12 that written agreements to arbitrate the entire controversy exist and that Plaintiff Jane Doe #2 has
13 refused to arbitrate the controversy.
14 By this Notice and Motion, CC and CSI also incorporate the arguments in the Motion to
15 Compel Religious Arbitration filed this date by Defendant Religious Technology Center (“RTC”),
16 and specifically incorporate all arguments and evidence presented by RTC in its Memorandum of
17 Points and Authorities in support of its Motion to Compel Religious Arbitration.
18 This Motion will be and hereby is made on the grounds stated in the Memorandum of
19 Points and Authorities in support of this Motion, as well as the Memorandum of Points and
20 Authorities filed by RTC, the Declarations of Lynn R. Farny and Margaret Marmolejo, and
21 exhibits thereto, the pleadings and other papers filed in this action, and on such other oral and
22 documentary evidence as may be presented at the hearing on this matter.
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DATED: January 6, 2020 SCHEPER KIM & HARRIS LLP
1 WILLIAM H. FORMAN
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By: /s/ William H. Forman
4 William H. Forman
Attorneys for Defendants Church of Scientology
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International and Church of Scientology Celebrity
6 Centre International
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1 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
2
I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................9
3
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ................................................................................................9
4
A. The Defendants, and Relevant Scientology Beliefs and Practices .............................9
5
B. Plaintiff Jane Doe #2 ................................................................................................10
6
C. Allegations of Plaintiff’s Complaint ........................................................................11
7
III. THIS LAWSUIT MUST BE ORDERED TO ARBITRATION .........................................12
8
A. The FAA Controls ....................................................................................................12
9
B. The Arbitration Agreements Are Valid and Enforceable.........................................13
10
C. The Dispute Falls Within Plaintiff’s Agreements to Arbitrate.................................14
11
D. CSI May Rely On The Enrollment Agreements To Compel Arbitration ................15
12
E. The Court Must Order Arbitration ...........................................................................16
13
1. Any Question Regarding the Scope of the Agreements to Arbitrate or
14 Their Validity Must be Determined by the Eventual Arbitrators .................16
15 2. The First Amendment Protects the Scientology Ecclesiastical
Dispute Resolution Procedures and This Court May Not Impede
16 Them .............................................................................................................17
17 (a) The First Amendment Bars Any Unconscionability
Challenge ..........................................................................................17
18
(b) In Any Event, the Arbitration Provisions Are Not
19 Unconscionable ................................................................................19
20 (i) There Is No Procedural Unconscionability ..............................20
21 (ii) There Is No Substantive Unconscionability ........................... 21
22
F. This Matter Should Be Stayed .................................................................................23
23
IV. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................23
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
1
Page(s)
2
Federal Cases
3
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,
4
563 U.S. 333 (2011) .............................................................................................................. 13, 20
5
Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison,
6 520 U.S. 564 (1997) .................................................................................................................... 13
7 Church of Scientology v. City of Clearwater,

2 F.3d 1514 (11th Cir. 1993) ................................................................................................. 20, 21
8
Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc.,
9
539 U.S. 52 (2003) ...................................................................................................................... 12
10
Easterly v. Heritage Christian School, Inc.,
11 No. 1:08-cv-1714, 2009 WL 2750099 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 26, 2009) ........................................ 19, 22
12 Garcia v. Church of Scientology Flag Service Org., Inc.,

No. 8:13-cv-220-T-27TBM, 2015 WL 10844160 (M.D. Fla. Mar.13, 2015)....................... 19, 23
13
Garcia v. Church of Scientology Flag Service Org., Inc.,
14 No. 8:13-cv-220-T-27TBM, 2018 WL 3439638 (M.D. Fla. Jul. 17, 2018).......................... 18, 22
15
Gen. Conference of Evangelical Methodist Church v. Evangelical Methodist Church of Dalton,
16 Georgia, Inc.,
807 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (N.D. Ga. 2011) ................................................................................. 19, 22
17
Graves v. George Fox Univer., No. CV-06-395-S-EJL,
18 2007 WL 2363372 (D. Ida. Aug. 16, 2007) ................................................................................ 12
19 Henry Schein, Inc., v. Archer & White Sales, Inc.,
586 U.S. ---, 139 S. Ct. 524 (Jan. 8, 2019) .................................................................................. 16
20
21 Homestake Lead Co. of Mo. v. Doe Run Res. Corp.,

282 F. Supp. 2d 1131 (N.D. Cal. 2003) ...................................................................................... 15
22
Meyer v. T-Mobile USA Inc.,
23 836 F. Supp. 2d 994 (N.D. Cal. 2011) ........................................................................................ 14
24 Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n,
820 F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 2016) ........................................................................................................ 22
25
26 Ortiz v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,

52 F. Supp. 3d 1070 (E.D. Cal. 2014) ......................................................................................... 19
27
Rent-a-Center, W., Inc., v. Jackson,
28 561 U.S. 63 (2010) ...................................................................................................................... 16
5
Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,
1 426 U.S. 696 (1976) ........................................................................................................ 17, 18, 22
2
Sparling v. Hoffman Const. Co., Inc.,
3 864 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1988) ....................................................................................................... 23
4 Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria,

442 F.3d 1036 (7th Cir. 2006) ..................................................................................................... 19
5
U.S. v. Rayborn,
6 312 F.3d 229 (6th Cir. 2002) ....................................................................................................... 13
7
Watson v. Jones,
8 80 U.S. 679 (1871) ................................................................................................................ 18, 20
9 Winfrey v. Simmons Foods, Inc.,

495 F.3d 549 (8th Cir. 2007) ....................................................................................................... 22
10
State Cases
11
Alla v. Moursi,
12 680 N.W. 569 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) ......................................................................................... 19
13
Am. Software, Inc. v. Ali,
14 46 Cal. App. 4th 1386 (1996) ...................................................................................................... 21
15 Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc.,

24 Cal. 4th 83 (2000)....................................................................................................... 17, 20, 22
16
Avery v. Integrated Healthcare Holdings, Inc.,
17 218 Cal. App. 4th 50 (2013) .................................................................................................. 14, 16
18 Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc.,
19 62 Cal. 4th 1237 (2016)............................................................................................................... 20
20 BDO Seidman, LLP v. Bee,

970 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) .......................................................................................... 23
21
Buckhorn v. St. Jude Heritage Med. Grp.,
22 121 Cal. App. 4th 1401 (2004) .................................................................................................... 15
23 Calif. Grocers Ass’n v. Bank of Amer.,
24 22 Cal. App. 4th 205 (1994) ........................................................................................................ 21
25 Dial 800 v. Fesbinder,

118 Cal. App. 4th 32 (2004) ........................................................................................................ 19
26
Engalla v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc.,
27 15 Cal. 4th 951 (1997)................................................................................................................. 14
28
6
Ericksen, Arbuthnot, McCarthy, Kearny & Walsh, Inc. v. 100 Oak St.,
1 35 Cal. 3d 312 (1983) .................................................................................................................. 13
2
Erickson v. Aetna Health Plans of Calif.,
3 71 Cal. App. 4th 649 (1999) .................................................................................................. 13, 14
4 Felner v. Meritplan Ins. Co.,

6 Cal. App. 3d 540 (1970) ........................................................................................................... 17
5
Flores v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc.,
6 93 Cal. App. 4th 846 (2001) ........................................................................................................ 20
7
Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc.,
8 114 Cal. App. 4th 77 (2003) ........................................................................................................ 21
9 Jenkins v. Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church,

825 N.E. 2d 1206 (Ill. App. 2005) ........................................................................................ 19, 22
10
Khalatian v. Prime Time Shuttle, Inc.,
11 237 Cal. App. 4th 651 (2015) ................................................................................................ 12, 14
12 Nguyen v. Applied Med. Res. Corp.,
13 4 Cal. App. 5th 232 (2016) .......................................................................................................... 12
14 Rowe v. Exline,
153 Cal. App. 4th 1276 (2007) .............................................................................................. 11, 15
15
Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC,
16 61 Cal. 4th 899 (2015)................................................................................................................. 21
17 Shepard v. Edward Mackay Enterprises, Inc.,
148 Cal. App. 4th 1092 (2007) .................................................................................................... 12
18
19 Sonic–Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno,

57 Cal. 4th 1109 (2013)............................................................................................................... 20
20
Thomas v. Westlake,
21 204 Cal. App. 4th 605 (2012) ...................................................................................................... 16
22 Westra v. Marcus & Millichap Real Estate Investment Brokerage Co., Inc.,
129 Cal. App. 4th 759 (2005) ...................................................................................................... 15
23
24 Federal Statutes
25 9 U.S.C. § 2 ......................................................................................................................... 12, 13, 19
26 State Statutes
27 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 367 ................................................................................................................ 9
28
7
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1281.2(b) .................................................................................................... 13
1
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1281.4 ......................................................................................................... 23
2
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1 I. INTRODUCTION
2 Plaintiff Jane Doe #21 grew up as a member of the Church of Scientology and was a
3 practicing parishioner as an adult. As a condition of participating in Scientology religious services,
4 Plaintiff agreed in written agreements to resolve through ecclesiastical justice procedures “any
5 dispute, claim or controversy” that might arise in the future between her and the Church of
6 Scientology Celebrity Centre International. Plaintiff remained committed to practicing Scientology
7 for at least seven years after signing such agreements.
8 In 2017, Plaintiff filed a police report claiming that she had been sexually assaulted over a
9 decade earlier by Danny Masterson, who is also a practicing Scientology parishioner. Plaintiff
10 alleges that, following the report, unidentified agents of Defendants then harassed and surveilled
11 her. These malicious allegations are false, and were engineered by (and televised on) a now-
12 cancelled anti-Scientology cable show, as part of a coordinated campaign against the Church. But
13 false allegations aside, Plaintiff’s agreements prohibit her from proceeding with this lawsuit.
14 Plaintiff chose, as a condition of participation in the Church, to be bound by Church law applied
15 through the Church’s ecclesiastical dispute resolution provisions, including religious arbitration.
16 Under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) or the California Arbitration Act (“CAA”), the
17 existence of agreements to arbitrate makes arbitration compulsory. Even more importantly, under
18 the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the United States and California Constitutions the
19 Church may establish its own rules governing its relationship with its members exempt from civil
20 law. The Church’s ecclesiastical arbitration is a condition of participating in Scientology services.
21 This Court may not interfere with this condition by imposing civil rules for arbitration. The
22 Church’s arbitration agreements, as written and agreed to, must be enforced.
23 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
24 A. The Defendants, and Relevant Scientology Beliefs and Practices
25
26 1
Plaintiff’s use of “Jane Doe” is improper. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 367 (“Every action must be
27 prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, except as otherwise provided by statute.”).
There is no applicable statute.
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1 Defendant Church of Scientology International (“CSI”) is a non-profit religious
2 corporation and the “Mother Church” of the Scientology religion. [Declaration of Lynn R. Farny
3 (“Farny Dec.”), ¶ 2.] CSI is dedicated to the advancement and dissemination of the Scientology
4 religion in accordance with Scientology Scripture, consisting of the religious writings and
5 recorded spoken words of L. Ron Hubbard, the Founder of the Scientology religion, through the
6 Scientology churches and missions that are under its ecclesiastical direction. [Id.] There are
7 thousands of Scientology churches, missions and groups in more than 167 countries, including
8 throughout the United States. [Id., ¶ 3.]
9 Defendant Church of Scientology Celebrity Centre International (“CC”) is a Church of
10 Scientology located in Hollywood. The mission of CC is to minister to its parishioners, including
11 persons such as artists, politicians, leaders of industry, sports figures, and others seeking privacy
12 in the exercise of their faith. Parishioners travel to California from around the globe to participate
13 in Scientology at CC. [Declaration of Margaret Marmolejo (“Marmolejo Dec.”), ¶ 2.]
14 Scientology was founded by L. Ron Hubbard. A core tenet of the Scientology religion is
15 that parishioners and Scientology churches must resolve all disputes between each other
16 exclusively through the Scientology internal Ethics, Justice, and binding religious arbitration
17 procedures. [Farny Dec., ¶ 20.] Scientologists agree to abide by Scientology ethics and justice
18 codes as a condition for participation in the religion. [Id., ¶ 17.] Issues that arise in disputes
19 between Scientology parishioners and the Church require application of Scientology doctrine,
20 including the Church’s ethical code of conduct. Only Scientologists have the background in
21 Scientology necessary to understand and apply those doctrines. [Id., ¶¶ 20-21.] Accordingly, the
22 scripture of the religion written by its Founder mandates that “we must use Scientology … justice
23 in all our affairs.” [Id., ¶¶ 17, 20.]
24 B. Plaintiff Jane Doe #2
25 Plaintiff Jane Doe #2 became a member of the Church of Scientology when she was a
26 child. [Compl., ¶ 199.] According to the Complaint, Plaintiff became close friends with
27 Defendant Danny Masterson’s brother, Chris, and met Masterson through mutual friends and her
28 auditing at CC. [Id., ¶ 200.] Plaintiff allegedly “ceased practicing” Scientology in 2004, when she
10
1 was approximately 25-26 years old. [Id., ¶ 208; Marmolejo Dec., ¶ 10.]
2 From April 1997 into 2001, Jane Doe #2 executed at least six agreements expressing her
3 commitment to Scientology as a condition for participating in Scientology religious services (the
4 “Enrollment Agreements”), and that she was participating in such services “under the
5 ecclesiastical principles of the Scientology religion.” [Marmolejo Dec., Exs. 1-6, ¶ 5.]2 Among
6 those ecclesiastical principles is one that Plaintiff assented to many times: that “any dispute” she
7 may have with CC be resolved through a religious arbitration according to Scientology religious
8 procedures.3
9 “[I]n the event I have any dispute, claim or controversy with the Church including, but not
limited to any dispute, claim or controversy arising under this Application/Agreement or in
10 connection with my participation in the Service, which cannot be resolved informally by
direct communication, resolution of that dispute, claim or controversy may be pursued
11 solely through the internal procedures of the Church’s Ethics, Justice, and Binding
Religious Arbitration system. . . . I understand and acknowledge that the Church’s
12 religious dispute resolution procedure includes application to senior ecclesiastical bodies,
including, as necessary, final submission of the dispute to the International Justice Chief of
13 the Mother Church – Church of Scientology International – (“IJC”) or his designate.”
14 [Marmolejo Dec., Exs. 1-6, ¶ 9 (emphases added).] To effectuate a religious arbitration, Plaintiff
15 agreed to submit a request for arbitration to the IJC and designate one arbitrator to hear and
16 resolve the matter. [Id., Exs. 1-6, ¶ 9.a.] The adverse party would then designate a second
17 arbitrator and the two designated arbitrators would select a third. [Id., Exs. 1-6, ¶ 9.b.] Moreover,
18 “consistent with [her] intention that the arbitration be conducted in accordance with Scientology
19 principles of justice and fairness,” Plaintiff agreed that all such arbitrators shall be “Scientologists in
20 good standing with the Mother Church.” [Id., Exs. 1-6, ¶ 9.c.]
21 C. Allegations of Plaintiff’s Complaint
22 Plaintiff alleges that Masterson assaulted her, but does not state when. [Compl. ¶¶ 201-
23
2
24 Plaintiffs’ counsel informed Defendants of the identity of Jane Doe #2. CC located Enrollment
Agreements for Jane Doe #2 in its records. [Marmolejo Dec., ¶ 9.] Jane Doe #2’s name is redacted
25 from the Agreements submitted to the Court. Counsel for Jane Doe #2 have been provided with
unredacted copies of the Enrollment Agreements.
26
3
As discussed in more detail below, CSI, although a non-signatory to Plaintiff’s Enrollment
27 Agreement, may invoke the mandatory arbitration provisions because Plaintiff has alleged that
they are agents of the CC. See Rowe v. Exline, 153 Cal. App. 4th 1276, 1284 (2007).
28
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1 205.] Plaintiff alleges that following her reporting of Masterson’s alleged abuse to Masterson’s
2 personal assistant, “many Scientologists began to disconnect”4 from her. [Id., ¶ 210.] Plaintiff also
3 alleges that after she disclosed the alleged assault to the police, “acts of harassment, surveillance,
4 and/or stalking were carried out by or at the direction of Defendants’ employees, agents, and/or
5 representatives.” [Id., ¶ 212.] Each of the causes of action alleged by Plaintiff—stalking, invasion
6 of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress—also incorporate inaccurate descriptions of
7 Scientology religious practices, such as auditing, [id., ¶¶ 22-25] and assertions that defendants
8 “concealed information” that supposedly “could have prevented” the alleged sexual assault against
9 Plaintiff, [id., ¶¶ 232-233, 239, 245 & 252].
10 III. THIS LAWSUIT MUST BE ORDERED TO ARBITRATION
11 A. The FAA Controls
12 The FAA applies to any “contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce” that
13 contains an arbitration provision. 9 U.S.C. § 2; Khalatian v. Prime Time Shuttle, Inc., 237 Cal.
14 App. 4th 651, 657 (2015). “[T]he phrase ‘involving commerce’ in the FAA is the functional
15 equivalent of the term ‘affecting commerce,’ which is a term of art that ordinarily signals the
16 broadest permissible exercise of Congress’s commerce clause power.” Shepard v. Edward
17 Mackay Enterprises, Inc., 148 Cal. App. 4th 1092, 1097 (2007) (citing Citizens Bank v. Alafabco,
18 Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 55 (2003)). There is no requirement that all parties to an agreement be involved
19 in conduct “affecting commerce.” Nguyen v. Applied Med. Res. Corp., 4 Cal. App. 5th 232, 246
20 (2016) (sufficient nexus with interstate commerce where defendant distributed surgical products
21 worldwide, and plaintiff worked on production line for those products); see Graves v. George Fox
22 Univer., No. CV-06-395-S-EJL, 2007 WL 2363372 (D. Ida. Aug. 16, 2007) (FAA applies to
23 agreement that applies Christian Conciliation Procedures).
24 Plaintiff’s agreements with CC, and benefitting CSI, affect interstate commerce.
25 CC is a Scientology church for persons such as artists, politicians, leaders of industry, sports
26 figures, and others seeking privacy in the exercise of their faith. Parishioners travel to California
27
4
The Complaint alleges that “disconnection” is a Scientology doctrine that requires parishioners
28 to dissociate themselves with persons declared “suppressive persons.” [Compl., ¶ 139, n. 21.]
12
1 from other states and other countries to participate in Scientology services at CC. [Marmolejo
2 Decl., ¶ 2.] CSI is the Mother Church of Scientology and oversees the ecclesiastical activities of all
3 Scientology churches, organizations, and groups worldwide. [Farny Decl., ¶ 4.]
4 Although not considered business enterprises, churches can and do engage in commerce
5 within the meaning of the Constitution’s commerce clause and the FAA. “The ‘business’ or
6 ‘commerce’ of a church involves the solicitation and receipt of donations, and the provision of
7 spiritual, social, community, educational (religious or non-religious) and other charitable
8 services.” U.S. v. Rayborn, 312 F.3d 229, 233 (6th Cir. 2002); see also Camps
9 Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 584-85 (1997). Here, CC required
10 Plaintiff to execute the Enrollment Agreements as a condition for participating in Scientology
11 services. [Marmolejo Decl., ¶ 3.] In addition, the Enrollment Agreements contain provisions
12 concerning the giving and return of religious donations that are used to help fund the Church’s
13 global ministry. [Id., Exs. 1-6, ¶ 10.] The Agreements, forms of which are used by Scientology
14 churches throughout the United States, contain additional terms, conditions, and covenants, which
15 manage and govern the way in which Scientology churches deliver Scientology services to
16 parishioners throughout the country and the world. The FAA governs.
17 B. The Arbitration Agreements Are Valid and Enforceable

The FAA provides that an agreement to arbitrate a dispute is “valid, irrevocable, and
18
19 enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
20 contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. The FAA reflects an “emphatic” and “liberal” federal policy in favor of
21 arbitration. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). Any “doubts concerning the
22 scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.” Ericksen, Arbuthnot,
23 McCarthy, Kearny & Walsh, Inc. v. 100 Oak St., 35 Cal. 3d 312, 320 (1983) (applying FAA).
The California Arbitration Act (“CAA”) is similar, requiring that arbitration provisions
24
25 “shall” be enforced, unless certain limited exceptions apply. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1281.2(b).
26 “California law incorporates many of the basic policy objectives contained in the FAA, including a
27 presumption in favor of arbitrability.” Erickson v. Aetna Health Plans of Calif., 71 Cal. App. 4th
28 649, 655 (1999). “Thus, even in non-FAA cases, courts ‘are guided by the rule that, contractual
13
1 arbitration being a favored method for resolving disputes, every intendment will be indulged to
2 give effect to such proceedings.’” Id.
3 A party seeking to compel arbitration meets its burden by “proving the existence of a valid
4 arbitration agreement by the preponderance of the evidence[.]” Engalla v. Permanente Med. Grp.,
5 Inc., 15 Cal. 4th 951, 972 (1997); see also Avery v. Integrated Healthcare Holdings, Inc., 218 Cal.
6 App. 4th 50, 59 (2013) (analyzing issue under both the FAA and CAA). Here, CC has met its
7 burden of establishing that there exist valid arbitration agreements with Plaintiff that require her to
8 resolve her disputes with CC through a religious arbitration. Plaintiff’s signatures on her
9 Enrollment Agreements with CC are properly authenticated. [Marmolejo Dec., ¶ 9.]
10 C. The Dispute Falls Within Plaintiff’s Agreements to Arbitrate
11 Plaintiff agreed in her Enrollment Agreements to arbitrate “any dispute, claim or
12 controversy with the Church. . . .” [Id., Exs. 1-6, ¶ 9 (emphasis added).] The word, “any” means just
13 that.5 Thus, all of Plaintiff’s claims are to be arbitrated. It does not matter that Plaintiff’s claims
14 sound in tort or statute. Agreements to arbitrate “all” or “any” claims cover such claims. Such
15 “[b]road arbitration clauses” “are consistently interpreted as applying to extra-contractual disputes
16 between the contracting parties.” Khalatian, 237 Cal. App. 4th at 660. Similarly, “contractual
17 arbitration agreements are equally applicable to statutory claims as to other types of common law
18 claims.” Meyer v. T-Mobile USA Inc., 836 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1004 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
19 Plaintiff may argue that her claims arose after she disclosed the assault to the LAPD in
20 2017, but such an argument is neither true, in light of how Plaintiff pled her claims, nor of any
21 legal significance. Plaintiff’s claims incorporate by reference all previous allegations into each and
22 every claim and cause of action, which include allegations of traumatic experiences occurring
23 while Plaintiff was a parishioner, and that Defendants conspired to cover-up and obstruct justice of
24 these events. These alleged events of trauma specifically include the assault by Masterson, which
25 Plaintiff asserts Defendants conspired to hide and “could have prevented,” [Compl., ¶¶ 229-233,
26 239, 245, 252], her fear that fellow parishioners would “disconnect” from her if she did report the
27
5
Definition 1b of Any: “EVERY—used to indicate one selected without restriction.” See
28 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/any.
14
1 assault, [id., ¶ 207], and supposed disconnection by fellow Scientologists after she spoke with
2 Masterson’s personal assistant about the assault, [id., ¶ 210].
3 Furthermore, it is irrelevant that some of the alleged tortious conduct occurred after
4 Plaintiff left the Church. Plaintiff agreed to arbitrate any dispute that may arise with CC, clearly
5 intending that the agreement apply to future disputes. Plaintiff is bound by her agreements. See
6 Buckhorn v. St. Jude Heritage Med. Grp., 121 Cal. App. 4th 1401, 1407 (2004) (reversing denial
7 of petition to arbitrate where agreement provided for arbitration and plaintiff’s claims for
8 defamation were based on events occurring after termination of agreement); Homestake Lead Co.
9 of Mo. v. Doe Run Res. Corp., 282 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1140 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (holding that where
10 an arbitration clause “fixes no temporal boundaries to its application,” it covers disputes that arose
11 from events occurring after termination of agreement).
12 D. CSI May Rely On The Enrollment Agreements To Compel Arbitration
13 CC is a signatory to Enrollment Agreements and may enforce the arbitration provisions.
14 Moreover, CSI also may compel arbitration based on Plaintiff’s Enrollment Agreements even
15 though CSI did not sign the Agreements. “California courts [recognize] that a nonsignatory sued
16 as an agent of a signatory may enforce an arbitration agreement.” Rowe v. Exline, 153 Cal. App.
17 4th 1276, 1284 (2007) (emphasis added). The allegation that a non-signatory defendant is the
18 agent6 of a signatory estops a plaintiff from arguing that the non-signatory cannot invoke
19 arbitration. In Westra v. Marcus & Millichap Real Estate Investment Brokerage Co., Inc., 129 Cal.
20 App. 4th 759, 767 (2005), the Court of Appeal reversed a trial court’s denial of a non-signatory
21 defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, holding that an allegation of agency entitled the non-
22 signatories to arbitration: “[Plaintiffs] even alleged [non-signatory defendant] was an ‘agent’ of
23 [signatory defendant], . . . These allegations in [plaintiffs’] pleading constitute judicial admissions
24 that [non-signatory defendant] was acting as the agent of the signatory parties.”) (emphasis in
25 original). Jane Doe #2 alleges that CC and CSI acted in concert with one another, and that “each of
26 the aforementioned Defendants lent aid and encouragement and knowingly financed, ratified,
27
6
CC and CSI deny that they are agents of each other or of any other defendant. This argument
28 rests on Plaintiff’s allegation that the defendants are agents of each other.
15
1 and/or adopted the acts of the other.” [Compl. ¶ 231.] Throughout the Complaint, Plaintiff refers
2 to CC and CSI collectively, does not differentiate the conduct of each entity, and alleges each
3 cause of action against “defendants.” [Compl. at p. 4, n.1 (referring to CC, CSI, and RTC
4 collectively as the “Institutional Defendants” throughout the Complaint); id., at pp. 38-45; id. ¶¶
5 236, 242 (asserting liability against “defendants and their agents”).] Plaintiff even alleges that each
6 Doe Defendant was an agent of CC, CSI, and RTC. [Id. ¶ 12.] Thus, even as a non-signatory, CSI
7 may enforce the arbitration agreement against Plaintiff. See Thomas v. Westlake, 204 Cal. App.
8 4th 605, 614–15 (2012) (“a plaintiff’s allegations of an agency relationship among defendants is
9 sufficient to allow the alleged agents to invoke the benefit of an arbitration agreement executed by
10 their principal even though the agents are not parties to the agreement.”).
11 E. The Court Must Order Arbitration

1. Any Question Regarding the Scope of the Agreements to Arbitrate or
12
Their Validity Must be Determined by the Eventual Arbitrators
13
14 To avoid arbitration, Plaintiff may argue that her Enrollment Agreements are
15 unenforceable. Plaintiff has the burden of establishing a defense to enforcement of the Enrollment
16 Agreements. See Avery, 218 Cal. App. 4th at 59. Given the parties’ expressed intention that any
17 dispute between them be resolved by religious arbitration, the threshold questions of invalidity and
18 scope are to be determined by the ecclesiastical arbitrators, not the Court.
19 Validity: In Rent-a-Center, W., Inc., v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010), the Court held that
20 where a party challenges an entire agreement as invalid, rather than challenging just the provision
21 to arbitrate, the arbitrator, not the court, is to determine the question of validity. Plaintiff here
22 expressed the wish that disputes between her and CC (and CSI and RTC) be resolved through
23 ecclesiastical dispute resolution agreements. If her argument now is that those agreements are
24 invalid as a whole (due to unconscionability, duress, or whatever theory she alleges), this Court’s
25 analysis stops here. Plaintiff agreed to arbitrate in her Enrollment Agreements. Any argument that
26 the agreements as a whole are invalid must be resolved through Church justice procedures.
27 Scope: In Henry Schein, Inc., v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 586 U.S. ---, 139 S. Ct. 524
28 (Jan. 8, 2019), a unanimous Supreme Court reversed a lower court’s denial of a motion to arbitrate
16
1 based on a finding that the party seeking arbitration proffered a “wholly groundless” reading of the
2 scope of the arbitration agreement to include arbitration. The Court held that, “[i]f a valid
3 agreement exists, and if the agreement delegates the arbitrability issue to an arbitrator, a court may
4 not decide the arbitrability issue.” Id. at 530.
5 The parties made clear that the civil courts were to have no say in determining whether
6 claims asserted against CC (and by extension CSI) were arbitrable. Plaintiff affirmed that “any
7 dispute, claim or controversy” she has shall be “pursued solely through the internal procedures of
8 the Church’s Ethics, Justice, and Binding Religious Arbitration system.” [Marmolejo Dec., Exs. 1-
9 6, ¶ 9 (emphasis added).] Because the parties made clear that there would be no recourse to civil
10 courts for their disputes, the Court cannot adjudicate the scope of the arbitration agreements.7
11 2. The First Amendment Protects the Scientology Ecclesiastical Dispute
12 Resolution Procedures and This Court May Not Impede Them
13 Alternatively, Plaintiff might instead seek to avoid arbitration of her claims by limiting her
14 challenge to the enforceability of the arbitration provisions. But such a challenge will fail.
15 (a) The First Amendment Bars Any Unconscionability Challenge
16 As a preliminary matter, the doctrine of “unconscionability,” as articulated by the
17 California Supreme Court in review of commercial employment agreements in Armendariz v.
18 Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 113 (2000), does not apply to this dispute.
19 The Free Exercise and Establishment clauses of the First Amendment, and similar provisions of
20 the California Constitution, prohibit this Court from imposing civil concepts of due process when
21 adjudicating disputes between a church and its members. Rather, a church’s procedures for
22 addressing such disputes are all but unreviewable. In Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v.
23 Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976), the United States Supreme Court articulated that the First
24 Amendment affords a church nearly unreviewable latitude in deciding internal disputes among
25 factions or members. The Court dismissed an action brought by a bishop challenging his removal
26
27 7
Under state law, the rule is the same. Questions regarding the agreement’s scope “are for the
arbitrators and not for the court to resolve.” Felner v. Meritplan Ins. Co., 6 Cal. App. 3d 540, 543
28 (1970).
17
1 because the church failed to comply with church laws and regulations. The First Amendment
2 “permit[s] hierarchical religious organizations to establish their own rules and regulations for
3 internal discipline and government, and to create tribunals for adjudicating disputes over these
4 matters.” 426 U.S. at 724. “Constitutional concepts of due process, involving secular notions
5 of ‘fundamental fairness’ or impermissible objectives, are . . . hardly relevant to such
6 matters of ecclesiastical cognizance.” Id., 715 (emphasis added). So too here. The only
7 permissible inquiry is what the Church of Scientology and Plaintiff agreed to. This Court may not
8 impose its own notions of “fairness” in deciding whether Plaintiff’s agreements with the Church
9 are fair or right. To do so would interfere with a church’s rules over its members, which is clearly
10 forbidden by Serbian Eastern Orthodox. See also Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 729-31 (1871)
11 (holding that civil courts may not exercise supervision over how a church generally chooses to
12 admit members and govern its relations with members).8
13 Accordingly, courts may not dictate to churches the terms upon which they accept
14 members. In Garcia v. Church of Scientology Flag Service Org., Inc., No. 8:13-cv-220-T-27TBM,
15 2018 WL 3439638 (M.D. Fla. Jul. 17, 2018) (“Garcia II”), a federal district court denied a
16 challenge to an arbitration conducted under the internal procedures of the Church’s Ethics, Justice,
17 and Binding Religious Arbitration system referenced in Plaintiff’s Agreement. The Garcia
18 plaintiffs’ due process objections to Scientology justice procedures could not trump the Church’s
19 First Amendment right to internal governance. Id., at *4 (“While [plaintiffs] may disagree with
20 how the arbitration was conducted their arguments raise secular notions of due process. And the
21 Free Exercise Clause prohibits this Court from resolving their disputes concerning the
22 interpretation or application of Scientology doctrine.”) Courts, therefore, routinely uphold
23 religious arbitration agreements requiring resolution of disputes in ecclesiastical courts under
24 faith-based procedures, regardless of whether those procedures conform to notions of civil due
25 8
“All who unite themselves to [a church] do so with an implied consent to [its] government, and
26 are bound to submit to it. … We cannot decide who ought to be members of the church. …
[W]hen they became members they did so upon the condition of continuing or not as they and
27 their churches might determine, and they thereby submit to the ecclesiastical power and cannot
now invoke the supervisory power of the civil tribunals.” Watson, 80 U.S. at 729-31.
28
18
1 process.9
2 All the foregoing cases treat religious arbitration agreements as unremarkable. But despite
3 the matter-of-fact treatment, none of these decisions would have been possible had the courts
4 imposed civil strictures of arbitration. Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1037
5 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Federal courts are secular agencies. They therefore do not exercise jurisdiction
6 over the internal affairs of religious organizations.”). “Secular notions of due process” (Garcia II)
7 have no place in review of Plaintiff’s agreements with CC. Plaintiff’s signatures on the agreements
8 mean ecclesiastical arbitration must proceed.
9 (b) In Any Event, the Arbitration Provisions Are Not
10 Unconscionable
11 Even if this Court were to engage in an unconscionability analysis, the facts show that the
12 ecclesiastical procedures used by CC (and CSI) fall well within the bounds of acceptable
13 ecclesiastical arbitration, and thus may not be set aside as “unconscionable.” See Garcia v.
14 Church of Scientology Flag Service Org., Inc., No. 8:13-cv-220-T-27TBM, 2015 WL 10844160, at
15 *2, *12 (M.D. Fla. Mar.13, 2015) (“Garcia I”) (finding the Church arbitration provisions
16 enforceable, and specifically rejecting arguments of procedural and substantive unconscionability).
17 Under the FAA, an arbitration agreement is “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
18 such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. This
19 savings clause in Section 2 of the FAA “permits agreements to arbitrate to be invalidated by
20
9
See, e.g., Dial 800 v. Fesbinder, 118 Cal. App. 4th 32, 50 (2004) (affirming enforceability of
21
judgment to be rendered in religious arbitration where arbitrators were rabbis and decision would
22 be based on Jewish law); Ortiz v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 3d 1070 (E.D. Cal. 2014)
(enforcing employer/employee arbitration under the Institute for Christian Conciliation’s Rules of
23 Procedure for Christian Conciliation); Gen. Conference of Evangelical Methodist Church v.
Evangelical Methodist Church of Dalton, Georgia, Inc., 807 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1294 (N.D. Ga.
24 2011) (enforcing church rules that “believers should resolve disputes among themselves or within
25 the Church wherever possible,” and “by means of Christian conciliation, mediation or
arbitration”); Easterly v. Heritage Christian School, Inc., No. 1:08-cv-1714, 2009 WL 2750099, at
26 *1 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 26, 2009) (teachers at Christian school agreed to resolution of differences by
“following the biblical pattern of Matthew 18:15-17,” and waived right to file lawsuit); Jenkins v.
27 Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church, 825 N.E. 2d 1206, 1212-13 (Ill. App. 2005) (enforcing
Lutheran Church doctrine mandating church-based arbitration of disputes); Alla v. Moursi, 680
28 N.W. 569 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (confirming arbitration award under Islamic law).
19
1 generally applicable contact defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, but not by
2 defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact an agreement to
3 arbitrate is at issue.” Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1742-43. Under California law, an arbitration
4 clause may be unenforceable if it is unconscionable. Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc., 62 Cal. 4th 1237,
5 1243 (2016); Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 113. However, to succeed on such a claim, a litigant must
6 show both procedural and substantive unconscionability. Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 114.
7 i. There Is No Procedural Unconscionability
8 The Enrollment Agreements survive procedural unconscionability review. To be
9 procedurally unconscionable, elements of “oppression” or “surprise” must be present. See
10 Baltazar, 62 Cal. 4th at 1243; Sonic–Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 57 Cal. 4th 1109, 1133 (2013).
11 “Oppression arises from an inequality of bargaining power that results in no real negotiation and
12 an absence of meaningful choice. Surprise involves the extent to which the supposedly agreed-
13 upon terms are hidden in a prolix printed form drafted by the party seeking to enforce them.”
14 Flores v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc., 93 Cal. App. 4th 846, 853 (2001).
15 Neither are present here. As to “oppression,” the concept of “no meaningful choice” may
16 make sense in a consumer context, but it has no bearing when an individual seeks religious
17 services. Plaintiff here expressed that she “voluntarily applie[d] to participate in Religious
18 Services” and she “desire[d] to participate in Scientology services” being “fully aware that these
19 are religious services” and that she was “participating in them under the ecclesiastical principles of
20 the Scientology religion.” [Marmolejo Decl., Exs. 1-6, at ¶ 5.] Neither CC nor CSI is a public
21 accommodation, a common carrier, or a secular employer. They have a constitutional right to
22 accept or reject members on whatever basis they wish. They may also impose conditions upon
23 membership free from government intrusion. See fn. 8, supra (quoting Watson, 80 U.S. at 729-31);
24 see also Church of Scientology v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1514, 1544 (11th Cir. 1993) (striking
25 down city ordinance requiring a church to disclose to its members expenditures from donations:
26 “The City may not intervene on behalf of such dissidents. If they remain dissatisfied with the
27 church’s voluntarily assumed disclosure policy then they may attempt to reform that policy from
28 within, they may acquiesce in the policy despite their objections or they may leave the church.”).
20
1 Thus, the concept of oppression bears little on review of a decision to participate as a
2 member of a church. Plaintiff chose repeatedly to participate in Scientology services. Plaintiff
3 participated in Scientology services from childhood to at least the age of 25. While Plaintiff may
4 no longer consider herself a Scientologist, the conscionability of the agreements she made to
5 pursue her religious desires is measured at the time she made those commitments. Am. Software,
6 Inc. v. Ali, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1386, 1391 (1996) (“[t]he critical juncture for determining whether a
7 contract is unconscionable is the moment when it is entered into by both parties—not whether it is
8 unconscionable in light of subsequent events.”). Plaintiff therefore repeatedly read, assented to,
9 and experienced the terms of her Agreements with the Church. This Court is in no position to
10 question whether the terms established by CC for Plaintiff to participate in religious services were
11 “procedurally” improper.
12 “Surprise” is also not at issue here. Plaintiff’s Enrollment Agreements set forth a dispute
13 resolution and arbitration system founded on the religious principles of Scientology. From 1997
14 into 2001, Plaintiff executed no less than six Enrollment Agreements containing religious
15 arbitration dispute resolution provisions. [Marmolejo Dec., Exs. 1-6, at ¶ 9.] Therefore Plaintiff
16 knew about and agreed to abide by Scientology’s dispute resolution system as a condition of her
17 participation in the religion. Having assented to that system repeatedly and then participated in
18 Scientology religious services over many years, Plaintiff can hardly claim surprise.
19 ii. There Is No Substantive Unconscionability
20 In typical civil or commercial cases, “substantive unconscionability focuses on whether the
21 provision is overly harsh or one-sided and is shown if the disputed provision of the contract falls
22 outside the ‘reasonable expectations’ of the non-drafting party or is ‘unduly oppressive.’”
23 Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc., 114 Cal. App. 4th 77, 88 (2003). “A contract term,” including an
24 arbitration provision, “is not substantively unconscionable when it merely gives one side a greater
25 benefit; rather, the term must be ‘so one-sided as to “shock the conscience.” ’ ” Sanchez v. Valencia
26 Holding Co., LLC, 61 Cal. 4th 899, 935 (2015). A substantively unconscionable agreement also
27 has been described as one that “no man in his sense and not under delusion would make on the one
28 hand, and no honest and fair man would accept on the other.” Calif. Grocers Ass’n v. Bank of
21
1 Amer., 22 Cal. App. 4th 205, 214 (1994). The California Supreme Court in Armendariz, articulated
2 a test for assessing substantive unconscionability in arbitration provisions of secular commercial
3 employment agreements, establishing “minimum requirements” such as neutral arbitrators, more
4 than minimal discovery, mutuality, and badges of substantive due process. 24 Cal. 4th at 113.
5 Imposition of the Armendariz tests for substantive unconscionability is wholly
6 inappropriate in this context. Armendariz and its progeny concern arbitration provisions in
7 commercial employment contracts. Plaintiff was clearly not an employee of CC. More importantly,
8 as shown above, civil law standards of fairness may not serve to abrogate the conditions a church
9 imposes in selecting members. See Serbian E. Orthodox, 426 U.S. at 715, 724, supra.
10 Moreover, while Plaintiff might insinuate that she cannot expect a fair hearing before a
11 panel of Scientologists, her supposed fear of partiality does not make a term unconscionable.
12 Garcia II, 2018 WL 3439638, at *6 (currently on appeal) (“to the extent . . . [plaintiffs] challenge
13 the partiality of the arbitrators because of their standing with the Church [of Scientology], they
14 agreed to inherent partiality in their agreements”) (citing Winfrey v. Simmons Foods, Inc., 495 F.3d
15 549, 551 (8th Cir. 2007)); see also Gen. Conf. of Evangelical Methodist Church, 807 F. Supp. 2d
16 at 1294-95, 1301 (enforcing arbitration provision that called for panel of church arbitrators: “The
17 Supreme Court has repeatedly counseled that [under] the FAA ... courts should not presume,
18 absent concrete proof to the contrary, that arbitration systems will be unfair or biased”); Easterly,
19 2001 WL 2750099 (rejecting claims that arbitrators would be inherently biased because of their
20 religious beliefs and affiliations); Jenkins, 825 N.E.2d at 1214 (2005) (rejecting partiality argument
21 based on fact that “the dispute resolution procedure calls for arbitrators who are either members or
22 employees of the [defendant] Synod,” because “Plaintiff has not pointed to any specific prejudice
23 he would suffer under the bylaws, but only a generalized fear of partiality. This anxiety is
24 insufficient to overturn the LCMS arbitration process.”). Plaintiff chose to have her disputes—any
25 disputes—heard by Church members. Plaintiff cannot now claim unfairness based on partiality
26 when any such partiality was inherent in her choice of arbitrators. Nat’l Football League Mgmt.
27 Council v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 820 F.3d 527, 532, 548 (2d Cir. 2016)
28 (“arbitration is a matter of contract, and consequently, the parties to an arbitration can ask for no
22
1 more impartiality than inheres in the method they have chosen”); see also BDO Seidman, LLP v.
2 Bee, 970 So. 2d 869, 873, 875 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (upholding arbitration clause in partnership
3 clause of accounting firm requiring arbitrators to be partners of firm).
4 Finally, the procedures are fair by any standard. As the Garcia I court noted, the arbitration
5 clauses in Plaintiff’s Enrollment Agreements “include the essential terms of an enforceable
6 arbitration agreement”: They describe how Plaintiff is to initiate dispute resolution (first through
7 informal means, then through a request for arbitration to the IJC); identify the matters to be
8 arbitrated (“any dispute”); describe the selection and number of arbitrators (Plaintiff designates
9 one, the Church another, and those two designate a third); identify the qualifications of the
10 arbitrators (Scientologists in good standing), and provide that arbitration is binding. See Garcia I,
11 2015 WL 10844160, *2, 8, and Exs. 1-6, ¶ 9. The arbitration provisions are mutually binding and
12 impose no arbitration fee on Plaintiff. In short, there is no reason not to enforce Plaintiff’s multiple
13 arbitration agreements.
14 F. This Matter Should Be Stayed
15 As here, when all of a plaintiff’s claims against a defendant are subject to an arbitration
16 agreement, the court must compel arbitration and stay the suit. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1281.4;
17 Sparling v. Hoffman Const. Co., Inc., 864 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988) (district court has
18 discretion to dismiss or stay action where all claims were subject to arbitration). Accordingly, CSI
19 and CC request that the Court stay the proceedings until the matter of arbitration is resolved in
20 accordance with the Court’s order, and if that order compels arbitration, stay the proceedings until
21 that arbitration is complete. See id.
22 IV. CONCLUSION
23 CSI and CC respectfully request the Court stay this case and order Plaintiff to pursue her
24 claims through Scientology internal Ethics, Justice, and binding religious arbitration procedures.
25
26
27
28
23
DATED: January 6, 2020 SCHEPER KIM & HARRIS LLP
1
WILLIAM H. FORMAN
2
By: /s/ William S. Forman
3 William H. Forman
Attorneys for Defendants Church of Scientology
4
International and Celebrity Centre International
5
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
24
SERVICE LIST
1 Chrissie Carnell Bixler v. Church of Scientology International
LASC Case No. 19STCV29458
2
SERVED VIA E-SERVICE AND U.S. MAIL Attorneys for Plaintiffs CHRISSIE
3 Robert W. Thompson CARNELL BIXLER; CEDRIC BIXLER-
Kristen A. Vierhaus ZAVALA; JANE DOE #1; MARIE
4 THOMPSON LAW OFFICES BOBETTE RIALES and JANE DOE #2
700 Airport Boulevard, Suite 160
5 Burlingame, CA 94010
Telephone: 650-513-6111
6 Facsimile: 650-513-6071
Emails: bobby@tlopc.com
7 kris@tlopc.com
8 ATTORNEYS NOT ADMITTED TO THE

CALIFORNIA BAR – SERVED VIA MAIL
9 ONLY AS A COURTESY
10 Brian D. Kent
Gaetano D’Andrea
11 M. Stewart Ryan
Helen L. Fitzpatrick
12 Lauren Stram
LAFFEY BUCCI & KENT LLP
13 1435 Walnut Street, Suite 700
Philadelphia, PA 19102
14 Telephone: 215-399-9255
Facsimile: 215-241-8700
15
Jeffrey P. Fritz
16 SOLOFF & ZERVANOS PC
1525 Locust Street, 8th Floor
17 Philadelphia, PA 19102
Telephone: 215-732-2260
18 Facsimile: 215-732-2289
19 Marci Hamilton
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
20 Fox-Fels Building
3814 Walnut Street
21 Philadelphia, PA 19104
Telephone: 215-353-8984
22 Facsimile: 215-493-1094
23 Ricardo M. Martinez-Cid
Lea P. Bucciero
24 PODHURST ORSECK P A
One S.E. 3rd Avenue, Suite 2300
25 Miami, FL 33131
Telephone: 305-358-2800
26 Facsimile: 301-358-2382
27
28
26
SERVED VIA E-SERVICE AND U.S. MAIL Attorneys for Defendant RELIGIOUS
1 Robert E. Mangels TECHNOLOGY CENTER
Matthew D. Hinks
2 Iman G. Wilson
JEFFER MANGELS BUTLER
3 & MITCHELL LLP
1900 Avenue of the Stars, 7th Floor
4 Los Angeles, California 90067-4308
Telephone: 310-203-8080
5 Facsimile: 310-203-0567
Emails: rmangels@jmbm.com
6 mhinks@jmbm.com
iwilson@jmbm.com
7
8 SERVED VIA E-SERVICE AND U.S. MAIL Specially-Appearing Attorneys for Defendant
Jeffrey K. Riffer DAVID MISCAVIGE
9 ELKINS KALT WEINTRAUB REUBEN
GARTSIDE LLP
10 10345 West Olympic Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90064
11 Telephone: 310-746-4400
Facsimile: 310-746-4499
12 Email: jriffer@elkinskalt.com
13
SERVED VIA E-SERVICE AND U.S. MAIL Attorneys for Defendant Daniel Masterson
14 Andrew B. Brettler
LAVELY & SINGER PROFESSIONAL
15 CORPORATION
2049 Century Park E 2400
16 Los Angeles, CA 90067
Telephone: 310-556-3501
17 Facsimile: 310-556-3615
Email: abrettler@lavelysinger.com
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
27
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Bixler v. Scientology: Motion To Compel Arbitration Against Jane Doe 2

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Bixler v. Scientology: Motion To Compel Arbitration Against Jane Doe 2

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Electronically FILED by Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles on 01/06/2020 07:25 PM Sherri R.

Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk of Court, by K. Hung,Deputy Clerk

SCHEPER KIM & HARRIS LLP

10 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

4 Angeles, California 90012, Defendants Church of Scientology Celebrity Centre International

13 refused to arbitrate the controversy.

17 Points and Authorities in support of its Motion to Compel Religious Arbitration.

22 documentary evidence as may be presented at the hearing on this matter.

7 Church of Scientology v. City of Clearwater,

12 Garcia v. Church of Scientology Flag Service Org., Inc.,

21 Homestake Lead Co. of Mo. v. Doe Run Res. Corp.,

26 Ortiz v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,

4 Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria,

9 Winfrey v. Simmons Foods, Inc.,

15 Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc.,

19 62 Cal. 4th 1237 (2016)............................................................................................................... 20

20 BDO Seidman, LLP v. Bee,

24 22 Cal. App. 4th 205 (1994) ........................................................................................................ 21

25 Dial 800 v. Fesbinder,

4 Felner v. Meritplan Ins. Co.,

9 Jenkins v. Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church,

13 4 Cal. App. 5th 232 (2016) .......................................................................................................... 12

19 Sonic–Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno,

25 9 U.S.C. § 2 ......................................................................................................................... 12, 13, 19

27 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 367 ................................................................................................................ 9

3 practicing parishioner as an adult. As a condition of participating in Scientology religious services,

6 Scientology Celebrity Centre International. Plaintiff remained committed to practicing Scientology

7 for at least seven years after signing such agreements.

20 law. The Church’s ecclesiastical arbitration is a condition of participating in Scientology services.

22 Church’s arbitration agreements, as written and agreed to, must be enforced.

23 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

24 A. The Defendants, and Relevant Scientology Beliefs and Practices

8 throughout the United States. [Id., ¶ 3.]

9 Defendant Church of Scientology Celebrity Centre International (“CC”) is a Church of

10 Scientology located in Hollywood. The mission of CC is to minister to its parishioners, including

13 in Scientology at CC. [Declaration of Margaret Marmolejo (“Marmolejo Dec.”), ¶ 2.]

23 in all our affairs.” [Id., ¶¶ 17, 20.]

24 B. Plaintiff Jane Doe #2

3 commitment to Scientology as a condition for participating in Scientology religious services (the

21 C. Allegations of Plaintiff’s Complaint

6 of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress—also incorporate inaccurate descriptions of

9 Plaintiff, [id., ¶¶ 232-233, 239, 245 & 252].

10 III. THIS LAWSUIT MUST BE ORDERED TO ARBITRATION

11 A. The FAA Controls

16 broadest permissible exercise of Congress’s commerce clause power.” Shepard v. Edward

23 agreement that applies Christian Conciliation Procedures).

3 Scientology churches, organizations, and groups worldwide. [Farny Decl., ¶ 4.]

7 spiritual, social, community, educational (religious or non-religious) and other charitable

10 Plaintiff to execute the Enrollment Agreements as a condition for participating in Scientology

17 B. The Arbitration Agreements Are Valid and Enforceable

22 scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.” Ericksen, Arbuthnot,

2 give effect to such proceedings.’” Id.

9 Enrollment Agreements with CC are properly authenticated. [Marmolejo Dec., ¶ 9.]

10 C. The Dispute Falls Within Plaintiff’s Agreements to Arbitrate

11 Plaintiff agreed in her Enrollment Agreements to arbitrate “any dispute, claim or

15 “[b]road arbitration clauses” “are consistently interpreted as applying to extra-contractual disputes

2 Masterson’s personal assistant about the assault, [id., ¶ 210].

11 from events occurring after termination of agreement).

12 D. CSI May Rely On The Enrollment Agreements To Compel Arbitration

13 CC is a signatory to Enrollment Agreements and may enforce the arbitration provisions.

22 signatories to arbitration: “[Plaintiffs] even alleged [non-signatory defendant] was an ‘agent’ of

23 [signatory defendant], . . . These allegations in [plaintiffs’] pleading constitute judicial admissions

11 E. The Court Must Order Arbitration